Conceptualising and Measuring Power: A Brief Introduction
David Marsh (IGPA)
In the past Political Scientists, who were mostly pluralists, were more likely to talk of
influence than power, and, following Robert Dahl, suggest that an individual/interest group
has influence over the government in so far as it/she can make the government do something
it wouldn’t otherwise have done. The key point here is that Dahl, like most other Political
Scientists, thought that power was manifested in the influence that groups had over
government policy, although he argued that, empirically, power in advanced liberal
democracies like the US was diffuse, not concentrated; the classical pluralist position.
This rather simplistic view of power was increasingly questioned.
In particular, some
political scientists argued that there were other ‘faces of power’, which didn’t involve
individuals or groups directly influencing policy decisions. Lukes (1974) identified three
faces of power. The first face involves decision making; here; an individual, or a group, has
influence over a government decision to the extent that they persuade the government to do
something it initially didn’t intend to do. The second face of power involves agenda setting;
here, a group has influence by controlling the agenda, so that some policy options are not
considered. A good example here would be UK agricultural policy between the 1930s and
the 1980s. During this period, there was a tight institutional link, often called a policy
community, between the Government, specifically the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and
Fisheries (MAFF), and the farmers, specifically the National Farmers’ Union (NFU).
Basically, this policy community negotiated about the level of production and state subsidies
in an Annual Price Review. However, there was clear agreement between both parties on the
broad policy, which was to grant farmers high subsidies in order to ensure high production.
To put it another way, the policy options were constrained by a consensus about the boundary
of the policy agenda.
The idea of a third face of power proved even more contentious. The argument was that the
whole debate about policy occurred within a social, cultural, economic, political and
institutional framework which favoured some interests over others.
This position was
radical, and often Marxist, and rested to a significant extent on the contested idea of ‘real
interests’. Here, citizens, especially disadvantaged citizens, are seen as socialised into a
partial, even ‘false’, view of their own interests, a view which serves the interests of those
who are powerful. So, as an example, it might be argued that, in patriarchal societies, women
are socialised into accepting gender roles which constrain their opportunities.
This view has something in common with the post-structuralism of Foucault (1980) or Laclau
and Mouffe (1985). Foucault suggests that power is everywhere; it is exercised without
intention. In his view, power works through, rather than on, people. So, a particular belief
system, or discourse, becomes powerful as more people come to accept the particular values
and beliefs associated with it. If the discourse is dominant, then different ideas become
virtually unthinkable and a particular way of viewing the world, and of acting, becomes
normal and right, while alternatives become deviant and wrong. At the same time, particular
figures of authority, for example, priests or doctors, are legitimised, even defined, by these
discourses. However, these discourses aren’t fixed, they are constantly contested and, in a
sense, it is resistance to the dominant discourse that defines power. Obviously, Foucault’s
work is rich and complex, but here the main point is that he would see power as inscribed in
institutions, process and discourse, not as exercised by individuals or groups. At the same
time, unlike Lukes, he does not see dominant belief systems as reflecting or forwarding, real,
that is objective and material, interests.
In the longer reading given you, Akram, Emerson and I (2015) examine how Foucault and
Bourdieu (1977) might be used to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the third
face of power. In particular, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus offers a conceptualisation of the
way in which agents can be influenced in ways of which they are unware, thus positing a preco0nscious realm.
Of course, the idea of different faces of power has clear methodological implications. If one
focuses on the first face of power, this involves studying the outcomes of public policy
decisions in the light of the prior commitments of government and the representations of
interest groups. From this perspective, power would be concentrated to the extent that one
group, or a limited number of groups, could consistently persuade government to take an
action it initially opposed. However, if one acknowledge the importance of agenda-setting,
then one might argue that a group like the NFU could consistency lose out in discussions of
detailed policies with government, but still exercise power because the agenda is set in a way
which forwards their interests. Here, the empirical focus would be on the extent to which the
broader agenda has remained relatively constant over time and whose interest that agenda
serves. Focusing on either the third face of power, using a Bourdieusian perspective, or on a
post-structuralist perspective like Foucault’s, presents much greater methodological problems
because here one needs to establish the nature and development of the belief system(s) and
the contestations between them. Similarly, to defend a notion of real interest, it is crucial to
show that a dominant belief system exists which forwards particular interests and, often
unknown to them, manipulate the views and interests of others.
In my view, if we are studying power, we have to acknowledge that it is inscribed in
institutions and processes, as well as exercised by individuals. From this perspective, agents,
whether individuals or groups, attempt to influence policy outcomes, but they do so on a
strategic terrain which is not a level playing field. So, in Australia there is structured
inequality which affects, but doesn’t determine, the influence individuals and groups have.
Consequently, we need to examine the structural and ideational terrain as well the policy
processes.
Bibliography
Bourdieu, P. (1977), Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Foucault, M. Power/knowledge, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1980.
Laclua, E. and Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and socialist strategy. London, Verso, 1985.
Lukes, S (1974, 2005), Power: A Radical View. 2nd Ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.