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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
Psychology III Distinction essay by John Furedy, 1961
(marked by J.D. Keehn)
A later version of this paper was given as a talk in 1963. (The Scientific Status of
Psychoanalysis. N.S.W. Group of the Australian Branch of the British Psychological Society,
May 1963).
The claim of psychoanalysis to a scientific status has been upheld both its
originator (6, 30) and by his followers, including such “modern” analysis as Fliess (8,
ix, xx). If this claim is just one, it follows that psychoanalysis and scientific
psychology should be “formally” identical, in that propositions they assert should
themselves have the same logical status; it does not follow that they should be
identical, or even compatible, in content (i.e., that which is asserted by their
respective propositions), so that such assertions as Eysenck’s that psychoanalytic
theories are “far fetched” (4, 238), or Jastrow’s that they are “unnatural (13, 157), are
irrelevant to the claim of psychoanalysis to being accepted as a since, in the
methodological or “formal” sense of the word. Moreover, while conceding that
psychoanalysis “is primarily a way of treating people (12, 4), it seems advisable for
our purposes to followed Sears and consider it only as a system of “concepts (2, vii)
or propositions, since its therapeutic value is only indirectly related to its scientific
status.
It seems to me, that while it is well-nigh impossible to give an entirely
satisfactory definition of the term “since”, Bergmann has stated on essential feature
when he says that “the crucial test is the possibility of prediction”, without which
characteristic “its [the theory’s] claim to be scientific … should be dismissed without a
hearing” (2, 218). From this it follows than the propositions asserted by such a
theory should be of such form as to enable them to be readily falsified by certain
conceivable observations and this in turn implies, if not logically, then at least
pragmatically, that they be stated in quantified terms.
Closely related to this characteristic are a number of attitudes associated with
the methods of science. The first of these is the spirit of doubt (26, 104), that
skeptical outlook which leads scientists to “demand the credentials” of, and
investigate rival hypotheses for, even the most accepted of their theories. The
second, which might be called the “eppu si muove” spirit, is the one which refuses to
submit to any authority and maintains that the truth or falsity of such statements as
“the earth moves around the sun”, should be investigated quite independently of he
who makes them, be he even as eminent as the famous Aristotle. The third and that
which is least recognized in this “practical” age, is the spirit of disinterestedness, the
spirit which enabled the Greeks to create the sciences of astronomy, geometry and
arithmetic from the Egyptian crafts of astrology, surveying and logistics, and which
caused Poincare more than 2000 years later to assert that science, to be a science,
“must be science for science’s sake” (18, 16).
There have been a number of reasons given for not accepting psychoanalysis
as a sconce which seems to me to be quite unjustified. Thus we have that class of
critics who commit the “content” fallacy of, to use Fliess’s expression, the “naïve
observer” (8, xiv). Under this class we might include (beside the comments of
Eysenck and Jastrow’s given above) such examples as the ethical (naivety” of Lynch,
when he abuses Freud for his “prurient imagination” (15, 256) and the
methodological “naivety” of Feiblemnan, when he dismisses the concept of the basis
importance of early sexual development by the facile verdict that “the absurdity of
such a theory does not require dwelling upon” (6, 314). Again, there are others who
would dismiss psychoanalysis on metaphysical grounds, forgetting the science is
metaphysically neutral. Examples of this are Feiblmenan's “realist” assertion that
“the fact that realism is a valid metaphysical position and nominalism an invalid one
would seem … to disprove the scientific claims of psychoanalysis” (6, 308), and
Flew’s “materialist” preconceptions in dismissing the Freudian unconscious
processes as psychological explanations, on the grounds that they are “not
sufficiently substantial” (7, 143). Finally there are the bombastic exaggerators such
as Eysenck, who, saying that its assertion are too vague to be tested, compares
psychoanalysis to “biblical prophecy” (4, 233), blatantly ignoring the fact that Freud
himself tested and found wanting his earlier hypothesis that hysteria was invariably
caused by an earlier actually physical seduction (16, 340).
However Eysenck’s comment, like most gross exaggerations, is only partly
unjustified. For it is undeniable that such concepts as “inhibited aggress” (6, 311)
and reaction formation make the predictive power (and consequently the possibility of
being falsified) of most psychoanalytic propositions very week indeed. And when,
added to this, we consider how completely unquantifiable are such aeteological
factors as Oedipus complex, anal fixation, etc., Freud’s own admission that, while “it
is always possible by analysis (i.e., post diction) to recognize the causation with
certainly”, a “predication of it (the causation) by synthesis is impossible (10, 227),
cannot be lightly dismissed as a momentary aberration form scientific principles, but
must be considered as indicative of the anti-predictive nature of far too many
propositions of psychoanalysis.
In any case, while it is true that Freud, after a number of observations,
rejected the physical seduction hypothesis for the symbolic and/or physical one, this
sort of “self-contained” (4, 232) hypothesis testing, which refuses to consider any
asexual explanations 9these being outside the Feudian system) of hysteria, such as
9for example) Eysenck’s inhibition concept, cannot be said to be in accord with the
skeptical spirit of science which was mentioned above. This is why Sears, in
concluding his empirical study of “the scientific status of the Freudian concepts (22,
vii), says that “further analysis of psychoanalytic concepts … may be relatively
fruitless as long as these concepts rest in the theoretical framework of
psychoanalysis (22, 147).
Again, when Freud says, in effect, that no proposition made by an unanalyzed
person about psychoanalysis should be considered seriously 9(9, 9304), we can
hardly maintain that this sort of appeal to the qualifications of the proposition-maker
is compatible with the “eppru si muove” spirit of science. As to the strength of the
spirit of disinterestedness in psychoanalysis, it is not surprising that it is so feeble,
when we remember that psychoanalysis if primarily a therapeutic tool. Indeed
Toulmin is not far wrong when he says that “therapeutic failure is as fatal to an
explanation in psychoanalysis as predictive failure is to an explanation ins physics
(25, 138).
This “practical” element is one of the most important factors in making he
term “scientific psychoanalysis” seem at times to be almost sefl0contradictory.
Another important factor is the enormous personal influence of Freud himself, if we
accept Boring’s description of the early psychoanalytic movements as “a personal
school centered on Freud and a group of loyal disciples (3, 707). as essentially
correct. And indeed, when finds an “authorized (sic) translation” of the “New
Introductory Lectures”, it would seem that Boring’s term “disciples” is a well chosen
one and that Landis’s assertion, the trainee analyst “must believe or else” (1, 27), is
not such a great exaggeration after all.
Thus, while it would be too much to say that all psychoanalytic concepts are
unscientific, it must be admitted, that at present there are too many anti-scientific
elements in psychoanalysis for it to deserve a fully scientific status. This conclusion
however, in no way implies that these elements can never be eliminated and even if
this is the case, it does not therefore follow that psychoanalysis is “no good”. The
label “scientific”, despite our twentieth century prejudices, has no ethical or pragmatic
connotations in the strict sense of the word. Psychoanalysis, even it if is completely
unscientific, may still be the best way of curing neurotics.
QUESTIONS FOR DISCCUSSION
1. Is there a “science” (i.e., a constant methodology) of a science (16, 27) as
S.S. Stevens holds, or is Ruth Munroe more correct when she says that “we
cannot blueprint the needs of science in logical terms” (17, 23) and that
psychology, being a “lower system” (17, 25) should stop aping physics
“beyond what is quite appropriate to its (i.e., psychology) own needs” (17,
23)?
2. Is Feiblau justified in his assertion that “the ahistorical character of science is
one of the most notable things about it” (6, 312)?
Keehn’s comments (for this teacher who was at Sydney only during the year of 1961,
see http://www.psych.utoronto.ca/users/furedy/Papers/ob/keehn4.doc ) on the essay:
Mr. Furedy,
In this connection it is not really enough to talk about the form of the propositions
used in the theory –=more important to examine the terms of the positions. Are they
the names of things or processes which could occur, or whose occurrence could be
observed, or are they “magical powers”? Really you only approach this question on
p. 3 middle para. This consideration really shows that science is not “metaphysically
neutral”—it is anti-metaphysical.
The other main issue about scientific status is whether the methods of investigation
conform to orthodox canons of empirical research (repeatable, etc.), and you make
relevant points here.
Is “anal fixation” any more unquantifiable than any other psychological concept?
Fixation is clearly a quantitative concept in Freud’s view—technique of quantification
(scales etc) are completely lacking, but I should think some reasonable attempt at
constructing them could be made (has in fact).
Grade: AREFERENCES
1. Alexander, F., Boring, E., Sachs, H., Landis, G., Brown, J., Willoughby, R.,
Symonds, P, Murray, H., Frenkel-Brunsiwick, E, shanow, D.
Symposium:Pyschoanalysis as seen by analysed psychologists. J. Abn
Psychol, 1940, 35, 3-55, 139-211, 305-325.
2. Bergman, G. On some methodological problems of psychology. Philos of
Science, 1940, 7, 205-19.
3. Boring, E. A history of experimental psychology, NY, 1950.
4. Eysenck, H. Sense and nonsense in psychology, 1957
5. _______ What is the truth about psychoanalysis?
1960, 52-57.
Reader’s Digest, Feb,
6. Feiblemann, J. Revival of realism. Univ. of North Carolina, 1946.
7. Felw, A. psychoanalytic explanation.
Macdonald, Oxford, 1954.
Philosophy and Analysis, ed. M.
8. Flies, R., ed. The psychoanalytic reader. London, 1958.
9. Fredu, S. New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. NY, 1933
10. ---------- Collected papers, vol 11, London, 1933
11. Hilgard Theories of Learning. NY, 1948
12. ---------- Psychoanalysis as a science in Kubie & Windin, eds
13. Jastrow, J. The house that Freud built. London, 1933
14. Karpman, B. Objective psychotherapy. J. Clin Psych, 1949, 193-336.
15. Luynch, A. Science: leading and misleading. London, 1927.
16. March, M. (ed) Psychological Theory: contemporary Readings, NY, 1951.
17. Munroe, R. Schools of psychoanalytic thought. NY, 1959
18. Poincare, H. Science and method. London, 1914.
19. Radcliffe-Brown, A. A natural science of society. Illinois, 1957.
20. Russel, B. The scientific outlook. London, 1934.
21. Saltey, A The case against psychoanalysis. NY 1952
22. Sears, R. Survey of objective studies of psychoanalytic concepts. Social
Science Research Council Bulletin No. 51
23. Spence, K. Behavior theory and conditioning. New Haven, 1956
24. Standon, A. Science is a sacred cow. NY, 1952
25. Tolmin, S. The logical status of psychoanalysis. Philosophy and Analysis, ed.
W. Macdonald, Oxford, 1953.
26. Wootton, B. Testament for a social science. London, 1950.