5
Possible Ethnic Revolution Or Insurgency In A Predatory
Unitary Hindu State, Nepal
Krishna B. Bhattachan
xfd|f dfG%] s]fxL klg dGqL, ;f+;b gePsfn] hlt sfd u/] klg
xfdLn] d'No gkfpg] /x]%f}+, z]kf{ hflts} dGqL / ;f+;b ePsf]
eP xfd|f] klg s]xL x"g ;SYof] .
ælxp+ lrt"jfÆ cf*= l/tf
z]kf{
-sflGtk"/,
;]K^]Da/
28,
1998_
"Whatever work we do we do not get the credit we deserve because we
do not have our ministers, members of Parliament, something could
have happened if there were Sherpa minister and MP."
"Snow Leopard" Ang Rita Sherpa
Kantipur, September 28, 1998.
Introduction
The twentieth century, according to Migdal (1974:226) has been "the
century of peasant revolution" and the coming twenty-first century,
according to Huntington (1997), shall be a century of "clash of
civilizations and the remaking of the world order." Fortunately or
unfortunately, Nepal did not witness a peasant or any other revolution till
now. Does it mean that there would be no ethnic
conflicts/clashes/insurgencies or social conflicts or a revolution in Nepal
in the twenty-first century? We know, following Piven and Cloward
(1979:xi), that "popular insurgency does not proceed by someone else's
rules or hopes; it has its own logic and direction. It flows from historically
specific circumstances: it is a reaction against those circumstances, and it
is also limited, by those circumstances."
I have used the term "ethnic conflict," following Brown (1993:4), to
refer to "a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural, or
territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities." Similarly, I
have used the term social conflict, following Lewis A. Coser (1956:8), as
a "struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in
which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their
rivals." Also, the term "revolution" means more than a "rapid, basic
transformations of a society's state and class structures" "accompanied and
in part carried through by class-based revolts from below," as stated by
Skocpol (1979:4). It actually means a sudden total change in the rules of
the political, economic, social and ideological games. I do not use the term
“predatory” as defined by Deepak Lal (1988) and Margaret Levi (1988) to
refer to “revenue maximizing” states. Peter Evans (1989:562) defines the
term "predatory" as “those who control the state apparatus ... without any
more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the
welfare of its society.” He is of the view that predatory states are not
developmental states. I have used the term "predatory state” to that multicultural state where only one caste/ethnicity, language, culture, religion
and region sits in the driving seat and dominates over others.
The main political changes that have occurred after the territorial
unification of Nepal in 1769, include the Kot Massacre ("Kot Parba") in
1846, fall of the 104-year old autocratic Rana regime in 1951, imposition
of autocratic partyless Panchayat political system in 1960 and
reinstatement of multi-party democracy in 1990. The pattern of political
demands by organized groups appears to have been repeating every ten
years for the last six-seven decades. Although, Nepali political leaders and
historians exaggerate political change of 1951 as a "revolution" it was,
however, never close to revolutions such as the English revolution of
1640, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789,
the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese Revolution of 1949.
These revolutions, according to Skocpol (1979:3), have "transformed state
organizations, class structures, and dominant ideologies." In our case, the
basic pattern has never changed.
Loss of meaning is characteristic feature of the Nepali society.
136
Negotiating the Resumption
Therefore, loss of meaning of the term 'revolution" is not really a surprise
for the Nepali people. So far, whatever types, magnitude and intensity of
political changes have occurred in Nepal in the past under any brand of
political system - be it during the 104-year autocratic family regime of the
Ranas or be it in the authoritarian partyless Panchayat rule - all such
changes revolved around the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris only; it has never
passed beyond their inner circles. This is exactly why none of the political
transformation has really changed the brutal fact that majority of the total
population of Nepal comprising indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits,
Madhesis, Muslims and Christians remain suppressed, oppressed,
depressed, exploited, subjugated and discriminated by the ruling Bahuns
and Chhetris.
Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of the Gorkha imperialism and
internal colonialism, succeeded in his mission by using Sam, Dam, Danda
and Bhed (“policy, money, punishment and divide & rule”). The ruling
Bahuns and Chhetris, on the one hand, never become tired of parroting the
myth of peaceful co-existence of caste and ethnic groups since time
immemorial. Indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits and Madhesis, on the other
hand, have never attempted in the past to stage any revolution or
insurgency but now, though lately, they are beginning to simmer their
strong dissatisfaction against the suppressive and oppressive rule by the
Bahuns and Chhetris.
I have divided this paper in three parts: (1) theories of
revolutions/insurgencies, (2) real and possible insurgencies in Nepal, and
(3) some contentious issues.
Theories of Revolutions/Insurgencies
I believe that a review of literature on revolution and collective actions
provides a frame for comparative understanding of such phenomena in
Nepal. Also, we can see how close or how far we are from revolutions and
insurgencies that had already occurred elsewhere.
There are six major families of social-scientific theories of revolutions:
Marxist theories represented by Karl Marx, aggregate-psychological
theories by Ted Gurr, systems/value consensus theories by Chalmers
Johnson, and political-conflict theories by Charles Tilly, structural theories
by Theda Skocpol, and political process theories represented by Dough
McAdam. Johnson (1982:170) has identified four basic groups: actororiented theories, structural theories, conjunction theories, and process
theories.
Marxist theories are based on the assumption that class is the prime
137
movers of change, including revolutions. According to Karl Marx, "At a
certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of
society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or-what
is but a legal expression for the same thing-with the property relations
within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development
of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins
an epoch of social revolution" (Marx 1859). Ted Gurr developed
aggregate-psychological theory first in his book Why Men Rebel?
According to him "The potential for collective violence varies strongly
with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation (RD) among members
of a collectivity." Likewise "The intensity of RD varies strongly with the
average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectations and
value capabilities" (Gurr 1971:360). Chalmers Johnson (1982) developed
the systems/value consensus theory of revolution. He writes, "Accelerators
- that is, the precipitating causes of a revolution - are thus events or
ideological beliefs that make revolution possible by exposing the inability
of the elite to maintain its monopoly of force"(Johnson 1982:101).
In the political-conflict theory developed by Charles Tilly (1978:52),
two models, namely, polity model and mobilization model, are identified.
Polity model comprises of government, contender, polity and coalition.
Mobilization model comprises interests, organization, mobilization, and
collective action (Tilly 1978:54). Theda Skocpol (1979) believes that
revolutions are not made; they come. In her non-voluntarist, structural
theory of social revolution, Skocpol has identified two main causes of
revolutions: (a) old-regime states in crisis or political crisis due to
monarchy/dominant class, agrarian economy and international pressures
and (b) peasant insurrection based on agrarian class structure and local
politics. McAdam has developed a political process theory that identifies
three sets of factors responsible for insurgencies. According to him, "The
first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population; the
second, the collective assessment of the prospects for successful
insurgency within that same population; and third, the political alignment
of groups within the larger political environment" (McAdam 1982:40).
Thus structure of political opportunities, indigenous organizational
strength as revealed by members, established structure of solidarity
incentives, communication network and leaders, and cognitive liberation
are the three important factors.
Neither actor-oriented nor structural theories really help to understand
the underlying causes and dynamics of revolutions and insurgencies. I
believe that the Marxists best analyze the class-based revolutions or
insurgencies but ethnic-based revolutions or insurgencies are best
138
Negotiating the Resumption
explained by political process theories.
Jack A. Goldstone (1986:2-5) has listed ten law-like empirical
generalizations on the basis of the observations on the "natural history" of
revolution around the world. These are as follows:
1.
"Prior to a revolution, the bulk of the "intellectuals" - journalists,
poets, playwrights, essayists, teachers, members of the clergy,
lawyers, and trained members of the bureaucracy-cease to support
the regime, write condemnations, and demand major reforms."
2. "Just prior to the fall of the old regime, the state attempts to meet
criticism by undertaking major reforms."
3. "The actual fall of the regime begins with an acute political crisis
brought on by the government's inability to deal with some
economic, military, or political problem rather than by the action
of a revolutionary opposition.
4. Even where revolutionaries have united solidly against the old
regime, following its collapse, their internal conflicts eventually
cause problems."
5. "The first group to seize the reins of state are moderate reformers."
6. "While the moderates seek to reconstruct rule on the basis of
moderate reform and often employ organizational forms left over
from the old regime, alternative, more radical centers of mass
mobilization spring up with new forms of organization."
7. "The great changes in the organization and ruling ideology of a
society that follow successful revolutions occur not when old
regime first falls, but when the radical, alternative, massmobilizing organizations succeed in supplanting the moderates."
8. "The disorder brought by the revolution and the implementation of
radical control usually results in forced imposition of order by
coercive rule."
9. "The struggles between radicals and moderates and between
defenders of the revolution and external enemies frequently allow
military leaders to move from obscurity to commanding, even
absolute, leadership."
10. "The radical phase of the revolution eventually gives way to a
phase of pragmatism and moderate pursuit of progress within the
new status quo."
Real And Possible Insurgencies or a Revolution In Nepal
In this section, I will give an overview of the history of insurgencies in
139
Nepal followed by a detail analysis of intensifying class-based insurgency
and possibility of ethnic, caste, region, and religion based insurgencies in
Nepal. Till now Nepal has never ever experienced any revolution.
A Brief Historical Review of Insurgencies
King Drabya Shah used violence to become a king of a Gurung
(Ghale) kingdom called Lig Lig. Later, King Prithvi Narayan Shah used
intensive violence in his mission of "territorial integration" of Nepal.
Historians have noted that he had ordered his army to cut tip of the nose
and ear of the peoples of Kirtipur, which eventually weighed 18 Dharnis
(about 42 Kilograms). Jang Bahadur Rana, the founder of the 104-year
autocratic rule used brutal violence in the Kot Parba (Kot Massacre) and
Bhandarkhal Parba (Bhandarkhal Massacre) to establish his autocratic
rule. Jamadar Sripati Gurung of Lamjung led the Gurung revolt against
Jang Bahadur in 1857 in a military parade organized in the Tundikhel in
Kathmandu. The Rana rulers killed Sripati. Later Sripati's associate
Sukadev Gurung led the insurgency by mobilizing the Gurungs of the
Gorkha and Lamjung (Manandhar 1998). The Rana rulers imprisoned him
for life; he died in prison in 1875. After his arrest, Supati Gurung
expanded the insurgency but the Rana rulers using the army suppressed it.
The Rana rulers accused him for trying to become the King of the
Buddhists. Lakhan Thapa Magar also had revolted against Jang Bahadur
in 1876. Later, he along with his two associates, Aja Singh and Achhami
Magar were hanged in Gorkha. A Sherpa woman had also rebelled against
the Ranas. Though these rebellious events were of little consequence to
make any dent on the autocratic political regime, they had nevertheless
indicated certain features of general unrest in the public life in Nepal.
Organized political insurgency was indeed initiated by the Nepali
Congress Party. An organized armed uprising led by the "Liberation
Army" of the Nepali Congress was launched first at Birgunj on the
midnight of November 11, 1950. The Liberation Army controlled many
districts and successfully overthrew 104-year autocratic Rana rule in
February 1951. Leaders of various indigenous ethnic groups, including
Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Newar, Thakali and Tharu, played
decisive role in armed uprising of 1951. Later the Bahun-Chhetri leaders
systematically and calculatively excluded them from the national politics
and public offices.
During the first half of 30 years of autocratic partyless Panchayat
regime (1960-1990), Nepali Congress Party unsuccessfully organized
several armed insurgencies, including the failed bomb attack to assassinate
140
Negotiating the Resumption
late King Mahendra and also King Birendra, along with a successful
hijacking of the RNAC airplane on a domestic flight. The first failed bomb
attack against late King Mahendra was in Janakpur in Januray 1962. From
1972 to 1974, the then banned Nepali Congress Party executed series of
planned but failed insurgency activities against the partyless Panchayat
political system. These failed insurgency activities include bombing in
Haripur, Saptari in August 1972, in Biratngar and Malangawa on
December 17, 1973, passenger plane hijacking on June 10, 1973, failed
attempt to assassinate King Birendra by bombing in Biratnagar on March
16, 1974, bomb attack against Prayagraj Singh Suwal on May 5, 1974, and
armed insuregncy in Timburbote in Solukhumbu district on December 16,
1974. The autocratic partyless Panchayat rulers invariably charged all
these activities of Nepali Congress as “terrorist,” “anti-national,” “anticonstitutonal” and “anti-King” activities.
The East Koshi Regional Committee of the Jhapa district Committee
of the Nepal Communist Party (Marxist Leninist), following Naxalite
movement of India, “killed” couple of local feudals in Jhapa district,
eastern Nepal on May 16, 1971. The autocratic Pancha rulers charged the
communist leaders who were involved in the killings as “terrorists” and
“criminals.”
The Nepal Janabadi Morcha led by Ram Raja Prasad Singh blasted
several bombs in Pokhara in June 19 and in Kathmandu, including the
building of Rastriya Panchayat and Hotel Annapurna, in June 20, 1986.
The people's movement of 1990 was also to some extent violent. The
army and police reportedly killed at least 48 citizens. This figure provided
by the interim government is believed to be a gross underestimate by the
general public. The latest violent events, that is, class-based people's war,
have been in progress since February 13, 1996. Ethnic and religion based
violence is beginning to simmer. But these are yet to turn into a full-blown
ethnic insurgency or a revolution.
Class-based Maoist Insurgency in Action
According to Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr.,
"Historically, guerrilla operations have contributed to or even led (1)
resistance to foreign invasion and occupation; (2) the attainment of
political or socioeconomic concessions from incumbent regimes; (3) the
overthrow of unpopular governments; (4) wars of national liberation or
decolonization; and (5) the creation of new political entities" (Guevara,
1985). Also, during the Vietnam War, Nepali people had admired the
courage of Vietnamese guerrillas led by Ho Chi Minh who succeeded to
141
kneel down one of the then two nuclear superpowers, the United States of
America. Poet Bhupi Sherchan (1993:38-41) wrote a poem entitled Ho
Chi Minhlai Chiti (“A letter to Ho Chi Minh”) predicting that the
Vietnamese people is destined to win a war against American imperialism.
Four years ago, hardly any one, except the Maoist parties, would have
thought of the possibility of launching an organized armed "insurgency" in
Nepal but now it has become a political reality. Before February 13, 1996,
Nepali public had heard and read about guerrillas of Vietnam, Peru, Iran,
Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere and "under ground"
political leaders and activists in Nepal but now the news media are flooded
with stories of Nepali guerrillas everyday. Four years ago, when the
Maoist people's war originated the space covered by guerrilla activities
was localized in the remote hills of Rolpa and Rukum districts but now it
has spread like a wildfire engulfing all 75 districts, except Manang. Four
years ago, the ruling and the opposition national political parties thought
of the then newly waged people's war as "children's games" but now both
Nepali and international intellectuals, diplomats and organizations,
including British Foreign Minister Mr. Robin Cook and the European
Parliament, have advised His Majesty's Government of Nepal to contend
this wild political fire through dialogue but not by using brutal force. By
now the Nepali people have either heard or experienced "Romeo
operation," "Sera-Kilo-2 operation" and "Peter operation" all launched by
the security forces to crush the Maoist insurgency with no positive
outcome.
The Maoist political parties under the leadership of Pushpa Kamal
Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, and the United People's Front led
by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, started people's war on February 13, 1996 after
the then Deuba government failed to respond to the former's 40 points
demands- 9-point demand related to nationalism, 16-point demand related
to democracy, and 13-point demand related to the question of livelihood.
These demands were made with the then prime minister Sher Bahadur
Deuba by submitting a memorandum on February 4, 1996 (NRBS
1996:19-20). The People's War started with three goals: (1) to establish a
politics of armed conflict, (2) to put in practice that army is the main form
organization and war is the main form of the struggle, and (3) to prepare a
base for guerrillas (NRBS 1996:25). In the first phase, the party took
several actions in at least five districts, namely, Rolpa, Rukum and
Jajarkot in mid-west, Gorkha in the west and Sindhuli in the central
development regions. For publicity as well as spreading the fear the
actions taken by the Maoist insurgents included armed attack on the police
posts, confiscation and tearing of promissory notes collected by the Small
142
Negotiating the Resumption
Farmer's Development Program (SFDP), bomb blasts at distillery
factories, attack on the local feudal, and petrol bombing on the Pepsi Cola
factory (NRBS 1996). According to the Informal Service Sector's (INSEC)
Human Rights Year Book 1996, "Deprived of their fundamental rights to
live, a total of 31 people, including 12 each in Rolpa and Rukum, 1 in
Jajarkot, and 6 in Sindhuli, Ramechhap, Kavre, and other districts, have
been killed by the Maoists. Similarly, 70 people have been killed in the
government's violent war. This includes 37 in Rolpa, 20 in Rukum, 5 in
Jajarkot, and 8 in other districts of the country." The report further writes,
"Various groups, including the representatives of human rights
organizations, have gone on observation visits of the various districts of
the country. The groups have made their reports public. These reports
show that there have been serious violations of human rights by the
government. People have been killed immediately after being arrested and
while being taken to the police post or on their way to the district
headquarters from the police post. The reports have denied that people
were killed in the alleged encounters with the Maoists, as claimed by the
government media"(INSEC, 1996).
The second phase was initiated after the "successful completion" of the
first year's activities. The three main goals of the second phase were: (1) to
widely mobilize people in favour of the People's War, (2) to control
weapons and other commodities, and (3) to concentrate power to
transform main areas into guerrilla areas (NRBS 1996:33).
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai gives two justifications for the armed conflict:
one is the external relations and processes, that is oppression by
imperialism and expansionism and the other is the internal social and
spatial (regional) relation. The latter is specified as semi-feudal relations
and retardation in agriculture, decline of industry and expansion of
comprador and bureaucratic capital, and regional inequality and
nationality question. Bhattarai writes:
"The oppressed regions within the country are primarily the regions
inhabited by the indigenous people since time immemorial. These
indigenous people dominated regions that were independent tribal
states prior to the formation of the centralized state in the later half of
the eighteenth century, have been reduced to the present most
backward and oppressed condition due to the internal feudal
exploitation and the external semi-colonial oppression. They have been
left behind the historical development process because of blockade of
their path of independent development and imposition of socio-cultural
[sic] along with economic oppression upon them with the backing of
143
the state by those forces who had come from outside. Thus it is quite
natural that the question of regional oppression of Mongol dominated
eastern, central and the western hilly regions or the Austro-Dravid
dominated Inner Tarai and Tarai regions are manifested in the form of
national oppression. They're the regional and the national question
intertwined with one another. Besides this, the problem of the Khas
dominated Far Western Karnali region can occur as regional question
instead of a nationality question and it will have to be tackled
accordingly. Thus, according to the concrete situation it is necessary to
solve the problem of oppressed regions and nationalities by granting
regional and national autonomy"(Bhattarai n.d.: 33-34).
In the similar vein, Prachanda, another prominent leader of the Maoist
insurgency, writes:
"Along with the development of the People's War a new consciousness
for fighting for their own rights and liberation is spreading amongst
many oppressed nationalities of the country such as Magars, Gurungs,
Tamangs, Newars, Tharus, Rais, Limbus and Madhesis. People's War
has speeded up the process of formation of various national liberation
fronts and expansion of nationality organizations. Similarly, today
along with the development of People's War, a wave of organization
and struggle has been created among Dalit castes at a greater speed and
a wider scale. The Dalits are today rebelling against inhuman tyranny
perpetrated upon by the feudal state of high caste Hindus."(Prachanda
n.d.:22).
Table 1. Classification of those killed by the police in the people's war
1.
2.
3.
4.
Total
Sex
a. Female
b. Male
Caste / Ethnic groups
a. Magar
b. Chhetri
c. Backward
d. Newar
e. Tamang
f. Bahun
Age
a. Below 25
b. Above 25
71
6
65
44
16
4
2
2
2
23
48
144
Negotiating the Resumption
5.
Charged with
a. Charged in false cases by the government
14
b. Not charged in Government cases
57
6.
Capacity
a. Party Member
29
b. Supporter
42
7.
Occupation
a. Farmer
62
b. Student
6
c. Teacher
1
8.
Involvement
a. Guerrilla group
11
b. Political organizers
6
c. Organizers of associate Organizations
9
d. Elected representatives
4
e. Supporting people
31
9.
Type of Killing
a.Shot after torture
59
b. In clash with police
6
c. By bullets or stones while breaking cordon
4
d. By torture in custody
3
e. Killed by hooligans
2
f. Thrown off a cliff
2
___________________________________________________________
Source: Central Publication Department NCP (Maoist) quoted by INSEC
(1997:122).
145
Table 2.
Latest number of Casualties in the Maoist People’s War By caste and
ethnic groups (Till February 2000)
S.N.
Caste/Ethnic
Groups
Number of individuals killed
by the police
Men Women
Total
Number of individuals All Total
killed by the Maoist
Men Women
Total
“High Castes”
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Bahun
46
Chetri
129
Thakuri
19
Sub-total
194
Dalits
Kami
32
Damai
14
Sarki
3
Sunar
1
Sub-total
50
Indigenous Peoples
Magar
186
Rai
1
Tamang
19
Tharu
9
Newar
11
Gurung
4
Lama
Sherpa
Danuwar
Sub-total
230
Madhise
Yadav
Rajput
Muslim
Sub-total
228
Others
Sub-total
228
All Total
702
14
13
1
28
60[7.5]
142[17.8]
20[2.5]
222[27.8]
59
122
26
207
1
2
3
60[17.1] 120[10.4]
122[34.6] 264[22.0]
28[7.9]
48[4.2]
210[59.6] 432[37.6]
6
1
1
8
38[4.8]
15[1.9]
4[0.5]
1[0.1]
58[7.3]
4
2
2
8
1
1
1
3
19
8
1
3
2
2
34
205[25.7]
1[0.1]
27[3.4]
10[1.3]
14[1.8]
4[0.5]
2[0.2]
2[0.2]
265[33.2]
72
2
11
5
12
8
2
1
113
1
1
2
73[21.0] 278[24.2]
2[0.5]
3[0.2]
12[3.4]
39
5[1.4]
15
12[3.4]
26
8[2.2]
12
2[0.5]
4
2
1[[0.2]
1
115[32.5] 380[32.9]
25
25
96
253[31.7]
253[31.7]
798[100]
6
1
1
8
8
8
344
1
1
9
6[1.8]
6[0.5]
1[0.3]
1[0.1]
1[0.3]
1[0.1]
8[2.3]
8[0.7]
9[2.6] 262[22.8]
9[2.6] 262[22.8]
353[100]1,151[100]
5[1.4]
3[0.8]
3[0.8]
11[3.0]
43[3.8]
18[1.6]
4[0.3]
4[0.3]
69[6.0]
Source: Adapted from Ekkaisau Satabdi, Volume 4, Number 3, (2000), p. 26.
Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage.
According to the Nepal Police Bulletin, the police claimed that more
than 1036 events occurred from February 13, 1996 to September 23, 1998.
The police report also claimed that the number of deaths and injured
common people and political activists were 83 and 233 respectively (see
Table 1).
146
Negotiating the Resumption
Similarly, 248 "terrorists" and 24 police died and 184 police were
injured in the encounter between the police and the Maoists. The police
have charged 1495 individuals who were engaged in "terrorist activities."
The police report stated that altogether Rs. 75,542,600 worth property was
lost due to "vandalism," "blasting" manhandling and looting. Police had
confiscated 685 "Bharua Bandook," 12 twelve bore guns, 55 "Katuwa
Pestols," 147 hand bombs, 13 mark-2 high explosive military pattern
grenade, 7 three-nut-three rifles and 57 bullets, 1 thirty-eight bore revolver
and 6 bullets, 456 pieces of gelatin, 97 detonators, 11 pressure cooker
bombs, 43 pipe bombs, 1 k.g. of very powerful(?) 83 m.m. 5.4 kg. Super
dyn explosive p.e.k used explosives and a number of sharp weapons
(Nepal Police 1999:66). Maoists had declared that the guerrillas would use
formal dress and occupy various military positions.
The main goal of the third phase was to lift the people's war to a new
height. The insurgency activities were further intensified during this
phase. The fourth phase, which is running now, is to develop Rolpa and
Rukum districts as base areas for guerrilla activities. The Janadesh Weekly
on October 27, 1998 has reported that the people's war has now entered
the phase of the formation of base areas. In a pamphlet released on
October 27 1998, the NCP (Maoist) have stated, "By now it is clear that
preliminary practice of local people's government has begun in various
parts of the country. This new government would be a common
government of the all patriotic and people's power who are anti-feudal and
anti-imperialism. We have been clarifying that given Nepal's distinctive
history, that type of new government would implement programmes to
ethnic autonomy based on the ethnic pluralism of specific ethnic groups in
specific regions by fully recognize and honour ethnic right to selfdetermination. The process of formation of base region and local people's
government would go hand in hand with acceptance of right to selfdetermination and ethnic autonomy; high caste hegemony for centuries
would be demolished"(Janadesh Weekly, October 27, 1998) [my
translation].
Although caste/ethnic identity of 228 individuals killed are not known,
Table 2 clearly reveal that Maoists have so far killed 210 so-called “high
castes” people and police have killed 265 indigenous people, mostly
suspected as Maoists. Similarly, Maoists have killed relatively few
indigenous people on the charge of being local feudals or police
informants, and police also have killed very few so-called “high caste”
people. In the case of Dalits about equal number of individuals are killed
by both Maoist and police. Both the Maoist and police have killed very
few people belonging to Madhesi and Muslims communities.
147
The Maoist People’s War has by now spread in all 75 districts, except
Manang. Recently, prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala has publicly
stated that he is going to activate the National Defense Council and use
army to contend the Maoist People’s War. However, the prime minister
has apparently given up the idea of mobilizing army against the Maoists
fearing its unintended consequences. Instead of army, he has now, while
speaking at a gathering organized by the Editors' Society in Kathmandu,
declared that he would set up an armed police to contend it. Hence, the
government appears to have been mired by confusion while dealing with
the Maoist insurgency (Himalaya Times, May 13, 2000).
Therefore, the current people's war may either succeed to declare
specific ethnic or regional autonomy in several parts of Nepal or His
Majesty's Government of Nepal will be forced to use army "as the last
resort" to contend the insurgency. In either case, it appears that the country
is now very close to a bloody civil war.
Li Onesto (1999) in its Part 16 of the 22 Part dispatches published in
the Revolutionary Worker provides detail information about the
involvement of indigenous ethnic groups or Nationalities in the ongoing
Maoist people's war. He writes, "One of the aspects of the People's War
that I'm very anxious to learn more about is the relationship between the
New Democractic Revolution and the struggle of different oppressed
nationalities in Nepal" (Onesto, 1999:11). He further writes, "The national
question is one of the most important components of the New Democratic
Revolution in Nepal. And during my visits to other parts of Nepal, I had
already gotten a glimpse of how the struggle of different ethnic groups is
fuelling the People's War" (Onesto, 1999:12). Onesto writes:
"Another member of this squad said: "The main reason I joined the
people's army is because there is discrimination by Hindu chuvinism,
by the reactionary ruling class against the indigenous people. I belong
to the Tamang people, one of the oppressed nationalities in Nepal. This
group doesn't have any opportunities in the government and the ruling
sectors, and we have been oppressed by the reactionary Hindu state. I
came to understand that, in order to get free from this kind of
oppression, we cannot do this without picking up the gun, because the
reactionary state power rules over us with the gun. This is why I joined
the people's army.
An older guerrilla, a 40 year-old man from Bethan said: "The main
reason I joined the people's army was not only economic repression,
but as an indigenous people we can't speak our language, read our
mother tongue and we are repressed by the Hindu government. So now
148
Negotiating the Resumption
I have great hope and determination that we will be able to establish a
New Democratic system that is for equality and will wipe out all the
discrimination that is being done by reactionaries.
Here in the west, the Magar people are the largest ethnic minority
group. And in Rolpa and Rukum, they make up a majority of the forces
fighting the revolution. In fact, the strong unity between the struggle of
the oppressed Magar people and the revolution is one of the reasons
these districts have become strongholds of the People's War"" (Onesto,
1999:12).
So far indigenous peoples or nationalities have joined the Maoist
insurgency movement as individuals. Their ethnic organizations have not
yet involved in the movement. Dhruba Kumar (1998:12), a security study's
expert at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS) has given some
reasons why ethnic organizations have not yet joined the Maoist people's
war. He is of the view that ethnic groups has "yet to evolve and
consolidate an umbrella organization to form a singular political platform
in taking indisputable decision," constitutional recognition of multilingualism and multi-ethnicity has "theoretically opened up the avenues in
articulating legitimate ethnic grievances, and "moderation is still the
currency through which both the government and ethnic groups can reach
satisfactory resolution to the problems they face." By now it is clear that
some ethnic organizations, such as the Magarat Liberation Front, Limbuan
Liberation Front, Tamuan Liberation Front, Tamang Liberation Front,
Khambuan Libertaion Front, Tharuwan Liberation Front and the Newa
Khala are politcally organized and all these organizations are very
sympathetic to the Maoist People's War.
People's War is primarily a class-based war. However, given the social
structure of the Nepali society and the collective memory of different
groups of people, the Maoist insurgents have invited various indigenous
ethnic groups to join in and support the people's war. So far, the
Khambuan Mukti Morcha led by Gopal Khambu have publicly supported
the people's war and they too have gone underground. According to
Dhruba Kumar (1998:12) the inclusion of ethnic issues and the rights to
'self-determination' by the Maoists as the raison d'etre for the people's war
can be understood as a strategy to widen the canvas of struggle through
the formation or attempted formation of a broad coalition of interests
against the state at a time when some ethnic groups like the Khambuan
Mukti Morcha (Khmabuan Liberation Front) have started their support to
the Maoist cause."
The Newars' of the Kathmandu Valley and other indigenous ethnic
149
groups have not openly supported or joined in the people's war as desired
by the Maoist leaders. The continuing leadership of the Maoist insurgency
by the Bahuns and Chhetris dismays some intellectuals and activists, who
are sympathetic to indigenous ethnic groups' plight and rights. However,
before making such observation, two more observations should be
considered. One, it is a fact that both parties have been able to reach out
and mobilize Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups, and women, which
otherwise have never been done by any national, including ruling, political
parties so far. Also, the Maoists have filled up positions at all levels,
including the high ranking positions, by these hitherto ignored and
marginalized groups. Two, one should remember that diamond cuts
diamond. Similarly, Bahun-Chhetris would be in a better position to
demolish the monopoly of the Bahun-Chhetris. It should be recalled here
that Marx has clearly shown how feudal society was transformed into
capitalist society because it was not because that the serfs rebelled against
the feudal lords but because feudal lords themselves contributed in this
process. If these two Bahun leaders should succeed in the people's war and
should continue to dominate the post-revolutionary period as done by the
"democratic" leaders of the post-people's movement of 1990, it would not
help to change the continuing trend of the last 230 years. On the contrary,
if they should succeed and subsequently honour the social diversity of
Nepal and its due representation of the Dalits, women, indigenous ethnic
groups and other minority groups in the public offices, many ethnic
activists believe that it should not be taken as a problem. They say that this
is what it should be but one has to wait and see. The NCP (Maoist) and the
United People's Front are led by the Bahuns, Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Dr.
Baburam Bhattarai respectively. Unlike other bigot and fair weather
Bahun-Chhetris, they appear to be more than all-weather liberals. As long
as they are not in power, it would be difficult to test what they are up to. If
they should succeed, come to power and give all the rights of indigenous
peoples, Dalits, women and other marginalized groups, it would hardly
matter if the two Bahun leaders continue to lead. If they should fail to
comply with what they have promised even after the success of the
People's war, they would not only get cumulative punishment but the
class-cum-ethnic-based people's war would pave a way for a violent total
ethnic war.
Ethnic Insurgency in Waiting?
Although the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 has
recognized multi-caste/ethnic and multi-lingual characteristics of the
150
Negotiating the Resumption
country, it failed to recognize it as a multi-religious country and also to
ethnopolitics. Thus, in theory, the state has constitutional authority to
suppress ethnopolitics, and in practice, that ethnic insurgency is the only
option left open.
The last political party that has very recently become ethnic sensitive is
the Nepali Congress. The NC party took lead in implementing some
programmes such as transmission of radio news in various mother
tongues, establishment of the Rastriya Janajati Bikas Samiti (National
Committee for Development of Nationalities), and development programs
for Adibasi and Janajati, and Dalits in the Ninth Plan (1997-2002). The
communist parties, including the NCP (UML) and the NCP (ML), though
they claim that their party stands for revolutionary change in the society
have never done what has been done by the Nepali Congress. It appears
that all the political parties, most of which are in full control of the Bahun
and Chetris of one or the other lineages, have begun to realize and sense a
real possibility of lighting up a fire of ethnic conflict or communal
violence along with an ethnic insurgency in the country in near future if
their genuine demands such as secularism, cultural autonomy, positive
discrimination, and the rights of the indigenous peoples are not fulfilled.
In the recent past two possible bloody confrontations between the
indigenous ethnic groups and the Bahun-Chhetris were averted. Once it
was when the Shiva Sena, the Hindu fundamentalist group announced a
first ever Nepal Bandh ("Nepal shut down") against the human rights
activists Padma Ratna Tuladhar who had opined that some indigenous
ethnic groups who have a tradition of eating beef has a right to practice
their religion. The Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) challenged
their call and later the Shiva Sena pulled out the Bandh and the possible
ethnic confrontation was averted. The second time was when the
Pashupati Chetra Bikas Samiti (Pashupati Area development Committee)
demolished the moratorium of the Rais, Limbus, Yakkhas and Sunuwars,
located at the Sleshmantak forest in the Pashupati area. Later, the Samiti
officially regretted for the incidence and promised to rebuild the
demolished moratorium. Thus the possible ethnic clash was averted. It
should be noted here that in ethnic conflicts within groups with close
interaction, "one side hates the other more intensely the more it is felt to
be a threat to the unity and the identity of the group" (Coser, 1956).
In my article on ethnopolitics published by CNAS, I had raised few
questions: "Is there a possibility of ethnic insurgency in Nepal? Will the
rising tide of ethnopolitics reach a shore of ethnic insurgency?"
(Bhattachan, 1995). I still believe that the political process model
developed by McAdam (1982) to explain Black insurgency in the United
151
States helps us to understand such prospects in Nepal. Following him the
possibility of ethnic insurgency may be analyzed on the basis of some
indicators such as structure of political opportunities and indigenous
organizational strength.
The structure of political opportunities in Nepal, the first indicator, is
unduly favourable to Bahuns-Chhetris, but unfavourable to non-BahunsChhetri groups. For the last two hundred years Bahuns-Chhetris were
able to capture up to 70-80 percent of the high level positions, including
political, administrative, police, and military. This is not a historic
accident, but a well-manufactured product of the ruling Bahuns-Chhetris
(Bhattachan, 1995:136). As political opportunities for hitherto denied
indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, and Madhesis, their ever rising
political awareness might take them in one of two directions: increasing
their political leverage or undermining the existing political system.
Currently, it is directed more towards the first option, but if the present
trend leads to a dead end, it will shift to an ethnic paradigm (Bhattachan,
1995:136). The other indicator of ethnic insurgency is the indigenous
organizational strength, particularly its membership, points of
commonality and solidarity, communication network, and leaders. If the
Nepal Janajati Mahasangh or any or some of the 31 member ethnic
groups that decide to stage an ethnic insurgency at the national and local
level it will not be difficult (Bhattachan, 1995:137).
If the "people's war" should fail or succeed but the Bahun-Chhetri
rulers become a mirror image of their predecessors in not yielding much to
the satisfaction of the indigenous ethnic groups and if they should lose
their patience with utter disenchantment, in either case, violent ethnic
clashes are inevitable. If such clashes should occur, then it becomes
durable, disruptive in the domestic politics, and it would not disappear so
easily. Welsh (1993:45) suggests, "to borrow and substantially amend
Marx's dictum, the problem is not to understand ethnicity, but to learn how
to cope with it." By paraphrasing Simmel's proposition, Coser (1956:71)
suggests that "a conflict is more passionate and more radical when it arises
out of close relationships." The outcome of such conflicts, according to
Brown (1993), is ethnic reconciliation, ethnic separation and ethnic war.
Welsh (1993:56) writes, "if multiethnic states are to have any hope of
sustaining democratic political systems, 'winner-take-all' outcomes have to
be avoided."
If ethnic conflicts, clashes, insurgencies should happen in Nepal, it
would not be replicas of ethnic problems in Sri Lanka, Bosnia-
152
Negotiating the Resumption
Herzgovina, Kosovo, Rwanda and Fiji. Instead, it would have its own
characteristics, feature, nature and consequences based on the collective
memory of the past and the existing social structure of the Nepalese
society.
Other Possible Insurgencies
In the future, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims and Chrstians also may resort
to insurgency activities if they continue to be oppressed, suppressed,
subjugated and exploited by the ruling so-called “high caste” Hindu, Hill
Bahun-Chhetris.
Dalits have been socially and economically most suppressed and
oppressed group not for centuries but for millenniums. The total
population of Dalits as revealed in the census report of 1991 is around 15
percent of the total 18 million populations of Nepal but the Dalits believe
that their total number should be at least one fifth of the total population of
Nepal, that is, about 4 million.
Dalits comprise of mainly two-type (1) Hindu Dalits and (2)
Hinduized Janajati (ethnic) Dalits. Hindu Dalits may be categorized into
(a) Hill Hindu Dalits and (2) Tarai Hindu Dalits. Among the Hill Hindu
Dalits, the main groups include Damai, Kami, Sarki, and Gaine; among
the Tarai Hindu Dalits the main groups include Chamar, Dom, Dusadh,
and Musahar. Among the Hinduized Janajati Dalit, the main Dalit groups
from the Newars include Pode, Chyame, and Kusule. Due to the intense
pressure exerted by the ruling Hindus, the Dalits themselves have
developed internal caste hierarchy with the concept of purity and pollution
among themselves in the process of Sanskritization, which in fact is an
internal colonization by the ruling Bahun and Chhetris. Due to the
influence of the dominant Hindu values, Dalits exist within the Dalits.
They all are scattered around the country; they do not have their traditional
homeland and they do not live numerously in one geographical region
because of the nature of their service-oriented occupation. If relative
deprivation should invite a revolution, Dalits should have staged
revolution thousand times but it was not even hatched till now because of
lack of strong organizations that binds them together in pursuit of a
revolution.
As Dalits have been traditionally treated as untouchable castes by the
so-called 'high caste' groups, they have been discriminated, suppressed,
oppressed and depressed so much that they were denied to touch 'high
caste' people, that their children were denied education, and that they were
denied to pursue occupation of their choice. Due to the efforts made by
153
some international donors and INGOs, few Dalits have been able to get
higher education. By now only one Dalit has earned a Ph.D. degree and
very few Dalits have received Master's and Bachelor's degrees. Dalits have
been demanding for secularism, positive discrimination, elimination of the
practice of untouchability, retain their family names in official documents,
including citizenship certificates, free entry in Hindu temples, and income
generating programmes. Recently, His Majesty's Government of Nepal has
established a Rastriya Dalit Tatha Uptpidit Bikas Samiti (National Dalit
and Oppressed Development Committee) under the Ministry of Local
Development. Dalits protested when a Bahun was politically appointed as
the first executive director of the committee. The Ninth FiveYear Plan has
a separate section on the Dalit Development Programs. The plan document
makes a provision to establish a high-powered National Dalit Council for
their development. So far these plans are confined in the plan documents
only becasue none of the action plans has been implemented yet.
With increasing use of Dalits as vote banks by the political parties,
exposure of organization building and awareness of suppressed ethnic and
other minority religious groups, Dalits have formed various organizations
on the national party lines.
Although there is no prospect of Dalit insurgency per se, nevertheless,
individually Hill Dalits have already been playing significant role in classbased people's war. In future the Dalits of the Tarai also may get involved
in the Maoist insurgency. They, however, would not support ethnic
insurgencies because ethnic grievances are against the hegemony of Hindu
religion and Nepali language of which they are also a part, along with the
Bahun-Chhetris of the Hills and Brahman, Kshyatriyas and Vaisyas of the
Tarai.
Similarly, Madhesi insurgency is also highly likely in Nepal. The
Nepal Tarai Congress was formed in 1951 with three objectives:
autonomy of the Tarai, Hindi as a state language and employment in the
civil service (Gaige 1975:109). In 1956, Save Hindi movement gained
momentum and hostile crowds clashed in many places. During the
autocratic partyless Panchayat rule, language issues in the Tarai remained
as grievances but did not get an opportunity to outburst into a mass
movement. In the early eighties, Gajendra Narayan Singh formed the
Nepal Sadvabana Parisad to raise the Madehsi issues. Later, after the
people's movement of 1990, the Parishad was transformed into the Nepal
Sadvabana Party demanding for the autonomy of the Tarai region. Since
1950, the question of Tarai identity has surfaced up again and again in
many different forms (Dahal 1992; and Yadav 1997).
If the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India wish (some Nepali
154
Negotiating the Resumption
public believe that they may be covertly trying their best) to stage a
Madhesi insurgency in Nepal it would not take long because of a number
of reasons, including open border, large scale of population movement
across the border, continuing marginalization and suppression of the
Madhesis, and heavy concentration of population of Indian origin in the
Tarai region. If Madhesi insurgency should happen in Nepal it may take
directions either to make the Singhadurbar to be more regional sensitive or
to a fate, as many Nepali public believe, of being another "Sikkim." If the
ruling Bahuns and Chhetris become sensitive towards the Madhesis and
recognize their legitimate demands as the citizens with equal rights, then it
would naturally head to the first direction. If they are continually ignored
suppressed and exploited the Madhesi insurgency or revolution may take
the second direction, which none of the conflicting parties would like to
see to happen. But open border, cross-border drug trafficking, terrorism,
and over immigration of the people of Indian origins outnumbering the
Nepali people and covert manipulation by the RAW may head to the
second direction. Currently, Nepal Sadvabana Party has been representing
the Madhesi issues but the party has been confined to small pockets rather
than expanding all over the Tarai. The public often charges them as an
"agent of India" but they claim that the big parties like Nepali Congress
and Nepal Communist Party were born in India but Sadvabana Party was
born in Nepal. The real possibility, however, is that if the Madhesis do not
trust the Sadvabana Party, it may be another party or parties that may
genuinely represent the problems of the Tarai and stage an insurgency or
revolution, if necessary. If, this should happen, there are good reasons to
believe that it would succeed.
If Madhesi insurgencies should occur in Nepal, we may see significant
roles played by the Tarai Dalits, Muslims and indigenous ethnic groups
such as the Tharus, Rajbanshis and Dhimals.
Muslim insurgency is also another possibility in Nepal though they are
concentrated in very few districts, namely, Rautahat, Kapilvastu and
Nepalgunj. They are most numerously populated in those districts. In the
past Hindu-Muslim clashes have occurred several times in Rautahat,
Nepalgunj and Birgunj. Such ugly communal confrontations are
increasing day by day due to provocation by the Shiva Sena, a religious
fundamentalist political party. Often, political parties and the local
administration and the police controlled by the Hindu "high" caste groups
have used power and authority to suppress such clashes. They are often
charged of taking sides of the Hindus only. In future, there is a possibility
of more intense violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims but these
will be of local or regional nature rather than nationwide. It is possible
155
only in democracy that even minority groups are heard and cared.
Muslims' demands including secularism, protection and promotion of
Masjid and Madarsas, and declaration of Ramajan as a national holiday
are legitimate and just. These demands should be fulfilled by the state, if it
is not a predatory state.
Unlike Dalit, Madhesi and Muslim insurgency, Christian insurgency is
impossible but they may align with or help other insurgency groups. The
rate of increase of the Christians indicates that if the Nepal continues to be
a Hindu state and Hindu fundamentalism and/or fanaticism intensifies, the
Christians will also grow. Possibly, in second half of the twenty-first
century, they may be in a position to stage an insurgency against the
Hindus.
Women in Nepal have been discriminated greatly by their male
counterpart under patriarchy of Hindu religion and culture. Women have
participated in both movments and Maoist insurgency. In future, if any
other insurgency activities should occur, they may be involved
significantly. In any case, women may never have their own violent
gender insurgency or revolution. Its main reason is that they do not want
to confront with their male family members.
Some Contentious Issues
There are many contentious issues concerning class, caste, ethnic,
region, religion-based insurgencies and collective actions. I, however, will
confine analysing the three most contentious issues that I believe have
practical and strategic implications. These issues are equality or non-zerosum-game versus replacement/displacement or zero-sum-game, traffic of
tolerance: one way versus both way, and incrementalism versus
radicalism.
Equality or Non-Zero-Sum-Game vs. Replacement/Displacement or
Zero-Sum-Game
It is a tragedy for indigenous ethnic groups and "blessings" for the
ruling Bahuns and Chhetris that Harka Gurung had to earn a Ph.D. degree
to say that Bahuns and Chhetris had have the monopoly over political,
religious, linguistic and cultural resources of the country. Similarly,
Ganesh Man Singh had to become a commander of the people's movement
of 1990 to say that Bahuns and Chhetris have dominated the political
parties, particularly the Nepali Congress and the government. The 'snow
leopard' Ang Rita Sherpa had to scale Mt. Everest ten times, mostly
156
Negotiating the Resumption
without using oxygen, to say that he had to suffer because no Sherpa is
either a minister or a member of the Parliament. This hard reality indicates
two things. One is that most of the common people belonging to
indigenous ethnic groups do not sense that the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris
are the villains of their development until they do miracles on their own
like that of Ang Rita, Ganesh Man Singh and Dr. Harka Gurung. And the
second is that how many people from indigenous ethnic groups would be
fortunate enough to be like Dr. Harka Gurung, Ganesh Man Singh and
Ang Rita Sherpa? One may wonder why these prominent people had to
wait so long to sense the truth and speak it out clear and loud?
So far, ethnic demands have been articulated through peaceful means
because the paradigm of such demand is equity and equality. The ruling
Bahuns and Chhetris continue to stay at the top of the ladder and have not
given any chance to those who are on the ground to climb up. Those
indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims and Christians are
politely requesting the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris to descend voluntarily
and allow them to climb up so that they can meet in the middle and live
happily ever after. But the Bahuns and Chhetris are adamant either to get
down even an inch or allow others to climb up even an inch. In such a
situation the indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Muslims, Madhesis, and
Christians have two cards to play: one is to become organized among
themselves and network with each other to raise their collective clout of
moving upwards together. This option is difficult and time-consuming.
The second is to chop off the very foundation of the ladder to bring it
down along with the groups of people sitting at its top. This option would
be definitely very violent. But one has to remember folk sayings that if
yellow grasses should be turned into green, old grasses must be burnt first
and that diamond cuts diamond. Pritvi Naryan Shah territorially integrated
Nepal by using violence and the Bahun-Chhetri monopoly that has been
continuing since then. Such a monopoly can only be removed by using
violence against them. Revolutionary change never occurs without
bloodshed. Bhupi Sherchan (1993:35) once wrote, "morning won't show
up without the fall of the stars, country won't become prosperous if some
sons do not sacrifice their lives." Also, Frantz Fanon (1968), in his famous
book The Wretched of the Earth, was of the view that if colonizers had
used violence to colonize the natives, then natives should use violence to
decolonize.
In an article on decentralization published by the Political Association
of Nepal (POLSAN), I had argued that "For those who are at the helm of
affairs, the mechanism of power takes on the form of a zero-sum-game.
Decentralization implemented in its true sense can lead to erosion in the
157
traditional monopoly of power and privilege of the ruling Bahuns and
Chhetris. Empowering local people also means specific ethnic groups
would gain control/monopolize power and benefits in each ethnic cluster,
which the rulers have tended to misinterpret as a form of
'communalism'...Power, however, is not really always a zero-sum game
and one cannot always say that if one gains it, somebody else must lose.
Power may increase even when it is distributed to a whole body of
peoples’... power shared makes everyone more powerful, but power
monopolized erodes it at the cost of the community, although in that
process, it may benefit certain groups" (Bhattachan, 1996:122). Despite
the controversy created by the opposition parties, The Local Autonomy
Act was passed by the Parliament in 1998. Prior to this, Yuba Raj
Sangraula, commenting on the draft Bill, had opined that the Bill recreates
centralization in the name of decentralization (Sangraula, 1998). The Act,
however, did not rectify the problem. I, therefore, believe that the
indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis and the Muslims should give
up the non-zero-sum games; instead, now onwards, they should play other
games, that is, zero-sum-games. These suppressed and oppressed groups
should be bold enough to say "if you rule us as long as you can do so but
we shall leave no stones unturned to displace you for good."
Traffic of Tolerance: One Way vs. Both Ways
With regards to tolerance between various castes and ethnic groups, I
had criticized the dominant group's view that Nepali society is uniquely
characterized by such tolerance or "communal harmony" by saying that it
is a "patently manufactured myth." Later, David Gellner conceded partly
by saying that "may be it was exaggerated to some extent but there has
been no serious communal ethnic clashes or violence in Nepal." Evidently
communal harmony is a myth because there were several attempts of
ethnic insurgency, which were ruthlessly suppressed by the rulers by using
excessive forces. It is a myth for another reason. Whatever tolerance has
been exhibited, all are from the side of ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis,
Muslims, Christians and other minority groups. The most intolerant
groups have always been the Bahuns and the Chhetris. If they have to lose
a little bit of their monopoly over power, privilege and authority, then
democracy becomes endangered, "communal harmony" suddenly turns
into "communalism," and the country comes to a verge of disintegration.
The country's national sovereignty remains entact, "communal harmony"
remains strong and feeling of "nationalism" heightens, if Bahuns and
Chhetris continue to monopolize power. What a shame! What a logic!
158
Negotiating the Resumption
Incrementalism vs. Radicalism
Most of the problems-political, economic, social, cultural, religious,
linguistic and regional-are so acute that its minimal reasonable solutions
demand radical approaches. It would not be easy to solve most of the
pressing problems overnight. No one has King Midas touch. It is not only
this that is well understood but also the incrementalist approach taken by
the all-weather and fair-weather liberal Bahun-Chhetri rulers as against
their conservative, fundamentalist fellows. The shocking example of
incrementalist position is revealed in a recent Human Development report
of Nepal, which states, "The composition of leadership in the state
bureaucracy mirrors the condition in the political sphere...There is an
astonishing continuity in the predominance of the high caste and specific
ethnic groups in state administration since the formation of the Nepali
state more than two centuries and a quarter ago, which appear to have
occupied 98 percent of the total civil service posts in 1854. More than one
century later, in 1969, this percentage came down only marginally, to 93
percent (Panday, 1989; Seddon, 1987). At present, of the 454 top-level
civil (Special Class and First Class) positions, 417 (92 percent) are still
occupied by the same groups. Similarly, only about 5 percent of high civil
service positions are held by women...and only one out of the 75 Special
Class positions" (NESAC 1998:145-146). It implies that the BahunChhetris took 144 years to come down from 98 percent to 92 percent (24
years for 1 percent) and if they should follow this rate of descend it will
take 1488 years to come down to their current real size, that is, about 30
percent according to Mithyanka (cooked data) of the census.
Conclusion
So far, there has been no revolution or large-scale ethnic clash,
violence, conflict, and insurgency in a predatory unitary Hindu state,
Nepal. It was good that bloody ethnic violence did not occur in the past
but it was bad that Bahun-Chhetri hegemony continues as usual. The
absence of ethnic conflict in the past in a multi-caste/ethnic, multi-lingual
and multi-religious society like Nepal along with Bahun-Chhetri
domination is a strong indication of a realistic conflict between the BahunChhetris and other ethnic and regional groups, such as indigenous ethnic
groups, Madhesis, Dalits, Muslims and Christians (Dahal 1995).
Most of the Nepalese people do not want any bloody violence. The
ruling Bahun-Chhetris should make the choice whether any bloody
159
violence should happen or not. If they continue to be adamant to give due
space to other caste, ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional groups, it
should mean that they are inviting their victims to use violence against
them. If they confess their blunders done in the past and voluntarily give
space long due to other suppressed and oppressed groups, inter-caste and
ethnic harmony could flourish in a more positive and healthy way.
The predatory nature of the unitary Hindu state has given birth to the
people's war. People's war, which is now more than four years old, has
blended class-based and caste/ethnic-based insurgency in the country.
With the declaration of the formation of base areas by the Maoists and the
government's unwillingness to accept the problem as the political problem,
the situation has worsened leading apparently to the verge of a bloody
civil war. At present Maoist people's war has prevented any possibility of
ethnic insurgency. In future, if the Maoist people's war should fail but the
unitary predatory Hindu state should continue as usual then ethnic
insurgency is inevitable.
References
Bhattachan, Krishna B., "Ethnopolitics and Ethnodevelopment: An
Emerging Paradigm in Nepal," in Dhruba Kumar, ed., State,
Leadership and Politics in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and
Asian Studies, 1995.
Bhattachan, Krishna B., "Decentralization in Socioculturally Plural
Nepalese Society," in Ganga B. Thapa, ed., Democracy and
Decentralization: A Policy Perspective on Nepal from POLSAN
Seminar, Kathmandu: Political Science Association of Nepal
(POLSAN) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), Germany, 1996.
Bhattarai, Baburam, Politico-Economic Rationale of People's War in
Nepal, Dillibazar, Kathmandu: Utprerak Publications Pvt. Ltd., n.d.
Brown, Michael E., "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," pp. 324, in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International
Security, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.
Coser, A. Lewis, The Functions of Social Conflict, London: Free Press of
Glencoe, 1956.
Dahal, Dilli Ram, "Grasping the Tarai Identity," Himal, volume 5, number
3, May/June 1992.
Dahal, Dilli Ram, "Ethnic Cauldron, Demography and Minority Politics:
The Case of Nepal," in Dhruba Kumar, Ed., State, Leadership and
Politics in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies,
1995, pp. 148-170.
160
Negotiating the Resumption
Evans, Peter, "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A
Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World
State," Sociological Forum, Vol. 4, No. 4, 1989.
Fanon, Frantz, The Wretched of the Earth, New York: Grove Press, Inc.,
1968.
Gaige, Frederick H., Regionalism and National Unity in Nepal, Delhi:
Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1975.
Goldstone, Jack A., ed., Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and
Historical Studies. Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,
1986.
Guevara, Che, Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln and London: University of
Nebraska Press, 1985.
Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel?, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University, Press 1971 (Fourth Printing).
Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
World Order, New Delhi: VIKING Penguin India, 1997.
INSEC, "Highlight of the Year - The Maoist People's War and Human
Rights," in Human Rights Year Book, 1996, Nepal, Kathmandu:
Informal Sector Service Centre, 1997, pp.83-128.
Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change, Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1982 (second edition).
Kumar, Dhruba, "Trends in Security Studies in Nepal: Recent Trends and
Future Directions." Paper presented at a Seminar on Future of Security
Studies in South Asia, organized by the Regional Centre for Strategic
Studies, Colombo, July 14-16, 1998.
Lal, Deepak, The Hindu Equlibrium, vol. I., Cultural Stability and
Economic Stagnation, India c1500BC-AD1980, Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1988.
Levi, Margaret, Of Rule and Revenue, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1988.
Manandhar, Triratna, "Rana Sasan Biruddha Gurungharuko Bidroha (B.S.
1933-34)," pp. 38-39, Voice of Mount Everest, (experimental issue)
July 1998.
Marx, Karl, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy." pp.136-140, in Marx, Engels Lenin, On Historical
Materialism. Moscow: Progress Publishers, ?? (first published 1859).
McAdam, Doug, Political Process and the Development of Black
Insurgency, 1930-1970, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1982.
Migdal, S. Joel, Peasants, Politics, and Revolution: Pressure Toward
Political and Social Change in the Third World. New Jersey: Princeton
161
University Press, 1974.
Nepal Police,"Atankakari Gatibidhi Niyantranma Gariyeko Prahari
Parichalan: Ek Carcha" [Mobilization of Police to Control Terrorist
Activities: A Discussion], in Prahari Divas Biseshanka, volume 40,
number 3, Asoj 31, 2055 (1999).
NESAC, Nepal Human Development Report 1998, Kathmandu: Nepal
South Asia Centre, 1998, pp. 145-146.
NRBS, Nepalma Janyudha, Part-One, Kathmandu: Nepal Rastriya
Buddhijibi Sangathan (NRBS) 2054B.S(1996).
Onesto, Li, "Magar Liberation." Part 16. Dispatches: Report from the
People's War in Nepal, Revolutionary Worker, December 12, 1999.
Panday, Devendra Raj, "Administrative Development in a SemiDependency: The Experience of Nepal," Public Administration and
Development, vol. 9, no.3, June-August 1989.
Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People's Movements:
Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
Prachanda, Two Momentous Years of Revolutionary Transformation,
Kathmandu: Utprerak Publications Pvt. Ltd., n.d.
Pradhan, Rajendra, "A Native by any Other Name ...," Himal, Vol. 17, No.
1. 1994, pp. 41-45.
Sangroula, Yuba Raj, "Concept of Local Governance under Autonomous
Local Governance Bill." A paper prsented in a one-day national
seminar on Strengthening Local Self-Governance in Nepal: Inputs for
Decentralization Bill, organized by Political Science Association of
Nepal (POLSAN) in cooperation with Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),
Germany, June 30, 1998.
Seddon, Seddon, Nepal: A State of Poverty. Delhi: Vikas Publishing
House, 1987.
Sherchan, Bhupi, Ghumne Mech Mathi Andho Manche, Kathmandu: Sajha
Prakashan. Eight Reprint, 2049 B. S, (1993).
Skocpol, Theda, States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia and China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979.
Tilly, Charles, From Mobilization to Revolution, New York: McGraw-Hill
Publishing Company, Inc., 1978.
Yadav, Upendra, Nepalma Madhesi Samudaya: Ek Bibechana,
Kathmandu: Research & Development Centre for Indigenous and
Ethnic People-Nepal, 1997.
Welsh, David, "Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict", in Michael
E.Brown, ed., Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton,
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993.
162