5 Possible Ethnic Revolution Or Insurgency In A Predatory Unitary Hindu State, Nepal Krishna B. Bhattachan xfd|f dfG%] s]fxL klg dGqL, ;f+;b gePsfn] hlt sfd u/] klg xfdLn] d'No gkfpg] /x]%f}+, z]kf{ hflts} dGqL / ;f+;b ePsf] eP xfd|f] klg s]xL x"g ;SYof] . ælxp+ lrt"jfÆ cf*= l/tf z]kf{ -sflGtk"/, ;]K^]Da/ 28, 1998_ "Whatever work we do we do not get the credit we deserve because we do not have our ministers, members of Parliament, something could have happened if there were Sherpa minister and MP." "Snow Leopard" Ang Rita Sherpa Kantipur, September 28, 1998. Introduction The twentieth century, according to Migdal (1974:226) has been "the century of peasant revolution" and the coming twenty-first century, according to Huntington (1997), shall be a century of "clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order." Fortunately or unfortunately, Nepal did not witness a peasant or any other revolution till now. Does it mean that there would be no ethnic conflicts/clashes/insurgencies or social conflicts or a revolution in Nepal in the twenty-first century? We know, following Piven and Cloward (1979:xi), that "popular insurgency does not proceed by someone else's rules or hopes; it has its own logic and direction. It flows from historically specific circumstances: it is a reaction against those circumstances, and it is also limited, by those circumstances." I have used the term "ethnic conflict," following Brown (1993:4), to refer to "a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural, or territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities." Similarly, I have used the term social conflict, following Lewis A. Coser (1956:8), as a "struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals." Also, the term "revolution" means more than a "rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures" "accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below," as stated by Skocpol (1979:4). It actually means a sudden total change in the rules of the political, economic, social and ideological games. I do not use the term “predatory” as defined by Deepak Lal (1988) and Margaret Levi (1988) to refer to “revenue maximizing” states. Peter Evans (1989:562) defines the term "predatory" as “those who control the state apparatus ... without any more regard for the welfare of the citizenry than a predator has for the welfare of its society.” He is of the view that predatory states are not developmental states. I have used the term "predatory state” to that multicultural state where only one caste/ethnicity, language, culture, religion and region sits in the driving seat and dominates over others. The main political changes that have occurred after the territorial unification of Nepal in 1769, include the Kot Massacre ("Kot Parba") in 1846, fall of the 104-year old autocratic Rana regime in 1951, imposition of autocratic partyless Panchayat political system in 1960 and reinstatement of multi-party democracy in 1990. The pattern of political demands by organized groups appears to have been repeating every ten years for the last six-seven decades. Although, Nepali political leaders and historians exaggerate political change of 1951 as a "revolution" it was, however, never close to revolutions such as the English revolution of 1640, the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the Chinese Revolution of 1949. These revolutions, according to Skocpol (1979:3), have "transformed state organizations, class structures, and dominant ideologies." In our case, the basic pattern has never changed. Loss of meaning is characteristic feature of the Nepali society. 136 Negotiating the Resumption Therefore, loss of meaning of the term 'revolution" is not really a surprise for the Nepali people. So far, whatever types, magnitude and intensity of political changes have occurred in Nepal in the past under any brand of political system - be it during the 104-year autocratic family regime of the Ranas or be it in the authoritarian partyless Panchayat rule - all such changes revolved around the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris only; it has never passed beyond their inner circles. This is exactly why none of the political transformation has really changed the brutal fact that majority of the total population of Nepal comprising indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims and Christians remain suppressed, oppressed, depressed, exploited, subjugated and discriminated by the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris. Prithvi Narayan Shah, the founder of the Gorkha imperialism and internal colonialism, succeeded in his mission by using Sam, Dam, Danda and Bhed (“policy, money, punishment and divide & rule”). The ruling Bahuns and Chhetris, on the one hand, never become tired of parroting the myth of peaceful co-existence of caste and ethnic groups since time immemorial. Indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits and Madhesis, on the other hand, have never attempted in the past to stage any revolution or insurgency but now, though lately, they are beginning to simmer their strong dissatisfaction against the suppressive and oppressive rule by the Bahuns and Chhetris. I have divided this paper in three parts: (1) theories of revolutions/insurgencies, (2) real and possible insurgencies in Nepal, and (3) some contentious issues. Theories of Revolutions/Insurgencies I believe that a review of literature on revolution and collective actions provides a frame for comparative understanding of such phenomena in Nepal. Also, we can see how close or how far we are from revolutions and insurgencies that had already occurred elsewhere. There are six major families of social-scientific theories of revolutions: Marxist theories represented by Karl Marx, aggregate-psychological theories by Ted Gurr, systems/value consensus theories by Chalmers Johnson, and political-conflict theories by Charles Tilly, structural theories by Theda Skocpol, and political process theories represented by Dough McAdam. Johnson (1982:170) has identified four basic groups: actororiented theories, structural theories, conjunction theories, and process theories. Marxist theories are based on the assumption that class is the prime 137 movers of change, including revolutions. According to Karl Marx, "At a certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of society come in conflict with the existing relations of production, or-what is but a legal expression for the same thing-with the property relations within which they have been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolution" (Marx 1859). Ted Gurr developed aggregate-psychological theory first in his book Why Men Rebel? According to him "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation (RD) among members of a collectivity." Likewise "The intensity of RD varies strongly with the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities" (Gurr 1971:360). Chalmers Johnson (1982) developed the systems/value consensus theory of revolution. He writes, "Accelerators - that is, the precipitating causes of a revolution - are thus events or ideological beliefs that make revolution possible by exposing the inability of the elite to maintain its monopoly of force"(Johnson 1982:101). In the political-conflict theory developed by Charles Tilly (1978:52), two models, namely, polity model and mobilization model, are identified. Polity model comprises of government, contender, polity and coalition. Mobilization model comprises interests, organization, mobilization, and collective action (Tilly 1978:54). Theda Skocpol (1979) believes that revolutions are not made; they come. In her non-voluntarist, structural theory of social revolution, Skocpol has identified two main causes of revolutions: (a) old-regime states in crisis or political crisis due to monarchy/dominant class, agrarian economy and international pressures and (b) peasant insurrection based on agrarian class structure and local politics. McAdam has developed a political process theory that identifies three sets of factors responsible for insurgencies. According to him, "The first is the level of organization within the aggrieved population; the second, the collective assessment of the prospects for successful insurgency within that same population; and third, the political alignment of groups within the larger political environment" (McAdam 1982:40). Thus structure of political opportunities, indigenous organizational strength as revealed by members, established structure of solidarity incentives, communication network and leaders, and cognitive liberation are the three important factors. Neither actor-oriented nor structural theories really help to understand the underlying causes and dynamics of revolutions and insurgencies. I believe that the Marxists best analyze the class-based revolutions or insurgencies but ethnic-based revolutions or insurgencies are best 138 Negotiating the Resumption explained by political process theories. Jack A. Goldstone (1986:2-5) has listed ten law-like empirical generalizations on the basis of the observations on the "natural history" of revolution around the world. These are as follows: 1. "Prior to a revolution, the bulk of the "intellectuals" - journalists, poets, playwrights, essayists, teachers, members of the clergy, lawyers, and trained members of the bureaucracy-cease to support the regime, write condemnations, and demand major reforms." 2. "Just prior to the fall of the old regime, the state attempts to meet criticism by undertaking major reforms." 3. "The actual fall of the regime begins with an acute political crisis brought on by the government's inability to deal with some economic, military, or political problem rather than by the action of a revolutionary opposition. 4. Even where revolutionaries have united solidly against the old regime, following its collapse, their internal conflicts eventually cause problems." 5. "The first group to seize the reins of state are moderate reformers." 6. "While the moderates seek to reconstruct rule on the basis of moderate reform and often employ organizational forms left over from the old regime, alternative, more radical centers of mass mobilization spring up with new forms of organization." 7. "The great changes in the organization and ruling ideology of a society that follow successful revolutions occur not when old regime first falls, but when the radical, alternative, massmobilizing organizations succeed in supplanting the moderates." 8. "The disorder brought by the revolution and the implementation of radical control usually results in forced imposition of order by coercive rule." 9. "The struggles between radicals and moderates and between defenders of the revolution and external enemies frequently allow military leaders to move from obscurity to commanding, even absolute, leadership." 10. "The radical phase of the revolution eventually gives way to a phase of pragmatism and moderate pursuit of progress within the new status quo." Real And Possible Insurgencies or a Revolution In Nepal In this section, I will give an overview of the history of insurgencies in 139 Nepal followed by a detail analysis of intensifying class-based insurgency and possibility of ethnic, caste, region, and religion based insurgencies in Nepal. Till now Nepal has never ever experienced any revolution. A Brief Historical Review of Insurgencies King Drabya Shah used violence to become a king of a Gurung (Ghale) kingdom called Lig Lig. Later, King Prithvi Narayan Shah used intensive violence in his mission of "territorial integration" of Nepal. Historians have noted that he had ordered his army to cut tip of the nose and ear of the peoples of Kirtipur, which eventually weighed 18 Dharnis (about 42 Kilograms). Jang Bahadur Rana, the founder of the 104-year autocratic rule used brutal violence in the Kot Parba (Kot Massacre) and Bhandarkhal Parba (Bhandarkhal Massacre) to establish his autocratic rule. Jamadar Sripati Gurung of Lamjung led the Gurung revolt against Jang Bahadur in 1857 in a military parade organized in the Tundikhel in Kathmandu. The Rana rulers killed Sripati. Later Sripati's associate Sukadev Gurung led the insurgency by mobilizing the Gurungs of the Gorkha and Lamjung (Manandhar 1998). The Rana rulers imprisoned him for life; he died in prison in 1875. After his arrest, Supati Gurung expanded the insurgency but the Rana rulers using the army suppressed it. The Rana rulers accused him for trying to become the King of the Buddhists. Lakhan Thapa Magar also had revolted against Jang Bahadur in 1876. Later, he along with his two associates, Aja Singh and Achhami Magar were hanged in Gorkha. A Sherpa woman had also rebelled against the Ranas. Though these rebellious events were of little consequence to make any dent on the autocratic political regime, they had nevertheless indicated certain features of general unrest in the public life in Nepal. Organized political insurgency was indeed initiated by the Nepali Congress Party. An organized armed uprising led by the "Liberation Army" of the Nepali Congress was launched first at Birgunj on the midnight of November 11, 1950. The Liberation Army controlled many districts and successfully overthrew 104-year autocratic Rana rule in February 1951. Leaders of various indigenous ethnic groups, including Rai, Limbu, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Newar, Thakali and Tharu, played decisive role in armed uprising of 1951. Later the Bahun-Chhetri leaders systematically and calculatively excluded them from the national politics and public offices. During the first half of 30 years of autocratic partyless Panchayat regime (1960-1990), Nepali Congress Party unsuccessfully organized several armed insurgencies, including the failed bomb attack to assassinate 140 Negotiating the Resumption late King Mahendra and also King Birendra, along with a successful hijacking of the RNAC airplane on a domestic flight. The first failed bomb attack against late King Mahendra was in Janakpur in Januray 1962. From 1972 to 1974, the then banned Nepali Congress Party executed series of planned but failed insurgency activities against the partyless Panchayat political system. These failed insurgency activities include bombing in Haripur, Saptari in August 1972, in Biratngar and Malangawa on December 17, 1973, passenger plane hijacking on June 10, 1973, failed attempt to assassinate King Birendra by bombing in Biratnagar on March 16, 1974, bomb attack against Prayagraj Singh Suwal on May 5, 1974, and armed insuregncy in Timburbote in Solukhumbu district on December 16, 1974. The autocratic partyless Panchayat rulers invariably charged all these activities of Nepali Congress as “terrorist,” “anti-national,” “anticonstitutonal” and “anti-King” activities. The East Koshi Regional Committee of the Jhapa district Committee of the Nepal Communist Party (Marxist Leninist), following Naxalite movement of India, “killed” couple of local feudals in Jhapa district, eastern Nepal on May 16, 1971. The autocratic Pancha rulers charged the communist leaders who were involved in the killings as “terrorists” and “criminals.” The Nepal Janabadi Morcha led by Ram Raja Prasad Singh blasted several bombs in Pokhara in June 19 and in Kathmandu, including the building of Rastriya Panchayat and Hotel Annapurna, in June 20, 1986. The people's movement of 1990 was also to some extent violent. The army and police reportedly killed at least 48 citizens. This figure provided by the interim government is believed to be a gross underestimate by the general public. The latest violent events, that is, class-based people's war, have been in progress since February 13, 1996. Ethnic and religion based violence is beginning to simmer. But these are yet to turn into a full-blown ethnic insurgency or a revolution. Class-based Maoist Insurgency in Action According to Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., "Historically, guerrilla operations have contributed to or even led (1) resistance to foreign invasion and occupation; (2) the attainment of political or socioeconomic concessions from incumbent regimes; (3) the overthrow of unpopular governments; (4) wars of national liberation or decolonization; and (5) the creation of new political entities" (Guevara, 1985). Also, during the Vietnam War, Nepali people had admired the courage of Vietnamese guerrillas led by Ho Chi Minh who succeeded to 141 kneel down one of the then two nuclear superpowers, the United States of America. Poet Bhupi Sherchan (1993:38-41) wrote a poem entitled Ho Chi Minhlai Chiti (“A letter to Ho Chi Minh”) predicting that the Vietnamese people is destined to win a war against American imperialism. Four years ago, hardly any one, except the Maoist parties, would have thought of the possibility of launching an organized armed "insurgency" in Nepal but now it has become a political reality. Before February 13, 1996, Nepali public had heard and read about guerrillas of Vietnam, Peru, Iran, Afghanistan, Colombia, Guinea-Bissau and elsewhere and "under ground" political leaders and activists in Nepal but now the news media are flooded with stories of Nepali guerrillas everyday. Four years ago, when the Maoist people's war originated the space covered by guerrilla activities was localized in the remote hills of Rolpa and Rukum districts but now it has spread like a wildfire engulfing all 75 districts, except Manang. Four years ago, the ruling and the opposition national political parties thought of the then newly waged people's war as "children's games" but now both Nepali and international intellectuals, diplomats and organizations, including British Foreign Minister Mr. Robin Cook and the European Parliament, have advised His Majesty's Government of Nepal to contend this wild political fire through dialogue but not by using brutal force. By now the Nepali people have either heard or experienced "Romeo operation," "Sera-Kilo-2 operation" and "Peter operation" all launched by the security forces to crush the Maoist insurgency with no positive outcome. The Maoist political parties under the leadership of Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, and the United People's Front led by Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, started people's war on February 13, 1996 after the then Deuba government failed to respond to the former's 40 points demands- 9-point demand related to nationalism, 16-point demand related to democracy, and 13-point demand related to the question of livelihood. These demands were made with the then prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba by submitting a memorandum on February 4, 1996 (NRBS 1996:19-20). The People's War started with three goals: (1) to establish a politics of armed conflict, (2) to put in practice that army is the main form organization and war is the main form of the struggle, and (3) to prepare a base for guerrillas (NRBS 1996:25). In the first phase, the party took several actions in at least five districts, namely, Rolpa, Rukum and Jajarkot in mid-west, Gorkha in the west and Sindhuli in the central development regions. For publicity as well as spreading the fear the actions taken by the Maoist insurgents included armed attack on the police posts, confiscation and tearing of promissory notes collected by the Small 142 Negotiating the Resumption Farmer's Development Program (SFDP), bomb blasts at distillery factories, attack on the local feudal, and petrol bombing on the Pepsi Cola factory (NRBS 1996). According to the Informal Service Sector's (INSEC) Human Rights Year Book 1996, "Deprived of their fundamental rights to live, a total of 31 people, including 12 each in Rolpa and Rukum, 1 in Jajarkot, and 6 in Sindhuli, Ramechhap, Kavre, and other districts, have been killed by the Maoists. Similarly, 70 people have been killed in the government's violent war. This includes 37 in Rolpa, 20 in Rukum, 5 in Jajarkot, and 8 in other districts of the country." The report further writes, "Various groups, including the representatives of human rights organizations, have gone on observation visits of the various districts of the country. The groups have made their reports public. These reports show that there have been serious violations of human rights by the government. People have been killed immediately after being arrested and while being taken to the police post or on their way to the district headquarters from the police post. The reports have denied that people were killed in the alleged encounters with the Maoists, as claimed by the government media"(INSEC, 1996). The second phase was initiated after the "successful completion" of the first year's activities. The three main goals of the second phase were: (1) to widely mobilize people in favour of the People's War, (2) to control weapons and other commodities, and (3) to concentrate power to transform main areas into guerrilla areas (NRBS 1996:33). Dr. Baburam Bhattarai gives two justifications for the armed conflict: one is the external relations and processes, that is oppression by imperialism and expansionism and the other is the internal social and spatial (regional) relation. The latter is specified as semi-feudal relations and retardation in agriculture, decline of industry and expansion of comprador and bureaucratic capital, and regional inequality and nationality question. Bhattarai writes: "The oppressed regions within the country are primarily the regions inhabited by the indigenous people since time immemorial. These indigenous people dominated regions that were independent tribal states prior to the formation of the centralized state in the later half of the eighteenth century, have been reduced to the present most backward and oppressed condition due to the internal feudal exploitation and the external semi-colonial oppression. They have been left behind the historical development process because of blockade of their path of independent development and imposition of socio-cultural [sic] along with economic oppression upon them with the backing of 143 the state by those forces who had come from outside. Thus it is quite natural that the question of regional oppression of Mongol dominated eastern, central and the western hilly regions or the Austro-Dravid dominated Inner Tarai and Tarai regions are manifested in the form of national oppression. They're the regional and the national question intertwined with one another. Besides this, the problem of the Khas dominated Far Western Karnali region can occur as regional question instead of a nationality question and it will have to be tackled accordingly. Thus, according to the concrete situation it is necessary to solve the problem of oppressed regions and nationalities by granting regional and national autonomy"(Bhattarai n.d.: 33-34). In the similar vein, Prachanda, another prominent leader of the Maoist insurgency, writes: "Along with the development of the People's War a new consciousness for fighting for their own rights and liberation is spreading amongst many oppressed nationalities of the country such as Magars, Gurungs, Tamangs, Newars, Tharus, Rais, Limbus and Madhesis. People's War has speeded up the process of formation of various national liberation fronts and expansion of nationality organizations. Similarly, today along with the development of People's War, a wave of organization and struggle has been created among Dalit castes at a greater speed and a wider scale. The Dalits are today rebelling against inhuman tyranny perpetrated upon by the feudal state of high caste Hindus."(Prachanda n.d.:22). Table 1. Classification of those killed by the police in the people's war 1. 2. 3. 4. Total Sex a. Female b. Male Caste / Ethnic groups a. Magar b. Chhetri c. Backward d. Newar e. Tamang f. Bahun Age a. Below 25 b. Above 25 71 6 65 44 16 4 2 2 2 23 48 144 Negotiating the Resumption 5. Charged with a. Charged in false cases by the government 14 b. Not charged in Government cases 57 6. Capacity a. Party Member 29 b. Supporter 42 7. Occupation a. Farmer 62 b. Student 6 c. Teacher 1 8. Involvement a. Guerrilla group 11 b. Political organizers 6 c. Organizers of associate Organizations 9 d. Elected representatives 4 e. Supporting people 31 9. Type of Killing a.Shot after torture 59 b. In clash with police 6 c. By bullets or stones while breaking cordon 4 d. By torture in custody 3 e. Killed by hooligans 2 f. Thrown off a cliff 2 ___________________________________________________________ Source: Central Publication Department NCP (Maoist) quoted by INSEC (1997:122). 145 Table 2. Latest number of Casualties in the Maoist People’s War By caste and ethnic groups (Till February 2000) S.N. Caste/Ethnic Groups Number of individuals killed by the police Men Women Total Number of individuals All Total killed by the Maoist Men Women Total “High Castes” 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. Bahun 46 Chetri 129 Thakuri 19 Sub-total 194 Dalits Kami 32 Damai 14 Sarki 3 Sunar 1 Sub-total 50 Indigenous Peoples Magar 186 Rai 1 Tamang 19 Tharu 9 Newar 11 Gurung 4 Lama Sherpa Danuwar Sub-total 230 Madhise Yadav Rajput Muslim Sub-total 228 Others Sub-total 228 All Total 702 14 13 1 28 60[7.5] 142[17.8] 20[2.5] 222[27.8] 59 122 26 207 1 2 3 60[17.1] 120[10.4] 122[34.6] 264[22.0] 28[7.9] 48[4.2] 210[59.6] 432[37.6] 6 1 1 8 38[4.8] 15[1.9] 4[0.5] 1[0.1] 58[7.3] 4 2 2 8 1 1 1 3 19 8 1 3 2 2 34 205[25.7] 1[0.1] 27[3.4] 10[1.3] 14[1.8] 4[0.5] 2[0.2] 2[0.2] 265[33.2] 72 2 11 5 12 8 2 1 113 1 1 2 73[21.0] 278[24.2] 2[0.5] 3[0.2] 12[3.4] 39 5[1.4] 15 12[3.4] 26 8[2.2] 12 2[0.5] 4 2 1[[0.2] 1 115[32.5] 380[32.9] 25 25 96 253[31.7] 253[31.7] 798[100] 6 1 1 8 8 8 344 1 1 9 6[1.8] 6[0.5] 1[0.3] 1[0.1] 1[0.3] 1[0.1] 8[2.3] 8[0.7] 9[2.6] 262[22.8] 9[2.6] 262[22.8] 353[100]1,151[100] 5[1.4] 3[0.8] 3[0.8] 11[3.0] 43[3.8] 18[1.6] 4[0.3] 4[0.3] 69[6.0] Source: Adapted from Ekkaisau Satabdi, Volume 4, Number 3, (2000), p. 26. Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage. According to the Nepal Police Bulletin, the police claimed that more than 1036 events occurred from February 13, 1996 to September 23, 1998. The police report also claimed that the number of deaths and injured common people and political activists were 83 and 233 respectively (see Table 1). 146 Negotiating the Resumption Similarly, 248 "terrorists" and 24 police died and 184 police were injured in the encounter between the police and the Maoists. The police have charged 1495 individuals who were engaged in "terrorist activities." The police report stated that altogether Rs. 75,542,600 worth property was lost due to "vandalism," "blasting" manhandling and looting. Police had confiscated 685 "Bharua Bandook," 12 twelve bore guns, 55 "Katuwa Pestols," 147 hand bombs, 13 mark-2 high explosive military pattern grenade, 7 three-nut-three rifles and 57 bullets, 1 thirty-eight bore revolver and 6 bullets, 456 pieces of gelatin, 97 detonators, 11 pressure cooker bombs, 43 pipe bombs, 1 k.g. of very powerful(?) 83 m.m. 5.4 kg. Super dyn explosive p.e.k used explosives and a number of sharp weapons (Nepal Police 1999:66). Maoists had declared that the guerrillas would use formal dress and occupy various military positions. The main goal of the third phase was to lift the people's war to a new height. The insurgency activities were further intensified during this phase. The fourth phase, which is running now, is to develop Rolpa and Rukum districts as base areas for guerrilla activities. The Janadesh Weekly on October 27, 1998 has reported that the people's war has now entered the phase of the formation of base areas. In a pamphlet released on October 27 1998, the NCP (Maoist) have stated, "By now it is clear that preliminary practice of local people's government has begun in various parts of the country. This new government would be a common government of the all patriotic and people's power who are anti-feudal and anti-imperialism. We have been clarifying that given Nepal's distinctive history, that type of new government would implement programmes to ethnic autonomy based on the ethnic pluralism of specific ethnic groups in specific regions by fully recognize and honour ethnic right to selfdetermination. The process of formation of base region and local people's government would go hand in hand with acceptance of right to selfdetermination and ethnic autonomy; high caste hegemony for centuries would be demolished"(Janadesh Weekly, October 27, 1998) [my translation]. Although caste/ethnic identity of 228 individuals killed are not known, Table 2 clearly reveal that Maoists have so far killed 210 so-called “high castes” people and police have killed 265 indigenous people, mostly suspected as Maoists. Similarly, Maoists have killed relatively few indigenous people on the charge of being local feudals or police informants, and police also have killed very few so-called “high caste” people. In the case of Dalits about equal number of individuals are killed by both Maoist and police. Both the Maoist and police have killed very few people belonging to Madhesi and Muslims communities. 147 The Maoist People’s War has by now spread in all 75 districts, except Manang. Recently, prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala has publicly stated that he is going to activate the National Defense Council and use army to contend the Maoist People’s War. However, the prime minister has apparently given up the idea of mobilizing army against the Maoists fearing its unintended consequences. Instead of army, he has now, while speaking at a gathering organized by the Editors' Society in Kathmandu, declared that he would set up an armed police to contend it. Hence, the government appears to have been mired by confusion while dealing with the Maoist insurgency (Himalaya Times, May 13, 2000). Therefore, the current people's war may either succeed to declare specific ethnic or regional autonomy in several parts of Nepal or His Majesty's Government of Nepal will be forced to use army "as the last resort" to contend the insurgency. In either case, it appears that the country is now very close to a bloody civil war. Li Onesto (1999) in its Part 16 of the 22 Part dispatches published in the Revolutionary Worker provides detail information about the involvement of indigenous ethnic groups or Nationalities in the ongoing Maoist people's war. He writes, "One of the aspects of the People's War that I'm very anxious to learn more about is the relationship between the New Democractic Revolution and the struggle of different oppressed nationalities in Nepal" (Onesto, 1999:11). He further writes, "The national question is one of the most important components of the New Democratic Revolution in Nepal. And during my visits to other parts of Nepal, I had already gotten a glimpse of how the struggle of different ethnic groups is fuelling the People's War" (Onesto, 1999:12). Onesto writes: "Another member of this squad said: "The main reason I joined the people's army is because there is discrimination by Hindu chuvinism, by the reactionary ruling class against the indigenous people. I belong to the Tamang people, one of the oppressed nationalities in Nepal. This group doesn't have any opportunities in the government and the ruling sectors, and we have been oppressed by the reactionary Hindu state. I came to understand that, in order to get free from this kind of oppression, we cannot do this without picking up the gun, because the reactionary state power rules over us with the gun. This is why I joined the people's army. An older guerrilla, a 40 year-old man from Bethan said: "The main reason I joined the people's army was not only economic repression, but as an indigenous people we can't speak our language, read our mother tongue and we are repressed by the Hindu government. So now 148 Negotiating the Resumption I have great hope and determination that we will be able to establish a New Democratic system that is for equality and will wipe out all the discrimination that is being done by reactionaries. Here in the west, the Magar people are the largest ethnic minority group. And in Rolpa and Rukum, they make up a majority of the forces fighting the revolution. In fact, the strong unity between the struggle of the oppressed Magar people and the revolution is one of the reasons these districts have become strongholds of the People's War"" (Onesto, 1999:12). So far indigenous peoples or nationalities have joined the Maoist insurgency movement as individuals. Their ethnic organizations have not yet involved in the movement. Dhruba Kumar (1998:12), a security study's expert at the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS) has given some reasons why ethnic organizations have not yet joined the Maoist people's war. He is of the view that ethnic groups has "yet to evolve and consolidate an umbrella organization to form a singular political platform in taking indisputable decision," constitutional recognition of multilingualism and multi-ethnicity has "theoretically opened up the avenues in articulating legitimate ethnic grievances, and "moderation is still the currency through which both the government and ethnic groups can reach satisfactory resolution to the problems they face." By now it is clear that some ethnic organizations, such as the Magarat Liberation Front, Limbuan Liberation Front, Tamuan Liberation Front, Tamang Liberation Front, Khambuan Libertaion Front, Tharuwan Liberation Front and the Newa Khala are politcally organized and all these organizations are very sympathetic to the Maoist People's War. People's War is primarily a class-based war. However, given the social structure of the Nepali society and the collective memory of different groups of people, the Maoist insurgents have invited various indigenous ethnic groups to join in and support the people's war. So far, the Khambuan Mukti Morcha led by Gopal Khambu have publicly supported the people's war and they too have gone underground. According to Dhruba Kumar (1998:12) the inclusion of ethnic issues and the rights to 'self-determination' by the Maoists as the raison d'etre for the people's war can be understood as a strategy to widen the canvas of struggle through the formation or attempted formation of a broad coalition of interests against the state at a time when some ethnic groups like the Khambuan Mukti Morcha (Khmabuan Liberation Front) have started their support to the Maoist cause." The Newars' of the Kathmandu Valley and other indigenous ethnic 149 groups have not openly supported or joined in the people's war as desired by the Maoist leaders. The continuing leadership of the Maoist insurgency by the Bahuns and Chhetris dismays some intellectuals and activists, who are sympathetic to indigenous ethnic groups' plight and rights. However, before making such observation, two more observations should be considered. One, it is a fact that both parties have been able to reach out and mobilize Dalits, indigenous ethnic groups, and women, which otherwise have never been done by any national, including ruling, political parties so far. Also, the Maoists have filled up positions at all levels, including the high ranking positions, by these hitherto ignored and marginalized groups. Two, one should remember that diamond cuts diamond. Similarly, Bahun-Chhetris would be in a better position to demolish the monopoly of the Bahun-Chhetris. It should be recalled here that Marx has clearly shown how feudal society was transformed into capitalist society because it was not because that the serfs rebelled against the feudal lords but because feudal lords themselves contributed in this process. If these two Bahun leaders should succeed in the people's war and should continue to dominate the post-revolutionary period as done by the "democratic" leaders of the post-people's movement of 1990, it would not help to change the continuing trend of the last 230 years. On the contrary, if they should succeed and subsequently honour the social diversity of Nepal and its due representation of the Dalits, women, indigenous ethnic groups and other minority groups in the public offices, many ethnic activists believe that it should not be taken as a problem. They say that this is what it should be but one has to wait and see. The NCP (Maoist) and the United People's Front are led by the Bahuns, Pushpa Kamal Dahal and Dr. Baburam Bhattarai respectively. Unlike other bigot and fair weather Bahun-Chhetris, they appear to be more than all-weather liberals. As long as they are not in power, it would be difficult to test what they are up to. If they should succeed, come to power and give all the rights of indigenous peoples, Dalits, women and other marginalized groups, it would hardly matter if the two Bahun leaders continue to lead. If they should fail to comply with what they have promised even after the success of the People's war, they would not only get cumulative punishment but the class-cum-ethnic-based people's war would pave a way for a violent total ethnic war. Ethnic Insurgency in Waiting? Although the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 has recognized multi-caste/ethnic and multi-lingual characteristics of the 150 Negotiating the Resumption country, it failed to recognize it as a multi-religious country and also to ethnopolitics. Thus, in theory, the state has constitutional authority to suppress ethnopolitics, and in practice, that ethnic insurgency is the only option left open. The last political party that has very recently become ethnic sensitive is the Nepali Congress. The NC party took lead in implementing some programmes such as transmission of radio news in various mother tongues, establishment of the Rastriya Janajati Bikas Samiti (National Committee for Development of Nationalities), and development programs for Adibasi and Janajati, and Dalits in the Ninth Plan (1997-2002). The communist parties, including the NCP (UML) and the NCP (ML), though they claim that their party stands for revolutionary change in the society have never done what has been done by the Nepali Congress. It appears that all the political parties, most of which are in full control of the Bahun and Chetris of one or the other lineages, have begun to realize and sense a real possibility of lighting up a fire of ethnic conflict or communal violence along with an ethnic insurgency in the country in near future if their genuine demands such as secularism, cultural autonomy, positive discrimination, and the rights of the indigenous peoples are not fulfilled. In the recent past two possible bloody confrontations between the indigenous ethnic groups and the Bahun-Chhetris were averted. Once it was when the Shiva Sena, the Hindu fundamentalist group announced a first ever Nepal Bandh ("Nepal shut down") against the human rights activists Padma Ratna Tuladhar who had opined that some indigenous ethnic groups who have a tradition of eating beef has a right to practice their religion. The Nepal Federation of Nationalities (NEFEN) challenged their call and later the Shiva Sena pulled out the Bandh and the possible ethnic confrontation was averted. The second time was when the Pashupati Chetra Bikas Samiti (Pashupati Area development Committee) demolished the moratorium of the Rais, Limbus, Yakkhas and Sunuwars, located at the Sleshmantak forest in the Pashupati area. Later, the Samiti officially regretted for the incidence and promised to rebuild the demolished moratorium. Thus the possible ethnic clash was averted. It should be noted here that in ethnic conflicts within groups with close interaction, "one side hates the other more intensely the more it is felt to be a threat to the unity and the identity of the group" (Coser, 1956). In my article on ethnopolitics published by CNAS, I had raised few questions: "Is there a possibility of ethnic insurgency in Nepal? Will the rising tide of ethnopolitics reach a shore of ethnic insurgency?" (Bhattachan, 1995). I still believe that the political process model developed by McAdam (1982) to explain Black insurgency in the United 151 States helps us to understand such prospects in Nepal. Following him the possibility of ethnic insurgency may be analyzed on the basis of some indicators such as structure of political opportunities and indigenous organizational strength. The structure of political opportunities in Nepal, the first indicator, is unduly favourable to Bahuns-Chhetris, but unfavourable to non-BahunsChhetri groups. For the last two hundred years Bahuns-Chhetris were able to capture up to 70-80 percent of the high level positions, including political, administrative, police, and military. This is not a historic accident, but a well-manufactured product of the ruling Bahuns-Chhetris (Bhattachan, 1995:136). As political opportunities for hitherto denied indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, and Madhesis, their ever rising political awareness might take them in one of two directions: increasing their political leverage or undermining the existing political system. Currently, it is directed more towards the first option, but if the present trend leads to a dead end, it will shift to an ethnic paradigm (Bhattachan, 1995:136). The other indicator of ethnic insurgency is the indigenous organizational strength, particularly its membership, points of commonality and solidarity, communication network, and leaders. If the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh or any or some of the 31 member ethnic groups that decide to stage an ethnic insurgency at the national and local level it will not be difficult (Bhattachan, 1995:137). If the "people's war" should fail or succeed but the Bahun-Chhetri rulers become a mirror image of their predecessors in not yielding much to the satisfaction of the indigenous ethnic groups and if they should lose their patience with utter disenchantment, in either case, violent ethnic clashes are inevitable. If such clashes should occur, then it becomes durable, disruptive in the domestic politics, and it would not disappear so easily. Welsh (1993:45) suggests, "to borrow and substantially amend Marx's dictum, the problem is not to understand ethnicity, but to learn how to cope with it." By paraphrasing Simmel's proposition, Coser (1956:71) suggests that "a conflict is more passionate and more radical when it arises out of close relationships." The outcome of such conflicts, according to Brown (1993), is ethnic reconciliation, ethnic separation and ethnic war. Welsh (1993:56) writes, "if multiethnic states are to have any hope of sustaining democratic political systems, 'winner-take-all' outcomes have to be avoided." If ethnic conflicts, clashes, insurgencies should happen in Nepal, it would not be replicas of ethnic problems in Sri Lanka, Bosnia- 152 Negotiating the Resumption Herzgovina, Kosovo, Rwanda and Fiji. Instead, it would have its own characteristics, feature, nature and consequences based on the collective memory of the past and the existing social structure of the Nepalese society. Other Possible Insurgencies In the future, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims and Chrstians also may resort to insurgency activities if they continue to be oppressed, suppressed, subjugated and exploited by the ruling so-called “high caste” Hindu, Hill Bahun-Chhetris. Dalits have been socially and economically most suppressed and oppressed group not for centuries but for millenniums. The total population of Dalits as revealed in the census report of 1991 is around 15 percent of the total 18 million populations of Nepal but the Dalits believe that their total number should be at least one fifth of the total population of Nepal, that is, about 4 million. Dalits comprise of mainly two-type (1) Hindu Dalits and (2) Hinduized Janajati (ethnic) Dalits. Hindu Dalits may be categorized into (a) Hill Hindu Dalits and (2) Tarai Hindu Dalits. Among the Hill Hindu Dalits, the main groups include Damai, Kami, Sarki, and Gaine; among the Tarai Hindu Dalits the main groups include Chamar, Dom, Dusadh, and Musahar. Among the Hinduized Janajati Dalit, the main Dalit groups from the Newars include Pode, Chyame, and Kusule. Due to the intense pressure exerted by the ruling Hindus, the Dalits themselves have developed internal caste hierarchy with the concept of purity and pollution among themselves in the process of Sanskritization, which in fact is an internal colonization by the ruling Bahun and Chhetris. Due to the influence of the dominant Hindu values, Dalits exist within the Dalits. They all are scattered around the country; they do not have their traditional homeland and they do not live numerously in one geographical region because of the nature of their service-oriented occupation. If relative deprivation should invite a revolution, Dalits should have staged revolution thousand times but it was not even hatched till now because of lack of strong organizations that binds them together in pursuit of a revolution. As Dalits have been traditionally treated as untouchable castes by the so-called 'high caste' groups, they have been discriminated, suppressed, oppressed and depressed so much that they were denied to touch 'high caste' people, that their children were denied education, and that they were denied to pursue occupation of their choice. Due to the efforts made by 153 some international donors and INGOs, few Dalits have been able to get higher education. By now only one Dalit has earned a Ph.D. degree and very few Dalits have received Master's and Bachelor's degrees. Dalits have been demanding for secularism, positive discrimination, elimination of the practice of untouchability, retain their family names in official documents, including citizenship certificates, free entry in Hindu temples, and income generating programmes. Recently, His Majesty's Government of Nepal has established a Rastriya Dalit Tatha Uptpidit Bikas Samiti (National Dalit and Oppressed Development Committee) under the Ministry of Local Development. Dalits protested when a Bahun was politically appointed as the first executive director of the committee. The Ninth FiveYear Plan has a separate section on the Dalit Development Programs. The plan document makes a provision to establish a high-powered National Dalit Council for their development. So far these plans are confined in the plan documents only becasue none of the action plans has been implemented yet. With increasing use of Dalits as vote banks by the political parties, exposure of organization building and awareness of suppressed ethnic and other minority religious groups, Dalits have formed various organizations on the national party lines. Although there is no prospect of Dalit insurgency per se, nevertheless, individually Hill Dalits have already been playing significant role in classbased people's war. In future the Dalits of the Tarai also may get involved in the Maoist insurgency. They, however, would not support ethnic insurgencies because ethnic grievances are against the hegemony of Hindu religion and Nepali language of which they are also a part, along with the Bahun-Chhetris of the Hills and Brahman, Kshyatriyas and Vaisyas of the Tarai. Similarly, Madhesi insurgency is also highly likely in Nepal. The Nepal Tarai Congress was formed in 1951 with three objectives: autonomy of the Tarai, Hindi as a state language and employment in the civil service (Gaige 1975:109). In 1956, Save Hindi movement gained momentum and hostile crowds clashed in many places. During the autocratic partyless Panchayat rule, language issues in the Tarai remained as grievances but did not get an opportunity to outburst into a mass movement. In the early eighties, Gajendra Narayan Singh formed the Nepal Sadvabana Parisad to raise the Madehsi issues. Later, after the people's movement of 1990, the Parishad was transformed into the Nepal Sadvabana Party demanding for the autonomy of the Tarai region. Since 1950, the question of Tarai identity has surfaced up again and again in many different forms (Dahal 1992; and Yadav 1997). If the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India wish (some Nepali 154 Negotiating the Resumption public believe that they may be covertly trying their best) to stage a Madhesi insurgency in Nepal it would not take long because of a number of reasons, including open border, large scale of population movement across the border, continuing marginalization and suppression of the Madhesis, and heavy concentration of population of Indian origin in the Tarai region. If Madhesi insurgency should happen in Nepal it may take directions either to make the Singhadurbar to be more regional sensitive or to a fate, as many Nepali public believe, of being another "Sikkim." If the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris become sensitive towards the Madhesis and recognize their legitimate demands as the citizens with equal rights, then it would naturally head to the first direction. If they are continually ignored suppressed and exploited the Madhesi insurgency or revolution may take the second direction, which none of the conflicting parties would like to see to happen. But open border, cross-border drug trafficking, terrorism, and over immigration of the people of Indian origins outnumbering the Nepali people and covert manipulation by the RAW may head to the second direction. Currently, Nepal Sadvabana Party has been representing the Madhesi issues but the party has been confined to small pockets rather than expanding all over the Tarai. The public often charges them as an "agent of India" but they claim that the big parties like Nepali Congress and Nepal Communist Party were born in India but Sadvabana Party was born in Nepal. The real possibility, however, is that if the Madhesis do not trust the Sadvabana Party, it may be another party or parties that may genuinely represent the problems of the Tarai and stage an insurgency or revolution, if necessary. If, this should happen, there are good reasons to believe that it would succeed. If Madhesi insurgencies should occur in Nepal, we may see significant roles played by the Tarai Dalits, Muslims and indigenous ethnic groups such as the Tharus, Rajbanshis and Dhimals. Muslim insurgency is also another possibility in Nepal though they are concentrated in very few districts, namely, Rautahat, Kapilvastu and Nepalgunj. They are most numerously populated in those districts. In the past Hindu-Muslim clashes have occurred several times in Rautahat, Nepalgunj and Birgunj. Such ugly communal confrontations are increasing day by day due to provocation by the Shiva Sena, a religious fundamentalist political party. Often, political parties and the local administration and the police controlled by the Hindu "high" caste groups have used power and authority to suppress such clashes. They are often charged of taking sides of the Hindus only. In future, there is a possibility of more intense violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims but these will be of local or regional nature rather than nationwide. It is possible 155 only in democracy that even minority groups are heard and cared. Muslims' demands including secularism, protection and promotion of Masjid and Madarsas, and declaration of Ramajan as a national holiday are legitimate and just. These demands should be fulfilled by the state, if it is not a predatory state. Unlike Dalit, Madhesi and Muslim insurgency, Christian insurgency is impossible but they may align with or help other insurgency groups. The rate of increase of the Christians indicates that if the Nepal continues to be a Hindu state and Hindu fundamentalism and/or fanaticism intensifies, the Christians will also grow. Possibly, in second half of the twenty-first century, they may be in a position to stage an insurgency against the Hindus. Women in Nepal have been discriminated greatly by their male counterpart under patriarchy of Hindu religion and culture. Women have participated in both movments and Maoist insurgency. In future, if any other insurgency activities should occur, they may be involved significantly. In any case, women may never have their own violent gender insurgency or revolution. Its main reason is that they do not want to confront with their male family members. Some Contentious Issues There are many contentious issues concerning class, caste, ethnic, region, religion-based insurgencies and collective actions. I, however, will confine analysing the three most contentious issues that I believe have practical and strategic implications. These issues are equality or non-zerosum-game versus replacement/displacement or zero-sum-game, traffic of tolerance: one way versus both way, and incrementalism versus radicalism. Equality or Non-Zero-Sum-Game vs. Replacement/Displacement or Zero-Sum-Game It is a tragedy for indigenous ethnic groups and "blessings" for the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris that Harka Gurung had to earn a Ph.D. degree to say that Bahuns and Chhetris had have the monopoly over political, religious, linguistic and cultural resources of the country. Similarly, Ganesh Man Singh had to become a commander of the people's movement of 1990 to say that Bahuns and Chhetris have dominated the political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress and the government. The 'snow leopard' Ang Rita Sherpa had to scale Mt. Everest ten times, mostly 156 Negotiating the Resumption without using oxygen, to say that he had to suffer because no Sherpa is either a minister or a member of the Parliament. This hard reality indicates two things. One is that most of the common people belonging to indigenous ethnic groups do not sense that the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris are the villains of their development until they do miracles on their own like that of Ang Rita, Ganesh Man Singh and Dr. Harka Gurung. And the second is that how many people from indigenous ethnic groups would be fortunate enough to be like Dr. Harka Gurung, Ganesh Man Singh and Ang Rita Sherpa? One may wonder why these prominent people had to wait so long to sense the truth and speak it out clear and loud? So far, ethnic demands have been articulated through peaceful means because the paradigm of such demand is equity and equality. The ruling Bahuns and Chhetris continue to stay at the top of the ladder and have not given any chance to those who are on the ground to climb up. Those indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims and Christians are politely requesting the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris to descend voluntarily and allow them to climb up so that they can meet in the middle and live happily ever after. But the Bahuns and Chhetris are adamant either to get down even an inch or allow others to climb up even an inch. In such a situation the indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Muslims, Madhesis, and Christians have two cards to play: one is to become organized among themselves and network with each other to raise their collective clout of moving upwards together. This option is difficult and time-consuming. The second is to chop off the very foundation of the ladder to bring it down along with the groups of people sitting at its top. This option would be definitely very violent. But one has to remember folk sayings that if yellow grasses should be turned into green, old grasses must be burnt first and that diamond cuts diamond. Pritvi Naryan Shah territorially integrated Nepal by using violence and the Bahun-Chhetri monopoly that has been continuing since then. Such a monopoly can only be removed by using violence against them. Revolutionary change never occurs without bloodshed. Bhupi Sherchan (1993:35) once wrote, "morning won't show up without the fall of the stars, country won't become prosperous if some sons do not sacrifice their lives." Also, Frantz Fanon (1968), in his famous book The Wretched of the Earth, was of the view that if colonizers had used violence to colonize the natives, then natives should use violence to decolonize. In an article on decentralization published by the Political Association of Nepal (POLSAN), I had argued that "For those who are at the helm of affairs, the mechanism of power takes on the form of a zero-sum-game. Decentralization implemented in its true sense can lead to erosion in the 157 traditional monopoly of power and privilege of the ruling Bahuns and Chhetris. Empowering local people also means specific ethnic groups would gain control/monopolize power and benefits in each ethnic cluster, which the rulers have tended to misinterpret as a form of 'communalism'...Power, however, is not really always a zero-sum game and one cannot always say that if one gains it, somebody else must lose. Power may increase even when it is distributed to a whole body of peoples’... power shared makes everyone more powerful, but power monopolized erodes it at the cost of the community, although in that process, it may benefit certain groups" (Bhattachan, 1996:122). Despite the controversy created by the opposition parties, The Local Autonomy Act was passed by the Parliament in 1998. Prior to this, Yuba Raj Sangraula, commenting on the draft Bill, had opined that the Bill recreates centralization in the name of decentralization (Sangraula, 1998). The Act, however, did not rectify the problem. I, therefore, believe that the indigenous ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis and the Muslims should give up the non-zero-sum games; instead, now onwards, they should play other games, that is, zero-sum-games. These suppressed and oppressed groups should be bold enough to say "if you rule us as long as you can do so but we shall leave no stones unturned to displace you for good." Traffic of Tolerance: One Way vs. Both Ways With regards to tolerance between various castes and ethnic groups, I had criticized the dominant group's view that Nepali society is uniquely characterized by such tolerance or "communal harmony" by saying that it is a "patently manufactured myth." Later, David Gellner conceded partly by saying that "may be it was exaggerated to some extent but there has been no serious communal ethnic clashes or violence in Nepal." Evidently communal harmony is a myth because there were several attempts of ethnic insurgency, which were ruthlessly suppressed by the rulers by using excessive forces. It is a myth for another reason. Whatever tolerance has been exhibited, all are from the side of ethnic groups, Dalits, Madhesis, Muslims, Christians and other minority groups. The most intolerant groups have always been the Bahuns and the Chhetris. If they have to lose a little bit of their monopoly over power, privilege and authority, then democracy becomes endangered, "communal harmony" suddenly turns into "communalism," and the country comes to a verge of disintegration. The country's national sovereignty remains entact, "communal harmony" remains strong and feeling of "nationalism" heightens, if Bahuns and Chhetris continue to monopolize power. What a shame! What a logic! 158 Negotiating the Resumption Incrementalism vs. Radicalism Most of the problems-political, economic, social, cultural, religious, linguistic and regional-are so acute that its minimal reasonable solutions demand radical approaches. It would not be easy to solve most of the pressing problems overnight. No one has King Midas touch. It is not only this that is well understood but also the incrementalist approach taken by the all-weather and fair-weather liberal Bahun-Chhetri rulers as against their conservative, fundamentalist fellows. The shocking example of incrementalist position is revealed in a recent Human Development report of Nepal, which states, "The composition of leadership in the state bureaucracy mirrors the condition in the political sphere...There is an astonishing continuity in the predominance of the high caste and specific ethnic groups in state administration since the formation of the Nepali state more than two centuries and a quarter ago, which appear to have occupied 98 percent of the total civil service posts in 1854. More than one century later, in 1969, this percentage came down only marginally, to 93 percent (Panday, 1989; Seddon, 1987). At present, of the 454 top-level civil (Special Class and First Class) positions, 417 (92 percent) are still occupied by the same groups. Similarly, only about 5 percent of high civil service positions are held by women...and only one out of the 75 Special Class positions" (NESAC 1998:145-146). It implies that the BahunChhetris took 144 years to come down from 98 percent to 92 percent (24 years for 1 percent) and if they should follow this rate of descend it will take 1488 years to come down to their current real size, that is, about 30 percent according to Mithyanka (cooked data) of the census. Conclusion So far, there has been no revolution or large-scale ethnic clash, violence, conflict, and insurgency in a predatory unitary Hindu state, Nepal. It was good that bloody ethnic violence did not occur in the past but it was bad that Bahun-Chhetri hegemony continues as usual. The absence of ethnic conflict in the past in a multi-caste/ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-religious society like Nepal along with Bahun-Chhetri domination is a strong indication of a realistic conflict between the BahunChhetris and other ethnic and regional groups, such as indigenous ethnic groups, Madhesis, Dalits, Muslims and Christians (Dahal 1995). Most of the Nepalese people do not want any bloody violence. The ruling Bahun-Chhetris should make the choice whether any bloody 159 violence should happen or not. If they continue to be adamant to give due space to other caste, ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional groups, it should mean that they are inviting their victims to use violence against them. If they confess their blunders done in the past and voluntarily give space long due to other suppressed and oppressed groups, inter-caste and ethnic harmony could flourish in a more positive and healthy way. The predatory nature of the unitary Hindu state has given birth to the people's war. People's war, which is now more than four years old, has blended class-based and caste/ethnic-based insurgency in the country. 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