Syllabus (Version 1)1
June 20, 2014
PHIL 340 Ethics (49414R)
VKC 210
12:00 – 1:45 MW
Professor John Dreher
Office: MHP 211
x05173
dreher@usc.edu
Hours: Mon Aug 25 – Wed Dec 3
Mon 2:15 – 3:15
Wed 10:45 – 11:45
Special Office Hour: Last Minute Review for Final Examination
Fri Dec 12: 9:15 – 10:45; by appointment
Final Examination
Fri Dec 12: 11:00 – 1:00
MATERIALS:
Aristotle, Irwin, trans., Nicomachean Ethics, second edition, Hackett, paper (NE)
Bentham and Mill, Troyer, ed., The Classical Utilitarians, Hackett, paper (CU)
Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Oxford, paper (V&V)
Hare, Moral Thinking, at the Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, paper (MT)
Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Ellington, trans., Hackett, paper (GMM)
Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Clark and Swenson, trans., Hackett, paper (GM)
Spinoza, Shirley, trans., Ethics, 2nd edition, Hackett, paper (E)
Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, paper (ML)
Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, Princeton University Press, paper (T&T)
DESCRIPTION: This course is an introduction to ethics, approached from the perspective of
Anglo-American analytic philosophy. The course seeks to introduce the main current in Western
ethical thought, via the works of Aristotle, Kant, Spinoza, and Mill, among the classics pertaining
to the distinctions between good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice. These four
philosophers offer significantly different approaches to ethics, but they all concern themselves
with the main distinctions of ethics. Aristotle locates the ethical in the rational nature of human
beings, arguing that the moral goodness is the ‘end’ of the soul that chooses to act on a rational
basis in accordance with moral virtue. Spinoza, an egoist, argues that what is good is that which
we know to be certainly useful to us, by which he means those things that promote our health
and secure our integration within a benign society. Kant disagrees, insisting that the good will,
the only thing good in itself, chooses the right because it is right, where what is right conforms
to ‘imperatives’ that are validated by a priori rational principles. Mill departs from Aristotle,
Spinoza and Kant, insisting that the overarching moral principle is to maximize goodness across
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This version of the syllabus is subject to change before the beginning of classes. Also, the schedule of
lectures, although firm, may be varied somewhat to accommodate interests as they arise.
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the moral population, where goodness is broadly defined to be pleasure, which is principally the
reduction and elimination of pain.
By the end of the nineteenth century considerable doubt had arisen about the traditional
ways of drawing the main distinctions of ethics. Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy profoundly
undermined confidence in the possibility of discovering any moral truths. Nietzsche argued that
value is essentially a human creation, those leading successful vibrant lives create their own
values. The course examines these philosophies not only from a classical perspective but
through the works of twentieth century champions of one view or another.
PHIL 340 is meant to be preparation for more advanced courses in ethics, including PHIL 440,
Contemporary Ethical Theory, and PHIL 442, History of Ethics to 1900 and PHIL 443, Value
theory.
REQUIREMENTS AND POLICIES: There will be a midterm examination, which will test for
knowledge of the reading assignments as well as expository and supplementary information
delivered during class. The midterm examination will emphasize the assigned philosophical
texts. There will also be a final examination. The first part of the final examination will test for
knowledge of the reading assignments as well as expository and supplementary information
delivered during class sessions following the midterm examination. The second part of the final
examination will be a comprehensive question dealing with the main theme of the course. The
comprehensive question will be discussed towards the end of the semester. Class attendance is
very strongly recommended. If you must miss a class, please make arrangements with a
classmate to bring you up to date on the missed class.
Lecture Notes: Lecture notes for each class will be distributed by e-mail and posted on
Blackboard, ideally before each class. The lecture notes are meant to summarize the essentials
of each lecture in a relatively non-technical, easily accessible form. They are not a substitute for
class attendance.
Papers: There will be two papers, the first approximately ten pages (3000 words); the second
15 - 20 pages. All papers should be submitted as hard copies and via Blackboard electronically
on the due date and time.
Paper Topic #1: Explain the distinction between teleological and deontological ethical theories,
illustrating the distinction by reference to Aristotle and to Kant. Identify the principal challenges
faced by each of the theories. How do Aristotle and Kant attempt to deal with the challenges of
their respective theories? Is either successful?
Paper Topic #2: Contrast the ethical theories of Mill with those of Aristotle, Kant and Spinoza.
In which respects is Mill sympathetic to Aristotle? Can Mill’s happiness principle account for
Aristotle’s eudemonia? Contrast Spinoza and Mill on the nature of moral motivation? Is
Spinoza’s egoism diametrically opposed to Mill’s utilitarianism? In particular, is it ever right to
act from self-interest according to MIll? Is it ever right to act for the good of another according
to Spinoza? How does Mill characterize Kantian ethical theory? Is Mill’s characterization of
Kant’s theory fair? Some Kantians argue that Mill’s theory fails to account for moral worth?
How might Mill and other utilitarians respond to the Kantian criticism?
Grading: Grades will be weighted as follows:
Midterm Exam – 15%
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Paper #1– 20%
Paper #2 – 30%
Final Exam: Part I – 15%
Final Exam: Part II – 20%
Grading scale:
94: A
90: A –
87: B +
84: B
80: B –
77: C+
And so forth
What Do Grades Mean?
In general, a grade of ’85,’ which is a ‘B’ on the grading scale above, indicates a solid
knowledge of the material covered on the hand-outs and a familiarity with the most
important passages drawn from primary texts. Higher grades of ‘B+,’ ‘A-‘ and ‘A’ indicate
knowledge that goes beyond the basics. In order of importance, those indicators are:
1. demonstrated capacity to analyze the logical structures of arguments, viz., to identify their
premises and conclusions and to determine their strengths and weaknesses;
2. demonstrated knowledge of primary texts by apt and accurate references to them;
3. apt comparisons of primary texts to those of other philosophers;
4. tracing the development and critical analysis of a philosophical position; e.g., Utilitarianism
from Mill to Hare to Foot to Williams.
5. explaining the relation of arguments in one sub-area of philosophy to those of another subarea; e.g., metaphysics/ethics; epistemology/ethics.
6. explaining how fields other than philosophy have influenced and been influenced by
philosophy, e.g., the influence of religion on ethics or of natural science on ethics during the
modern period.
Late Submissions and Missing Work:
Work submitted within 48 hours after the due date and time will be penalized by 1/3 letter
grade. Work submitted more than 48 hours but less than one week after the due date will be
penalized by 2/3 of a letter grade. Work submitted later than one week after the due date
but before the final examination will be penalized by one full letter grade. Work will not be
accepted without an excuse after the final examination.
Missing work after the final examination will be penalized as follows: For any examination or
required paper, the final course grade will be lowered by one full grade. For example,
suppose that only three of four, equally weighted, required pieces of work were submitted on
time and received grades of 90, 85 and 93. The average of the three would be: 89.33, which is
a ‘B+.’ The course grade would be reduced by one full letter grade to ‘C+.’
Integrity and Timeliness:
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Please remember that the University strictly prohibits plagiarism, which can be the mere
failure to acknowledge the work of another as well as the deliberate misrepresentation of the
work of another as your own. You must acknowledge your indebtedness not only to the ideas
of others but also to their words.
In general, excuses for late papers or missed examinations will be accepted only in
extraordinary circumstances, including illness, genuine family emergency, or unavoidable
absence for an approved University of Southern California activity. Please remember that it is
impossible accommodate a special request by a single individual unless the same opportunity
is extended to everyone in the class. This makes it virtually impossible to allow extensions of
due dates for reasons other than those indicated above.
SCHEDULE OF READINGS, ASSIGNMENTS AND EXAMINATIONS:
1. Mon Aug 25: Introduction: What are the traditional problems of ethics and the
main strategies for dealing with those problems in Western philosophy? Does
'ethics' differ from 'morality'? The Hegelian conception of ethics; the strong and
weak points of the Hegelian conception. How do Enlightenment and 19th century
ethical theory differ from prior theories? How does twentieth century moral
philosophy differ from preceding moral philosophies? What is meta-ethics? How is
it distinguished from ethics?
2. Wed Aug 27: Aristotle, NE, Book 1: Virtue and the rational activity of the soul;
virtue and the aim of human activity; happiness and virtue; the good for ‘man’ is the
rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Misfortune can blemish
even a happy life, but virtue saves us from misery. Virtues do not arise in us
naturally, but rather by habituation. Moral virtues are dispositions to deal with
the anticipation of pleasure and pain rationally.
3. Mon Sep 1: University Holiday: Labor Day
4. Wed Sep 3: Aristotle, NE, Book II: Acquisition of virtue; definition of virtue;
virtues of character; relations between mean and extremes; the virtuous act is the
mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency. The mean is chosen for
reasons, as a prudent person would define them. In the case of both character and
health, good character (virtue) and good health tend to be ruined by both excess and
deficiency; hence, virtue coincides with the mean between excess and deficiency.
5. Mon Sep 8: Aristotle, NE, Book III, VII: Aristotle on the Metaphysics of Virtue:
Virtue and choice; voluntary and involuntary acts, acts done in ignorance, excusing
conditions; the distinctions between decisions, wishes and desires; deliberation and
deliberative desires; that the activities of virtue concern those things that promote
”ends,” are voluntary and accord with our decisions. It follows that virtues are “up to
us.” (Otherwise they would not be activities based upon deliberation.) Virtuous
activity includes cultivation of virtues.
6. Wed Sep 10: Aristotle, NE, Book VII: Aristotle on Vice: Injustice and Intemperance:
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There are two types of injustice. In general, injustice refers to vice. But matters of
profit are referred exclusively to justice, which is correlated with a special form of
injustice, dealing with the distribution of honors and wealth. A second sub-specie of
justice refers to the rectification of wrongs, which is essentially restoration.
Restoration is a form of (what is usually called) retributive justice, which is making
people suffer in proportion to the suffering that they have caused others. There are
three person-types: virtuous/vicious; continent/incontinent; God-like/bestial. The
pleasures of the intemperate are sometimes bestial (that is, resemble the pleasures of
those who acts are completely irrational.). The temperate person takes pleasure in the
right things, in the right way, with the right people, at the right time. Incontinence
differs from intemperance. The intemperate person lacks practical knowledge,
thinking that the intemperate act actually is the mean; the incontinent person knows that
the act deviates from the mean, but does it anyway.
7. Mon Sep 15: Aristotle, NE, Book X: §1 - §9: Aristotle on Pleasure and Happiness:
Pleasure is an activity, but not a process because the pleasure experienced in activity
is complete each instant; pleasure is not something that is completed by a process,
but pleasures can increase or decrease during a process (like music or sports).
Happiness is not found in pleasure, but in those activities that accord with virtue. Virtuous
activities give rise to pleasure. Happiness is always associated with independence; that is,
with what cannot be taken away. Decent people (viz. those conforming to generally
accepted standards ) respond to reason, but base people respond only to the threat
of pain. Men generally live as they wish, laying down rules for their wives and children,
in effect establishing private tyrannies. Thus the inculcation of virtue is a matter for
legislation in the city, and so ethics is connected with politics.
8. Wed Sep 17: Foot, V&V, Essay 1: A contemporary neo-Aristotelian theory: Virtues are
beneficial characteristic that belong to the will. Virtue and vice are revealed by our
innermost desires as well as our intention. A wise person knows what is worth pursuing and
how to get what is worth pursuing; a wise person wants to get what is good. The virtues
should be viewed as correctives. The virtues provide necessary responses to temptation,
and they correct deficiencies of motivation. Explaining the difficult case of charity
9. Mon Sep 22: Kant, GMM, Preface, Section I: What is moral worth? There are three key
principles of morality: An action has moral worth only if it is done from duty; an action done
from duty derives its moral worth not according to the purpose for which it is done but
rather from the maxim from which it is done, and duty is the necessity of an action that is
done out of respect for law. The moral law must bind all rational creatures; otherwise its
necessity would be rooted in human nature. The only thing good in itself is a good
will; nevertheless the virtues should be cultivated because they make it easier for us to resist
temptation and to act in accordance with moral law. Contemporary responses to the
Kantian program: Foot and W. D. Ross.
10. Wed, Sep 24: Kant, GMM. Section II; 1. According to Kant, all (ethical) maxims have:
a. Form: They are chosen as if they are universal laws of nature. (Hence the first form
of the Categorical Imperative: Act only so that the maxim of your action can be
consistently willed to be a universal law of nature.) b. Matter: The relative ends of a
human being or other creature with sensuous desire cannot provide the basis of a moral
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imperative because the imperative would be limited by interests. Thus, ethical maxims
apply to all rational creatures and bind them by reason by reason alone. (Hence the maxim:
Treat others as ends; never as means (to satisfy sensuous desire).) c. Form-in-Matter: A
complete determination that harmonizes the maxims within a kingdom of ends that all
rational creatures are bound by reason and hence motivated to cultivate. (Hence the
maxim: Act from maxims that create a systematic union of different rational beings
through common laws.) Introduction to 19th century and contemporary criticisms: Mill,
W.D. Ross, Williams, Foot.
11. Mon, Sep 29: Kant GMM: Section II; Heteronomy and autonomy of the will;
autonomy and the kingdom of ends; the autonomy of the will is presupposed by
morality and the heteronymous will is the source of all spurious principles of
morality. A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a legislator who makes
himself subject to the legislation. In the kingdom of ends price is distinguished from
worth, and it is worth that gives a thing its dignity. If free will is presupposed,
morality and the C.I. follow by analyzing the concept of freedom; To wit, the only
possible way to be free is to act according to one’ rational nature.)
12. Wed, Oct 1: Kant GMM: Section III: Freedom and autonomy of the will rest on the
foundation of pure practical reason; but still there is an issue about moral
motivation: Why I should subject myself to the C.I. when I would at times rather act
straightway to satisfy my desires? There is an apparent circle: In the ‘order of
efficient causes’ we suppose our actions (and even decisions) to be determined by
antecedent events, but in the ‘order of ends’ we think of ourselves as subject to moral laws,
which we freely choose to accept or to reject. Indeed, we think of ourselves as
subject to those laws because we think of ourselves as free or autonomous. Even so
there may not really be a circle, because there may be ‘two points of view,’ one when
we conceive of our will as an ‘a priori’ efficient cause and another when we represent
ourselves (to ourselves) as effects of efficient causes. The categorical imperative is
possible because the idea of freedom makes us parts of the intelligible realm.
Respect for the law arises when competitors (sensuous motivations) are swept out of the
way to make room for the motivational force of the moral law.
13. Mon, Oct 6: Contemporary Perspectives: The problem of moral motivation and the
possibility of moral luck. Williams, ML, Essay 2, pp. 20 – 49; Is there moral luck?
Agency and responsibility: Does it undermine the Kantian system of morality?
Thomas Nagel, ‘Moral Luck:’ To praise and blame, or to celebrate and deplore?
Foot, V&V, Essay XI; Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, Can there be
a categorical imperative that motivates?
14. Wed, Oct 8: Midterm Examination
15. Mon, Oct 13. Mill, CU, Utilitarianism, What is Utilitarianism? Where
does it fit into the spectrum of moral philosophies? The Happiness Principle;
intimations of rule utilitarianism – that the cultivation of a noble character benefits
the whole of humankind even if it does not always benefit the noble individual; that
some pleasures are ‘elevated’ does not show that they are ‘intrinsically superior or
different in character from other, “lower” pleasures; on the contrary, it is our sense
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of dignity that accounts for our desire not to fall into a ‘lower states of existence.’
Utilitarianism only occasionally requires individuals to take the public good into
account; it is sufficient for most to take into account only their private affairs (that
is, the limited group of people affected by their choices). Virtue becomes habitual
and therefore is not a burden but often a source of pleasure.
16. Wed, Oct 15: Mill, CU, On Liberty, Mill expresses sympathy with the idea of Wilhelm von
Humboldt that ‘the end of man prescribed … by the dictates of reason …. is a complete and
consistent whole.’ (Cf. Williams) A person ‘whose desires and impulses are one’s own,’ as
‘developed and modified’ by one’s own culture, ‘is said to have character.’ Punishment, viz.
deliberately inflicting pain on others, is justifiable only to deter the violation of the rights of
others. Personal vices, like egotism and other degrading personal traits, are a subject of
moral reprobation only insofar as they involve a breach of duty to others. Duty to oneself
can mean nothing more than ordinary prudence. (cf. Utilitarianism)
Discussion of Paper #1
17. Mon, Oct 20: Hare, MT, Ch 1: Prescriptivity and Moral Reasoning: How can the
language of morals can be related to the demandingness of morality? Can
psychology plus logic reveal other-regarding action guiding principles that
are commended by reason to all? The three principal logical properties of moral terms are
universalizability, prescriptivity and overridingness. Imperatives are’ entailed’ by
prescriptives. The ‘must’ in you ‘must ϕ’ (viz. the deontic ‘must’ ) is treated exactly like
the ordinary ‘must,’ except that the deontic ‘must’ is universalizable. A final property of
the ‘ought’ and ‘must’ of moral language is its overridingness, that is, the property of taking
precedence on rational grounds over all other ‘oughts’ and ‘musts.’
18. Wed Oct 22: Hare MT Ch 2 – 4: (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely
entirely on the handouts for this material): Moral Conflict and the possibility of
resolution, error theories. Are the emotive and descriptive contents of terms
logically independent? See; Foot, ‘Moral Beliefs,’ in V & V, Essay 8 (Suggested
Reading Only: You may rely entirely on the handouts for this material).
PAPER #1 DUE
19. Mon Oct 27: Hare, MT, Ch 5, Ch 6 pp. 87 – 110: Taking on the sorrow of another;
Preference utilitarianism; now-for-then preferences; then-for-then preferences
argument for the claim that anyone who accepts the moral point of view must also
accept preference utilitarianism. The simplifying assumption of prudence in
defining preference utilitarianism
20. Wed Oct 29: Williams, ML, Essay 1: The stringent constraints of Kant’s moral
philosophy and utilitarianism. Grounding values in the projects of life, defining
personal identity and integrity. Partiality and equality; the essential error in
impartial ethics, particularly in Utilitarianism and Kantian morality; the man
who had one thought too many.
21. Mon Nov 3: Williams, Essay 3: Bearing the consequences and the unraveling of
the self; utilitarianism us just as responsible for things that we do not do as it does
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for things that we do. Utilitarianism wrongly requires people to give up personal
identity; that is, integrity in the sense of wholeness of character. Even if we grant the
utilitarian view that the goal of morality is to promote happiness, we shall still need
to concede that pursuing happiness is not an activity in itself. It must be that one
pursues something else, a ground-level project, and in that project and its goals one
finds happiness.
22. Wed, Nov 5: Spinoza, E, Pts I and II (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely
entirely on the handouts for this material): Spinoza’s ontology: substance,
attributes, infinite modes, the Imprint Theory of Causation; Parallelism, the nature
of the human being and the human mind.
23. Mon, Nov 10: Spinoza, E, Pts III: (Suggested Reading Only: You may rely
entirely on the handouts for this material) The distinction between adequate and
true ideas; that we cannot have adequate ideas of finite modes Spinoza’s egoist
psychology; the conatus, conceptions of joy and sorrow; the role of adequate ideas
in Spinoza’s psychology; their relation to truth; the conatus.
24. Wed Nov 12: Spinoza, E, Pts IV and V: Spinoza’s definition of ‘Good,’ egoist
moral theory; its relation to conventional morality; freedom and adequate ideas
Spinoza’s conception of happiness, viewing life sub specie aeternitatis, the
intellectual love of God
25. Mon Nov 17: Nietzsche, GM, First Treatise, The origin and reconstruction of
morality. The role of nobility in moral thinking. The weak seek to subdue the noble
through the inculcation of an ethic that champions servility; religion and the origin of slave
morality; Zarathustra champions a ‘tightrope walker’ who fearlessly traverses a
chasm, one side representing the culture of slave morality; the other a world freed of
the slave morality. Zarathustra’s project is the re-valuation of values; that is, the
eradication of the ‘tablet,’ the unalterable Word that is written in stone.
26. Wed Nov 19: Nietzsche, GM, Second Treatise, Third Treatise, pp. 35 – 118.
Bad Faith and bad conscience, authenticity, Spinoza’s influence on 19th century
philosophy, especially, Nietzsche, Hegel’s influence on Nietzsche: fürsich v. insich;
the will to power, the ascetic ideal; Was Nietzsche an egoist?
Foot, V&V, Essay VI, pp. 81 – 95; Revaluation of values
27. Mon Nov 24: Williams, T&T, pp. 1 – 83; Truth as a culturally invariant moral value:
Accuracy and sincerity, the biological and intellectual survival value of virtue. The concept
of ‘narrative’ in contemporary philosophy; history contrasted with myth. Accuracy
presupposes that there is a truth to be valued, and that truth is the validation history; that
the state of nature is essentially a myth, which cannot be a vehicle of the truth unless it can
be tied to actual history. The liberal society depends upon truth and truthfulness.
Initial, brief discussion of paper #2
28. Wed Nov 26: No Class: University Holiday, Thanksgiving Day Eve
29. Mon Dec 1: Full discussion of Paper #2
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30. Wed, Dec 3: Discussion of the comprehensive question for the final examination;
course evaluation
31. Mon, Dec 8: (3:00 p.m.) PAPER # 2 DUE