THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS REGULATION AND
EXISTENTIAL SECURITY ON RELIGIOUS INVOLVEMENT:
A CROSS-NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
by
Jaime Dean Harris, Ph.D. Candidate
The Pennsylvania State University
1
Abstract
Using data from the 2001 International Religious Freedom Reports, the 2003
United Nations’ Human Development Report, and Wave 4 of the World Values
Survey, this study explores the relationship between religious regulation and national
rates of religious involvement. Ordinary least square analysis is used compare
models employing various regulation variables against models which emphasize
traditional indicators of socio-economic modernization and existential security. The
analysis reveals that there is statistical evidence supporting each model. Restrictions
on religious supply and factors affecting individuals’ sense of deprivation have
significant roles in predicting religious variation.
2
Introduction
Scholars have developed various theoretical explanations concerning the
determinants of religious participation and belief. Secularization theories arguing that
religious involvement declines as societies modernize have enjoyed an unusually
protracted and relatively unquestioned authority for decades; however, recent studies
have challenged the primary tenets of the secularization doctrine and numerous
technical criticisms and refinements have been offered by both secularization
supporters and opponents. In this essay, I address challenges raised by proponents of
religious economy models and attempt to conduct an empirical test of the core tenets
of two competing perspectives: the existential security thesis and religious economy
models.
This research examines the predictive power of both religious supply and
demand. Proponents of religious economy models place emphasis on religious
supply as an explanation of variation in religious involvement while Norris and
Inglehart’s existential security argument focuses more on the factors altering demand
for religious products. This analysis finds that both are useful in predicting variation.
Further, I argue that specific forms of religious regulation have different effects on
religious involvement, and these distinctions are important in refining religious
economy models.
I utilize new data from the U.S. State Department’s International Religious
Freedom Reports that quantifies governmental and non-government practices that
constrain religious supply as well as multiple measures of modernization for 66
countries to test these competing theories. The analysis improves upon past research
3
by relying on data from a large number of countries rather than focusing primarily on
cases within in United States and Western Europe, and tests the applicability of the
religious economy model across a variety of geographic and cultural regions.
Literature Review
Overview of Classic Secularization Theory
For decades, the prediction of imminent secularization was accepted as a near
universal truth in the social sciences and led to an era of research that treated religion
as a social footnote if not ignoring it as a causal factor entirely. Indeed, since the time
of the Enlightenment, the decline of religion has been considered one of the
fundamental, unchanging principals of social science (Hadden, 1987; Fox and
Sandler, 2004). Arguably, one of the reasons for secularization doctrine’s longevity
is the broad array of definitions and predictions that fall under the nebulous
secularization label. The variation among secularization hypotheses is so great that,
as Philip Gorsky (2000) states, it is more accurate to speak of the “secularization
paradigm” than to refer to a single, unified secularization theory. Four broad
orientations can be distinguished within the secularization paradigm: transformation,
privatization, disappearance and decline.
The classic secularization theses are similar in their assertions that religious
involvement declines because the cognitive and structural prerequisites for societal
modernization leave less need and room for religion in normal routines. Essentially,
the classic secularization paradigm focuses on transformations in the wider socioeconomic structure and subsequent religious implications. Barring the disappearance
4
or reversal of social and technological progress, the decrease of religion is
unavoidable.
Existential security
Focusing on human need as a predictor of religious involvement, Norris and
Inglehart (2004) have developed one of the more compelling arguments supporting
demand-side theories of religious involvement. The central idea is that religious
involvement will decline in the presence of modernity; however, unlike previous
theories, Inglehart and Norris’ propose an argument for religious variation rather than
unavoidable decline. The mechanism driving this variation is referred to as
existential security and is identified as a state in which the basic necessities of
existence and physical security are not threatened. They argue that individuals in
poorer, less-developed nations are more susceptible to premature death, disease,
hunger and a number of other hardships that result in a higher demand for religion as
a source of emotional comfort and assurance as well as a provider of physical
necessities. Economic development and improved standards of living increase
existential security which decreases the importance of religious values and
subsequent religious involvement. Norris and Inglehart find considerable support for
this argument after conducting a cross-national analysis and conclude that overall
religious demand is associated with socio-economic conditions (2004). Existential
security potentially encompasses similar measures as those utilized in classic
secularization theory, but conceptually and theoretically it is largely considered
independent of modernization. Because its primary mechanisms rely upon
5
individuals’ level of deprivation rather than societal progress, there is theoretical
room for a society that is, by most conventional measures, modernized, yet still
sustains high levels of religious involvement. The United States is an obvious
example.
Gill and Lundsgaarde’s analysis demonstrates and inverse relationship
between state welfare spending and religiosity. They argue that there may be a
substitution effect that accounts for individuals’ lack of need for religion in welfare
states. While they acknowledge that it is not true for everyone, the authors suggest
that deprivation and necessity draw people to religious participation, but provisions
from the state have the opposite effect. In essence, it is the same need-based
motivator that characterizes Norris and Inglehart’s existential security thesis. It is
expected, then, that indicators of well-being will affect religious behavior by
influencing individuals’ demand for religion. Utilizing this logic, I develop the
following hypothesis regarding the relationship between human need and religious
involvement.
Hypothesis 1: As socio-economic well-being increases,
religious involvement decreases.
The last two decades have witnessed a number of scholars arguing forcefully
against the “old” paradigm citing the persistence of religious behavior and belief in
modernized nations of the world as evidence of classic secularization’s inaccuracy.
Some have gone so far as to suggest the secularization paradigm be thoroughly
reexamined if not discarded altogether (Stark, 1999). Proponents of religious
6
economy models of religious involvement offer a systemic critique of the
secularization paradigm and offer an alternative perspective on religious involvement.
Religious Economy Models
The principal assumption of the economic model of religious involvement is
that religious organizations are sensitive to market forces of supply and demand, and
religious markets within a society can be divided into producers and consumers (Stark
and Finke, 2000). Religious firms act as suppliers providing products in the form of
doctrines and practices and “choose the characteristics of their product and the means
of marketing it” (Finke and Iannaccone, 1993). Individuals act as rational, selfinterested consumers through belief and participation in certain religions that appeal
most to individual tastes and preferences (Finke and Stark, 1998; Stark and Finke,
2000). In this way, religious firms and consumers seek to maximize their benefits in a
mutually favorable exchange. Because the assumption of cost/benefit analysis in the
religious economies model is so central it has often been labeled the “rational choice”
theory of religion1.
What distinguishes the economic theory of religion from more conventional
explanations of religious change is a matter of emphasis. Rather than focusing on
individuals’ demand for religion as an explanation of patterns of religious behavior,
increases and decreases in religious participation are attributed to variations in
religious supply. Supply-side theorists argue that religious demand is relatively stable
1
The literature debating the merits and weaknesses of rational choice is extensive and complex, but an
in depth dialogue on this paradigm is not the purpose of this paper. I employ the cost/benefit
conception of rationality described by Stark and Finke (2000, Ch. 2).
7
among populations (Finke and Iannaccone 1993; Stark and Finke 2000; Jelen, 2002)
and suggest that religious organizations “typically attract members through open and
active recruitment” (Froese, 2001). Focusing on religious firms rather than on
religious consumers, and, contrary to more conventional notions of religious
behavior, it is argued that massive increases in religious participation like that of the
First and Second Great Awakenings in the United States are not products of sudden
changes in demand but of successful marketing campaigns by religious providers
(Finke and Iannaccone, 1993).
Fluctuations in religious participation are the result of variations in the
religious market. Stark and Finke (2000) argue that greater levels of religious
pluralism within a society—numbers of distinct firms in a single market—increase
organizational innovation and competition for adherents and resources. “A particular
religious firm can flourish only if it provides a commodity that is at least as attractive
as its competitors,” (Iannaconne, 1991:158) and, essentially, the greater the number
of religious firms competing in a market, the greater the variation and specialization
of the product. With more specialized products available, firms can establish
themselves in one of the numerous and stable “niches” within a market which, in turn,
drives the participation rate up (Stark and Finke, 2000).
Religious economy proponents assert that supply-side competition is an
important predictor of religious involvement, and utilizing pluralism as a proxy for
religious competition, studies have found support for this argument both domestically
(Finke and Stark, 1988; Finke, 1990; Finke and Stark 2005) and abroad (Fox and
Tabory, 2008; Iannaccone, 1991; Hamberg and Pettersson, 1994). In this analysis, I
8
examine external factors that act to regulate the religious market and potentially stifle
organizational competition. Further, by focusing on practices and policies that
proscribe free competition rather than pluralism, this analysis lifts the assumption of
market neutrality—that is, I do not assume that all religious firms in a market can or
do compete equally. Measures of government and social regulation of religion are
more direct and valid measures of religious market freedom, and, therefore, better
indicators when testing the religious economy model.
Government Regulation of the Religious Market
The structure of the religious market is subject to influence from several
sources, but regulatory actions of the state are perhaps the most readily observed and
investigated. Grim and Finke define government regulation as “the restrictions placed
on the practice, profession, or selection of religion by the official laws, policies or
administrative actions of the state” (Grim and Finke, 2006:7). Because of the power
advantage, the ability of the state to produce and enforce legislation renders it a
major, if not the most important, source of market regulation—both economic and
religious.
Chaves and Cann examine religious participation cross-nationally for eighteen
Western industrialized nations. Utilizing a six-point scale of “direct financial subsidy
or benefit to a religious institution” (1992:280), they find that increased state
regulation of the religious market is indeed associated with decreased religious
participation. In fact, they argue that religious regulation is a more important
determinant of religious participation than pluralism. Studies of Eastern Europe
9
during and after Communist rule also illustrate the diminutive effect state regulation
can have on religious participation (Froese 2001; Froese and Pfaff, 2001). Numerous
other studies report similar findings from various regions around the globe (Barro and
McCleary, 2003; Gill, 1994, 1998; Stark and Iannaccone, 1994; Yang, 2006). By
increasing the cost of competition and producing barriers to entry, government
regulation diminishes religious involvement. Fox and Tabory (2008) explicitly test
and confirm this proposition. These findings give rise to the second hypothesis of
this research.
Hypothesis 2: Controlling for other factors, government/state imposed
regulation will decrease the religious participation within a country.
Communism
It is important to stress that Communist regimes represent a unique and
particularly aggressive blend of government and social regulation. Traditionally,
Communist policies regarding religion are repressive and have a negative impact on
both religious supply and demand. For example, according to 2001 International
Religious Freedom Report for China, “the Government seeks to restrict religious
practice to government-sanctioned organizations and registered places of worship to
control the growth and scope of the activity of religious groups,” (p. 1) and has
“banned all groups that it has determined to be cults,” (p. 3). The extensive
regulation of religious activity and the barriers to entry placed before new firms
fosters a religious market that cannot and will not sustain high levels of religious
involvement. Demand is also affected as Communist regimes adopt an atheist
10
government position and often ban religious instruction for minors in an attempt to
devalue religious influence and delegitimizes religious authority.
Yang’s (2001) examination of the practices in Communist China and Froese’s
examinations (Froese and Pfaff, 2001) of religious variation before and after
Communist rule in Eastern Europe demonstrate that intentional government
regulation and persecution may not eradicate religion in and of itself, but it can most
definitely devastate the infrastructure and networks required for religious
maintenance and transmission. Though both examinations reveal an increase in
religious involvement following the elimination or relaxation of Communist regimes,
the intensive efforts to abolish religion, including anti-religious propaganda and
education, should still have had a substantial effect on the general population. It
should come as no surprise, then, that religious involvement remains considerably
lower in current and formerly Communist countries.
Social Regulation of the Religious Market
Research on the effects of regulation has typically been state-centered;
however, there is no reason to believe that non-government institutions, associations
and social actors cannot have a significant and similar impact on the religious market
and, subsequent participation (Grim and Finke, 2006). In fact, legal policies and
practices are only one possible source of market regulation, because regulatory power
is not nested solely within the state. Non-governmental influences can and do
directly affect religious participation as well.
11
Social regulation and government regulation are similarly defined, but
whereas government regulation concerns the policies and practices of the state, social
regulation refers to restrictions placed on religion by “other groups, associations, or
the culture at large” (Grim and Finke, 2006). The regulatory power of non-state actors
often equals or surpasses that of the state, and, like their more formal counterparts,
non-state actors can successfully utilize various forms of regulatory practice and even
coercion to engage in “expansionist and/or protectionist actions aimed at controlling
the religious marketplace” (Grim, 2005:22). Religious cartels, as demonstrated by
Finke and Stark (2005), had a great role in manipulating the growth and development
of the United States religious economy. A more coercive element is added to this
argument suggesting that in the absence of government regulation, a dominant
religious group can suppress the growth of religious competitors with threats and
intimidation (Jelen, 2002). One need only look to the U.S. State Department’s
International Religious Freedom Reports to find demonstrations of religious social
power. In numerous Islamic countries with constitutions professing freedom of
religion and expression, the social and normative dominance of Islam, accompanied
by prejudice, discrimination and violence, creates a religious market that may be free
from state regulation but is subject to the influence of the dominant Islamic culture
(International Religious Freedom Reports, 2001).
Unlike government regulation, social regulation often relies on previous
religious commitment and activity. It is also much more dependent upon informal
social networks often tied to religious organizations. Therefore, one could expect that
social regulation could be positively correlated with religious involvement, especially
12
in countries with an overwhelming religious majority. The relationship between
social regulation and religious involvement is probably more complex and less direct
than that of government regulation. From these arguments, I develop two competing
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3: Controlling for other factors, an increase in social
regulation will decrease religious involvement.
Hypothesis 4: Controlling for other factors, an increase in social
regulation will increase religious involvement.
Hypothesis 3 follows a strict interpretation of the religious economy model,
and predicts that any market regulation will significantly decrease religious
involvement. Hypothesis 4, however, suggests that the extensive use of networks and
non-government associations as a source of social influence will actually maintain
and possibly augment rates of religious involvement.
Religious Beliefs and Practices
Distinguishing between attitudes and behaviors is a matter of social science
convention. It is well known that certain attitudes correspond with certain behaviors,
but to conceptually conflate the two or to consider one a direct measure of the other is
a mistake. For this study, the multidimensional nature of religious behavior is
acknowledged, and religious belief is distinguished from religious practice in the
overall conception of religious involvement. I argue that the effects of religious
regulation on belief and practice are not equal and reveal the boundaries of religious
regulation.
13
In the two largest world religions, Christianity and Islam, individuals are
called upon to express their faith through congregation, proselytizing and prayer.
Because of the institutionalized nature of this particular form of religious practice, I
argue that it is more susceptible to religious regulation—that is, State and non-State
regulators have a greater capability of interfering with religious practice. Legal
restrictions, harassment and the desecration of minority holy sites are relatively
common occurrences in many countries and the fear of reprisals for public expression
may very well discourage overt displays of religious commitment (International
Religious Freedom Reports, 2001).
Religious belief, I argue, is more resistant than practice. Even the most
repressive government and social agencies cannot regulate the beliefs of the entire
population. Further, belief does not necessarily require physical expression, and it is
therefore less vulnerable to restriction by external forces. In his examination of
religious regulation in China, Yang (2006) suggests that increasing regulation does
not lead to a decline in religiousness but to a complication of the religious market
where regulated individuals simply take their beliefs underground until regulations
are eased. Yang demonstrates that even outlawing religion cannot eradicate religious
practice, and belief proves even more resistant. This logic leads to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Regulation of the religious market will have a greater
effect on religious practice than on religious belief.
Data, Measures, and Methods
14
Previous examinations of the religious economy model have been subject to
several data limitations. Most studies have been confined to the United States or to a
small number of Western countries, and such small samples have limited the
generalizability of the religious economy model to the global population (see Fox and
Tabory, 2008 as a notable exception). In order to adequately test these hypotheses a
large number of countries must be represented from various regions of the world.
The data on religious regulation has also been limited. Lacking accurate
measures of regulation, past research employed single measures of pluralism as
indicators of market freedom. In this analysis, I use data from several sources to
address the limitations of past research. Reliable and refined measures of religious
regulation are derived from the 2001 U.S. State Department’s International Religious
Freedom (IRF) Reports. The 1998 International Religious Freedom Act requires that
an annual report on the state of religious freedom be generated for the host country of
every U.S. Embassy. These reports are based on a wide variety of sources including,
but not limited to: national and local government records, local NGO’s, newspaper
accounts, and reliable anecdotal evidence provided by clergy, religious leaders, and
other key individuals. The data is then condensed into the annual report and
submitted to the U.S. State department. A coding instrument developed by Grim and
Finke (2006) quantifies this data and generates three indexes measuring government
religious regulation, social religious regulation and government favoritism. Data is
15
available for 196 countries and regions around the world and provide reliable and
relatively unbiased data on religious regulation, persecution and abuse.2
The primary source of behavioral data for this study comes from the World
Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is the largest cross-national study of individuals
conducted to date and contains religious, socio-economic and religious data dating
back to 1981 with five subsequent waves of the survey being administered.
Nationally representative samples from approximately 70 countries provide unique
measures of religious involvement that are essential elements in this analysis. I use
the fourth wave of the data which spans the years 1999-2004, and I only analyze
countries with populations exceeding one million people, resulting in a sample size of
66 countries. Unfortunately, the WVS is highly Eurocentric and has modest
representation from Africa and Asia, but it still provides more regional variation than
other data sources. It is important to note, however, that findings from this data may
not be generalizable to every region of the world.
Much of the modernization data used in this analysis are derived from the
2003 CIA World Factbook and the 2003 United Nations Development Reports. These
are free resources that provide statistics on the socio-economic development of nearly
every country and region in the world. An advantage to using this data is that it
provides reliable measures of the educational and economic predictors theorized to
influence religious involvement. In this examination of overall religious participation
and belief, national statistics like those found in these two sources are not only
preferable, but essential.
2
For a complete discussion on the International Religious Freedom Reports and measures of religious
freedom, see Grim and Finke 2006.
16
Dependent variables
Religious Participation: Hypothesis 6 argues that religious practice will be
much more susceptible to market constraints, and I use two measures to test the
effects of regulation on religious participation—regular attendance and regular
prayer. Although religious participation is a multi-dimensional behavior that
manifests itself in a variety of ways, these two forms of practice represent the most
common and visible religious activities.
I use aggregated rates of religious attendance for each country in the sample to
develop a measure of “regular attendance.” This variable represents the percentage of
the population that reports attending religious service at least once a month.
Individuals were asked to respond to the question “Outside of weddings,
funerals…how often do you attend religious service?” Responses claiming “more
than once a week,” “weekly,” or “at least once a month” are considered regular
attendance, and a country percentage is computed from the sample total.
Regular prayer is similarly computed. Responses to the question “How often
do you pray” indicating that an individual prayed at least once a month are considered
“regular prayer” and aggregated into a prayer frequency variable that is comparable
across countries.
Religious belief: I hypothesize that religious beliefs are more resistant to
religious regulation than religious practice, and to test this hypothesis I use several
indicators of supernatural beliefs associated with most forms of religious practice.
Each indicator of religious belief is the percent of the sample that responded “Yes” to
the following questions: “Do you believe in God?”; “Do you believe in life after
17
death?”; “Do you believe in Heaven?” and “Do you believe in Hell?”. These four
measures are simple indicators of national trends in belief in fundamental religious
tenets; however, it is important to note that they reflect the belief structures of the
“Abrahamic” traditions and may not capture the beliefs of followers of Indian and
Taoist traditions.
Predictor Variables
The primary purpose of this analysis is to discover the most powerful
determinants of overall religious behavior and to find if the data supports the classic
secularization theses, the religious economy model, or existential security. I employ
several measures representing each of the competing models to test their effects on
different forms of religious involvement.
Socio-economic Modernization Variables: Classic secularization theories
argue that modernization has a negative effect on religious involvement; however,
modernization, much like secularization, has been defined in numerous ways and
researchers still have not reached a consensus on its proper measure (Irwin, 1975).
Still, most agree that modernization implies educational improvement, urbanization,
and economic development (Divale and Seda, 2001). This analysis utilizes as
educational improvement as an indicator of societal modernization. This measure is
operationalized as the percentage of the adult population that is literate (Literacy) and
is taken from the 2003 United Nations’ Development Report.
Existential Security: I operationalized existential security into a single
measure: income. Income is measured as the per capita gross domestic product for
18
each nation, and serves as a primary indicator of individuals’ capability to meet their
needs and wants.
The Gini income coefficient is a measure of income inequality ranging from
zero to one hundred with higher scores indicating higher levels of income inequality.
In the context of this analysis, the measure is used to test the effects of relative
economic deprivation. Research has shown that income inequality is a primary
determinant of variation in mortality across nations, presumably due to lack of access
to health and social services (Rodgers, 2002). Therefore, in accordance with the
existential security hypothesis, greater income inequality should increase religious
involvement.
Religious Regulation Variables: Two measures of religious regulation are
used to measure restrictions on religious supply: government regulation and social
regulation. The government regulation variable is derived from the coding of the
2001 International Religious Freedom Reports. Six items concerning the role of the
state in regulation certain religious behaviors are scaled together to create the
Government Regulation Index (GRI). This measure focuses primarily on the legal
restrictions imposed by the state and stops short of overt coercion. It is an elevenpoint scale with low government regulation coded as zero and high government
regulation coded ten. Social regulation uses the Social Regulation Index (SRI)
derived from the 2001 reports. This five-item scale measures the practices and
attitudes of non-state actors that act as restrictions on the practice and profession of
19
religion. The scale is very reliably coded and equals zero when social regulation is
low and ten when it is high.3
Controls
In addition to the predictors I attempt to control for a number of variables that
may alter the effects of my variables of interest. They are the following:
Level of Democracy: This is controlled for utilizing data from the Polity IV
dataset. Researchers for the Polity project annually develop two separate measures of
government autocracy and democracy for each country in the international system,
each coded zero to ten. The autocracy score is the subtracted from the democracy
score and the difference is utilized as a measure of the level of democracy with
negative ten indicating complete autocracy and ten complete democracy.
Logged country area: This measure is taken from the 2003 CIA World
Factbook, and is simply the logged area of the country in square kilometers. This
variable is used to control for any effects the geographical size of a country may have
on religious involvement. For example, it is possible that a large country may
demonstrate more religious involvement due to regulatory difficulties created by
distance from central authorities. Or, perhaps there may be greater religious
involvement because individuals in communities separated by vast distances rely on
the networks developed under the auspices of the local religious community for
information, necessities, or simple entertainment.
Communism: Paul Froese (2001) found that a history of Communism has
significant effects on religious involvement. This is a dummy variable coded zero if
3
See Appendix A for items included in SRI and GRI or see Grim and Finke 2006.
20
the country has never been Communist and one if the country was once or is currently
under Communist rule. Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics for all variables utilized
in this analysis.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
N
Controls
Democracy
64
Area
66
Density
65
Regulation Predictors
Communism
66
Gov’t Regulation
63
Social Regulation
63
Modernization
Literacy
44
Existential security
Income
66
Income Gini
62
Religious Participation
Regular Attendance 66
Regular Prayer
56
Religious Belief
Belief in God
Belief in life after
Death
Belief in Heaven
Belief in Hell
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Deviation
-10
6.54
3.5
10
16.65
6,333
5.13
6.06
12.47 1.83
120.31 161.23
0
0
0
1
9.44
10
.30
4.31
4.15
.46
3.10
3.24
41.10
99.80
85.97
15.70
39.13
24.7
81.62
57.8
71.91
36.59
9.01
9.12
3.10
12.10
85.29
94.00
42.16
55.09
24.02
24.42
63
18.8
100
85.56
17.82
63
63
63
15.8
16.4
9
100
100
100
64.98
65.14
56.17
22.41
27.94
29.77
Existential Security and Religious Economy
The four models in Table 2 show that overall religious attendance rates are
affected by factors influencing both supply and demand in the religious market.
Model 1 predicts national rates of regular attendance at religious service after
controlling for broad geographic and political variables in the country. The area,
21
population density, and level of democracy of a nation do not significantly affect rates
of attendance. Past and present Communist rule however drastically decreases
religious participation. According to this analysis, communism decreased regular
religious attendance by approximately 22%. This is hardly surprising considering the
resolute atheist position of Communist regimes and the coercive methods they
employed. Using this control model only, error can be reduced by 21% in the
prediction of national attendance rate.
Model 2 tests the effects of existential security, and Model 3 serves as a test of
the religious economy model. As can be seen below, the addition of the
modernization indicators in Model 2 increases prediction capability a great deal. In
this model the R-squared statistic increases to 0.45, and supports the existential
security hypothesis. Income inequality has a statistically significant, but small,
positive relationship with attendance rates—one unit increase of the income Gini
coefficient increases attendance rates by .59%. The negative relationship between
average income and attendance is highly significant and relatively strong. A unit
increase in the logged per capita GDP is associated with an 8.27% decrease in
religious attendance. Communism is also is statistically significant and is associated
with a decrease in attendance of nearly 25%.
The effects of constraints placed on religious supply by external forces are
examined in Model 3. According to the analysis, a unit increase in the Government
Regulation Index (GRI) decreases rates of adherence by approximately 2.9%. Social
regulation, however, has no statistically significant relationship with attendance even
after applying the lowered standard for significance. As in previous models,
22
Communism is associated with a large reduction in religious attendance. In this case,
a decrease of approximately 20%.
Model 4 is the full model and includes all variables employed in the analysis.
Although the R-square statistic in this model is higher than that of the previous three,
the adjusted R-square suggests that the complete model is only 6% better at
predicting religious attendance than Model 2. Still, the relationships hypothesized for
both existential security and regulation are partially supported. Income is significant
and negatively related to religious attendance as is government regulation. In terms
of comparative predictive strength, however, average income has a stronger negative
effect on religious attendance than government regulation. Model 4 also reveals a
positive relationship between social regulation and attendance. The 2% increase in
attendance for every unit increase in attendance supports the predictions of
Hypothesis 5; social regulation is associated with an increase in religious
participation.
The effect of Communist rule on religious attendance is one of the most
robust findings in the analysis. Across the models, Communism has a consistent and
powerful negative effect on religious attendance causing an average decrease of
approximately 23%. Although, Communism is entered as a control variable for most
of the analysis, its theoretical implications are of great importance and will be
discussed further below.
Table 2. Regression Models Predicting Regular Religious Attendance
Model 1
B (Std. B)
Controls
Area
0.72 (0.05)
Model 2
B (Std B)
Model 3
B (Std B)
Model 4
B (Std B)
-0.58 (-0.04)
.09 (0.01)
-1.81 (-0.13)
23
Density
Democracy
Communist
Security
Income
Income Gini
Regulation
Gov’t
Social
Constant
R-sq
Adj R-sq
N
0.00 (-0.01)
-0.56 (-0.14)
-22.15 (-0.42)**
-0.00 (-0.04)
0.81 (0.18)
-24.78 (-0.47)**
0.00 (0.07)
-0.97 (-0.24)
-20.30 (-0.38)**
0.00 (-0.10)
0.29 (0.07)
-23.98 (-0.35)**
—
—
-8.27 (-0.52)**
0.59 (0.22) a
—
—
-8.80 (-0.55)**
0.62 (0.23) a
—
—
42.28a
0.21
0.16
63
—
—
98.83**
0.45
0.39
59
-2.86 (-0.36) a
1.96 (0.26)
55.30*
0.25
0.17
61
-3.03 (-0.38)*
2.10 (0.28) a
123.70**
0.53
0.45
58
Note: * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). a Significant at
.1 level (2-tailed).
Rates of regular prayer are analyzed in Table 3 utilizing the same model
structures as Table 2. Prayer is conceptualized as another outward form of religious
expression and, hypothetically, should be sensitive to changes in supply and
demand—religious markets and existential security, respectively. Generally, the
models in Table 2 demonstrate greater predictive ability than those in Table 3.
Higher R-square and adjusted R-square statistics with regard to predicting rates of
prayer suggest that prayer is more sensitive to national conditions and influences.
The models examined in Table 3 demonstrate similar relationships between
modernization, religious regulation of the market, and rates of religious
participation—in this analysis, rates of regular prayer. Average income has a
statistically significant and strong negative effect on rates of religious prayer adding
further support to the negative relationship between religious involvement and human
development predicted by the existential security hypothesis. Further, observing the
standardized coefficients, it is clear that income is by far the strongest predictor of
rates of prayer by comparison. Income also has a substantially large influence on
24
prayer decreasing rates by approximately 10%. Increasing income inequality has a
weak but significant association with prayer and raises the rate of prayer slightly.
The relationship between market regulation and prayer supports Hypotheses 2
and 4—government regulation is negatively associated with participation while social
regulation has a positive relationship. Model 4 shows that a one-unit increase in the
Government Regulation Index (GRI) corresponds to a significant 3% decrease in
rates of prayer. The standardized coefficient suggests that the GRI has moderate
predictive power when compared with other variables in the model. Social regulation
is associated with a significant 2% prayer rater increase.
Past or current Communist rule has a robust negative relationship with prayer.
In all four models, previously or currently Communist countries have regular prayer
rates that are, on average, 18% percent lower than their non-Communist counterparts.
Table 3. Regression Models Predicting Regular Prayer
Model 1
B (Std. B)
Controls
Area
Density
Democracy
Communist
Security
Income
Income Gini
Regulation
Gov’t
Social
Constant
R-sq
Adj R-sq
N
Model 2
B (Std B)
Model 3
B (Std B)
Model 4
B (Std B)
3.08 (0.22)
0.00 (-0.01)
-1.33 (-0.29)*
-17.78 (-0.34)**
0.91 (0.07)
0.00 (0.07)
0.91 (0.18)
-21.10 (-0.41)**
1.96 (0.14)
0.00 (0.07)
-1.59 (-0.35)*
-15.55 (-0.30)*
-0.92 (-0.07)
0.00 (-0.12)
0.51 (0.10)
-20.37 (-0.40)**
—
—
-9.46 (-0.61)**
0.71 (0.26)*
—
—
-10.06 (-0.64)**
0.76 (0.28)*
—
—
30.15
0.26
0.19
53
—
—
97.65**
0.53
0.46
50
-2.76 (-0.32) a
2.32 (0.28)
46.98
0.30
0.20
51
-2.94 (-0.35)*
2.27 (0.27)*
128.57**
0.62
0.54
49
25
Note: * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). a Significant at
.1 level (2-tailed). Note: Models run using listwise deletion.
The analysis of religious participation provides support for both existential
security predictions and religious economy models. Demand for religious goods
appears to be considerably influenced average income and income inequality.
Utilizing more refined measures of religious regulation, it becomes apparent that all
regulation on the market is not equal in its effects. State interference and repression
tends to decrease participation, while social regulation leads to significant increases in
the opposite direction. Overall, it appears that religious participation is, indeed, quite
sensitive to factors affecting supply and demand.
Religious Belief
Hypothesis 5 argues that religious belief is less sensitive to external regulation
affecting supply than religious participation. Recall that this prediction is based on the
assumption that belief does not necessarily require any outward expression and is
more easily hidden in the presence of repression, thus, enabling individuals to
maintain discordant religious faiths. The results presented in Table 2 suggested that
there was support for this hypothesis. To test this hypothesis further, four measures of
somewhat generic religious beliefs are aggregated and examined.4 Models predicting
religious belief are the same as those predicting religious participation, and the final
complete models are presented in Table 4.
4
Note that these measures are not representative of all of the major world religions. For example,
Buddhism does not necessarily assert a belief in an omnipotent, omniscient entity or God, while many
animists may believe in numerous gods.
26
The general findings from this analysis suggest that Hypothesis 5 is partially
supported. Government regulation has no significant effect on religious belief;
however, it is revealed that social regulation is significantly associated with increases
across all four belief measure. Also, Communism, a unique blend of state and social
regulation, is associated with considerably lower rates of religious belief. All of this
suggests that the regulation on religious supply is more complicated with regards to
religious beliefs. Formal, legal restrictions have no effect whereas cultural
constraints do.
According to the results in Table 4, religious belief is more associated with
demand. The effect of security on religious belief is significant in predicting most of
the belief measures. Beliefs in God, Heaven and Hell are significantly reduced by a
single unit increase in logged per capita income, and, in each case, income has
moderate predictive strength when compared to other variables.
Income inequality, expressed as the Gini coefficient, has statistically
significant positive effects on all religious beliefs. Belief in God increases by .52%
for every unit increase in the Gini coefficient, and belief in life after death, heaven
and Hell increase by .61%, .79%, and .54%, respectively. The effects of inequality,
then, are significant but substantively small. Still, coupled with the effects of income,
factors affecting religious demand have significant influence on religious beliefs.
Table 4. Regression Models Predicting Religious Belief
Belief in…
Controls
Area
Density
Democracy
Communist
God
B (Std. B)
-1.36 (-0.13)
0.00 (-0.03)
0.26 (-0.07)
-14.62 (-0.37)**
Life After Death
B (Std B)
0.12 (0.01)
0.00 (0.04)
-1.21 (-0.29) a
-18.00 (-0.38)**
27
Heaven
B (Std B)
1.22 (0.08)
0.00 (0.17)
-0.63 (-0.12)*
-23.76 (-0.40)**
Hell
B (Std B)
0.50 (0.03)
0.01 (0.19)
-0.64 (-0.11)
-19.32 (-0.30)**
Security
Income
Income Gini
Regulation
Gov’t
Social
Constant
R-sq
Adj R-sq
N
-4.70 (-0.40) a
0.52 (0.25) a
-1.65 (-0.12)
0.61 (0.25) a
-6.90 (-0.38)**
0.79 (0.25)*
-9.21 (-0.48)**
0.54 (0.16)
-1.20 (-0.20)
1.83 (0.32) a
121.92**
0.41
0.31
56
-1.81 (-0.25)
2.18 (0.32) a
65.26 a
0.47
0.38
56
-2.05 (-0.22)
2.18 (0.26) a
86.64*
0.61
0.54
56
-0.88 (-0.09)
2.65 (0.29)*
106.63**
0.64
0.58
56
Note: * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). ** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed). a Significant at
.1 level (2-tailed).
Discussion
These analyses offer support for both perspectives concerning the
determinants of religious involvement. The hypotheses tested here demonstrate that
some core assumptions posited by religious economy model theorists are not
supported, while others operate in the predicted manner. For example, religious
economy proponents argue that religious demand is constant across individuals;
however, numerous models show that increases in human development significantly
reduce rates of religious involvement. Further, by distinguishing between various
types of religious regulation, some previously overlooked nuances can be included in
future religious economy model studies.
It was hypothesized that religious regulation, both government and social,
would decrease religious involvement; however, the relationships found here indicate
that the story is more complex. While the regulatory and repressive actions of the
state have the expected negative effects on religious involvement, social regulation
operates in the opposite direction. So, why does one form of regulation decrease
28
involvement and the other increase it? One explanation may be that social regulation,
by definition, emerges from non-governmental institutions and, therefore, relies more
heavily upon resources and motivations embedded in social networks and institutions.
Gaining access to these networks for effective social regulation requires common
perspectives and a degree of unity regarding the social place and toleration of
religion. A source of this unity is in shared religious beliefs and institutions which
would, in effect, support religious practice and belief of one sort while regulating or
repressing beliefs and practices considered undesirable within a society. Utilizing
this logic, it makes sense for a nation with a great deal of religious unity to sustain an
environment of elevated social regulation and religious involvement. This would
explain cases such as Pakistan, Nigeria, Italy and Philippines which have very high
levels of social regulation and boast unusually high rates for regular religious
attendance. These, nations are also dominated by a single religious faith which may
serve as a conduit to social networks. In future research, measures of religious
homogeneity could be constructed that would serve a crude control measure of
religious unity. Controlling for this, it would be possible to test for any residual
effects of social regulation.
Overall, the tests of modernization and religious economy models lend
only partial support for classic secularization predictions—Hypothesis 1—and the
religious economy hypothesis—Hypothesis 3. There does appear to be a negative
relationship between education and attendance; however, belief remains unaffected.
Skepticism regarding the rationalization explanation for religious decline should
increase even more when one takes into account research demonstrating the in some
29
countries there is actually a positive relationship between religious involvement and
education (Sacerdote, 2002).
Existential security, conceptualized in terms of income and income inequality,
is associated with a significant reduction in participation rates, supporting Hypothesis
2. This recent manifestation of a classic deprivation thesis, like religious economy
models, distances itself from the unavoidable decline purported by the classic
secularization paradigm. This analysis shows that religious demand is not in a state
of stability or decline; rather, existential security has an important role demand
fluctuation as argued by Norris and Inglehart (2004). Moreover, the analyses reveal
that security has a greater negative effect than regulation and is also a stronger
predictor. This does not suggest that religious supply is not a useful predictor of
participation and belief, but it does imply that factors influencing religious demand
may be more critical to understanding participation.
The research on the effects of Communism on religious involvement,
particularly that of Paul Froese and associates (Froese, 2001; Froese and Pfaff, 2001),
asserts that the concentrated efforts of Communist regimes to eliminate religion from
the social landscape were only partially successful because: 1) religion was never
entirely eliminated; and 2) the effects were only temporary. Still, as this analysis
suggests, past and current Communist rule substantially decreases religious belief and
practice. This decrease is understandable when one considers that the Communists
attacked religious involvement by banning and punishing religious education, practice
and profession and by declaring atheism as the state philosophy. In terms of the
religious economy thesis, Communism can and should be considered a specific and
30
extreme type of state regulation. The question still remains about the half-life of the
Communist effect. Arguably, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rapid
transformation of secular and religious markets to a less regulated form, it could be
hypothesized that involvement will increase as religious diversity increases. This
hypothesis is beyond the scope of this essay but has great potential as a future study.
This essay demonstrates that both demand and supply matter in the religious
economy. It also shows that external factors have more influence on certain aspects
of religious involvement such as religious participation, but little to no effect on
belief. Still, more research is needed to correct for the many limitations in this
analysis. Data from a larger number of countries from more diverse regions would
allow for greater generalizability. For example, Africa is conspicuously
underrepresented in this sample although it possesses a variety of states where
religion plays an especially large role in society. Data limitations also prevent an
analysis of the role of ethnic and religious homogeneity in religious involvement.
Such additions could potentially add to the explanatory power of measures supply and
demand, and further the understanding of the determinants of religious involvement.
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33
Appendix A
Area
Density
Democracy
Communist
Density
Income
Income Gini
Literacy
Gov’t Regulation
Logged area of the country as listed by the 2003 World Factbook
Population density of the country as listed by the 2003 World Bank Reports
on Human Development
Polity Score of country on the autocracy/democracy spectrum in 2003.
Range
-10 – 10.
Dummy for whether the nation has ever been under communist rule
Number of people per square kilometer from the 2004 United Nations World
Population Prospects Vol. 1.
Logged per capita gross domestic product for 2005. CIA World Factbook.
Range 5.52 – 10.58
2003 Gini index coefficient measuring income inequality within each nation.
Taken from the 2003 United Nations Development Report. Range: 0-1
Literacy rate of the population over 15 years old from the 2003 United
Nations Development Report.
Does the Report mention whether foreign missionaries are allowed to
operate?
0=Allowed and/or no limits reported; 1=Allowed but with restrictive limits
reported; 2=Prohibited
Does the Report mention that proselytizing, public preaching, or conversion
is limited or restricted? 0=No; 1=yes, but (equally) for all religions; 2=yes,
but only for some religions
Does the Report indicate that the government interferes with an individual’s
right to worship? 0=No or no interference; 1=Some interference; 2=severe
interference
How is freedom of religion described in the Report? 0 = law/Constitution
provides for freedom of religion and the Government generally respects this
right in practice; 1=law/Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the
Government generally respects this right in practice, but some problems
exist, e.g. in certain localities; 2=limited rights and or rights are not protected
or are restricted; 3=does not exist
Does this Section of the Report specifically mention that the government
policy contributes to the generally free practice of religion? 0=yes; 1=yes,
but exceptions are mentioned; 2=no.
Social Regulation
Societal attitudes towards other or nontraditional religions are reported to be:
0=amicable; 1=discriminatory (but not negative); 2=negative just towards
certain religious brands or in certain regions; 3=hostile
According to the Report, what are social attitudes toward conversions to
other religions? 0=no problems reported; 1=some tension; 2=negative;
3=hostile
Does the report mention that traditional attitudes and/or edicts of the clerical
establishment strongly discourage proselytizing? 0=No; 1=yes
According to the Report, do established or existing religions try to shut out
new religions in any way? 0=No; 1=Yes
What is the situation regarding social movements in relation to religious
brands in the country? 0=none; 1=flashes of activity; 2=regional organized
activity; 3=national organized activity
34
Appendix B
Table 5. Regulation Correlations
GRI_01
GRI_01 GRI: Government Regulation
Index
gri_05
SRI_01
sri_05
1
.863(**)
.659(**)
.560(**)
63
63
63
63
.863(**)
1
.719(**)
.710(**)
63
.659(**)
63
.560(**)
63
64
.719(**)
63
.710(**)
64
63
1
63
.770(**)
63
64
.770(**)
63
1
64
Correlation
N
gri_05 GRI: Government Regulation
Index.
Correlation
SRI_01 SRI: Social Regulation Index
N
Correlation
sri_05 SRI: Social Regulation Index
N
Correlation
N
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 6. Disaggregated Existential Security Correlations
HDI2003
HDI2003 2003 Human
Pearson Correlation
1
35
logpercapGDP
.911(**)
CIAlifex
.856(**)
UNalit03
.729(**)
Development Index
(United Nations, 2005)
Income
Logged per capita GDP
(CIA World Factbook)
Life expectancy
Life expectancy at birth
in years, 2005.
UNalit03 Literacy rate;
adults over 15 years old,
2003, see note
N
63
62
63
44
Pearson Correlation
N
.911(**)
1
.719(**)
.494(**)
62
62
62
43
Pearson Correlation
N
.856(**)
.719(**)
1
.386(**)
63
62
66
44
Pearson Correlation
N
.729(**)
.494(**)
.386(**)
1
44
43
44
44
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Table 7.1. Modernization and Regulation on Regular Attendance
Unstandardized Coefficients
B
(Constant)
Area
Density
Democracy
Communism
Literacy
105.808
Std. Error
32.311
-1.029
1.855
-.002
Standardized
Coefficients
T
Sig.
Beta
3.275
.002
-.080
-.555
.582
.004
-.094
-.670
.507
.380
.505
.093
.753
.456
-29.806
-.424
7.018
.224
-.588
-.270
-4.247
-1.894
.000
.066
Table 7.2 Modernization and Regulation on Regular Attendance
(Constant)
Area
Density
Democracy
Communism
Government Regulation
Social Rgulation
Unstandardized
Coefficients
B
Std. Error
55.300
27.306
.091
2.100
Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
T
Sig.
.007
2.025
.043
.048
.966
.002
.004
.066
.449
.655
-.968
.595
-.244
-1.627
.110
-20.300
-2.864
1.962
6.552
1.474
1.319
-.382
-.361
.263
-3.098
-1.943
1.487
.003
.057
.143
Table 7.3 Modernization and Regulation on Regular Attendance
Unstandardized
Coefficients
(Constant)
Area
Density
Standardized
Coefficients
t
Sig.
B
110.386
Std. Error
31.606
3.493
.001
-.208
1.952
-.016
-.107
.916
.001
.004
.025
.165
.870
36
Beta
Democracy
Communism
Literacy
Government Regulation
Social Regulation
-.070
-26.335
-.486
-2.843
.910
.547
7.068
.227
1.473
1.207
-.017
-.519
-.310
-.340
.126
-.128
-3.726
-2.145
-1.930
.754
.899
.001
.039
.062
.456
Table 7.4 Modernization and Regulation on Belief in God
Unstandardized
Coefficients
(Constant)
Area
Density
Democracy
Communism
Literacy
B
104.658
-.239
-.002
.228
-22.536
-.049
Std. Error
24.832
1.445
.003
.376
5.343
.164
Standardized
Coefficients
t
Sig.
Beta
-.027
-.119
.083
-.668
-.048
4.215
-.166
-.742
.607
-4.218
-.299
.000
.869
.463
.548
.000
.766
Table 7.5 Modernization and Regulation on Belief in God
Unstandardized
Coefficients
(Constant)
Area
Density
Democracy
Communism
Government Regulation
Social Regulation
B
89.108
.034
.000
-.602
-13.120
-1.072
1.698
Std. Error
21.609
1.686
.003
.455
5.141
1.117
1.020
Standardized
Coefficients
t
Sig.
Beta
.003
.011
-.200
-.328
-.178
.303
4.124
.020
.070
-1.324
-2.552
-.960
1.664
.000
.984
.944
.191
.014
.342
.102
Table 7.6 Modernization and Regulation on Belief in God
Unstandardized
Coefficients
(Constant)
Area
Density
Democracy
Communism
Literacy
Government Regulation
Social Regulation
B
113.821
.249
.001
-.117
-24.192
-.415
-3.573
2.048
Std. Error
34.351
2.073
.004
.555
7.199
.230
1.496
1.229
37
Standardized
Coefficients
t
Sig.
Beta
.020
.027
-.027
-.517
-.263
-.417
.273
3.314
.120
.154
-.211
-3.360
-1.804
-2.388
1.667
.003
.905
.879
.834
.003
.083
.025
.108