Bookmark 1
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, Memorandum for the
President, "Vietnam Situation," 21 December 1963
Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 3, pp. 494-496
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington
21 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Vietnam Situation
In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions
after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.
1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the
next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communistcontrolled state.
2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting.
Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making
decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the
Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little
talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic
hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are
receiving little or no direction; military operations, too, are not being effectively
directed because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A
specific example of the present situation is that General Dinh is spending little or no
time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs fulltime direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and
Tho.
3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been
poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of
confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the
Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above
all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with
major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show
Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not
know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has of course been stressed
to him both by Dean Rusk and myself (and also by John McCone), and I do not think
he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and
cannot readily change now.
Lodge's newly-designated deputy, Davis Nes, was with us and seems a highly
competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he
would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee
operating below the level of the Ambassador.
As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to
improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our
respective spheres.
4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best
guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since
July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on
distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of
the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of
Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in these
provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others
have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own
Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all
major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.
As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so
that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to
have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a
reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic
pacification plans must be prepared, allocating adequate time to secure the remaining
government-controlled areas and work out from there.
This gloomy picture prevails predominantly in the provinces around the capital and in
the Delta. Action to accomplish each of these objectives was started while we were in
Saigon. The situation in the northern and central areas is considerably better, and does
not seem to have deteriorated substantially in recent months. General Harkins still
hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.
In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be
provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao
sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian
border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are
expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence
will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch
in on the government's side.
5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land
corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from
Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best
guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the
first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is
apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have
been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a
few shipments.
To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for crossborder operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would
not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. Our first need would be
immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are
preparing on an urgent basis.
One other step we can take is to expand the existing limited but remarkably effective
operations on the Laos side, the so-called Operation HARDNOSE, so that it at least
provides reasonable intelligence on movements all the way along the Laos corridor;
plans to expand this will be prepared and presented for approval in about two weeks.
As to the waterways, the military plans presented in Saigon were unsatisfactory, and a
special naval team is being sent at once from Honolulu to determine what more can be
done. The whole waterway system is so vast, however, that effective policing may be
impossible.
In general, the infiltration problem, while serious and annoying, is a lower priority
than the key problems discussed earlier. However, we should do what we can to
reduce it.
6. Plans for Covert Action into North Vietnam were prepared as we had requested and
were an excellent job. They present a wide variety of sabotage and psychological
operations against North Vietnam from which I believe we should aim to select those
that provide maximum pressure with minimum risk. In accordance with your direction
at the meeting, General Krulak of the JCS is chairing a group that will lay out a
program in the next ten days for your consideration.
7. Possible neutralization of Vietnam is strongly opposed by Minh, and our attitude is
somewhat suspect because of editorials by the New York Times and mention by
Walter Lippmann and others. We reassured them as strongly as possible on this-and in
somewhat more general terms on the neutralization of Cambodia. I recommend that
you convey to Minh a Presidential message for the New Year that would repeat our
position in the strongest possible terms and would also be a vehicle to stress the
necessity of strong central direction by the government and specifically by Minh
himself.
8. U.S. resources and personnel cannot usefully be substantially increased. I have
directed a modest artillery supplement, and also the provision of uniforms for the Self
Defense Corps, which is the most exposed force and suffers from low morale. Of
greater potential significance, I have directed the Military Departments to review
urgently the quality of the people we are sending to Vietnam. It seems to have fallen
off considerably from the high standards applied in the original selections in 1962,
and the JCS fully agree with me that we must have our best men there.
Conclusion. My appraisal may be overly pessimistic. Lodge, Harkins, and Minh
would probably agree with me on specific points, but feel that January should see
significant improvement. We should watch the situation very carefully, running
scared, hoping for the best, but preparing for more forceful moves if the situation does
not show early signs of improvement.
Robert S. McNamara
Return to Vinnie's Home Page
Return to Vietnam War Page