Descartes
Trademark Argument for God
There are two primary avenues of critique for the trademark argument in 3M. Firstly Descartes’
idea of God isn’t up to snuff, it isn’t as coherent and clear and distinct as it needs to be for the
argument to work. Read and consider Cottingham’s discussion of the little girl who develops a
blueprint for a ‘supremely complicated computer’. Secondly, at this stage in the Meditations,
Descartes has no access to the outside world. His idea of Causation then, must be a priori: after
Hume’s critique of causation as a priori causation can be argued to be a contingent relation, not a
necessary one.
Nature of the Idea
Descartes needs the idea of god to start the whole argument off. While Descartes may be correct in
suggesting that an idea’s representational content must be explained (cp. Child’s computer
diagram), this idea must be clear, or at least coherent.
(3rd Obj & Reply)
Hobbes
– Denies D’s adequate idea of God
– Construes ‘idea’ as image
D’s Reply
– Idea needn’t be an image
– ‘whatever is perceived by the mind’
(5th Obj & Reply)
Gassendi – Cannot have an idea of the ‘infinite’
– The human mind cannot comprehend infinity
– Therefore cannot contemplate any idea representing an infinite thing
– Accuses D of ‘negating’ the finite
D’s Reply
– I understand in a manner appropriate to the human mind.
– I cannot have a ‘fully adequate conception’
– I did not negate finite – rather my limited idea implies a negation of the infinite
– CP. His method for showing that he is not perfect – doubt/limit
Idea of God is Only a Negative Idea (paragraph 23)
D’s Reply – Clarity and ‘Priority’
– God is a positive idea
– ‘I clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than in a finite one
and hence my perception of the infinite, that is God, is in some way prior to my perception
of the finite, that is myself’ (AT 45-46)
– The clarity of the idea and the D’s notion that the infinite is ‘prior’ suggests that the idea
could not have been created by negating the finite (which would have then been prior)
Idea of God is ‘materially false’ and came from nothing (para. 24)
D’s Reply – CAP
– The idea is clear and distinct and contains more objective reality than any other idea.
Idea of God is cumulative (para.25-6)
Gradual increase of knowledge – idea of omniscience
D’s Reply – (Idea of) God does not contain any ‘potentialities’
– Gradual increase only yields indefiniteness; potentially more
– My idea of God represents God has not having any potentialities, but being fully ‘actual’
– God is ‘actually infinite’ not ‘indefinitely finite’
Anthony Kenny – Idea of God is not necessarily coherent.
Kenny’s understanding of the argument for an idea of God.
1. I doubt
2. I lack one perfection
3. I am not perfect
4. I know I am not perfect
5. I know what ‘not altogether perfect’ means.
6. I know what ‘altogether perfect’ means.
7. I have an idea of an absolute perfect being.
Steps 5 to 6: Descartes uses the ‘priority’ claim
Steps 6 to 7 requires CAP and 3
Kenny’s reformulation of the argument.
This argument doesn’t necessarily lead to a ‘coherent’ idea of God.
1. I am not triangular
2. I lack one shape
3. I am not omniform
4. I know I am not omniform
5. I know what ‘not omniform’ means
6. I know what ‘omniform’ means
7. I have an idea of an omniform being.
Steps 5 to 6: Descartes uses the ‘priority’ claim
Steps 6 to 7 requires CAP and 3
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Therefore D’s argument that he has an idea of God does not necessarily lead to a coherent
idea of God
Kenny argues that in order to be clear and distinct my idea must at least be coherent.
Causal Adequacy principle
Emergent Properties
 Where the effect contains more reality than the cause
(Cp. Cottingham)
Causation is not a priori
Hume:


Causation is an a posteriori experience of the world.
Our idea of causation is a direct result of ‘habit’ or ‘custom’
Causation is not a ‘logical inference’ or deduction
 Given an effect, there is nothing self-evident or entailed about the cause.
 Cause to effect may seem deductively valid but it not so for the reverse.
 EG. That A can move B, does not entail that when B is moved it was moved by
A, nor can B give us any information about A (i.e. its properties.
 SO: D’s CAP is based on experience, not intuition. Thus it is unavailable to D
at this stage: 3M Argument fails.
 Movement from B to A is inferential, so the origin of D’s idea of God might not
be God at all, but something less than God.
Argument from Existence
At Para.30: D asks “whether I myself, who [has] this idea could exist if no such
being existed.”
Could I be self-creating?
NO: or else I would have given myself all the perfections of which I can
conceive
 It would have been more difficult to bring about my existence than my
knowledge
 Therefore: I have not done the difficult bit by bringing myself into
existence and overlooked the easier bit of giving me perfections.
Could I have always existed (not been created)?
NO: Preservation and creation only a ‘conceptual’ distinction
 If a life is made up of time slices, to exist from one moment to the next
would be the same as ‘creating’ me anew
 If I had the power to do this I would recognise such power.
Could my parents have created me?
Yes; but from where the idea of God?
 My idea could not have come from a chain of imperfect causes.