CHID495, Spr-2010 reading guide
Reading Guide: CPJ, Analytic of the Beautiful
Aesthetic Judgment, First Moment: Quality
§1 – Judgments of the Beautiful are Aesthetic
 In judgments of taste (JoT) we relate the representation of an object by means of the Imagination and
Understanding to the Feeling of the subject
 Thus, JoT is non-cognitive, non-logical – it is aesthetic; JoT = Aesthetic Judgments of Reflection
 Also, JoT has a subjective determining ground
 In JoT the subject feels itself as it is affected by the representation of the object in its faculties (imagination
and pure understanding), it is a “feeling of life”
 In JoT the given representation is held in the subject “up to the entire faculty of representation, of which the
mind becomes conscious in the feeling of its state” (90)
§2 – The Pleasure Determining JoT is Disinterested
 JoT concerns “how we judge [the objects] in the mere contemplation,” NOT anything which is at stake in the
object (politically, sensually, ethically, epistemologically, etc.); i.e. we are not compelled by anything external
to the act of contemplation of the object
 JoT, therefore, is determined by disinterested satisfaction effected by the contemplation of a beautiful object
§3 + §4 – What the Pleasure Determining JoT is NOT: Agreeableness or Goodness
 JoT does not concern the agreeableness of an object to our senses (because then sensation would be the
ground)
o If sensation determines the aesthetic judgment, we are simply asserting that it gratifies our idiosyncratic,
individual preferences (e.g. you prefer green things, and the object is green)
 JoT does not concern the goodness of an object to our reason, as good for something or morally good (because
then reason would be the ground)
o If reason determines the aesthetic judgment, we are asserting either that it is a good for something, or
good in itself, both of which use a concept for measurement in reason (e.g. you have a concept of hammer,
and the object is a particularly well-made hammer)
 Both agreeableness and goodness combine an interest with the judgment
§5 – Comparison of 3 Determining Pleasures: the Agreeable, the Beautiful, and the Good
 The Agreeable and the Good both relate judgment to Desire (Reason and Sense, or Reason and Understanding
respectively)
 The Beautiful is not related to Desire at all (and hence not at all to Reason)
 JoT consists in a “free satisfaction” in which neither the senses nor reason “extorts approval” (95)
 We are inclined to the agreeable, we respect the good, and we favor the beautiful
See p.96 Definition (Quality of JoT)
Aesthetic Judgment, Second Moment: Quantity
§6 – Judgments of the Beautiful are Universal
 JoT contain a claim to “subjective universality”; they assert a universally valid ground for disinterested
pleasure
§7 – Comparison of the Beautiful
 Judgments of the agreeable assert grounds for a private feeling that is beyond debate; e.g. “This poem is
agreeable to me”
 Judgments of the beautiful asserts grounds for a public feeling that is valid for all; “This poem is beautiful”
o For Kant, adding “for me” to this judgment is ridiculous, since it is making a claim that has to do with its
universal validity (but not certainty), and not a private validity as in agreeableness; That is, judgments of
the beautiful makes a claim for the assent of everyone
 Judgments of the good also assert validity for everyone, but are always mediated by a concept
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CHID495, Spr-2010 reading guide
§8 – The Universality of Satisfaction in JoT is Represented as Subjective
 The aesthetic judgment of taste (on the beautiful) reveals a special capacity in us, since it ascribes the pleasure
in an object to everyone, yet does not ground this pleasure on a concept
 It would never occur to us to make a judgment that claims universal validity of feeling if we did not have some
ability to apprehend this condition in experience, since otherwise all judgments unmediated by concepts
would be immediate inclinations of sense and desire (claims of private agreeableness) and we would have no
impulse or purpose for sharing them (to express them publically)
 There is universal capacity to make universal judgments of feeling (JoT), just not universal agreement of the
application of this capacity
 Universality not based on concepts is not logical, but aesthetic; JoT concern aesthetic universal validity
 Note: JoT postulates universal VALIDITY, not universal ACCORD for everyone who judges the object; one is
not rationally/logically “convinced” of someone’s claim about beauty, but only assents to it with confirmation
in his or her own apprehension of the object in question
§9 – Investigation into JoT: Does Feeling Precede or Follow the Judging?
 It must FOLLOW the judging.
 Since, if we held that the feeling came before the judging, it would mean our judgment would immediately
depend on intuition (representation through which the object is GIVEN) and be determined by sensation
 “Thus it is the universal capacity for the communication of the state of mind in the given representation which
[…] must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence” (102)
The Determining Ground
 The ground is subjective: no empirical concept of the object is involved at all (i.e. no empirical
Understanding), and no Reasoning is involved (no inferences are being drawn, not desires pursued, no active
willing at all)
 The only faculties involved are Sensibility, Imagination, and PURE Understanding (and of course the power of
judgment)
 The determining ground IS the STATE OF MIND: “the state of mind that is encountered in the relation of the
powers of representation to each other” in which they (Sensibility and Imagination) relate a given
representation to cognition in general (pure Understanding)
The State of Mind in JoT
 The state of mind IS the FREE PLAY of the powers of representation (S<-I->U); see p. 103 “The subjective
universal communicability […]”
 The ground of the pleasure we feel is the “harmony” of the faculties of cognition in the judging
 The universal subjective conditions of the judging of objects is the GROUND of the universal subjective
validity of satisfaction felt in the judging of a beautiful object
The Pleasure in the Beautiful
 The pleasure we feel (grounded and determined as above) is expected of everyone (in their own JoT, viz. a
aesthetic judgment of reflection) as necessary, AS IF it were a property of an object determined in accordance
with concepts
 Beauty is nothing by itself, it is not actually a property of things: it consist ONLY in relation to the feeling the
subject
QUESTIONS (103):
 In what way do we become conscious of a mutual subjective correspondence of the powers of cognition with
each other in JoT? (aesthetically or intellectually)
 Is it intellectual, wherein a concept unites Imagination and Understanding? No.
 Is it aesthetic, wherein sensation harmonizes Imagination and Understanding? Yes.
 We become conscious, then, only through sensation of an effect on the mind that consists in the facilitated
play of both Imagination and Understanding, “enlivened in mutual agreement”
 How and whether apriori aesthetic judgments are possible? [yes, see next section for how]
See p.104 “The animation of both faculties [… end of section]”
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CHID495, Spr-2010 reading guide
Aesthetic Judgment, Third Moment: Relation
§10 – On Purposiveness in General
 The “object itself … as an effect” (105): When we think the object itself NOT as determined by the cognition of
the object, but as an EFFECT only possible through a concept of its form or existence.
To Explain and Conceive
 See p.105 “An object or a state or even an action […] representation of a certain rule”
 Comment: We call objects, etc. of our judgments “purposive” even when they do not suggest a necessary and
singular purpose, since it cannot be explained or conceived by us without assuming an intrinsic causality in
accordance with purposes. That is, we can only begin to explain and conceive certain objects through
assumption of them as wills, as self-organizing objects of experience that the grounds of their own reality.
Purposiveness without Purpose
 Purposiveness of objects exists without reference to ENDS or single purposes because we do not ascribe their
(the objects’) forms TO a will, but must make our explanation of their possibility conceivable by deriving it
from a will.
 Thus, we can observe purposiveness concerning form without grounding in a concept of an end or
determinate purpose- but ONLY by reflection (i.e. by reflecting judgments, aesthetic (JoT) or teleological)
§11 – The Object of JoTs: Form of Purposiveness
 No subjective purpose or end can be the DETERMINING GROUND of JoT
 No representation of an objective purpose (concept of its end in an concept of good—good for [perfection], or
good in itself [morality]) can be the ground of JoT
 Thus, only the “subjective purposiveness in the representation of an object without any end, consequently the
mere form of purposiveness in representation through which an object is given to us…” is the determining
ground (106)
§12 – The Grounds of JoT are Apriori
 See p.107 “The consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness [… end of section]”
 The pleasure is relational, formal: it is effected by empirical experience, but not determined by it, since it (the
pleasure) is an effect of the animation of our cognitive powers (state of mind) that is maintained in
indeterminate contemplation of the object.
 Note: this pleasure is ANALOGOUS to the passivity of mind in its repeated attraction to charm (something we
like and find interesting and pleasurable to the senses), but it differs in the configuration of our powers: in
charm, our sense is leading the powers, in beauty our powers are animated into a free play
§13-§16 – Errors: Charm, Emotion, Perfection, Concepts
 Kant elaborates on his views of JoTs and beauty in relation to common errors of impure judgments which are
made via the above grounds
§17 – Ideal of Beauty
 There is no possible determining RULE of taste via concepts (we cannot “prove” beauty in concepts)
 The ground of the communicability of beauty is the “unanimity in judging of forms under which objects are
given to them” (116)
 Ideal of beauty is an ideal of imagination, of purposive presentation; See p.117 “Hence the archetype of taste
[…]”
 Kant here entertains a “psychological explanation” but ultimately indicates its limited value and inadequacy to
JoTs
Aesthetic Judgment, Fourth Moment: Modality
§18 – The Modality of JoTs
 Not possible, or actual, but necessary: All representations can possibly combine with pleasure, agreeable
representations actually combine with pleasure, but beautiful representations necessarily combine with
pleasure
 As a necessity thought, is it only exemplary (demands assent, but does not determine assent)
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CHID495, Spr-2010 reading guide
§19-§22 – The Subjective Necessity in JoTs
 JoTs indicate a “should” – all reflections on the object should assent to the judgment, but it does NOT claim
that other will actually assent
 It can claim universal assent only insofar as there is a common ground: this is common sense (which is not at
all what you think this means: see below)
 Common sense is NOT common understanding: Kant makes a distinction here which he will take up and
elaborate in the section on the deduction (p.160+; esp. §39) after the analytic of the sublime. Here, however,
common sense is identified negatively as a commonality in judging subjects that cannot be reduced to the
common understanding (all the historical, social conceptions we inherit and acquire in culture – in discursive
cognitive experience); it suffices here only in that we could not explain the fact that we attempt to make
judgments of taste (and not just of agreeableness, usefulness, etc.) all the time.
 Comment: There is, at the very least, a theory-choice here concerning the distinction between sense and
understanding (CPR introduces this) and its consequence in the making of judgments (apprehensions) which
cannot be explained (or conceived, and hence possible) by determining forms of judgment (which require a
concept to be determining).
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