Week 11 – Feminism: Does Care
Supplement or Supplant Moral REASON?
Order:
1. Waluchow on Feminism (pgs. 223 –244).
2. Gilligan: Supplement (G&H, pgs. 273 –
284).
3. Noddings: Supplant (G&H, pgs. 285 –
292).
1. Waluchow
The basic Feminist claim is that at best,
traditional moral theories are incomplete
because they fail to account for the moral
experiences of women, at worst, they justify
a status quo that perpetuates the
subordination of women.
Men are historically regarded as dominating
the public sphere, which is characterized by
reason, power and conflict.
Women, by contrast, have been confined to
the private sphere, i.e., home life,
characterized by intimate caring
relationships.
This distinction has been justified as
‘natural’ or ordained by God and as such,
the further inference that this life satisfies
women was made.
Feminists typically reject this natural
argument; women’s relegation to the private
sphere is a matter of convention and is
therefore liable to change.
Many Feminists also argue that women are
still being oppressed, even in Modern
Western Democracies. Western
Democracies have been designed by men,
for men, at the expense of women. The
Feminist goal is to root out these
‘patriarchal’ social structures.
Of course, while most Feminists share
similar goals there are many disparate
methods and conclusions among feminists.
One of the more prominent discussions
revolves around the idea that women have a
unique moral perspective that focuses on the
caring nature of interpersonal relations. This
is the issue we’re going to focus on.
The first question we must address is
whether women are actually different in
nature than men. Few dispute differences
between men and women, but most see
those differences as a matter of social
convention. Hence the distinction between
sex, which is biological, and gender, which
is a social construct.
Most involved in this discussion rely on the
social roles of women as those that establish
the different ethical perspectives of men and
women.
Some maintain that the feminine perspective
supplements traditional ethical theories,
others hold that those traditional theories
need to be abandoned in favour of an ‘ethics
of care’.
Lawrence Kohlberg, a psychologist,
introduces a scale of moral development that
identifies six stages. Women don’t tend to
make it past stage 3. Carol Gilligan, also a
psychologist, replies that while she agrees
with the differences in moral reasoning
between men and women Kohlberg
identifies, she does not accept that the
‘higher’ stages are in fact superior.
Men appeal to abstract, universal principles,
whereas women cite concrete relationships
and solutions that require communication
and compromise. On Gilligan’s account, the
male approach, far from being superior
misses an important aspect of our everyday
moral lives.
Gilligan emphasizes that these differences
are simply a function of the Western account
of ‘female’, and so do not represent any
natural difference between men and women.
So for Gilligan, traditional ethical theories
need to be amended to capture the
complexities of a situated existence, not
abandoned.
Nel Noddings maintains that while rules and
reasoning may have a place in the proper
moral theory, the emphasis should be on
caring. Universal rules ignore our complex,
interdependent lives.
Have Gilligan and Noddings provided a
legitimate criticism of traditional ethical
theories by focusing on their appeal to
universal, abstract moral principles? Surely
the very idea of ‘universal moral rules’
should not be completely abandoned.
Why can’t there be ‘principles of care’? Not
every relationship is so unique that it defies
comparison and therefore categorization
with other similar relationships.
Maybe the criticism is of generalization, not
universalization… a less general (more
specific) rule can (and arguably must) still
be applied universally. But few traditional
moral theorists deny the importance of
taking everyday situations into account.
So the idea that universalizability should be
rejected cannot be sustained so long as we
believe people must use reasons to justify
their moral decisions.
A broader Feminist criticism of traditional
moral theories is that they fail to take the
context in which specific choices are made
into account. E.g., fertility technology and
the cause of a market that seeks it out.
2. Gilligan: Supplementing Traditional
Moral theories (G&H, pgs, 273 – 284).
Male bias must be identified before equality
between women and men can be possible.
And the task is difficult because many of our
modern male institutions are couched in the
language of neutrality. E.g., science,
specifically psychology.
C: The problem with psychology is that it
has identified ‘male’ as ‘normal’ which, by
definition, ensures that ‘female’ is regarded
as deviant. Women do not have a deficient
moral perspective, simply a different one.
And the fact that men devalue and ignore the
female moral perspective is precisely what
leads to the failing of traditional moral
theories.
Section 1. Men are taken as the norm for
psychology. E.g., Freud claims women have
a less well developed ego and super-ego.
Section 2. pgs. 275 – 278: The goal in this
section is to show that the differences
between women and men identified by
Freud are legitimate, but they do not show
women are by nature less well-developed
people.
The idea is that girls, based on their close
relationships with their mothers, are more
able to experience empathy. Boys, by
contrast, have greater difficulty with
interpersonal relationships.
And this fact is borne out in the games of
young girls and boys. Girls are less
interested in rules and conflict, whereas
boys seem to enjoy this aspect as much as
they enjoy the game itself.
Neither of these orientations toward
interpersonal relations can be regarded as
superior; they are different, and each has its
shortcomings.
Section 3: pgs. 278 – 280. The tension
between the female tendency toward
empathy and compromise versus the rule
based conflict resolution of males arises
from the fact that the male view dominates
our social norms. As a result, the female
perspective on moral life is devalued and
disregarded.
Section 4: pgs. 280 – 284. How the
dominant male view of morality invades
psychology… Kohlberg. His male bias
invades his study in the very construction of
his account of moral development, i.e., he
appeals to males as ‘normal’, and thereby
guarantees the inferiority of women.
Kohlberg’s results are accurate, it is his
interpretation that is flawed. Women appeal
to relationships and responsibility not rights.
And there is nothing that makes that appeal
less valuable. So we need to reconstruct
Kohlberg’s stages to allow for the different
gender perspectives to be regarded equally.
The importance of the feminine can be seen
all the way back to Greek mythology.
Noddings: Supplanting Traditional Moral
theories (pgs. 285 – 292).
Take note of Noddings’ rhetorical method –
instead of appealing to abstract hypothetical
examples as evidence of her position, she
presents interpretations of literature, i.e., art,
i.e., concrete/complex interpersonal (though
perhaps fictional) relationships.
What is ‘Caring’, and how is it different
from the male perspective?
C: Caring can only be understood from the
position of the one-caring, typically the
female. We do not reason according to
abstract principles to lead an actual moral
life, but need to be attentive to the emotional
bonds we have with those in our lives.
Section 1: pgs 285 – 289. The differences
between men and women are evident by
contrasting Ceres (Demeter) and her
reaction to the loss of her daughter against
Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son.
The key to moral life is not the proper
rearrangement of abstract principles, but
taking steps to actually care for those in your
real life. Both men and women are capable
of this caring, but it is undervalued in
women.
Section 2: pgs 290 – 292. A new ethic can
be built on women’s experiences…
concentric circles of care. Caring most, and
being most attentive to those with whom
you are immediately surrounded (i.e.,
family). Then those with whom you interact
outside the home. Then those whom you’ll
come to meet, and finally, you care for
strangers as distinct individuals. The strain
on the one-caring will not come from
abstract universal rules but internal
emotional pressure.