Phil 04 – Fall 07
Anderson
Outline of the Logic of Dworkin’s Essay
Essay #14, The Right to Ridicule, is on pp. 493-95 of the text. It is a challenging piece of work.
It is helpful, I think, to divide it up into three main parts.
Part One – The case for self-censorship of the cartoon. (Paragraphs 1 and 2)
Dworkin’s claim: The refusal of the British and American press to publish the Danish cartoon
was the right thing to do.
His argument is inductive; he gives several reasons in support.
(a) The risk of more violence by publishing the cartoon is too great.
(b) The public’s right to a free press is not an absolute right. This is one of those rare exceptions
where self-censorship is better.
(c) Those who really want to see the cartoon can view it on the Internet.
(d) The cartoon has no significant informational content or literary or artistic merit that the
public would be deprived of by its censorship. (This is obviously Dworkin’s personal view;
others may disagree with him on this.)
Objection: Censoring the cartoon would only play into the hands of the fanatics who fomented
the violence. It is giving them just what they wanted.
Reply: The violence was being fomented for political – not religious – reasons. Hence,
continuing its publication would only serve the interests of the fanatics all the more.
Part Two – Dworkin’s positive argument for free speech and press. (Paragraphs 3-6)
Dworkin raises the concern (paragraph 3) that the self-censorship will mistakenly lead some
people to think there should be very sweeping limits on free speech and press; that anything that
is likely to offend the members of any religious minority, or ethnic or racial group, is fair game
for censorship.
Dworkin’s main argument for not censoring speech or press, even if the target of the speech is
deeply offended or insulted by it. (Paragraph 4)
Laws and policies are not legitimate unless they have been adopted through a democratic
process.
A process is not democratic if government has prevented anyone from expressing his convictions
about what those laws and policies should be.
Therefore, free speech is a condition of legitimate government.
Note that this is a valid argument, so the only grounds for criticism would be to question the
truth of the premises.
Clarification of the scope of the conclusion. (Paragraph 5)
Free speech, as Dworkin interprets it, includes the right to ridicule, which means the right to say
things that may be taken as offensive and insulting. Ridicule, he writes, is a unique form of
expression that has long been used in political struggles. It cannot be translated into “nice”
inoffensive language (or art) without losing its impact.
An important implication of the argument for unlimited free speech. (Paragraph 6)
Minorities often rightly want laws that protect them against discrimination in hiring, housing,
education, etc. But, like any other law, those anti-discrimination laws should come about by
legitimate procedures. And as Dworkin has just argued, they won’t be legitimate unless there is
free and open debate on their merits. That means bigots and others who are bitterly opposed to
such laws have a right to have their say in the matter. So it comes down to this: if you want laws
that protect minorities against unfair discrimination, you have to be willing to put up with speech
that may be insulting and demeaning.
Part Three: The hypocrisy allegation and the alleged special status of religion.
Some European countries have censorship laws that prohibit people from publicly denying the
Holocaust. (Paragraph 7) So they are being hypocritical: they don’t want the cartoon censored
but they do want to censor other things. Dworkin recommends an easy solution: there should be
no censorship laws concerning the Holocaust.
Is religion special? (Paragraph 8) Some people argue that religion is so important a factor in
their lives that they feel it is a religious duty to strike back – even violently – at those who insult
their religion. Therefore, ridicule of anyone’s religious beliefs in public should be censored.
Dworkin’s reply is similar to the argument in paragraph 6. Religious minorities want the law to
protect their right to freely worship the religion of their choice. But they can’t have it both ways:
if the laws that protect their religious practices are to be legitimate, then the debate over those
laws has to be free of censorship.