Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy Making:
Multi-level Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to
Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy
Michael E. Smith
Georgia State University
Abstract
The expansion of European foreign and security policy cooperation since the 1970s
imposes unique requirements on European Union (EU) member states, and the coordination of
these various obligations presents a major challenge to the EU’s pursuit of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP). However, the past decade also has seen significant progress toward
the multilevel governance of EU foreign policy, particularly when compared to the limited policy
coordination of the 1970s and 1980s. This article examines the relationship between institutional
development and the multilevel governance of EU foreign policy, as represented by the CFSP.
In particular, it explores: 1) the extent to which the CFSP policy space can be described in terms
of multilevel governance; 2) the processes by which governance mechanisms influence the
domestic foreign policy cultures of EU member states; and 3) how the interaction of domestic
politics and governance mechanisms produces specific policy outcomes.
Keywords
Common foreign and security policy, domestic politics, European foreign and security policy
cooperation, multilevel governance
The expansion of European foreign and security policy cooperation since the early 1970s
has involved a complex fusion of several institutional forms: intergovernmental,
transgovernmental, and supranational (Smith 1998). Each of these institutional mechanisms
imposes unique requirements on European Union (EU) member states, and the coordination of
these various obligations presents a major challenge to the EU’s pursuit of a Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP). In response to this problem, the Maastricht Treaty on European
Union attempted to re-organize these institutional forms into a coherent policy process. Yet
while the current CFSP process is still not as supranational as other EU policy domains, such as
the single European market, the past decade has seen significant progress toward the multilevel
governance of EU foreign policy, particularly when compared to the limited policy coordination
under the European Political Cooperation (EPC) framework of the 1970s and 1980s.
This generic process can be described in terms of a greater consolidation of authority at
the EU level (which consists of both national and EU organizational inputs), and a greater degree
of national adaptation to EU foreign policy norms (procedural and substantive), or
“Europeanization.” Although the EU certainly possesses some elements of a federal system, the
term “multilevel governance” is preferred here for two reasons: the EU clearly is still a treatybased polity and its member states reserve ultimate authority to approve all decisions, especially
in foreign/security policy. And although multilevel governance usually assumes a greater role
for supranational EC organizations (chiefly the Commission and European Court of Justice) in
policymaking (Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996), my chief goal here is to
demonstrate its applicability to the realm of foreign/security policy, an area where supranational
organizations traditionally have been marginalized.
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The use of multilevel governance also helps us avoid the pitfalls of intergovernmental
approaches to EU foreign policy, such as two-level games (Bulmer 1991; Putnam 1988) or
liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1993). Although these conceptual tools may shed light
on high-level negotiations about treaty reforms, as during major Intergovernmental Conferences
(IGCs) of the EU, they are problematic in describing normal policy outcomes for several reasons.
One problem is their treatment of national preference formation as a distinct domestic political
process. A growing body of research suggests that it may be inappropriate to describe national
and EU-level decision-making, even in foreign policy, as two separate but linked processes. EU
member states do not form their national positions in isolation from each other and then attempt
to realize those goals at the EU level (Sandholtz 1996). Intensive domestic lobbying on CFSP
issues also is quite rare relative to other EU policy domains, nor do EU states typically “ratify”
common policy decisions, either formally or informally.
A second problem is institutional: in foreign policy, EU states are required to discuss
their thinking about problems before arriving at national positions. EPC/CFSP norms
deliberately reorient member states toward a “problem-solving,” as opposed to bargaining, style
of decision-making. This involves an appeal to common interests and the use of ostracism or
peer-pressure to sanction potential defectors. Under certain conditions, these processes may
inhibit the pursuit of rigid national policy positions in the realm of the CFSP. Moreover, past
policy decisions become new reference points for discussions about foreign policy whether at the
national or EU levels. Indeed, this problem of precedent-setting was a major factor in explaining
why it took several years for the CFSP to function effectively. Several states were concerned
about setting legal precedents while EU organizational actors, such as those in its various legal
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services, where drafting texts with the understanding that legal precedents were being set (Smith
2001a).
This article examines the relationship between institutional change (at the EU and
domestic levels) and the multilevel governance of EU foreign policy, as represented by the
CFSP. In particular, I first explore the extent to which the CFSP policy space can be described
in terms of multilevel governance. In the second section, I describe the specific processes by
which governance mechanisms influence the domestic foreign policy cultures of EU member
states. Of special concern are the unique mechanisms by which CFSP governance permanently
alters the domestic political structures of EU member states in ways that are not immediately
apparent by a reading of EU treaty obligations. The third and final section explores how the
interaction of governance mechanisms and domestic politics produces specific policy outcomes.
This relationship is crucial in determining how the EU acts (or fails to act) in foreign policy. It
also represents a move from ad hoc international cooperation (or the coordination of national
foreign policies, as under EPC) to a far more collective decision-making process (or multilevel
governance, as under the CFSP), although this process is neither supranational nor federal. How
the EU has managed to both institutionalize and Europeanize its multilevel governance of
foreign policy, while still respecting national sovereignty, is a key question for students of
international cooperation and European integration. Answering this question could also shed
light on why most other regional organizations have failed in this goal.
MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN/SECURITY
POLICY PROCESS1
The analysis of multilevel governance in EU foreign policy must begin with the broader
context in which that governance is embedded. EU states today share a high general propensity
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for common action due to certain inherent characteristics found within the region itself. These
include historical experiences (the legacies of the two world wars and the Cold War), a sense of
common fate, a high degree of interdependence as commonly measured in the literature (trade
and financial flows, immigration, travel, etc.), a common cultural/normative heritage
(democracy, free markets, the rule of law, social justice/cohesion, and human rights), and the
most intensive national participation in a network of international organizations (UN, OSCE,
EU, NATO, Council of Europe, etc.) found in any region on the planet. Among the states of
Western Europe, the EU is now the primary frame of reference for more policy decisions than
any other international/regional organization, and it is for this reason that any discussion of
multilevel governance must focus primarily, though not exclusively, on the EU. For in the realm
of foreign policy, even EU decisions must show some sensitivity to decisions taken elsewhere,
particularly the UN and, to a lesser degree, NATO. Although I cannot pursue this issue within
the confines of this article, we should be aware that interactions between the EU’s own system of
governance and those of functionally-related institutions like NATO will become increasingly
important as the EU develops its capabilities as a global actor.
Yet these general propensities for cooperation do not, by themselves, lead to common
action, particularly in foreign policy. This is the “value added” of a multilevel governance
approach to EU foreign policy: to explain how common general interests are defined, prioritized,
and translated into concrete policy actions through institutionalized behaviors at the EU and
domestic levels. Governance can be broadly defined as the authority to make, implement, and
enforce rules in a specified policy domain. Multilevel governance refers to the sharing of this
authority across an institutionalized, hierarchically-structured set of actors with varying degrees
of unity/coherence, commitment to EU norms, and power resources. In applying multilevel
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governance to EU foreign policy, as compared to other EU policy domains, one must: 1) pay
greater attention to the decentralized structure of the CFSP (i.e., a diminished role for the
Commission/EP/ECJ relative to socio-economic policy areas, and more access points into
decision-making) and 2) increase the potential influence of EU member states (as policy
entrepreneurs, barriers, and implementers), which involves domestic politics in complex ways
along the lines of existing approaches to multilevel governance (i.e., continuous negotiations
across several tiers of decision-making).
These EU-domestic interactions will be explored in further detail below. For the
moment, I focus on the general structure of multilevel governance in EU foreign policy. In
particular, I argue this structure of CFSP governance now involves four major elements. First
and most generally, it involves a much greater coherence of the policy sector and rationalization
of the policy process, far beyond what had existed under EPC. This change can be described in
terms of the definition of the CFSP itself, its linkages to the policies, organizations, and
procedures of the EU’s first pillar (the EC), and its practical operation. Although numerous
problems of coherence remain (Smith 2001b), EU foreign policy is now a formal EU policy
domain with complex linkages, procedural and substantive, to other EU policies. Second, the
CFSP is legally binding on EU member states, which includes some limited compliance
mechanisms. Third, the CFSP includes several authoritative decision-making rules, in the form
of qualified majority voting (QMV). Although the procedures are somewhat convoluted, and
they are not applicable across the entire range of CFSP activities, their inclusion in the
Maastricht Treaty clearly represents a breach of the long-standing taboo against supranational
decision-making procedures for EU foreign policy. Even if QMV is rarely utilized, which is the
norm, the threat of QMV may help EU states find consensus in the hopes of avoiding a
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potentially embarrassing vote. Fourth and finally, the TEU provides a greater degree of
autonomy for EC organizational actors in European foreign policy during specific phases of the
policy process as described below.
If we further break down the CFSP policy-making process into a sequence of behaviors
and the key actors involved, we can see where these various actors are most likely to influence
each policy stage. Table 1 provides a general overview of this process to help structure the rest
of this article.
Table 1 The CFSP Policy Process since Maastricht (major provisions only).
Policy stage
Agenda-setting: Defining general
principles/areas for the CFSP
Decision-making regarding specific CFSP
policies
Implementing common positions and joint
actions (includes external representation)
Funding of the CFSP
Performance evaluation in terms of policy
coherence (EC/CFSP/JHA/ESDP) and
compliance (very limited)
Democratic legitimacy (very limited)
Relevant actors
European Council of Heads of State/Government (which
includes a member of the Commission)
Council of the EU and Commission (supported by COREU,
Political/Security Committee, European Correspondents,
working groups, CFSP Secretariat, CFSP Policy Planning
and Early Warning Unit, COREPER)
EU presidency, High Representative for the CFSP,
Commission, ad hoc Special Representatives.
Commission and EP in most cases
Council of the EU, Commission, Political/Security
Committee (supporting role for ECJ)
EP and to a lesser extent, national parliaments
Taking a closer look at the EU’s system of multilevel governance, the first key point is
that national foreign policy actors must participate in highly institutionalized group decisionmaking forums at all stages of the process, including broad agenda-setting at the European
Council level. In fact, the capacity to block this decision-making (or bypass it altogether), rather
than actively participate in it, represents the main “national” power still enjoyed by EU member
states in the CFSP. Yet even this power is diminishing as the EU expands its role in world
politics and takes over many of the domestic activities normally governed by member states. Of
course, this process of multilevel governance has not yet extended to the European Security and
6
Defense Policy (ESDP), but it may be moving in that direction, at least in terms of tacit
norms/customs. The recent experiments with small EU military actions in Macedonia and the
Democratic Republic of Congo may hasten this process.
A second point is that the capacity for national influence into the process varies according
to the policy stage at hand. Although the European Council may be the most direct way for
national governments to set the EU agenda, even this level is subject to certain constraints for
two reasons. First, the Maastricht Treaty has already specified a number of broad agenda-setting
aims of the CFSP within the EU's single institutional framework.2 The Lisbon European Council
(26/27 June 1992) further approved a report by the EU foreign ministers that identified certain
"factors determining important common interests"3 and the specific objectives to be taken into
consideration when adopting a CFSP joint action, most of which center around democracy,
human rights, and conflict-prevention. Similarly, the Edinburgh European Council (7/8
December 1992) set down a basic list of issues suitable for action in the field of security.4 Any
national (or Commission) proposal for the CFSP is thus bound by these broad objectives; on
these topics, EU member governments cannot easily “hijack” the process for their own selfish
ends. Second, the European Council, as under EPC, does not devote much attention to the dayto-day implementation of CFSP policies for several reasons: its does not meet often or long
enough to take normal policy decisions, it is usually more concerned with Community affairs
rather than CFSP affairs, and whatever decisions it does take regarding foreign policy have
usually been prepared by others actors in other institutionalized EU forums (chiefly the Council
of the EU). As the European Council also includes a member of the Commission, even this
supposedly “pure” intergovernmental forum is subject to the influence of supranational actors.
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Other stages of the policy process reflect a complex interplay between national and EU
level processes. The financing of the CFSP provides it with material resources from national or
EU sources (once a decision to act has been taken), although more of this process has been
delegated to the EU level since Maastricht.5 Performance evaluation and democratic oversight
are quite limited as parts of the multilevel governance of the CFSP and are not a major focus of
this paper. Instead, my analysis of multilevel governance will stress CFSP decision-making and
implementation processes, where the interaction between national representatives and EU
actors/processes is the most intensive. Before examining that interaction, however, we must first
determine the extent to which domestic political processes have already been altered, or
Europeanized, by intensive participation in the EU. In other words, to what extent are EU
member states predisposed to utilize the CFSP system, beyond the general common interests
noted at the beginning of this section?
GOVERNANCE AND THE EUROPEANIZATION OF DOMESTIC POLITICS
In addition to the emergence of governance structures as noted above, certain aspects of
the EU’s foreign policy machinery cause sympathetic changes in national foreign policy
structures (Smith 2000). These aspects include the tendency toward problem-solving as noted
above, plus several key norms. These include: 1) regular communication and consultation on
foreign policy issues through a dense transgovernmental network; 2) confidentiality, in the sense
that member states can not use information shared between them to embarrass or blame other
states; and 3) decision-making by consensus, although there are some provisions for taking minor
policy decisions through QMV as we saw above. As a result of these norms, participants in EU
foreign policy do not always resort to the lowest common denominator position, as
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intergovernmental theories often suggest, but tend toward compromise and a median position in
the hopes of reaching a decision. In addition, these CFSP working methods have had feedback
effects into European domestic politics that help reinforce the system in the absence of sustained
central leadership by EC organizations. Two of these effects are relatively indirect and do not
concern me here; these are changes of interpretation in some national constitutions to conform to
common foreign/security policy norms, and a general growth in public support for the pursuit of
the CFSP. Under normal circumstances, these changes can foster a climate of passive approval
for the delegation of day-to-day policy-making authority to the EU’s foreign policy system.
More important to my argument here are two direct effects of national participation in EU
foreign policy at two different levels of analysis: the individual level (elite socialization) and the
organizational level (changes in national foreign policy bureaucracies). Changes at both levels
demonstrate the key relationship between pragmatic problem-solving and rule-making in EU
foreign policy as member states try to fill in the gaps left by the treaties in ways that cause farreaching changes in their own national foreign policy cultures. At the individual level of
analysis, institutionalized communications networks (chiefly CFSP working groups and the
COREU system6) and the passage of time encourage this elite socialization. Evidence of this
process has been well documented in the literature and need not be repeated here.7 The key point
is that socialization processes help make the CFSP less like a series of periodic summits (as with
many intergovernmental forums) and more like a decentralized but highly institutionalized
framework for policy coordination. They also help to erode the monopoly that high-level
government officials appear to hold over foreign policy while reorienting all EU foreign policy
participants towards “Europe.” In fact, elite socialization processes exhibit aspects of three
general logics of institution-building found in the literature: socialization, functional, and
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appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989; North 1990). Thus, EU foreign policy elites have
become far more familiar with each other’s thinking regarding foreign policy (socialization
logic), they have learned to value EU foreign policy as a way to enhance their own foreign policy
capabilities (functional logic), and they have learned to believe the EU is an acceptable arena in
which to take foreign policy decisions (appropriateness logic).
At the bureaucratic level of analysis, there is substantial evidence to show that EU
membership in general and CFSP membership in particular influence the way individual member
states organize their pursuit of foreign policy.8 The expansion and institutionalization of EU
foreign policy topics since 1970 makes it increasingly difficult for EU member states to devise
national policies without some reference to EU activities. In addition, the EU’s system of shared
leadership of the CFSP (particularly the EU presidency) requires EU member states to help
formulate and articulate EU foreign policy positions in numerous settings. These requirements
in turn tend to encourage more far-reaching changes in national foreign ministries beyond
privileging their overall role in the process. To the extent that these changes last beyond
individual changes of government and take place in accordance with CFSP requirements,
multilevel governance is enhanced. Three changes in particular will be stressed, although others
can be mentioned when examining individual EU states.
First, the CFSP requires the establishment of new national officials to serve it (chiefly
European Correspondents in national capitals and CFSP counselors attached to COREPER).
These institutional roles persist beyond the appointment of specific individuals and provide a key
source of continuity in national attention to CFSP affairs. Second, the CFSP encourages the
expansion of most national diplomatic services (although there have been some cutbacks since
the end of the Cold War). Third, the CFSP leads to a clear reorientation (and in a few states, also
10
a reorganization of internal administrative structures) of national foreign ministries toward
“Europe” in order to improve their handling of European affairs, particularly as EC and CFSP
activities are increasingly expected to function in a coherent manner. While some EU states
have maintained a distinction between their economic (EC) and political (CFSP) departments, in
others there has been a much closer linkage between the two in the hopes of maintaining
consistency of external policy. Together, these three developments have helped to reinforce the
common norms and goals of EU foreign policy (for details of these changes, see Hill 1983; Hill
1996; Manners and Whitman 2000; Smith 2000).
In general, these changes have: 1) enhanced the status of foreign ministries relative to
other domestic ministries involved in EU affairs; 2) opened more channels of access to EU
processes; 3) improved the linkages between economic and political components of EU policies;
4) helped to blur distinctions between domestic and foreign policy; and 5) reoriented national
foreign policy makers more towards “Europe.” These changes also can be summarized in terms
of consistency or coherence, as suggested by a reading of several different trends in the growing
literature on EU foreign policy. Table 2 organizes these changes along two dimensions:
vertical/horizontal and procedural/substantive.
Table 2 Types of coherence/consistency in the governance of EU foreign policy
Procedural/institutional
Substantive/policy
Vertical (or “Europeanization”)
National policy mechanisms
support/conform to common EU policy
mechanisms.9
National policies support/conform to
common EU policies.11
Horizontal
EU foreign policy mechanisms are uniformly
applied across policy areas/time. 10
Various EU policies conform to broad goals
or principles.12
If process matters for policy, then vertical procedural/institutional coherence should
promote vertical and horizontal/substantive policy coherence. To fully appreciate these
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interactions and situate them in a broader context of multilevel governance, we need to explore
how the system functions to produce regular policy outputs. In other words, how does the
interaction of domestic politics and governance mechanisms produce specific policy outcomes?
EU-DOMESTIC INTERACTIONS AND POLICY OUTCOMES
As the process of CFSP decision-making at the EU level has been fairly welldocumented, in this section I will focus on the ways by which domestic factors might be brought
into the analysis of EU foreign policy-making. If we first recognize that each EU member state
reserves the right to take unilateral foreign policy decisions through national decision-making
processes, then we need to examine why EU states would deviate from this tendency. However,
to answer this question, we must first make an assumption about micro-foundations, or national
preferences. Here there are two possibilities, each of which applies to different policy issues.
One is that we assume EU states form preferences largely at the domestic level and then
merely utilize the EU system to pursue them. If this is so, processes of multilevel governance (if
states choose to pursue that route) in foreign affairs might have an impact on the details of
policy, such as funding, but not on the general substance, which is likely to be decided by
consensus. This view applies particularly to issues where states still claim a unique right (the socalled domaines réservés) to decide that issue largely on a unilateral basis. As some EU states
still assert this right over certain foreign policy problems, we must accept that the multilevel
governance approach to the CFSP does not apply uniformly across all questions of foreign
policy. EU states therefore retain a capacity and willingness to take some decisions on a purely
national basis, although they may need to justify them at the EU level. For these largely
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unilateral decisions one can rely on standard foreign policy decision-making models such as
rational actor, bureaucratic/organizational politics, or domestic interest groups.
However, since the range of “legitimate” domaines réservés has been shrinking over the
years, we must also consider that EU membership by itself increasingly causes or persuades EU
states to pursue (or at least to accept) collective rather than national decision-making as a
general rule. As I argued above, two general trends – institution-building at the EU level
(intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and supranational) and sympathetic changes in domestic
politics – both undermine the ability and willingness of EU states to take foreign policy decisions
with complete disregard for the positions of their EU partners and the EU’s own body of rules
and policies. The problem with this view, of course, is that foreign policy making in individual
cases becomes so complex that no single model can possibly incorporate the various factors that
may influence a specific outcome. This fact explains the attractiveness of the rational-actor
approach to national foreign policy and the liberal intergovernmental model to EU foreign policy
(for a concise review, see Öhrgaard 1997).
To solve this problem, it may be helpful to first frame the multilevel governance of the
CFSP in terms of an ideal type where each of its elements aligns with all others to produce
optimal collective action in foreign policy. By “optimal” I mean the ordinary or routine nature
of joint decision-making rather than the effectiveness of a specific foreign policy. In other
words, if the “normal” approach to foreign policy is through national (for unilateral) or
intergovernmental (for multilateral) decision-making, then how does multilevel governance in
the EU help overcome that tendency? We might first propose that the potential influence of
multilevel governance varies depending on numerous factors which for the purpose of deductive
theory-building can be grouped under four headings: 1) inherent characteristics of the policy
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problem/issue; 2) stages in the policy-making sequence; 3) novelty of the policy; and 4) domestic
factors.
Inherent characteristics of the policy problem/issue
The first of these factors involves the inherent characteristics of the foreign policy
problem. To greatly simplify, foreign policy problems can be organized along two dimensions:
the time frame involved (crises, short/medium term, and long-term) and the degree to which
violence may be involved in pursuing the policy. The time frame refers to the degree of urgency
surrounding the issue: crises must be decided within weeks at most (more often days or even
hours); short/medium term policies must be decided over months or a few years; and long term
problems must be decided over several years or even a decade. The degree of violence refers to
the political costs accompanying a problem and also varies continuously, ranging from little or
no possibility of violence to actual combat military operations. The key point is that most
foreign policy problems or goals involve some degree of inherent intractability depending on
these factors, both of which may favor or undermine multilevel governance. Time and the
willingness to use violence to resist or cause change are the main factors facing every decisionmaker. More importantly, these factors are largely independent of the initial definition of the
problem to be solved or goal to be reached. Yet they can have a profound effect on whether the
EU responds as a global actor or collapses into unilateral decisions or no decisions at all.13
Stages in the policy-making sequence
The second factor involves key actors and stages in the policy-making sequence itself,
each of which may favor or undermine multilevel governance. As I noted above, multilevel
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governance of the CFSP involves several major policy stages. Each of these suggests a related
hypothesis about the ability of EU member states to deviate from this inherently multilateral
process (i.e., act unilaterally):
1. Agenda-setting: Does the issue fall under existing, specific European Council
mandates, whether in geographic or functional terms? If so, the capacity for unilateral national
action on those problems may be reduced. These mandates include the agenda items set down in
the years following the Maastricht Treaty noted above.
2. Decision-making: What type of policy tool is under consideration (diplomatic,
economic, or military), and what are the associated decision rules: QMV, consensus only, or
some combination of the two (i.e., economic sanctions)? In general, multilevel governance will
be most problematic in situations where consensus is the formal rule (such as the ESDP) and/or
the decision involves complex cross-pillar actions (such as the EC and CFSP).
3. Implementation: As the CFSP provides for several types of implementation, the
potential for multilevel governance varies accordingly. Here we can ask: does the chosen policy
tool involve delegation to EU bodies (chiefly the Commission, which is most optimal), a preexisting framework (such as a joint council in the case of the EU’s agreement with Mexico,
which is less optimal than delegation to the Commission alone) or strictly through national
implementation (such funding for the administration for Mostar, which is even less optimal than
joint councils or similar arrangements)? The greater the degree of national involvement in
implementation, the more difficult the optimal functioning of multilevel governance.
4. Funding: Similar to the question about implementation, we can ask: does the policy
tool involve only EU funding through its budget, mixed funding through EU or national funds, or
national funds alone? Again, the greater the degree of national involvement in providing funds
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for the policy (which often requires input by national parliaments), the more difficult the optimal
functioning of multilevel governance.
5. Coherence/compliance: Here we can ask: are there mechanisms for ensuring horizontal
coherence across other EU activities (substantive and procedural) and ensuring compliance
(vertical coherence) if national implementation is involved? In EU foreign policies, coherence is
increasingly pursued through the use of comprehensive framework agreements, which take into
consideration all relevant EU policies toward an important country/region/problem and attempt
to resolve contradictions or inconsistencies (Szymanski and Smith 2004). Compliance is more
problematic, as most CFSP decisions do not include provisions for compliance, nor do the EU
treaties themselves say much about this issue. Therefore we can only speculate about the
potential role of compliance mechanisms in any CFSP policy decision.
6. Democratic legitimacy: It is difficult to hypothesize about this aspect of multilevel
governance as it is far more of a normative question compared to other phases of the policy
process. In addition, the nature of foreign policy making does not lend itself to optimal oversight
by parliaments (or similar arrangements). Some decisions (like treaties) may require approval by
national parliaments and/or the EP, but the negotiation and implementation of such agreements
must be delegated to other actors. However, to the extent that democratic legitimacy matters for
the routine operation of multilevel governance in foreign policy, we can ask: does the policy tool
allow legitimate involvement or oversight by elected bodies, where “legitimacy” varies
according to the decision type (funding, approving agreements, approving appointments, etc.)?
If so, national governments may have less reason to oppose a common policy on the grounds that
it violates democratic norms.
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Novelty of the policy decision
The propensity for optimal multilevel governance also likely depends on whether the
policy decision is an entirely new one or an on-going/follow-on decision (such as administrative
agreements or follow-on implementation decisions) where decision-making procedures have had
a chance to coalesce or even institutionalize into framework agreements or similar “package
deals.” Similarly, whether the policy problem has resulted in the creation of one of the more
than two dozen CFSP working groups may matter a great deal. Most pre-decision deliberation
takes place within such expert working groups, and their role in framing problems and
suggesting appropriate policies is crucial to the smooth operation of the CFSP. New problems
that do not enjoy the sustained attention of a permanent CFSP working group (whether
functional or geographic) are not likely to result in concrete policy decisions except in rare cases.
Domestic factors
Finally, we need to find a systematic way to incorporate the role of domestic factors
(whether regular or idiosyncratic) in the pursuit of multilevel governance. This is extremely
difficult considering the variation across the EU in terms of historical experiences, power
resources, key relationships, cultural norms/values, institutional mechanisms, and government
types. Although we have seen a general harmonization of certain domestic political factors in
line with EU/CFSP participation, there is still great diversity among EU states that certainly
influences the pursuit of individual CFSP policies. Attempting to organize and rank the
influence of these factors (such as large vs. small states, permanent/temporary UN Security
Council members, neutral states, etc.) for all EU states would be an extremely difficult, and
17
possibly even counterproductive, exercise if our purpose is to develop a deductive theory of
multilevel governance in the CFSP.
Instead, it may be more useful to examine how situation-specific (rather than country
specific) domestic factors are likely to interfere with the optimal operation of multilevel
governance in the CFSP. Although some domestic events may improve the operation of the
CFSP in terms of multilevel governance, we might find it difficult to determine whether a
decision was the result of effective consensual decision-making (or other factors) or effective
leadership by a single EU state, except in isolated cases where one EU state played a dominant
role throughout the process. Thus, it may be easier, at least in terms of finding evidence, to
determine the conditions under which domestic events undermine or interfere with the normal
performance of the CFSP. In other words, what aspects or conditions of domestic politics might
lead EU states to deviate from “normal” multilevel governance as a policy process described
above? These conditions can be organized under two headings, general and specific.
General characteristics of EU member states can be organized in terms of 1) government
ideology (pro-EU/CFSP or not); 2) government unity (coalition or not); and 3) type of state
(centralized or federal). In general, we might hypothesize that optimal participation in the CFSP
policy process will be undermined when a government exhibits an anti-EU/CFSP ideology,
involves a coalition (especially with multiple parties or a very minimal winning coalition), and
requires approval by federal states when taking key policy decisions.
Specific characteristics/situations are unique to each policy decision at the time it is
made. These factors might include: 1) major unique political events such as elections or
referendums (governments facing tough elections are less likely to take risks on questionable
CFSP actions); 2) scandals/crises (which undermine the leadership ability of a government); 3)
18
whether the issue is subject to a domaine réservé of an EU state; and 4) in the case of economic
sanctions (or similar) whether an EU member state has a close economic relationship with the
target state.
Since one or more of these factors is likely to be in operation for one or more EU member
states during any typical CFSP decision, we need to qualify the argument: the factors are most
likely to interfere with optimal multilevel governance in three situations: 1) during certain phases
of the policy process as mandated by the CFSP decision itself (implementation, funding,
coherence/compliance); 2) when a country experiencing such factors is in a key position of
influence in the EU (this mainly involves holding the EU presidency, but could also involve the
appointment of special representatives for the CFSP or participation in some forms of collective
representation such as the “troika” mechanism); and 3) possibly when normal CFSP policy
decisions are taken during other major events, such as IGCs, which may reduce the willingness
of governments to take a risk with the CFSP. These factors are listed in Table 3:
Table 3 Factors influencing optimal multilevel governance in the CFSP
Policy stage
Most optimal
Least optimal
1. Agenda-setting
2. Decision-making rule
Issue conforms to European Council mandate
QMV or not insisting on a consensus.
Policy involves a minimal chance of violence
and a long time horizon
By the Commission or other institutionalized
Body
By EU budget alone
No European Council mandate
Insisting on consensus.
Policy involves violence and a short
time horizon.
By member states (which intensifies
domestic complications)
By member states (which intensifies
domestic complications)
No framework agreement and/or no
compliance standards (which
intensifies domestic
complications).
3. Implementation
4. Funding
5. Coherence/compliance
6. Democratic legitimacy
Framework agreement (or similar) for greater
coherence.
Specific standards and punishments for
ensuring compliance if applicable to EU
member states.
Policy permits input by the EP as appropriate
(treaty approval, funding, special
appointments, etc.).
Policy allows no systematic input by
the EP or national parliaments.
19
Therefore, we might hypothesize that the multilevel governance of the CFSP will be most
optimal in situations where: the issue conforms to an European Council mandate; the decision is
reached by QMV (or no insisting on a consensus), has a long time horizon, and does not involve
violence; the policy involves explicit delegation to EU organizations or a pre-existing
framework; funding is provided by the EU budget; and the EP provides input as required by the
policy decision. In addition, governance will be improved in cases of follow-on policies (or
where enough time for deliberation on more complex problems, especially where a mandate
and/or consensus are lacking) and where the issue is covered by an existing CFSP working
group. Conversely, multilevel governance will be most difficult where there is no European
Council mandate; little consensus (or insisting on a consensus or using a veto in the case of
QMV), a good chance of violence and short time horizon; national implementation (through the
EU presidency); national funding; and no mechanisms for democratic oversight. The problems
will be further exacerbated for entirely new policies, and when a CFSP working group does not
presently cover the issue.
We should also note that optimal multilevel governance does not necessarily mean
“supranational” in the usual sense of the term: the use of QMV for decision-making and
delegation to the Commission. Similarly, we should note that the EU foreign policy system is
increasingly able to “compensate” in situations when a policy stage is not conducive to
multilevel governance, by: 1) delegating (tacit or explicit) leadership to an EU state or the
Commission on an issue; 2) making new informal rules for that situation (such as mixed
agreements); or 3) not applying existing rules (such as not requiring QMV even when the policy
tool warrants it). This is why it is difficult to use a single policy phase by itself, such as
decision-making, to predict the chances of optimal CFSP policy-making or governance. This
20
ability to make new rules has developed gradually over the past three decades, which explains in
part the limited number of formal EPC policy decisions compared to output under the CFSP.
As an ideal type, multilevel governance in the CFSP certainly is difficult to pursue. For it
to function effectively (as opposed to creating deadlocks) in EU foreign/security policy,
numerous variables must come into proper alignment. One example of this involves the EU’s
policy toward South Africa, which is often cited as a successful EPC/CFSP joint action. South
Africa was one of the first major areas confronted by the CFSP during its first few months of
operation, yet EPC had devoted attention to that country since the mid-1970s, which included the
creation of an EPC working group at that time. In a series of EPC/CFSP debates leading up to
and following the collapse of the white majority government in South Africa, a core of EU states
argued for higher cost collective foreign policy actions to undermine the apartheid system and
pave the way for a democratic transition. These actions ranged from a “Code of Conduct for
Community Companies with Interests in South Africa” (1977) to include support targeted at nonviolent anti-apartheid groups and sanctions targeted at the white government and its military
forces, both of which were increasingly implemented by the Commission rather than individual
EU member states. Throughout these debates, the UK, Germany, Greece, and Portugal
repeatedly expressed initial opposition to such costly measures, primarily to maintain access to
South African natural resources, yet all four states declined to exercise their right of veto and
thus succumbed to the wishes of their EU partners.
Efforts under the CFSP involved a transition from working against apartheid (as under
EPC) to helping to improve new democratic institutions and economic development in South
Africa. Toward these ends, the Commission began producing policy option papers on this issue
as early as 1992, and an outline of the EPC-CFSP policy transition was set down during the
21
Danish Presidency in June 1993. After rescinding the Code of Conduct and the 1985 sanctions
against South Africa (involving nuclear and military cooperation and the exchange of military
attaches) in late 1993, the EU implemented a series of positive inducements to encourage the
new government. These actions included dispatching a large team of 450 officials to help with
elections. The activities of this group went far beyond mere elections monitoring, 14 and the
Commission was fully responsible for coordinating these activities. In fact, the Commission’s
successful involvement here showed much potential for implementing future CFSP joint actions.
Thus, following this first joint action, the EU began a more extensive effort to integrate
the former pariah state into the global community. A Commission delegation was established in
Pretoria in December 1993, and it became the central contact between the EU and the local
government. This was a major change compared to EPC, when relations were conducted
through EU member states with embassies in South Africa (i.e., national implementation).15 In
April 1994 the Council adopted a Commission proposal for stronger relations with South Africa;
the new framework involved trade and economic cooperation, a political dialogue (where the EU
placed its usual emphasis on human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and social justice), and
development cooperation. Through these strands of activities involving the EC and CFSP, the
EU showed more coherence and uniformity of its policy toward South Africa than ever before
despite occasional defections by individual EU states from specific policy details. Martin
Holland's detailed assessment of this policy deserves quoting at length:
From both the European and South African perspectives, the joint action has been
an almost unqualified success. . . . (T)hrough the joint action a comprehensive approach
was adopted rather than segregated incrementalism. Coordinating the various policy
sectors (development, trade, election-monitoring, etc.) together under a single initiative
22
(the joint action), while difficult and possibly time-consuming, had led by the end of
1994 to a compatible and comprehensive policy mix that was regionally sensitive as well
as of direct benefit to South Africa.
(Holland 1995: 566)
The South African experiment also ultimately “improved the effectiveness of European
policy” and confirmed the Commission's enhanced status in this domain, as it “fully utilized its
power of initiative and was the leading player throughout 1993-94 in structuring the Union’s
contemporary policy, fulfilling a role of at least primus inter pares” (Holland 1995, p. 566).
Thus, it could be argued that the EU's comprehensive approach to South Africa epitomized the
optimal multilevel governance of foreign policy as I defined it above.
Conclusion
This article has examined the institutional development of EU foreign policy at the
European and national levels, arguing the case for a multilevel governance approach to
understanding the CFSP. Like the EU itself, the CFSP is an extremely unique process in
international affairs and it has developed considerably since the early days of EPC. However, as
a decentralized deliberative process, the CFSP is subject to many constraints at the EU and
domestic levels, as I have outlined in this article. The process also takes time to work
effectively, which frustrates observers inside and outside the EU. Numerous opportunities still
exist for member states to undermine the process, even if only “accidentally” by virtue of certain
domestic events such as elections. These opportunities in turn are contingent upon both the
inherent characteristics of the policy problem and domestic situational factors. I have attempted
23
to incorporate both sets of factors into a general theory of how the EU formulates and executes
common foreign policy decisions.
These inherence tendencies will come under increasing stress in the very near future.
The largest increase in membership in the EU’s history will greatly expand the range of potential
foreign policy problems, yet the EU’s constitutional convention is not likely to reform CFSP
procedures to the degree necessary to cope with 25 member states. Without more extensive
institutional reform at the EU level (such as greater use of QMV, and more delegation to the
Commission), in the future the CFSP might be pursued only when coalitions of willing take the
lead. Otherwise weak (or no) action might be the rule until the EU’s deliberative processes have
a chance to alter the domestic political cultures of the new member states in line with EU foreign
policy priorities. In fact, the EU might even consider specific ways to foster more domestic
changes (such as eliminating the political directors from the process and delegating many CFSP
decisions to COREPER) in hopes of a more general harmonization of foreign policy interests.
However, deliberate efforts toward this end, as through Europe’s constitutional convention,
might be resisted as unacceptable violations of state sovereignty. Still, this is not completely
outside the realm of possibility, and may be the only way for EU states to avoid the potential
CFSP deadlocks that loom after the next enlargement.
Address for correspondence: Michael E. Smith, Assistant Professor, Department of Political
Science, Georgia State University, PO Box 4069, Atlanta, GA 30302-4069, USA. Tel: 404 651
4839. Fax: 404 651 1434. e-mail: mesmith@gsu.edu
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
24
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the workshop entitled “EU Governance
and External Relations,” organized by the Mannheim Center for European Social Research,
University of Mannheim, Germany, October 10-11 2003. I am grateful to the directors of the
workshop (Michèle Knodt, Frank Schimmelfennig, and Wolfgang Wagner) and to other
workshop participants for their helpful input on this article.
NOTES
1
The argument in this section is derived in part from Smith, 2003, chapter 7.
2
These include: 1) safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests, and
independence of the EU; 2) strengthening the security of the EU and its members in all ways; 3)
preserving peace and strengthening international security; 4) promoting international
cooperation; and 5) developing and consolidating democracy, the rule of law, and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.
3
These factors are: 1) geographical proximity of a given region or country; 2) an
important interest in the political and economic stability of a region or country; and 3) the
existence of threats to the security interests of the EU.
4
Four sets of issues suitable for joint action in the security field: the CSCE process,
disarmament and arms control in Europe, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and
the economic aspects of security (especially technology transfer). Later, the Extraordinary
European Council (Brussels, 1993) defined the general objectives of European security as
preserving the territorial integrity and political independence of the EU, its democratic character,
its economic stability, and the stability of neighboring regions.
5
On CFSP (and JHA) financing problems since Maastricht, see Monar 1997.
25
6
COREU is the correspondance Europeène system, an encrypted telex network used
within the CFSP.
7
See the sources in Smith, 2000, pp. 617-19. The idea of elite socialization also informs
many of the chapters on individual countries in Manners and Whitman, 2000.
8
It should also be noted that the evolution of EPC/CFSP has coincided with changes in
national military structures. Although these developments have been increasingly linked to the
emergence of EU defense cooperation, it is impossible to disentangle them from related changes
in NATO, which takes them beyond the scope of this article.
9
Hill 1983; Manners and Whitman 2000; Smith 2000.
10
Neuwahl 1994; Smith 2001b.
11
Hill 1996; Manners and Whitman 2000; Smith 2004; Williams 2002.
12
Coignez 1992; Krenzler and Schneider 1997; Szymanski and Smith 2004.
13
Some might also consider proximity as another inherent characteristic of foreign policy
problems, yet the record of EPC/CFSP is difficult to interpret on this point. Although the EU has
produced a few more foreign policy outputs regarding its “near abroad” (CEECs, Russia, the
Middle East), proximity by itself cannot help one predict the potential for using EU mechanisms
to handle a certain issue. Some close problems have divided EU states (such as Yugoslavia and
the Mediterranean) while other distant problems have been addressed with far-reaching common
foreign policies, whether at the level of individual countries (South Africa, Korea), regions
(Central America), and the international system (the landmines ban, renewal of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty).
26
14
For a description of their activities, see Holland 1995. Holland also asserts (pp. 563-
564) that in terms of “observer days,” the EU was the major player in South Africa as compared
to the UN.
15
Though the Commission did have a small, non-accredited “European Commission
Technical Coordination Office” in South Africa, which handled the 1985-86 Special Program
and development assistance.
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