Rationality and Conversation:
A Thesis on Grice’s Theory of Conversation
Matthew Schoolfield
MSc (By Research)
The University of Edinburgh
2007
Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Gricean Theory .............................................................................. 1
1.1 Introduction............................................................................................. 1
1.2 Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature ......................................... 2
1.3 Epistemology and Testability of Gricean Theory .................................... 9
Chapter 2: Criticisms, Alternatives and Neo-Gricean Theory......................... 12
2.1 Kasher and Hintikka: Rationality as the Basis for Conversation ........... 12
2.2 Pre-Eminent Schools of Thought.......................................................... 18
2.2.1 Neo-Griceans................................................................................. 18
2.2.1.1 Martinich .................................................................................. 18
2.2.1.2 Levinson .................................................................................. 20
2.2.1.3 Leech ...................................................................................... 24
2.2.2 Relevance Theory .......................................................................... 25
2.3 Davis: The Anti-Gricean ....................................................................... 29
Chapter 3: Conversational Goals ................................................................... 33
3.1 Explanatory Failures of Gricean Theory ............................................... 33
3.2 Social Norms as Presumed Goals........................................................ 34
3.3 The Communicative Goal ..................................................................... 35
3.4 The Suasive Goal ................................................................................. 40
3.4.1 Seller-Consumer Relationship ....................................................... 40
3.4.2 The Bargainer Relationship ........................................................... 42
3.5 The Epicurean Goal ............................................................................. 44
3.6 Exclusivity, Exhaustiveness, and Conclusion ....................................... 45
Chapter 4: Implicature within Goal-Oriented Conversation ............................ 47
4.1 Quantity: Make Your Contribution as Informative as Is Required ......... 47
4.1.1 Some, Not All ................................................................................. 47
4.1.2 Tautologies .................................................................................... 50
4.1.3 Other Violations ............................................................................. 51
4.2 Quality: ................................................................................................. 52
4.2.1 One Should Make His or Her Contribution One That Will Not
Express Something False ....................................................................... 52
4.2.2 Do Not Express That for Which You Lack Adequate Evidence ...... 54
4.3 Relation: Respond Relevantly .............................................................. 54
4.4 Manner: ................................................................................................ 56
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4.4.1 Avoid Unnecessary (or Excessive) Obscurity of Expression.......... 56
4.4.2 Avoid Ambiguity ............................................................................. 58
4.4.3 Avoid Unnecessary Prolixity .......................................................... 59
4.4.4 Avoid Unnecessary Disorder ......................................................... 61
4.5 Conclusion............................................................................................ 61
Chapter 5: Conclusion ................................................................................... 63
Works Cited ................................................................................................... 67
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Chapter 1: Gricean Theory
1.1 Introduction
Paul Grice presents a theory of conversation and implicatures in his essay
“Logic and Conversation.” This work was first presented in his William James
Lectures in early 1967 and was discussed at some length before being published1 in
Cole and Morgan’s Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3: Speech Acts in 1975 (Chapman
2005, 100). This theory attempts to bridge the gap between what participants in
conversation say, and what they mean.
Grice presents this theory within the
framework of the Cooperative Principle: “Make your conversational contributions
such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction
of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1989, 26). The theory enables
Grice to present an account for the interpretation regarding discourse that would
otherwise be considered irrational. This account, however, has drawn much criticism
from both those who support this theory of conversation, and those who believe that it
is inherently flawed.
Neo-Griceans, such as Levinson, have presented updated
models of conversational implicature, streamlining the theory in some ways and
expanding on it in other ways. Revisionists, such as Sperber and Wilson, have
created new theories based on other principles. Detractors to the Gricean account of
conversation include Davis, Kasher, Hintikka, and an interesting sociological work by
Haviland. Davis provides a cornucopia of counterexamples and suggests a theory of
convention in its place. Kasher objects to the idea of the Cooperative Principle
always being apparent in conversation; this is due to his rejection of the idea that
participants in conversation always have a common goal. Hintikka suggests a gametheoretical approach to conversational implicature, but does not expand on this idea.
Finally, others consider the theory to be either insignificant or susceptible to many
counterexamples.
Primarily, if the Cooperative Principle is not necessary for
communication then it has much less force regarding conversation; thus, if the usual
counterexamples presented against the theory are trivialized, as is usually the case, the
applicability of the theory to conversation in general will be undermined.2 Supposing
that Davis, Kasher, and Hintikka are right in their criticism of Grice, one can present a
new version of conversation, taking a more inclusive approach to participant’s goals
1
2
Walker (1975) notes that the lectures were not published at the time of his paper on the subject.
Notably, Bird (1979) has this contention.
1
in conversation.
This would not only expand the framework for conversational
implicatures, but provide a means to explain concepts that Grice does not include in
his Cooperative principle, such as the way in which one ought to resolve the
criticisms of these maxims. It may also allow more room for phenomena such as
politeness, which Grice does not account for.
Once this new theory of
communication, based on both maxims and convention, is fleshed out, it should
provide a significantly more inclusive account of implicature, and one with greater
explanatory power.
1.2 Grice’s Theory of Conversational Implicature
It should be helpful to start by discussing Grice’s theory of meaning. When
talking about the meaning of a sentence, Grice notes that the term “to mean” can be
used in some interesting variations. Take the example, “Those three rings on the bell
(of the bus) mean that the bus is full,” this example would be quite different from,
say, “Those spots mean (meant) measles” (Grice 1989, 213-214). This difference
involves the fact that while both statements are, technically, cancellable, only the
former will still be rational when it is cancelled. Thus, if the bus driver mistakenly
rings the bell when the bus is not full, the bell still “means” the bus is full, though it is
not. This is unlike the latter statement, which involves natural meaning. This second
statement becomes contradictory if one adds, “Those spots meant measles, but he
hadn’t got measles” (Grice 1989, 213). Grice writes that the former statement can be
restated as “Those three rings on the bell mean ‘the bus is full’” (Grice 1989, 214).
This Grice refers to as nonnatural meaning. Grice uses the term “meansNN” to refer to
this specific nonnatural usage. Grice gives a definition of meansNN when he states,
“‘A meansNN something by x’ is (roughly) equivalent to ‘A intended the utterance of x
to produce some effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention’”
(Grice 1989, 220). When the bus drive rings the bell, he “meansNN” the bus is full;
but also, if he says “There’s not any room back there” to a potential bus rider, he still
“meansNN” the bus is full. It is this theory of meaning that will lead Grice to study the
implicatures created by the distinction between meaning something and “meaningNN”
something.
Grice, in his essay “Logic and Conversation”, attempts to provide a
framework for the pragmatics of conversation. He does so in this essay by presenting
a theory of implicature. His desire is to answer a debate between what he calls
2
“formalists” and “informalists” who disagree on the meaning of “~, , , , (x), x,
x,” and their supposed English counterparts “not, and, or, if, all, some (or at least
one), the” respectively (Grice 1989, 22). Between the formal logic of the formalists
and the natural language logic of the informalists, Grice has this approach:
I wish… to maintain that the common assumption of the contestants that the
divergences do in fact exist is (broadly speaking) a common mistake, and that
the mistake arises from inadequate attention to the nature and importance of
the conditions governing conversation. I shall, therefore, inquire into the
general conditions that… apply to conversation as such, irrespective of its
subject matter. I begin with a characterization of the notion of “implicature.”
(Grice 1989, 24)
To define his idea of implicature he explains, “I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the
verb implicate and the related nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf.
what is implied)” (Grice 1989, 24). With these new terms Grice is able to clearly
approach what would otherwise be very awkward subject.
Conventional implicatures, as opposed to the conversational implicatures that
Grice wishes to explore, are those which contain an implication explicitly within
statements. Grice gives the example, “He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave”;
here, the relationship between the consequence, “being brave,” and the antecedent,
“being an Englishman,” is inherent in the utterance (Grice 1989, 25). The “therefore”
makes this implication explicit; there are other words that are able to do this job as
well, for example: but, therefore, moreover, thus, hence, etc. (Bultinck 2005, 15).
This explicit relationship will not be there, however, for conversational implicatures,
which are non-conventional implicatures.3
Next, Grice classifies conversational implicatures as a subclass of nonconventional implicatures. These types of implicatures, due to the vague nature of the
implicatum will need some communication tool in order for them to be effective.
Thus, there must be a fundamental rule to guide them. Grice points out,
The following may provide a first approximation to a general principle. Our
talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession of disconnected
remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are characteristically, to
The terms “conventional” and “non-conventional” do not mean “(not) having to do with social
conventions,” which will be discussed in depth later; rather, they refer to whether or not an implicature
conjunction is used within the statement itself. The distinction between “conversational” and
“conventional” implicatures is not affected by Davis’ theory of implicatures by convention.
3
3
some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in
them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a
mutually accepted direction. (Grice 1989, 26)
Here, Grice makes a key step in providing his theory of conversation with the
foundation that there is an implicit shared goal in conversation. There are, however,
objections to this move.
It is important, though, to point out that Grice presents this principle as a
normative definition of conversation.
Griceans contend that participants of talk
exchanges will engage in “conversation,” as a general concept, only when following
the Cooperative Principle. Since Grice has presented this principle as a condition for
normatively defined conversation, then is no problem with counterexamples
emerging. Grice would just contend that the action engaged in by the participants is
not conversation.
However, this normative definition may be significantly less
interesting as a theory of communication when compared to more general theories
with more explanatory power.
Intuitions regarding “conversation” may not be
fulfilled within the Gricean framework.
Because he imposes this requirement for what counts as conversation, Grice is
able to present his “rough general principle which participants will be expected
(ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is
required… One might label this the Cooperative Principle” (Grice 1989, 26). This
Cooperative Principle is the basis for conversational maxims. Grice decides to pay
tribute to Kant by creating four categories “Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner”
(Grice 1989, 26). The categories, along with there maxims, are as follows:
Quantity:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current
purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Relation:
1. Be relevant
Manner: Be perspicuous
1. Avoid obscurity of expression
4
2. Avoid ambiguity
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)
4. Be orderly (Grice 1989, 26-27)
Under the Category of Quantity Grice presents two maxims Q1 and Q2.4 These
maxims obviously are associated with the amount of information exchanged between
participants engaged in conversation. The Q1-maxim is very strong; there seems to
be an assumption by Grice that the amount of information necessary for participants
to provide will be known through some means, such as context, if it is not made
explicit. Clearly, desiderata in most conversational discourse are made explicit. The
Q2-maxim here is not particularly the source of much controversy. However, Grice
notes that it may be superfluous and, therefore, some may expect it to be worrisome.
On one interpretation of the maxim, though Grice neglects to point out, his Q1-maxim
may indeed implicitly include the Q2-maxim. This reading presumes that one is to
increase the level of information up to the correct amount, the other reading merely
sees it as telling participant not to go beyond the desired amount of information. This
interpretation, however, does not damage the Quantity Maxims; rather, it may simply
be a clarifying distinction, due to some confusion regarding the Q1-maxim.
The second category Grice lays out is that of quality. This, he states, should
be understood under the supermaxim, “Try to make your contribution one that is
true”; but, this is separated into two specific maxims:
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. (Grice 1989, 27)
These two maxims compose different aspects of this supermaxim, and their specific
characteristics differ drastically.
The QL1-maxim maintains strict guidelines for
participants; whereas, the QL2-maxim will require participants to exercise their
judgment as to the adequacy of their responses.
Next there is the Category of Relation. For this, Grice simply gives the single
maxim “Be Relevant” (Grice 1989, 27). This seemingly simple maxim holds that one
is expected to make his or her input to the conversation appropriately relevant. This
maxim, however, has caused significant amounts of criticism. Grice points out that he
This essay will use Bultinck’s notation. This is not always the notation of others; therefore, there may
occasionally be a [bracket] to insert this notation into other’s quotations.
Quantity – Q1 and Q2.
Quality – QL1 and QL2.
Manner – M1, M2, M3 and M4.
4
5
even struggles with the problems presented by this extremely vague maxim. Indeed,
Searle, Wilson, and Sperber all reject this maxim. Searle remarks that, though it is
initially intuitive, it is ultimately problematic (Searle 1992, 14).
Finally there are the maxims of manner. These may be insufficient, as Grice
points out, for there may be many other maxims regarding the appropriate way of
engaging in cooperative conversational discourse. Also, Grice comments that these
may be of lesser importance than the maxims of other categories. He writes, “It is
obvious that observance of some of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is
the observance of others; a man who has expressed himself with undue prolixity
would, in general, be open to milder comment than would a man who has said
something he believes to be false” (Grice 1989, 27). Manner seem to be more
aesthetic than the other categories; however, in terms of importance, it seems that the
M2-maxim regarding ambiguity is arguably the most important of the maxims of
manner.
This is due to its relationship to equivocation and, therefore, a close
relationship to the QL1-maxim.
After his discussion of these maxims he suggests that these are not the only
maxims employed in conversations. He writes “There are, of course, all sorts of other
maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as “Be polite,” that are also
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate
nonconventional implicatures” (Grice 1989, 28). It is notable that he decides to
intentionally leave out certain maxims from his categories, though this may be due to
the inherent limits on lectures.
Grice, to explain how these implications are to be understood, presents four
ways in which maxims may be unfulfilled. These four ways are violation, opting out,
being faced with a clash, and flouting. First, there may be a violation; Grice writes
that a person “may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if so, in some cases
he will be liable to mislead” (Grice 30).
This could happen in many ways.
Obviously, there is a violation of the QL1-maxim, which would simply be an
occurrence of lying. This, however, is not the only case in which one could mislead.
One could violate the M2-maxim, speaking ambiguously with the intention to
misinform. There also seems to be the ability to do the same with the Q1-maxim,
providing minimal amounts of information with the intention of deception. This is
why courts call for people to tell “the whole truth,” compelling people to include all
the appropriate contents.
6
It seems, however, that some of the maxims are not able to be violated for the
purposes of misleading or deception. A violation of the maxim of relevance, for
example, would only cause confusion, rather than deception, so long as all the other
maxims are maintained. The same could be said for a violation of the M3-maxim,
regarding brevity.
It does not appear that being excessive with language could
mislead, again supposing that all other maxim are being fulfilled.
Secondly, Grice says that one can opt out. He writes that one “may opt out
from operation both of the maxim and of the Cooperative Principle; he may say,
indicate, or allow it to become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the
maxim requires. He may say, for example I cannot say more; my lips are sealed”
(Grice 1989, 30). This principle, as the example suggests, can be directly applied to
Q1-maxim of quantity.
He may also, however, opt out of the Q2-maxim by
attempting to filibuster during the conversation. In fact, this opting out may be
applied to all of the maxims as an overt sign of unwillingness to cooperate in the
conversation. However, the fact that Grice allows for individual participants to opt
out at whatever time they like may be problematic to his conception of the
Cooperative Principle and his reasons for its status in conversation, because opting
out is actually semi-cooperative.
The last two reasons for failing to follow maxims will prove most useful to
Grice and his description of conversational implicature. The third reason one may fail
to follow maxims is that they may clash. Grice writes, “He may be faced by a clash:
He may be unable, for example, to fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as
informative as is required) without violating the second maxim of Quality (Have
adequate evidence for what you say)” (Grice 1989, 30). Grice gives the example of
one person (A) asking another (B) where someone else (C) lives: “A: Where does C
live? / B: Somewhere in the South of France” (Grice 1989, 32). In this example, A
wants to know which city C lives in; however, B may not know this fact, so he might
leave the Q1-maxim unsatisfied in order to fulfill the QL2-maxim. Because of this
clash, however, Grice states that “B implicates that he does not know in which town C
lives” (Grice 1989, 33). Many examples of clashes between various maxims are
possible, each presenting different implications. This is not the primary style in
which people implicate things; rather, most implication will come from flouting
maxims.
7
One issue that may concern those critical to Grice’s account of conversation is
the method by which determines which maxim will prevail when involved in a clash.
It seems that whenever there is a direct clash between maxims, one much choose the
most appropriate maxim to follow; however, Grice merely glosses over this as though
it will be obvious. This may be a mistake for Grice. It seems that one must have a
methodology of maxim superiority if one is to understand how implications are
caused by a clash. Suppose, given the previous example, that B were to flout the
QL2-maxim, rather than the Q2-maxim, and just guesses a city. Suppose he or she
responds with “Marseille?”, implying that he or she does not know the city, but
wishes to provide the appropriate amount of desired information. Grice gives no
reason why this should not be the case. He simply asserts that some maxims are more
important than others.
Given the number of maxims that may occur under the
Category of Manner, there may be various clashes, forcing some participants to leave
maxims unfulfilled, yet there is no guide as to which maxims are more or less
important in general.
Presenting a strategic theory to conversation may provide
answers to dilemmas of this kind.
Flouting, as opposed to resolving a clash, is clearly where Grice is gets most
of his traction regarding conversational implicature. Grice explains, “He may flout a
maxim; that is, he may blatantly fail to fulfill it…
This situation is one that
characteristically gives rise to a conversational implicature; and when a
conversational implicature is generated in this way, I shall say that a maxim is being
exploited” (Grice 1989, 30). Here, the participant is supposed to make it clear that he
is not opting out, there is no reason to suspect that he or she is unable to fulfill
maxims due to a clash, and it is supposed to be clear that there is no intent to mislead;
thus, the other participant, the listener, must be somewhat perplexed if the statement is
taken literally, which will alert him or her to the implication.
Grice presents many examples of flouting. He explains, “A is writing a
testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads
as follows: ‘Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at
tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.’” (Grice 1989, 33). This, according to Grice, is
a case in which A must be flouting the Q1-maxim. He argues that, since A took the
time to write the letter, he must not be opting out. Also, there is no reason to suppose
A is being deceptive, this seems obvious. Finally, because there is no apparent reason
for there to be a clash of maxims, and A ought to be imparting much more information
8
regarding the skills the student possesses, then “He must, therefore, be wishing to
impart information that he is reluctant to write down. This supposition is tenable only
if he thinks Mr. X is no good at philosophy. This, then, is what he is implicating”
(Grice 1989, 33). This structure of flouting of maxims will be the model Grice uses to
explain the disconnects the often occur between what is said and what may be meant
by a speaker.
Finally, Grice lays out his requirements for working out conversational
implicatures. He posits that in order to work out implicatures one must rely on the
following five pieces of information:
(1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of
any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its
maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other
items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all
relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both
participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case. (Grice
1989, 31)
All of this information allows a participant to work out implicatures that he or she
may be presented with. Most of these points are fairly uncontroversial; however, the
fourth requirement may prove to be contentious, due to its broad nature. Regardless
of this possible controversy, one should be able to work out these conversational
implicatures if this information is present.
Grice does create a decent theory of communication to serve his purposes;
however, as his critics and contemporaries will suggest, this theory is far from
complete. With redundant maxims and potentially significant maxims left out, there
is a lot to be improved upon. Still, as far as creating the framework for a general
theory is concerned, he has done well by providing an intuitive format for
understanding the distinction between what is said and what is meant. After a review
of his followers’ work many of these issues will be resolved. Primarily, there is the
general rejection of the relevance maxim, but also serious reformulations of redundant
maxims. In addition to this, the critics of the Cooperative Principle will provide
theories of implicature based on general principles of reason, rather than this
controversial principle.
1.3 Epistemology and Testability of Gricean Theory
9
One particularly interesting work to look at before moving to criticisms of
Gricean Theory is Sadock’s “On Testing for Conversational Implicature.” Here,
Sadock first lays out the claims that Grice states distinguishing conversational
implicature from conventional implicature, then reviews whether these characteristics
are valid in identifying types of implicature. Grice presents six different properties
that Sadock discusses:
(a)
Conversational implicata are capable of being “worked out” on the
basis, inter alia, of the Cooperative Principle.
That is, they are
CALCULABLE.
(b)
Conversational implicata are CANCELLABLE.
(c)
Conversational implicata are NONDETACHABLE.
(d)
Conversational implicata are not part of the meaning of the uttered
forms. They are NONCONVENTIONAL.
(e)
Conversational implicata are not carried by what is said, but by the
saying of it.
(f)
Conversational implicata may be INDETERMAINATE. (Sadock 1978,
284)
Sadock primarily concerns himself with the first three of these as “practical tests” for
determining implicature, because he cannot see how the last three could provide any
real test for conversational implicature.
Sadock almost immediately rejects the first quality (a), because the maxims
are “so vague that almost anything can be ‘worked out’ on the basis of almost any
meaning,”; he ultimately determines, not surprisingly, that “Calculability is not a
sufficient condition for conversational implicature” (Sadock 1978, 285-286).
Calculability is certainly a necessary condition for implicature; however, it is not a
sufficient one. Therefore, using calculability in a test for conversational implicature is
not effective. Sadock then turns to detachability. However, because Grice notes that
“conversational implicatures are in fact based on the WAY what is said is said—on
how it is put,” Sadock believes that “nondetachability is not a sufficient test for
conversational implicature… nondetachability is not strict enough to distinguish
between entailment and conversational implicature” (Sadock 1978, 288). Neither of
these two tests work, however, cancellability, as one will see, is better suited as a test
for implicature.
10
Sadock then addresses cancellability, “the best of the tests,” at length 5 (Sadock
1978, 292). Cancellability allows an implication to be canceled without making a
statement contradictory. For example, “Gertrude not only just failed to swim the
English Channel, in fact she swam it” is at least somewhat contradictory, but “It’s
cold in here, but I don’t want you to close the door” is perfectly acceptable (Sadock
1978, 292-293). One problem that Sadock makes clear, however, is that “The test
does not distinguish cases of ambiguity from cases of univocality plus possible
conversational implicature. One of the senses of a grammatically ambiguous sentence
may always be contradicted” (Sadock 1978, 293). This point is that if there is an
implicature in an ambiguous sentence, one of the interpretations of the statement is
always cancelable. Sadock explains, “The sad fact is that in the very cases where
argument is likely to arise as to whether something conveyed by an utterance is
conversationally implicated, the competing claim would be that the utterance is
ambiguous” (Sadock 1978, 294). Thus, cancellability ultimately fails as a test for
conversational implicature.
Sadock does propose one more test, however. This is a test of reinforceability
of a conversational implicature. This test looks for redundancy, for example, “It’s
odd that dogs eat cheese, and they do” is redundant; however, “Some grades were
good, but not all” is perfectly informative. Still, Sadock points out, “only assertions
are valid test expressions for the reinforcement test while any expression that
unequivocally indicates that a speaker holds a certain belief… can function properly
in testing for cancellability” (Sadock 1978, 295). So, sadly, “There is no sufficient
tests for conversational implicature and no group of tests that together are sufficient…
Cancellability and reinforceability fail to be sufficient… because, in the very
important case of grammatical ambiguity, any one sense is obviously cancellable or
reinforceable” (Sadock 1978, 295-296). Unfortunately for students of implicature, the
ability of testing for conversational implicature is not foolproof; however, Sadock
provides for a general schema, using cancellability and reinforceability, for
identifying conversational implicata.
5
This opinion is echoed by Grandy (1989); Stalnaker (1989) does not pose any objections.
11
Chapter 2: Criticisms, Alternatives and Neo-Gricean
Theory
2.1 Kasher and Hintikka: Rationality as the Basis for Conversation
Asa Kasher presents one of the more obvious criticisms to Grice’s work in his
essay, “Conversational Maxims and Rationality.” Kasher places his emphasis on the
dubiousness of the Cooperative Principle; primarily, he examines whether or not the
Cooperative Principle is actually inherent to conversation.
Kasher begins by
elaborating Grice’s position, primarily noting the Cooperative Principle. He then
points to his own objectives, which are to show “(a) that the cooperation principle has
a problematic presumption, (b) that the connection between the cooperation principle
and the principles to be derived from it is a problematic one, and (c) that the latter
four principles follow from more general and more basic principles” (Kasher 1976,
201). He attempts to show these three points by viewing conversation through a goalachievement lens. Kasher directly addresses the second of these statements first. He
makes a parallel between the Cooperative Principle and a goal-achievement principle,
which he lays in the following way:
Is the cooperation principle one on which the four principles of quantity,
quality, relation, and manner are well grounded? The general relationship
between the cooperation principle and the other principles is parallel to the
relationship between the general instruction of (5) and the more specific
instructions of (6):
(5)
At every stage on a way towards achieving an end of yours, act
as required for the achievement of the aim.
(6)
(a)
Do not use the means you have for achieving your ends more or
less than is required for their achievement, ceteris paribus;
(b)
Try to achieve your ends by the standard use of the means you
have for their achievement, ceteris paribus;
(c)
At every stage on the way to achievement of your ends,
consider the means being used by other persons to achieve their
ends, as you come to determine the manner of your progress at
that stage, ceteris paribus; and prefer using your means in a
manner which is likely to help the progress of others on their
12
way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of
these means, ceteris paribus;
(d)
Give preference to means which lead you to your ends over
means which lead you to situations wherein achievement of the
ends themselves is just a possible result. (Kasher 1976, 202203)
Here, Kasher notes (b)-(d) are parallel to (5) in the same way that quality, relation,
and manner relate to the Cooperative Principle, respectively. The point that Kasher is
making with this long set of parallels is that the Gricean maxims are not derivable
from the Cooperative Principle.6 He begins his argument by showing that (a)-(d)
clearly hinder (5). Condition (a) prevents one from using all the means one has to
achieve goals, (b) prevents one from using nonstandard means, (c) requires one to
consider others goals, etc. The only time when one must follow (a)-(d) is when two
people cannot achieve their goals alone and must depend on each others resources.
Here, one can see the parallel; as Kasher writes, “Can it be that the element of
cooperation may make it possible to derive the accompanying principles from the
cooperation principle? It is quite clear - with one exception – that such is not the
case” (Kasher 1976, 204). Thus, the general Cooperative Principle “Make your
conversational contribution such as is required, at the state at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged,” does
not in necessarily lead one to follow the Gricean maxims (Grice 1989, 26). People
must only follow them in cases where they cannot achieve their conversational goals
without the assistance of others. Kasher also notes, about the exception regarding
mutual necessity, “this exception does not show that cooperation of aims and means is
an essential element in the connection between the cooperation principle and the
accompanying principles” (Kasher 1976, 204). Thus, Kasher shows, as he intended,
that “the connection between the cooperation principle and the principles to be
derived from it is a problematic one,” or at least is not a necessary one (Kasher 1976,
201).
Kasher then lays out the rationality principle that he will rely on. He writes,
“(R) Given a desired end, one is to choose that action which most effectively, and at
least cost, attains that end, ceteris paribus” (Kasher 1976, 205). He then shows how
6
These claims are probably not anything that Grice would disagree with.
13
each of the sub-principles in (6) is achieved by (R). This principle (R) has in it a clear
call for efficiency. Thus, it implies the previous principle (6a) and with it the first
Gricean maxim when considered in regards to conversational goals. Secondly, (6d)
also follows from this (R) principle, because one would want to raise the probability
of achieving one’s goals as much as possible, all things being equal. Kasher also
notes that the first half of (6c) is also implied by (R). The second half of (6c) and
(6b), however, require more explanation. The reason why (6b) is fulfilled by (R)
depends strongly on the ceteris paribus cause. Given that all things are equal (Kasher
uses the example of striking a nail with a hammer as opposed to striking a nail with a
coconut), one ought to opt for the standard hammering implement, due to an inherent
risk that is involved when using a tool for a purpose other than its standard function.
This risk may be negligible in many cases; however, no matter how small the risk, it
is rational to play it safe. In this way, (6b) is fulfilled.
There are some problems, however, in the explanation of the second half of
(6c), that one should “prefer using your means in a manner which is likely to help the
progress of others on their way to the achievement of their ends, over any other use of
these means, ceteris paribus”. The first notable problem that Kasher accepts is that of
Hobbesian theory. In certain circumstances in a state of nature, a person might not
want to use means to assist others in achieving their goals, due to a constant mistrust.
Because this state of nature is such a nasty place, it is logical for one to assume the
goals achieved by others may threaten a person, and may ultimately end in harming
him or her. However, as Kasher argues, helping others achieve a goal creates the
possibility of attaining the benefit of two things: future help from the person one
assists and possible benefits from the goal he or she is trying to achieve (Kasher 1976,
208-209). Therefore, if the person one could help has the goal of, say, building a
large weapon that could help him or her injure others, perhaps one should not assist
that person; however, if that goal is something that one doesn’t think can be used to
harm others, all things being equal, the possibility of future benefit should be enough
to make it rational to use means which will also benefit others.
Thus, the (R)
principle satisfies all of (6c).
Kasher still believes that the Gricean model is effective; however, there must
be an argument for forming implicatures. Kasher writes, “Since we are not accepting
the cooperation principle – neither as the basis for the accompanying maxims nor
itself – we should try improving the structure of the characteristic argument for
14
forming implicatures” (Kasher 1976, 210). In order to do this, Kasher suggests the
rationalization principle. He writes, “(RP) There is no reason to assume that the
speaker is not a rational agent; his ends and his beliefs regarding his state, in the
context of utterance supply the justifications of his behavior” (Kasher 1976, 210).
This principle, as a premise to Kasher’s argument, seems essential. On occasion
people attempt to converse with non-rational agents: the mentally ill, pets, and even
plants. However, supposing one is communicating with another rational agent, one
must presume that when that agent begins violating (6a-d), there is a purpose. As
Kasher states, “If we replace, in the implicature-forming argument structure, the
cooperation principle (CP) with the rationalization principle (RP), we shall not lose
any power of explanation but rather gain additional power” (Kasher 1976, 211). The
additional power includes certain replies of silence, for example “if I refrain from
answering Morton’s question, at the threshold of my home, ‘Have you stopped
playing the trumpet?’, and I stare at him without opening my mouth, my silence has a
complicated disjunctive implicature” (Kasher 1976, 213).
Here, Kasher has the power to present the implicatures that Grice provides;
however, he does so under the rationality principle (R), rather than the Cooperative
Principle. This argument against Grice is quite effective, since it encompasses the
Gricean implicature model while having greater explanatory power.
Kasher
accomplishes his three starting goals, showing that sometimes “there is no full
cooperation, because it is contrary to my interests, to a certain extent… Grice’s
cooperation principle does not permit such an explanation without radical changes in
its content, its justification and the manner of its operation. We have presented such
radical changes in this article” (Kasher 1973, 214-215).
It is this view of
communication that must be exploited to have a full comprehension of implicature in
general. However, this view is not widely accepted by philosophers interested in
conversational implicature. It is in expounding on these ideas where the bulk of this
work will be derived.
Another paper that must be explored is “Logic of Conversation as a Logic of
Dialogue,” by Jaakko Hintikka. In this paper Hintikka complements Grice on a body
of work; however, he singles out “Logic and Conversation” to criticize. Hintikka
believes that the Gricean maxims “are not, and cannot be, the rock bottom of a
satisfactory analysis of the logic of conversation” (Hintikka 1986, 273). One of the
reasons Hintikka thinks this, is his belief that, “when the time comes to conceptualize
15
the results of… discourse-theoretical observations Grice often seems to retreat back to
formulations that pertain to utterances taken one by one rather than to the interplay of
different utterances in discourse” (Hintikka 1986, 259). Hintikka is interested in a
“different, more flexible framework in which the dynamics of discourse are spelt out
more explicitly” (Hintikka 1986, 259). First-order predicate logic is clearly not the
logic of dialogue. This point, as Hintikka wants to explore, leads to a fundamental
difference between propositions and the utterances of dialogue. The new strategy for
understanding conversation Hintikka wants to employ is explained as follows:
Grice says that one of his ‘avowed aims is to see talking as a special case or
variety of purposive, indeed rational, behavior’ [Grice 1989, 28]. If so, the
bag of conceptual tools one can profitably use in studying conversational logic
should be a special case, or variety, of the conceptual tools one uses in
studying the rationality of human behaviour in general. One such tool is game
theory. (Hintikka 1986, 262)
Thus, Hintikka argues that the framework for studying dialogue needs to be shifted
from formal logic to game theory. Game theory is geared toward better understanding
which appropriate strategies one ought to use in given situations, or games.
Hintikka then sketches a simple schema in which conversations can be viewed
game theoretically. He writes, “Two speakers make ‘moves’ alternately. There are
four different kinds of moves: (a) Assertoric moves. (b) Interrogative moves. (c)
Deductive moves. (d) Definitory moves” (Hintikka 1986,
262).
Hintikka then
explains how each of these steps work. First, a “player” must make an assertoric
move, in which he or she “puts forward a new proposition (a new ‘thesis’)” (Hintikka
1986, 262). An interrogative move is a questioning move, the answer (if one can be
given) to which “is then added to the list of the answerer’s theses” (Hintikka 1986,
262). The deductive moves are pretty straightforward, it is comprised of “a logical
conclusion from the totality of his/her opponent’s theses,” and previous conclusions
obtained by the same means (Hintikka 1986, 263). Finally, definitory moves are
when one “introduces a new non-logical symbol by and appropriate explicit
definition” (Hintikka 1986, 263). These four moves are used to prove all the players’
theses, but according to Hintikka the goals can be varied.
Hintikka believes that the Gricean maxims can be incorporated into his model.
In referring to maxim Q2, Hintikka notes, while Grice remarks that one ought not
violate Q2 for fear of confusing the hearer, for Hintikka there “is nevertheless
16
operative,… in ordinary discourse, a different pressure against extra information.
Everything a player of my dialogical games says can be used against him (or her) by
the opponent” (Hintikka 1986, 270). Here, the player will want his discourse to be as
weak as possible; thus, requiring him to prove less by the rules of the game. This is a
fundamentally different reason to act in accordance with the Q2-maxim; however the
end result is the same.
The same result will be found regarding the maxims of quality, QL1, and QL2.
Because one only gets a payoff by proving the maximum amount of statements in the
dialogue, one will only want to propose things that he or she may be able to show to
be true. Surprisingly, QL1 is also satisfied by this game. Hintikka writes, “if my
opponent gives true answers to my question, if the opponent is fairly well-informed,
and if the effects of my own answers can be discounted, then it is ceteris paribus in
my own best interest to put forward true theses” (Hintikka 1986, 272). Manner,
unlike quantity, quality, and relevance, is not of interest to Hintikka. He states that it
“is different in kind from the first three” (Hintikka 1986, 274). This should become
apparent, as arguments to this affect will be made later. Relevance, however, must be
addressed and is actually reworded to state that it is a move within the rules to
increase one’s pay-off. This Hintikka must explain; he states, “For instead of the
relevance of the several utterances in a dialogue I could collectively speak of the
coherence of the dialogue” (Hintikka 1986, 273). Hintikka refers to a Sherlock
Holmes story in which Holmes solves a mystery about a prize race horse by asking a
shepherd an apparently irrelevant question about the recent status of his sheep
(Hintikka 1986, 275). However, this question, as is often the case with the solutions
to intricate puzzles, was the crucial link between a series of facts that ultimately
achieved the goal of solving this mystery.
From all this, one can see that Hintikka has crafted a formal game that models
the Gricean maxims. This game, like Kasher’s work, does not require a Cooperative
Principle; and, in fact, becomes a competition between the players of the game. Still,
there are clearly some problematic results of this account. For example, intuitions of
conversation stray far from this schema. Conversations are certainly not games in
which one must prove, or at least hope to prove, all the propositions that one puts
forward. Still, the idea of conversation as a goal oriented game, with pay-offs and
costs, is certainly an idea which has not been explored, and may have some benefits.
17
The primary significance of these two works, however, is their alternative approach to
the theory of conversation, which is based on rationality theory.
2.2 Pre-Eminent Schools of Thought
The dominant theory of conversational implicature has been the Gricean
model, though it should be noted that this subject is quite young. There does not seem
to be much consensus in the philosophical community regarding the way in which
meaning is communicated by these implicatures.
However, in the linguistics
literature about conversation, Grice’s seems to be the default theory explaining the
nature and existence of implicature.7 Grice’s theory has been debated, and there have
been three primary schools of thought regarding the subject. Firstly, there are the
Neo-Griceans. This group accepts the general theory that Grice laid out and expands
on it, making minimal changes to the substance of the theory. They tend not to reject
major theses of Grice, such as the Cooperative Principle.
Levinson is a prime
example of a Neo-Gricean; Leech is also, but to a lesser extent. The second school of
though are revisionists. This group usually scraps a large section of Gricean theory,
for a simpler model based on fewer principles.
Sperber and Wilson are the
quintessential example of this with their own Relevance Theory. This theory uses one
overarching principle, their Relevance Principle, to encapsulate all the ideas within
Gricean theory. Finally, there are those who reject the Gricean theory on the whole
and suggest that implicature is ultimately rooted in social conventions. Wayne Davis
exemplifies this group providing an exhaustive attack on Gricean theory. As one will
see, Davis rejects the ideas presented by Grice and resorts to social conventions as an
explanation for the existence of conversational implicature. The consequences of
these different schools have only recently been discussed in literature.
2.2.1 Neo-Griceans
2.2.1.1 Martinich
One Neo-Gricean is A. P. Martinich. His reformulation of Grice’s maxims is
probably the least different of all the theories. In fact, Martinich has only two major
criticisms to the theory as presented by Grice. The first change Martinich proposes is
to the maxims of quality. Martinich argues that they are faulty because they are too
rigid:
7
Such as Wardhaugh (1985).
18
Both are defective because too [sic] narrow. Cast as they are in terms of
“truth”, “falsity” and “evidence”, they apply only to those speech acts that
attempt to say how the world is, that is, to statements, assertions and the like.
They suffer from the typical philosophical disease of fixating on serious
factual statements when people often do other things with language.
(Martinich 1980, 219)
He suggests, instead, a maxim that is “broad enough to cover the entire spectrum of
speech acts” (Martinich 1980, 219). He settles on his authenticity supermaxim B′:
B′.
Be authentic. That is, do not knowingly participate in a speech act for
which the conditions for its successful and non-defective performance
are not satisfied. (Martinich 1980, 220)
This rewording of the Quality Maxim certainly accounts for speech acts, and there is
something to this speech act adjustment; however, it initially strikes one as odd that
this speech-act-sensitive language is needed. It seems that most speech acts, at least
the ones that Martinich lists, such as promising, forgiving, and apologizing all entail
non-natural meanings. Grice clearly had this in mind when he proposed his maxims,
so this dramatic change may be unnecessary to the theory.
For those who are
particular about speak act theory it may be notable. Still, it is probably excessive to
edit Grice’s principles in this way. Regardless, Martinich’s authenticity supermaxim
is only one of the two alterations that he makes to Grice’s theory.
The second maxim that Martinich modifies is the maxim of relation. He
divides this maxim into two submaxims, unlike his modification to the QL-maxim.
He calls the first of these two submaxims C1, which is, “Make your contribution one
that moves the discussion towards its goal” (Martinich 1980, 220). This modification
does address two of the major criticisms levied against Grice, those of Kasher and
Hintikka. By addressing the goal-oriented nature of conversation, Martinich points to
one of the major ways to improve the Gricean model. However, Martinich misses one
of the main intuitions that Kasher brings up, that in order to address the goal-oriented
nature of conversation, one cannot simply address aspects of Grice’s theory, because
of its presumption of the Cooperative Principle as its foundation. The only way in
which this submaxim could stand without conflicting with the Cooperative Principle
is if all conversational goals were cooperative; however, this is simply not the case.
Thus, unfortunately, this submaxim cannot even be addressed without an entire
overhaul of the Gricean system.
19
Martinich refers to the second of the two submaxims of relation as C2. This
maxim is as follows: “Express yourself in terms that will allow your hearer to tie your
contribution into the conversational context” (Martinich 1980, 221). This brings light
onto another alternative to Gricean theory, which is that of Relevance Theory.
Without the addition of C1, however, this submaxim does not seem significantly clear
enough to warrant this rewording. Context is important; however, without a general
theory of context, as Martinich only provides a vague quote by Strawson to found his
theory, the difference between contributions being relevant and being able to be tied
into a conversational context cannot be differentiated (Martinich 1980, 221-222).
Thus, Martinich’s reformulations ultimately fail, but they reiterate the criticisms
presented in Hintikka and Kasher.
2.2.1.2 Levinson
Continuing with the modifications of Neo-Gricean theory, one must mention
the theory presented in Levinson’s Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized
Conversational Implicature.
It concerns itself with general conversational
implicatures (GCIs) rather than particularized conversational implicatures (PCIs).
Thus, Levinson’s theory of pragmatics is intentionally incomplete, as he points out
when he writes, “a theory of GCIs has to be supplemented with a theory of PCIs that
will have at least as much, and possibly considerably more, importance to a general
theory of communication” (Levinson 2000, 22). One of the problems Levinson sees
in the Gricean theory is that there is no major distinction between the generalized
implicatures and the particular implicatures. Levinson writes:
In the immediate context of a discussion of the distinction, Grice provides
only one, none too clear, example… viz. the inference from the indefinite
article to the assumption that the speaker is not in a position to be specific.
Thus the assertion of (6) might normally carry the GCI inference:
“I saw a woman in my office.”
GCI: ‘I saw someone other than my wife/girlfriend/mother/etc.’
because “the speaker has failed to be specific in a way in which he might have
been expected to be specific, with the consequence that it is likely to be
assumed that he is not in a position to be specific” [Grice 1989, 37-38].
(Levinson 2000, 17)
20
However, Levinson claims that Grice was particularly interested in these generalized
implicatures; thus, the GCI theory Levinson creates would be of great interest to
philosophers with similar interests to Grice’s.
This GCI theory is comprised of three heuristics, upon which all of the
Gricean general implicature should rest. This theory should guide the interpretation
of ambiguous sentences. The three heuristics are the Q-heuristic (regarding quantity),
the I-heuristic (regarding “informativeness”), and the M-heuristic (regarding manner).
Levinson uses they symbol “+>” to mean “implicates, as in ‘p’ +> ‘q’ (uttering ‘p’
implicates ‘q’)” (Levinson 2000, xi). This is differentiated from the symbol “++>”
which, for Levinson means, “communicates (the sum of what is said and what is
implicated)” (Levinson 2000, xi).
The Q-heuristic is supposed to model Grice’s Q1-maxim, “What isn’t said,
isn’t” (Levinson 2000, 35). This is important for his theory of scalar implicature
between words like “all” and “some,” and others like “not all” and “none.” It also can
be used in regards to the simpler aspects of the Q1-maxim such as “‘Three boys came
in’ +> ‘not four’” (Levinson 2000, 36). However, the scalar implicatures presented
by Levinson are particularly interesting, primarily the relation of the Q-heuristic to the
traditional square of opposition. Levinson writes:
Aristotle held that in the case of the modals the I/O relation was logical but
in the case of the quantifiers it was a nonlogical suggestion. Hamilton and
Jespersen held the relation is logical for all the squares, De Morgan and J. S.
Mill that it is nonlogical for all the squares, and so on.
The theory of GCIs helps to explain the confusion. The I (some) corner of
the square carries a generalized scalar implicature to the effect that the O (not
all) corner also holds.
It is the generalized nature of the inference that
explains the confusion even among these eminent scholars thinking deep and
hard about the problem. “Some” strongly suggests ‘not all’, and “Some in fact
all” or “Not all, indeed none,” indicating that the suggestion cannot be a
logical relationship. (Levinson 2000, 68)
The significance of the Q-heuristic here is obvious. It allows the square of opposition
to be understood not for just the typical all, some none(not some), not all pairs, but
can be implemented even with the logical connectives and, or neither/nor, not
both (Levinson 2000, 64-67). Still, the real affect that this Q-heuristic produces is
21
the conditions by which the hearer knows that statements tend to be more efficient
than they technically must be. People will often, as this heuristic allows, disregard
specifier phrases such as in “exactly n things,” and “Possibly, but not definitely X” in
casual speech. Thus, the Q-heuristic allows for limits on what one must say, so as not
to exasperate speakers or confuse hearers.
The I-heuristic that Levinson presents is somewhat different. He defines this
heuristic as, “What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified”; here Levinson
mimics Grice’s Q2-maxim “Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required” (Levinson 2000, 37). This heuristic covers things often left unsaid, for
simplicity’s sake. Levinson gives the example, “‘If you mow the lawn, I’ll give you
$5.’ +> ‘Iff you mow the lawn, will I [sic] give you $5’” (Levinson 2000, 37). The Iheuristic also has particular applicability in explaining why conjunction statements
usually imply temporal order and causal connection, and why conditional statements
almost always imply a causal relation. This is why, for example when one says, “He
got in the car, turned on the engine, and drove away,” typically that person implies
that the actions were done in that order, and that there was a causal connection
between them. This heuristic, however, will need to work with the M-heuristic to
have any serious weight; because, in order for something to be said in the
stereotypical way, there must be a way to say something non-stereotypically, which is
what the M-heuristic marks for hearers.
The M-heuristic is related to Grice’s maxim of Manner. Levinson explains,
“What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal” (Levinson 2000, 38). To explain this
principle Levinson continues, “The underlying idea here is that there is an implicit
opposition or parasitic relationship between our second and third heuristics: what is
said simply… picks up the stereotypical interpretation; if in contrast a marked
expression is used, it is suggested that the stereotypical interpretation should be
avoided” (Levinson 2000, 38). This heuristic is used in order to interpret oddly
worded sentence, which contain superfluous wordage, e.g. excessive phrasing or
double negation. The example Levinson gives are of the following form, “‘Bill
stopped the car’ +> (by I) ‘in the stereotypical manner with the foot pedal’,” which
invokes the I-heuristic due to its simplicity; whereas, “‘Bill caused the car to stop’ +>
(by M) ‘indirectly, not in the normal way, e.g., by the use of the emergency brake’,”
which relies on the M-heuristic because of the indirect way in with the statement is
made (Levinson 2000, 39). Davis’ criticisms of this theory of implicature, to be
22
discussed in depth later, will effectively undermine these implicatures; thus, the
relationship between these heuristics may be in jeopardy.
One of the main pieces of work Levinson incorporates, that Grice clearly fails
to explicitly provide for, is his guidelines for the resolution of implicature clashes.
Where Grice addresses the fact that clashes may occur, he does not explicate which of
his principles will have precedence over others. This allows for the problematic
situation where one must decide which maxim is most important in any given
situation, and thus, which maxim one ought to follow rather than another. Levinson
sees this problem and addresses it when he writes, “As sentences become complex,
these inferences may arise from different clauses, and traffic rules will need to be
established.
In short, we have a projection problem” (Levinson 2000, 157).
Levinson’s “resolution schema” is as follows:
a:
Genuine Q-implicature… take precedence over I-implicatures;
b:
In all other cases, the I-principle induces stereotypical interpretations,
unless:
c:
A marked expression has been used where an unmarked one could
have been employed instead, in which case the M-implicature defeats
the relevant I-implicature, by inducing the inference to the complement
of the I-implicature that would have arisen from the unmarked
expression. (Levinson 2000, 157)
More simply put, “Q-implicatures > M-implicatures > I-implicatures”; yet, even
Levinson admits that this is much too simple of a model, because “This still leaves
much detail unresolved—for example, the resolution of potential implicatures of
different subtypes arising under the same principle, or of inferences coming from
different clauses” (Levinson 2000, 157-158). However, this general schema seems
sufficient for Levinson’s ends, as his theory is about implicature in general, and if
pressed he should be able to provide a more in depth version to suit the needs of
different problems.
This theory of generalize conversational implicature, though much more
cohesively formed, has still been criticized by Davis, as noted, among others. One of
the main issues is that, like Grice’s theory, Levinson must also incorporate the
Cooperative Principle, which many have argued is faulty.
counterexamples that this type of system will ultimately fail.
23
Davis argues via
2.2.1.3 Leech
Geoffrey Leech is another example of a Neo-Gricean. He presents a modified
version of Gricean theory as a means to better explain pragmatics in his Principles of
Pragmatics. The theory presented by Leech, however, is unique from the other NeoGriceans. Primarily, he separates himself by explicitly stating his acceptance of goaloriented framework for pragmatics. The second difference between Leech and other
many of the Neo-Griceans is his attempt to unite the Gricean Cooperative Principle
with other principles he presents, namely his Politeness Principle and Irony Principle.
In relation to his acceptance of a goal-oriented framework for pragmatics,
there are many example to support this from his work. When referring to speech
situations, he states, “I shall often find it useful to talk of a goal or function of an
utterance, in preference to talking about its intended meaning, or [the speaker’s]
intention in uttering it” (Leech 1983, 13). This position is reiterated when Leech
writes, “The principles of pragmatics are fundamentally non-conventional, ie [sic]
motivated in terms of conversational goals” (Leech 1983, 24). The reason Leech
thinks that pragmatics are non-conventional, is that Leech believes that a theory of
motivation, with the additional principles he will add, will provide a general theory of
pragmatics.8
The extra principles related to the Cooperative Principle that Leech adds are
the Politeness Principle, and the Irony Principle.
He formulates the Politeness
Principle in a negative way, stating, “Minimize (other things being equal) the
expression of impolite beliefs,” to which “there is a corresponding positive version
(‘Maximize (other things being equal) the expression of polite beliefs’)” (Leech 1983,
81). This Politeness Principle has maxims of tact, generosity, approbation, modesty,
agreement, and sympathy (Leech 1983, 132). The Politeness Principle is coupled
with an Irony Principle that “is parasitic on the other two” (Leech 1983, 142). Leech
explains in the following way:
The [Cooperative Principle] and the [Politeness Principle] can be seen to be
functional by direct reference to their role in promoting effective interpersonal
communication; but the [Irony Principle]’s function can only be explained in
terms of other principles. The [Irony Principle] is a ‘second-order principle’
which enables a speaker to be impolite while seeming polite; it does so by
8
Contrast this with Searle (1969).
24
superficially breaking the [Cooperative Principle], but ultimately upholding it.
(Leech 1983, 142).
Here, the complex relationship of these three principles is laid out. The Politeness
Principle needed by Leech to explain the instances in which apparently cooperative
communication seems to violate the Cooperative Principle, and the Irony Principle to
explain how speakers can violate the Politeness Principle while being cooperative. It
should be noted that Grice mentions both phenomenon; he suggested a politeness
maxim in “Logic and Conversation,” and gives an explanation for irony in “Further
Notes.”
The primary concern of this theory, however, is its insistence that, while
pragmatics is goal-oriented, conversation as a whole is not goal-oriented, and
conversational implicature is caused by a violation of maxims. These principles of
politeness and irony seem quite adequate; however, his theory of conversation in
general will not provide the explanatory power for conversations that are not
cooperatively based.
2.2.2 Relevance Theory
The next major, new theory of conversational implicature is Relevance
Theory. This theory is presented briefly in Wilson and Sperber’s essay “On Defining
‘Relevance’” and much more clearly in Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance:
Communication and Cognition. This theory, as was briefly touched upon before, is
significantly different from Grice’s and Levinson’s theories, because it relies on one
overarching principle. This principle is that of relevancy.
Sperber and Wilson begin by establishing their definition for ostensiveinferential communication. This essentially means that one communicates that he or
she is intending to communicate something. One basic example of this is the phrase
“Excuse me, we must inform you that p.” This phrase expresses that one intends to
express something, and conveys this intention.
They define this ostensive
communication as such:
Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a stimulus
which makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the
communicator intends, by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more
manifest to the audience a set of assumptions I. (Sperber and Wilson 1986,
63)
25
This definition will ultimately be essential to their conception of relevance, because
the principle of relevance that Sperber and Wilson create is essentially about these
ostensive communications, and not communication in general.
In order to establish a theory of relevance they must first lay out the conditions
for which relevance can exist. They write, “We are not trying to define the ordinary
English word ‘relevance’… we believe that there is an important psychological
property – a property of mental processes – which the ordinary notion or relevance
roughly approximates… What we are trying to do is to describe this property: that is,
to define relevance as a useful theoretical concept” (S&W9 1986, 119).
The
beginnings of this definition they lay out as, “An assumption is relevant in a context if
and only if it has some contextual effect in that context” (S&W 1986, 122). This
definition is clearly lacking; however, Sperber and Wilson provide it to show that
context is a condition of relevance. Something can only be relevant if there is a
context in which it is relevant. Another way in which this definition is lacking is that
it does not show that “relevance is a matter of degree” (S&W 1986, 123).
The authors want to show that relevance is similar to “productivity or yield,
which involve some form of cost-benefit analysis” (S&W 1986, 123). This costbenefit analysis ultimately will take the form of processing cost versus contextual
effects. Now, contextual effect plays the prominent rolls in determining relevancy.
The amount a specific context is changed by given assumptions primarily affects
relevance; however, “other things being equal, an assumption requiring a smaller
processing effort is more relevant” (S&W 1986, 125). This yields a comparative
definition which is as follows:
Relevance
Extent condition 1: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that its
contextual effects in this context are large.
Extent condition 2: an assumption is relevant in a context to the extent that the
effort required to process it in this context is small. (S&W 1986, 125)
These extent conditions provide the degree basis by which Sperber and Wilson want
to judge relevance.
Sperber and Wilson also define “Relevance to an individual” by way of a
simple extension of their general principle of relevance. They state, “An assumption
9
“S&W” will be used for “Sperber & Wilson” for the sake of brevity.
26
is relevant to an individual at a given time if and only if it is relevant in one or more
of the contexts accessible to that individual at that time” (S&W 1986, 144). This is
not a significant modification; rather, it is simply a formal move to refer to one of the
common uses of the term “relevance.”
Sperber and Wilson provide an extent
condition based definition for relevance to an individual.
They also define
“Relevance of a phenomenon” in a similar way, the only main difference is that
phenomena are relevant only if they are relevant to an individual.
Finally, Sperber and Wilson are ready to present their primary claim about
relevance.
First, there is their presumption.
They write, “an act of ostensive
communication automatically communicates a presumption of relevance”; however,
they want to say something stronger in their principle. Thus, they provide a definition
for a presumption for optimal relevance. This definition is as follows:
Presumption of optimal relevance
(a) The set of assumptions I which the communicator intends to make
manifest to the addressee is relevant enough to make it worth the
addressee’s while to process the ostensive stimulus.
(b) The ostensive stimulus is the most relevant one the communicator could
have used to communicate I. (S&W 1986, 158)
Here, if the addressee holds this presumption, then the ostensive stimulus will appear
to be significant to the addressee, regardless of whether or not he or she knows why it
relevant. Next they present their “Principle of relevance”:
Principle of relevance
Every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own
optimal relevance. (S&W 1986, 158)
This principle deals with ostensive communications; not, as the authors explicitly
note, with all forms of communication. Ostensive communicators do not always
provide the optimal information to their addressees, however, “they necessarily intend
the addressee to believe that they do” (S&W 1986, 158). In addition to this question,
Sperber and Wilson address the conception of filibuster. This is a situation in which
do not care whether or not their information is relevant or not; it is only a delaying
tactic in arguments or formal proceedings. This, however, is a “rare situation” in
which addressees can assume “that the apparent communicator is not really
addressing them, and perhaps not communicating at all” (S&W 1986, 159). This is
not normally the case in communication, and is a notable exception to the rule.
27
Sperber and Wilson also explain the difference between their work and
Grice’s approach.
They note that there are many differences between the two
theories, writing, “One is that the principle of relevance is much more explicit than
Grice’s co-operative principle and maxims” (S&W 1986, 161). This is a quality that
any revisionist theory will want to have. They continue, “Another is that Grice
assumes that communication involves a greater degree of co-operation than we do”
(S&W 1986, 161). This sidesteps a common criticism of the Gricean analysis.
One of the criticisms Sperber and Wilson bring against the Gricean theory is
one of their major differences as well. That is, that Grice’s theory depends on people
knowing, following, and expecting other to follow mutually-constitutive behaviors in
order for them to communicate with each other. Sperber and Wilson expound on this
when the state, “Grice’s principle and maxims are norms which communicators and
audience must know in order to communicate adequately… the audience uses its
knowledge of the norms in interpreting communicative behavior” (S&W 1986, 162).
The main difference here and the authors point out is that the communicating is
second nature, not the result of cultural upbringing, as is shown by the following:
The principle of relevance, by contrast, is a generalization about ostensiveinferential communication. Communicators and audience need no more know
the principle of relevance to communicate than they need to know about the
principles of genetics to reproduce. Communicators do not ‘follow’ the
principle of relevance; and they could not violate it even if they wanted to.
(S&W 1986, 162).
This difference is quite dramatic and shows that what Sperber and Wilson are dealing
with is fundamentally different than what Grice accomplishes with his theory.
The most important difference, according to the authors, between their’s and
Grice’s theories is the difference in “the explanation of communication” (S&W 1986,
162). They illustrate this difference as follows:
Grice’s account of conversation starts from a distinction between what is
explicitly said and what is implicated.
No explanation of explicit
communication is given… Implicatures are explained as assumptions that the
audience must make to preserve the idea that the speaker has obeyed the
maxims, or at least the co-operative principle. The principle of relevance is
intended to explain ostensive communication as whole, both explicit and
implicit. (S&W 1986, 162-163)
28
This approach is different from Grice’s in that Sperber and Wilson want to explain
much more than Grice does. Grice’s theory of communication does not differentiate
between different kinds of communication; Sperber and Wilson’s theory depends on
essential differences in the way people communicate in order to explain implicature
through relevance. Bultinck (2005) reiterates this point when he writes, “Relevance
Theory is actually much more than a reformulation of some of Grice’s insights, it is
meant as an outline of ‘the system used by human beings in spontaneous inference,
and in normal utterance comprehension in particular’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 94)
and has specific psychological ambitions, which ultimately lead to the presentation of
a ‘cognitive architecture’” (Bultinck 2005, 27). Here one can see that Sperber and
Wilson have different aims with their work. However, these goals incorporate the
ideas Grice wanted to express in his theory of communication.
2.3 Davis: The Anti-Gricean
Wayne Davis, in his book Implicature: Intention, Convention, and Principle in
the Failure of Gricean Theory, presents the most pervasive argument against Gricean
theory to date. This work is critical of Grice’s theory as well as the theory of
generalized conversational implicature and Relevance Theory.
He begins by
presenting Grice’s theory. One principle he adds, though he argues it is already
presented in the theory, is what he calls “Grice’s Razor.” This principle is as follows:
“Grice’s Razor: Other things being equal, it is preferable to postulate conversational
implicatures rather than senses, conventional implicatures or semantic presuppositions
because conversational implicatures can be derived from independently motivated
psychosocial principles” (Davis 1998, 19). This principle will be essential to most if
not all of Davis’ claims, so he cites a massive number of sources to support it, which
Grandy (1989, 516) supports in addition to this list.
Davis’ first major argument against Grice is in the matter of quantity. He
writes, “The existence of quantity implicatures is undeniable. What is false is the
claim that quantity implicatures are derived from or explained by the Maxim of
Quantity” (Davis 1998, 35). One of the main reasons for this maxim is for weaker
statements to block stronger statements: “The idea is that if the speaker were in a
position to make the stronger statement, he should have” (Davis 1998, 34). However,
Davis produces a myriad of counterexamples to this.
In presenting these
counterexample Davis uses a different symbol from Levinson; thus, for the
29
propositions Davis puts forward “=>” to be read as “implicates” and “≠>” as “does
not implicate.” Here Davis compares:
“Did anyone die?”
Some did => -(All died).
Yes ≠> -(All died). (Davis 1998, 35)
However, some of Davis’ numerous counterexamples of weaker statements not
implying stronger statements are as follows:
Some died ≠> -(Only some [a few, a minority] died).
Some died ≠> -(Some were killed [murdered, assassinated, executed,…])
Some died ≠> -(35.72% died). (Davis 1998, 35-36)
These arguments, and arguments denying that implicature, as some have considered,
can be “in force” in certain circumstance and not in others arbitrarily, affect Grice’s
and Levinson’s theories (Davis 1998, 37).
Davis next attacks tautology implicatures. The common example for this type
of implicature is “War is war,” and is associated with a violation of the Maxim of
Quantity, as it provides no information. He begins by noting that neither Grice nor
Levinson provide an account for how the Maxim of Quantity generates these
implicatures (Davis 1998, 42). Then he presents some counterexamples of nonimplicating tautologies to undermine the principle in general; for example, “If it rains
then it will rain or snow… The red car is either red and fast or red but not fast,” etc.
(Davis 1998, 45). Additionally, he points out that when one considers statements
similar to tautologies, “War is an armed conflict between groups,” they will typically
appear to him or her as a definition, rather than consider the speaker to be implicating
something (Davis 1998, 46). He writes, “tautology implicatures are far and away the
exception rather than the rule… The fact that most tautologies lack implicatures
undermines the claim that observed tautology implicatures can be derived from
general psychosocial principles” (Davis 1998, 45). Concluding with, “the moral is
clear. Generalized tautology implicatures… are not explained by the Gricean maxims.
Convention seems to be the only answer” (Davis 1998, 46). His attack of the Gricean
account of these implicatures is quite substantial. He follows in the same manner
with a criticism of conjunction implicatures.
Davis continues in this fashion undermining much of the work Griceans have
attempted to settle, including “indeterminate” implicatures, relevance implicatures,
what he calls “close-but” implicatures, etc. (Davis 1998, 70-75).
30
He attacks
Levinson’s theory when he addresses quantity implicatures more in depth, stating that
scalar implicatures “can easily be extended: <all, nearly all, most, many, a few,
some>,” and that this extension undermines implicatures caused by the Maxim of
Quantity (Davis 1998, 84). He then moves on to the Relevance Theory of Sperber
and Wilson. He writes that beside its connection to the Maxim of Relation, the
Principle of Relevance cannot follow Grice’s model in the following way:
The Principle of Relevance does not imply any of Grice’s other principles…
Cooperative Principle: nothing guarantees that the contribution with the
greatest number of contextual implications per cost must be the contribution
required by the accepted purpose of conversation.
Maxim of Quality:
nothing… requires that the conveyed proposition or any of its contextual
implications be true or justified.
Maxim of Quantity… more, or less,
informative propositions might be proportionately less costly to process.
Furthermore the Principle of Relevance fails to imply the Maxim of Manner to
the extent that brevity involves sacrificing content and not just eliminating
unnecessary verbiage. (Davis 1998, 100-101)
Thus, according to Davis, many of the typical implicatures Grice’s theory wants to
present, simply cannot be shown via Relevance Theory. In Sperber and Wilson’s
defense though, the premise of their paper is solely to explain relevance.
Conversational implicature through a relevance principle is merely an added benefit.
Still, if the theory is merely about processing cost, there are many types of implicature
that are based on excessively verbose language.
Finally, Davis presents his theory of implicature conventions. Primarily, he
argues that conversational implicature, unlike Grice’s claims, is not necessarily nonconventional. He writes, “We will see that being conventional does not entail being
part of the meaning of implicature-bearing sentences, and that the distinction Grice
marked with the terms ‘conversational’ and ‘conventional’ is valid even though
convention is involved in both” (Davis 1998, 133). His theory presents implicature as
a taught practice that is perpetuated because it is useful and convenient for the
practice to be perpetuated. The four reasons besides precedence for implicature to be
perpetuated are that one can form a mental association with an idea, that they are
habitual, that they are traditional, and that they are reinforced by social pressure
(Davis 1998, 134-135). From these practices, implicatures arrive, often arbitrarily,
and persist due to perpetuation. However, one thing that Davis does not directly
31
address is a point that Sadock makes, “the principles that ORIGINALLY allowed
these expressions to have metaphorical senses are still vital and therefore these
conventionalized implicatures are also causes where the Cooperative Principle could
be invoked, but where it should not be” (Sadock 1978, 287). If an implicature
becomes prominent enough to become a convention, its origins must still be
accounted for.
Davis, not considering this fact, presents his theories for the
conventional basis for quantity implicatures, tautology implicatures, disjunction
implicatures, modal implicatures, relevance implicatures, “close-but” implicatures,
manner implicatures, and “interrogative/imperative” implicatures.
This theory is
quite dramatic in the way it presents conversational implicature. There is much for
Davis to explain regarding the pervasiveness of some of the common implicature.
Indeed, simply because Davis can provide a genealogy for certain implicatures, does
not mean there is evidence that implicatures did, in fact, arise via these methods; and,
the real strength of his argument relies on what some call “Obviously… overly
harsh,” counterexamples (Bultinck 2005, 29).
32
Chapter 3: Conversational Goals
One of the main issues regarding implicature that may be overlooked is the
purpose of conversation itself. Rather than explicate conversation as a general system
of communication, one may consider viewing conversation as a goal-oriented
preoccupation.10 This will produce different conversational kinds. Holdcroft (1979)
provides a basic framework for discourse kinds.11 These share a similar groundwork
for kinds of conversation. Through the combined lenses of Holdcroft’s kinds and
Kasher’s emphasis on goals, many of the common counterexamples that Gricean
theory has come up against will be alleviated. In addition to this, the conversational
theory will have greater explanatory power than Grice’s theory. One example of this
can be found in sociological works where social conventions of cultures differ in such
a way that violations of Grice’s maxims are an essential part of conversation. These
aberrations in conversational structure can be explained via this alternative theory of
conversation.
One example of this is in regards to the Zinacantan language. John Haviland
writes, “It is notable, parenthetically, that the Zinacantecos also frequently appear to
violate Grice’s maxim of Quality… Zinacantecos do tell premeditated lies, routinely;
it is often a matter of preventing a leak in the carefully patrolled fences of privacy and
domestic confidentiality” (Haviland 1988, 97).
Haviland points out that Grice’s
maxims do not prevent people from telling lies to one another; in fact, his theory
specifically allows for this. However, Haviland goes on to say that “there is, in
Zinacantán, almost a tradition, and certainly and interpretive technique, for extracting
a grain of truth from the great boulders of deception that are routinely thrown about”
(Haviland 1988, 98). Here, the cultural norms of a language require people to tell
partial, or whole, untruths with the presumption that the hearers will interpret the
actual facts from these statements.
This is tantamount to a culture of mass
exaggeration. This evidence can be explained by a serious reformulation of the
Gricean premises; this will cover more conventions that his ethnocentric theory does.
3.1 Explanatory Failures of Gricean Theory
10
This view is held by Gauker (2001).
Discourse kinds are referred to by Holdcroft (1979); however, he refers to individual types of speech
acts, rather than dialogue centered goal-based conversational forms. However, he does provide an
interesting study of four types of dialogues employing interests as factors.
11
33
One of the primary problems of Gricean theory is that it presumes the
Cooperative Principle. This, as Kasher contends, will not always be the case in
conversation; however, cooperation is often beneficial to participants in achieving
certain goals. The primary goal that cooperation can achieve is reliable information
transfer. When two parties have a mutual interest in transferring information to each
other, they ought to follow a principle of cooperation. However, there are many
instances in which two parties might want to be deceptive in their discourse. These
cases occur any time participants have non-cooperative goals.
An interesting point that emerges to reinforce the idea that Grice’s model is
insufficient is how one would come to use deception in a conversation according to
Grice.
Grice allows for violations of maxims; however, if one is engaging in
deception then he or she is not following the “cooperative efforts” that “each
participant recognizes” (Grice 1989, 26). These deceptive moves may cause the talk
exchange to not qualify as conversation. Grice writes, “at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable” (Grice 1989,
26).
This would suggest that non-cooperative conversations are not actually
conversations for Grice. For Grice to contend that one can violate maxims, and thus
use deception or other unsuitable moves, within conversation seems selfcontradictory. The only consolation for Grice is that he qualifies this by saying that
conversations “normally” follow the Cooperative Principle, and that the Cooperative
Principle is a “rough” principle (Grice 1989, 26).
This leaves non-cooperative
conversations unexplained by the Gricean model.
Thus, an alternative model
allowing for non-cooperative goals would have greater explanatory power.
Two non-cooperative goals that can manifest themselves in forms of
conversation are persuasion, and entertainment. The ends of each are different; thus,
their content will also be quite different. However, these other forms of conversation
may reject the Cooperative Principle that communication requires. Participants may
have conflicting goals, in which case communication may break down.
These
conflicts illustrate the uncooperative aspects of conversation, which are much more
complicated than Grice allows for.
3.2 Social Norms as Presumed Goals
Conforming to social norms, or conventions, must be considered a presumed
goal with regards to conversation. Social norms, like those of the Zinacantecos, will
34
be followed to some extent, even if only out of habit, whenever people interact with
each other. Grice notes that these norms will be significant when he writes, “There
are, of course, all sorts of other maxims (aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such
as “Be polite,” that are normally observed by participants in talk exchanges” (Grice
1989, 28). However, these social conventions play a much larger role in conversation
than Grice illustrates here. The conversational kinds that emerge will be dramatically
affected by these conventions, so much so that many Gricean maxims will no longer
hold. For example, the amount of coercion or equivocation that one may use while
attempting to persuade someone of something will often be influenced by
conventions, rather than any maxims. Thus, for a more fundamental understanding of
a maxim’s necessarily one can investigate the balance of these social conventions
with Gricean maxims in different types of conversation.
Participants in conversation will often have to choose between maintaining
conventions and achieving goals. Norms may be broken if the goal achieved by the
conversation is more important than the goal of satisfying the social norm. For
example, suppose a person was being unduly harassed by a friend. He or she may
resort to shouting or profanity, in violation of social norms, in order to dissuade that
friend from pursuing his or her nuisance. Whereas this would be considered highly
uncouth in a normal setting, many situations may prove such that preserving certain
conventions will not outweigh the importance of achieving certain goals. Thus, social
norms must always be weighed against the goals of a specific conversation in order to
determine which is more important.
3.3 The Communicative Goal
The communication of ideas as a goal of conversation is not often considered
separate from the concept of conversation itself. It is the basis and presupposition for
Gricean Theory. It is often taken for granted as the point of conversation, because
diaologue is the primary medium by which overt communication occurs. It is only
when communication is contrasted with other uses of conversation that one is able to
see that conversation can be a tool for achieving the specific goals through utterances.
Here, within the Communicative Goal, conversation is used to transmit information
from one participant to another. The efficiency of this transfer will be determined by
weighing the importance of the communication against various social factors.
35
Cooperative conversation can be understood in this framework, in contrast to Gricean
theory where it cannot be separated from conversation as a concept.
Presuming the Communicative Goal, Kasher’s and Grice’s results should
come reasonably well.
The Communicative Goal attempts to correctly transmit
information from one individual to another. Though this may seem obvious, there are
many obstacles in conventional conversation to achieving this; issues regarding even
the most common social conventions. Because there are very few conversations in
which social norms will not inhibit communication, an example can help explain the
type of communication represented by this model. One common example is that of a
person communicating with his or her doctor. Here, full discloser about the relevant
information is beneficial for both parties. Almost all, if not all, of the Gricean
maxims will be fulfilled. However, most conversations regarding communication will
fall prey to the influence of the social norms held by the participants. Politeness is
one of the most common of the infringing norms. Honesty in communication will
always suffer to some extent (though often to a negligible degree) when this particular
convention is invoked.
The primary similarity between the Gricean model and conversation with the
Communicative Goal is that they both require the Cooperative Principle as a
prerequisite. The Cooperative Principle is suggested by Grice, but as a principle for
what would define conversation in general. This will not hold when looking at
suasive
conversations.
Still,
when
approaching
conversations
regarding
communication, most of the maxims and the Cooperative Principle will conform. For
example, if one does not express true information in a conversation where one’s goal
is communication, that person cannot be acting in a cooperative way.
The first maxim under the Category of Quantity, “Make your contribution as
informative as is required,” will be necessary (Grice 1989, 26). It is clear that if one
intends to share an idea, that person must provide at least the minimum amount of
information needed to communicate the idea. This point is fairly obvious; however, it
is important to understand that the person speaking must to have the goal of
communication. Clearly, someone can end up being vague or provide insufficient
information in violation of this maxim, but if they intend to communicate fully and
fail in some respect, then they will not accomplish their goal.
Thus, in certain
situations, it is often the case that people must perform some ritual, such as swearing
an oath, to assure others that communication is their goal. This usually provides
36
additional penalties for anyone not fully communicating the needed information, so as
to prevent deception from being advantageous.
One example of this is that in
courtrooms, when one is communicating some events relating to an alleged crime, the
witness must swear to tell the whole truth.
This illustrates the importance of
sufficiency in communication. Though one may want to leave some facts undisclosed
for some reason or another, if one has the goal of communication, then the minimum
relevant facts must be included.
The second maxim under the Category of Quantity, “Do not make your
contribution more than is required,” is not necessary in conversations regarding
communication (Grice 1989, 26). Though in English-speaking communities this is
desirable, it is not necessary that only the minimum amount of needed information be
given. So long as the amount of information given is limited, there is no inherent
problem created by providing too much relevant information beyond causing, as Grice
notes, a “waste of time” (Grice 1989, 26). The undesirability of this excessive
information, however, relies on cultural norms. It is not very difficult to suppose a
culture in which excessive verbosity is desirable, and tact is looked upon as
inappropriate. Thus, it seems that, though most may find it desirable, a maxim of a
maximal limit for information is not necessary.
The Communicative Goal will require the first maxim under the Category of
Quality. When Grice notes “do not say what you believe to be false,” he hits upon the
most essential criterion for communicating.
There is an essential breakdown in
communication when one is dishonest in the information he or she states. However,
the maxim can be improved if it is reformulated. There are problems of cultures
where people may exaggerate regularly. In fact, a person in this type of culture may
say something literally true, but express something false. In these situations, one
might want to exaggerate some fact in order to express a true idea. Thus, this maxim
should be reformulated as “One should make his or her contribution one that will not
express something false.” Here, “say” is avoided because statements that are literally
false can, within a reinterpreting convention, be understood properly.
The
Zinacantecos may communicate cooperatively in this way, even if there is usually a
benefit from deception in their culture. This principle is the most basic need in
cooperative information transmission; the information must not express something
false.
37
Grice’s second maxim of quality “Do not say that for which you lack adequate
evidence,” unlike the previous maxim, is much more complicated (Grice 1989, 27).
Primarily, the term “say” will be replaced with “express” for the reasons stated
earlier. However, regarding the maxim’s content, there will be serious issues. Taken
loosely, this would be a perfectly acceptable rule for communicators to follow;
however, the problem with this maxim is that “adequate” is vague. Depending on
who one communicates with there will be a different level of information one is able
to share, considering the different attitude of “adequate.” To illustrate this, imagine a
philosophical skeptic and a physicist having a conversation about the external world.12
The nature of what counts as evidence will be the deciding factor to what each
considers “adequate.”
Obviously, there needs to be a limit on what may be
considered evidence. Unless it is well defined between the two communicating, what
is considered adequate will fall under the category of social norms. Ultimately,
however, there must be at least some basic level of understanding as to what can
count as evidence or they may be very serious breakdowns in communication.
Grice’s third category, the Relevance maxim, is often desirable in
communicative conversations; however, it is not necessary for achieving all
communicative goals and may, itself, be irrelevant occasionally.
It is desirable
because when one is obtaining certain chunks of information, communication requires
that responses must regard the desiderata. However, this is only the case when one is
responding to a question. When posing a question, as Hintikka shows using his
Sherlock Holmes example, the relevance principle is not essential to achieving
specific communicative goals (Hintikka 1986, 275).
Though others may have
reduced the idea of relevance to efficiency, relevance is an important aspect to
cooperative conversations when applied correctly. Perhaps a better maxim would be
“Respond Relevantly.” A very subtle side note, however, is that this maxim is not
necessary if the communicator can only respond with one unit of binary information,
e.g. if the response can only be affirmative or negative.
Of the fourth category, that of manner, the maxims are necessary for
communication, but only when reformulated. The idea of manner is in relation, as
Grice states, “to how what is said is to be said” (Grice 1989, 27). The first of these
maxims of manner is “Avoid obscurity of expression” (Grice 1989, 27). This maxim
12
This is one of the central problems brought up in debates regarding epistemological contextualism.
38
will be required in cooperative communication. The reason for this is that in order for
“obscurity” to be sensible, one must first have some type of principle of clear,
coherent communication. If clarity is not considered desirable in communication,
then the possibility of confusion arises, or is at least increased, for the listening
participant. This is not cooperative in regards to information transfer. Thus, being
obscure is inherently violating rules of cooperative discourse. One might argue that
there are no maxim based rules whatsoever for cooperative discourse, such as Davis
suggests. However, cooperative discourse demands that one does not use language
that removes clarity where, all things being equal, it would remain. Though societies
might exist where obscurity is desirable, one must assume that only a certain,
maximal level would be allowable, lest the information communicated be
undecipherable. In this case, one might want to reformulate the maxim as “Avoid
unnecessary (or excessive) obscurity of expression.” Still, in cases where obscurity
exists within language, cooperative communication would try to avoid it.
Grice’s second maxim of manner “avoid ambiguity” will be necessary for
cooperative communication (Grice 1989, 27). Ambiguity comes from a situation in
which two interpretations can arise from one statement. Though cases in which
ambiguity is not cleared by context are rare, instances in which ambiguous statements
are not clarified provide more than one interpretation of the given information and,
therefore, will cause confusion. A side note to this is that many formal languages do
not allow for ambiguity.
Thus, the avoidance of ambiguity, with regards to
cooperative communication, must only be followed when it can occur.
The next maxim of manner, “Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity),” is unlike
the previous two (Grice 1989, 27). Brevity is a cultural norm and may be helpful in
contemporary, English discourse; however, there is no reason to believe that it might
not be a positive attribute in other cultures, even when communicating cooperatively.
The question of being “unnecessarily” prolix is allowable, because in any language an
unnecessarily
or
excessively
diffuse
statement
is
always
detrimental
to
communication. This is due to necessity and excessiveness being defined within the
scope of social convention. Still, the pure maxim “Be brief” cannot be defended as
anything but a principle based in cultural etiquette. Thus, while a consideration for
avoiding “unnecessary prolixity” is acceptable, any issue of brevity being required for
cooperative communication will be only decided within a conventional framework.
39
The same will be true for the final maxim “Be orderly” (Grice 1989, 27). The
issue of orderliness would be quite difficult to formally define.
It would seem
difficult to find any culture in which being orderly is offensive or unhelpful. Though,
one could imagine a culture in which the speed of giving information is more
important than the orderliness in which it is given. Hence, it does not appear that this
is a necessary ingredient to being cooperative, yet there could be the maxim “Do not
be unnecessarily disorderly.”
Thus, in achieving the goal of cooperative communication, many of the
Gricean Maxims are not necessary.
Though in contemporary, English-speaking
cultures they will all be helpful; this is due to the cultural norms that most English
speakers follow.
The apparent similarities between the Gricean model and the
Communicative Goal model appear so because they both presume the Cooperative
Principle. However, there can be conversations in which one person is trying to
obtain something from another participant, who may be unhelpful. The Gricean
model, with its presumed Cooperative Principle, does not allow for a presumption of
uncooperativeness when looking at conversations. These conversational phenomena
allow the goal-oriented model greater explanatory power.
3.4 The Suasive Goal
The next general, conversational goal discussed here is the suasive goal. This
is where one participant tries to persuade another participant of something through
conversation. The primary distinction between this conversational model and the
communicative or Gricean models is that the Cooperative Principle does not hold with
regards to suasive conversations.
The consequences of this distinction are vast.
Primarily, the principle guiding these types of conversation will be almost exclusively
social convention, rather than maxims. The limit to what forms of coercion may be
used depends wholly on weighing the consequences of achieving one’s goal with
violating cultural constructs, including social norms, laws, and ethics. There are two
distinct relationships between participants in suasive conversations: the SellerConsumer Relationship, and the Bargainer Relationship.
3.4.1 Seller-Consumer Relationship
The Seller-Consumer Relationship is the more basic of the two types of
suasive conversation. This relationship involves one participant trying to convince
40
the other participant of some idea.13 The term “seller-consumer” may be initially
misleading; though the relationship between a vendor selling a product to a consumer
falls clearly under this conversation style, so do many other persuasive relationships.
Some examples are a child asking his or her mother for a treat, or a political pundit
speaking to a voter about why that voter should choose a more conservative or liberal
position on a specific issue. The Seller-Consumer Relationship deals solely with the
transfer of information with the intention to persuade.
One unique, and possibly damaging, aspect to the Seller-Consumer
Relationship in suasive conversations is that there need not be an actual conversation
at all. As is often the case with advertisements, a simple statement alone may be
made with respect to an idea, which can affect passive participants. No dialogue takes
place, and yet information has been given to a person. It is arguable that these
instances should not be counted as conversation at all, but there are serious, suasive
conversations that do take place. Many suasive dialogues certainly are conversations,
whether they are persons asking advice from others, or people trying to explain their
action to their colleagues. Though one could claim that advertising is a kind of oneshot conversation between advertisers and consumers, for the purposes of this paper
only dialogue between two or more participants, each with some input, will be
counted as conversation.14 That being said, one may examine the aspects of this type
of conversation.
The seller-consumer form of suasive conversations is not governed by any of
the Gricean maxims. In order for one participant to persuade another, one may violate
each and every maxim Grice formulates. The only factor that must be taken into
account is social norms. Suppose one decides to not be as informative as needed.
This frugalness with information may be an intentional move designed to prevent
unfavorable information from being considered by the consuming participant, thus
affecting opinions. Cultural norms may prevent this from happening; for example, a
used car salesman may be required by law to tell buyers the necessary amount of
information regarding a car’s history (damage, problems, etc.). Now, it is probably in
the salesman’s interests to achieve the goal of selling cars, but only after maintaining
the goal of not going to jail for fraud. Therefore, the salesman may be able to dupe
13
This can be compared to Holdcroft (1979); however, here interests are not necessarily opposed,
though they are certainly not identical.
14
Though many of the examples used in this essay may be shortened for the sake of brevity, they can
all be reformulated in a conversational framework.
41
the consuming participant; however, cultural conventions, or laws, usually prevent
this from being in his or her interest.
This result will not occur in other situations. For example, suppose Bill is
inviting his good friend John to a party. In this situation Bill knows that John’s
nemesis George will be in attendance. Bill may neglect to tell John this information
with hopes that John will attend. There is no egregious social norm in this society
that would prevent Bill from taking this route of action. Thus, it is to the advantage of
Bill to take this approach. One may achieve the goal of persuasion through this
method in a suasive conversation and, in this situation, without any serious
consequence.
These results will be the same for the rest of the maxims. Cultural norms may
or may not prevent the persuading participants from providing too much information,
too little information, lying, stating things they do not know, making irrelevant
statements, being obscure or ambiguous, or failing to be brief or orderly. None of the
maxims that guided the previous forms of conversation will apply.
Only
consequences will influence whether or not the maxims should be violated. This is
how the most skillful rhetoricians fine tune their craft. Their skill comes from their
ability to understand the cultural norms they can exploit, and to exploit them if
necessary.
3.4.2 The Bargainer Relationship
The Bargainer Relationship is quite different from the Seller-Consumer
Relationship. This relationship must be semi-cooperative, because of the nature of
bargaining.15 This relationship is under the Suasive Goal, because it occurs when two
participants attempt to persuade each other to come to an agreement. It is semicooperative because in order to have a negotiation, the two parties are subject to
certain rules of negotiation. Offers are made, and when they are, participants must be
able to presume these offers are made without an intention to default. Otherwise, this
would not a bargaining relationship; rather, it would be a Seller-Consumer
Relationship, with one side merely attempting to convince the other to do something.
This negotiating framework will be normative.
The distinction between
negotiating and convincing involves a set of agreed upon principles, in order to reach
an arrangement. Thus, there are Gricean maxims that will be affected. The maxims
15
This can also be compared to Holdcroft (1979); again, interests, here, are not necessarily opposed,
but they are not identical.
42
of quantity do not apply to negotiations in a necessary way; one may provide too
much or too little information if it suites the need of the negotiating parties. The
maxim of relevance will not apply either. One can talk irrelevantly in negotiations,
though it may annoy the other participants. Obscurity, brevity, and orderliness are all
at the discretion of the negotiating participants. However, one maxim of manner that
must be observed is that of ambiguity. For there to be negotiations, both parties must
know what is on the bargaining table. The rules of deception regarding bargaining are
more complicated than those of pure persuasion. This will be reflected with regards
to maxims of quality.
The maxim of quality will apply differently, however, to each type of suasive
relationship. For bargaining to occur there must be a specific type of statement: an
offer. Offers are different from the rest of the dialogue that occurs. These offers will
behave differently due to the conversation being semi-cooperative. The first revised
maxim of quality, “One should make his or her contribution one that will not express
something false,” will hold only with offers put on the negotiating table.
The
participants may use deception with regards to reactions to offers, and rejections of
the negotiations, but offers must always be made honestly. This semi-cooperative
nature of bargaining allows the Gricean maxim to hold, but only limitedly.
The second revised maxim of quality, “Do not express that for which you lack
adequate evidence,” will follow similar rules. When making offers, one must be
honest to then extent that the other participants have a legitimate idea of what they
will be receiving for their offers. If a participant is in doubt of facts, he or she may
want to be careful with what is offered, in order to prevent a situation leading to that
participant defaulting on a transaction. However, all the other input, not falling under
the category of offers, will depend on social norms rather than any normative maxims.
This again shows the semi-cooperative nature of negotiations, as opposed to the
Seller-Consumer Relationship.
The specifics of the two forms of suasive conversations are different; however,
the goals of both are the same. They both are based in persuading participants to do
or believe things.
This distinction separates this form of conversation from
communicative conversation, which relies on a strict cooperative structure. These
two conversational goals distinguish themselves from a third conversational goal, the
Epicurean Goal.
43
3.5 The Epicurean Goal
The last goal discussed here is the Epicurean Goal. This goal is one of simply
achieving pleasure through conversation. This type of conversation is rooted in the
fact that human beings are naturally predisposed to engage in conversation, regardless
of whether or not it has an explicit purpose. Steven Pinker elaborates this point in his
book The Language Instinct. Pinker writes, “Language is not a cultural artifact that
we learn the way we learn to tell time or how the federal government works. Instead,
it is a distinct piece of the biological makeup of our brains…
some cognitive
scientists have described language as a psychological faculty, a mental organ, a neural
system, and a computational module.
‘instinct’” (Pinker 1994, 18).
But I prefer the admittedly quaint term
For this reason people find themselves chatting
aimlessly, or even talking to themselves. Thus, the only goal that can be established
here is a negative one. People will not continue in aimless conversations which cause
them some sort of pain, broadly speaking, for example, boredom, annoyance, or being
prevented from doing something causing pleasure. From this, one can consider a goal
of pleasure seeking as the goal of engaging this instinctual conversation while
avoiding pain.
The consequences of considering these phenomena as a pleasure-seeking goaloriented form of conversation will provide excellent explanatory power for some
dialogues. The Epicurean Goal provides much more leeway for exaggerations and
falsities. Though these types of conversations are usually more or less cooperative,
people entertaining each other through conversation can lead to a wide variety of
flexibility in accomplishing this goal. Like the Seller-Consumer Relationship in the
suasive model of conversation, epicurean goal-oriented conversation will not be
constrained by any of the Gricean maxims. They all may fail because what is
considered entertaining is decided by social norms, and this differs widely by culture.
People can provide too little information in their statements, often referred to as an
“inside jokes,” or they may even quiz each other in various ways, in order to entertain
themselves. Comedians typically find themselves providing more information than is
necessary, in order to exacerbate the effect of a specific joke. Thus, the quantitative
maxims cannot even be considered.
As for the maxims of quality, they will be as easily dispensable as the
quantitative maxims. Most of the tales that people tell are exaggerations if not
44
complete facsimiles. This will also be the case for storytellers who base their stories
on truth, the specifics of which they do not have adequate evidence to support.
Relevance is irrelevant to achieving the epicurean goal; absurdist comedy is based in
being as far from relevant to a situation, and is entertaining because of this.
Obscurity, disorderliness, and lack of brevity all can contribute to humor; thus, the
status of their corresponding maxims as significant to the epicurean goal is nil.
Finally, the maxim “Avoid ambiguity” is notable because of the fact that a cornucopia
of wit and humor are derived precisely from the violation of this maxim.
Misdirection, puns, double entendres, etc. can all be created from the use of ambiguity
in conversation. The interplay between conversational implicatures and such uses
will be explored in the next chapter.
A notable feature of the epicurean goal-based conversational framework is that
it is not necessarily cooperative. Teasing and mocking are forms in which one person
is able to achieve this goal without cooperating with the other participants. Thus, it is
very similar in structure to the Seller-Consumer Relationship in suasive conversation;
however, because the goals driving the conversations are different, the content of the
conversations will differ dramatically.
3.6 Exclusivity, Exhaustiveness, and Conclusion
Two immediate concerns regarding this conversational theory are whether
each of the types of conversation are exclusive, and whether or not the theory is
exhaustive with regards to types of conversation. When considering whether the
types of conversation are exclusive, it is clear that they are not.16 Conversations
frequently bounce between epicurean and communicative goals, and then can move to
include suasive goals. The conversations themselves need not be taken as singular
entities, and may vary in composition. Statements and chunks of conversation can be
examined within certain frameworks with reasonable discretion. Whether or not this
will be problematic to the theory in general remains to be seen; however, there are no
immediate concerns that appear to be significantly detrimental.
As for exhaustiveness, the question seems to be of less importance. If there
are other forms that are not addressed here, they can simply be added to the theory.
These new conversational kinds should not pose any conflicts, presuming they are
making normative claims.
16
Secondly, if the existing conversational types can be
This is in contrast to Holdcroft (1979).
45
broken down further, into more precise entities, this can only add to the specificity of
the theory. The study here is not expected to be exhaustive; however, it does provide
a general framework for studying conversation in a different way. Conversation is a
complex organism, and may be better suited as a subject of study, rather than a topic
within linguistics.
An example of this is that conversations with the Epicurean Goal are, more
often than not, at least somewhat cooperative, if not very cooperative. Jokes often
play on the maxims of communication to surprise, which creates humor. Here, the
goal of the conversation is not communicating information; however, the conversation
is still cooperative in nature, because jokes often require some maxims to be
observed. Other types of entertaining conversation do not. Thus, there may be
different types of conversational relationships, like the Bargainer Relationship, that
can be created normatively within these goals. Joke-telling may be one of these
relationships based on the fact that it has semi-cooperative elements.
Finally, this framework for conversation will provide different, more precise
results for theory of conversational implicature than Grice can explore in his lectures.
The goal-oriented structure helps point to where implicatures appear and shows why
implicatures are significant as conversational tools. This structure will provide less
problematic results and greater explanatory power.
The goal of this theory of
conversation is to provide a much more intuitive and inclusive framework for the
exploration of conversational implicatures that better reflects conversation as a
phenomenon in nature.
46
Chapter 4: Implicature within Goal-Oriented Conversation
The result of this type of conversational theory will be that implicatures are
similar to Davis’ theory; namely, they are conventional. This is due to the inclusion
of non-cooperative kinds of conversation. In cooperative conversation maxims exist
because the rules of cooperation require them. The weight of social convention,
however, influences conversation to a much greater extent.
The methods of
communication one employs during conversation, beyond what the maxims require,
will be based in these social norms. Maxims, however, will still be significant in this
theory, unlike Davis’, which does not present a theory of cooperative maxims at all.
Maxims are useful in cooperative conversation, because a violation of a maxim can
act as a cue that a specific conventional use of language has occurred. Thus, maxims
may prevent confusion in discourse, but implicature remains under the realm of
convention.
When evaluating conversational implicature within a goal-oriented theory of
conversation there are a few caveats that must first be established. Many of the social
norms governing interaction between participants within the English-speaking world
may create implicatures not signaled by violations of maxims. This primarily is in
regards to non-cooperative suasive speech. These formal customs and laws often
require those who are attempting to persuade someone of something to act in a more
cooperative manner than is required by communicative theory alone. This, however,
does not mean that these cooperative actions are necessary by default; they are
conventional.
Though, certain counterexamples will illustrate that these social
conventions do not cover all suasive interaction.
4.1 Quantity: Make Your Contribution as Informative as Is
Required
4.1.1 Some, Not All
The most written about implicature is that in which “some” implies “not all.”
This implicature is prominent in regards to communicative conversation. Because the
speaker in a communicative conversation must make his or her contribution as
informative as is required (Grice’s Q1-Maxim), the flouting of this maxim by the use
of “some” rather than “some, but not all” or “some, in fact all” will signal the
implementation of this convention. The problems that Davis poses regarding “someall” implications illustrate the difficulty in attempting to show how a rule for
47
implication, rather than a conventional system of implication, accounts for how all
statement of lesser informativeness cancel statements of greater informativeness. It is
not merely that weaker statements block stronger statements, as Levinson contends.
In the example, “Did anyone die?”, a cooperative response of “some did” will imply
that “not all” died. This is simply because a cooperative participant would have said
“everyone died,” or “not everyone died,” if he or she was presenting the most
informative statement possible. However, the following counterexamples clearly
illustrate how more informative statements are not always negated by this maxim:
Some died ≠> -(Only some [a few, a minority] died).
Some died ≠> -(Some were killed [murdered, assassinated, executed,…])
Some died ≠> -(35.72% died). (Davis 1998, 35-36)
This presents a problem: should one assume that a general rule follows from a
violation of this maxim? Bird notes that this is the type of counterexample needed to
seriously hinder Grice’s theory on the whole, stating, “it would be necessary to
provide examples… where [the Cooperative Principle] is in operation, but the
implicatures are not present” (Bird 1979, 148). If the violation is a linguistic cue,
however, due to conventional usage, then there is no problem presented by Davis’s
counterexamples.
This is not the end of the story for scalar implications. Depending on the
formulation one has for scalars, there will be other linguistic conventions one must
follow if one is being cooperative, such as “Some < Many.” There are a myriad of
various, conventional scalar implications that one may encounter. This may lead to
confusion; most people do not have identical scalar vocabularies. Though this will
not usually be problematic in cooperative communication, the extent to which scalars
are of varying degree presents serious problems to the principle that weaker
statements always negate stronger statements. Maxims as cues prevents this problem
altogether.
Another example of how, even in cooperative language, the “some-all”
implicature can fail is the case of mathematical facts.
Specifically, there is
Goldbach’s Conjecture. Here, the statement is “all evens, greater than 2, are the sum
of two primes.” However, suppose someone were to declare, “I prefer to say ‘some
evens, greater than 2, are the sum of two primes’; because, regardless of the truth of
Goldbach’s Conjecture, I can never be wrong.” The statement is uncontroversial;
however, according to Grice’s theory, this statement might insinuate that Goldbach’s
48
Conjecture was false. Obviously, the statement would have to meet the requirements
of flouting. However, this type of statement would not fall into any of the other
failings of fulfilling maxims, including violations, opting out, or facing a clash. There
may be some who consider this a case of a clash of maxims; the lack of knowledge
that all of the evens are the sum of two primes does not mean that one would have to
violate the Q1-maxim. However, one could say, “Some, but perhaps not all, evens
greater than two are the sum of two primes.” Here, the Gricean model fails because
the “some” in this statement does not imply “not all” and there is no other explanation
for why this instance is not flouting.
This solution will be similar to cases within suasive conversations. Suasive
conversations do not necessarily take any of the Gricean maxims, and rely on
weighing social conventions against each other. This fundamental difference changes
the outcome of the implicatures.
The lack of maxims is evident through some
examples. First, suppose a businessman is selling his wares and a potential customer
approaches. The potential customer asks, “Are your customers happy with your
service?” The vendor replies “Not everyone.” Because it could be that none of the
customers have been happy with this service, a cautious customer may want to know
more information. The businessman is not breaking any laws or lying by responding
in this way; he is telling the truth, though it is worded in an opportunistic way. The
wording in legal documents, often referred to as legalese, is used to avoid this type of
pitfall in non-cooperative speech.
The problem with these types of examples,
however, is that there may be a cue from the presumption of cooperation, instead of
merely advantageous marketing due to cultural laws regarding advertising.
Another example, however, shows when the “some-all” convention may apply
to suasive conversation. This is that of a child trying to use language to his or her
advantage when explaining himself or herself. Children are usually quick to find that
they can tell the parents the truth, yet avoid telling the whole truth. Suppose a mother
catch her son, crumbs covering his mouth and hands, next to a new box of cookies,
freshly emptied. The mother may ask “Did you eat all those cookies?”; to which the
child may respond, “I ate some of them.” Here, the child is telling his mother the
truth, because lying to his mother would be more disadvantageous than admitting he
had eaten all the cookies. However, the reason he uses this example is due to the
conventional aspect of the “some-all” implication. Therefore, he chooses this answer
because it is most advantageous, allowing for the possibility that he did not eat them
49
all. Of course, the mother knows that her son is answering in this useful manner, and
will probably follow up with more probing questions to show her son that she is
knows that his cleverness is not effective. Here, this illustrates that conventions can
be used within a suasive framework without maxims cueing them.
The “some-all” implication is often evident in conversations with the
Epicurean Goal.
cooperative.
This is due to the Epicurean Goal being usually somewhat
Yet, an example of how the implication might fail appears in the
following entertaining tongue twister:
Some sums sum sums some sums sum.
Here, the statement, in the first instance of the word “some”, does not use “some” to
imply “not all”; however, the second instance of “some” does utilize the implication.
Though the mathematical component might be used again here, the primary purpose
of the statement is entertainment through rhyme scheme difficult pronunciation.
Though the statement is true when interpreted loosely, the truth of the statement is
irrelevant; for the statement to achieve its goal in conversation, it need only entertain
to be successful.
4.1.2 Tautologies
Tautologies are another subject of Q1-maxim violations. The situations in
which a statement providing no new information is presented by a participant will
also act as cues that a social convention is in use. The tautologies usually presented
are of the form “An X’s an X,” or “Xs will be Xs.” These two forms of statements do
present tautologies, and in a cooperative conversation one will recognize that they do
not present any intrinsic information. However, as Davis points out “If it rains then it
will rain or snow” and “The red car is either red and fast or red but not fast” do not
have the implications that “A war’s a war” or “Boys will be boys” do (Davis 1998,
45). This is due to the cultural usage of the two formulas “An X’s an X” and “X’s will
be Xs.” Here, the argument that maxim violations in cooperative communication will
be logical cues is effective.
Formalizing how “An X is an X” behaves is not
particularly significant to this essay; rather, pointing out that it is conventional, and
based learned rules, is what must be shown here. If the tautologies are not common
conventional uses, they will be confusing; however, it will make the listening
participant pause to attempt to understand why such a statement has been made. In
50
this way, we again see how this type of logical cue theory can inform where the
Gricean theory fails.
In conversation with the epicurean goal, entertainment can be made from
statements providing no new information. The example of tongue twister can be used
here again. Though the common statement that is used is “If Peter Piper picked a
peck of pickled peppers, then how many pickled peppers did Peter Piper pick?”, if this
statement is reformulated to form a tautology then, assuming it is sufficiently
entertaining, then it should be observed for entertainment value without recourse to
implicatures. The reformulation could be as follows:
If Peter Piper picked pickled peppers, then Peter Piper picked pickled peppers
plus plump plums, had he some, or plump plums had he none.
Here, there has been no new information created; rather, a long rhyming tautology is
presented to entertain. This type of absurdness is refreshing to some, though many
may find it less than entertaining. However, there is not any implication intrinsic to
the solution, or reason that the solution should be interpreted in some other way. The
Epicurean Goal removes this necessity from the conversation.
4.1.3 Other Violations
Grice’s famous example of the professor’s letter must be examined as another
violation of not providing appropriate information. The less than informative nature
of letter implies that the professor thinks that his or her pupil is not good at
philosophy. However, in Grice’s own gloss, the thought process that the reader of the
letter goes through, he basically describes the violation of the maxim as a logical cue,
rather than a direct implication. Here, the social convention of “if one has nothing
good to say, then say nothing at all” is being employed; this is how the reader of the
letter is able to interpret the inappropriately written letter. The cue informs the reader
of the letter that he or she might be able to interpret the writing according to some
convention, rather than being purely straightforward.
The same ignoring of all relevant information can be used suasively. The need
for laws, forcing drug companies to advertise the side effects, or even to state the side
effects of their products at all, is evidence that leaving out relevant information will
help sell certain products.
This again can be applied to the rules forcing food
companies to publish the nutritional facts of their food on their products.
Informativeness is clearly not always a priority of those who wish to persuade.
51
The use of this maxim with regards to the epicurean goal will provide for
some unique results. The violations of a maxim may provide a cue that the epicurean
goal is being used rather than that of the cooperative goal. One good joke that
incorporates the use of making the conversation less informative than needed is by
Jimmy Carr; he comments, “Say what you want about the deaf…” (Carr & Greeves
197). Here, Carr does not provide the audience with the full amount of information to
clearly understand the statement he makes. To ruin the joke completely, one can
explain it fully. There is a turn of phrase, “Say what you want about Xs,” followed
by, “but (or because) they Y Z.”
However, Carr proceeds to stop talking mid-
sentence. Instead of adding “because they can’t hear you,” he allows the lack of
information to lead the audience to figure the rest out, adding to the comic timing.
The audience doesn’t question whether there is some serious implication, beyond the
missing phrase, due to this lack of information. They know that the break was
deliberate, because of the conventions of stand up comedy.
4.2 Quality:
4.2.1 One Should Make His or Her Contribution One That Will Not
Express Something False
The violation of this maxim will usually cue a sarcastic or humorous
interpretation in cooperative communication. This is not, however, necessarily innate
to all languages. Often, this type of language use causes confusion, rather than the
implications it intends to present. Thus, executing this implication typically requires a
type of finesse that other implications lack, because the extent to which a statement
will be obviously false is quite variable. Therefore, there is usually an accentuation in
pronunciation to illicit the reference to convention. Though this accentuation is often
observed, it is not necessary in order to enact the social conventions. Here,
cooperative communication and suasive conversation diverge greatly. In cooperative
conversation, deception is not profitable for either party, in which case the
cooperative partner may attempt to translate the false statement via a social
construction.
In conversations based on the Seller-Consumer Relationship, however, the
exact opposite is true. The participants may use deception to their advantage, and
making false statements is a key part of this. Though most cultures hold as social
norms the principle that one ought not deceive others, this only inhibits deception
52
insofar as maintaining the social norms outweighs achieving a specific goal by the
conversation. Take, for instance, an example of a hostage negotiator.
While a
negotiator may assure a hostage taker that his or her demands are being met, the
negotiator may simply be stalling to allow time for the police to prepare to subdue the
criminal. In this instance, the benefits provided by upholding the cultural convention
of honesty are vastly outweighed by the benefits of capturing a criminal.
The previous example of violating the QL1-maxim to achieve some end
requires the listening participant to be ignorant about the veracity of the false
statement. The extent to which a suasive conversation can use false statement to
deceive is significant, even to the point of using statements that are obviously false to
persuade. Politicians, renowned for their sincerity, do occasionally use statements
that are obviously false for political gain, such as the claims by fringe party
candidates that they fully expect to win elections. Thus, the degree to which these
suasive conversations can use statements known to be false to achieve ends is not
limited by participants’ ignorance of the truth of claims.
With regards to conversations based in the Epicurean Goal, expressing what
one believes to be false is not particularly a matter of deceit; rather, the truth of many
statements is irrelevant to the purpose of the conversations. Thus, the participants
often do not even question whether a statement is true or not, nor do they consider the
truth of a statement relevant. Consider the many jokes and stories told by comedians;
their purpose is to entertain, not to be informative for any particular reason. One
example of this is a joke by Demetri Martin, which goes, “I keep a lighter in my
pocket at all times. I’m not a smoker, I just really love certain songs” (Carr &
Greeves 50). The joke has more to do with the common convention of people holding
up lighters during songs they really like. Though no one but Demetri Martin himself
knows the truth of the statement, it is safe to assume that, for all intents and purposes,
it is false. The truth of the statement is, in this case, irrelevant. It adds to the humor
of the statement to personalize the comment rather then put it in a true context, e.g. “I
wonder if some people carry lighters at all times… etc.” Here, the statement could be
made without recourse to false statements, and achieve its purpose; however, because
epicurean conversation is not cooperative, it is irrelevant whether or not the statement
is true. This is not just limited to humor; the whole of story-telling is engaged in
practice of telling something untrue, with truth being irrelevant.
53
4.2.2 Do Not Express That for Which You Lack Adequate
Evidence
The QL2-maxim in cooperative communication is in place to prevent the
QL1-maxim from being violated. In cooperative conversation a violation of this
maxim should cause pause, as it is a cue that some sort of convention might be the
only way to interpret this statement. Grice’s example of this is, “Every nice girl loves
a sailor,” which is an example of hyperbole (Grice 1989, 34). This should caution the
participant listening to this statement. Even if this participant does not know the
convention that Grice is employing, he or she certainly knows that Grice could not
possibly have the evidence to state this confidently. Here, those communicating will
presume things like hyperbole or exaggeration if they reinterpret the statement using
conventions.
A violation of this maxim is probably the most useful to those attempting to
persuade others through conversation. The way in which this is employed will vary,
however, depending on the different cultural norms guiding conversation. A simple
usage of this type of violation appears in the statement “Come to the game; you’ll
have fun.” The facts of whether or not the participant will have fun are clearly not
known to either participant, because it is a predictive statement.
This type of
statement is used to entice the other participant to believe, or do, something the
speaking participant wants. Convincing people to think or do things sometimes has
more to do with rhetoric than with logic; thus, this violation can often be exploited.
However, in suasive conversations, it is often the case that participants are on guard
for these kinds of statements.
Like the QL1-maxim, the QL2-maxim will be violated by those with the
epicurean goal. One example of this is the telling of myths. Often the tellers of
historical events do not have evidence that the actions occurred in the way they are
told. However, this is really insignificant, because if the myths are told to entertain
the listening participants will not be concerned about whether the events are factually
true. The hearers of these stories ought not look at any exaggerations as evidence of
truth; this is clearly not the intention of the stories. The Gricean model clearly fails in
these cases due to the non-cooperative kind of conversation.
4.3 Relation: Respond Relevantly
54
With regards to relation, the third of the four categories that Grice puts
forward, there will be implication conventions referred to by irrelevant responses in
cooperative communication. The common example put forward is the convention of
answering a question with another question that is obviously affirmative. Consider
the following example exchange:
Participant A: Are you a football fan?
Participant B: Is the pope catholic?
Here, the second participant is answering the question by using this particular
convention (obviously the answer to “Is the pope catholic?” is affirmative; therefore,
the answer to “Is participant B a football fan?” is also affirmative). However, if the
first participant is not familiar with this convention, then he or she must presume that
either the second participant is not communicating cooperatively or that the second
participant is intending his statement to be understood under some conventional rules.
Supposing that participant A has no reason to suspect that participant B is not
communicating uncooperatively, he or she may have to inquire as to what participant
B means.
Using irrelevant responses to questions is another of the commonly used
rhetorical devices employed in non-cooperative conversation. The usefulness of this
type of convention is that one may, by not responding relevantly, deceive without
saying anything untrue. In this way, the use of the “some-all” distinction in a noncooperative sense is closely related to this relevance principle, and is probably a
violation both the category of relevance as well as that of quantity. In fact, whenever
one responds irrelevantly to a question posed, one is violating the Q1-maxim,
requiring participants to be as informative as is necessary. Regardless, there are many
clear examples of this type of implicature being used to persuade.
One method of speaking that is used by those who do not want to reveal their
beliefs, but do not want to lie to the person with which they are speaking, is
responding such that there is no need to definitively answer affirmatively or
negatively. Suppose a wife has finished a terrible piece of what is supposed to be
apple pie, which her husband made especially for her. He asks, “Did you enjoy the
pie?”, to which she responds, “I always enjoy a good piece of apple pie.” Here, the
wife has not lied to her husband, the result of which would be very undesirable should
he ever find out. However, she does not want to disappoint her husband either; thus,
weighing the disappointment she will cause him by being honest about his cooking,
55
against the disappointment she would cause him should he find out she has not
answered his question in a relevant manner. She may choose to answer with a
truthful, irrelevant response, saving herself from the trouble of dealing with his
disappointment, if only temporarily.
Epicurean goals need not create maxims regarding relevance. Entertaining
conversations often take their humor or good spirits from their irrelevance. One
illustration of this are witticisms that are entertaining because the solutions to them
are irrelevant. One such witticism is as follows:
What do Alexander the Great and Winnie the Pooh have in common?
Same middle name. (Carr & Greeves 75)
Here, the solution is refreshing (to some) because of the irrelevance of the “the”
connecting the two part of each of their names. Most audience members, when
hearing this question for the first time, will struggle to find some relevant fact
connecting the two before realizing their struggle was in vain when the solution is
revealed to them, unless they understand the joke-telling ritual of question and
punchline. In this case, they will probably not search for the solution knowing it
comes from some clever aspect of the question, or irrelevance in the solution. Many
comedians have been famous for their use of the irrelevant to create humor; notably,
Steven Wright and the comic troupe Stella.
4.4 Manner:
4.4.1 Avoid Unnecessary (or Excessive) Obscurity of Expression
Avoiding unnecessary obscurity of expression is the first of the types of
maxims based within social conventions. Here one must work within the framework
of the conventions in order to understand the unnecessary or excessive aspects of the
statements in question. Supposing one is in a cooperative conversation and obscurity
is used, then there is always the possibility that some social convention is being
employed.
Grice presents the example, “X is meeting a woman this evening”;
implying that the woman X is meeting is not his wife, sister, or other close friend
(Grice 1989, 37). Before presenting this example Grice warns that the generalized
conversational implicature may be controversial “since it is all too easy to treat a
generalized conversational implicature as if it were a conventional implicature” (Grice
1989, 37).
Unfortunately, social conventions must be considered before the
implication could even be interpreted, to understand excessiveness or unnecessarily
56
ambiguous statements.
The implicatures are, therefore, consumed within a
conventional framework, and if translated to another framework they will need to be
changed to suit the new framework’s limits for excessive or necessary levels of
ambiguity.
In suasive conversations excessive obscurity might be beneficial to selling a
product or convincing someone of some claim, etc. For example, suppose a herbal
supplement is advertised as having “health-giving properties”; the excessively vague
language used within the framework of English-speaking societies does not imply that
the product does not have normal health-giving properties. Placebos and non-medical
products can promote health, even though there is no explicit function they provide.
Thus, this message means exactly what it says; the manufacturers want to inform the
consumers that their product has health giving properties, in order to persuade the
consumer to buy the product. Though the proof for these products’ properties is often
in question (snake oil salesmen have profited off of these types of products for
centuries), there is no implication brought about by this use of excessive ambiguity.
Another reason suasive conversation may use excessive ambiguity is to avoid
liability. Insofar as contracts are created by the buying and selling of goods, there is
an incentive for a vendor to used excessively vague language in his or her marketing
when referring to what his or her product will provide, in order to have some plausible
deniability if services cannot be rendered. This type of language is often used in stark
contrast to the legalese used in contracts. This type of language does not necessarily
imply anything other than what is stated, again, in order to protect from liability. In
other words, using excessively vague language allows marketers to claim that they did
not actually advertise things that a consumer may claim a product did not provide.
Epicurean goal-based conversation will not necessarily produce implicatures,
because it is often the case that excessive vagueness is entertaining. For example, the
verbosity used in creative writing is often viewed as beautiful. Poems by Robert
Frost, or ee cummings, use unnecessary vagueness in an attempt to reveal beauty. Art
often revels in its excessive vagueness. Often, the endings to stories are intentionally
vague so as to leave the audience thinking, such as in the film 25th Hour (2002) or
Made in America (2007), the final episode of The Sopranos television series. The
idea of translating examples of art into conversation is tentative at best. However, the
idea of excessive vagueness in art translating to a type of conversational art, as a form
57
of entertainment, should be fairly uncontroversial. This type of conversation will be
non-cooperative, and may be intentionally vague to achieve entertainment.
4.4.2 Avoid Ambiguity
In cooperative conversation, ambiguity should be avoided to prevent potential
confusion of other participants. A classic example of this would be to avoid telling
another participant, when preparing to get money before going to spend the day at the
river, “I will meet you at the bank.” This statement will be confusing because of the
ambiguity of “bank.” Obviously, it could mean river bank or banking institution.
Thus, in cooperative discourse this type of language should be avoided. The example
Grice presents is in regards to the message “I have Sind/sinned” given by a general
who had been ordered to capture the territory of Sind; Grice notes the following:
Whether the straightforward interpretant is also being conveyed seems to
depend on whether such a supposition would conflict with other
conversational requirements, for example, would it be relevant, would it be
something the speaker could be supposed to accept, and so on.
If such
requirements are not satisfied, then the straightforward interpretant is not
being conveyed. If they are, it is. (Grice 1989, 36)
Given the Gricean interpretation, one ought to assume the non-straightforward
meaning when statements are intentionally ambiguous.
This seems quite strict,
though given the cooperative nature assumed by the Gricean conversations it is not
unreasonable. One must at least see the intentional ambiguity as a cue that either the
participant is not being cooperative or that he is referring to some conventional way of
speaking. The argument for social convention over Grice’s strict non-straightforward
interpretation will allow for more leeway for speakers to accidentally engage in minor
ambiguities without confusing their audience with bizarre interpretations.
Ambiguity in seller-consumer based, suasive conversations can be very
beneficial to those who want to convince. Clearly, ambiguous language can be used
to the advantage of marketers. One example of how ambiguity can used to persuade
is in the case of Nike’s advertising slogan. Though usually non-controversial, Nike’s
marketing statement “Just do it” could be construed by some as having some risqué
connotations. Here, the ambiguity may be used to make the products more appealing
to consumers. Still, cultural norms, more often than not, do not allow for ambiguity
to be used to convince. It is often looked upon as tantamount to deception.
58
In epicurean conversations, ambiguity will be the source of the majority of
humorous statements. However, one caveat is that some of the humor that comes
from ambiguous statements is based in cooperative language, e.g. double entendres.
In comedy, there is often the expectation that an ambiguous statement will be used in
order to be funny. Therefore, it is usually assumed that the comedian will use
language that is ambiguous before revealing the punchline, so it must be very subtle.
In this way, the comic conversations are different than those presented by Grice,
which are intentionally ambiguous. In the cooperative conversation the audience
must be aware of the ambiguity when interpreting the statement. Grice states, “We
must remember that we are concerned only with ambiguity that is deliberate, and that
the speaker intends or expects to be recognized by his hearer” (Grice 1989, 35). In
comedy, this ambiguity is disguised. A good example of this is a joke by Demetri
Martin, which starts off with an unambiguous sentence, “I ordered a wake up call the
other day,” which one would be hard pressed to interpret in any other way than how it
is presented; however, when the punchline is revealed the second interpretation is
clearly evident: “The phone rang and a woman’s voice said, ‘What the hell are you
doing with your life’” (Carr & Greeves 104). Here, the comedian goes directly
against cooperative conversation, using unrealized ambiguous sentences to entertain,
rather than to create implicatures.
4.4.3 Avoid Unnecessary Prolixity
Regarding prolixity, one must again note that in order to interpret an
“unnecessary” level, one is already working within a framework of social convention.
In cooperative conversations, a reasonable amount of brevity is very beneficial to
conversation, because an excess of verbiage could be confusing to other participants.
A fairly common example of this is when someone emphasizes a statement by adding
excessive information. Take, for example, a situation in which a friend of someone
working a store wanted some special discount, which may appear as follows:
Participant A: “Can you give your friends free soda?”
Participant B: “Well, I cannot allow anyone I serve any discounts; however, I
am very forgetful, and might accidentally forget someone has not paid for
something. I do feel very distracted today…”
In this example, the second participant is implying that he will give his friend free
soda, by the excessive reference to his forgetfulness. The first participant is tipped off
59
to this by the unexpectedly long answer to his simple question. However, this is not a
strict rule. Suppose the conversation went as follows:
Participant A: “Can you give your friends free soda?”
Participant B: “I can’t allow anyone to have free soda. If I did my boss would
be furious. I wouldn’t have the trust the boss normally grants me around the
register, I certainly wouldn’t get a promotion, and I am not going to risk my
job of three years for something as insignificant as a soda.
Here, the second participant is not implying that he will give his friend free soda. In
fact, he is using the extra verbiage to stress that he cannot. Though one may argue
that the second situation is not an example of excessive prolixity, it is clear that the
excess of verbiage act as cues in both situations. In the first example it acts as a cue
to inform participant A that participant B is using the convention of referring to
forgetfulness to imply that A may get free soda. In the second example, the excessive
prolixity acts as a cue to inform A that B is using the social convention of stressing the
importance of a statement by reemphasizing its points. Thus, while excess does
violate the maxim of not being unnecessarily prolix, it does not have a strict Gricean
style result; rather, it is a cue that an interpretation via social conventions may be
necessary.
In suasive conversation excessive verbiage is often used in order to trick one
of the participants into becoming confused and agreeing to things they might not want
not to agree to. Conmen often employ this technique in order to distract the people
they are taking advantage of whist they commit some act that will end up being
disadvantageous to the victim. Often people, aware that someone is attempting to sell
them something, will simply ignore a person who is attempting to engross them in
obviously excessive language in order to convince them of these things. This type of
conversation is not cooperative and usually fails.
In epicurean conversations excessive use of language is often employed in
order to accentuate the humor of the conversation. Comedian Dennis Miller’s whole
career has been based on his ability to rattle off excessive metaphors and descriptions
of certain events purely to entertain. Comics often use excessive description in order
to intensify the effect of the humor in their conversations without the expectation that
something is being implied by the excessive language; rather, because it is more
entertaining.
60
4.4.4 Avoid Unnecessary Disorder
Grice presents this maxim and Levinson uses it to explain why statements that
use conjunctions tend to present events in the order in which they occur. He uses the
example, “‘John turned the switch and the motor started.’ +> p and then q, p caused q,
John intended p to cause q, etc.” (Levinson 2000, 38). Generally, the former events
temporally precede, or are the causes of, the latter events in English-speaking
communities. This, however, is clearly by convention, as it would not be hard to
imagine a language in which the opposite were true. However, given the social
convention, unnecessary disorder in cooperative language must be interpreted as a cue
intending to communicate something via abnormal means. Examples of disorder in
cooperative conversation within English-speakers conventions are presented by
Davis: “John set a record and cleared 15 feet” (Davis 1998, 50). Gricean theory
would claim that because the mention of the record comes first, then it is the causal
factor or comes temporally before the second event. Under this interpretation one
must assume that John cleared 15 feet because (or after) he set a record. Obviously,
this is the incorrect interpretation of the statement. Thus, the guidelines for this type
of implicature are not strict, as in the Gricean model; rather, they are loose, and are
only violated when the word disorderliness is employed conventionally.
Suasive conversation may use unnecessary disorder in order to convince
participants of something. By exploiting the conventions or ordered speech, a seller
can offer a guarantee to, for example, “pay for shipping the product to have it repaired
and fix your product for free” if one experiences any problems with a certain product,
though the rebate to offset the cost of shipping may come months after the product
has been fixed. This is just one example, but in non-cooperative conversation, one
can violate certain social norms if it is profitable to do so.
Epicurean conversation also does not require that this maxim be held. If the
participants find it entertaining to start inverting conventional word order, then they
are not necessarily implying something in particular; rather, merely enjoying
themselves. An example of this is when children learn wordplay; they may invert
word order to act silly.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter one can see that, in cooperative conversation, violations of
maxims can be logical cues that the statement must be interpreted though the lens of
61
some social convention. Examples to the contrary have been given for the other kinds
of conversation. The Gricean model is quite different from this, stating that the
implicatures are “general psychosocial principles” produced by the violation of
maxims (Davis 1998, 45). Implicatures are based in convention, as Davis points out;
however, since different conversations can have different goals, the cue that comes
from violations of these maxims will only necessarily come when the conversation is
cooperative.
One issue that needs to be noted is Grice’s inclusion of “(4) other items of
background knowledge” in his list of the information needed to work out an
implicature (Grice 1989, 31). This is problematic only if one assumes that this “other
knowledge” includes the implicature conventions. This is very unlikely, however,
since Grice is arguing that maxims are causing the implicatures, rather than acting as
a reference tool. This interpretation would also clash with principle (e) that Sadock
brings up, “Conversational implicata are not carried by what is said, but by the
saying of it” (Sadock 1978, 284). Finally, Davis shows that Grice cannot employ this
type of conventional implicature because his theory infers that “implicatures are
derived from or explained by” maxims (Davis 1998, 35). Thus, even if one adheres to
the broadest sense of the principle of charity, Grice cannot allow for his theory to be
based in conventions. “Other items of background knowledge” probably refers to
more banal information, such as in the example:
A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. (Grice 1989, 32)
The bits of background information Grice believes one needs to know in order to
work out conventions are probably facts like “people usually visit their girlfriends
often,” rather than them needing to know about implicature conventions.
62
Chapter 5: Conclusion
This essay is primarily a criticism of Gricean theory. It first illustrates Gricean
theory and its principles, then shows how the topic of implicature and how Gricean
theory have been dealt with through the years. It presents a new theory that attempts
to solve the problems of the Gricean framework as well as those in Kasher’s and
Davis’ theories. What this theory attempts to create is a goal-based framework for
conversation, thus eliminating the priority of cooperation in Gricean theory; also, it
provides maxims within cooperative conversations, thus creating explanatory power
that Davis lacks, showing why one might know to reinterpret apparently irrational
statements when an implicature is being used.
Finally, it bases implicatures on
convention, eliminating the copious, internal problems of Gricean theory that Davis
points out.
This theory is primarily centered on two points. First, conversation is a goaloriented endeavor and these goals provide different kinds of conversation depending
on the goals involved. Second, implicatures are conventional, but maxims still play a
role in conversation. The goals in conversation presented are the Cooperative Goal,
Suasive Goal, and Epicurean Goal. The Cooperative Goal leads to conversations with
maximized communication.
Cooperative conversations have maxims and these
maxims generally follow those set out by Grice.
persuasion.
The Suasive Goal is that of
Suasive conversations can be broken down into two groups:
conversations with the Seller-Consumer Relationship, and conversations with the
Bargainer Relationship. Seller-consumer based conversations are those in which both
parties know one participant is trying to convince the other to think something or to
do something. Conversations based on the Bargainer Relationship are those in which
two parties are attempting to convince each other of something or to do something.
Finally, the Epicurean Goal is that of pleasure seeking. Epicurean conversations are
those in which both parties are attempting to enjoy themselves, instead of trying to
convince or communicate efficiently.
These kinds of conversation may not be
exhaustive; however, they provide a general framework for exploring the implicatures
that occur in conversation.
Implicatures in conversation, presented here, are conventional. This, however,
does not require the theory of maxims from being discarded. The cooperative maxims
provide for ways in which cooperative participants ought to act in order to efficiently
63
communicate. Other forms of conversation may be created by designating further
maxims. Within a kind of conversation, a violation of relevant maxims will provide a
cue that a statement may be interpreted through a convention. Supposing that the
kind of conversation is not known, maxim violations may inform participants that
certain kinds of conversation are not being engaged in, that the conversation is not
cooperative. The violation of maxims as logical cues differs greatly from the Gricean
theory, which leads those hearing a violation to a specific translation. This is not the
case here; maxim violations merely inform participants that conventional
interpretations might provide rational interpretations of confusing statements.
This theory is more of an amalgamation of theories rather than a sweeping,
new one. Kasher, Hintikka, and Leech have each, to some extent, presented a theory
of conversation based in goals, rather than presenting them as a purely cooperative
endeavor. Though Grice does not present conversation as purely cooperative, the
Cooperative Principle is required for his theory to be used. Others have tried to
present various versions of his theory, but the Gricean model still does not have the
explanatory power of theories like Kasher’s and the one this essay presents; this is due
to its need for the Cooperative Principle as a foundation.
The Cooperative Principle is not inherently flawed; however, it cannot provide
a general account for conversation, because of its limited nature. A general principle
of acting in a rational manner at all times, as Kasher presents, also seems not to reflect
conversation in general. Therefore, this paper presents a theory of conversational
kinds as a middle ground. While there may be a general overarching principle of
rationality guiding conversation, compartmentalizing kinds of conversation will prove
to be more efficient with regards to practical usage. Therefore, providing the four
general kinds of conversation, based on three goals, will be effective in describing
conversation in general. Only within this framework can a theory for conversational
implicature have the explanatory power needed to be applied to conversation in
general.
The primary distinction between the Gricean theory and the goal-oriented
theory of cooperative conversation is in regards to where implicatures are derived.
Grice presents the implications as the natural result of obviously non-cooperative
speech in conversation. This theory presents the violation of maxims as logical cues;
but, rather than presenting a strict interpretation of each maxim, each cue only
informs the listener to refer to some social norm, or convention, with which to
64
interpret the non-straightforward statement. The listener must refer to his or her
(metaphorical) encyclopedia of conventions in order to find the proper interpretation
for the non-rational statement. Though this may often seem automatic, when Grice
presents implicature as an automatic process without reference to social conventions,
he presumes the proper translation is not derived from these conventions.
The
analysis of the example in the previous chapter, the professor’s letter of
recommendation that Grice presents, is an excellent illustration of how Grice does, de
facto, resort to social conventions to explain his theory.
Though many suasive conversations and epicurean conversations follow
cooperative conventions, in addition to the many non-cooperative conventions in
cooperative conversations, the important fact is that they are not necessary. This
makes for a very messy theory, with conventions inundating every aspect of
conversation; however, the efficiency provided by Gricean theory comes with a cost.
If a theory sacrifices explanatory power for neatness, the theory runs the risk of
having a limited accuracy within real-world frameworks. Davis’ counterexamples of
the failure of the Gricean model show its dramatic limitations.
A system of conventional implicature alone is not complete.
There are
requirements to cooperative communication that must be followed. The maxims are
required for rational thinkers within a cooperative framework, because of the rules of
cooperation. The need for maxims within cooperation, however, does not mean that
the Grice presents an adequate theory of explaining how an implicature is worked out.
Davis has a theory of conventional implicatures; however, he does not account for the
logical cues presented by cooperative language. Here, this theory provides a way to
interpret how people can use initially irrational language within a cooperative
framework to inform that a reference to a convention is being made. However, these
maxims, unlike Grice’s, are the minimum required for cooperative communication.
The reduction of the maxims in cooperative communication, in contrast to
Leech and others, is done so with necessity in mind. Here, the theory is translatable
into other cultures without issue. Grice’s theory of conversational implicature may
appear natural to those who possess the same social norms of which Grice makes use.
However, since the Zinacantecos’ culture appears bizarre to the Englishman, one can
assume many of the Gricean maxims will appear bizarre to their culture in the same
way. Thus, the emphasis on logical necessity is warranted. There is more work to be
done understanding the social conventions in English-speaking communities;
65
however, this is job of linguists and cultural anthropologists, though the work of
Levinson and Leech is clearly of linguistic interest.
One important issue that will certainly be raised in the philosophical
community is that of formalism against functionalism.
If there is a formalist
argument supporting non-necessary maxims that this theory excludes, they may need
to be reconsidered.
This theory approaches conversation from a functionalist
perspective; namely, the conversational practices employed by participants are
purposeful goal-oriented endeavors. Though the use of a functionalist perspective
with regards to conversation should not be too controversial, functionalists may
discover counterarguments to the effect of, say, that “some-all” implicatures are
innate. The lack of a “nall,” “not all” type word, may be hardwired; however, until
that can be shown a skeptical approach can, arguably, be adopted.
In conclusion, the theory of conversational implicature that Grice presents is
flawed.
The observations by Kasher and Hintikka must be observed, and the
objections presented by Davis must be answered. While Levinson and Leech present
modifications of Grice’s theory, they are formalizing social conventions rather than
providing a general theory of implicature. Sperber and Wilson’s relevance theory
places too much attention on efficiency, rather than investigating convention like
Davis.
The debate about conversational implicature has usually been about
formalizing conventions, in an attempt to present a simple theory. This work attempts
to forgo simplicity for a more accurate representation of conversation and how
implicature works.
66
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