Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
Pearl Harbor Timeline
 1940 July: U.S. imposes trade sanctions, followed by an embargo, aimed at curbing Japan's military aggression in Asia.
 1941 January: Adm. Yamamoto begins communicating with other Japanese officers about a possible attack on Pearl Harbor.
 Jan. 27: Joseph C. Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan, wires Washington that he has learned that Japan is planning a surprise attack on
Pearl Harbor. No one in Washington believes the information. Most senior American military experts believe the Japanese would attack
Manila in the Philippine Islands if war broke out.
 February: Adm. Husband E. Kimmel assumes command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii. Kimmel and Lt. General Walter C. Short,
commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, prepare for the defense of the islands. They ask their seniors in Washington for
additional men and equipment to insure a proper defense of military instillations.
 April: U.S. intelligence officers continue to monitor Japanese secret messages. In a program code-named Magic, U.S. intelligence uses a
machine to decode Japan's diplomatic dispatches. Washington does not communicate all the available information to all commands,
including Short and Kimmel in Hawaii.
 May: Japanese Admiral Nomura informs his superiors that he has learned Americans were reading his message traffic. No one in Tokyo
believes the code could have been broken. The code is not changed.
 July: Throughout the summer, Admiral Yamamoto trains his forces and finalizes the planning of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
 Sept. 24: The "bomb plot" message from Japanese naval intelligence to Japan's consul general in Honolulu requesting a grid of exact
locations of ships in Pearl Harbor is deciphered. The information is not shared with the Hawaii's Adm. Kimmel and General Short.
 November: Tokyo sends an experienced diplomat to Washington as a special envoy to assist Ambassador Nomura, who continues to seek
a diplomatic solution. Japan wants the U.S. to agree to its southern expansion in Asia diplomatically but if those efforts were unsuccessful,
Japan was prepared to go to war.
 Nov. 16: Submarines, the first units involved in the attack, depart Japan.
 Nov. 26: The main body, aircraft carriers and escorts, begin the transit to Hawaii.
 Nov. 27: Kimmel and Short receive a so-called "war warning" from Washington indicating a Japanese attack, possibly on an American
target in the Pacific, is likely.
 Night of Dec. 6, Morning of Dec. 7: U.S. intelligence decodes a message pointing to Sunday morning as a deadline for some kind of
Japanese action. The message is delivered to the Washington high command before 9 a.m. Washington time, more than 4 hours before the
attack on Pearl Harbor. But the message is not forwarded to the Pearl Harbor commanders and finally arrives only after the attack has
begun.
Supports the charges against Kimmel and Short
Challenges the charges against Kimmel and Short
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
Now that you understand the negotiations, political realities, and actions taken by American decisions makers it is
time to determine if Admiral Kimmel deserved his fate. Create a pie graph that demonstrates the degree to which Admiral
Kimmel and General Short and other factors bear responsibility for the mistakes made prior to Pearl Harbor.
 Information about the planning, execution, and impacts of the attack on Pearl Harbor
 The actions and knowledge of President Roosevelt, General Marshall, Admiral Kimmel, General Short, the
interpreters, etc.
 The impact of communication failures, governmental mistakes, the Japanese, and pure accidental
circumstances.
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
The Translators
Lieutenant Colonel William F. Friedman was a cryptographer working for the US
government. In August 1940, he broke the Japanese diplomatic (Purple) Code. Using a
machine similar to a typewriter, Friedman was able to decode Japanese diplomatic
communications. This decoded information was known as “Magic.” Those who were able
to receive the Magic information were the President, Secretary of State, and the
Secretaries of the Army and Navy. As a result of the broken code, the United States
received all of the Japanese diplomatic messages.
The Naval and Army intelligence offices were notorious for being dramatically
understaffed. As a result there was significantly more work to be done than there we
people to complete the tasks. Compounding the staffing and funding problem was the fact
that intelligence was seen as a dead end for a soldiers career. Few people sought out a
position with the intelligence agencies and those that were assigned looked to quickly be
transferred out. This created turnover that impacted the cohesiveness of the workforce.
Of the many hundreds of people who worked for military and naval intelligence,
perhaps half a dozen in each service were able to take decoded Japanese messages and
make information they considered usable. That was because the codes came out in the
form of syllables that had to be grouped together in a very particular way for the
information to make sense. Perhaps only half of those who were proficient in Japanese
could appreciate the significance of the translated materials. This added up to about three
people in each of the services that could read and accurately translate Japanese messages.
An additional problem may have been created by the way the messages were
handled. Army intelligence translated messages coming in on odd-numbered days of the
week. Naval intelligence handled those on the even numbered days. The Army and Navy
intelligence divisions did not integrate those messages. In the last weeks before war, the
intelligence officers were working sixteen hour days. Frequently they only had time to
partially translate messages because of the volume of work they were being asked to do.
The most proficient translators were the supervisors, but they could not devote their
energies to translation because of other responsibilities.
Historians debate the degree to which problems with the translators played a role in
the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Elmer Barnes and John Toland dispute the role that
confusion played in the intelligence services as a reason for them missing the significance
of various Japanese messages. They believe that enough of the messages clearly
pinpointed Pearl Harbor as the object of the Japanese attack that the disorganized
intelligence services still should have understood the gravity of the situation.
Historians David Kahn and Gordon Prange, and Forrest Pouge disagree. The mass
quantity of information coming into the intelligence agencies was overwhelming.
Intelligence officers were told to translate the most important messages first but were not
trained on how to prioritize the messages. In addition, the lack of coordination between
intelligence divisions in the Army and Navy, combined with the lack of enough officers
trained in Japanese, created a massive backlog of information needing to be decoded and
analyzed. Many messages went untouched for weeks or months.
Complementing the volume of work, lack of coordination, and poor training was the
fact that the intelligence agencies were not aware of how much US-Japanese relations had
broken down in the latter half of 1941 and were not as cognizant of how serious the issue
had become. Finally, many in the intelligence community held the traditional view that if a
Japanese attack were to occur it would happen in the Philippines.
Historian Roberta Wohlstetter writes that “After the event, the Magic decodes
seemed to contain some very obvious clues to a direct Japanese attack on the United
States and Washington’s inability to predict such an attack can easily be made to look like
gross stupidity or negligence or a conspiracy to conceal vital information.” But during
1941, the clues that seem so obvious in hindsight were neither obvious nor known.
Adapted from: Bachrach, Deborah. Great Mysteries: Pearl Harbor-Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press,
Inc., 1989.
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
What role did General George C. Marshall play?
George Marshall was the Army’s Chief of Staff who acted as the advisor to the
Secretary of War and to the President. General Marshall was in charge of planning and
supervising the army’s organization, equipment, and training. He had to make decisions
regarding military strategy….In the days before the attack; General Marshall knew that
negotiations between the United States and Japan had broken down. He knew that
Japanese embassies in Washington and elsewhere were burning diplomatic documents, a
sign that hostilities were about to break out. …General Marshall believed that if Japan did
attack, it would hit the United States military installations in the Philippines first. To
prepare for this, General Marshall increased the size and strength of forces available to
General MacArthur in the Philippines. This was done to the expense of other outpost—
including Pearl Harbor.
On November 27, 1941, under General Marshall’s signature, a message warning of
war (Called the War Warning) was sent to American military outposts throughout the
Pacific Ocean. The message read:
Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort
to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make
aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against
either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by
the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their
naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for
carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa and Continental
Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A
similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and
Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.
On December 6, 1941, a small group of important people in Washington knew that
events were overtaking the United States. They knew through secret sources that tall talks
were ended between the United States and Japan. In addition, they knew that a message
was to be delivered on Sunday at 1:00 PM Washington time from the Japanese
Ambassador. General Marshall was the only person in the group, which included the
president, cabinet members, and military leaders, who did not have access to this
important information. It was not until 11:30 am on December 7, 1941 that General
Marshall received access to this information.
Upon receiving the information on the morning of December 7, 1941, The Chief of
Staff wrote out a longhand message to all Pacific commanders warning them to be on alert
for an enemy attack. Marshall handed the message to an aid to take to the Army message
center for coding and transmittal. He told the aide to give special priority to the message
to be delivered to General MacArthur in the Philippines. The message was marked
“routine delivery” to Hawaii…. Because of atmospheric interference, the usual army radio
could not be used. Instead the operator sent the message by Western Union Telegraph
service. It was delayed in San Francisco and did not reach Hawaii until 8:30 am, after the
Japanese attack had begun…
Many historians have criticized the actions and inaction of General Marshall prior to
the attack on Pearl Harbor. In front of a Congressional Committee Marshall testified that
he had provided full warnings to his subordinates at Pearl Harbor. Marshall believed that
the “war warning message of November 27 was as specific an alert as a commanding
officer would require…President Harry Truman, Secretary of War Henry Stimson both
defended the actions of General Marshall. In addition, historian Cabel Phillips defends
Marshall’s behavior. He writes that as soon as General Marshall saw the dispatch
regarding the cessation of negations between Japan and the United States, he recognized
its significance and alerted the military installations that could possibly be impacted.
Adapted from: Bachrach, Deborah. Great Mysteries: Pearl Harbor-Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press,
Inc., 1989.
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
Who was General Short and what role did he play?
General Walter Short was the commanding Officer of the United States Navy based in Pearl Harbor
Hawaii. In command of the entire naval presence in Hawaii, Short was very concerned about possible
sabotage by the Japanese. On November 27, 1941, General Short received the War Warning message
from General Marshall. The message read:
Negotiations with Japan appear to have been terminated to all practical purposes with only
the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue
talks. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If
hostilities cannot, repeat, cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the
first overt act. This policy should not, repeat, should not be construed as restricting your
course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese actions you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but
these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat, not, to alarm civilian population to
disclose intent…Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers.
General Short and his Chief of Staff read the message several times and decided that the United
States Government wanted to avoid doing anything that would provide an excuse for war. Since Short
only had six B-17 bombers at his disposal for long distance reconnaissance, he assumed others were
conducting long-range surveillance. All he did in response to Marshall’s war warning was prepare Pearl
Harbor from sabotage. To do so, General Short ordered that all ammunition be locked away for
safekeeping. He then had all the airplanes placed wingtip to wingtip—a protective formation—so that he
could guard more planes with fewer soldiers. This was done to protect the planes for sabotage. General
Short then ordered all of his troops to be alert against possible sabotage. On November 28th, General
Short wrote to General Marshall informing him of the measures taken at Pearl Harbor. General Marshall
never responded to General Short’s report. ( See Below)
A second warning to prepare for subversive activities and sabotage in Hawaii was
issued to General Short on November 28th by United States Army Adjutant General Emory
Adams (See below)
In his own defense, in 1946 General Short testified before Congress about the attack. Unlike some of his
predecessors in Hawaii, Short was more concerned with sabotage from Japanese-Americans on Oahu, and this led
to Army planes parked in such a way as to make them more vulnerable to aerial attack.. In explaining his reasons
for his instituting an alert against sabotage only, General Short has stated:






That the alert message (War Warning) he received on November 27 contained nothing directing him to be
prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack on Hawaii;
that the dispatch was a "do-don't" message which conveyed to him the impression that the avoidance of
war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident
might occur in Hawaii which Japan would regard as an overt act;
that he was looking to the Navy to provide him adequate warning of the approach of a hostile force,
particularly through distant reconnaissance which was a Navy responsibility; and
that instituting higher level alerts would have seriously interfered with the training mission of the
Hawaiian Department.
that he received other messages after the November 27 dispatch emphasizing measures against sabotage
and subversive activities;
that “there was within the War Department an abundance of information which was vital but was not
funneled to him. The War Department had nine days between the War Warning and the attack to tell me
that my actions were not what they wanted. I accepted their silence as a full agreement with the actions
taken.”
Historian Gordan Prange argues that it was General George Marshall’s fixation with a Japanese attack on the
American base in the Philippines that contributed to General Short not being prepared for an attack but instead for
sabotage. This fixation weakened General Short’s ability to prepare because the General Marshall saw Hawaii as of
secondary importance and that sabotage was the worry in Hawaii not an all-out Japanese attack.
Adapted from: Deborah Bachrach, Great Mysteries: Pearl Harbor-Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press,
Inc., 1989.
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
Was secret information withheld from key decision makers?
In the year prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, there was a tremendous amount of
intelligence being intercepted and decoded by the United States Army and Naval
intelligence units. Lieutenant Colonel William F. Friedman was a cryptographer working
for the US government. In August 1940, he broke the Japanese diplomatic (Purple) code.
Using a machine similar to a typewriter, Friedman was able to decode Japanese diplomatic
communications. This decoded information was known as “Magic.” Those who were able
to receive the Magic information were the President, Secretary of State, and the
Secretaries of the Army and Navy. As a result of the broken code, the United States
received all of the Japanese diplomatic messages. Hawaii was denied access to one of the
Purple decoding machines and thus any message intercepted in Hawaii had to be send to
Washington to be deciphered. Thus, Kimmel and Short had t trus that Washington would
inform them of any important intelligence from those intercepts.
The question is why this information was not shared with Admiral Kimmel and General
Short.
On September 24, 1941, the "bomb plot" message from Japan Naval Intelligence to
Japan’s consul general in Honolulu was decoded. The text was:
"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to your abbreviating
as much as you like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so
important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have
you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.)"
Despite the information requested in the Bomb Plot Message the intelligence was
not shared with Admiral Kimmel or General Short. After the war, Admiral Kimmel and
General Short claimed that the messages were deliberately withheld for the Hawaiian
command. Kimmel told one Congressional committee that “I can say without any
reservation whatsoever that that it would have changed my ideas completely and every
one of my staff: to have known of Japanese consular reports on the pattern of battleship
berthing in the harbor. Lt. Commander Charles C. Hiles, an intelligence agent during the
war believes that the “first bomb plot message and the consulate’s reply tells the whole
story…Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet’s base, this intelligence
should have been appreciated and supplied to the Hawaiian command for their
assistance.” These thoughts are corroborated by General Short. He testified in a 1946
congressional hearing that his planes would not have been destroyed on the airfields if he
had been informed of the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations and the “bombplot” message. Short believed, as did Kimmel, that they were kept in the dark so they could
be made the scapegoats for the attack.
Historian Edward Layton writes that if “Kimmel had known what Washington knew
all along, he and his staff would have acted differently.” Layton believes that context is an
essential factor in transferring information into intelligence and Kimmel was not provided
with the proper context. If Kimmel and been informed all along, he would have been able
to protect the fleet. Historian Gordan Prange attributes the disaster to a
misunderstanding. He suggests that there was not plot involved in the failure to convey
information to Pearl Harbor commanders. He believes that people in Washington simply
did not understand the significance of the messages. “IF Washington is to be condemned,”
argues Prange, “it is for failure to evaluate properly what information they did have.”
Not everyone though blamed the officers in Washington for not sending the bomb
plot message to Hawaii. Admiral Stark told a joint congressional committee, “There was
literally a mass of material coming in. We knew the Japanese appetite was almost
insatiable for detail in all reports. These dispatches might have been put down as just
another example of their great attention to detail.”
Adapted from: Bachrach, Deborah. Great Mysteries: Pearl Harbor-Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press,
Inc., 1989.
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
What role did naval officers play?
Admiral Harold Stark was the chief of Naval Operations in Washington and was at the very top of
the navy hierarchy in 1941. He answered only to the Secretary of Navy, Frank Knox, for all aspects of
American naval operations all over the world….Admiral Husband “Hubby” E. Kimmel was Commander in
Chief of the U.S. Naval Fleet. He was in charge of all operations of the Hawaiian fleet: repairs, training,
and readiness for war. He was also responsible for the safety of the fleet while it was at sea. Kimmel
reported directly to General Stark…Admiral Richard Kelly Turner was one of Stark’s subordinates in
charge of war plans….Turner believed that Japan would attack Russia, not the United States. He also
erroneously believed that the officers at Pearl Harbor had access to the secret Japanese information that
was available in Washington. Turner convinced Admiral Stark that this was true…He never revealed to
Kimmel that Washington had gained access to secret Japanese information. When negotiations virtually
ended between Japan and the United States, Stark did not inform Kimmel. Turner told Stark that Kimmel
already knew. The only warning Stark sent to Kimmel was the following War Warning message on
November 27:
This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking
toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move
by Japan is expected in the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese
troops and organization of the naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition
against the Philippines, Thai or Kra peninsular, or possibly Borneo. Execute an
appropriate defensive deployment.
The message did not mention Pearl Harbor as a possible target for attack so Stark did not order
mobilization of the fleet, or order air reconnaissance. General Stark believed that no further warnings
were necessary since Kimmel could best determine how to deploy his forces in light of the secret
information Turner insisted was available to him….On Sunday morning, December 7, Admiral Stark
arrived at his office in no apparent rush. He read the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message for
himself and then the fourteenth which had just been decoded and translated. It indicated that all
relations between Japan and the United States would be broken. Then came the ominous message the
Japanese ambassadors would deliver this message to the American government at precisely 1 p.m.
eastern standard time, or 8 a.m. Pearl Harbor time. Stark discussed with his staff what steps he should
take…Nevertheless, Stark saw no need to instruct Kimmel in Hawaii to take any precautions. Stark spoke
late in the morning with General Marshall. Only then did he agree to be associated with a message being
sent to all Pacific commanders regarding possible hostile Japanese actions. That message arrived too late
to avert disaster…
Historian Gordon Prange believes that much of what happened in the Navy Department was a
result of Stark’s reliance on Turner. Prange writes that Turner’s strong, strident, and aggressive
personality dominated Stark. Turner, Prange believes, helped turn Stark’s attention away from Pearl
Harbor and toward Russia. The chief of naval operations was thus looking in the wrong direction and
missed important clues…He writes that Stark could easily have discovered that Kimmel was not aware of
all the secret intelligence available in Washington. Stark had only to consult with his own subordinates to
find that out. But he did not do so, Stark thus failed in his responsibility toward the United States. The
Navy court of inquiry also expressed this view. It stated that Stark’s prime obligation was to keep his
subordinate commanders, “particularly those in distant areas, constantly supplied with information.” A
1945 congressional committee found that Start was “so obsessed by an executive complex” that he could
not besmirch his dignity by stooping to determine what was going on and not going on in his
organization…In December 1941 President Roosevelt appointed a commission to investigate culpability
for Pearl Harbor.
In 1942 the Roberts Commission announced its conclusion, finding Stark’s actions above reproach.
It placed blame for the tragedy entirely with Admiral Kimmel’s Hawaiian command. The Roberts
Commission found that Stark had been in regular contact with Kimmel: He had sent out numerous
warnings besides the November 27 “war warning”; and he provided Kimmel with sufficient information
to enable a competent commander to take defensive precautions in time to protect the fleet.
Historian Leonard Baker also defends Stark; Baker suggests that there was no lack of information
or lack of contact between Washington and the naval base in Pearl Harbor. The Hawaiian commanding
officer had been ordered to be ready for the outbreak of hostilities at any moment. According to Baker,
Stark should not be blamed for Kimmel’s failure to protect the fleet. Baker points out that Stark had
deliberately out the words “war warning” at the top of the November 27 message. This was intended to
“accentuate the gravity of the situation” facing the United States in its relation with Japan…During his
year in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel developed the Pacific fleet into a fine fighting machine. He believed the
fleet’s job was to attack the enemy at the outbreak of hostilities. Each man had to be fully trained to
perform his task to perfection….Messages from Washington and the removal of most of his B-17 Flying
Fortress bombers to the Philippines convinced Kimmel that Pearl Harbor would not be attacked. The
November 27 “war warning” confirmed his belief. It did not mention Hawaii. So Kimmel made the
serious error of not insuring long range reconnaissance by the few patrol airplanes he had. Instead he
increased patrol by his ships of the eaters around Oahu, the island on which Pearl Harbor was located.
Kimmel and his superiors in Washington believed the biggest threat to Hawaii was from Japanese
submarines…Kimmel did not have access to the Japanese secret codes but his did have a very able staff of
intelligence officers. Kimmel and his staff agreed that information they received from Washington did
not suggest the need for an alert of for the fleet to be sent to sea. Nor did there seem to be reason to send
out the few planes left in Hawaii to look for the Japanese fleet…On January 23, 1942, the Roberts
Commission…told that Admiral Kimmel, along with General Short, was responsible for the country’s
humiliation. Admiral Kimmel was removed from his post at Pearl Harbor….Kimmel charged that
Washington failed to give him available information. It had also kept him short of supplies, particularly
airplanes. He believed that the navy department had used him as a scapegoat to avoid acknowledging
public responsibility for its own errors. He hinted that people in high places had been involved in a major
cover-up…Historian John Toland agrees that the admiral was denied vital information. He also contends
that the November 27 message urged Kimmel to do nothing that could be seen as warlike.
Historian Harry Elmer Barnes also comes to Kimmel’s defense. He argues that Kimmel could not
have reacted appropriately to the war message. Kimmel’s superiors in Washington failed to give the
admiral information which would have made that warning make sense in Hawaii. Hawaii was denied
access to one of the Purple decoding machines and thus any message intercepted in Hawaii had to be
send to Washington to be deciphered. Thus, Kimmel and Short had t trus that Washington would inform
them of any important intelligence from those intercepts.
The admiral told various investigative committees he had far too few planes to conduct a full
sweep of all approaches to Pearl Harbor by a Japanese attack force. He indicated that in the six months
before the attack, he had repeatedly asked for more planes. All these requests had been denied. Kimmel
reported that when the carrier force under his command left the harbor, he tried to keep the few planes
left to close the base…Historian Richard Collier wrote that Kimmel literally had “begged for 250
reconnaissance planes” but that his request had been turned down in Washington.
Adapted from: Bachrach, Deborah. Great Mysteries: Pearl Harbor Opposing Views. San Diego: Greenhaven Press, 1989.
Justice Delivered or Miscarried: Admiral Kimmel and Pearl Harbor
Did the United States Miss Important Intelligence?
American intelligence gathering was not as advanced as their British allies.
Nevertheless, a number of important pieces of intelligence were presented to United
States authorities prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. In each instance the intelligence
was deemed unreliable, untrustworthy, or could not be corroborated with other pieces of
information and was thus ignored.

January 27, 1941, Dr. Ricardo Shreiber, the Peruvian envoy in Tokyo told Max
Bishop, third secretary of the US embassy that he had just learned from his
intelligence sources that there was a war plan involving a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor. Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador to Japan, sent the state department a
very early warning about Japanese intentions. Grew learned from a Peruvian
diplomat--through a Japanese cook working in the embassy in Tokyo--that Japan
intended to attack the United States. This information was forwarded to
Washington, DC on January 27, 1941. After a limited investigation, American
intelligence dismissed the rumor as unfounded gossip. Soon after, a British spy
presented information to the Federal bureau of Investigation (FBI) that the Japanese
were interested in the schedules of ships into Hawaii. FBI agents did not trust the
British agent and thus dismissed this warning as speculation rather than fact.

July 10, 1941 - US Military Attaché Smith-Hutton at Tokyo reported Japanese Navy
secretly practicing aircraft torpedo attacks against capital ships in Ariake Bay. The
bay closely resembles Pearl Harbor.

July - The US Military Attaché in Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were
constructing special small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl
Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from
Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and
submerging.

August 10, 1941, the top British agent, code named "Tricycle", Dusko Popov, told
the FBI of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor and that it would be soon. The FBI
told him that his information was "too precise, too complete to be believed. The
questionnaire plus the other information you brought spell out in detail exactly
where, when, how, and by whom we are to be attacked. If anything, it sounds like a
trap." He also reported that a senior Japanese naval person had gone to Taranto to
collect all secret data on the attack there and that it was of utmost importance to
them. The info was given to Naval IQ.

Early in the Fall, Kilsoo Haan, an agent for the Sino-Korean People's League, told
Eric Severeid of CBS that the Korean underground in Korea and Japan had positive
proof that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor before Christmas. Among
other things, one Korean had actually seen the plans. In late October, Haan finally
convinced US Senator Guy Gillette that the Japanese were planning to attack in
December or January. Gillette alerted the State Department, Army and Navy
Intelligence and FDR personally.

24 September 1941, the "bomb plot" message in J-19 code from Japan Naval
Intelligence to Japan’s consul general in Honolulu requesting grid of exact locations
of ships pinpointed for the benefit of bombardiers and torpedo pilots was
deciphered. Chief of War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark
repeatedly kept it and warnings based on it prepared by Safford and others from
being passed to Hawaii. The chief of Naval Intelligence Captain Kirk was replaced
because he insisted on warning Hawaii. The bomb plots were addressed to "Chief of
3rd Bureau, Naval General Staff", marked Secret Intelligence message, and given
special serial numbers, so their significance couldn't be missed. There were about
95 ships in port. The text was:
"Strictly secret.
"Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines
insofar as possible:
"1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five subareas (We have no objections to
your abbreviating as much as you like.)
"Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
"Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island.
(This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
"Area C. East Loch.
"Area D. Middle Loch.
"Area E. West Loch and the communication water routes.
"2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor
(these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes
briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more
vessels along side the same wharf.)"

October 1941 - Soviet spy Richard Sorge, informed Kremlin that Pearl Harbor
would be attacked within 60 days. Moscow informed him that this was passed to the
US. Interestingly, all references to Pearl Harbor in the War Department's copy of
Sorge's 32,000 word confession to the Japanese were deleted.
In hindsight it appears that there was more than enough intelligence to point to an
attack on Pearl Harbor. Historians remind us that this intelligence was part of millions of
snippets of information. The information was evaluated relative to other pieces of
intelligence--some of which indicated a Japanese attack on Panama or the Philippines.
Adapted from: Bachrach, Deborah. Great Mysteries: Pearl Harbor-Opposing Viewpoints. San Diego: Greenhaven Press,
Inc., 1989.