Actors in Transition:
Jatropha Initiatives in Indonesian Villages
Submitted to Innovation and sustainability Transitions in Asia Conference
Yuti A. Fatimah
PhD Student
The Twente Centre for Studies in Technology and Sustainable Development (CSTM)
University of Twente
y.arianifatimah@utwente.nl
Abstract
This paper elaborates the concept of transition using seven functions of
innovations systems (Hekkert et al, 2007; Negro et al., 2007) and interaction
(Raven & Verbong, 2009). To test those concepts, two cases about Jatropha
initiatives in Indonesia are presented. The first looks at the dynamic of a local
entrepreneur in building his network to perform the functions, while the second
observes a multi-national company as the main actor. In this paper, I show that
transition follow specific patterns namely continue and discontinue transition
where the first is a subset of the second. The first type of transition can be
understood by following steps in the seven functions, while the second, can be
understood by seeing the interaction between different socio-technical system
although it result cannot be predicted. I argue that the sources of uncertainty in
discontinue transition are: (i) interaction between two or more socio-technical
system each of which follow the continue transition; and (ii) interaction between
the socio-technical system with different scale. Additionally, through the concept
of irreversibility (Callon, 1991), I show the durability of the socio-technical system
is determined by the type of relation between the actors, whether it is
complementary or substitutability.
Keywords: interaction, Jatropha, seven functions, socio-technical system,
transition
1. Introduction
During the last couple of years, the issue of sustainability has attracted policy makers,
scientists, and scholars to promote transition to the desired situation. However as the
range of actors become wider, transition to the desired situation not only becomes
difficult because it has to accommodate various interests, but also because the boundary
that form actors’ action keeps on changing. To accommodate this dynamic, Geels (2005)
defined system innovation as ‘a transition from one socio-technical system to another (p.
2)’.
By taking the definition above, transition can be understood in the context of
system innovation, or in other words, it promotes change on one hand, and conserves
certain roles in the other. To understand how system innovation may accommodate these
two poles, I offer two types of transition to explain change and adopt the concept of
irreversibility introduced by Callon (1991) to understand conservation. The two types used
in this paper are continues and discontinue transition. The first focus on the dynamic
inside the socio-technical system elaborated using seven functions of innovation system
(Hekkert et al., 2007; Negro et al., 2007) as follows (i) entrepreneurial activities; (ii)
knowledge development; (iii) knowledge diffusion through networks; (iv) guidance of the
search; (v) market formation; (vi) resources mobilization; and (vii) creation of
legitimacy/counteract resistance. While the second focus on the interaction between
different socio-technical systems which partly built upon the work of Raven and Verbong
(2009).
While to understand how certain innovation failed to change the socio-technical
regime, I use the concept of irreversibility. Callon (1991) said that the degree of
irreversibility depends on:
(i) the extent to which it is subsequently impossible to go back to a point where that
translation was only one amongst other; and (ii) the extent to which it shapes and
determines subsequent translations (p. 150).
This concept matches with function 7 where innovation system irreversibility is
determined by its ability to create legitimacy or counteract resistance.
To see how those different concepts may be used to explain system innovation, this
paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 presents two cases of Jatropha initiatives in
Indonesia. The first looks at the dynamic of a local entrepreneur in building his network to
perform the functions, while the second observes a multi-national company as the main
actor. Section 3 analyses the case study using the concept of seven functions of innovation
system, interaction, and irreversibility. Section 4 elaborates the concept in the previous
section in the context of transition. Section 5 is concluding remarks.
2. Jatropha Development in Indonesia
Jatropha program in Indonesia was started in September 2003 after New Energy
and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO) Japan asked Indonesian
Forestry Agency about the possibilities of Jatropha plantation in large scale (Octavianus,
2007). The assessment succeeded in stimulating the first trial plantation in 2 ha land
owned by West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) local government. To test the relation between the
planting method and Jatropha yield, the trial used plant cuttings method and seeds.
However, according to Nanang Samudra, Regional Secretary of NTB, before jatropha was
being promoted as energy crops, local communities in the area has used it as toothache
reliever and fuel for traditional torch since 1980s. Although “we cannot say the
development is economically success because no institution or individual care about the
development of Jatropha seriously”, he said.1
In January 2004, NEDO in cooperation with Agency for the Assessment and
Application of Technology (BPPT), Indonesian Forestry Agency and Department of Energy
and Mineral Resources conducted an International Workshop on Biomass and Clean Fuel
Power Plant. Three months after the workshop, NEDO agreed to fund a two-year project
entitled ‘Jatropha Oil Utilization for Power Generation in Remote Area’ (Octavianus,
2007). The project involved Mitsubishi Research Institute, Kyushu Electric Power, Institute
of Technology Bandung (ITB)2, and NTB local government (Manurung, 2007). As part to see
the Jatropha oil performance as diesel fuel, three tests were being conducted: (i) engine
test at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, (ii) National Geography Jatropha Expedition 2006, and
(iii) durability test on caterpillar engine.
The first test was conducted by comparing the performance of straight jatropha oil
(BD 100), diesel-Jatropha oil (BD 50), and diesel oil (K100). Based on the experiment, BD
100 gave the highest pressure in fuel pipe, while K100 gave the highest pressure in
cylinder. The next test was to see the feasibility of Jatropha oil utilization as diesel fuel.
Similar with the first, three types of oil were tested in the form of car road show with
route Atambua (East Nusa Tenggara), Denpasar (Bali), Bandung (West Java), and Jakarta.
The road show which approximately took 3,200 km was supported by National Geographic
Indonesia, Biotechnology Research Center ITB, and BioChem Prima International Inc. In
1
Minutes of Meeting of Provincial Workshop in Mataram, Lombok, NTB, 29 October 2007 (see GFA Report,
2008)
2 One of ITB’s researcher, Robert Manurung has started research about Jatropha since 1991 (see “Robert
Manurung: Jarak Itu Berkah untuk Indonesia”, Kompas 8 April 2007)
several provincial capitals, the road show contingent was greeted by the head of the local
district. At the end of the journey, Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
received the contingent in Jakarta by giving them a closing speech about national
government position to support biofuel development in Indonesia. The third test was
conducted in the laboratory by involving partner from industry.
Beside research on the technical aspect of Jatropha, social and legal activities
were being conducted to promote its development. In May 2005 for example, Robert
Manurung together with Indonesian Farmers’ Association (HKTI), one of the biggest Moslem
group in Indonesia (Nahdlatul Ulama), and Institute of Agricultural Bogor (IPB) proclaimed
their commitment to support Jatropha curcas as a national program. To trigger Jatropha
commercialization, two state-owned enterprises and one government agency planted
Jatropha curcas in August 2005. At the national level, support emerged in the form of
national declaration to alleviate poverty through biofuel development. The declaration
was signed by eight ministers and other stakeholders in October 2005, several days after
Indonesian government increase the oil price.
Year 2006 became the climax of biofuel development in Indonesia. In early 2006,
Indonesian government issued the Presidential Decree No. 5/2006 about National Energy
Mix sets the target that by 2025, 5% of the national energy need is supplied by biofuel
products. Several months later, a Presidential Instruction No.1/2006, defines the objective
as the “Supply and Utilization of Bio-fuel as Alternative Fuel.” To mobilize resources, the
Presidential Decree No. 10/2006 sets on stage “The National Team for Bio-fuel
Development to Accelerate Poverty and Unemployment Reduction.” As strategy,
Indonesian government set three tracks for biofuel development namely energy selfsufficient village, regional biofuel development, and special biofuel zone (Yusgiantoro,
2007). From those tracks, Jatropha activities were arranged under the first track.
However, in promoting Jatropha, the national government through Biofuel National Team
and the scientists placed the crop as an economic commodity. According to Manurung,
“Jatropha oil can increase people’s welfare, especially in marginal land. If each farmer
get the access to manage 3 ha of critical land where each ha can be used to plant 2,500
Jatropha tress, with productivity 10,000 kilogram per ha (per year) and the Jatropha seed
can be sold with price 500 rupiah (0.056 US$) per kilogram, a farmer can get an additional
income 1.25 million rupiah per month only from Jatropha seeds. This number can increase
if the farmers develop derived products from the crop.”3
These basic assumptions create problems when farmers were being asked to
consume Jatropha for their own purpose instead of selling it (Amir et al., 2008). ‘Farmers
are attracted by unreasonably high yield and price expectations. Some farmers expect the
same price currently paid for good seeds for propagation (i.e. as much as 40,000 IDR/kg
for IP seed) for their harvested production’ (GFA, 2008:48). The second problem emerged
when farmers did not get the productivity as promoted. According to the Second Secretary
of Bio-fuel National Team who is also a researcher in BPPT, suspects that the prediction
was based on an immature calculation, “The information comes from a scientist that
cultivates Jatropha curcas in a small area. The calculation can be inaccurate for bigger
plantations.”4 Correction about Jatropha also came from the feasibility study report
entitled “Development of Jatropha curcas Oil for Bio-energy in Rural Areas”5. In contrast
with the main claim stating Jatropha can grow in many climate zones and on marginal
sites, the study reports that Jatropha has a minimal rainfall requirement to survive which
is 300 mm. In dry season, it can survive but does not produce oil seeds.6 According to
3
See “Minyak Jarak Pengganti Solar”, Kompas, 15 Maret 2005.
Interview of Unggul Prayitno with Jurnal Nasional, 6 February 2008.
5 The report was conducted by GFA Envest Consultant, a company which based in Hamburg, with support from
Indonesian government through the Ministry of Agriculture proposed to be included in the Blue Book and to be
financed from grant funds provided by the German Government.
6 It requires a minimum precipitation of 600 mm to produce fruits, and a favourable distribution of water,
GFA, 2008
4
Suhari, head of forest community (LMDH) in Tanjungharjo village, Grobogan, Central Java,
Jatropha seed that he planted did not give much fruit. This situation was worsened by the
fact that Jatropha fruit did not ripe on the same time resulting it as a labour-intensive
fruit. With price 1400 Rupiah per kilogram for dry seed, Suhari chose to withdraw his
involvement in Jatropha plantation7.
Another reason why farmers withdrew their involvement was disconnection
between farmers and business groups arose. A biodiesel plant in Tanjungharjo village
owned by the state-owned enterprise has never been operated since its first opening
ceremonial. The same situations occurred in Mandalasari village, West Java and areas
where international private sector that had a purchase agreement did not continue their
involvement with tangible investment (Amir et al., 2008; GFA, 2008; Yuliar et al., 2006).
Initially, the Biofuel National Team designed state electricity of Indonesia, PLN and stateowned oil company of Indonesia, Pertamina as stand by purchaser. However until 2010,
the biomass used for biodiesel mix was made of palm oil (Kusdiyana, 2010). To see how
the Jatropha’s actors response to these dynamics, seven functions of innovation system is
used to elaborate two cases. The first looks at a local entrepreneur in Alas, West Nusa
Tenggara while the second observe a multi-national company in Grobogan, Central Java.
Local Entrepreneur in Alas, NTB
As mentioned above, involvement of the local government of NTB in biofuel
program was started in 2003 after NEDO came to the region. According to Regional
Secretary of NTB, there was two occasions stimulated the development, the Governor’s
visit to Japan where he brought back a pressing machine, and secondly, through Jatropha
road show in 2006.8 Beside accidental event, Jatropha development continuity in NTB was
determined by NEDO’s fund stimulating new dynamics in the area. Ibrahim, a biodiesel
researcher originating from NTB was one of the actors who emerged from these dynamics.
Started in 2003 when he was still a bachelor student in National Institute of
Technology (ITENAS), Bandung, West Java, Ibrahim joined ITB’s Biodiesel Research Group.
His involvement as a last year Mechanical Engineering student in the group was not only to
take care of research about biodiesel machine, but also to supply Jatropha from his
birthplace in NTB. Beside Ibrahim who played double roles, Tatang H. Soerawidjaja, a
senior researcher in the group also played as a policy advocate. In 2001, Soerawidjaja
promoted the importance of biofuel development to Indonesian policy makers. His actions
succeeded in forming Biodiesel Forum of Indonesia a year later, involving various
stakeholders from government agencies, research institutes and private sector. On the
same year, Soerawidjaja also established a joint research with Rekayasa Industri, a stateowned company under the scheme of RAPID. Results from this joint research was realized
in the form of biodiesel plant in Adolina, North Sumatra which built by Ganesha Energy 77,
a cooperation formed by ITB’s alumni year 1977.
In 2009, Ibrahim brought the biodiesel technology developed in the research group
to his birthplace through a company he built named Industri Tanaman Energi (ITE). With
funding partly from Indosat, a telecommunication company that paid the biodiesel in
advance, Ibrahim had the capital to build a biodiesel plant. In the contract between
Indosat and ITE, Indosat agrees to buy 33,000 liter for 9,800 Rupiah (1.09 US$) per liter9.
This price did not cover the transportation cost from the plant to the Base Transceiver
Station (BTS) for 3,000 Rupiah per liter in Lombok and Sumbawa area, NTB. Besides acting
as biodiesel buyer, Indosat under Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) scheme donate
screw presses to 25 farmer’s groups in NTB.
To support the continuation of the biodiesel production with capacity 1,000 liter
per week, Ibrahim formed Setia coop. The cooperation aims to manage Jatropha
7
8
9
Interview with Suhari in his house in Tanjungharjo, Central Java, 9 August 2010.
Minutes of Meeting of Provincial Workshop in Mataram, Lombok, NTB, 29 October 2007 (GFA Report, 2008)
Interview with Ibrahim via email, 16 January 2010.
plantation by involving 250 farmers and covering 1,200 ha land in Sumbawa Island. The
biodiesel production also succeeded in creating job for 12 people who work in the
biodiesel plant. However, given the declining of international oil price, the current
biofuel became less competitive, as consequence, Indosat returned its energy
consumption to fossil fuel. This situation created instability for ITE.
Multi-National Company in Grobogan, Central Java
Jatropha plantation in Grobogan district was started in 2006 when Energi Hijau
Lestari (Enhil), a state-owned company below RNI10, entered the area. Karnadi, head of Sri
Rejeki farmer’s group in Bandungsari village, Ngaringan said that his entanglement with
the program was formalized through a contract between Sri Rejeki group and Enhil stating
Enhil commitment to purchase the Jatropha produced by the farmers. This agreement was
followed by Jatropha seed distribution by the company where farmers received it for free.
Beside Karnadi and his group, there were 21 other farmers’ groups that cooperated with
Enhil, each of which got 2.5 ha land. To show it seriousness in developing Jatropha, Enhil
built a biodiesel plant in Tanjungharjo village, Ngaringan and gave Jatropha stove to the
farmers’ groups.
According to Hartono, Director of Enhil, the business model from this cooperation
was through zero-waste concept. The company would buy Jatropha for 700 Rupiah per
kilogram or 700-1000 Rupiah per kilogram if the seeds have been peeled, processing it at
the cost of 500 Rupiah per liter, and then sell the Jatropha oil to the farmers for 1500
Rupiah per liter. This price was much cheaper than kerosene reached 2600 Rupiah per liter
at that moment. To add the profit value to his company, Enhil was planning to develop a
derivative product from the Jatropha waste which according to Hartono can be used as
material for soap, briquette, and medicine.
On the opening ceremonial of Enhil’s biodiesel plant in February 2007, Yudhoyono
promised to give grant of 10 billion Rupiah to 15 farmers’ groups as an initial capital to
develop Jatropha11. The huge amount of grant soon boosted Jatropha plantation in
Ngaringan sub-district. However until August 2010, Suhari, head of forestry community
named Tanjungharjo Manunggal who lived approximately 500 meters from Enhil’s factory,
did not get any rupiah from the incentive promised12. This situation was worsening by the
fact that Enhil had never operated. According to Suhari, the company only bought his
Jatropha crops once. Additionally, a year after the opening ceremony of the factory, no
activity was seen. Therefore, he withdrew his involvement in Jatropha plantation.
Setio Utomo, head of farmers’ group in Ngarap-arap village, Ngaringan sub-district
has different story. His involvement in Jatropha plantation was started in November 2008
through BUMN Peduli initiative. In performing its duties, BUMN Peduli asked the farmers’
group to make a proposal consist of farmers’ identity card to indicate their commitment in
Jatropha plantation. After the proposal has been accepted, the farmers received seeds
from BUMN Peduli. In each phase such as planting, maintaining and harvesting, the
farmers got money based on the number of stems in the field. To control all of these
activities, BUMN Peduli hired a field supervisor with responsibility to calculate each stem
available with aims to prevent the possibility of corruption.
The first harvest was unsuccessful due to bad quality of the seeds. The Jatropha
can live properly but with little amount of fruits. For the second plantation, BUMN Peduli
used seeds from Balitri, a research center for spice and industry crops. This time the
Jatropha plant gave fruits as expected, however new problems emerged. With materials
10
In 2005, RNI signed an MoU with ITB on research about Jatropha.
See http://www.esdm.go.id/berita/umum/37-umum/487-1200-hektar-jarak-pagar-di-grobogan-awali-desamandiri-energi.html
12
The grant was handed over to BUMN Peduli, a new body formed by the national government. In performing
it duties, BUMN Peduli distribute the grant to the farmers in several stages and the rest of it was used to build
and operate a biodiesel plant in Torroh sub-district, Grobogan.
11
KOH, methanol, and 4 kilogram of Jatropha for 1 liter biodiesel, where 1 kilogram
Jatropha was valued at 1700 Rupiah, the production cost of biodiesel become
uncompetitive with fossil fuel. Resistance also came from the farmers who consider 1700
Rupiah per kilogram as too cheap. In making decision, the farmers compared Jatropha
price with corn which averagely worth 2000 Rupiah and need less care.
At the moment where farmers and local government face uncertainty on how to
deal with Jatropha, Waterland Asia Bio Ventures (WABV), a multi-national company
established with investment from 32 Dutch companies, started to show success story.
From the timeline, WABV interaction with Grobogan’s actors started 5 months after
Yudhoyono came to Ngaringan sub-district, Grobogan. The first interaction between WABV
and Grobogan’s local government was formalized by a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) about Jatropha Curcas Linn development for 30 years. The MoU was signed by
three-partite namely WABV as investor, forestry agency of Purwodadi (the capital of
Grobogan) as the party who owned the land and farmers groups named Organization of
Forest Village Communities (LMDH) as party who cultivate the plant. As the first trial, a
project was conducted in an area of 522.1 ha for Jatropha plantation and 326 ha for seed
breeding.
Success of the first trial was followed by Jatropha processing plant construction in
Danyang village, Purwodadi sub-district in November 2008. The plant has production
capacity with total amount of 800 liter per day (or equivalent with 2.4 ton Jatropha per
day). To meet that number, in 2008, the area for Jatropha plantation has covered 2,500
ha and involves 36 farmers’ groups. In increasing farmers’ loyalty, besides buying the
Jatropha fruit for 1300 Rupiah plus 10% per kilogram, the farmers also received fertilizer,
stove, and foods crops which can be planted in the same area as Jatropha (intercropping). Additionally, WABV also offered pickup service where WABV employees take the
Jatropha fruit from the farmers’ field. Intensive activities in maintaining Jatropha
development has delivered WABV to its first Jatropha oil export to European market in
July 2010. With total amount of 20,000 liter, the Jatropha oil will be used as jet fuel.
However having a long failure story, interviews with the local government in
Forestry and Plantation Office13, Industry, Trade, and Mining Office, District Planning
Agency, and Agricultural, Food Crops, and Horticulture Office showed that they doubted
the sustainability of WABV.
3. Functions, Interactions, and Irreversibility
Framing the Actors of Alas, NTB
From two cases above, seven functions of innovation system appear in different
forms. In the first case, entrepreneurial activities characterized by its role ‘to generateand take advantage of-new business opportunities’ (Hekkert et al., 2007:421) appears in
Ibrahim actions. He was taking new business opportunities by expanding his roles as
researcher to the domain of business. This expansion stimulates the emergence of a new
network where its appearance was done by riding an existing network. In the initial phase
for example, Ibrahim did not build the NTB-ITB network from zero, instead of riding the
family and cultural (traditional) network that he already has in NTB, and the professional
(modern) network in Bandung. Since both networks conserve their culture, infrastructure,
and roles, the type of this interaction is symbiosis instead of integration. Distinction
between symbiosis and integration is also a key to understand network stability. As
mentioned earlier, irreversibility of a network is determined by level to which it is
impossible of an actor to go back. In Ibrahim’s case where interaction between two sociotechnical systems conserve their existing culture and roles, the level of irreversibility
become low.
13
The authority of Forestry and Plantation Office and Forestry Agency is distinguished by the land ownership.
The first deal with residents’ land, while the second deal with state’s land
The second function is knowledge development where Ibrahim develop his
knowledge through the existing research agenda in his ITB’s research group. The type of
interaction emergence from this interaction is symbiosis. Ibrahim utilized the technical
knowledge from the research group and as return, he share the social aspect of biodiesel
aspect to the group. This barter is possible since the group itself has interest in applying
findings from the laboratory to practice.
The third function is knowledge diffusion through networks. In this stage, the
knowledge diffusion not only appears in the form of workshops and conferences but also
through informal lobbying. To get the grant from RAPID scheme for example, Soerawidjaja
used the ITB’s alumni network where the general director of the company who cooperate
with him comes from the same Department in ITB. This cooperation succeeded in building
a biodiesel plant in Medan, North Sumatra where the same technology is used by Ibrahim
to expand his business in NTB.
In the fourth function, guidance of the search appears in the form of partner
selection. In this stage, Ibrahim starts to create a boundary between his interest as an
entrepreneur and his role as a biodiesel researcher. Therefore, the type of interaction in
this function shifts from symbiosis to spill-over. In this type of interaction, Ibrahim receive
a transfer of rules from one socio-technical regime to the new one, although in different
level. Using the terminology developed in multi-level perspective (MLP), levels of sociotechnical systems can be distinguished into three analytical level: niches (micro level),
socio-technical regimes (meso level), and an exogenous socio-technical landscape (macro
level) (Rip and Kemp, 1998; Geels, 2002; Geels, 2004; Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels,
2010). These ‘levels’ also indicate the network stability (Geels, 2010). In Ibrahim’s case,
the university belongs to a socio-technical landscape where its activities were partly
guided and funded by the national government. In the spill-over, Ibrahim’s socio-technical
system receive the knowledge and technology transfer from the university’s system, but
its stability depends on the dynamics at the micro level which is tested in the next
function, market formation.
To compete with embedded technologies called the fuel regime, Ibrahim entered
the market by riding Indosat’s promotion and CSR scheme. Through this scheme, he has
the space to make an experiment on the new socio-technical system and as return; Indosat
got promotion as a company supporting biofuel development in Indonesia. Additionally,
Indosat support the shifting from fossil fuel regime to bio-fuel by giving screw press to the
farmers. This experiment, as described by Berkhout et al. (2010), ‘promote new networks
of actors with knowledge, capabilities and resources, cooperating in a process of learning’
and ‘are given some protection from normal selection pressures in the market’ (p. 262).
However in the case, the experiment has expired date as I show in the seventh function.
The type of interaction in this function is symbiosis between a biodiesel company and
telecommunication company.
In the case, resources mobilization appears in the form of biodiesel plant and Setia
coop. Through the biodiesel plant, Ibrahim has increased his involvement with the NTB’s
network from Jatropha supplier to biodiesel producer. As a Jatropha supplier, he can
easily disconnect his relation with the Jatropha farmers whenever there is no demand. But
after he build a biodiesel plant, the consideration is no longer whether there is a demand
or not instead of how to create the demand so it can cover the initial capital. Based on
these situations, there are different type of interaction among the actors, integration
between Ibrahim’s biodiesel company and the farmers and symbiosis between Ibrahim’s
biodiesel company and the telecommunication company.
To see the durability of the new socio-technical system, the system has to
counteract the possible resistance. Unfortunately, in the last function, Ibrahim’s network
in NTB failed to maintain its relation with Indosat due to competition with the fossil fuel
price. For the initial stage of the biodiesel business, Indosat has helped the company
development by paying the biodiesel in advance. However, the aid from Indosat only came
once and after both of them has finished their contract, decision whether Indosat want to
continue the cooperation and not is determined by the fuel price.
Framing the Actors of Grobogan, Central Java
As mentioned in Section 2, there are three Jatropha initiators in the area, each of
which has intersection with the farmers and the local government. In this paper, I focus on
the Jatropha development initiated by WABV and use the dynamics resulted from two
others as background. WABV performs the function through its investment in Indonesia. As
a company that been established by several European based companies seeking
sustainable bio-mass energy sources to operate, entrepreneurial activities of WABV appear
in the form of seeking investor for supporting this project. In these situation, there are
two types of interaction, integration among the WABV investors (since all of them share
the same risk), and symbiosis between WABV, Forestry agency, and the farmers.
In performing knowledge development, WABV has started it extensive research
since 1995 in countries such Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Netherlands, and Vietnam.
The research covers a formidable team of genetic and plant breeding scientist and
agronomist. As a strategy to increase value of the land, WABV also develop an on-going
research on inter-cropping optimization. This intensive and high-tech research shows that
WABV has enough space for experiment as seen in the long term contract with Indonesian
forestry agency and farmers’ groups. Using the transition context coined by Smith et al.
(2005), this type of activities can be classified as purposive transitions. The pressure to
shift from fossil fuel to a sustainable bio-mass energy source has triggered many investors
in Europe to share their capital in supporting WABV. As result, the company has
coordinated the investors’ interest through bio-mass research and production with
external adaptation.
The external adaptation can be seen in the knowledge diffusion. As a multinational company targets the European market and conducts it plantation in Indonesia,
WABV has to meet the European standard, the farmers’ expectation, and the investors’
interests. In the context of knowledge diffusion, WABV translate the European standard of
environment by developing the concept of inter-cropping. To diffuse this knowledge,
WABV apply formal and non-formal network. In the first network, WABV employ its
workers to monitor the farmers’ activity. Monitoring activities were also conducted by the
Forestry Agency which has a monthly meeting with the head of the farmers’ groups. While
to extend the network, WABV use religious event to attract farmers’ interest, one of them
was conducted in Moslem’s fasting month in August 2010 by inviting a well-known Moslem
figure as presenter. The farmers’ reaction to this activity and how they deal with the
plant create an external adaptation whether more investors are needed or whether the
diffusion method is effective in attracting more farmers.
To extend and also protect the aim of the business, guidance of the search
becomes one of the most critical functions in this case. As stated by Hekkert et al. (2007),
‘changing preferences in society, if strong and visible, can influence R&D priority setting
and thus the direction of technological change’ (p. 423). In business where farmers and
agriculture become the dominating actors, WABV has to assure that the technological
change meet not only the European standard but also apply the most possible profit for
the farmers. Implication of this relation can be seen in the seventh function.
Differently with the first case where the socio-technical change follows emergent
transformation (Smith et al., 2005) as of the new business has to create the market; WABV
works the other way around. The need of sustainable bio-mass energy sources had
triggered WABV formation. With intensive research from 1995, it implies that WABV had a
secure market as long that the company can guarantee the sustainability criteria of the
product. As consequence, the key of the fifth function is by convincing the targeted
market of how environmental-friendly the business is14.
To mobilize the resources, WABV in cooperation with Bosch and Siemens Home
Appliance Group (BSH) gave Jatropha stoves to the farmers. According to BSH
representative in Indonesia, the production cost of one stove is 50 US$ and being sold with
the same price because it is done under the CSR scheme. At the moment, WABV buy all of
the stoves and being responsible in the distribution process. In the ceremonial opening of
Agro Food Processing Plant in Semarang and BSH Service Center for the Jatropha Cooking
Stoves in Purwodadi in November 2010, WABV gave the stoves to LMDH representative.
The attendance of the representative from the Australian embassy, local government of
Grobogan, BSH representative, and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) expert who
based in Singapore represent the active action of WABV in maintaining its resources.
In order to develop well, WABV has to create legitimacy or anticipate the threat
that may risk the new socio-technical system. One of the threat that been coined by
William Nolten, President Director of WABV, is the farmers behavior due to welfare
change. In the presentation made by Waterland Agro Food, one of WABV joint partner,
Waterland’s intercropping farming model were proven successful in increasing farmers’
income from 30% - 500% depends on the maturity of the plant. Mbah Sul, a farmer in Jati
Pohon village, Grobogan sub-district who received Lemon grass (sereh) seed from WABV as
plant to be intercropped with Jatropha, confirmed the increasing of his income. However,
Mbah Sul’s model cannot be copied to all type of farmers since he is the type of farmer
who work in someone else’s land namely Forestry Agency land. Therefore, when the
Forestry Agency agreed to cooperate with WABV to cultivate Jatropha, choices available
for farmers like Mbah Sul become very limited.
With this situation, possibility to counteract resistance to shift to Jatropha
development is bigger from farmers who own land, especially if other commodities have
higher price, than farmers who only has access to land through Forestry Agency. One of
the commodities that often used as comparison was corn. This situation can be understood
since Grobogan district is one of the biggest corn producers in Indonesia and contribute
22.89% of the total of Central Java demand in May 2010. Grobogan success in producing
corn was fully supported by the Vice Governor, Icek Baskoro who will run for Grobogan
governor 2011-2016. He was hoping the corn business in Grobogan can be developed to
off-farming. Competition between WABV business model and traditional farming become
one of the elements which determine the continuity of WABV socio-technical system.
Table 1 Comparison between Alas and Grobogan using the matrix of seven functions and interaction
Function
1: Entrepreneurial activities
2: Knowledge development
3: Knowledge diffusion
4: Guidance of the search
14
Type of Interaction
Alas, NTB
Grobogan, Central Java
Symbiosis (Ibrahim - ITB)
Integration (WABV’s
investors) & symbiosis
(WABV, Forestry Agency,
LMDH)
Symbiosis (Ibrahim - ITB)
Integration (WABV’s
investors)
Symbiosis (Ibrahim - ITB)
Integration (WABV’s
investors) & symbiosis
(WABV, Forestry Agency,
LMDH)
Spill-over (Ibrahim’s
Integration – Mandatory
company – ITB)
(WABV – European market);
Integration (WABV’s
This tendency appears in WABV presentations where it promotes Social, Economic, Environment, and
Development sustainability (SEEDs)
5: Market formation
Symbiosis (Ibrahim’s
company - Indosat)
6: Resources mobilisation
Symbiosis (Ibrahim’s
company – Indosat – Setia
coop)
7: Creation of legitimacy
Competition (Ibrahim’s
company – Fossil fuel
company)
investors)
Integration – Mandatory
(WABV – European market);
Integration (WABV’s
investors)
Integration (WABV’s
investors); Symbiosis (WABV,
BSH, CDM consultant,
Forestry Agency, LMDH)
Integration (WABV’s
investors); Competition
(WABV business model –
farmers traditional crops)
4. Actors in Transition
Elaboration of the two cases above have shown that seven functions and multiregime interaction can be combined to get a better understanding of the processes of
socio-technical change. Additionally, the cases show that integration at the macro level
has may be translated differently at the meso and micro level. However, these concepts
still leave a question on how to modulate the socio-technical change for sustainability
transition? Comparison between the cases above shows that context play an important role
in each stage of the socio-technical change. As seen in the first case, where the context is
emergent transition, the new socio-technical change failed to survive due to the decrease
of world oil price. While in the second case where the context is purposive transitions, the
new socio-technical change succeed to survive due to a huge amount of investment giving
the ‘new’ system space for experiment.
Fossil fuel
Bio-fuel
Global
Landscape
developments
Research
fund
Fossil fuel
price
Foreign Environment
investment standard
Fossil fuel
Bio-fuel
National
Industrial networks,
strategic games
Sociotechnical
regimes
Culture,
symbolic
meaning
Techno-scientific
knowledge
Infrastructure
Markets, user
practices
Sectoral policy
Technology
Technological
niche
1980
1998 2002
2003 2006
2008
2010
Fig. 1 Socio-technical change of Jatropha Development in Indonesia (developed from Geels, 2002)
The existence of huge investment in a ‘new’ system contradict the basic
assumption of MLP, “transitions do not come about easily, because existing regime are
characterized by lock-in and path dependence, and oriented towards incremental
innovation along predictable trajectories” (Geels, 2010:495). Taking MLP’s assumption as
framework, the huge investment in WABV means that there is a bigger socio-technical
system where WABV system in Grobogan is a subset of it. This finding consistent with the
first case where the emergent transition in Ibrahim’s case can be understood through the
bigger socio-technical systems namely the fossil fuel landscape and the Indonesian
political landscape.
As seen in Fig. 1, activities on biofuel at the micro level have been started from
1980s. However, it success to influence the socio-technical regime emerged more than
twenty years later, after the New Order fall in 1998, the increasing trend of world oil
price, political instability due to the reducing of oil price subsidy, numbers of
demonstrations (Djadijono, 2005), and an on-going research on alternative energy. To
simplify those complex relation, I offer a concept named discontinue transition where its
emergence is caused by: (i) interaction between two or more socio-technical system each
of which follow the continue transition; and (ii) interaction between the socio-technical
system at different level. This concept can be used to understand the socio-technical
change afterwards, but not before due to its complexity.
Additionally, the emergence of new socio-technical system in niche implies that
the transition always conserve certain roles or relations from the old system. This is shown
in the first case where each system put their roles upon the durability of the network. In
this type of relation, it seen that the new system emerged has a low level of irreversibility
due to the existence of one dominant actor and availability of a substitute actor. On the
opposite with the first case, the second case shows that WABV conserve its relation with
Jatropha and let the external factors to adapt. In this case, Jatropha is the
complementary actor which increases the level of irreversibility.
5. Concluding remarks
In the context of sustainability transitions, the different paths above raise a
question about governance in transition. What is the dominating concept of the
sustainability transitions? How can we modulate transition to the desired situations? How
do we know if the transitions lead to the right path? The cases above show that although
both cases were built upon rhetoric of sustainability (see Section 2), in practice, the two
cases have different paths. Explanation of these varieties can be understood from the
concept of power. As described by Dahl (1957), power is ‘the ability to get others to do
something they might not otherwise have done’ (in Smith et al., 2005). By seeing the
actors’ interaction in performing functions of innovation system, the degree of power can
be seen by the type of relation. Except integration where actors share the same norms
and belief, the chance to get others to do something is determined by the negotiation
process and therefore, become unpredictable.
The socio-technical transition of Jatropha initiatives in Indonesia shows that
although there were formal umbrella at the national level, its durability in the district and
village level is determined by the local actors’ initiative. The actors’ reaction to continue
or withdraw their participation based on financial consideration in the socio-technical
change is one possibility to assess the sustainability. However, in longer term this may
conflicting with energy availability and environmental issues. The variety of sociotechnical change is good in the sense that it opens a space for correction, especially in
unstable science. On the other hand, it also increases the possibility to fail due to low
entanglement among the actors.
Additionally, this paper has shown that the concept of interaction can be used not
only in explaining crossing boundaries in technological regime, but also in describing the
interaction between socio-technical system and socio-political system.
References:
Amir S., Nurlaila, I. and Yuliar, S., 2008. ‘Cultivating Energy, Reducing Poverty: Biofuel
Development in an Indonesian Village’, Perspectives on Global Development and
Technology 7 (2008) 113-132.
Berkhout, F, Verbong, G., Wieczorek, A. J., Raven, R., Lebel, L., Bai, X., 2010.
Sustainability experiments in Asia: innovations shaping alternative development
pathways? Environmental Science & Policy 13 (2010) 261-271.
Callon, M., 1991. 'Techno-economic networks and irreversibility', in Law, J., (Eds.),
A sociology of monsters: essays on power, technology and domination, Routledge,
London, pp. 132-161.
Djadijono, M., 2005. Kenaikan Harga BBM 2005: Derita Rakyat dan Komplikasi Politik.
Analisis CSIS Vol. 32, No. 2, Juni 2005.
Geels, F. W., 2002. Technological transitions as evolutionary reconfiguration processes: a
multi-level perspective and a case-study. Research Policy 31 (8/9) (2002), pp. 1257–
1274.
Geels, F.W., 2004. From sectoral systems of innovation to socio-technical systems: insights
about dynamics and change from sociology and institutional theory. Research Policy
33 (6/7), 897–920.
Geels, F. W., 2005. Technological Transitions and System Innovations: A Co-evolutionary
and Socio-technical Analysis, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Geels, F.W., Schot, J.W., 2007. Typology of sociotechnical transition pathways. Research
Policy 36 (3), 399–417
Geels, F.W., 2010. Ontologies, socio-technical transitions (to sustainability), and the
multi-level perspective. Research Policy 39 (2010) 495–510.
GFA Envest, 2008. Feasability Study Development of Jatropha Curcas Oil for Bio-energy in
Rural Areas, Indonesia, Jakarta.
Hekkert, M. P., Suurs, R.A.A., Negro, S.O., Kuhlmann, S., Smits, R.E.H.M., 2007. Functions
of innovation systems: A new approach for analysing technological change.
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 74 (2007) 413–432.
Kusdiyana, D., 2010. “Kebijakan Penyediaan dan Pemanfaatan Bahan Bakar Nabati,”
Sosialisasi Kebijakan dan Pemanfaatan Bahan Bakar Nabati sebagai Bahan Bakar Lain,
11 November 2010.
Manurung, R., “Valorisation of Jatropha curcas using the Bio-refinery Concept,” United
Nations Expert Group Meeting on Biofuel Meeting, New York, 29-30 March 2007.
Negro, S. O., Hekkert, M. P., Smits, R. E., 2007. Explaining the failure of the Dutch
innovation system for biomass digestion—A functional analysis. Energy Policy 35
(2007) 925–938.
Octavianus, O., 2007. “Bibit Unggul Kesuksesan Program Nasional Energi Alternatif”
Raven, R. and Verbong, G. P. J, 2009. Boundary crossing innovations: Case studies from
the energy domain. Technology in Society 31 (2009) 85-93.
Rip and Kemp, 1998 A. Rip and R. Kemp, Technological change. In: S. Rayner and E.L.
Malone, Editors, Human Choice and Climate Change, Battelle Press, Columbus, OH
(1998), pp. 327–399.
Smith, A., Stirling, A., Berkhout, F., 2005. The governance of sustainable socio-technical
transitions, Research Policy 34 (2005), pp. 1491–1510.
Yuliar, S., Nasir, R.M., and Nurlaila, I, 2006. Adopsi Bahan Bakar Nabati sebagai Sumber
Energi: Telaah dalam Perspektif Inovasi Sistemik.
Yusgiantoro, P., 2007. “Indonesia’s Experience on Biofuel Development”, presented in the
International Biofuel Conference, Brussles, July 5th, 2007.