WILL THE REAL TURKEY PLEASE STAND
UP? TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND
OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS*
(Draft. Do not quote without permission.
Comments are always welcome)
Balkan Devlen, PhD
Izmir University of Economics
*Prepared for the WISC 2008, Ljubljana, Slovenia.
INTRODUCTION
Since November 2002 the Turkish government is headed by Justice and
Development Party (better known with is Turkish acronym AKP) that has Islamist roots.
From time to time AKP’s Islamist legacy created tensions in domestic arena between the
government and civil-military bureaucracy, which is know for its staunch secularism.
Examining whether ideological differences between the AKP government and civilmilitary bureaucracy is carried over to the foreign policy issues such as EU membership,
the Cyprus issue, and the developments in Iraq is the main focus of this study. In other
words, the main question I ask in this study is whether the Turkish state speaks with one
voice with regards to foreign policy issues or whether there are notable differences
among the key players such as the Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the
Chief of General Staff?
At this stage of this study I examine the belief systems of the key decisionmakers in the Turkish foreign policy establishment by using operational code analysis in
order to answer this question. I use foreign policy speeches by the Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, then the Foreign Affairs Minister Abdullah Gul, and then the Chief of
General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok from the years 2005 and 2006 in order to construct and
compare their operational codes.
It is important to point out that this is a very much work in progress as I gather
more data from earlier periods as well as 2007 to be able to construct more detailed
profiles of these decision-makers and disaggregate their respective beliefs about different
foreign policy domains such as accession to the EU, the Cyprus problem, the situation in
Iraq etc. Therefore, the current results and the discussion are tentative and should not be
seen as conclusive profiles of these decision-makers.
METHODOLOGY
Operational code analysis focuses on the beliefs of political leaders as causal
mechanisms in explaining foreign policy decisions (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969,
1979; Walker 1983, 1990; Walker and Schafer 2007). It was originally developed by
Leites (1951, 1953) to analyze the decision-making style of the Soviet Politburo and later
developed and refined by George (1969, 1979), Holsti (1977), and Walker (1983, 1990).
According to the operational code construct leader’s cognitive schemata or belief system
has two components. The first set is the five philosophical beliefs about the political
universe in which the leader finds himself and the nature of the “other” he faces in this
environment. Second, there are five instrumental beliefs that represent the image of “self”
in this political universe and the best strategies and tactics one could employ to achieve
one’s ends (George 1979; Walker 1990). Taken together they “explain diagnostic and
choice propensities of the agents who make foreign policy decisions” (Walker and
Schafer forthcoming). The philosophical and instrumental beliefs are the answers to the
following questions developed by George (1969, 1979):
The Philosophical Beliefs in an Operational Code are:
P-1. What is the ‘‘essential’’ nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one’s
political opponents?
P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental val-
ues and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this
score, and in what respects the one and/or the other?
P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?
P-4. How much ‘‘control’’ or ‘‘mastery’’ do self and other have over historical
development? What is self and other’s role in ‘‘moving’’ and ‘‘shaping’’ history
in the desired direction?
P-5. What is the role of ‘‘chance’’ in human affairs and in historical development?
The Instrumental Beliefs in an Operational Code are:
I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?
I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?
I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?
I-4. What is the best ‘‘timing’’ of action to advance one’s interests?
I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one’s interests?
P-1, I-1, and P-4 are considered master beliefs as they are key in determining the
answers for the rest. The central assumption of operational code analysis is that
individual leaders matter in shaping the foreign policy of states and that the beliefs they
have might act as causal mechanisms in understanding why they chose a certain foreign
policy decision. Beliefs could have three idealized effects if they are going to act as
causal mechanisms in the explanation of foreign policy decisions. First, beliefs can have
mirroring effects, which suggests that the environment is highly transparent and they
reflect the situation accurately and influence action. In this instance, they are necessary
conditions for action. Second, beliefs can have steering effects, which suggests that even
if they do not reflect reality they can still be the basis for action. In such a situation,
beliefs are both necessary and sufficient conditions for action. Third, beliefs can manifest
learning effects as they may change over time. This learning effect influence future
actions depending on whether they converge or diverge from reality (Walker and Schafer
2004:3). Walker and Schafer (2005:4) clearly posit the main question, “when and how do
the beliefs of leaders act as pivotal causal mechanisms in explaining and anticipating the
processes of strategic interaction between states at several levels of decision: moves,
tactics, strategies, and policy preferences?”. To put it more simply, when and how does
cognition affect decision-making?
Holsti (1977) developed an operational code typology by trying to answer
George’s (1969) questions about philosophical and instrumental beliefs. He developed
six types of operational codes (A, B, C, D, E, F), which are later reduced to four (A, B, C,
DEF) by Walker (1983, 1990). This typology is based on the nature (temporary vs.
permanent) and the source (individual/society/international system) of conflict in the
political world, deduced from the answers to P-1, I-1, and P-4. (Walker and Schafer
forthcoming). In the revised typology the pessimists (DEF types), who see the conflict as
permanent, are lumped together regardless of the source of that conflict. Walker (1983)
argues that such a move is justified because there are no discernable differences in the
remaining philosophical and instrumental beliefs of DEF types so they could be seen as a
single ideal type. Optimists, however, differ in how they see the source of the conflict:
misperceptions by the individuals (A), societal institutions (B), or anarchic nature of the
international system (C). Those differences have an impact on the rest of the
philosophical and instrumental beliefs (Walker et al. 1998). The following table
represents this typology:
TYPE A
Conflict is temporary, caused by human
misunderstanding and Miscommunication. A
“conflict spiral,” based upon misperception and
impulsive responses, is the major danger of war.
Opponents are often influenced in kind to conciliation
and firmness. Optimism is warranted, based upon a
leader’s ability and willingness to shape historical
development. The future is relatively predictable, and
control over it is possible. Establish goals within a
framework that emphasizes shared interests.
Pursue broadly international goals incrementally
with flexible strategies that control risks by
avoiding escalation and acting quickly when
conciliation opportunities arise. Emphasize
resources that establish a climate for negotiation
and compromise and avoid the early use of force.
Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit
TYPE C
Conflict is temporary; it is possible to restructure the
state system to reflect the latent harmony of interests.
The source of conflict is the anarchical state system,
which permits a variety of causes to produce war.
Opponents vary in nature, goals and responses to
conciliation and firmness. One should be pessimistic
about goals unless the state system is changed,
because predictability and control over historical
development is low under anarchy. Establish
optimal goals vigorously within a comprehensive
framework. Pursue shared goals, but control risks
by limiting means rather than ends. Act quickly
when conciliation opportunities arise and delay
escalatory actions whenever possible, other
resources than military capabilities are useful.
Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit
Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit
Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit
Conflict is permanent, caused by human nature
(D), nationalism (E), or international anarchy
(F). Power disequilibria are major dangers of war.
Opponents may vary, and responses to conciliation
or firmness are uncertain. Optimism declines over
the long run and in the short run depends upon the
quality of leadership and a power equilibrium.
Predictability is limited, as is control over historical
development. Seek limited goals flexibly with
moderate means. Use military force if the
opponent and circumstances require it, but only
as a final resource.
Conflict is temporary, caused by warlike states;
miscalculation and appeasement are the major causes
of war. Opponents are rational and deterrable.
Optimism is warranted regarding realization of goals.
The political future is relatively predictable, and
control over historical development is possible. One
should seek optimal goals vigorously within a
comprehensive framework. Control risks by
limiting means rather than ends. Any tactic and
resource may be appropriate, including the use of
force when it offers prospects for large gains with
limited risks.
TYPE DEF
TYPE B
Table 1. Contents of the Revised Holsti Operational Code Typology.Instrumental
beliefs are in bold, and philosophical beliefs are not. Source: Walker (1983, 1990).
Contemporary operational code analysis uses an automated content analysis
system called Verbs In Context System (VICS), introduced by Walker, Schafer, and
Young (1998). VICS focuses on the verbs in the leader’s public statements and their
attributions regarding exercise of power to the Self and Others to construct quantitative
indices that correspond to the philosophical and instrumental beliefs in Table 1 (Walker
and Schafer forthcoming). The VICS indices for the master beliefs, P-1 (nature of the
political universe), I-1 (strategic approach to goals), and P-4 (ability to control historical
development), are mapped on the vertical (P-1/I-1) and horizontal (P-4) axes in Table 1
to locate leader’s image of the Self and Other in one of the four quadrants. The locations
for Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b) leads to predictions regarding strategic
preferences over the goals of settle, submit, dominate and deadlock (Walker and Schafer
forthcoming). Table 2 provides details about the calculation of VICS indices.
PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS
Elements
Index
Interpretation
P-1.
NATURE OF THE POLITICAL
UNIVERSE (Image of Others)
%Positive minus %Negative
Transitive Other Attributions
+1.0 friendly to
-1.0 hostile
P-2.
REALIZATION OF POLITICAL
Mean Intensity of Transitive
+1.0 optimistic to
VALUES (Optimism/ Pessimism)
Other Attributions divided by 3
–1.0 pessimistic
POLITICAL FUTURE (Predict-
1 minus Index of Qualitative
1.0 predictable
ability of Others Tactics)
Variation** for Other Attributions
to 0.0 uncertain
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Self (P4a) or Other (P4b) Attributions 1.0 high to 0.0
(Locus of Control)
[Self plus Other Attributions]
low self control
ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of
1 minus [Political Future x
1.0 high role
Control)
Historical Development Index]
to 0.0 low role
P-3.
P-4.
P-5.
INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS
Elements
Index
Interpretation
I-1.
APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction
of Strategy)
%Positive minus %Negative Self
Attributions
+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high
conflict
I-2.
PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity
of Tactics)
Mean Intensity of Transitive
Self Attributions divided by 3
+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high
conflict
I-3.
RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)
1 minus Index of Qualitative
Variation for Self Attributions
1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk
averse
I-4.
TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibilbility of Tactics)
1 minus Absolute Value [%X
minus %Y Self Attributions]
1.0 high to 0.0
low shift propensity
a. Coop v. Conf Tactics
Where X = Coop and Y = Conf
I-5.
b. Word v. Deed Tactics
Where X = Word and Y = Deed
UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise
of Power)
Percentages for Exercise of
Power Categories a through f
+1.0 very frequent
to 0.0 infrequent
a. Reward
a's frequency divided by total
b. Promise
b's frequency divided by total
c. Appeal/Support
c's frequency divided by total
d. Oppose/Resist
d's frequency divided by total
e. Threaten
e's frequency divided by total
f. Punish
f 's frequency divided by total
Table. 2. Verbs in Context Belief Indices in a Leader’s Operational Code
All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between 1.0 and þ 1.0. P-2 and I-2 are
divided by 3 to standardize the range (Source: Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998). The Index of Qualitative Variation is a
ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs
for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications’’ (Watson and
McGaw, 1980:88).
Walker and Schafer (2007) further refined preference orderings based on the key
operational code indices and developed a “theory of inferences about preferences”. The
inferences are made by comparing the leader’s key operational code scores (P-1, I-1, and
P-4) with a norming sample of world leaders. When the index scores lie above (below)
this norm, the index is considered positive (negative) for the purposes of inferring
preferences. For the P-4 index, a norming range of one standard deviation was set, and
the index is interpreted by looking at whether the score is within one standard deviation
of the norming mean or outside of it. Therefore, it is possible to construct the subjective
games of the political leaders once we calculate their operational codes. However in this
study I will not attempt to do such a thing for two reasons. First, the purpose of this study
is not so much to predict specific behavior of the key decision-makers of the Turkish
foreign policy elite in specific strategic episodes but to compare their belief systems with
each other. Second, the hand-coded scores cannot easily be compared to the computercoded scores thus we cannot use the norming group reliably in this instance. Therefore,
the construction of subjective games of the Turkish foreign policy elite should be left for
future research.
DATA AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
I used a collection of speeches, interviews, and press conferences by Recep
Tayyip Erdogan, Abdullah Gul, and Hilmi Ozkok from the years 2005 and 2006 to
analyze their operational codes.1After sorting out foreign policy related texts, I used the
texts that contain at least 20 coded verbs (as suggested by Walker and Schafer 2007:44)
in the analysis. Then I chose ten speech acts from Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah
Gul each randomly for analysis. I could only found one long speech and one interview for
Hilmi Ozkok for that time frame therefore I coded both of them. Both speech acts yielded
more than the minimum amount of verbs. All speech acts were hand-coded, therefore the
results below cannot be compared to norming group scores which are computer coded
(see Walker and Schafer 2007:43-45).
According to the analysis Erdogan has a benign view of the political universe (P1: 0.33) and places the Other in Quadrant A (P-1: 0.33 and P-4b: 0.34). Erdogan’s scores
suggest a cooperative strategic orientation with significantly greater control over
historical developments compared to his image of the Other (I-1: 0.45 and P-4a: 0.66),
which places him in the Quadrant C. Gul’s view of the political universe and the Other
within is conflictual (P-1: -0.18 and P-4b: 0.27) which places the Other in Quadrant DEF
in the revised Holsti typology. Gul’s self image other hand suggests a cooperative
strategic orientation with a high degree of control over historical developments (I-1: 0.56
and P-4a: 0.73), which places him the C Quadrant.. Hilmi Ozkok’s operational code
reveals a conflictual view of the political universe and the adversary (P-1: -0.13 and P-4b:
0.55), which places the Other in B Quadrant. His strategic orientation on the other hand is
still cooperative but with lesser control over historical developments (I-1: 0.26 and P-4a:
1
The texts that have been used in this paper are taken from http://www.fulltextnews.com
0.45), which places him in A Quadrant. These scores are plotted in the figure below. For
P-4 scores 0.50 is taken as the cut off point to determine relative control:
Type A
Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit
(I-1/P-1)
Type C
Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit
+1.0
+0.75
*Gul(S)(0.56/0.73)
+0.50
*RTE (S)(0.45/0.66)
*RTE (O)(0.33/0.34)
*Ozkok(S)(0.26/0.45)
+0.25
(P-4 ) 0.0
+.25
0.50/0
0.75
*Ozkok(O)(-0.13/0.55)
1.0 (P-4)
*Gul (O) (-0.18/0.27)
–0.25
–0.50
–0.75
–1.0
Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit
Type DEF
Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit
(I-1/P-1)
Type B
Recep Tayyip Erdogan = RTE, Abdullah Gul = Gul, Hilmi Ozkok = Ozkok, Self = (S),
Other = (O).
DISCUSSION
The results of the preliminary analysis suggest that the Turkish foreign policy
elite share a relatively common strategic orientation despite their different beliefs about
the nature of the political universe. However, before proceeding to discuss their
differences and similarities, first I will discuss each decision-makers’ operational code in
more detail.
Erdogan has type A philosophical beliefs which are associated with a cooperative
worldview. Leaders with type A philosophical beliefs tend to see miscommunication and
misunderstanding as the roots of the conflict in international system. They believe that
opponents would respond in kind to conciliation and firmness. Erdogan also attributes
low level of control over historical developments to his opponents, believing that he has
the ability to shape the course of the events and can persuade his opponents to follow his
lead. His instrumental beliefs and his sense of high level of control places makes him a
type C leader. Leaders with type C instrumental believes tend to pursue their goals in a
non-conflictual way and stresses shared norms, negotiations, and compromise instead of
military methods. Erdogan’s belief in his control over historical developments also
suggests that he would develop more ambitious plans but would control his risk by
limiting the means rather than ends he pursued. In other words, Erdogan’s operational
code suggests that he believed that in a world that is rather cooperative and in which the
opponents would respond in kind to your actions, a leader with the ability to control
historical developments can devise ambitious plans and could carry them out by using
rather cooperative means to achieve them as using conflictual means would be risky.
Gul has type DEF philosophical beliefs which subscribes to a more conflictual
worldview in which the conflict is permanent, whatever the cause of it might be. This is
the typical realist view of the world that is based on power relations. It also suggest
prudence and caution in world politics. He also attributes a relatively low level of control
to his opponents. Gul’s instrumental beliefs and his relatively high sense of control over
historical developments places him in the C Quadrant. Therefore, he shares similar
strategic orientation with Erdogan, although Gul has even more cooperative orientation
and his sense of control is even higher than Erdogan. This is interesting particularly
because of his philosophical beliefs point towards a world of conflict. It suggests that Gul
believes himself to be an idealist, a powerful, persuasive idealist nevertheless, in a realist
world. Unlike Erdogan who sees a benign world, Gul has no such illusions but still chose
cooperation over conflict in his policies believing that he, in the end, could control the
course of history. He would take advantage of the opponents when the opportunity is
present but would avoid escalation if possible.
Ozkok’s philosophical beliefs points towards a conflictual world in which the
opponents have greater control over historical developments. Type B philosophical
beliefs suggest that appeasement and miscalculation are the main causes of war. The
opponents act rationally and could be deterred. His instrumental beliefs on the other hand
suggest a type A leader who would pursue shared interests using flexible strategies and
avoiding escalation whenever possible. In other words, a type A leader believes in
negotiation and compromise and refrain from early use of force. It suggests that Ozkok’s
belief system is largely in line with Ataturk’s dictum “Peace at Home, Peace Abroad”.
Considered together with his philosophical beliefs, his instrumental beliefs point towards
a strategy of rewarding the opponent for cooperative behavior and avoidance of
escalatory behavior in international relations. This seems to be in line with Ozkok’s
public persona of being relatively ‘dovish’ compared to other Turkish military leaders.
How do three decision-makers stand in relation to one another? Bearing in mind
that this is a research in progress and the results are quite tentative, I think three
observations are in order. First, all three decision-makers seem to have different views of
the world. While Erdogan’s view of the world is relatively cooperative, both Gul and
Ozkok have conflictual images of the political universe. Interestingly, Gul has even more
conflictual image of the world compared to Ozkok. This finding suggests that Turkish
foreign policy elite do not share a common view of the international system.
Furthermore, Gul as the Foreign Minister is closer to Hilmi Ozkok, rather than Erdogan
in his diagnosis of the world. So the apparent political ideological differences (Islamist
vs. Secular) do not account for the divergence between Erdogan and Gul. One
explanation might be that Gul as the Foreign Minister also represents the bureaucracy of
the foreign ministry and that is reflected in his speeches. We need further data to be more
confident about this interpretation however.
Second, despite their differences in philosophical beliefs, all three leaders have a
cooperative strategic orientation. Erdogan and Gul have very similar instrumental beliefs
as both of them are type C leaders but Ozkok also has a cooperative orientation as a type
A leader. This suggests that despite their differences in their views of the nature of the
international system, the Turkish foreign policy elite share a common belief in the utility
of cooperative strategies in achieving one’s political goals. Here I have to note that the
majority of the speech acts that are used up to this point of the research are mainly about
three topics; the accession talks with the EU, the Iranian nuclear program, and the
situation in Iraq. Although I have not conducted a separate analysis for each domain due
to the insufficient amount of data, this aggregate data of three very different foreign
policy issue tentatively suggest a generally cooperative attitude on the part of the Turkish
foreign policy elite. In other words, we can speculate that Turkish foreign policy elite
speak with similar voices indeed even if they are not identical. Naturally, further analysis,
data collection, and if possible comparison with computer-coded operational codes are
needed to move this explanation from the realm of speculation to the realm of solid
scientific claim.
Lastly, both Erdogan and Gul have a relatively high sense of control over
historical developments compared to Ozkok. Although comparison with computer-coded
data might be misleading I just would like to point out that the P-4a for the norming
group is 0.21 while Erdogan and Gul have 0.66 and 0.73 respectively. Even with a
possible margin of error among hand-coded and computer-coded data this is quite a bit
difference. On the other hand, Ozkok is more closer to an average world leader compared
the other two. Belief in the ability to control historical developments is generally
associated with grandeur and ambitious plans and might lead to great political victories or
disastrous defeats depending on the extent which one’s beliefs correspond to the reality.
Therefore, we can expect that Ozkok would have followed more prudent policies
compared to Erdogan and Gul, while the latter two might be tempted to play riskier
political gambles.
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