A Synopsis of David J. Hesselgrave’s , Communicating Christ Cross-Culturally
(Zondervan, 1978).
Introduction
Beyond the technical books by shapers of the science of linguistics there are scores of practical
books which apply the new principles to various fields of study. Of those practical books only a
few would be worthy of attention in a class on linguistic theory. It is appropriate in our seminary
setting to introduce a work on missionary communication by an author who is not only a
specialist-practitioner, but who has apprehended the foundational importance of modern
linguistic theory [as well as related disciplines] as a basis for defending, defining, and delineating
a cross-cultural communication strategy.
I would like to mention a few strengths of Hesselgrave's work before summarizing the major
areas of discussion. First, for our purposes it is important for us to know that Dr. Hesselgrave is
treating the "real issues" in linguistic theory and not just dealing in secondary sources and straw
men. His footnotes include citations from the major works we have been studying: Francis Boas,
Edward Sapir, Benjamin Whorf, Noam Chomsky, and Eugene Nida. Second, Hesselgrave's
approach to communication is a holistic approach. It is cross- disciplinary, drawing from
specialists in linguistics, communication theory [rhetoric, media, etc.], anthropology,
psychology, sociology, religion [comparative], theology, and philosophy. The meat of the book
and its primary value is found in seven sections in which he progressively deals with the
following:
Worldviews—ways of perceiving the world
Cognitive Processes—ways of thinking
Linguistic Forms—ways of expressing ideas
Behavioral Patterns—ways of acting
Social Structures—ways of interacting Media Influence—ways of channeling the message
Motivational Sources—ways of deciding.
Both in the order of discussion and the reach of the material we see a Christian perspective at
work. He begins with man as a religious creature, his whole life [thought and behavior] shaped
and shaded by enculturated meta-propositions about the world. From there he proceeds to treat
communication from every vantage point that helps us to see man's complex existence—mind,
body, will, community-in toto. No area is treated as if isolated from the rest. No method of
investigation is set up as objective, universal, or neutral.
This leads me to a final commendation before we take a brief look at the seven sections before
mentioned. Hesselgrave, throughout the work, continually strives for balance between
transcendence and contexualization. A work on cross-cultural communication must stress
contextualization. Our drastically different worldviews make our cultural differences [in thought,
speech, action, social interplay, et al.] profound and impenetrable apart from understanding those
basic assumptions. Yet Hesselgrave points to evidences of transcendence in the essential
sameness of human nature and the necessity for a logic of non-contradiction in the common
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sense that world which transcends all multivalued, contextualized logics, in order to understand
the rationality of the universe and the phenomena of scientific progress.
1. Worldviews—Ways of Perceiving the World
Worldviews are like glasses, says Hesselgrave. They are so close to your face that you don't
notice them, and you are not apt to try on someone else's glasses. Worldviews are so much a part
of us that few ever critically examine their own worldview, much less seriously consider
someone else's worldview, either for understanding it or converting to it. The closeness of our
worldview—it is imminent within culture1is one way of understanding why it is so difficult to
locate or to change, but another reason is that worldviews are religious in nature. They are
"unprovable" assumptions about ultimate reality, man, nature, and their relationships to one
another.2 In as much as they are religious in nature, they are also religiously held. Hesselgrave
repeats in each of his chapters treating specific worldviews that the missionary must respect and
thoroughly know the worldview of his hearers. He must not depend on destructively assaulting
the weaknesses of a worldview, but must deal with its strengths as well. After all, are we not
claiming that the Christian worldview can "bring every thought captive to the obedience of
Christ"?
Hesselgrave points out the contributions of each worldview to a holistic view of reality. The
diversity of culture when seen in this light shows the image of God on all men, and the
significance of Holy City in Rev 21:24 into which "all the kings of the earth will bring their
splendor." Western culture brings inventiveness, efficiency, progress in the sciences; tribal
[including Chinese] cultures bring their artistic sensitivity to the world of nature; eastern
mystical culture bring to us the awe of the unknown and the absolute, the dimension of intuition,
experienced truth. Hesselgrave should be commended for the fact that in each of these sections
he sees God and Christianity as the transcendent factor and not western cultural manifestation of
it. The result of the fall is our fixation on one of the above categories of thinking, to the
exclusion of the others, and provincial attitudes which keep us from appreciating other cultures.
Western Christians are no less susceptible to these factors than are non-Christians from other
cultures. Yet Christianity transcends our incompleteness to embrace man in wholeness.
2. Cognitive Processes-Ways of Thinking "East and West are ever meeting, but East and West
have never met [p. 204]."
Worldviews actually shape the way we think about things. It is not perhaps the process of
thinking that is different, but the path of thinking, and especially the priority of different kinds of
thinking. Hesselgrave follows the "trisystemic" approach of F. H. Smith in positing basically
three cognitive priority arrangements found in three categories of worldviews. Western culture
prioritizes conceptual or abstract thinking, puts concrete relationships second, and psychical
experiences or intuitional thinking are last priority. Chinese and tribal peoples tend to think first
1
James Down: "Failure to grasp this simple fact about culture—that is, culture, not rocks or trees or other physical
surroundings, is the environment of man—dooms any attempt to work in a cross-cultural setting" (p. 124).
2
See pg. 282 discussion on the paradigm under which to consider behavior. Hesselgrave defends his seven
dimensional model of culture as communication—beginning .with worldview—against a biologically based model
of behavior/culture/communication.
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of concrete relationships, analogical thinking, then concepts, and again intuition comes last.3
Confucianism, the uniting social force in China for millennia, is very practically oriented. The
third way of prioritizing is found in Indian [Hindu] culture. They would depend first on
intuition/psychical experience, second on concrete relationships, and third on abstract concepts.
In giving instruction on presenting the gospel in each of these priority settings we are reminded
that priority does not mean exclusiveness. In each instance presentation of the gospel must be
"full orbed," and not truncated. Contextualization means that we understand the priority of the
respondent culture, and we guard against falling into western patterns of diminished thinking.
For instance in the chapter on relating Christ to intuitional thinkers Hesselgrave points out that
not only are we westerners prone to dwell on logic and abstraction, we are also prone to
oversimplify profound complexities in an exasperating way, and we lose the sense of awe and
mystery that is can be so much a part of life at the common sense level; things to which the
Hindu are atuned.
3. Linguistic Forms—Wavs of Expressing Ideas4
For our immediate purposes in this class on theories of language the most important thing in this
section is Hesselgrave's chapter on the interplay of worldview and language. In it he gives
special attention to Boas, Sapir, and Whorf.
He begins with Sapir, who after World War II challenged a pair of commonly held assumptions
about language: 1) that in language "we simply report reality as see and understand it", and 2)
"that language reflects a kind of natural [universal?] logic, that is prior to and independent of
language" [p. 258]. Sapir on the other hand asserted that language is the way in which one
acquires a worldview. Therefore language plays a "determining and defining" role [p. 258, cites
Sapir, Lansuase: An Introduction to the Study of Speech, pp. 207-20].
Whorf then popularized the hypothesis, here summarized in four statements. 1) There is no
universal logic in the human mind that operates independent of and prior to language. 2)
Individual languages determine what a man sees in the world and how he thinks about it. 3)
Differing languages will produce differing worldviews. 4) Language does not only express ideas,
but it molds them.
Hesselgrave follows the demise of this hypothesis, citing criticisms leveled in 1954 by Jenkins,
Walker, and Sebeok. Their three main criticism being a) the circularity of reasoning that different
languages reflect different worldviews; b) a methodological fallacy of translating texts into
English and then extrapolating the worldview from the translation; and c) that Sapir and Whorf's
experimentation had already been accomplished cross-culturally. Hesselgrave then follows up
with Chomsky's generative transformational grammar, which insists that the differences between
3
The two authors Hesselgrave cites disagree on whether Chinese thinking would put concepts over intuition, but
agree that concrete is the priority.
4
See also chapter 4: "Perspectives from the Science of Communication" and chapter 5: "Meaning of Linguistic
Symbols" in which are found discussions on the arbitrariness and adaptability of language, Nida's distinction
between signs and symbols, correspondence of language and reality, logic [s] and language, contractual nature of
meaning, analogical nature of religious language from Aquinas forward, developments affecting linguistics:
Renaissance —> Reformation —> Enlightenment "> Positivism —> Behaviorism, Existentialism.
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languages are at the surface level and that at the deep level there is commonalty in the function
of grammar.
In spite of this demolition of cultural-conceptual relativism, Hesselgrave points up that even
those who first attacked the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis acknowledged the interplay between
worldview of a culture and its reflection in language. He reports on fascinating study written up
in Biology and Medicine. (1972: 157-62) that showed a correlation between language
(worldview) and right/left brain stimulus. The study showed that Japanese and European subjects
reacted oppositely to the same stimulus, and furthermore, in another study bilingual Hopi Indian
children had different brain responses depending on the language in which they were replying,
Hopi or English.
Hesselgrave then goes on to support this correlation of worldview and language by looking at the
work of Francis Boas. Boas finds two indicators of culture in language. 1) Vocabulary of culture
will be based on the survival needs of the community, and its other dominant interests. Examples
are legion: a tribe that had no need to distinguish blue from green versus another that had over
100 words for colors and 200 for noises, Eskimos with many words for snow, seals, and water,
Africans with 25 words for "to carry," demonstrations of social structure by the words or lack of
them for different family members. 2) The other indicator of cultural viewpoint is found in the
formal elements of language. Boas notes that in English the verb "to be" always denotes time. A
verb is always put in the "form" [may be understood not to be actually denoting time] of present,
past, or future. Other cultures do not have the same character in their "to be" verb, but may
substitute location of an action, or the source of information, for our characteristic placement of
an act in time. Hesselgrave notes that in the Chinese language their affinity for particularity and
concreteness [see above discussion on cognition] comes out in their poverty of verbs, and the
plethora of nouns and compounds. Granet's study of the Book of Odes showed 18 words for
mountain, and 23 for horse.
Though Hesselgrave's focus is mostly on the contextualization side, since cross-cultural
communication is his aim, he operates from a firm conviction that there are transcendent
elements at work. Two quotations should make the case.
Robert E. Longacre has argued on linguistic grounds that the various languages gives evidence
of a common substructure and that this fact belies the idea that language is a product of evolution
and not a gift of God [p. 242].
The mystery, yes even the miracle of language, with the entire marvel of intelligible
communication, can be understood only on the basis of transcendental presuppositions [p. 242,
Wilbur Marshall Urban, Language and Reality, p. 84].
4. Behavioral Patterns—Ways of Acting
We Western philosophy students and novice linguists would probably be happy to have studied
worldview, cognition, and language, and just be done. But Hesselgrave has just begun. As we
will see momentarily, we must see "culture as communication" [quotes mine, idea his, p. 281] if
we are to have an adequate view of either communication or culture. Culture involves acting,
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interacting, and decision making within social structures. Our technological age precipitates
discussion on media of communication as well. So as we see, there is more to communicating to
the "mind of a people" than just dealing directly with the mind. The whole man is still in view.
Of primary importance in this section is Hesselgrave's interaction with a biologically based
analysis of culture/behavior that also views it from a communication standpoint. E. T. Hall
categorizes behavior in terms of ten "primary message systems" [hereafter PMS]. Only #1 is
linguistic and the rest are non-linguistic. They are
1. interaction
2. association
3. subsistence
4. bisexuality
5. territoriality
6. temporality
7. learning
8. play
9. defense
10. exploitation
Hall says that each PMS communicates the culture. Each PMS can be broken down into three
levels: isolates, which for example in language [interaction PMS] would correspond to
phonemes, sounds; sets, which would be like words, or morphemes; and patterns, which
grammar would represent in language. Each PMS, then is learned in three ways. There is formal
learning which might be like parents correcting/teaching their children at home and work. Then
there is informal learning by which the young assimilate by imitating models. Finally there is
technical learning, such as one would do at school in a detached and detailed way.
Perhaps the most important insight of Hall, which Hesselgrave affirms also, is that most of
culture is communicated at the imitation or informal level, where critical thinking does not enter
in readily. Culture is learned and reinforced primarily by absorption. Therefore if behavioral or
basic belief change is to be sought, says Hesselgrave, it must be reinforced heavily at the
informal, "out-of-awareness" level. I think that this is where Guiness's [via Peter Berger]
plausibility structures fit in.
Where Hall and Hesselgrave disagree fundamentally is in the placement of the mind. Hall's
system is biologically based and so culture/behavior, although couched in terms of
communication, never appeals to the mind as a source of communication. Hesselgrave on the
other hand maintains both ontologies of mind and matter in his seven categories of
communication [w. v., cognition, language, behavior, et al.]. Once this is established he goes on
to describe the role played by various categories of silent communication and their
interpretations in varying cultures: e.g. body motion, touching, proxemics, paralanguage, etc.
5. Social Structures-Ways of Interacting
At this stage in the discussion it becomes more and more difficult to maintain balance between
contextualization and transcendence. There are two basic social dynamics: one vertical and one
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horizontal. The vertical dimension has to do with class and rank. The horizontal dimension has to
do with homogeneity5 of the group at any level.
The strictures caused by the fall are that communication is easier or harder according to whether
or not one follows these constraining forces of social structure. In the fallen order
communication between the classes happens from the top down. This means that the missionary
who identifies himself unequivocally with the lower classes forfeits the opportunity to win the
upper classes. On the other hand the American missionary usually comes into a new culture near
the top of the socioeconomic ladder, at least because of his education if not his monetary backing
and standard of living. He has the opportunity to identify with the upper classes and win them to
Christ, and yet he does not go against the social grain in dealing also with the lower class.
Communication up the ladder is least affective.
Communication down from above is effective, but not always affective. Communication within,
horizontal to, a class if the most effective and affective. There is no doubt but that the gospel
transcends those barriers and the witness of the Church should be .that they are a class-less,
redeemed society, yet the evangelist must begin by working within the strictures of fallen
culture. As an outsider the missionary communicator has the opportunity which the national
Christian do not, to choose at what level he will enter society. He must be as wise as a serpent in
his choice.
6. Media Influence—Ways of Channeling the Message
There is no escaping Marshall McLuhan (Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, NY:
McGraw-Hill, 1964) when one begins-to talk about media. Hesselgrave does not try. His insights
are too keen to be ignored.
The first thing to understand about McLuhan is his definitions of media and message when he
says, “the media is the message.” Media for McLuhan becomes almost a synonym for
technology, whatever acts as an extension of the human body. Message should not be confused
with content. He defines message in terms of "impact" or effect and separates it from content
[385]. Hesselgrave thinks what he is getting at, more than that media changes the content of a
message, is that media have messages of their own to communicate, and sometimes the media
obscures the message.
The first effect of any media according to McLuhan's definition, and Ellul would agree I think, is
that though they are improvements in efficiency, they remove the realm of personal involvement.
As the media are more involved the personal involvement is diminished.
Secondly, especially in terms of visual media, communication becomes instantaneous. Images
communicate wholes immediately (as Ellul points out in his first chapter). Entire sets of
assumptions are in back of images. Hesselgrave points out the possibilities for misunderstanding
that are inherent. He gives the example of his post World War II ministry in Japan when he
5
Homogeneity might be seen in terms of the type of social setting a culture is in, or if they are in transition: egs.
tribal, peasant, or city society. Or it might be racial homogeneity, or religious. The point in homogeneity is that we
subconsciously trust those who are most like ourselves.
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showed an evangelistic film, but the nationals fixated on the American suburban houses. This is
why McLuhan says that motion picture viewing presupposes a high degree of literacy. Otherwise
the audience may be totally baffled by what they see, will be distracted by what we think are
minute details, and otherwise be confused by having read in their own worldview.
Hesselgrave says that media should be chosen according to purpose. If teaching content is the
main aim then the slower moving media, the ones which assume less participation/ background
on the part of the respondents, are the most appropriate. On the other hand the higher speed
media are more adapted to persuasion or reporting, but they also require more "participation"—
filling in the blanks— than the slower media [p. 393].
We must be aware of our own cultural preferences for certain types of media, and must adapt our
methods of presenting the gospel to the respondent culture. As Hesselgrave says, we must
remember that we are exporting the message of the media as well as the message of the gospel.
But most important to note is that no medium stands alone. Especially mass media, which
Westerners are prone to depend on. And the very thing we intend to do with mass evangelism is
the thing that mass media is poorest at doing.
"Mass media can help only indirectly to change strongly held attitudes or valued practices. . . .
[and] has never proved very effective in attacking attitudes, values, or social customs that are
deep-set or strongly held" [p. 404, Wilbur Schramm, The Process and Effects of Mass Media.
(Urbana: U of I, 1955), p. 152].
The best reinforcement for mass media, says Hesselgrave is live social contact. We can take a
lesson from the East that they once took from us. The fastest growing religious group in Japan is
Soka Gakkai, in which the Buddhists are adopting small group Christian style meetings for
fellowship and teaching.
7. Motivational Sources—Ways of Deciding. “Humanly speaking, people are persuaded for their
reasons, not ours”[p. 463].
This statement sums up the reason for exploring culturally the ways in which individuals and
groups make decisions. Decision making is a definite outgrowth of worldview and social
structure. As such the missionary must know the "points of contact" where he may be the most
persuasive, the pattern that the process of decision will follow according to the social structure,
and the transcendent dynamic of decision as both a point and process, as it operates in this fallen
universe.
Hesselgrave cites three general areas of contact to consider. 1) The religion/worldview of the
respondent culture is a place that many have tried to establish contact. It is a necessary point of
contact which will shape all that the missionary does, yet is it the place where primary
persuasion takes place? Dr. Hesselgrave says no. For three reasons he says no. a) The process is
philosophically suspect. By what rational standard do we judge one religion as better than
another? Reason is not the final court of appeal, for this would make it even above Christianity,
b) It is psychologically suspect. It is not able to deal with issues of the heart. And c) it is
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scientifically suspect since we know that similarities between religions as points of contact are
surface level only.
2) Others have tried felt needs as the point of contact for persuasion. Here is a fine approach as
long as felt needs are not confused with basic needs. Not all felt needs are basic needs. The
minister should concern himself primarily with basic needs and never let felt needs deter him
from ministering to basic needs of body, mind, and soul.
3) The most important point of contact, however, says Hesselgrave, is the person of the
missionary himself. He must be the ambassador of Christ in his message, and the incarnation of
Christ in his actions. If the respondents do not have access to this example of a "Christian" they
may never be persuaded that there is any comeliness in Christianity [pp. 434-36]. If the gospel
cannot make whole the man who comes to speak, then how can I believe there is any power for
me?
The next thing to understand about persuasion is the role that culture and social structure have on
the decision making process. For example in Eastern worldviews a premium might be placed on
non-action rather than action, because of a view that reality is dialectic. To chose one over
another would be to divide the natural order and step out of harmony with the universe.
For another example in many cultures decisions are made by consensus of the group.
Missionaries who force immediate individual decisions alienate the convert from his culture and
may lose the opportunity to win the group, where if they had appealed to the group consensus
may have been to accept Christ as a people.
Hesselgrave divides cultures into two major groups, each with two subgroups. The main
divisions are between collective-dependent decision makers and individual-independent
decision makers. But we find Western culture under both groups. There are cultures where
ancestors are the focus, and, in a sense, they provide the "peer pressure" toward or away from
decision. They, like modern Americans, make group decisions.
This is one of the really interesting phenomena that Hesselgrave brings up several times. There is
a circular movement from tribal features to individualism in a technological age, but then back
again to tribal elements. It is no small wonder that cell groups meet felt needs and cause such
growth in Western churches today. Most of us cannot stand the pressure that pluralism puts on us
to create our own meaning without social support. Even the individualism of centuries past in our
history was socially reinforced.
American individualism is an example of an individualism based on objective orientation—
absolutes. God, creation, revelation. On the other hand there is Eastern subjective individualism,
where decision is based on inner light, personal revelation. Each of these worldview orientations
is reflected in social structure and decision making paths.
Finally in understanding decision we need to see it both in terms of a point in time, and yet as a
process ongoing. What Hesselgrave describes in terms of five steps I would summarize by
saying that in all of our experiences of coming into Christ there is the initial process of hearing,
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wrestling, and coming to conviction. This is the point where our "decision" has been made. We
will follow Jesus. But following our decision we experience "dissonance," we go through trials
almost immediately which test our decision. We can either revert back to the world, or we can
complete/confirm our decision by immersing ourselves in the Christian life both individual and
corporate.
In the end this decision process is made on the basis of whether or not the new convert
understands that it is "worth it" to persevere. At the root of the Christian message, says
Hesselgrave, is communicating the basic message that the "reward" outweighs the "cost." Jesus
said, "What shall it profit a man, if he should gain the whole world and lose his own soul?"
James D. Strauss
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