A reoccupation scenario
EFRAIM INBAR
Monday, January 14, 2002 The Jerusalem Post
Strategic planning requires thinking about worst-case scenarios. One such scenario is the
reoccupadon of Palestinian cities - anathema to the Israeli body-politic, which largely prefers
separation from the Palestinians and has no appetite whatsoever for conquest of Arabpopulated areas and for the duties which accompany occupation. The strategic rationale for
reoccupation is also doubtful.
Despite Israeli reluctance, reoccupation, particularly of the West Bank, is not a far fetched
event. The probability of the Israel Defense Forces taking over all or a large part of the
territories transferred to the Palestinians as part of the "Oslo process" has increased and the
political atmosphere conducive to an Israeli invasion is ripening.
In Israel, the Oslo peace process has been largely discredited. Since the Palestinians
launched their violent campaign in September 2000, the Israeli government and the majority
of Jews in Israel are gradually accepting the prognosis of IDF Intelligence that the Palestinian
Authority - particularly its chairman, Yasser Arafat - is incapable of becoming a bearable
neighbor. So far, the authoritarian and corrupt Palestinian Authority has failed to establish a
political entity with monopoly over the use of force, thus allowing armed militias freedom of
action. The current attempts by Arafat to limit violence are not seen as intended to dismantle
the armed groups and to confiscate illegal weapons, but to create an atmosphere conducive
to a greater receptiveness in the world to Palestinian demands. However, as long as Arafat's
policies against the radical militias are insufficient to end the violence against Jews, they are
unlikely to generate significant international pressure on Israel to curtail its counterterror
policies.
Moreover, the capture of the Karine A freighter carrying large quantities of Iranian-supplied
weapons, has eased the Israeli campaign to portray Arafat and the PA as worthwhile
negotiating partners. Even the Europeans, once staunch supporters of the Palestinians,
have questioned Arafat's commitment to the peace process. Arafat has lost much of his
international support, which had previously constituted a serious constraint on the IDF's
freedom of action against the PA.
We already see clear erosion in the sanctity of PA-ruled territories as a threshold for Israeli
military operations. In the past months we witnessed an increasing number of lengthy
incursions by IDF units into Palestinian cities. In some parts of the PA-ruled territories the
Israeli presence acquired semi-permanence. Growing IDF presence in several locations
seems almost an inevitable form for providing a modicum of security. The world has become
accustomed to such a presence.
An Israeli invasion could be the result of several security considerations. For example, the
illicit Palestinian procurement of Katyushas with a 20-kilometer range, such as were
intercepted on the Karine A, may force Israel into an attempt to control all areas adjacent to
the border to remove the threat to Israeli cities and airports. Indications of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles in Palestinian hands could also become a casus belli. The realization that the
Palestinians have acquired capabilities which are potentially very detrimental to Israel and
that the current military engagement is no longer able to contain the security dangers
emanating from the Palestinian Authority would propel the IDF into large-scale action. Such
preemptive strikes are a part of the Israeli strategic menu.
A failed Palestinian state - the current situation is nearing this status - would breed internal
chaos and free terrorists of any constraints. This might elicit Israeli intervention. While
domestic turmoil weakens the Palestinian revisionist national movement - in the long run a
beneficial development to regional stability - short-run security considerations, such as limiting
terrorist activities, may push Israel into reoccupation of areas breeding high levels of
terrorism.
The continuous violence may actually leave Israel no choice but to intensify its military
responses to the war the Palestinians have conducted since September 2000. Few countries
facing the current level of Israeli casualties would be willing to demonstrate restraint.
Moreover, if the Labor Party were to leave the government the domestic constraints for
destroying the PA would be lessened. It seems that Israel should prepare itself for the
undesirable, but maybe inevitable, scenario of reoccupation. Actually, occupation is not
necessarily a dirty word. Failed states such as Bosnia and Afghanistan have come under a
form of occupation. At the end of World War II the US occupied Germany and Japan and
restructured the political system of its two former enemies, turning them into respectable
democracies and members of the Western camp.
It is not clear that Palestinian society has the ingredients that were existent in Germany and
Japan for a similar transformation. Moreover, Israel's resources for such radical political
engineering are more limited than America's. Yet, an occupation which entails a greater
Israeli willingness than in the past to obliterate corruption, to initiate democratic reform, and to
introduce a new school curriculum to educate for true coexistence between Arabs and Jews
might elicit tacit approval even from Palestinians who are fed up with Arafat's rule.
The vision of building a new Palestinian body-politic through occupation is probably not very
realistic. This leaves the option of reoccupation of the West Bank as quite an unattractive one
for Israel, although due to Palestinian failures Israel seems to be moving in that direction.