Psy 531 Affects and emotions
A Brief Introduction to Appraisal Theories
As we’ve discussed, many theorists believe it is definitional of emotions that they are
intentional states, i.e., that they are about something such as an object or event. In
particular, they reflect an assessment of the meaning of that object or event. The
dimensions along which meanings are assessed are often referred to as appraisal
dimensions.
Appraisal along some dimensions, e.g., the dimensions of valence and some version of
arousal or activation or salience, seems necessary to defining a state as affective.
Russell and Feldman Barrett identify the affective states determined by appraisal along
just these two dimensions as “core affects.” But core affects can exist without being
clearly attached to an object/event. The resulting “free-floating” or diffuse affects
arguably should not be classified as emotions unless or until they are attributed to an
object/event.
Other appraisal dimensions, such as certainty and responsibility/agency, seem
important to distinguishing among different emotional states. For some theorists, all
these dimensions are clearly “cognitive” in nature, because they involve interpretation
and the assessment of meaning. For others, some of these dimensions reflect built-in
behavioral and/or affiliative dispositions, which become clearly “cognitive” only when
reflected upon and/or “managed.”
Are some of these appraisal dimensions “basic” or fundamental? Those who answer
“yes” tend also to believe that there is a relatively small set of fundamental emotions (or
of families of emotions), such that particular combinations of appraisals can predict (and
be predicted by) self-reported/experienced emotion. These authors (e.g., Lazarus,
Scherer, Roseman, C. Smith, Ellsworth) point to a set of abstract (i.e., relatively content
free) dimensions of appraisal. It is important to note that these authors do not deny that
there are important social and cultural influences on the interpretation of specific
eliciting situations, on expressive and behavioral tendencies, and on conceptual
(especially linguistically-mediated) representations of emotions. Nor do they deny the
importance of differences in physical and social environments. But they do suggest that:
. . . the relationship between appraisals and emotions is culturally general,
perhaps even universal . . . If people from different cultures appraise a
situation in the same way, they will experience the same emotion. If they
experience a different emotion, it is because they have appraised the
situation differently.
Ellsworth, P. & Scherer, K. (2002). p. 584.
Opposed to these appraisal theorists are authors (e.g., Ortony, Feldman Barrett) who
believe that the number of possible appraisal dimensions and the number of different
possible emotional experiences is, essentially, unlimited. This is another case in which
different views arise from focusing on commonalities or on differences across
individuals and cultures.
Appended is a table in which three sets of proposed cognitive appraisal dimensions are
organized to highlight their similarities. On the back of the page is Roseman’s (1991)
structural theory of appraisals. Finally, I also append an analysis of sadness and anger
emotion episodes on several emotion episode components, including appraisal
dimensions.
Suggested reading: appraisal dimensions (does not include papers assigned for March 5)
Ellsworth, P. & Scherer, K. (2002). Appraisal processes in emotion, In Davidson, R.J.,
Scherer, K. & Goldsmith, H. (2002). Handbook of Affective Sciences, Oxford
University Press, pp. 572-595. (LR and one copy in Psych Lounge)
Ellsworth, P.C. (1994). Some reasons to expect universal antecedents of emotion, In
Ekman, P. & Davidson, R.J. (Eds). The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions,
Oxford University Press, pp. 150-154. (LR)
Lazarus, R. (1994). Universal antecedents of emotion. In In Ekman, P. & Davidson,
R.J. (Eds). The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, Oxford University
Press, pp. 163-171. (LR)
Lewis, M.D. (1996) Self-organising cognitive appraisals, Cognition & Emotion, 10, 1-25.
Mauro, R., Sato, K, & Tucker, J. (1992). The role of appraisal in human emotions: a
cross-cultural study, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 62(2), 301-317.
Scherer, K.R. (1997). Profiles of emotion-antecedent appraisal: testing theoretical
predictions across cultures, Cognition & Emotion, 11(2), 113-150.
Scherer, K.R., Schorr, A. & Johnstone, T. (2001). Appraisal Processes in Emotion,
Oxford University Press. Especially the introductory chapter by Roseman & Smith.
Special issue of Cognition & Emotion: Appraisal and Beyond, 7(3/4), 1993.
“Classics”
Roseman, I. J., (1991). Appraisal determinants of discrete emotions, Cognition &
Emotion, 5(3), 161-200.
Smith, C.A. & Ellsworth, P.C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion,
Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 48(4), 813-838.
Smith, C.A. & Lazarus, R.S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational themes, and
the emotions, Cognition & Emotion, 7(3/4), 233-269.
Comparison of Anger and Sadness Episodes
In terms of core affects:
Both are negatively valenced (normally)
Sadness nearly always negative, anger more likely to have some pleasant
aspects (especially when pleasant and unpleasant rated on separate
scales)
Anger generally more aroused and, thus, intense
Both are considered by many to be “basic” emotions
Anger associated with increased sympathetic nervous system activity, sadness
more variable – sometimes parasympathetic dominant
Dimensions of cognitive appraisal
Presence of goal-related obstacle in both
Urgency higher for anger than sadness
Clear differences in agency
Anger: usually other person (but can be object), certainty variable
Sadness: situational source (can be specific), certain loss
Legitimacy low, usually lower for anger
Ability to cope (potency)
Anger: high
Sadness: low (loss usually irrevocable)
Behavioral responses
Anger: approach, aggression, assertiveness
Sadness: withdrawal, lethargy
Distinct facial expressions (sadness consistently recognized, anger more
variable)
Functional analyses:
Sadness: time to re-evaluate, evocation of social support
Anger: assertion of status, demand for reparation or change in behavior
Relationships to other emotions
Sadness can lead to anger if a distinct source of blame can be identified
Can be accompanied by fear/anxiety if loss leaves one in threatened state
Depression: pathological sadness?
Grief: sadness-related emotion syndrome
Anger can lead to happiness if reparation/change achieved
To fear or to sadness if attempt to change situation fails,
To shame if inappropriate (function-unrelated or overly intense) responses
occur
To guilt if source initially misidentified
Pathological anger: antisocial personality
Cardiovascular consequences of “hostile anger”