Virtue ethics
Consequentialist and deontic theories aim to explain good or right action. You may
feel that neither approach finally addresses why one should be moral. Nor do they
adequately accommodate the importance of one’s character in the formation of moral
decisions and actions and the role of the character of others in one’s moral
evaluations of them. This emphasis on character and the dispositions which shape
our attitudes and judgements is found in an approach to ethics known as virtue
theory. Here the focus shifts from what makes an action good or right to the question
of how one should be. This finds expression in the attempt to spell out the
constitutive elements of the good life.
In very, very rough terms the historical trajectory of virtue theory begins with Plato
and Aristotle who both emphasised the role of virtues and character in ethical
thinking. In the thirteenth century Aquinas synthesised Christian dogma with a
broadly Aristotelian approach. However, Kant’s attempt to ground ethical thought in
pure reason and the utilitarian emphasis on outcomes set modern moral thinking on
a course away from a consideration of character. The moral law abstracts away from
the naturalistic contingency of character and consequences appeal to the satisfaction
of (questionably) measurable aspects of one’s psychology or interests. The revival of
the influence of virtue theory since the late 1950s is due to Philosophers such as
Elizabeth Anscombe1 and Alasdair MacIntyre.2 The moral approaches inherited from
the Enlightenment had left us with the language of duty and obligation, but this has
ceased to be anchored in a common way of life, sets of traditions and practices
which make them meaningful. To know how to be and what to do one needs to be
embedded in a form of life which provides a kind of unity or narrative to the
development of a person’s character. Contemporary interest in the role of virtue and
character has also been boosted by work on the significance of the emotions in
shaping our attitudes, judgements and character.
Set out below are notes on the position developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean
Ethics (NE), which sets the agenda for virtue theory.
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Context
Intellectual background and interests. Works in practical philosophy - Magna Moralia
(not by A). Eudemian Ethics. Nicomachean Ethics. (EE IV-VI = NE V-VII). Politics.
NE X9 - ethics and political science parts of a single enquiry. Edited lecture notes.
The Greek city state. Male citizen body who participated in the governance of the
state. Relatively small social and public space. Attitude to those outside of that
culture. Prior to impact of Christianity - Aristotle 384-322 BCE.
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The purpose and method of ethics
Ethics is concerned with praise and blameworthy actions and the states of
character of (rational) agents. The focus is on the question of how one ought to
live, of what the good life is. Ethics aims to elucidate the good for individual and
community (NE I 2). Ethics centrally interested in virtues (and vices) - a virtue
(arete) is a disposition of character which has the right pattern of motivation.
Virtues include courage, temperance, generosity, magnanimity, truthfulness,
justice. Significance of the emotions and their development.
‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, Philosophy (33) 1958 pp.1-19.
After Virtue (University of Notre Dame Press, 1981)
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Theoretical and practical knowledge. Ethics is not a fit subject for the young and
inexperienced.
Naturalism - ethics grounded in an account of human nature
Cannot expect precision beyond that which is appropriate for the subject matter
(NE I 3). Look to the opinions of the wise and the many.
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Action - means and ends.
The teleological framework. Everything has an end or purpose (telos): knives,
eyes, foxes and humans.
The ultimate end of human action is happiness; it is an end sought for its own
sake; it is complete and self-sufficient. 'Happiness'. The concept of eudaimonia flourishing, well-being, a fulfilled life. Richer notion of happiness than mere
pleasure. But N.B. the contribution of pleasure.
Candidates for the eudaemon life (I 4,5): a life of money making; a life of sensual
pleasure; a life in which one is well thought of. Not capture what we can mean
when we talk of a fulfilled life or of what is to enjoy well-being or to flourish or to
be truly happy.
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Function and the function argument
The function argument (NE I 7). The good life for some thing is a life spent in
pursuit and realisation of its end. The ultimate end of some kind (say a species)
can be identified by a consideration of its distinctive function (ergon), capacities
or characteristic activity. An X achieves its goal or end (telos) when it functions
properly. Humans share features with all other kinds of organisms - at the most
general of levels - all organisms have as functions survival, growth, reproduction.
Humans are distinguished by possession of reason (and language). Possession
of logos is essential to being human. The human function is the exercise of
reason.
As an essentially rational creature the good life must a life guided by reason.
Aristotle tell us that 'human good turns out to be activity of the soul exhibiting (in
accordance with) excellence, and if there are more than one excellence (virtue),
in accordance with the best and most complete' (NE I 7). 'Happiness is an activity
of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue' (NE I 13). At this stage the detail of
such a life remains to be specified and Aristotle goes on to analyse the nature of
the virtues in the following books.
The concept of soul. The form or organising principle, animating the matter of our
body. Human flourishing consists in performing well those activities of which our
soul renders us capable.3
Across a complete life happiness, well-being, flourishing consists in the exercise
of the virtues. A person acts in certain ways because she sees that it is the right
thing to do and is moved to act for its own sake. Pleasure in the action.
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The human good
The virtues and the mean
Moral virtue (or virtues of character) and intellectual virtue.
Key role of practical wisdom (phronesis). The highest skill or virtue of the mind in
thinking about practical matters to see what is good for oneself and for men in
general. The practically wise man (phronimos) can judge what ought to be done
C.f. Hughes, G., Aristotle on Ethics (Routledge) esp. p.37
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or how one should be in this particular situation. Develop virtue through being
brought up properly, habituation, engagement with others and practice.
Performing just actions, being generous and so on leads one to develop that kind
of character and to choose such actions for their own sake. Virtues are
dispositions developed through practice and habituation. The importance of
having the right kind of emotional responsiveness.
To possess a virtue is to observe the mean between excess and deficiency (NE II
6, 8-9). Virtue is a mean between two vices. Consider e.g. the virtues courage
and good temper.
The doctrine of the mean is not a doctrine of moderation (consider the failure
involved in not being angry enough sometimes) and it is not an appeal to a
method of (quasi) quantification or measurement - c.f. mean 'in relation to the
thing'
The doctrine of the mean telling us to have the right motivations to undertake the
appropriate action to the right degree on the right occasion towards the right
people. Empty and unhelpful?
Conflict of virtues and judgements . The role of practical wisdom. The rationality
of the emotions - our responses properly attuned to the states with which we are
confronted.
The unity of the virtues.
Of the challenges and questions which arise let's consider some of the following.
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Instrumentalism?
Flourishing and the virtues. The various virtues are pursued for their own sake
and for the sake of eudaimonia. So, should we regard happiness as a more final
end? We always choose happiness for its own sake. This is not the case with
honour, pleasure, intelligence, and good qualities generally. We do pursue them
partly for their own sake, but also for the sake of happiness in the belief they will
be instrumental in promoting it (NE I 7). But why should being pursed for their
own sake and for that of something else render virtues inferior?4 See Norman pp
28-31 for discussion on this and related issues. We should see A's point as being
that happiness is not the same kind of thing as a virtue such as courage, but that
happiness is constituted by possession of them.
The consistency of Aristotle's account : inclusive and dominant goods
Happiness or flourishing is then a state enjoyed in virtue of being virtuous in
character and acting accordingly. At the risk of oversimplification there is a
dispute as to whether we should understand happiness to consist in one kind of
activity, for whose sake we ultimately do everything else (the dominant
interpretation). Or, whether happiness consists in a package of activities (the
inclusivist interpretation).
The picture through much of NE is that happiness consists in a range of goods or
activities - a life guided by practical wisdom. This encourages the inclusivist view
of e.g. Ackrill. In NE X 7 we are told that happiness is to be identified with just
one good: it consists in a single rational activity, that of philosophical
contemplation. This looks as clear a statement of the dominant view as one
could wish for. Then in NE X 8 it appears that a flourishing life consists in the
See Norman, R., The Moral Philosophers (Clarendon, 1983) pp.28-31. Chapters 3&4 have a
good discussion on Aristotle.
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multifaceted activities of good citizenship. Is Aristotle just inconsistent? Perhaps
a problem in the editing of the lectures?
The life for the few and the life for the many?
Is the inclusivist interpretation the more plausible? Again note the constitutive
relationship between a set of goods and activities and a fulfilled life. One
suggestion - could we see contemplation as the best element of the good life, but
one which is not the good for the whole human being since we are not in fact
gods or pure intellects?
Another suggestion (stretching perhaps what the text can stand!) - there is an
interplay and interdependence between practical and theoretical reasoning in a
fulfilled life. In acting as well as we can we understand what it means to act in
that fashion and the way in which our conduct relates to the structure of one's life
and the world in which that life unfolds. Theoretical reflection for its own sake and
directed at a life guided by practical wisdom is how we can come to give fullest
expression to our distinctive capacity of reason. C.f. Hughes pp. 45-51
Problems with the function argument
Analogy with artefacts - who or what determines the function of humans?
Analogy with organs - the function of an organ specified in relation to the creature
of which it is a part. Of what whole in the individual human a part? But appeal to
the notion of flourishing being connected to essence? But is reason or logos our
essence?
Why should our flourishing be determined by our unique feature(s)?
What is characteristically human? One might emphasise the continuities with
animals.
The teleological background
Women and slaves - a problem?
Virtue and morality
Is the Aristotelian account unduly conservative? Narrow cultural space.
Promotion of traditional virtues. Scope for reflection and criticism?
Is it committed to egoism? Selfishness and moral egoism. The good life grounded
in consideration of the self. The question of what kind of person to be opens
space for seeing the needs of others as such.
The virtuous criminal. I may employ great skill, intelligence, courage and
judgement in my criminal activities. I may even be generous to the poor. There
seems much to admire about my character, but my actions are wrong. How can
the Aristotelian approach account for this?
Challenges to naturalist accounts of morality.
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