Reading list Autumn 2009
Obligatory Course Reading
Aglietta, M, Rebérioux, A (2005), Corporate Governance Adrift. A critique of shareholder value,
Cheltenham, ch 2 (27 p)
Barca, F, Becht, M (ed) (2002), The Control of Corporate Europe, chap.1 (Introduction by Becht an
Mayer) (45 p)
Berglöf, E (1994), A Control Theory of Venture Capital, Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 10(1) (20 pages)
Demski, J (2003), Corporate conflicts of interest, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 17, no 2
(21 pages),(Library, Online)
Gugler, K (ed) (2001), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance, Oxford, chap. 1-3 (31
Jensen, M, Ruback, R (1983), The market for corporate control. The scientific evidence, Journal of
Financial Economics (42 pages) (Library, Online)
La Porta, R, Lopez-de Silanes, F, Schleifer, A, Vishny, R (2000), Investor protection and corporate
governance, Journal of Financial Economics 58 (24 pages), (Library, Online)
Lazonick, W, O’Sullivan, M (2000), Maximizing shareholder value: a new ideology for corporate
governance, Economy and Society, vol. 29, no. 1 (22 pages)
Milgrom, P, Roberts, J (1992), Economics, Organization & Management, London, chap. 2, 5, 6, 8
(135 pages)
Rajan, R, Zingales, L (2003), The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the
twentieth century, Journal of Financial Economics 69, 5-50, (excluding 4.6 – 4.8 and A1 – A4) (30
Schleifer, A, Vishny, R (1997), A survey of corporate governance, The Journal of Finance (38
Tirole, J (2001), Corporate Governance, Econometrica, vol. 69, no. 1 (the following is excluded 2.2
– 3) (34 pages), (Library, Online)
Vives, X (ed) (2000), Corporate governance. Theoretical and empirical perspectives, Cambridge,
chap. 6 (25 pages)
The country report used in ‘Group work on the “Standard View of Corporate Governance”’ (from
Gugler, K (ed), “Corporate governance and economic performance”, Oxford 2001)
Suggested Supplementary Reading
Berglöf, E, Pajuste, A (2003), Emerging Owners, Eclipsing Markets. Corporate governance in
Central and Eastern Europe (ch 11 in Cornelius, P K, Kogut, B (eds), Corporate Governance and
Capital Flows in a Global Economy), Oxford
Bottazi, L, Da Rin,M, Hellmann, T, “Active financial intermediation: Evidence on the role of
organizational specialization and human capital”,
Consultation on future priorities for the action plan on modernising company law and enhancing
corporate governance in the European Union, Directorate General for Internal Market and Services,
December 2005
European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA), Survey of the Economic and
Social Impact of Management Buyouts & Buyins in Europe, Research Paper 2001
Hansmann, H (1996), The Ownership of Enterprise, Cambridge, chap. 5 (pages 69-79), chap. 6
(pages 89-98, 105-117)
Hellman,T, Puri, M, The interaction between product market and financing strategy: the role of
venture capital, The Review of Financial Studies, 2000
Jensen, M C (2003), A theory of the firm: governance, residual claims, and organizational forms,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, ch 1.3 (pages 63 – 79)
Lazear, E (1995), Personnel Economics, Cambridge, pages 136-143
Murphy, K J, Executive Compensation, Marshall School of Business, University of Southern
Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union – A plan
to move forward, The EU Commission, Brussels 21.5.2003
Rebérioux, A (2002), European Style of Corporate Governance at the Crossroads: The role of
worker involvement, Journal of Common Market Studies, volume 40, number 1 (Library, Online)
Swedish Competition Authority (2002), The pros and cons of merger control, chap. 2
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