The Instrumental Value Link Between Humans and Non-Humans
Environmentalists have lauded the intrinsic values of species, natural processes, and the
earth itself since the origin of the conservation movement. The intrinsic value of the earth and its
non-human inhabitants, the value of the thing-in-itself, transcends both utility-, and monetary-based
standards. It is not the intention of this paper to challenge the existence of these values. Rather, I
wish to show that the use of intrinsic values for conservation’s sake might do more harm than good.
Norton (1991) shows that a division exists between conservation biologists and
environmental philosophers. This division rests on the way that the groups perceive one another’s
stance. Conservation biology’s goal is to preserve all species and gene distributions within species.
Environmental philosophers would not disagree with such a noble goal; in fact, natural entities’
intrinsic value encourages the notion of gene and species conservation. However, the use of nonpragmatic measures may turn the scientist away from environmental philosophy. Intrinsic values
held by one group may inhibit the transfer of ideas among groups. Polarization of groups seeking
similar goals is inherently less productive than cooperation between these groups.
Norton’s convergence hypothesis states that the ultimate goal of both instrumental and
intrinsic value systems is the conservation of biological diversity. Neither value system can survive
without the continued pursuit of biodiversity. Indeed, the ultimate goal of these two supposedly
incongruous value systems is the same. Furthermore, Brown and Peterson (1993) point out that
intrinsic values are chosen and defended by humans, just as instrumental values are. Thus, our
intrinsic values are also preference-based.
A frequently cited reason to preserve extant tropical rainforests is the possibility of future
pharmaceutical products. Although it is obvious that tropical rainforests have many possible
instrumental benefits to humans, species within the rainforests have coevolved, and thus have
instrumental benefits to one another. Bengston (1993) aptly states that, “…everything, or every
event has consequences for other things or events…everything does have its instrumental value.”
With this notion in mind, it seems almost arrogant to attribute intrinsic value to species from which
we receive no instrumental value. In effect, we are claiming that if no economic gain manifests
from a certain species, we must attribute a philosophical sense of value to the organism in order to
protect it.
Of course, environmental philosophers probably have no intention of portraying such
arrogance. Instead, the intrinsic values they create are commonly used to defend species with no
monetary value. As was previously stated, intrinsic value systems and conservation biology strive
for the same goal: conservation of species. The reasoning differs slightly, but in both cases the
beneficiary is the human species. No intrinsically-oriented argument would, or could exclude the
human valuer. Intrinsic values lose their meaning as the human factor is removed.
For instance, it is desirable to protect the spotted owl species for myriad reasons. The owl’s
intrinsic value can arguably be used as one of these reasons. Wouldn’t one of the more important,
and politically gainful, issues at hand be the possible lost link in the food chain, a chain which we
are also a part of? The intrinsic value we find in other species is derived from the intrinsic value
that we feel for the human race. Thus, it can be argued that the intrinsic value of non-human
species is instrumental since our main concern lies in perpetuating the existence of the human race.
As Immanuel Kant (~1785) asserts, “Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards
humanity.” I encourage the sentiment behind Kant’s words; the preservation of biological
diversity, a common goal of both environmental philosophers and conservation biologists, must
agree that humans are truly endangering themselves by exterminating others. Otherwise, those who
oppose the use of intrinsic values as a method of finding worth in non-human species have few
reasons to care about the spotted owl and similar creatures.
Intrinsic values are a comforting way for some to argue for the conservation of species and
habitat. However, it stands that these objectives can be met through other, less controversial and
thus, divisive means. The true goal of conservation biology, the sustained well-being of the human
race, is much more fitting.
I would not, for a second, condemn one for citing intrinsic value of a species as a positive
aspect of its existence. Instead, I wish to only assert that the use of intrinsic values to protect the
continued existence of a species has two negative consequences: 1.It segregates populations who
share a common goal, and; 2.We take the focus off of the intended beneficiary of the cause:
humans. Without the human focus many persons uninterested in an endangered species of mollusk
may pay little attention to environmental issues.
Works Cited
Bengston, David N. 1993. “Changing forest values and ecosystem management.” Society and
NaturalResources 7:515:533.
Brown, Thomas C., and George L. Peterson. 1993. “A political-economic perspective on sustained
ecosystem management.” In: Covington, W. W., and L. F. DeBano, (tech. coords.)
Sustainable ecological systems: implementing an ecological approach to land management.
USDA Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Forest and Range Experiment Station. Ft. Collins,
Co. General Technical Report RM-247. pp. 228-235.
Kant, Immanuel. “Duties to Animals.” In: Botzler, Richard G., and S. J. Armstrong,
Environmental Ethics: Divergence and Convergence. 1998. McGraw Hill, Boston. p. 312313.
Norton, B. G. 1991. “Toward Unity Among Environmentalists.” Oxford University Press, New
York.