Diversity Management and Otherness-Politics:
Organising (with) Difference
How a theoretical thinking about diversity can make a
difference in addressing policies and actions
MA Thesis
Genderstudies Department
Faculty of Humanities
Utrecht University
First Reader: Drs. I.van der Tuin
Second Reader: Dr. M. Zarzycka
T.J.K. van Eijk
0007544
12 June 2008
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the many people who have supported me throughout the process
of writing this thesis. I especially want to express all my gratitude to my first feminist
teacher and mentor at the Department of Genderstudies,Utrecht University, drs. Iris
van der Tuin for all her help, ideas and encouragements, she remains a big inspiration
to me. Very special thanks to prof. dr. Rosi Braidotti, who has been a motivator,
inspirator and a role model to me. Her belief in me pushed me to make my work
better. My appreciation to dr. Marta Zarzycka for her time to read and comment on
my thesis. A big thanks to Elisabeth van Dijl for a far superior knowledge of the
English language. I am very grateful to the staff and students at the Department of
Genderstudies, Utrecht University, for providing such a stimulating environment in
which to study. Finally, I owe particularly deep debts of gratitude to my parents, for
supporting me in all endeavours, including this one and to my partner Bas
Nieuwenhof for his constant source of love, patience and understanding.
2
Contents
Introduction................................................................................................................... 4
1.
The history of gender theory and the diversity-discourse ......................... 8
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
2.
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
3.
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
4.
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.5.
4.6.
4.7.
5.
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
6.
6.1.
6.2.
6.3.
6.4.
6.5.
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 8
Equality debates within feminism .................................................................................... 10
Situated Knowledges ......................................................................................................... 11
Intersectionality .................................................................................................................. 12
Critical debates in the diversity literature ................................................... 13
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 13
A narrow and broad definition of diversity ...................................................................... 13
A stable and dynamic conception of identity .................................................................. 15
Power ................................................................................................................................... 16
Socio-historical context ..................................................................................................... 17
Trappings of diversity management ........................................................... 19
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 19
Marginalisation ................................................................................................................... 20
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 21
Diversity equals identity: Implied choices .................................................. 24
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 24
Identity Politics and diversity ............................................................................................ 24
Critique on Identity Politics ............................................................................................... 25
Feminism and Identity Politics ......................................................................................... 26
Nealon on Identity Politics ................................................................................................ 27
Shaping side-roads: Diversity multiplies Otherness ..................................................... 28
Qualifying and altering Otherness ................................................................................... 29
Becoming Other, becoming indiscernible .................................................. 31
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 31
Becomings and multiplicities ............................................................................................ 31
Becoming Other in the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari ............................................. 33
Rosi Braidotti on becoming in Deleuze and Guattari .................................................... 35
Sara Ahmed on becoming in Deleuze and Guattari ..................................................... 36
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 37
Safe, social-cultural, spaces ........................................................................ 38
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 38
Relationships as safe space............................................................................................. 39
Music as safe space .......................................................................................................... 39
Writings as safe space ...................................................................................................... 40
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 40
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 41
References ................................................................................................................. 44
3
Introduction
My internship at the Dutch Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water
Management, a part of the Master’s programme Comparative Women’s Studies in
Culture and Politics, made me aware of the great popularity of the term ‘diversity
management’. For their direction Human Resources and Management Organisation
(HRMO), I conducted a research on ‘diversity and women in top positions’ within the
organisation. Diversity management is a key human resource strategy within this
sector and is fast becoming an element of good business and practice. Diversity
management is also increasingly viewed as a managerial policy and modality of
governance, devised as a means to pursue economic productivity with greater
efficiency instead of reflecting the claims and demands of marginalised groups.
As a working definition for diversity management throughout my thesis I refer
to the work of Roosevelt Thomas, who defined diversity management in Beyond Race
and Gender as “a comprehensive managerial process for developing an environment
that works for all employees”.1 Diversity management means, according to Roosevelt
Thomas, approaching diversity at three levels simultaneously: individual,
interpersonal and organisational. Diversity management is as an issue for the entire
organisation, involving the very way organisations are structured. Diversity
management approaches diversity from a management perspective. That is, it deals
with the way organisations are managed and the way managers do their jobs. It is
grounded in a very specific definition of ‘managing’: “creating an environment that
allows the people being managed to reach their full potential. At its best, it means
getting from employees not only everything you have a right to expect, but everything
they have to offer”.2
Studies on diversity management seem to have a two-fold purpose. A first
purpose is to identify discriminatory practices in the workplace. Several studies have
examined the working experiences of minority groups, inducing our attention to
phenomena such as the glass ceiling effect3, wage differences4 and segregation5. A
1
R. Roosevelt Thomas, Beyond Race and Gender: Unleashing the Power of Your Total Work Force by
Managing Diversity (New York 1992) 10.
2
Idem, 12.
3
For example: T. Cox and S. Nkomo, Factors affecting the upward mobility of black managers in
private sector organisations in: Review of Black Political Economy 1990, 18 (3) 39-48.
4
second purpose is to examine the effects of diversity on work-related outcomes. For
instance, studies have examined the relationship between value diversity and conflict,
or between cognitive heterogeneity and problem-solving capabilities.6 Striving to
achieve one (or both) of the two purposes, the diversity (management) domain has
primarily focused on the consequences of diversity and seems to have neglected
theoretical reflections on the notions of ‘diversity’, ‘difference’, or ‘the Other’. This
apparent need for theorising has been indicated by reknowned scholars in the field,
such as Sara Ahmed, concerned about the continuation of the diversity domain.7
Currently, the scholarly diversity domain seems to be in an ‘identity crisis’,
with critical debates concerning the future direction of ‘diversity studies’ and how
theorising and concept-development can play a role in this. Also, in ‘practice’
contexts, a call for conceptualisation and reframing can be noticed. The number of
diversity programmes, of legal measures and social strategies is still growing, but my
evaluation is that the everyday reality of dealing with, and changing diversity issues is
one of ‘things that are easier said than done’. (Outcomes that differ from conforming
to what is common practice, from serving the mainstream and powerful are not very
‘popular’). My internship experience at the Ministry made it all the more clear to me
that every action proposal has a political implication and that even the way people talk
and think about problems and solutions can be sensitive. Though the value of
structural, legal and cultural interventions has been recognised, many critical
L. Wirth, Breaking through the glass ceiling. Women in Management (Geneva:International Labour
Office 2001).
4
J. Ashraf, Is gender pay discrimination on the wane? Evidence from panel data, 1968-1989 in:
Industrial and Labour Relations Review 1996, 49 (3) 537-547.
F.D. Blau and A.H. Beller, Trends in earnings differential by gender, 1971-1981 in: Industrial and
Labour Relations Review 1988, 41 513-529.
5
R. Anker, Gender and jobs: sex segregation of occupations in the world (Geneva: International
Labour Office 1998).
H. Ibarra, Ethnicity, opportunity and diversity of social circles in managerial networks in: Academy of
Management Journal 1995, 38 (3) 673-703.
6
For a review see: F. J. Milliken and L.L. Martins, ‘Searching for common threads: Understanding the
multiple effects of diversity in organisational groups’ in: Academy of Managements Review 1996, 21
(2) 402-433.
7
Sara Ahmed is Lecturer at the Institute for Women’s Studies at Lancaster University. Following her
first degree at the University of Adelaide, she undertook doctoral studies at the Centre for Critical and
Cultural Theory, Cardiff University before taking up her present post. She has published widely on
feminist and critical theoretical themes, and is editor of the Women’s Studies Network (UK)
Association, of which she has been an executive committee member since 1996.
(http://assets.cambridge.org/97805215/92253/sample/9780521592253web.pdf) Last accessed: April 1 st
2008.
5
comments have simultaneously been raised.8 Furthermore, HRMO-practices such as
recruitment and training as a way to manage diversity seem to have a rather limited
impact, incapable of changing social relations and cultural values. It could be
suggested that using ‘old’ and well-known methods makes diversity into an equally
‘old’ problem that is not really given a chance to be looked at and listened to with a
fresh theoretical perspective.9
Therefore, I will take a step back in my thesis to think about diversity
theoretically, arguing that it is the thinking itself that has to become different and that
a different thinking will make a difference in addressing policies and actions. If it is
accepted that this is the case, the challenge is to continually renegotiate what a wider
concern with diversity, motivated not by economic productivity but by social justice,
might entail, and then to create space for the institutional development of this broader
vision. Moreover, the challenge also entails affirming the continued need for diversity
ánd equality, reclaiming older, unfashionably universal, equality agendas.
The main point I aim to establish in this thesis is that diversity is not a matter
of constructing identities per se, but of a moving Otherness. Following this line of
thought, I question whether diversity can be approached policy-wise as a
‘management tool’ and propose to address it as a ‘politics’. For this, I will depart from
the current debates in diversity management, in which I identify four main issues: a
narrow or broad definition of diversity, a stable or dynamic conception of identity, the
role of power, and the importance of the socio-historical context. With the discussion
of these four issues, I will try to indicate the implicit ‘theoretical’ choices prioritising
the concept of ‘identity’, turning the issues of diversity into a managing of individuals
and ‘their’ identities. Consequently, I argue that the recent criticisms on the concept
of identity, and its policy, as a view through wich ‘the Other’ is understood in term of
its similarities with ‘the Self’, shortcuts the notion of difference and implies that the
development of an individual is based on lack and absence. This also applies to
diversity management and is reflected in policy proposals and actions. Rather than
pursuing the route of identity, I try to explore another route, paving a possible way of
conceiving ‘the Other’ from the position of ‘the Other’ and not from fixed norms and
T.E. Harris, ‘Diversity: Importance, ironies and pathways’ in: C.D. Brown, C.C. Snedeker and B.
Sykes (eds.) Conflict and Diversity (Cresskill, NJ 1997).
R. Roosevelt Thomas, ‘From affirmative action to affirming diversity’ Harvard Business Review 1990,
March-April 68 107-117.
9
D.A. Thomas and R. Ely, ‘Making differences that matter: A new paradigm for managing diversity’
Harvard Business Review 1996,September-October 79-90.
8
6
possibilities. I will refer to the concept of ‘Otherness’ for this, but my aim is not to
erase ‘identity’ by simply replacing it by some other concept. Instead, I want to
stimulate the thinking and conceiving through a centrifugal force that alters the
thinking and conception itself.
The purpose of my thesis is then to develop this thinking by connecting and
relating to the philosophical work of Ahmed, Braidotti and the writings of Hill Collins
on the Black-feminist standpoint, and recent political studies on democracy.10 It is not
my intention to make a distinct binary opposition between ‘identity politics’and a
moving Otherness. I would like to argue that postmodern feminism is also a form of
identity politics. Standpoint theory and postmodern feminism can be seen as two sides
of the same coin. Post-identity politics in this sense should be viewed as a Deleuzian
feminism. The ‘post’ in identity politics refers here to dealing with the ‘problems’ of
standpoint theory and postmodern feminism at the same time.
The qualifications that I connect and associate to ‘Otherness’, are: its relation
to an ontology of becoming, its crossing out of the identifiable into becomingindiscernible or anonymous, its dependence on safe, social-cultural spaces, and on
open, empty, (open to different opinions and voices) public spaces. To conclude, I
reflect on the different ways in which this ‘Otherness-thinking’ is related to the four
critical issues of the diversity literature and discuss its qualifications as possible
conditions for what I might sum up as an ‘Otherness-politics’, rather than ‘diversitypolitics’.
10
I am well aware of the fact that the works from Ahmed and Braidotti (Postmodernism/diversity)on
the one hand and Hill Collins (Standpoint theory/ identity) on the other hand are seen as theoretical
opposites. I deliberately included Hill Collins to make sure that this thesis is not premised on pigeonholing, as I am trying to find a way to escape this same practice in diversity management. Furthermore
I argue in my thesis that it is very helpful to think beyond the essentialising identity aspect of Stanpoint
theory and use the spirit of her work to make it applicable to diversity management.
7
1.
The history of gender theory and the diversity-discourse
1.1.
Introduction
It has been suggested that policy-makers and political theorists operate on an
‘egalitarian plateau’, in which it is generally accepted that citizens should be treated
as equals.11 But what does treating people like equals entail? Previous generations of
femininists have debated the relative merits of equality of opportunity versus equality
of outcome but few now hold equality of outcome as a political ideal. This is perhaps
because equalising outcomes has come to be viewed as denying choice.12
The issue whether equality requires all women being treated the same as all
men, irrespective of their differences, or whether equality requires that differnces
between women and men be recognised and provided for remains central to feminism
and gender studies. It is possible to identify three perspectives in what has become
known as the equality/difference’ debate. First, the ‘equality perspective’, here the
concern is to extend to women the same rights and privileges that men have, through
identifying areas of unequal treatment and eliminating them via legal reforms. In
contrast to the androgyny or gender neutrality often implied by the equality
perspective, those within the ‘difference perspective’ insist on the recognition of and
valuing of the ways in which women are different from men. Difference theorists,
then, are critical of equality strategies where the masculine is the norm against which
women are judged, and where femininity is positioned as as something to be
transcended in order for equality to be achieved. A third perspective in the
equality/difference debate involves ‘going beyond’ the dichotomy represented by the
previous two perspectives. ‘Diversity’ theorists criticise both the equality and
difference perspectives. “The ‘equality’ perspective fails to recognise the socially
constructed and patriarchal nature of the criterion of evaluation deemed pertinent to
social inclusion. The ‘difference’ perspective fails to theorise the extent to which
‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’ are themselves socially constructed and also underplays
11
12
W. Kymlicka, Contempory Political Philosophy Oxford Oxford University Press, pp. 5 (1990).
A. Philips, Which Equalities Matter? Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 1 (1999).
8
the significance and plurality of order forms of difference”.13 The perspective of
‘diversity’ involves deconstructing the choice of either equality or difference.
The dominance of the equality approach has thus been challenged by various
social movements, which insist that (liberal) egalitarianism has privatised gendered,
cultural, religious and other differences, thereby failing to focus on the importance of
the diversity of ways of thought, life, tastes and moral perspective. From this
perspective, treating people as equals requires the giving of due acknowledgement to
each person’s identity, and this entails the recognition of what is unique to each
individual.14 ‘Difference’ theorists therefore suggest that the state should:
acknowledge the diversity of cultures within policy and policy making: grant laws
that exempt some groups from laws and not others; create political institutions that
give special rights to marginalised groups; and modify cultural symbols in recognition
of the presence of diverse groups.15 So, in this way the shift in focus from economic
to cultural inequalities is accompanied by a shift in focus from sameness to difference.
Equality now appears to require a respect for difference and diversity rather
than a search for similarities. The critique from authors working in the framework of
gender focuses on the gender-blindness and adrocentrism of distributive justice. For
example, many theories of egalitarian justice assume that the concept of justice
applies only to the public sphere, taken distributions within the family as a given.
Feminist political theorists have argued that analyses of social justice that are
sensitive to gender need to include the private sphere and consider the gendered
division of labour within it.16 Feminist theorists argue that, in the context of
patriarchal society, the pursuit of gender equality/difference is constantly entrapped
by exaggeration and denial.17
13
J. Squires, Gender in Political Theory (Cambridge 1999) 131.
C. Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’ in: C. Taylor and A. Gutmann (eds) Multiculturalism and
The Politics of Recognition Princeton: Princeton University Press pp. 39 (1992).
15
W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship Oxford: Clarendon Press (1995).
16
D. Bubeck, Care, Gender and Justice Oxford: Clarendon Press (1995); S. Okin, Justice, Gender and
the Family New York: Basic Books (1989); C. Pateman, ‘Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Dichotomy’ in A. Philips (ed). Feminism and Equality Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp.103-126 (1987).
17
D. Rhode, ‘The Politics of Paradigms: gender difference and gender disadvantage’, in G. Bock and
S. James (ed) Beyond Equality and Difference London: Routledge, pp.149-63 (1992).
14
9
1.2.
Equality debates within feminism
I will expand upon the equality debates here. Debates about equality within feminist
writings have been shaped by perception, frequently referred to as ‘Wollstonecraft’s
dilemma’ that equality and difference are antagonistic aims.18 Throughout its history,
argue Bock and James, women’s liberation has sometimes been seen as the right to be
equal and sometimes as the right to be different.19 The central tension between these
two positions arises from a dispute whether a commitment to gender-neutrality can
ever be achieved by pursuing a strategy of equality. Whilst some argue that women
should demand equality within existing institutions, others feel that, in the context of
patriarchal society, the pursuit of equality might inevitably result in requiring
everyone to assimilate to the dominant gender norm of masculinity. Those who
believe the former to be possible fall within the ‘equality’ perspective; those who are
sceptical adopt a ‘difference’ perspective. Put bluntly, women appear to be faced with
a clear choice: in a society where male is the norm, one can, as a woman, pursue
either assimilation or differentiation. One can aim to transcend one’s gendered
particularity, or to affirm it as immanent: pursue ‘gender-neutrality’ or seek ‘gendervisibility’.
As Fraser notes, “from the equality perspective, then, gender difference
appeared to be inextricable sexism. The political task was thus clear: the goal of
feminism was throw off the shackles of ‘difference’ and establish equality, bringing
men and women under a common measure.”20 By contrast, difference theorists accept
and even celebrate gender difference. The nurturing, peace-loving, intuitive and
emotional qualities of women are celebrated rather than subordinated. They view the
individualistic, competitive and rational qualities of existing structures with suspicion
and hostility rather than admiration and longing. The existence of these two distinct
strategies has haunted feminist debates since their inception. As Joan Scott notes:
“When equality and difference are paired dichotomously, they structure an impossible
choice. If one opts for equality, one is forced to accept the notion that difference is
18
C. Pateman, The Disorder Of Women: Democracy, Feminism And Political Theory. Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, pp. 196-7(1987).
19
G. Bock and S. James, (eds) Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and
Female Subjectivity London: Routledge, p.4 (1992).
20
N. Fraser, ‘A rejoinder to Iris Young’, New Left Review, vol. 223, p.127 (1997).
10
antithetical to it. If one opts for difference, one admits that equality is unattainable”.21
It is not so hard to see the ‘impossible choice’ within the invocation of ‘equality and
difference’. The assertion that minority cultures or the perspective of women are of
value and that equality is problematic if equated with sameness are to be found
echoed in current ‘diversity’ discourses.
1.3.
Situated Knowledges
To portray the ‘history of gender theory’ correctly it is important to reflect upon
another feature, namely the feminist assertion that knowledge is not objective and that
the social identity and interests of the enquirer always delimit knowledge claims. The
acknowledgement of the situated nature of knowledge (standpoint theory) reinforced
demands that difference should be positively recognised. Theorists such as Patricia
Hill Collins, for instance, argued that women as a group are more likely to use
concrete knowledge and dialogue than men. 22 Feminist standpoint theorists argued
that in a patriarchal context, what is perceived to be objective will actually prove to be
an articulation of men’s experiences and men’s perspectives.23 This in contrast to
what Joan Tronto argued, more generally, that there was a distinct form of moral
reasoning common to all marginalised social groups as a result of their particular
historical exclusion.24 The aim of these theorists was not to break the link between
experience and knowledge, but to enable a different set of experiences to provide the
basis for new knowledge claims. This claim focused attention on the link between
identity and knowledge, reinforcing arguments for the recognition of difference.
J. Scott, ‘Deconstructing Equality-Versus Difference: Or, the Uses of Poststructuralist Theory for
Feminism’ in D. Tietjens Meyers (ed.) Feminist Social Thought: A Reader New York: Routledge,
p.765 (1997).
22
P.H. Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment
New York: Routledge, pp.201-19 (2000).
23
S. Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?: Thinking from Women’s Lives New York: Cornell
University Press, (1991).
24
J. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: The Political Argument of an Ethic of Care New York: Routledge,
(1993).
21
11
1.4.
Intersectionality
Of course theorists have also voiced epistemological ‘concerns’ about this celebration
of difference, leading to a suspicion of the tendency to head towards reification of
group difference. These concerns lead to the development of a theory of
intersectionality.25 Critics argued that the politics of recognition formalises and
freezes identities that are actually subject to constant change and thereby reinforcing
the tendency of such groups to become exclusionary to outsiders and coercive to
insiders. 26 Benhabib, for instance, argues that it is ‘theoretically wrong and political
dangerous’ to assume that the individual’s search for authentic selfhood should be
subordinated to the struggles of groups.27 From this perspective, the celebration of
group difference is too unitary to be sensitive to the contradictions and antagonisms
within as well as between groups and even within individuals.
Intersectionality emerges as a critique, exploring the effect of in-group
essentialism, in which a sub-set of a group seeks to fix the characteristics of a specific
identity, marginalising those group members who differ in other aspects of their
identity. The pursuit of diversity from this framework is therefore motivated by a
perception that those who share multiple marginalised identities face challenges that
are qualitatively different from those who do not.28
What becomes clear from this very brief survey of the politics of difference
literature is that from this perspective diversity signifies the recognition of difference,
the acknowledgement of situated knowledge, and the acceptance of intersectionalty.
25
G. Wekker and H. Lutz, Een Hoogvlakte met koude Winden. De Geschiedenis van het gender- en
etniciteitsdenken in Nederland. (met Helma Lutz). In Botman, M. N. Jouwe en G. Wekker (red.)
Caleidoscopische Visies. Zwarte, Migranten- en Vluchtelingen Vrouwenbeweging in Nederland.
Amsterdam: KIT, pp. 25-46 (2001).
26
E. Kiss, ‘Democracy and the Politics of Recognition’, In I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds.)
Democracy’s Edges Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.194 (1999).
27
S. Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era Princeton: Princeton
University Press, p.53 (2002).
28
See for example the works of: P.H. Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and
the Politics of Empowerment New York: Routledge, (2000) and K. Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the
intersection of race and sex: A Black feminist critique of antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory
and antiracist politics’ In K. Bartlett and R. Kennedy (eds.) Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law
and Gender San Francisco: Westview Press, (1991).
12
2.
Critical debates in the diversity literature
2.1.
Introduction
In this chapter I will depart from the current debates in diversity management in
which I identify mainly four issues: a narrow or broad definition of diversity, a stable
or dynamic concept of identity, the role of power and the importance of the sociohistorical context. With this discussion I will try to indicate the implicit theoretical
choises prioritising the concept of ‘identity’, turning the issues of diversity into a
managing of individuals and ‘their’ identities. Consequently, I argue that the recent
criticisms on the concept of identity, and its policy, as a view through wich ‘the
Other’ is understood in term of its similarities with ‘the Self’, shortcuts the notion of
difference and implies that the development of an individual is based on lack and
absence. This also applies to diversity management and is reflected in policy
proposals and actions.
2.2.
A narrow and broad definition of diversity
A first central question within diversity literature is whether diversity shoul be
narrowly or broadly defined.29 Scholars who favour a narrow definition argue that the
domain of diversity research should be restricted to specific cultural categories such
as ethnicity and gender.30 On the other hand, scholars preferring a broad definition
argue that diversity encompasses all the possible ways people can differ.31 Individuals
do not only differ because of their ethnicity, gender, age and other demographic
categories but also because of their values, abilities, organisational function, tenure
and personality.
S.M. Nkomo, ‘Identities and the complexity of diversity’ in: S.E Jackson and M.N. Ruderman (eds.)
Diversity in work teams (Washington DC 1995).
30
For example: E.Y. Cross, J.H. Katz, F.A. Miller and E. Seashore, (eds) The promise of diversity:
Over 40 voices discuss strategies for eliminating discrimination in organisations (Burr Ridge 1994).
A.M. Morrison, The new leaders: Guidelines on leadership diversity in America (San Francisco 1992).
31
For example: S.E. Jackson, K.E. May and K. Whitney, ‘Dynamics of diversity decision making
teams’ in: R.A. Guzo and E. Salas (eds.) Team effectiveness and decision making in organisations (San
Francisco 1995).
R. Roosevelt Thomas, Beyond Ethnicity and Gender: Unleashing the power of your total workforce by
managing diversity (New York 1991).
29
13
Those favouring a narrow perspective argue that diversity based upon ethnicity
and gender cannot be understood in the same way as diversity based upon
organisational functions, abilities or cognitive orientations.32 Differences due to
organisational function or to gender have different effects and therefore, they need to
be distinguished. It is further stressed here that the key issues of diversity are those
that arise because of discrimination and exclusion of cultural groups from traditional
organisations.33 If diversity is a concept that is inclusive to all individuals, it will
become very difficult to identify discrimination practices. The main concern of this
perspective is that a broad definition may imply that all differences among people are
the same. Diversity studies would then only reach the reductionistic conclusion that
‘everyone is different’ and, if this conclusion is accepted, the concept of diversity may
become “nothing more than a benign, meaningless concept”.34
The risk of the narrow approach, however, is that research usually focuses
only on one dimension at a time, ethnicity or gender, and that it is easy to fail to
recognise the interactions with other dimensions. In other words, an increasingly
narrow approach is an decrease in the use of feminism postmodernism and a relying
on identity-politics. Those favouring a broad definition argue that an individual has
multiple identities and that the multiple dimensions cannot be isolated in an
organisational setting. Individuals bring not only their ethnicity and/or gender but also
their particular knowledge, personality, and cognitive style to the work setting. If
diversity literature wants to understand the dynamics of a heterogeneous workforce, it
needs to address the interactive effects of multidimensional diversity. Broadly
defining diversity is further considered crucial to prevent the domain of diversity of
falling apart into separate sub-domains. Having a broad understanding of all types of
differences is seen as helpful to understand one’s own research better, without
necessarily arguing that all differences are equivalent. Another argument favouring a
broad definition refers to the potential positive effect on diversity programs. The
expectation is that diversity management will become more acceptable if it is not only
oriented towards specific groups of employees but if it is inclusive to all employees.35
S.M. Nkomo, ‘Identities and the complexity of diversity’ in: S.E. Jackson and M.N. Ruderman (eds.)
Diversity in work teams (Washington DC 1995).
33
Cross et al, 1994; Morrison, 1992.
34
Nkomo, 1995, p. 248.
35
R. Thomas, 1991.
32
14
2.3.
A stable and dynamic conception of identity
A second issue in the debate refers to a stable or dynamic conception of identity.
Relying on social identity theory, several diversity studies link the individuals’
identity directly to the social category they belong to on the basis of their individual
characteristics.36 For instance, a person is identified as ‘a woman’ if she belongs to the
social category of women. The reasoning is that people categorise themselves and
others on the basis of how closely their individual characteristics match the
stereotypes of various groups. Such a categorisation process is not merely a cognitive
process but is followed by an identification process with affective and evaluative
components.37 According to this perspective, a person’s identity is conceived as
stable, fixed, unitary and internally consistent. It is an objective set of characteristics,
which leads to a specific identity. The view of the self can be considered as
autonomous, as “a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and
cognitive universe organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against
other such wholes and against a social and natural background”.38
Feminist researchers favour a reframing of identity towards relational
embeddedness, where the concept of identity is not one of cross-time and crosssituational coherence but one of multidimensional embeddedness.39 From this
perspective, identity is “best seen as a set of contradictory, fluid, contextual
constrained positions within which people are capable of exercising choice”.40
Questions such as ‘Who am I?’ or ‘What kind of person am I?’ are not answered once
and for all, but are constructed as social interactions and experiences change, not only
over time, but also during the work day as one encounters a variety of people and
situations. Important in this relational perspective is the fluid, processual nature of
identity that is contingent upon social relations. Behaviour that was formerly
attributed to the individual alone is now seen as arising out of the negotiated
relationship with other individuals. Even if people belong to the same social category,
36
H. Tajfel, (ed.) Social identity and intergroup relations (Cambridge 1982).
H. Tajfel and J.C. Turner, ‘The social identity theory of intergroup behavior ‘ in: S. Worchel and W.G.
Austin (eds.) Psychology of intergroup relations (Chicago 1986).
37
H. Tajfel, 1982.
38
C. Geertz,, ‘From the native’s point of view: on the nature of anthropological understanding’ in: R.
Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (eds.) Interpretive Social Science (Berkely 1989) p. 229.
39
J. Shotter and K.J. Gergen, Texts of Identity (Newbury Park, CA 1989).
K.J. Gergen, The saturated self. Dilemmas of identity in contemporary life (New York 1991).
40
R.J. Ely, ‘The role of dominant identity and experience in organizational work on diversity’ in: S.E.
Jackson and M.N. Ruderman (eds.) Diversity in work teams (Washington DC 1995) p. 184.
15
the meaning of their identity is not necessarily the same because they develop their
identity in close interaction with other people who confirm, support or disrupt
different identity claims. A person may see herself as a result-oriented manager as
well as a loving mother and a politically conservative voter. Identities are dynamic,
multiple and contextual. From this relational perspective, the question of ‘Who am I?’
opens up a world of possibilities.
2.4.
Power
Although there is much discussion on the concept of identity as relational and
contextual within he diversity literature and diversity managers are becoming
increasingly aware of this, it is still not mirrored in policies and actions. This brings
the diversity literature to two other issues, namely power and the socio-historical
context, as important factors that can create and re-create identity in potentially
infinite ways. Attention to these two factors is mainly put forward by scholars
stressing the emancipatory purpose of diversity studies. Especially those who take a
narrow definition try to understand differences between people within structures of
power inequalities and the socio-historical context. However, the danger of this
approach lies in the assumption that it is only those in the oppressed position, women
and people of colour, who constitute diversity. It leads to phrases such as ‘the diverse
group’ or ‘the diverse person’, implying that the condition of diversity inheres solely
in members of oppressed groups: only people of colour have a ethnicity, only women
have a gender, and only gay, lesbian and bisexual people have a sexual orientation.41
So what actually happens here is that unequal power relations and inequalities are
reinforced instead of broken down.
This assumption also has important consequences for formulating strategies on
how to deal with diversity and identity.42 If diversity is only a characteristic of a
certain, oppressed group, then dealing with diversity means dealing ‘correctly’ with
oppressed groups. It then remains an identity-politics, whereas we have seen this is
also a form of exclusionary practice. For people in dominant positions, this means that
they only need to change their perceptions of and behaviours towards those ‘Others.’
As such, prescriptions for change require little of dominant groups in terms of self-
41
42
S.M. Nkomo, 1995; R.J. Ely, 1995.
S. Ahmed, Differences that Matter Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1998).
16
reflection or addressing the inner workings or logic of oppressive mechanisms within
the organisation. The danger of the notion of diversity as a set of attributes that reside
in some people and not in others is that it leaves dominant groups fundamentally
unchanged and relations of domination intact. Ahmed therefore proposes an approach
to diversity which places power at the centre and which considers diversity as a
specific condition of a relationship instead of a set of attributes.43 She defines
diversity broadly, to distinguish people’s experiences into, for example, experiences
of dominance and suppression, and to explicitly study both. By engaging multiple
axes of identity, both dominant and oppressed, within each person, this approach may
create the conditions for empathy among people who may otherwise feel frustrated
with, guilty about, or angry toward one another.44 This line of thought is inclusionary,
it focuses on all people, dominant and oppressed. Because such experiences are
simultaneously present in each person, members of the dominant group do not have to
feel frustration and guilt while members of the oppressed groups do not have to hold
onto their position of being dominated. As a result, people may engage more fully,
more consciously, and more productively in their relationships and their work.
2.5.
Socio-historical context
A fourth issue in the literature debates refers to the importance of the socio-historical
context to fully understand the dynamics of diversity at the workplace.45 Given the
importance of inter-group dynamics for diversity, contemporary interactions are
considered to be influenced by the legacy of prior interactions among members of
those groups. It is the history of inter-group relations, which is the social-cultural
background on which the effects of diversity are constructed.46 This background
includes not only an organisational, but also a societal component. Occupational roles
tend to be segregated by ethnicity or by gender on the basis of assumptions about
ethnicity- or gender-related competences, having their roots in the history of the
labour market and in differences in educational opportunities. Having more attention
for the role of history would therefore help to understand how segregation phenomena
43
S. Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion (New York 2004) 4, 11-12.
Ibidem, 30.
45
T. Cox, 1995; H. Triandis, ‘The importance of contexts in studies of diversity’ in: S.E. Jackson and
M.N. Ruderman (eds.) Diversity in work teams (Washington DC 1995).
46
C.P. Alderfer and K.K. Smith, ‘Studying intergroup relations embedded in organisations’
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1982 27 (3) 5-56.
44
17
and oppressed mechanisms function in organisations. This implies that organisations
reproduce rather than invent these mechanisms and are therefore reflections of the
broader society. In short: gender not only has an individual level, but also a structural
and symbolic level.47
47
S. Harding, The Science Question in Feminism Cornell University Press 163-197 (1986).
18
3.
Trappings of diversity management
3.1.
Introduction
In this chapter I would like to focus on diversity management as a practice. I will
argue that by focusing on the the characteristics of the employee rather than the
structures that create inequalities diversity management may contribute to the
displacement of struggles to address economic inequality by allowing governments
and businesses to claim that they are pursuing equality by recognising diversity,
whilst doing nothing to address economic inequality.
Human resource managers in both the corporate and public sector frame their
concern with diversity in ways that clearly resemble claims made by feminist theorists
about situated knowledge. They are also attentive to the fact that many of their most
highly prized employees bring these (new) values to their employment negotiations.
Yet the managers channel these claims into their preset priorities and inflict them with
their own preoccupations. As a result, for businesses diversity signifies (at least in
their official corporate statements), a better return on their investment in human
capital, a way to capitalise on new markets, increase creativity, and secure economic
gain.
What, then does diversity obscure? Does the celebration of diversity eclipses
equality concerns, marginalising the concern with social justice in favour of a narrow
corporate managerialism? The shift in focus from group difference to individual
diversity may lead to marginalisation of the expertise and concerns of particular
equality strands and more generally may result in a loss of attention to structural
disadvantage. Moreover, the (corporate) commitment to ‘managing diversity’ is a
reductive project, aiming to increase the economic productivity of businesses, which
priorities a ‘business case’ for diversity rather than a wider concern with social justice
in a manner that delimits claims to social inclusion.
19
3.2.
Marginalisation
The question initially posed was; what does diversity obscure? An immediate concern
is that the claims of particular oppressed groups (women, ‘black’ people) will be
marginalised, and the resources devoted to their demands as a result reduced. For
instance, critics have suggested that these policies will dilute policies against racism
and ethnic discrimination “by mixing them with policies of other groups”.48 These
arguments frequently entail claims that some social groups have suffered greater
oppression than others (women, ‘black’ people), thereby raising debates about
hierarchies of oppression, but also including concerns that forms of exclusion simply
differ, and therefore remedies need to be tailored accordingly. Women’s advocates,
for instance, have focused their attention on the importance of private sphere
discrimination.49 Whilst an ‘additive’ model of politics that leads to competition
between marginal groups for scarce resources has its own attendant difficulties, the
alternative in which groups are subdivided into even more distinguished categories
generates concerns that structural analysis will be replaced by ‘mere description’.50
The fear that structural analysis will be lost may be borne out the tendency of
diversity management to treat all differences as of an equal status, shorn of the
political concern with structural inequality. In this way human resource managers
address not only those differences that intersectionality theorists focus upon, such as
race, gender age, disability and sexuality, but also diverse personalities, working
styles and speed of learning. Human resource management in this way is little more
than the diversity of opinions , requirements and desires in a consumer’s market. The
new managerialist emphasis on diversity individualises the notion of disadvantage,
and reduces it to individual needs and requirements and not the collective or
systematic disadvantage to a group over time or discrimination against an individual
due to their colour, race or sex.51 This has occurred to the extent that diversity
management is severed from the histories of wider structural and cultural inequalities
J. Wrench, ‘Diversity Management Can be Bad For You’ In: Race and Class 46 (3) pp.73-84 (2005).
See for example the work of: J.Lovenduski, Feminizing Politics Cambridge: Polity Press, (2005).
50
R. Thomas, 1991, 36.
51
J. Clarke and J. Newman, The Managerial State: Power, Politics and ideology in the remaking of
social welfare London: Sage, (1997).
48
49
20
premised upon race and racism, gender, ethnicity and class.52 In short: diversity
management obscures the sources of the differences it seeks to exploit, focusing on
the characteristics of employees or applicants rather than the structures that create and
perpetuate these characteristics.
Another concern for diversity management is that employers might not
experience diversity as producing an advantage, because the diversification of the
workforce may create institutional tensions rather than increased productivity, in
which case the pragmatic business case for diversity loses its purpose. And what
about the fact that diversity management may be employed selectively in relation to
certain social groups and not others if representatives of particular groups are
perceived to offer greater business advantage than others? In this case diversity would
undermine rather than increase equality between groups. It may well also be the case
that it entrenches cultural stereotypes in the process by assuming that a person’s age,
religion, gender, sexuality, race or disability are unproblematically associated with
certain characteristics and that ‘customers’ of the same gender, age, sexual orientation
or religion share those characteristics with them. This to the extent that it relies on
such assumptions, diversity management paradoxically affirms sameness.
3.3.
Conclusion
The business case for diversity resonates the logic of standpoint theorists, claiming
that tacit knowledge is a significant asset, that this knowledge is accessed through
identities, and shared by those with similar identities, into the knowledge economy
thesis. In doing so, diversity advocates turn our attention away from the remedial
argument previously used to justify positive discrimination or affirmative action
policies, emphasising social gain rather than group grievance. This approach focuses
on the future potential contribution of groups, rather than their historical exclusion. It
requires no admission of previous wrong, no acknowledgement of social injustice or
structural discrimination. It focuses instead on the positive contribution that a diverse
student body or workforce can have, for the institution, its clients and shareholders. In
C. Mohanty, ‘Preface: Dangerous Territories, Territorial Power and Education’ In L. Eyre and L
Roman (eds.) Dangerous Territories: Struggles for Differences and Equality in Education p. xiv
(1997).
52
21
this way the argument is narrowed, no longer framed by issues of social justice, but
reduced to issues of (corporate) productivity.
In doing so, it could be argued that diversity management diverts theoretical
and practical attention away from issues of redistribution to those of recognition.
Brian Barry, for instance, asserts that: “Diverting attention away from shared
disadvantages such as unemployment, poverty, low-quality housing and inadequate
public services is an obvious long-term anti-egalitarian objective.”53 By focusing on
the characteristics of the employee rather than the structures that create inequalities,
diversity management may contribute to the displacement of struggles to address
economic inequality by allowing governments and businesses to claim that they are
pursuing equality by recognising diversity, whilst doing nothing to address economic
inequality.
There is a growing body of literature that critiques the emergence of the
‘diversity discourse’ in terms of the loss of focus on redistributive justice. Deem and
Ozga, for instance, argue in relation to their work on gender equality in higher
education: “Whereas the concepts of equity and equal opportunities imply an
underlying concept of social justice for all and active endeavours to change this, the
notion of diversity invokes the existence of difference and variety without any
necessary commitment to action or redistributive justice”.54 Diversity is increasingly
used to focus attention on economic productivity, which serves to obscure the wider
issues of social justice. In this way the emergence of diversity management reduces
the scope of equality concerns, de-politicising social relations and containing equality
objectives within a utilitarian market model.55 Diversity management becomes a
strategy to increase the employment rates of certain currently under-represented
sectors of society, facilitating both social integration and economic competitiveness.
But whether this also facilitates social justice is another question.
I am suggesting that diversity could be seen as a management strategy in two
distinct senses: first, as a business strategy of (corporate) actors, and second as a type
of management of individuals employing particular technologies of domination, as a
53
B. Barry, Culture and Equality Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.11-12 (2001).
R. Deem and J. Ozga, ‘Women managing for diversity in a post modern world’ In C. Marshall (ed.)
Feminist Critical Policy Analysis London: Falmer Press, p.33 (1997).
55
J. Wrench, ‘Diversity Management Can be Bad For You’ In: Race and Class 46 (3) p.78 (2005).
54
22
practice of governance.56 Diversity is a new notion that contributes to ‘government’ of
new domains of regulation. The reconceptualisation of employment equity in terms of
diversity opens up previously untapped resources in the interests of commercial
exploitation: the tacit knowledge of previously marginalised groups can be tapped for
profit along previously dominant groups. By enjoining both employers and employees
to value diversity this management strategy promises to solve social problems not by
addressing structural factors, but by altering the way we govern ourselves. A flexible
labour market requires a flexible workforce.
M. Foucault, ‘Technologies of the Self’ In M. Foucault (ed.) Luther H. Martin et al. Technologies of
the Self: a Seminar with Michel Foucault pp.18-19 (1988).
56
23
4.
4.1.
Diversity equals identity: Implied choices
Introduction
For purposes of evaluation I call for the above overview of the diversity-discussion,
even though it might be considered a ‘wrong’ discussion. Wrong because it does not
fully address some fundamental conceptual choices, implicit but with far-reaching
implications for diversity practices and interventions. That is the main point of this
text, to ‘question’, ‘shake’ and ‘change’ the conceptual preconditions and choices
lingering in the four issues of ‘critical’ debate. The question I pose is whether this
debate is critical enough. I will start here with my theoretical elaboration, thereby
taking a step back from the debates within feminist theory as discussed in the previous
chapters.
4.2.
Identity Politics and diversity
It seems as if a large part of the diversity discussions are tied up to the notion of
‘identity’: diversity equals identity. As a consequence, a lot of subtle and difficult
questions related to diversity are shortcuted and reduced to a riddle of difference. For
instance, is the future direction of the diversity domain cared for when we say that
people ‘have’ diverse characteristics, that they are individuals having identities (even
socially constructed), that they belong to ‘minority’ groups that are oppressed, and
that we speak of ‘organisations’ which repeat and mimic societal histories? Debates
on diversity inevitably seem to be debates about identities, which brings the
discussion to the need for a close examination of how the whole diversity-identity
debate is constructed as something that lingers on in postmodern- and standpoint
theory as exhaustive opposites, whereas they are in fact the opposite sides of one and
the same coin. I will enter some of the critics on the notion and use of identity, as well
as, in the next part, develop other qualifications that might open up into multiple and
differing conceptions of Otherness and lead to other intervention conditions that may
renew ways of dealing with people in organisations. Diversity then multiplies
Otherness, yet not in a difference kind of way.
Identity politics in feminism refers to formulating and validating political
claims on the basis that those making the claims share a certain social location as, say,
24
‘lesbians,’ ‘black women,’ and ‘people with disabilities’.57 Part of the strength of the
notion of identity and of identity politics lies in the fact that is sets out realistically
accomplishable goals that are particular to groups of common interests. However,
identity politics seems to be on the defensive as the concept of identity is increasingly
criticised as narrow and ineffective in addressing the needs of those groups that have
been marginalised by the rest of society.58
4.3.
Critique on Identity Politics
Identity politics, as the label suggests, centres on the idea of authentic, fixed
identities. This is its strength because by narrowing the purview of emancipation it
can set realistic goals. Therein, however,also lies the problem. Identity politics is in a
position of impossibility to consider multiple subject positions as it centralises certain
forms of being the standard of something. For example, first wave feminism has been
accused of heterosexism and indifference to ethnicity. Both lesbian and black women
blame early feminism that their idea of ‘a woman’ was the white middle class woman
with no attention toward the differences among women. In addressing this critique,
Butler points out that the list of adjectives referring to different social groups, colour,
sexuality, ethnicity, class and ablebodiedness invariably closes with an embarrassed
‘etc.’ at the end of the list.59 It is through this horizontal trajectory of adjectives that
one strives to encompass a situated subject, but invariably fails to be complete. It is
this inability to treat multiple subject positions, the inability to attend to more than
one specific subject at a time, which has come to be an important critique of identity
politics.60 Identity politics fails to recognise the interactions among different
characterisations and the possibilities of different identities within the same social
category.
Another formulated critique is that identity politics is an attempt to thematise
‘the Other’ in terms of its similarities with ‘the Self’. Because any state of sameness
actually requires difference in order to structure itself, identity requires difference in
57
D. Cameron, The Feminist Critique of Language: A Reader (London 1998);
C. Lusanne, ‘Emerging Social Justice Movements in Communities of Color’ in: J. Anner, Beyond
Identity Politics (Boston 1996).
59
J.P. Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York 1990) 143.
60
S. Benhabib, “Democracy and Difference: The Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida,” The Journal of
Political Philosophy 2, no. 1 (January 1994): 1-23; C.T. Mohanty, “Feminist Encounters: Locating the
Politics of Experience,” in Destabilizing Theory, ed., Michelle Barret and Anne Phillips (Cambridge,
UK: Polity Press, 1992), 74-92.
58
25
order to be. It is this necessary dependence on difference for its own identity that has
kept open a space for ‘the Other’. This realisation comprises what Nealon calls the
theoretical success of multiculturalism.61 There is an increasing appreciation of
differences and everybody seems to love ‘the Other’. At the same time, however, the
realisation of difference necessity has not led to a significant increase in social respect
and tolerance.
4.4.
Feminism and Identity Politics
Feminism, however, has an entire body of well known critical identity politics.
Namely, standpoint theory as theorised by Nancy Hartsock in 1983, and founded in
Marxist ideology. Hartsock argued that a feminist standpoint could be built out of
Marx's understanding of experience and used to criticise patriarchal theories.62 Hence,
a feminist standpoint is essential for the examining of the systemic oppressions in a
society that devalues women's knowledge. Standpoint feminism makes the case that
because women's lives and roles in almost all societies are significantly different from
men's, women hold a different type of knowledge. Their location as a subordinated
group allows women to see and understand the world in ways that are different from
and challenging to the existing male-biased conventional wisdom.63 Standpoint
feminism unites several feminist epistemologies. Standpoint feminist theorists attempt
to criticise dominant conventional epistemologies in the social and natural sciences, as
well as defend the coherence of feminist knowledge.64
Initially, feminist standpoint theories addressed women's standing in the
sexual division of labour. Standpoint theorists such as Donna Haraway sought to
show standpoint as the "notion of situated knowledge to counter the apparent
relativism of Standpoint theory".65This theory is considered to have potentially radical
consequences because of the focus on power and the fact that it challenges the idea of
61
J.T. Nealon, Alterity Politics. Ethics and Performative Subjectivity (Durham 1999).
N. Hartsock, "Comment on Hekman’s Truth and method: Feminist standpoint theory revisited: Truth
or justice?" Signs 22(2) (1997).
63
U. Narayan, "The Project of Feminist Epistemology" in S. Bordo and A. Jaggar (eds.)
Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing Rutgers: Rutgers
University Press pp.256-272 (1989).
64
S. Andermahr, T. Lovel and C. Wolkowitz, A Concise Glossary of Feminist Theory London and
New York: Arnold (1997).
65
N. Hartsock,, "The Feminist Standpoint" in S. Harding and M. B. Hintikka (eds.) Discovering
Reality Holland; Boston; London: D. Riedel Publishing Company pp.283-310 (1983).
62
26
an ‘essential truth’, especially the hegemonic reality created, passed down and
imposed by those in power.
Criticism of standpoint feminism has come from postmodern feminists, who
argue that there is no concrete "women's experience" from which to construct
knowledge. In other words, the lives of women across space and time are so diverse
that it is impossible to generalise their experiences. Standpoint feminism has absorbed
this criticism, and many standpoint feminists now recognise that because of the many
differences that divide women it is impossible to claim one single or universal
"women’s experience".66 Because it does not occur in a vacuum, it is important to
view sexism in relation to other systems of domination and to analyse how it interacts
with racism, homophobia, colonialism, and classism in a "matrix of domination".67
Contemporary standpoint feminist theory perceives that it is "a relational
standpoint, rather than arising inevitably from the experience of women".68
Standpoint feminists have recently argued that individuals are both oppressed in some
situations and in relation to some people whilst at the same time being privileged in
others. Their goal is to situate women and men within multiple systems of domination
in a way that is more accurate and more able to confront oppressive power structures.
69
One of the critiques of this stance is that such an intense focus on the many
differences between women obliterates the very similarities that might bond women
together. If this is the case, trying to create a broad-based feminist community or
building consensus on specific policy becomes problematic.
4.5.
Nealon on Identity Politics
Both critiques bring Nealon to the formulation of the central critique that identity
politics, even if it broadens its scope to include diversity, is a politics of lack. The
difference that is needed for the own identity is also always a difference as lack. This
thought that an identity can never be completed already assumes an ideal Other that is
66
U. Narayan, "The Project of Feminist Epistemology" in S. Bordo and A. Jaggar eds.,
Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing Rutgers: Rutgers
University Press pp.256-272 (1989).
67
P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of
empowerment New York: Routledge (2000).
68
S. Andermahr, T. Lovel and C. Wolkowitz A Concise Glossary of Feminist Theory London and New
York: Arnold (1997).
69
M. B.Zinn, and B. Thornton Dill "Theorising Difference from Multiracial Feminism", Feminist
Studies 22(2) pp.321-331 (1996).
27
desired but can never be reached. We need the Other because we have all been
excluded from the privileges of an ideal self. Because we need each other for
recognition and happiness; the needing ‘the Other’ often shows itself as resenting ‘the
Other’.70 This resentment is, for Nealon, a symptom of a larger problem with an
identity politics of lack. The very notion of intersubjectivity is thought of as lack
implying that any specific lack or failure becomes an indication of a more generalised
lack. What we have in common is that we all lack something in some way: “I can’t
have everything, I lack completeness; I cannot be a positive term, so I live in/with the
solace of Others, who likewise lack such wholeness”.71 If the subject is no other than
a symptom of a founding lack, its primary mode of agency is then directed toward
making up for that lack. Therefore, it is resentment, rather than collective resistance,
which is the pre-eminent social effect of the politics of lack. As long as difference is
understood in terms as the constant discovery of lack, one underestimates the
hazardous productivity of difference’s specificity. It is therefore that difference must
be reinscribed outside the realm of loss, lack, or failure. Or in the words of Nealon:
“every identity politics as a project is doomed to fail because every specific identity
likewise fails to be complete.”72
In this thesis I will take on Nealon’s elaboration on identity politics to indicate
the implicit theoretical choices prioritising the concept of identity, turning the issues
of diversity into a managing of individuals and their identities.
4.6.
Shaping side-roads: Diversity multiplies Otherness
For Nealon, but also for Ahmed, the challenge is to work out a notion of difference as
other than lack or failure of sameness for which Nealon uses the term ‘Otherness’ or
‘Alterity.’ In defining it, the term ‘Otherness’ is closely related to the concept of
‘Othering’ and Foucault’s notion of the ‘exteriority’ or marginality of the subject.
Often thought of as synonymous with ‘Other’, the condition of Otherness exemplifies
the marginal or peripheral that does not have access to the centres of power. The
centre (or centres) represent(s) a point of origin in which meaning is fixed and
validated as the determining norm. Those excluded from the centre by virtue of
70
S. Ahmed, (2004) 44, 76, 139.
J. T. Nealon (1999) 5.
72
Idem, 3.
71
28
ethnicity, class, gender or religion are categorised as irrelevant to normative
conventions and designated ‘Other’ .73
Considering the critical reception of the notion identity and how it shapes
identity politics, I will depart from Nealon’s notion of Otherness, opting for a more
radical notion of unbounded identity-space, multiplying its versions with the
multiplicity-thinking of Ahmed, shaping side-roads that may alter thinking about
diversity. The idea is to qualify Otherness by relating with ‘the Other’ that does not
merely return to the same and work out a notion of difference as other than lack or
failure of sameness. The concept of Otherness implies a response, first and foremost,
to ‘the Other’. Such a response does not respond to a problem or question, it responds
to ‘the Other’, for ‘the Other’. For Nealon, subjectivity thought as lack seems to
separate the subject from what it can do. It thematises the subject as an effect (a noun)
rather than an effectivity (an action): “as long as identity is not thematised as a
hazardous performative act, a verb rather than a noun, a multiple becoming rather
than a monological symptom, a deployment of force rather than an assured process of
mourning, it seems destined to remain a locus for resentment, naming itself always in
terms of expropriation from an ideal that it can’t ever hope, and doesn’t even wish, to
attain”.74 Response to ‘the Other’ is, therefore, about action, about producing deeds
and negotiations, not about mourning for a loss or lack.75
4.7.
Qualifying and altering Otherness
My purpose now is to further conceive the notion of Otherness. How to qualify
Otherness and its conditions? How to speak of Otherness and difference, without
immediately again fixing ‘the Other’, without creating ideals by fixing possibilities
and repeating the same problems of identity? Is it possible to engage in an ‘open’
qualifying, to phrase concepts without qualities? Is there another way of conceiving
‘the Other’ possible? How to think of Otherness that itself is becoming and
multiplying? Otherness is then not a well-defined fixed point, but rather a traffic
73
S. Gamble, (ed.) The Routledge Critical Dictionary of Feminism and Pos feminism (New York
2000).
74
J.T. Nealon, (1999) 12.
75
S. Ahmed, (1998) 52-53.
29
island or refuge for multiple visitors with diverse experiences, impressions and
stories. I here relate to the work of Ahmed, Braidotti and Collins.76
76
S. Ahmed, (1998) and (2004); P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness
and the Politics of Empowerment (New York 1991); R. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and
Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (New York 1994).
30
5.
Becoming Other, becoming indiscernible
5.1.
Introduction
Identity thinking is all about ‘being’ someone’, about essentialism and essences. It
tries to give names to all of what one is or, rather, should be: an ideal worker with
specific features, with all the expected and usual categories, and, on top of that, all
new features, from female sensitivity to exotic cultural backgrounds. Against this
‘unicity’, to which identity and being thinking lead, it could be suggested that
becoming-Other is a matter of becoming-indiscernible. I would like to elaborate on
the idea that becoming is not the activity of building or constructing identities, or of
becoming more outspoken and developed as a person. It is a step back, more modest.
A step aside, also. It is the paradox that to be a person one has to become impersonal
and anonymous. One is open for the streams rather than that one tries to order or to
stop them. It is about becoming indiscernible, a blade of grass between the grass. The
concept that Deleuze and Guattari use for this ‘becoming-person’ is haeccity. This
‘this-ness’ is a form of individuation that is different from that of person, a subject, or
a thing. Such as with a season, a winter, a summer, an hour, a date, it is concerning a
human not about the life, but a life, a set of accelerations and slownesses. Instead of
subjectivity where one always draws lines and becomes visible, individuation via
haeccity is an alternating state between movement and rest: “you have the
individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life, a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a
pack. Or at least you can have it, you can reach it”.77 Instead of having a personality
as in a Western culture, an option is offered here of becoming-individual among
collective streams, as a form of anonymity.
5.2.
Becomings and multiplicities
Identity can be considered a notion of order. It is a concept of structuring and
constructing cohesion, even if, within a social constructionist frame, one conceives it
relationally and embedded within multiple subjectpositions. Becoming-Other is,
Quote from G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, ‘A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia’ in R.
Braidotti, Intensive Genre and the Demise of Gender (Forthcoming 2008) 2.
77
31
however, first of all a becoming, a swimming following the repetition of multiplicity,
participating in the ongoing streams. I connect here with the engaged reading of
Deleuze and Guattari as discussed by Ahmed.78
For Ahmed, a person is an open multiplicity, a series that is open ended. For a
person on the move, it is a matter of keeping open possibilities, the ability for making
ever new connections. Sometimes, we think to have reached a harbour, but soon
enough we will find ourselves (thrown) back in an open sea.79 What counts, are the
plural lines of flight that keep one’s life open. Instead of through discipline and
control, Deleuze and Guattari approach life through creativity and pluralism. The
Other in ourselves, such as ‘being’ a woman, is not a feature to build upon one’s
complete identity, no, it is rather a line of flight, through which a woman with all
women and men, can become woman, a becoming woman: “Becomings involve a
moment between entities, a passing from one to an other that is beyond the meeting of
two points. Becomings are not imitations, identifications or evolutions, they are not
anything that implies a correspondence amongst relations.”80 Becomings involve a
movement in which the real is the ‘becoming’ and not the supposedly fixed term
through which that becoming passes. Given this, becomings cannot be reduced to
identity, they traverse the (supposedly inviolable) distinctions upon which identity
thinking relies.81 One will never be, for instance, a woman or a gay, fully
emancipated, yet one can not get ‘out’ of it. The focus is on lines of flight. The
coming out of a gay is then exactly that, it is coming in the middle, in between,
following the line of flight of gayness, and being taken by and within all the
(im)possibilities. When one thinks to have reached a safe harbour (like equal wages
for women or the right to marry for gays), one will soon be back in the open sea. So,
becoming cannot have or be a fixed identity, it is always a becoming-Other, pure
differences and multifications rather than unification. The multiplicity of becoming
requires always escaping from the many accessible and accepted norms, values and
codes, while at the same time being surrounded by or immersed in them.
Connecting to this philosophical work, a first side-path opens up, a
qualification of Otherness as becoming, as multiplicity. Becoming then means
78
S. Ahmed, (1998).
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateau:. Capitalism and Schizophrenia (London 1992) in
S. Ahmed (1998) 69-79, 88.
80
S. Ahmed (1998) 70.
81
Ibidem, 70.
79
32
escaping from accepted codes and keeping possibilities open. Multiplicity is
connected to the possible where to become is not to attain a specific form but the
ability to take any value. A becoming is like an indeterminate person in a seemingly
constraining surrounding, a blank domino in a game with seemingly fixed rules and
regulations. It implies also questioning the ever-emerging fixations that we ourselves
and others are ready to use. Rather than looking for the coherence of one’s life story,
it requires stepping aside, and, even, doubting one’s name.
5.3.
Becoming Other in the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari
Becoming-Other in the thinking of Deleuze and Guattari is then not a contribution to
some identity theory but a way to conceive the becoming of minorities as a becomingminority. Proposed in Deleuze and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus, ‘becomingminority’, or to be more precise, ‘becoming-minoritarian’, lays emphasis on the nonessentialising act of becoming, and advocates an attitude to deviate from thinking and
acting as the majority would do. Taking after a minority but in a deterritorialised
sense, becoming-minoritarian opposes the act of imperialising, territorialising, and
homogenising characteristic of the majority mode of expansionism. To become,
Deleuze and Guattari expound, is to become anomalous, while being impressed with
norms, to transgress the institution one is in, and to discern oneself from the majority.
Number is not the key point that makes a group or a party majority. The majority is
the stronger one in power relations, who determines a state or standard and makes
others minority whether in larger or smaller quantities. Therefore, all becoming that is
liberating is becoming-minoritarian. ‘Minoritarian’ is not to be confused with a
‘minority’; the former lays emphasis on becoming or process while a ‘minority’ refers
to an aggregate or a state. Deleuze and Guattari make the distinction as follows:
“Jews, Gypsies, etc., may constitute minorities under certain conditions, but that in
itself does not make them becomings. One reterritorialises, or allows oneself to be
reterritorialised, on a minority as a state; but in a becoming, one is deterritorialised.
Even blacks, as the Black Panthers said, must become-black. Even women must
become-woman.”82 The example of being black is not a feature one has (for once and
for all), but it is a ‘this’, that is becoming, with new expressions, actions, and different
82
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis
1987) 291.
33
intensities. Every person is a life, not a this or that, but a this and a repeating
difference. An open series. What Deleuze and Guattari phrase as deterritorialisation is
an opening up of overcodings. This is often difficult for minority groups, namely that
their struggle becomes a form of overcoding, for example there is only ‘the black
cause.’
The ‘narrative of becoming’ offered by Deleuze and Guattari works through
another coupling also, not just majoritarian/minoritarian, but also molar/molecular.
According to Deleuze and Guattari, all becomings are molecular, not a matter of
molar subjects. A molecular identity is fluid and beyond the form and structure of
identification. Becoming-woman is not an issue of a clearly defined molar entity
(such as that woman), but of disappearing in the molecular collectivities (a woman
amongst women). The molar woman is too much the recognisable woman with her
forms and organs. Becoming-woman is not imitating or transforming oneself into the
image, endlessly reproduced in language and image, in daily meetings and in media,
or trying to transform oneself towards that image. This does not mean that, in order to
regain their own organism, their own history and their subjectivity, women should not
follow a molar politics. It is the sound of ‘we women’ through which one emerges
(textually) as woman. But there is another step required, if one wants to avoid drying
up: a molecular politics.83 Virginia Woolf was alert to such a molecular level when
she responded appalled when being asked if she was writing ‘as a woman.’ Rather,
“writing should produce a becoming-woman as atoms of womanhood capable of
crossing and impregnating an entire social field, and of contaminating an entire social
field, and of contaminating men, of sweeping them up in that becoming”.84
Becoming-woman is then that the becoming itself is woman, just as it is not
the child that is becoming, but becoming itself that is child. A girl is thus the
becoming-woman of every sex.
83
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis
1987) 276.
84
G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis
1987) 276.
34
5.4.
Rosi Braidotti on becoming in Deleuze and Guattari
Braidotti gives the example of Virginia Woolf also, who in her life and work always
inscribed becomings: “Becoming has to do with emptying out the self, opening it out
to possible encounters with the ‘outside’. Virginia Woolf is exemplary here, in that
the artist’s eye captures the outside world by making it more receptive to the totality
of perception”.85 As Virginia Woolf put it herself: “I am rooted, but I flow”.86 A
haecceity has neither a beginning nor an end, an origin nor a destination; it is always
in the middle. This becoming in-between, in between times, sexes and elements is
strikingly illustrated in her novel Orlando. Woolf conceived the writing of Orlando as
an in-between, as a writer’s holiday. Orlando is both male and female, both in the
18th as in the 20th century. Only at the end, Orlando freezes into a ‘human being’, but
it makes her turn pale: “for what more terrifying revelation can there be than it is the
present moment? That we survive the shock at all is only possible because the past
shelters us on one side and the future on another”. 87
Braidotti and Ahmed both identify some contradictory relationships in the
mode of thinking by Deleuze and Guattari. For Braidotti, on the one hand, the
becoming- minority/nomad/molecular/woman is posited as the general figuration for
the new philosophical subjectivity and on the other hand, however, not all forms taken
by the process of becoming are equivalent.88 The model of woman-as-Other is
proposed in relation to male-as-norm, and although this distinction is to be read
symbolically, not applied to real females, the notion of the feminine still exists in a
problematic relationship to the male. Deleuze seems not to acknowledge the unequal
weight accorded to the two pairs of the binary; in performing an evaluative reversal
the binary is reified.
There are two difficulties here: how to remove ‘woman’ from this unequal
binary and what this means for real women, “in all their diverse ways of
understanding and inhabiting the subject position of woman”.89 Furthermore,
85
R. Braidotti, Intensive Genre and the Demise of Gender (Forthcoming 2008) 4.
Quote from V. Woolf, The Waves in R. Braidoti, Intensive Genre and the Demise of Gender
(Forthcoming 2008).
87
V. Woolf, Orlando (London 1998).
88
R. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist
Theory (New York 1994) 114.
89
R. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist
Theory (New York 1994) 115.
86
35
positioning ‘woman’ as icon of difference does little to remedy the problem of
women’s diverse subjectivities and moreover it erases the structural relations of
power which continue to posit males as the norm. Three more problems in Deleuze’s
theory, identified by Braidotti, are: “an inconsistent approach to the issue of the
‘becoming-woman’; the reduction of sexual difference to one variable among many,
which can and should be dissolved […]; and an assumption of symmetry in the
speaking stances of the two sexes.”90 Hence, Braidotti argues, it is not possible to
simply insert new wine in old bottles; rather a feminist project of subjectivity “implies
the transformation of the very structures and images of thought, not just the
propositional content of the thoughts”.91 The theory which Deleuze develops as an
embodied male subject for whom the dissolution of identities based on the phallus
results in bypassing gender altogether, toward a multiple sexuality, is not appropriate
for female/feminist embodied subjects. Later on I will explain in my thesis that these
‘problems’ do not necessary mean that is is impossible to incorporate becomingtheories in a theoretical thinking abut diversity and diversity management.
5.5.
Sara Ahmed on becoming in Deleuze and Guattari
In Ahmed’s reading of Deleuze, she argues that Deleuze’s model of phantasies raises
several critical questions, dealing largely with the fascination with ‘the Other’ (in the
problematic way it is conceived here) and the notion of ‘becoming-woman’ as
phantasmatic. In the sense of Deleuze’s paradigm, “power becomes defined as a
struggle between identity and its partial collapse (becoming). This sets up a hierarchy
between identity/totality and difference […]”.92 The privilege of male-as-norm has
not been challenged; what has changed is his access to and desire to claim previously
forbidden places as his own. “‘Being woman’ here is not relevant; rather, the claim to
‘woman’ still constitutes the passivity of the woman, her positioning as a means
through which the masculine subject is in dialogue with (him)self […] ‘woman’
stands for the very phantasy of masculinity over-coming itself: not only can he
construct but he can also destroy the border between Self and Other”.93 In this sense,
the ultimate male transcendence has been achieved. Moving between subjectivities of
90
Idem, 117.
Idem, 120.
92
S. Ahmed (1998) 73.
93
S. Ahmed, (1998) 77.
91
36
choice is a luxury accorded to subjects whose valid place has already been secured.
To summarise Ahmed’s main points: first, the notion of ‘becoming-woman’ requires
placing ‘woman’ in the realm of phantasy such that she assumes a ‘saturation of
significance’; second, that this operation re-centres the male philosophical subject and
puts him in dialogue with himself; third, that becomings in general provide
opportunities for already privileged subjects to play with identies. Most importantly,
phantasies of becoming-woman do not resolve problems inherent in being woman.
5.6.
Conclusion
When one bears in mind the ‘shortcomings’ of the theory of becoming it is very much
appropriable in thinking about Otherness. Becoming anonymous can be seen as a
second qualification of Otherness and helps in referring to the modesty, the
impersonal way of becoming. Anonymity means a becoming without a totalitarian
definition of the I. Instead of having a personality, a molar entity, this qualification
stresses the option of becoming individual among collectives, experimenting with
many things in a non-narcissistic way. It goes against the dictatorship of having an
identity. Becoming-Other implies becoming anonymous, exploring the multiple
possibilities without idealising or choosing the safety of one specific form. Or, in the
words of Ahmed, there is a need to move from speaking about difference (ironically,
as undifferentiated) to speaking about differences as diverse and constituted within
power relations. Difference as undifferentiated, points Ahmed out, “prevents any
articulation of contradictions between regimes of difference in the form of
antagonistic relations of power […] postmodernism is predicated on the refusal or
erasure of differences that matter”.94 This is difference as indeterminately
differentiated, (the photonegative of statically differentiated) thus, two sides of the
same coin. We must resist designating ‘difference’ and ‘differences’ as static
categories, and rather think of them always in a relational sense, such that identities
are constituted in the interstices between a variety of structural relations.
94
S. Ahmed, (1998) 192.
37
6.
Safe, social-cultural, spaces
6.1.
Introduction
If becoming Other requires the step of a molecular politics, the question is how this
collective process can be approached. Through connecting with the writings of
Patricia Hill Collins in her book Black Feminist Thought, I want to further explore the
concept of ‘safe spaces’. Hill Collins considers a black feminist ‘standpoint’ a
specialised thought, produced by African-American women intellectuals. This
standpoint has several dimensions including “the presence of characteristic core
themes, the diversity of experiences, the varying expression regarding the core themes
and their experiences with them, and the interdependence of ‘black women’s’
experiences, consciousness and actions”. 95
Hill Collins considers developing knowledge of the self as essential to black
women’s survival. Unlike ‘white women’s’ images attached to the cult of true
womanhood, the controlling images applied to ‘black women’ are so uniformly
negative that they almost necessitate resistance if ‘black women’ are to have positive
self-images. Challenging these controlling images and replacing them by a ‘black
women’s’ standpoint is according to Collins an essential component in resisting
systems of ethnicity, gender and class oppression. She identifies at least three safe
spaces in which efforts to find a voice have occurred: ‘black women’s’ relationships
with one another, the ‘black women’s’ blues tradition, and the voices of ‘black
women’ writers.
I am well aware of the fact that elaborating on her work might be seen as
reterritorialisation and an undermining of my own arguments. It is therefore that I
only turn to her work for inspiration on safe spaces and creativity. I do not want to
imply that her work is an advocation of becoming-theory.
95
P. Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of
Empowerment (New York 1991) 32.
38
6.2.
Relationships as safe space
A first safe space is formed by ‘black women’s relationships with one another. As
mothers, daughters, sisters and friends, African-American women affirm one another.
The mother-daughter relationship is a fundamental relationship in the life of ‘black
women’. Mothers teach their daughters to survive in the interlocking structures of
ethnicity, gender and class oppression while simultaneously rejecting and
transcending these same structures. They show their children varying combinations of
behaviours as ensuring their survival by protecting them in dangerous environments
as well as helping them to go further than they themselves were allowed to go.
Motherhood thus has specific connotations in the lives of ‘black women’. Mothering
is not only an activity of biological mothers or ‘bloodmothers’, it is also practiced by
‘othermothers’, grandmothers, sisters, aunts or cousins take on, temporary or longterm, childcare responsibilities for one another’s children. This brings along wellorganised, resilient and women-centred networks. Sisterhood is another important
relationship, referring to the supportive feeling of loyalty and connectedness among
one another, due to the shared feeling of oppression.
6.3.
Music as safe space
African-American music as art has provided ‘black’ women a second safe space in
which to find a voice. Music has played a central role in their lives, resulting in the
ability to “create with their music an aesthetic community of resistance, which in turn
encouraged and nurtured a political community of active struggle for freedom”.96
Spirituals, blues, and the progressive rap all form part of a continuous struggle,
which is at once aesthetic and political. For instance, blues recordings represented the
first permanent documents expressing a ‘black’ women’s standpoint, altering their
illiterate condition. These songs can be seen as poetry, as expressions of ordinary
‘black’ women, rearticulated through the Afro centric oral tradition. When ‘black’
women sing the blues, they sing their own personalised, individualistic blues while
simultaneously expressing the collective blues of African-American women. The texts
96
A.Y. Davis, Women, Culture and Politics (New York 1989) 201.
39
resist the externally defined and controlling images of ‘black’ women and focus on
their independence and self-respect.
6.4.
Writings as safe space
The expression of a ‘black’ women’s voice in the oral blues tradition is also
supplemented by a growing voice in a third location, the space created by ‘black’
women’ writers. Increased literacy has provided new opportunities for ‘black’ women
to transform former institutional sites of domination such as research and literature
into institutional sites of resistance. Since the seventies, a community of ‘black’
women writers explore new themes and old taboos such as that ‘black’ women are not
allowed to leave their children, to have interracial affairs, have lesbian relationships or
be the victims of incest. Writing, and all its forms; literature, songs, essays and poems
is a daily activity through which ‘black’ women articulate their self-defined views, be
it with an intensive sense of community.
6.5.
Conclusion
Hill Collins’ writings about safe spaces for ‘black’ women show a valuable option of
how becoming-Other can become possible. The safety of spaces can create a culture
of resistance against the dominant ideology and allows the exploration of one’s
becoming. Inspiration can be found in the safe spaces but they have to be placed in
the centre to delete the centre-margin binary. Hill Collins further stresses the idea that
regardless of the actual content of ‘black’ women’s self-definitions, the act of
insisting on self-definition validates ‘black’ women’s power as human subjects. These
safe spaces are further characterised by ‘black’ women’s relationships with each
other, their family and community. It is not through an increasing autonomy that
‘black’ women develop their standpoint but through their relationships and affiliation
with each other. Rather than defining themselves in opposition to others,
responsibility for and connectedness with each other provide possibilities for
becoming-Other. Safe spaces, as a third qualification, reflect a social-cultural process
through which persons can develop, as to speak with Virginia Woolf, a room of their
own and a different voice.
40
Conclusion
My purpose has been to qualify the concept of Otherness in an open, multiplying way.
The qualifications I developed are that: becoming Other is a becoming, taking
difference as multiplicity; becoming Other is a form of becoming anonymous; a life
via haeccity and becoming Other requires aesthetic, social, cultural collectives,
forming safe spaces. To further reflect on the notion of Otherness, I relate these
qualifications to the four critical issues of the diversity literature as well as discuss
them as conditions for what I will sum up as an Otherness politics.
The reframing of ‘diversity’ along the qualifications of Otherness is an inquiry
to inscribe difference and Otherness in a process of becoming rather than being. As a
consequence, the discussion of a broad or narrow definition, or the question whether
one should include many or few categories is not the point anymore. Defining is a
form of representing, of being, making people always lacking an ideal, another. The
point is to allow people’s life to be connective, to participate in multiplicity, and to
sneak out of the dualities into the middle, the in-between. The question is not to be or
not to be, but to be and to be. Following the notion of Otherness, the discussion
whether identity is stable or dynamic can also be questioned. Of course, no identity is
stable, but sometimes it can be more stable than some relational perspectives suggest:
categories can be hard-core. The point would rather be to step aside of these
overcodings, and to go against the ethnicity of uniqueness and identification, focusing
on a becoming indiscernible. Such a becoming, is a matter of becoming intensive,
rather than a matter of stable or dynamic.
Finally, the discussion on the historical context of diversity was connected
with a concrete illustration of such a historicity or historical dimension: safe spaces
that are in-betweens where creativity and new (cultural, social, aesthetics) forms are
forming one’s becoming.
The question can be raised then, whether different actions are implied in these
concepts of Otherness. Does politics, a diversity policy, based upon Otherness also
consists of different interventions? And does it make a difference? I consider the four
qualifications of Otherness also as four conditions for an Otherness-politics and for
diversity policies. By conditions, I mean possibilities to work from, conditio sine qua
non, conditions which cannot work without each other, conditions without which
41
nothing can work. While presenting the conditions of an Otherness politics, I discuss
some interventions that attend to these conditions.
The notion of Otherness and its qualifications offers policy makers the crucial
reminder that we need to approach the Other from the position of the Other and not
from a dominant reality. We need to move away from the use of predetermined norms
and ideals to which every person needs to conform. Instead, a response to the Other
that indicates that this Other will be approached in his or her own variety, is
necessary. Evennmore, a response to the Other is needed which indicates the belief
that everybody can make a surplus.
A first condition in trying to implement this type of policy is to think persons
as becoming. Becoming means a continuous experimenting without a final
destination. One never will be a woman, a low educated person or a deaf-mute person
but one is always part of a becoming. I recognise this thinking in projects oriented at
the employment of lower educated persons in which the intervention of ‘trajectorysupport’ is being used. The idea of trajectory-support is one of individual coaching
which starts from the abilities and skills of the person. Instead of taking the norms or
‘ideal’ of higher educated persons, the coach offers a mentoring where each
participant can develop his or her trajectory from their own standards. Also, in the
(earlier) examples of ‘black women’, the idea is not to reach the musical or literary
standards of established artists but rather to develop a language of their own following
newly created visions that can even change the dominant standards.
Becoming also means becoming indiscernible. Taking this as a condition of a
policy, becoming indiscernible implies that developing happens in a modest, humble
way. Becoming a so-called minority is not so much a matter of trying to achieve the
options determined by the centre of the system, such as reaching higher hierarchical
levels for women, or rights to marry for gay people. Of course, the norm-options
should be available to each individual, but a policy of becoming woman or becoming
gay means foremost creating spaces to discover their own particular zones. One
disappears in the molecular collectives. In the examples of ‘black’ women, the
collective is very crucial. It is not important than one person shines on the scene, it is
a collective movement where individual versions disappear in the black and
anonymous movement. A similar principle can be seen in gay and lesbian protests and
prides. Though many gays and lesbians look for very individualised expressions as a
way to become noticed in their Otherness, they simultaneously thrive on becoming
42
anonymous in a pride march, adding colour to the multi-coloured pride-flag; or they
like to be ‘just there’ in anonymous bars or clubs, disappearing while feeling special.
The other qualification of Otherness, safe spaces, is an important condition
through which becoming indiscernible can be made possible. Policy makers can first
of all create the necessary safe space in which individuals can develop their own
voice. Since safe spaces allow for the exploration of one’s becoming and the nurturing
of bonding relationships, it is a crucial condition for diversity policies to consider. For
instance, language policies in which there is a huge pressure for immigrants to learn
the local language of their new ‘home’ country. Though this can be considered a
reasonable request, one seldom simultaneously hears the confirmation that immigrants
have the right to speak and develop their mother language. This language is their safe
space to fall back upon as they are entering many new and uncertain spaces (not in the
least the new language to learn). This language forms also the main connection to
their history; from which one cannot cut off anybody as one’s history forms a major
potential for new openings and new becomings.
Following Otherness and its qualifications, an Otherness-politics and the many
more localised diversity policies are in the first place oriented towards making
difference possible. Conditions need to be put in place through which Otherness is not
overruled by the norm but is allowed to develop its own variety of options. It is
through safe spaces and public spaces that a difference, the Other can explore its
possibilities and express these to other parties. A minority can then make a surplus,
maybe also for the dominant Other, but in the first place for themselves, from their
own perspectives.
43
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