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What matters in survival?
I will argue for Parfit’s view that psychological connectedness is what matters in
survival. Psychological connectedness consists of the sharing of mental modes, such
as a belief in God, an intention to exercise, or a love of dogs. This radical view
opposes both Cartesian Dualism and using the condition of bodily continuity.
Dualism’s flaws, such as communication between the substances, are described
elsewhere, and I will not revisit them here. To reach Parfit’s conclusion I will first
argue for bodily continuity as the condition for survival, then show that that reasoning
is flawed. I will describe the difference between psychological continuity and
connectedness and show that psychological connectedness can provide a coherent
response to two puzzling thought experiments. Finally I will show that it is
incompatible with personal identity. Personal identity is the theory that you are
identical to the person as you were yesterday, and identical to the person you will be
tomorrow. We all hold the relationship of identity to ourselves over time. While this
might sound simple enough, identity’s attributes as a one-to-one relationship, an allor-nothing relationship and a transitive relationship means that it leads to paradoxical
results when applied to cases more complicated than those met in everyday life. To
Parfit’s excellent exposition of this subject, I will only add a thought as to why our
intuitions, which authors such as Wiggins place great store on, might be misled: that it
is evolutionarily successful for us to care for this body in which we inhabit.
Williams presents a very convincing case for the importance of bodily continuity in
the following thought experiment. Two people, A and B, enter a body-swapping
machine. This machine will record both their brain states, then alter the A-body-brain
to be like B, and the B-body-brain to be like A. A and B enter the machine, and when
they come out the A-body person acts like and thinks that they are B, and vice versa.
While there might be problems if the bodies were radically different, which I will pass
over here, it feels as though we would be quite happy to accept that nothing is lost in
this exchange, and that the two persons have swapped bodies. But Williams then asks
us to consider what it would feel like if you were person A. You would be told that
you were going into the machine, which would act in a number of stages:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
A is subjected to an operation which produces amnesia;
amnesia is produced in A, and other interference leads to certain
changes in his character;
changes in his character are produced, and at the same time certain
illusory ‘memory’ beliefs are induced in him; these are of a quite
fictitious kind and do not fit the life of any actual person;
the same as (iii), except that both the character traits and the
‘memory’ impressions are designed to be appropriate to another
actual person, B;
the same as (iv), except that the result is produced by putting
information into A from the brain of B, by a method which leaves B the
same as before;
the same happens to A as in (v), but B is not left the same, since a
similar operation is conducted in the reverse direction.
Williams, in The Self and the Future pp21
Looking down the gradual changes, it is hard to pin-point where you would stop being
you. Williams highlights this by saying that the A body will be tortured after the
operation; the question is, who should be worried by that, person A or person B? In
Simon Amey U4423598 A850/04
the first, objective description, we might have thought that B should worry, since B
was being transferred into A’s body which would then be tortured. But looking at the
second, personal description it feels as though you should worry, because you are
person A, and even if your mind has been altered, it will still be you being tortured.
As Williams points out, if you are to be tortured, it makes no difference if you are also
given amnesia before hand. So it seems that our body is necessary survival: the
programming of someone else’s brain does not matter at all because they would not
be you; and your body is also sufficient for survival: that whatever changes your brain
might undergo, you will still in there, caring about what happens to your body.
Try to applying the language of identity seems to reach two different conclusions
here, depending on the viewpoint we take to the experiment. From the objective view
of person A and B going into the machine and having their minds swapped, identity
seems to be swapped with them. But considering the machine’s actions occurring on
your own mind suggests that even despite the changes to your brain, your identity
remains with your body. Williams suggests this means that the body is the better
candidate for the condition of identity, and hence of survival.
Having put the case for bodily continuity, I will now attack it, before moving on to
Parfit’s own thought experiment and the conclusions he draws from it. First, bodily
continuity is not nearly so simple as it appears. Our cells are constantly dying and
being replaced. After seven years, almost every atom in our body has been lost. In just
the same way as Theseus’ ship1, someone could collect up these atoms, and rebuild a
model of us. If perfect, this model would be alive, and would have a greater claim to
bodily continuity than we do. Clearly, literal, physical continuity is not what is really
important. The ongoing, functioning body that we inhabit is what matters, and that is
what is meant by bodily continuity. However, the body has lots of functional parts,
and they do not all matter for our survival…
So, secondly, consider that all not body parts are equal. We can lose a finger and we
are still ourselves. We can lose a limb, and we are still ourselves. In fact it seems that
we can lose almost all our body, and still be ourselves. The part that really matters
must be our brain. And so, and this is still consistent with Williams’ thought
experiment, it is the ongoing functional brain that is really important, and that must be
the criterion for bodily continuity and survival.
But, thirdly, we must consider that the brain is not one simple entity (not once
dualism has been rejected). How much of the brain must survive in order that you
survive? Is there some special part of the brain that makes you, you? Cases of brain
damage indicate that there is not. It seems that the measure of ourselves, like so many
things in the world, exists only on a sliding scale. With some brain damage, you might
be a very much like yourself, but with a few differences. As the injury increases, so
will the difference between ‘you’ before and ‘you’ after. Is there a magic percentage
that must be present so that you are still you? Any percentage must be chosen
1
As described by Hobbes, paraphrased here: Theseus sails from Athens to Crete. On the way his ship
is constantly falling apart, and by the time he lands every plank has been replaced. A Cretan travels
along behind him collecting all his discarded planks, and recreates his ship from them. There are now
two ships in Crete, but which is Theseus’ ship? This might be considered conceptually undecidable, as
our concept of a ship cannot cope with this sharp division between physical and functional continuity.
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arbitrarily, and be a conventional decision rather than shed any conceptual light. So
bodily continuity comes down to a debate of percentages of brain mass.
The only percentage that could conceivably have a deeper meaning is 50%, but Parfit
shows that this case is in fact the strongest argument for a psychological criterion for
survival in his thought experiment of division:
Our brains consist of into two hemispheres. As a treatment for epilepsy, the links
between the hemispheres are sometimes separated. Once they are, under laboratory
conditions, two independent consciousnesses can be evinced, each seeing through one
eye and controlling one hand. Normally there is a division of labour within the brain,
with one hemisphere specialising in mathematical reasoning, and the other dealing
with speech, but either hemisphere can learn either skill. Following Parfit, consider
the case of a person, P, without any division of labour within their brain, where either
hemisphere can take over the complete functioning of the brain2. This brain is divided
and one half is transplanted into a waiting body. The other half is thrown away. Has P
survived? They are psychological and physically continuous with the person before
the operation, and are unchanged in disposition or outlook. By all measures P seems
to have survived.
But what if the other half of the brain was not thrown away, but was similarly
transplanted into another waiting body? Now P seems to have survived as two people,
P’s identity has been split. Can we say that only one person exists after the operation?
We cannot pick that one person to be one of the bodies, because there is nothing to
choose between them. If we say that the left-brain-body is where P survives, this gives
us no grounds for saying why the right-brain-body has not survived. Clearly both have
survived, or neither. Might we say that P survives in neither body? But when only one
half of the brain was transplanted, P had survived. If we say that the dual transplant is
not survival, then the left-brain-body should stop the second transplant at all costs,
because it will destroy their survival. Clearly that is ludicrous; it breaks the intrinsic
requirement that the survival of one person cannot depend on what happens to a
second person. To conclude, after the dual transplant, we cannot say that P did not
survive, and we cannot say that they survived in only one body. We must conclude
that P survived in both bodies. As identity is necessarily a one-to-one relation, this
gives no plausible response for what has happened to P’s identity.
How can the two different descriptions of Williams’ body-swapping machine and
survival in the case of division be reconciled? With a new criterion for survival:
psychological connectedness. Psychological connectedness involves holding the same
hopes, desires, fears, intentions etc. over time. Each individual is nothing more than
the sum of these mental states, and these states are constantly evolving. We can now
see why division poses no problems for survival, connectedness can easily split and
continue in two bodies. In the first half of Williams’ thought experiment, where A and
B walk into the machine and emerge in each other’s bodies, connectedness has been
transferred, and survival continues in another body. And we can now draw a line in
Williams’ 6 stages of transference where survival stops. At stage 2 your character is
altered. There psychological connectedness is broken, there you cease to survive.
2
As well as the hemispheres, there is also a lower part of the brain that is not dual-redundant. For the
purposes of this thought experiment, that is ignored.
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Psychological connectedness is subtly different from psychological continuity.
Continuity is not sufficient for connectedness: consider the strange case of Dr. Jekyll
and Mr. Hyde; that although they shared memories and were psychologically
continuous, they had completely different outlooks and were not psychologically
connected. Nor is continuity necessary for connectedness. Psychological continuity
might be broken by amnesia, but the psychological connectedness might remain, with
the same intentions and beliefs, even though their formation was not remembered.
While psychological continuity is transitive, psychological connectedness is not. You
might be strongly connected to yourself five years ago, and youself five years ago
might be strongly connected to yourself ten years before that, but it does not follow
that you are strongly connected to yourself fifteen years ago.
Most importantly, psychological connectedness is not identity. While identity is
sufficient for connectedness, connectedness does not imply identity. First, as division
shows, connectedness can branch and hold a one-to-many relationship. Since identity
is always a one-to-one relationship, this means that identity does not always hold
where there is connectedness. Secondly, connectedness is always a matter of degree.
You almost perfectly connected with you from yesterday, but there have been some
changes. Over the years these changes will be very great. Contrast identity, which is
an all or nothing relation. Thirdly, identity is transitive while connectedness, as
described above, is not. Connectedness is a much more versatile and enduring
condition, that can explain survival in the thought experiments described without
contradiction, and with less implausibility than trying to apply the idea of identity.
Why might concern for identity, Cartesian Egos, and our bodies be so prevalent?
Even while I am writing the logical arguments for what matters in survival, I can
barely shake off the belief that I am within this body, that this is what I should take
care of, and be damned with psychological connectedness. I believe the start of the
answer is evolution. Those creatures who fought for themselves the hardest, who
looked after themselves best and who reproduced most were those who harboured the
delusion that what mattered to their survival was their body. Wiggins identifies this
instinctive drive to protect ourselves as an animal, but fails to question it. Evolution,
whether through nature or nurture, should strongly favour that instinct, but that does
not make it true, or even valuable. Indeed, from a moral point of view excessive
concern with ourselves could be highly damaging.
To conclude, the thought experiment of division gives strong evidence that what
matters in survival can have a one-to-many relationship, and hence what matters is not
identity. Bodily continuity is flawed because it cannot draw a reasonable line in the
possible spectrum of degrees of bodily survival, but the condition of psychological
connectedness surmounts this by not being an all-or-nothing relation, and saying
instead that our survival is always a matter of degree. Therefore psychological
connectedness is what matters in survival.
Word Count: 2241
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Bibliography:
Course Notes, chapter 4.
Williams, B., 1973, The Problems of the Self, reproduced in the course notes.
Parfit, D., 1971, Personal Identity, reproduced in the course notes.
Wiggins, D., 1991, The Concern to Survive, reproduced in the course notes.
Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford University Press
Broks, P., 2003, Into the Silent Land, Atlantic Books