Contemporary Political Philosophy: Constructivism & Critical Theory
Optional course, Philosophy MA and Social and Political Thought MA
Spring Term 2008 Tutor: Gordon Finlayson
Seminar: room and time Tuesday Russell Building 13, 12-14 p.m.
Course Outline and Reading List
The term ‘Kantian constructivism’ was introduced by John Rawls to describe a procedure for deriving
moral, legal and political standards from the bare idea of what it is to be a person or a rational agent.
Versions of this strategy, with or without the name ‘constructivism’, can be discovered not only in
Rawls’s derivation of his principles of justice from choices made in an original position, and in Kant’s
moral philosophy, but also in O’Neill, Habermas, Scanlon and other recent political and legal
philosophers. The course will examine the structure and cogency of various political constructivist
arguments.
Week
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10
Topic
Kant’s Ethics & Kant’s Theory of Right
Rawls I: A Theory of Justice
Rawls II: Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory
Sandel’s Communitarian Critique
Rawls II: Political Liberalism
Habermas’s Discourse Ethics
The Feminist Critique of Moral Theory
Habermas’s Between Facts and Norms
The Habermas-Rawls dispute.
General reading
Finlayson J.G (2005). Habermas: A Very Short Introduction
Wolff, J. (1996) An Introduction to Political Philosophy
Knowles, D. (1998) Political Philosophy
Mullhall S. and Swift A., (1992) Liberals and Communitarians,
Christman, J. (2002) Social and Political Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction
Constructivism in contemporary political philosophy:
McKinnon, C. (2002) Liberalism and the Defence of Political Constructivism
Roberts, P. (2005) Political Constructivism
# = essential reading for seminar
A: Primary Texts B: Secondary texts C: Further Reading
* = recommended
+ = good introductory reading
1. Kant’s Ethics & Kant’s Theory of Right
Kant is far and away the most important historical figure for central figure for contemporary
political constructivism, and most constructivists combine their views with a particular
interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy and philosophy of right. In this session we will
concentrate on his argument for the second formula of the basic moral imperative, the
categorical imperative: that we should treat others as ends rather than means, and on a close
reading of the key parts of his philosophy of right, or philosophy of law.
A: # Kant, I. [1785] Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals trans. M. Gregor, 1998 or ed. L. Denis
2005, or as Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. L.W. Beck, 1959, or as The Moral Law,
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trans. H.J. Paton, 1948, part 2, Prussian Academy pagination pp. 426-448 and (the argument that
every rational agent must treat every other as an end in him/herself)
# Kant, I. [1793] “On the Common Saying: ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in
Practice’” in Immanuel Kant: Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss, CUP, Cambridge 1970 pp. 61-92.
# Kant, I. [1797] The Metaphysics of Morals trans. M. Gregor, 1991 (recommended translation),
Doctrine of Right: ‘Introduction to Doctrine of Right’ and §1-9, 36, 41-49, 49 remark A, 52, 62,
Conclusion. (Some of this material can be found in Hans Reiss ed. pp.131-143
B: Kersting, W. (1992) ‘Politics, freedom and order: Kant’s political philosophy’ in P. Guyer ed. The
Cambridge Companion to Kant
Wood, A. (1999) Kant’s Ethical Thought, chapter on Kant’s political philosophy
O.Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, ch. 9.
Pippin, R.B. (1985) ‘On the moral foundations of Kant’s Rechtslehre’ in R. Kennington ed. The
Philosophy of Immanuel Kant, reprinted in Pippin’s Idealism as Modernism.
Seminar Questions:
Why, according to Kant, should we treat others as ends rather than mere means?
What is it, according to Kant, to treat someone as an end in themselves?
What does Kant mean by Right (Recht)?
Is his principle of Right based on the categorical imperative, and if so how?
What is ultimate justification for law in Kant?
How does Kant propose to unite individual morally autonomous individuals in a political community?
How according to Kant do individual, society, state relate to each other?
What according to Kant is the aim of political society?
C:
Introductions to Kant’s ethics:
Schneewind, J.B. (1992) ‘Autonomy, obligation and virtue: an overview of Kant’s moral philosophy’,
in P. Guyer ed. The Cambridge Companion to Kant
Korsgaard, C. (1998) ‘Introduction’ to Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, tr. M. Gregor
Walker, R.C.S. (1998) Kant: Kant and the Moral Law, The Great Philosophers (a very short book)
Guyer, P. (1998) ‘Introduction’ to Guyer, P. ed. Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical
Essays
Introductions to Kant’s political and legal philosophy:
Reiss, H. (1970) ‘Introduction’ to Reiss ed. Kant’s Political Writings, secs. 4-6
Riley, P. (1986) ‘The “elements” of Kant’s political philosophy’, Political Theory 14:4
Sullivan, R.J. (1989) Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory, chs. 16-17
Kersting, W. (1992) ‘Politics, freedom and order: Kant’s political philosophy’ in P. Guyer ed. The
Cambridge Companion to Kant
On the foundations of the principle of right:
Riley, P. (1982) Will and Political Legitimacy, ch. on Kant
Taylor, C. (1984) ‘Kant’s theory of freedom’ in Z.A. Pelczynski and J. Gray eds. Conceptions of
Liberty in Political Philosophy, reprinted in Taylor’s Philosophy and the Human Sciences:
Philosophical Papers Volume 2, 1985
Mulholland, L.A. (1989) Kant’s System of Rights
Flikschuh, K. (2000) Kant and Modern Political Philosophy
2. Rawls’s A Theory of Justice
John Rawls’s argues that a social structure is just if it conforms to the two ‘principles of justice’ that
people would choose if they had to choose between different possible principles to govern their
society from an ‘original position’ that is behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, i.e. from a position in which they
did not anything about their personal characteristics or abilities.
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A: #Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice, or 2nd ed. 1999, secs. §1-4, 8, 11, 40, 60 & 68.
B: Höffe, O.“Is Rawls' Theory of Justice Really Kantian?” Ratio 1984. pp. 103 -124
Cohen, G.A. “If You’re an egalitarian How come you’re so rich?” Harvard University Press (2000) chs.
9 & 10.
Seminar Questions:
What does Rawls mean by saying that persons are free and equal?
How does he think the original position models this conception of the person?
What role does the original position play in A Theory?
What does Rawls mean by Justice?
How Kantian is this theory?
What are the implications of his theory, if any, for the personal behaviour of individuals?
3.
Rawls: Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory
Rawls went on to develop the idea that the original position procedure is a way of modelling a
Kantian conception of persons as free and equal, so that ultimately the principles of justice are
‘constructed’ from this conception of a person. He also said that this conception of the person is not
necessarily a true one, just one that is part of an ‘overlapping consensus’ that members of modern
democratic societies share for political purposes. Here we will focus on the idea of constructivism in
Rawls’s theory.
Seminar Reading.
A: # Rawls, J. (1980) ‘Kantian constructivism in moral theory’ (The Dewey Lectures), Journal of
Philosophy 77:9, reprinted in Rawls’s Collected Papers, lecture 3, which is revised as lecture 3,
‘Political constructivism’ in Rawls’s Political Liberalism 1993.
Available on-line @ Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022362X%2819800909%2977%3A9%3C515%3AKCIMT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1
B: # O’Neill, O. (2002) ‘Constructivism in Rawls and Kant’, in S. Freeman ed. The Cambridge
Companion to Rawls (Argues that Rawls is essentially communitarian)
“O’Neill, O. “Constructivism in Ethics” (1998). In E. Craig (Ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
London: Routledge. Available on-line @ http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/L014
Korsgaard, C. REALISM AND CONSTRUCTIVISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
Available on-line @ http://www.pdcnet.org/pdf/8Korsgaard.pdf
Seminar Questions:
What is constructivist about Rawls’s Justice as Fairness?
What is thus constructed, and what is it constructed out of?
Are all the elements of the construct also constructed, or are there some simples?
What is the point of constructivism?
Who is the opponent of the constructivist? What philosophical position is it designed to refute?
C: Further Reading.
Constructivism in general
See also the short articles on Social Contructivism and Constructivism in Mathematics in
http://www.rep.routledge.com.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/
On Rawls’s constructivism:
+ Arneson, R.J. (1989) ‘Introduction’ to symposium on Rawlsian theory of justice, Ethics 99
Brink D. O. (1987) ‘Rawlsian constructivism in moral theory, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 17
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Rawls and Kant:
Krasnoff, L. (1999) ‘How Kantian is constructivism?’, Kant-Studien 90:4
Doppelt, G. (1988) ‘Rawls’ Kantian ideal and the viability of modern liberalism’, Inquiry 31
Rawls, J. (1989) ‘Themes in Kant’s moral philosophy’, in E. Förster ed. Kant’s Transcendental
Deductions, reprinted in Rawls’s Collected Papers
Rawls, J. (2000) Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, section on Kant
Gillroy, J.M. (2000) ‘Making public choices: Kant’s “justice from autonomy” as an alternative to
Rawls’ “justice as fairness”‘, Kant-Studien 91:1
4.
The Communitarian Critique of Rawls.
Michael Sandel argues that the concept of the self as a purely rational chooser on which Rawls relies
is unrealistic since every individual is in fact already steeped in the values of their particular society.
This critique applies implicitly to the whole constructivist tradition. John Gray asserts that the very
idea of human beings as free agents fundamentally distinct from other animals is simply a longstanding illusion of Western religion and philosophy.
Seminar Reading:
A: #Sandel, M.J. (1982) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, 2nd ed. 1988, introduction, chs. 1-3,
conclusion
#Sandel, M.J. (The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, Vol. 12, No. 1
(Feb., 1984), pp. 81-96 Available online @ Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00905917%28198402%2912%3A1%3C81%3ATPRATU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X
Walzer, M. (1983) Spheres of Justice, preface, ch. 1
B: Pogge, T. (1989) Realizing Rawls, ch. 2 ‘Sandel and the conception of the person’ [m]
+ Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P. (1990) Rawls, ch. 7
+ Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. (1992) Liberals and Communitarians: An Introduction, 2nd ed. 1996,
Introduction, chs. 5,6
#Gray, J. (2002) Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and Other Animals, Granta, pp. 37-52
Seminar Questions:
What are Sandel’s chief Objections to Rawls’s Theory of Justice?
What does Sandel mean by the unencumbered Self?
Where, if anywhere, do his criticisms bite?
Can political constructivism provide a basis for justifying a legal order if it is based on a conception of
the self that is (a) produced or (b) reinforced by that same order?
How should a political constructivist respond to Sandel’s critique of Rawls?
5.
Rawls’s Political Liberalism
Seminar Reading:
A: # Rawls, J. (1985) ‘Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14.
Available on-line @ Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00483915%28198522%2914%3A3%3C223%3AJAFPNM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0
Revised as lecture 1, secs. 1-5 of Rawls’s Political Liberalism 1993.
# Rawls, J. Political Liberalism Lecture 3 “Political Constructivism” §1-4
# Rawls, J. Political Liberalism Lecture 4 “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus” §1-5
# Rawls, J. Political Liberalism Lecture 6 “The Idea of Public Reason” §1-4
B: +Kymlicka, W. (2002) Contemporary Political Philosophy¸ 2nd ed., ch. 6 sec. 7 ‘Political liberalism’
Seminar Questions:
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What does Rawls mean by calling this conception of justice a ‘political’ one?
What is a comprehensive doctrine?
Why is justice for Rawls not a comprehensive doctrine?
What is an overlapping consensus?
What are public and non-public reasons?
What are ‘pro-tanto’, ‘full’, and ‘public justification’?
What is the duty of civility? Who owes it to whom?
C: Further Reading:
Raz, J. Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No.
1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 3-46. Available on-line @ Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00483915%28199024%2919%3A1%3C3%3AFDTCOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J.
Reprinted in Raz, J. Ethics in the Public Domain, Oxford, 1194 ch. 4.
6.
Habermas’s Discourse Ethics
Seminar Reading.
A: #Habermas, J. 1992. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Politypp 57-70
& 76-94.
Habermas, J. 1993. Justification and Application. Cambridge: Polity pp. 1-16.
B: Rehg, W. Insight and Solidarity, University of California Press, 1994, ch. 3.
#McMahon, C. ‘Discourse and Morality’, Ethics 110/3, (2000) pp. 514-36
Available online @ Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=00141704%28200004%29110%3A3%3C514%3ADAM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B
C: Finlayson, J. G. Habermas: A Very Short Introduction, OUP 2005.
Heath, J. Communicative Action and Rational Choice, MIT Press, 2000.
7.
The Feminist Critique of Moral Theory.
Seminar Reading:
A: Either: Benhabib, S. (1987) ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Feminist Theory’ in S. Benhabib and D. Cornell (eds.) (1987).
Benhabib S. and Cornell D. (eds.) (1987). Feminism as Critique. Essays on the Politics of Gender in
Late-Capitalist Societies. London, Polity Press.
Or: Benhabib, S. (1992) ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan
Controversy and Moral Theory’ in S. Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and
Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics. London, Routledge, 1992.
B: Finlayson, J. G. “Women and the Standpoint of Concrete Others: The Critique of Discourse
Ethics and Feminist Social Criticism.” Pdf -file Available on course webpage.
Blum, L. (1998). ‘Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory’, Ethics 98: 472-491.
C: Further Reading:
Gilligan (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge
Massachusetts, Harvard University Press
- (1986). ‘Remapping the Moral Domain’, in T. Heller, M. Sosna, and D. Wellbury (eds.),
Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality, and the Self in Western Thought.
Stanford California, Stanford University Press.
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Meehan, J. (2000). ‘Feminism and Habermas’s Discourse Ethics’, Philosophy and Social Criticism,
26/3: 39-52
- (1998) ‘Communicative ethics’ in Alison M. Jaggar and Iris Marion Young (eds.), A Companion to
Feminist Philosophy. Oxford, Blackwell.
- (1995) (ed.) Feminists Read Habermas. London, Routledge.
Okin, S. (1989). Justice, Gender and the Family. New York, Basic Books.
- (1989a). ‘Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice.’ Ethics 99/2: 229-49.
8.
Habermas’s, Between Facts and Norms
A: #Habermas, J. (1996) Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 81-4, 99-131, 447-463.
#Habermas, J. [1998] 'Three Normative Models of Democracy' in The Inclusion of the Other
Cambridge, Polity.
B: Habermas, J. [1992] 'Life Forms, Morality and the Task of the Philosopher' in Autonomy and
Solidarity, ed. P. Dews. London, Verso, pp. 187-211.
Joshua Cohen, ‘Reflections on Habermas on Democracy’ Ratio Juris 12/4, 1999 (385-416)
C: Further Reading
O'Neill , O. (1994) 'Practical reason and possible community: a reply to Jean-Marc Ferry', Ratio
Juris 7:3
Peters, B. (1994) 'On reconstructive legal and political theory, Philosophy and Social Criticism 20:4
Baynes, K. (1995) 'Democracy and the "Rechtsstaat": Habermas's "Faktizität und Geltung"', in S.K.
White ed. The Cambridge Companion to Habermas
Scheuerman, W. E. (1998) 'Between radicalism and resignation: democratic theory in Habermas's
Between Facts and Norms' in P. Dews ed. Habermas: A Critical Reader
Olson, K. (2003) 'Do rights have a formal basis? Habermas' legal theory and the normative
foundations of the law', Journal of Political Philosophy 11:3
Moral Objectivity and Reasonable Agreement: Can Realism Be Reconciled with Kantian
Constructivism? Ratio Juris 17 (1), 27–51,
Rummens, S. (2006) Debate: The co-originality of private and public autonomy in deliberative
democracy', Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (4), 469-481
9.
The Habermas-Rawls dispute.
A:
Habermas, J. 1995. ‘Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on
John Rawls's Political Liberalism’, The Journal of Philosophy XCII(3): 109-131. Available online @ Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022362X%28199503%2992%3A3%3C109%3ARTTPUO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
Rawls, J. ‘Reply to Habermas’, The Journal of Philosophy XCII(3): 132-80. Available on-line @
Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022362X%28199503%2992%3A3%3C132%3APLRTH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
(Reprinted in Rawls, J. 2005. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.
372-435.)
B: McMahon, C. 2002. ‘Why There is No Issue Between Habermas and Rawls’, The Journal of
Philosophy, XCIX (3): 111-129. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022362X%28200203%2999%3A3%3C111%3AWTINIB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J
Finlayson. ‘The Habermas-Rawls Dispute Redivivus’ Politics and Ethics Review 3/1, 144-162.
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