Staub, E. (2006). Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing or intractable conflict:
understanding the roots of violence, psychological recovery and steps toward a general
theory. Political Psychology, 27,(6), 867-895.
Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing or intractable conflict: understanding the roots of
violence, psychological recovery and steps toward a general theory.
Ervin Staub
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Running Head: Reconciliation after genocide
Ervin Staub’s address:
Department of Psychology, Tobin Hall,
University of Massachusetts, Amherst MA 01003
e-mail: estaub@psych.umass.edu
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Abstract
This article explores psychological avenues to reconciliation between groups. It describes the
psychological changes in survivors, perpetrators and passive bystanders in the course of the
evolution of increasing violence and points to healing from the psychological wounds created as
an essential component of reconciliation. It also explores the role of understanding the roots of
genocide, and of violence between groups in general, in contributing to healing, to the creation of
a shared history in place of the usually contradictory histories held by groups that have been in
violent conflict, and to reconciliation in general. The role of processes that have been
emphasized in the literature on reconciliation, such as truth, justice, and contact between groups
are discussed. Bottom up approaches focusing on the population and top down approaches
involving leaders and the media, and the importance of changes in institutions and structures are
discussed. The article exemplifies many of the issues and processes by a discussion of the
genocide in Rwanda, and by the description of interventions, ranging from work with small
groups, including leaders and the media, to radio programs that aimed to further reconciliation,
as well as research evaluating an intervention.
For indexing purposes:
genocide
healing/psychological recovery
Reconciliation
Understanding the roots of genocide
Prevention
Mass violence
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Reconciliation after genocide, mass killing or intractable conflict: understanding the roots of
violence, psychological recovery and steps toward a general theory.
Ervin Staub
University of Massachusetts at Amherst
When violence between groups comes to a halt the building of constructive, nonviolent
relations between groups becomes possible. However, violence often resumes (Long & Brecke,
2003). The psychological wounds that have resulted from the violence and fear, mistrust or hate
may interfere with building better relations and lead to renewed violence (de la Rey, 2001).
Violence may resume even if it was halted by negotiations and agreements between parties
(de Silva & Samarasinghe, 1993). This is the case because agreements are often not satisfying to
all segments of the hostile groups, because they may not be appropriately carried out, and by
themselves they do not sufficiently alter the psychological realities of group members created by
past history. This applies, for example, to the Oslo agreements between Israelis and Palestinians,
which for a while diminished violence (McCauley, 2002, a, b). “The peace accord is at best a
rough blueprint… Whether lasting peace will be constructed depends on what happens next”
(Boyce, 2002, p.8). Renewed violence is probably an even greater danger when extreme violence
is stopped by one party defeating the other, as in the case of Rwanda.
One aim of this article is to note some of the psychological effects of group violence on
the parties to the violence and thereby identify their psychological situation when reconciliation
might start. Another is to describe an approach that my associates and I have developed and used
in Rwanda to promote healing--or psychological recovery--and reconciliation, research we have
conducted to evaluate its effectiveness (Staub, Pearlman, Gubin and Hagengimana, 2005), and
varied uses of the approach in Rwanda (Staub and Pearlman, 2001; 2006; Staub, Pearlman, and
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Miller, 2003). Reconciliation has special urgency for preventing new violence in situations, like
Rwanda, where groups remain intermixed. We have used both bottom up approaches to
reconciliation, which attempt to promote changes in the population, and top down approaches
working with the media and leaders who can shape the attitudes of the community as well as the
nature of institutions that may further reconciliation. I will also discuss the political and social
context of these interventions. Another aim is to emphasize the value and potential uses of one
of the elements of our approach, promoting understanding of the roots of violence. A final
purpose is to briefly describe other processes that the literature indicates are important for
reconciliation, to note relationships with elements of our approach, when they exist, and to
initiate steps toward a general conception of reconciliation.
What is reconciliation.
Reconciliation may be defined as mutual acceptance by groups of each other (Staub and
Pearlman, 2001; Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003). The essence of reconciliation is a changed
psychological orientation toward the other. Reconciliation means that victims and perpetrators,
or members of hostile groups, do not see the past as defining the future, as simply a continuation
of the past. It means that they come to see the humanity of one another, accept each other, and
see the possibility of a constructive relationship. This definition is consistent with other
definitions, which focus on restoring a damaged relationship, and on both the processes involved
and the outcome (Broneus, 2003; de la Rey, 2001; Kriesberg, 1998b; Lederach, 1997).
While the focus of this definition (and of the interventions described in the article) is
psychological change, institutions and how they operate are important, both in promoting
reconciliation, and in solidifying or maintaining psychological changes that can be subverted by
political and social processes. Whether the media devalues or humanizes groups, how the justice
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system or schools operate, the nature of leadership, structural justice or the situation of groups in
society, are crucial in promoting or hindering reconciliation. However, when psychological
interventions affect leaders or the media, they can bring about institutional change. For example,
if journalists come to present issues between groups in a manner that promotes reconciliation
rather than incite hostility, this can be regarded as change in the media as an institution.
There is extensive interest in reconciliation, but as yet limited research (e.g. Gibson, 2002,
2004; Byrne, 2003, 2004; Staub et al, 2005). Much of the already substantial literature describes
practical efforts, like truth and reconciliation commissions, or interventions by practitioners, or
focuses on theory (e.g. Abu-Nimer, 2001; Lederach, 1997; Proceedings, 2002; Volkan, 1997).
However, reconciliation is also an aspect of the prevention of violence and peacemaking and can be
facilitated by processes such as contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, in press), peace
education (Salomon and Nevo, 2002), dialogue and interactive problem solving (Kelman, 1990;
Kelman and Fisher, 2003; Rouhana and Kelman 1994; Ross and Rothman, 1999).
A brief history of the genocide and its aftermath in Rwanda.
Starting on April 7, 1994, the day after snipers shot down the plane carrying the President
of Rwanda, over a 100 day period Hutus killed about 700,000 Tutsis, as well as about 50,000
politically moderate Hutus. Estimates of the number of people killed vary, and of how many
people were killed in each group, but this is a relatively common estimate (des Forges, 1999;
Mamdani, 2002; Prunier, 1995). The killings were accompanied by rape, the mutilation of
women, and other forms of physical and psychological violence and torture. The perpetrators in
this government-organized violence included parts of the military, young men in paramilitary
groups, and ordinary people. This was an “intimate genocide” (Staub and Pearlman, 2001),
5
neighbors killing neighbors, and people in mixed families killing family members and
occasionally even their own children (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2002).
The genocide
evolved out of a past history of conflict and violence. A long history of
dominance by the minority Tutsis (about 14% of the population) over the majority Hutus (about
85%) greatly intensified under the colonial rule of the Belgians. The Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda
live next to each other and share the same language and religion, primarily Catholic. They may
have been originally different ethnic groups, but the primary differences over time became those
of occupation, class, power and social identities. The Tutsis tended cattle, were wealthier and had
power, the Hutus were agriculturalists (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2002).
Starting with a so-called white paper in 1916, the Belgians developed a racist ideology of
Tutsi superiority (Mamdani, 2002) and used the Tutsis to govern the country. The condition of
the Hutus progressively deteriorated. In 1959 a Hutu rebellion, in which about 50,000 Tutsis
were killed, brought Hutus to power. After independence from Belgian rule in 1962, there was
Hutu violence and discrimination against Tutsis, including mass killings in the early 1960s and
1970s. The government did not allow refugees from this violence to return. In 1990, the
Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) entered the country from Uganda, composed mainly of children
of Tutsi refugees. A civil war began, with a cease fire in 1993, followed by the Arusha Accords
that delineated plans for a government shared by Tutsis and Hutus.
While there was greater political openness and new political parties were created, among
the Hutus an ideology of "Hutu power" developed and was propagated by elements of the
government and media, intensifying fear and devaluation of Tutsis. The Tutsis were going to kill
everyone, they will take away people’s property, they will rule over Hutus as before. A "Hutu
Ten Commandments" propagated violent action against all Tutsis. The genocide began, and with
6
the world watching but remaining passive it continued until the RPA defeated the government
army (des Forges, 1999; Prunier, 1995; Staub, 1999a).
Since then, the power has been in the hands of the minority Tutsis. In the years
immediately following the genocide, there were incursions by perpetrators, now refugees in the
Congo, killing more Tutsis in the Northwest. With many Tutsis who were refugees in
neighboring countries returning, the distribution of the population is about the same as before the
genocide. Members of the groups live next to each other as neighbors, as before. The
government initiated a policy of unity and reconciliation, a rare, intentional societal process to
help people heal and reconcile. However, as part of unity, people are expected to consider
themselves Rwandans, and not use the terms Hutu and Tutsi. Discussing differences between the
groups has been called “divisionism.” This policy does now allow Hutus to express their
concerns and identity. In the former Yugoslavia, where the government, led by Tito, did not
allow an exploration of the mass killing of Serbs by Croats that took place during the second
World War, the inattention to deep psychological wounds and past group relations is likely to
have contributed to the violence during the 1990s (Staub, 1996). While in Rwanda there is a
justice process (see below), this policy is a source of potential conflict.
Over the years the government in Rwanda has become increasingly intolerant of
“divisionism,” at times applying the term, and also the more extreme accusation of propagating
genocidal ideology, to individuals and groups that it sees as potential opposition. Some of these
individuals have been prosecuted and some groups have been outlawed, including the primary
opposition party at the time of the 2003 presidential elections. Such societal processes affect
reconciliation (Uvin, 2003). However, in Rwanda there are also continuing positive processes,
such as equality in admission to education, and activities that promote reconciliation. In some of
7
our work we have collaborated with the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, a government
organization. And it was at the invitation of high level government officials to expand the scope
of our reconciliation efforts that we began to develop the radio programs described below, which
among other things advocate opposition to leaders who promote policies of devaluation and
hostility, active bystandership and pluralism. Inconsistent and at times contradictory policies and
practices are likely to be present in many post-conflict situations, due to the influence of complex
circumstances and psychological forces.
The impact of mass violence.
The evolution of violence. Understanding the psychological situation of survivors,
perpetrators and bystanders—witnesses who are part of the perpetrator group but have not been
directly involved in violence—is important for reconciliation. This psychological situation is not
only the result of the violence, but also of what happens in the course of its evolution.
The effects on survivors. Whether it is the outcome of a conflict that has become
intractable, or the result of difficult life conditions and psychological and social processes that
follow from them, mass killing and genocide are the end points of an evolution of harmdoing
(see Staub, 1989b, 2003). In the course of this evolution the victims are increasingly devalued,
are identified as enemies of an ideology that perpetrators create, and are harmed in varied ways.
They tend to feel abandoned, and betrayed by former neighbors, friends, lovers and in mixed
families even by family members who break off relations with them, as in Germany during the
Nazi era (Staub, 1989b), or engage in violence against them, as in Rwanda (des Forges, 1999;
Mamdani, 2002). The survivors carry the impact of both the increasing persecution and violence
and of the mass killing or genocide. Their basic needs for security, for feelings of effectiveness
and control over important events in one’s life, for positive identity, for positive connections to
8
other people and communities, and for a comprehension of reality and of one’s own place in the
world, have all been deeply frustrated (Staub, 1989b, 2003; Staub and Pearlman, 2001; 2005).
Victimized people tend to suffer from both PTSD and complex trauma (Herman, 1992;
McCann and Pearlman, 1990). They feel diminished and vulnerable, seeing the world, other
people, and especially members of groups other than their own as dangerous. Without healing,
when there is new group conflict, it will be difficult for them to consider the needs of the other
and to trust the other, and thereby to resolve conflict peacefully. In response to threat they may
strike out, believing that they need to defend themselves, but actually becoming perpetrators.
Healing, or psychological recovery, can improve the quality of their lives, make unnecessary
“defensive” violence by them less likely, and help them become open enough to the perpetrator
group to engage with processes of reconciliation (Staub, 1998; Staub and Pearlman, 2005).
The effects on perpetrators and passive bystanders. Usually a group turns against an
already devalued group, or is unable to resolve conflict because of its negative view and mistrust
of the other group. In the course of harmful actions, individual actors and the group as a whole
change. They learn by doing. They justify their actions by increasingly devaluing the victims,
and excluding them from the moral realm (Fein, 1979, 2003; Opotaw, 1990; Staub, 1989b,1990).
In the end there may be a reversal of morality; killing the victims becomes the right thing to do
(Staub, 1989b). New institutions are created that serve discrimination and violence. In
intractable conflict group beliefs evolve about the group’s just cause and the enemy’s
responsibility for the conflict and violence (Bar-Tal, 2000; Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003).
Participation in mass violence also creates trauma. People who have killed, including
soldiers, are traumatized by their actions (Laufer, Brett, & Gallops, 1985; McNair, 2002; Parson,
1984; Rhodes, Allen, Nowicki, & Cillesen, 2002). Vietnam veterans who engaged in atrocities,
9
in violence that is extreme, unnecessary and/or directed at civilians, were especially affected
(McNair, 2002). Those who execute genocide routinely engage in atrocities. Group support,
ideology and changes due to learning by doing serve to some extent as protective mechanisms.
But as they protect from trauma, guilt and shame, they diminish empathy for victims (Browning,
1992). The restriction of empathy tends to generalize, and violence often expands beyond the
original victim group (Staub, 1998b; des Forges, 1999). After the violence is stopped,
perpetrators tend to maintain the rightness of their actions and continue to devalue and blame the
victims. They surround themselves with a defensive shield (Staub and Pearlman, 2006).
Although once a genocide starts some people endanger themselves to save lives (Africa
Rights, 2002; Oliner and Oliner, 1988), passivity by witnesses/ bystanders in the course of the
evolution of harmdoing is the norm (Staub, 1989b). The psychological effects of passivity are
similar to but less intense than the effects of perpetration. To reduce their own distress, passive
members of the perpetrator group tend to distance themselves from victims, in part by accepting
justifications offered by perpetrators, and by blaming and devaluing victims. This reduces
empathy and inhibits guilt, perhaps with the help of the commonly held belief in a just world,
where innocent people do not suffer (Lerner, 1980). As bystanders change, at least some of them
join the perpetrators (Lifton, 1986; Staub, 1989a,b).
Perpetrators of even relatively minor harmdoing tend to minimize the harm they have
caused (Baumeister, 1997). The profound changes in identity, values, views of themselves, views
of the victims and probably of human beings in general makes it extremely difficult for
perpetrators of and passive bystanders to mass violence to acknowledge, presumably to
themselves as well as others, that their actions were wrong. Few perpetrators showed regret or
expressed sympathy for their victims in testimonies before the Truth and Reconciliation
10
Commission in South Africa (Broneus, 2003; Byrne, 2003, 2004). Serbs, Croats and Muslims
who participated by e-mail in the New York Times “conference” on the Internet on Bosnia:
Uncertain Paths to Peace in 1995 did not acknowledge their own group’s contribution to the
conflict and violence but always pointed at the other groups1. The inability to acknowledge
harmdoing interferes not only with reconciliation but also with being reincluded in the moral
community, which perpetrators presumably want (Nadler, 2003). Healing from the wounds
created by one’s actions or the actions of one’s group may lighten their weight, and may enable
people to begin to assume responsibility and undo the transformation--- in their orientation to the
victims, to people in general, in their personality and values. The resulting greater openness to
the other group may facilitate reconciliation. While the nature of psychological wounds of
survivors, perpetrators and bystanders varies greatly, as does the moral meaning of their
woundedness, healing by each group can facilitate reconciliation.
Elements of an approach to reconciliation and its applications in Rwanda.
Effective reconciliation requires engaging with and changes in a whole range of actors in
a society, from members of the population whose psychological orientation is the core to
reconciliation, to national leaders who can shape policies, practices and institutions. In this spirit,
our “interventions” have come to include over time training of the stuff of NGOs that worked
with groups in the community, seminars/workshops with community leaders, journalists, and
national leaders (government ministers, the heads of commissions, members of the supreme
court and advisors to the President), and the development of nationally broadcast radio programs
that according to surveys conducted in the summer of 2005, 90 percent of the radio listening
population regularly listens to. We also trained trainers in the approach and conducted research
1
The “conference” was organized by topics, each topic guided by a moderator, who introduced the topic, followed the
11
evaluating its effectiveness (Staub et al., 2005; Staub and Perlman, 2001, 2006). Both the vision
and the possibility of such a wide-ranging engagement have evolved over time.
Healing from past victimization. A number of scholars and practitioners have suggested
that healing is important for reconciliation (Montville, 1993; Kriesberg, 1998b; Staub,1998;
Staub and Pearlman, 2001, 2006). Galtung (2201) defines reconciliation as “the process of
healing the traumas of both victims and perpetrators after violence, providing a closure of the
bad relations” (p. 3). Healing strengthens the self, moderates the perception of the world as
dangerous, and makes it more likely that positive changes in the other group are perceived.
Trauma researchers and therapists, working with individuals, have suggested engagement
with rather than avoidance of painful, traumatizing experiences as one process in healing
(Herman, 1992; Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995). When this happens under emotionally
supportive conditions, so that people can learn that the danger present at the time of their
traumatizing experiences is not present any more, it reduces the negative emotional force of
painful memories. Another central process, since victimization creates mistrust and fear of other
people, especially those outside the group, is reconnecting with and gaining new trust in people.
Acknowledgment by others of the suffering of survivors also furthers healing (Gibson, 2004;
Proceedings, 2002). In the course of healing people may come to experience empathy with
themselves, which opens them to empathy with other people. They may also feel less vulnerable
and more trusting. This makes the beginning of reconciliation possible. As reconciliation begins,
creating further safety and trust, healing can progress.
After group violence healing will ideally be a group process. First, a huge numbers of
people have been affected—in Rwanda the whole population. Second, the violence was a group
discussion and made occasional entries to guide it. I was the moderator of the discussion on “healing and reconciliation”.
12
process. Third, Rwanda in particular is a collectivist, community oriented society. To promote
healing, in small groups (and through the radio), we provided information about the impact of
traumatizing events on people. The purpose of this was to help people understand changes in
themselves and in others around them as a natural, normal consequence of extreme and in their
case horrendous events. In small groups, people also engaged with their experiences during the
genocide, with empathic support from others. The radio programs provided community
education, through the example of people in radio dramas as well as in informational programs,
including people supporting each other through empathic listening.
Large group approaches to healing include testimonials and commemoration. They offer
the opportunity both for engagement with experience and reconnection. It seems important for
such commemorations to focus not only on the pain and suffering, which can make wounds
persist and make the past into a “chosen trauma” (Volkan, 1997), but also on hope, the
possibilities of a better future. For example, a historical/psychological focus on the military
defeat of Serbia by the Turks at Kosovo in 1389 seemed to reaffirm Serb victimization and the
sense of the world as dangerous. A televised re-enactment of the battle of Kosovo in 1988
(Leatherman, et al., 1999), arranged by Milosovic at a time of increasing societal problems
(Staub, 1996), may have added to the nationalism that resulted in the wars and mass killings in
the former Yugoslavia.
Understanding the origins of violence. Understanding the origins of violence appears to
be an important tool in promoting reconciliation and preventing new violence. Prevention
requires, in part, the opposite of the influences that lead to violence, such as humanization of the
other, in place of devaluation (see Table 1 for influences that contribute to mass killing or
genocide, as well as some of the opposite influences important in prevention). Understanding
13
what leads to violence can shape the emotional orientation of and practices by members of the
community, including leaders. It can also promote healing. Understanding how social conditions
and culture have shaped perpetrators may ease the anger and hostility by survivors. It may also
ease the defensiveness of perpetrators. Meaning making is central to being human and in the
course of successful therapy usually a story develops that integrates and creates meaning out of
experiences of suffering (Herman, 1992; Pennebacker, 2000). This meaning may consist of
understanding why a perpetrator acted as he or she did (O’Connell Higgins, 1994). Another
important meaning may be to decide to act either to help others who have suffered or to prevent
such suffering (Kestenberg and Kestenberg, 1988; Staub, 2005b; Valent, 1998).
Basic human needs. An element of our approach has been education about basic human
needs and their role in violence, trauma and healing. Maslow’s (1968) theory of human needs
has inspired other theories. The frustration of universal human needs has been viewed as a source
of intractable conflict (Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1990). The frustration of basic needs such as
security, a feeling of effectiveness and control, a positive identity, positive connection to other
people, autonomy, and comprehension of reality has been seen as an important contributor to the
psychological and social processes that, in certain cultural contexts, can initiate processes leading
to mass killing or genocide (Staub, 1989b; 1996; 2003). These needs are profoundly frustrated by
victimization and violence, and they require some degree of fulfillment for healing to occur
(McCann and Pearlman, 1990; Pearlman and Saakvitne, 1995). Their fulfillment facilitates the
resolution of conflict, and helps to develop caring about others’ welfare (Staub, 2005b).
An intervention and its experimental evaluation.
In an intervention to promote healing and reconciliation in Rwanda, 35 individuals were
trained, both Tutsi (about two thirds of the group) and Hutu, who worked for local organizations
14
which worked with groups in the community (Staub et al., 2005). The participants then used this
training, integrated within the seminar with their prior approach, with groups in the community.
In the training, there were brief lectures and extensive discussion. One topic was the
impact of traumatizing events, like genocide. Another was avenues to healing. A third topic was
understanding the origins of genocide, with the group applying this understanding to Rwanda . A
fourth topic was basic human needs. In another element of the intervention participants first
individually thought about and then shared their experiences during the genocide in small
groups. While writing about painful experiences facilitates healing (Pennebacker, 2000), about
50% of the population, and thus 50% of the people who the people we trained would later work
with, could not write. There was demonstration, rehearsal and discussion of empathic responding
to others’ distress. Then, to be consistent with the procedure they would later need to use with
community groups, participants were asked to think about their experiences. After that, in small
groups participants talked about their painful experiences. There was a great deal of open and
highly emotional sharing of what happened to participants during the genocide (Staub and
Pearlman, 2001, 2006; Staub, et al., 2003; Staub et al., 2005).
Trauma creates insecurity, mistrust and disconnection from people. While it was Tutsis,
the survivors of the genocide, who talked about their painful experiences during the genocide,
they did this in a mixed group, with Hutus present as empathic witnesses. This was likely to
contribute to another important element of healing, reconnecting with other people.
Reconnecting with members of the other group may be expected to contribute to healing by
members of both groups.
The effects of the training were evaluated not on the participants in the training, but on
people in community groups they subsequently worked with (Staub et al.,2005). New groups
15
were created, led by some of the people we trained using their new “integrated approach”
(integrated groups). Other newly created groups were led by facilitators from the same
organizations who did not receive the training (traditional groups). These groups met for four
weeks, twice a week, for two hours. In control groups community members did not receive
treatment but were evaluated, using questionnaires, about the same time as participants in the
treatment groups--before the treatment, immediately afterward and two months later.
The participants in the integrated group showed a significant reduction in trauma
symptoms from before the treatment to two months afterwards, both over time and in relation to
the two other groups, which showed slight deterioration. (In following up on the findings of a
significant analysis of covariance, the significance level of the mean difference between
integrated and traditional groups was p. 012, between integrated and control p. 000, while the
other two groups did not differ). They also showed a more positive orientation toward members
of the other ethnic group—or more readiness to reconcile, as we also called it-- both over time
and in relation to the traditional and control groups, which did not change on this dimension.
(The difference between integrated and traditional was p.008; integrated and control p. 006).
This measure indicated greater awareness of the complexity of the roots of violence, greater
willingness to work together for a better future, and “conditional forgiveness,” that is, greater
inclination to forgive members of the other group if they acknowledge what they have done and
apologize (the latter applying more to Tutsis then to Hutus).
Healing wounds due to membership in a perpetrator group. Perpetrators, and the usually
much larger number of people in the perpetrator group who have been passive bystanders, who
are central to reconciliation, also need to heal. Their main avenues to healing are also those
described above. Their defense against guilt and shame may make it difficult for them to engage
16
with the painful effects of their own or their group’s actions. However, external pressures and
their desire to justify themselves and regain a moral standing (Nadler, 2003) can motivate them
to engage in potentially healing activities. For example, they may expose themselves to, engage
with, and hear the stories of survivors, as did Hutus in the study reported above (Staub et al.,
2005). Exposing perpetrators to the stories of survivors unrelated to people they themselves have
harmed is an approach that has had some success with violent perpetrators in the U.S. Such
experiences can facilitate empathy with the victims. Empathy for the perpetrators or for passive
bystanders by other people which manages to circumvent their defensiveness (GobodoMadikezela, 2003), while it can be difficult to offer, may also be important for healing by them.
Healing by the perpetrator group can be furthered by certain societal processes. For
example, in Rwanda, about 50,000 Hutus were killed by the Hutu perpetrators, many of them
because they were seen as potentially or actually opposing the genocide. During the genocide,
some Hutus tried to save Tutsis, sometimes successfully (Africa Rights, 2002; Staub and
Pearlman, 2001), at other times losing their lives in the process (des Forges, 1999).
Commemorating the Hutus who opposed the genocide and acknowledging and celebrating those
who attempted or actually did save lives shows that the group whose members perpetrated the
genocide is not rejected as a whole. It acknowledges that the perpetrator group was not
monolithic, providing a more complex and differentiated view of the group, both in its own eyes
and in the eyes of the survivors. Extensive discussion in our seminars with leaders-- with Tutsi
leaders originally resisting the idea of commemorating rescuers at that time (Staub and Pearlman,
2002)-- may have contributed, together with attention created by the publication of a book on
rescuers (Africa Rights, 2002), to including them since 2003 in commemoration of the genocide.
Understanding, reconciliation and prevention.
17
In the study described earlier, the various elements joined in contributing to healing (the
reduction in trauma symptoms) and reconciliation (a more positive orientation toward the other
group). The contribution of the different elements was not separable. However, there were
informal indications that consideration of the psychological/cultural roots of genocide had
significant psychological benefits.
The frequently articulated view in Rwanda as the reason for the genocide has been bad
leaders and ignorance by the people. In the project described above, participants were presented
with a conception of the origins of genocide and mass killing (Staub, 1989b, 1996,1999a, 2003),
with many examples of how this conception applies to instances around the world. They were
told about instigating conditions such as difficult life conditions (economic problems, political
turmoil, and so on), conflict between groups, war, and the frustration of basic needs these create.
They were told that these frequently give rise to greater identification by people with a group,
scapegoating, and positive visions of the future that become destructive ideologies by identifying
enemies who supposedly stand in the way of creating that better future. These are psychological
and social processes that groups of people turn to in their attempts to satisfy frustrated needs for
security, effectiveness and control, positive identity, connection, and comprehension of a
changing and difficult world. An evolution of harmdoing and violence may follow in the course
of which individuals and the group change in ways that makes greater violence likely. Certain
cultural characteristics make this process more likely, such as a history of devaluation of some
group, overly strong respect for authority and the absence of pluralism, and a past history of
victimization and woundedness. The passivity and often also complicity of internal and external
bystanders allows the evolution of violence, the unfolding of “steps along a continuum of
18
destruction” (See Table 1). An analysis of the influences leading to the genocide in Rwanda
indicates that the processes these concepts describe were present in Rwanda (Staub, 1999a).
The participants in various seminars/workshops, after a presentation of a general
conception of the origins of genocide, with examples from other places, were asked to apply the
conception to Rwanda. With the exception of a group of high level government leaders in 2001,
who were hampered by the ideology that they have created, that there are no Tutsis and Hutus
only Rwandans, all groups readily did this and found all the elements present in Rwanda. The
substantive but also emotional discussions, which combined intellectual understanding with the
participants’ own experiences, seemed to lead to an experiential understanding of the roots of
genocide (Staub, 2000). The leaders in the course of the discussion acknowledged the
psychological and social differences between groups and agreed with our application of the
conception to the Rwandan genocide (see Staub and Pearlman, 2002; 2006).
As participants in the various seminars/workshops came to see the genocide they suffered
as one of a number of genocides, the perpetrators’ actions as psychologically and culturally
understandable, even though horrible, and genocide as not an incomprehensible evil but the
outcome of understandable human processes even if extreme and terrible in their consequences,
they seemed to feel humanized or ‘rehumanized.’ They expressed the newfound belief that they
were not the victims of blind evil or God’s punishment and the hope that understanding the roots
of violence, they can act to prevent it (Staub et al., 2005; Staub and Pearlman, 2005).
The combination of research findings and observations in Rwanda suggest that
understanding the roots of violence between groups can contribute to both healing and
reconciliation. This seems true of survivors, as well as members of the perpetrator group whose
19
defensive processes might have eased as they came to understand the influences leading to their
group’s actions and saw that others understood these influences as well.
Insert Table 1 about here
Understanding origins suggests practices for prevention. Devaluation suggests the
importance of humanizing the other. The role of overly strong respect for authority suggests the
importance of moderating authority, for example, by considering the merit of leaders’ actions,
rather than their position. The powerful role of destructive ideologies suggests the importance of
positive visions that are inclusive, that join all groups in building a better future. In working with
national leaders in Rwanda, practices for prevention were identified (Table 1), and leaders
examined policies they have recently created from the perspective of their potential to contribute
to or prevent violence (Staub and Pearlman, 2002, 2005).
Education through the media: radio programs
The experiences and knowledge gained through engagement with participants in the
seminars and through the research were used to develop, in collaboration with the Dutch NGO
LaBenevolencija, two educational programs, using the radio, the primary media outlet in
Rwanda. One of them, beginning to broadcast in May 2004, to continue through 2007, is a
weekly radio drama, a story of two villages in conflict. Elements of the approach described
above about the origins and prevention of violence, healing and reconciliation, are embedded in
the story. A second, monthly program that began to broadcast in October 2004 is informational,
the concepts of the approach communicated in a direct manner, with Rwandans elaborating on
the concepts. To improve the quality of the programs there is continuous feedback from
“listener” (focus) groups (40 groups of 10 people each in 10 settings around the country).
Evaluation of the programs’ impact on the population indicates benefits in knowledge, attitude
20
and behavior in comparison to a treatment control group (Levy-Paluck, 2006). Following the
same approach new programs will begin in Burundi and the Congo in 2006.
Other elements required for reconciliation.
Reconciliation must take places at various levels, the psychological, political,
institutional/structural, and cultural. The contribution of each is crucial, but interconnected.
Institutions of justice may not be created, and principles and rules of justice may not be evenly
applied without psychological changes—in attitudes and feelings toward the “other.”
Psychological changes will not occur or be maintained without justice and other institutions that
serve reconciliation. These processes and levels are interlocking; progressive change in one
requires changes in others. Their relative contribution is difficult to identify, but in future work
the way they interrelate will be important to further specify (but see also conclusions). For a
summary of important processes required for reconciliation see Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here.
Truth and a shared history (collective memory). Establishing the truth seems an essential
motive of victims/survivors. After the military dictatorships in South America, with their torture
and killings, truth commissions emerged to investigate and describe what was done (e.g. Nunca
Mas, 1986). South Africa created the Truth and Reconciliation commission on the assumption
that truth is essential for reconciliation (Gibson, 2002, 2004; Tutu, 1999).
The truthful description of harmful actions is an acknowledgment of the suffering of
victims and is therefore healing to them. Truth that is empathic with the victims and indicates
that the perpetrators’ actions are unacceptable also reaffirms the moral order (de la Rey, 2001).
By expressing the community’s refusal to accept such actions, it can enhance feelings of safety.
21
The establishment of the truth makes it more difficult for the perpetrators to deny their
actions or their responsibility for the harm they caused, and to claim that they themselves were
the victims. After the Holocaust, the Nuremberg trials, using thousands of pages of documents
and many films the Nazis created, showed the German people what was done in their name and
with their participation. This was probably crucial in starting Germany on the road to democracy.
The Holocaust was unusual in that violence was completely one sided. Even in a
genocide, however, perpetrators and victims have different stories. In intractable conflict, usually
each sides sees its cause and actions as just (Bar-Tal, 2000b, Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003). When
Palestinian and Israeli high school students were asked to describe the conflict from the
perspective of the other side, they were not able to do so (Salomon, 2003).
In many instances of mass killing there is some harm done by both sides, if not at the
time of the mass killing or genocide, then over a longer historical period. In Rwanda, the
genocide was one-sided, and was preceded by repeated mass killings of Tutsis, by sporadic
killings at other times and by discrimination and persecution (des Forges, 1999). However, Hutus
refer to the period before 1959, when Tutsis were dominant in Rwanda, and especially the period
during Belgian colonial (des Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2001), which seems to have become a
“chosen trauma” (Volkan, 1997, 1998) for them, as a period of servitude, even slavery. In
addition, in the course of the civil war starting in 1990, Hutu civilians were killed. While after
the genocide was stopped the government was successful, on the whole, in inhibiting revenge
killings, in the course of the fighting in 1994 to end the genocide and defeat the government
there were revenge killings (des Forges,1999). Afterwards, in the course of fighting infiltrators
from the Congo who were killing Tutsis, Hutu civilians were killed. A large number of Hutu
22
refugees into Zaire were also killed in the course of the advance of Kabila’s army against
Mobutu, helped by the Rwandan army (de Forges, 1999; Mamdani, 2002).
Survivors of genocide understandably focus on the immediate truth, the perpetration of
horrendous violence against them. Perpetrators and members of the perpetrator group tend to
focus on an account of events that includes, and usually emphasizes, either the harm they had
suffered or the threat to them by the other party. Consideration of injuries to both sides, even if
substantially unequal, makes the development of a shared history, of shared collective memories
possible (Cairns and Roe, 2002; Bar-Tal, 2002; Kriesberg, 1998b; Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003).
When antagonistic groups have conflicting accounts of the roots of violence, their
antagonism is likely to continue. But resolving differing views of a violent history is hard.
Deeply wounded survivors may find it impossible to consider the injury their group has done to
the other, which in their consciousness pales in significance. And members of the perpetrator
group (Baumeister, 1997) may overemphasize their group’s suffering at the hands of the other
and use it as justification for their actions.
Establishing a shared collective memory can be the result of reexamination and
reinterpretation of history, involving a process of negotiation. One example of such negotiation
was the Franco-German commission of historians, which in the 1950s had critically scrutinized
the myths of hereditary enmity between the French and German peoples and revised the existing
history textbooks. As a final product the commission provided new accounts of the history of the
two nations (Willis, 1965). However, such negotiations seem very difficult when wounds are
fresh. Other processes, such as healing, may need to precede them.
In the seminar in Rwanda with high level leaders participants strongly affirmed the
importance of a shared collective memory, but regarded it as an ideal that may not be possible to
23
achieve in the short run (Staub and Pearlman, 2002, 2006). However, as already noted, Rwanda
is engaged in societal processes that aim to promote reconciliation, with seminars, national
conferences that are televised and on the radio, the gacaca proceedings (see below), the release
of large numbers of prisoners in 2003/2004 and the promotion of reconciliation by national
leaders. The ministry of education in Rwanda has made the introduction of peace education and
reconciliation a top priority for schools, with ongoing projects on the teaching of history
(Murenzi, 2004). While all this may make the creation of a shared history possible, openness to a
shared history also requires societal processes that address the past in just manner, and political
developments that create just relations between groups. To rework the past, people must have
confidence in a shared future. (See Table 2 for processes limiting or promoting reconciliation).
The role of understanding the origins of violence in creating a shared history in Rwanda.
Establishing a shared collected memory may be greatly facilitated by understanding how
both one’s own group’s and the other group’s harmful actions have come about. Such
understanding can facilitate acceptance. In seminars in Rwanda in 2000 to 2003, with trauma
workers, journalists, commissioners of the Unity and Reconciliation Commission, government
leaders and others, we have experimented with creating a shared history by offering explanations
of historical events rooted in our conception of the origins of genocide. These explanations were
welcomed by and seemed useful for participants. As an example, we applied the concepts used
in understanding the genocide at a societal level to individuals, in an attempt to provide
understanding of young killers, part of the paramilitary groups, the Interahamwe, made up of
young men. This took the following form:
Starting in the 1980s, Rwanda was in a very bad economic
situation, with many young men without jobs, without prospects.
With the invasion of the RPF in 1990 a civil war has begun
Relative suddenly there was substantial political activity, with new
24
political parties, an unusual situation for Rwanda that required
adjustment to unfamiliar and for a very hierarchical society
seemingly chaotic circumstances. The political parties started to
create youth groups, apparently to gain young followers. Out of
these youth groups grew the Interahamwe.
At some point the parties began to give them military training, making
them into militias. These young men had acquired some material
security, a community, a sense of importance. Their needs for
security, identity, connection, and comprehension of reality,
previously presumably frustrated, were at least somewhat satisfied.
In the U.S. young men in similar situations join gangs.
These young men did not join to be killers. That evolved later. However,
they have learned for many years to devalue Tutsis. Added to this
were recent events that had to strongly affect them: the victories of
the Tutsi led invaders; the intense, vicious propaganda against
Tutsis on the radio and in newspapers, with constant reminders of
Hutu “slavery” and with constant exposure to the ideology of Hutu
power and to the Hutu “ten commandments” which demanded
violent action against Tutsis; the killing of the democratically
elected Hutu President in Burundi by segments of the Tutsi army
which fed Hutu fears that the Tutsis would not share power with
Hutus; all the authorities over them-from the leaders of the
Interahamwe to higher authorities--telling them that violence
against Tutsis was right; witnessing violence against Tutsis before
the genocide that was in no way discouraged by authorities; the
evolution and change in them as violence began; the development
of a group value and spirit in killing; and the development of
commitment to the group of young men they were part of. As it has
been described in relation to terrorists, commitment to cause and
comrades join each other.
All of this makes it psychologically understandable what they did, horrible
as it was, and that being part of the Interahamwe made it difficult
not to do what they did. It is important not to take this
understanding as an excuse for what they were doing, since people
can make choices. But to prevent violence, to practically enable
people to make different choices, it is essential to inhibit the
development of the kind of societal system and process that came
into being in Rwanda.
The process of creating a shared history may need to combine a focus on the roots of
events, with negotiation about both what has happened and their meaning--in seminars, dialogue
25
groups and other formats used in conflict resolution. When views about what has happened and
why cannot be reconciled, a joint history ought to include a plurality of perspectives, varied
statements about events and about their interpretation. This can provide an example of and foster
pluralism, which is an important aspect of the creation of a non-violent society. When the history
taught in schools and described in history books includes such varied elements, the groups that
constitute that society are likely to be on their way to healing and reconciliation.
Justice and reconciliation. Justice is another important need of survivors of genocide and
mass killing. Justice is served, in part, by punishing perpetrators. Justice requires truth. It
acknowledges the harm done to victims. It helps them heal, makes a moral statement about the
perpetrators’ actions, and to some extent balances the harm, suffering and loss of status by
victims (Berscheid, Boye & Walster, 1968; Staub, 2005a). It is sometimes assumed that
punishment will discourage future perpetration. However, punishment usually focuses on a
limited number of people. Moreover, genocide and mass killing are societal processes that have
deep societal, cultural and psychological roots. Punishment alone, without addressing those
roots, is unlikely to inhibit group violence.
For the sake of building peace, in part to avoid creating new hostility in members of the
perpetrator group, most post conflict societies punish only some (at times very few) of the
perpetrators. Often this is less than what is needed to satisfy and help heal the survivors—or to
change society in a constructive way. Punishment of at least important perpetrators, public
discussion of the reasons to limit punishment, and the use of other forms of justice may together
satisfy psychological needs and provide the psychological benefits required by the different
parties to advance reconciliation.
26
Restorative justice refers to contribution by perpetrators to the lives of survivors and to
rebuilding society. It may include monetary compensation, as well as work. Compensation for
victims/survivors, if necessary by the state, however that is now constituted, helps them improve
their economic situation devastated by violence. This has been viewed as important by theorists
(Broneus, 2003) and been found important for the population in South Africa (Gibson, 2002). In
Rwanda, at hearings held by the Unity and Reconciliation Commission in 1999 about what
people require for reconciliation, survivors often mentioned improvement in their material
conditions, devastated by the genocide. In the radio listening (focus) groups across Rwanda, in
January 2004, many people said that their poverty reminds survivors of what they have lost in
the genocide and intensifies trauma.
Justice is a matter of both actions and the perceptions they create. Just societal procedures
have been found especially important (Tyler and Smith, 1998). In an analysis of interviews of
women who were raped during the genocide in Rwanda (Lillie, 2005), lower trauma symptoms
were associated more with the perception of an effective justice system than with the personal
experience of justice. For lasting reconciliation, just relations between groups must be created
(Kelman, 1990). Past harm done and ways to balance it in the present need to be considered.
However, like truth, this is a complex matter that goes beyond exact equality or equity.
Community courts in Rwanda and the requirements of justice, healing and reconciliation.
After intense violence between subgroups in a society, how can justice be promoted in ways that
build peace? South Africa created the Truth and Reconciliation process, which in addition to
establishing the truth also offered a balance of amnesty and punishment, and compensation for
victims (Byrne, 2003, 2004).
27
In Rwanda, the justice system was destroyed in the genocide. To deal with the
approximately 125 thousand prisoners accused of having perpetrated the genocide, people’s
courts, the gacaca, have been created, based on an ancient community practice. 250 thousand
people have been elected to serve as judges, in groups of 19, in 9-10 thousand locations around
the country. It was hoped that these courts will further establish the truth, create justice, and that
participation by everyone, which is required by the “gacaca law,” will bring people together as
they work for the shared goal of a just and peaceful society (Honeyman et al., 2004).
However, after the horrors of genocide or mass killing, probably all justice processes are
unavoidably imperfect. In South Africa, these imperfections included perpetrators describing
their acts without apparent regret or empathy for victims, testimony by survivors that
retraumatized them, and the state delaying compensation for victims and planning to reduce the
level of compensation from what was originally promised (Byrne, 2003, 2004).
In Rwanda the people’s courts are creating further upheaval, as over a period of years
people describe or are exposed to the descriptions of horrible acts. Both national leaders and
community leaders have been concerned that these experiences will retraumatize survivors, and
create new trauma, for example, in young children, or in relatives of women who describe rapes
that other people did not know about. An additional concern is renewed anger among survivors,
as well as new hostility among some members of the perpetrator group who may have been
passive bystanders, but not perpetrators, and constantly hear about the terrible violence by their
group, this implicating them as members of their group (Staub and Pearlman, 2002, 2006).
To limit the harmful potential of the gacaca and promote its potential to advance
reconciliation, in working with the media and community and national leaders we discussed how
they can help members of the community protect each other from retraumatization, by providing
28
information about how people can support each other, for example, through empathic listening.
We considered how understanding the roots of violence, for example, by describing how a young
man would have become an Interahamwe killer, can help people cognitively process the origins
of the violent actions they hear about in the gacaca. This can, in turn, limit survivors’ emotional
reactions to what they hear. Such cognitive processing and the understanding it entails may also
lessen the feeling by passive bystanders that they are being blamed and shamed. As a result,
instead of feeling hostility, they may be able feel empathy for the victims.
Forgiveness and reconciliation. There has been controversy about the importance of
forgiveness in reconciliation (Hayes, 1998; Shriver, 1995). Forgiveness has been defined as a
change from negative emotions and thoughts about the offender such as anger, resentment and
the desire for revenge to more positive, benevolent ones (McCullough, Fincham and Tsang,
2003; Worthington, 1998). Research with individuals, such as rape victims or people harmed by
relatives, friends or associates, suggests that forgiving can relieve psychological distress
(Worthington, 1998). With regard to genocide, an important question is what is of primary
benefit for healing and reconciliation, forgiving the perpetrators, or the bystanders—passive
members of the perpetrator group—who are usually the substantial majority of that group.
Forgiving and reconciliation are related, overlapping concepts. However, forgiveness is
usually described as one sided, in contrast to reconciliation, which is mutual. In the case of
intense, one-sided violence, forgiveness without appropriate actions by perpetrators or members
of the perpetrator group can have harmful effects (Perlman, 2002; Staub, 2005a). Victimization
creates wounds, as well as an imbalance in the relationship between victims and perpetrators. It
diminishes the status of the former in relation to the latter, and also in relation to other, nonvictimized people.
29
Being forgiven may bring about positive change in some perpetrators. However, it does
not require anything of them. As a result, it may limit acknowledgement and empathy by
perpetrators, and maintain or enhance the imbalance between the groups (Staub, 2005a). In South
Africa, as part of the TRC process (Byrne, 2003), survivors appeared to have been further injured
by confessions by perpetrators without indications of regret. In Rwanda as well, some
perpetrators confessed their actions in front of the community but did so without any expression
of feelings, creating distress among community members. The need for reciprocity in the
forgiveness process was shown in the study described above (Staub, et al. 2005), where
participants expressed “conditional forgiveness,” contingent on the acknowledgment of
harmdoing and apology (see also Staub, 2005a). This is consistent with past research which has
shown that apology is important in promoting forgiveness(see Worthington, 1998).
The more perpetrators acknowledge their actions and the harm they have created, assume
responsibility, express regret and apologize, show empathy and concern for the pain and
suffering of the victims, and offer reparation, whether it is monetary or compensatory actions,
the more they help survivors feel safe, affirm their worth and balance the relationship. These
processes all promote forgiveness. In turn, forgiveness can give rise to such processes and
actions in members of a perpetrator group.
Forgiving the other group seems more important for advancing reconciliation than
forgiving the actual perpetrators. Members of the perpetrator group who have not participated in
perpetration may do a great deal to facilitate reconciliation and forgiveness by acknowledging
the harm done by their group and apologizing for its actions.
Contact between groups and community building as avenues to reconciliation. The
contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Sherif et al.,1961; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), stresses the
30
importance of contact between people belonging to different groups as a way to overcome
prejudice and hostility. Thus, contact is an avenue to reconciliation.
Contact and its potential benefits are a crucial element in the success of dialogue groups,
problem solving workshops and other forms of conflict resolution (Kelman and Fisher, 2003;
Rouhana and Kelman, 1994). Deep contact, genuine engagement, what Deutsch (1973) has
called “cross-cutting relations,” must exist for contact to work. Joint activities, with shared,
“superordinate” goals, facilitate such contact (Sherif et al., 1961). A number of other conditions,
such as equality between the parties and support by authorities have been identified as important
for effective contact (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1997; 1998).
In dialogue groups, in the course of contact, as progressively their pain and suffering is
heard and acknowledged, participants can acknowledge more their own group’s harmful actions.
The “authorities” present, usually neutral third parties who facilitate the engagement, support
these processes. There is also self-selection: people with intense negative views and closed
minds about the other party are unlikely to participate. Equality between the parties can be
strived for, even if in the outside world there is difference in power. However, such differences
in the larger society, especially if they are unacknowledged, make the process more difficult. For
example, with the minority Tutsis holding power in Rwanda and with the ideology of “unity,”
Hutus may feel that they not only lack power but are also deprived of an identity and a voice.
Structural arrangements in a society that create both opportunities for, and the type of
contacts that promote positive relations are helpful. Schools can promote reconciliation by
having children from different groups in the same classrooms, with cooperative learning
procedures (Aronson et al., 1978) and other practices (Staub, 2003) that create positive contact.
Individuals from different groups (as well as nations) can be part of institutions that create
31
contact and serve shared interests. In India, in three cities where significant Hindu-Muslims
violence did not occur in response to instigating conditions, there were institutions that included
members of both groups, who organized themselves to combat rumors as they arose and to
engage with politicians and inhibit them from making speeches that would increase tensions. In
three cities where instigating conditions led to violence no such institutions existed (Varshney,
2002). Reconciliation between the French and Germans was facilitated by contact between cities,
and the creation of institutions after World War II the countries were part of, for example, the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) (Kriesberg, 1998).
People joining together to rebuild communities after great violence is another avenue to
reconciliation. Such efforts can enhance security, feelings of effectiveness, develop positive
identity and connection, and provide a new and more positive comprehension of reality. They
can also fulfill the need for transcendence (Staub, 2003), as individuals focus on and work for
something beyond and greater than themselves. In Angola and other places, members of
communities have developed ceremonies, combining tradition with psycho-social principles, to
reintegrate child soldiers into the community (Wessells and Monteiro, 2001). The children were
enticed to be soldiers with food or other incentives, or were abducted. As soldiers, they
sometimes killed people in their own communities. As communities engaged in reintegration,
they were also rebuilding the community and fostering healing, reconciliation and forgiveness.
Raising inclusively caring children. Finally, raising children in ways that makes it likely
that as adults they will not devalue others, and will be active bystanders in the face of potentially
destructive social processes, is important for the prevention of violence and reconciliation (Table
2; Staub, 2003, 2005b). Creating the societal and cultural conditions and processes important for
the prevention of violence between groups and for reconciliation, as discussed in this article and
32
presented in Tables 1 and 2, makes it more likely that socializers will raise children in ways that
promotes these characteristics. Raising children in such ways will in turn help further develop
these societal characteristics and processes.
Cultural specificity and sensitivity
A number of authors point to the importance of sensitivity to culture (Broneus, 2003;
Lederach, 1998) as well as to the specific characteristics of the situation (Leatherman, DeMars,
Gaffney, & Vayrynen, 1999) in attempting to promote reconciliation. In this article, the
importance of establishing general principles has been implicit, if not explicit all along.
However, general principles need to be applied and modified as appropriate depending on the
history of group relations, culture, the role of bystanders.
The concept of reconciliation, and especially of forgiveness, which have religious
sources, may find more resonance in a religious, predominantly Catholic society like Rwanda,
than in less religious societies (see Staub, 2005a). While justice seems universally important,
cultural characteristics and practices shape what will satisfy people’s need for justice. A justice
process like the gacaca may be more difficult to introduce in a society without the cultural
tradition in which the practice is rooted. Theorists, researchers and practitioners must consider
both universal principles and the specific, and at times unique elements of each situation.
Conclusions:Psychology, social structure, politics and institutions.
Efforts to promote reconciliation need to focus on at least three domains. First, on
changing attitudes by the people, as we have attempted to do by training facilitators who work
with groups in the community and through radio programs. Second, on changing the words and
actions of those who can both influence people, and affect societal processes and the nature of
institutions, which was an aim of our work with leaders and journalists. Third, on creating and
33
changing societal institutions, such as schools, the justice system, the political system, and
NGOs, in part by working with leaders as we did, but also by directly working with those
institutions. Psychology has an important role in all these. While there are often realistic
constraints on creating positive structural conditions, such as established institutions and lack of
societal resources, frequently psychological elements like fear and hostility play a crucial role.
A societal process of reconciliation requires changes in structures, in societal institutions,
policies and practices that can promote change in the attitudes of the population, as well as help
maintain change. For example, reducing inequalities, establishing more equal opportunity in
schools and employment for Catholics in Northern Ireland has helped prepare the ground for the
peace process there (Cairns, E. & Darby, J. (1998). Our “interventions” aimed to promote
psychological change, through healing, understanding, and the emotional changes and attitudes
associated with these. However, psychological change and changes in policies and institutions
are interconnected. To establish a fair system of justice requires a reasonably positive attitude
toward a group that has been an enemy. The operation of such a system, in turn, can promote
healing (Lillie, 2005) as well as positive attitudes (Gibson, 2004). Creating schools that promote
reconciliation also requires already existing positive attitudes.
Early in this article I noted the current policies of the Rwandan government with regard
to “divisionism,” which deprives opposition in general and Hutus in particular of a voice, making
reconciliation more difficult. The reason for such policies can be psychological woundedness
and the resulting vulnerability, view of the world as dangerous and negative attitudes to the other
group. It can also be realistic concern about the still hostile intentions of the other group, as well
as the desire of those in power to retain their power. Working with leaders may help them see the
34
dangers in such policy, and as long as the realistic danger is not too great enable them to take the
risks involved in allowing and promoting pluralism, guided, in part, by enlightened self-interest.
Reconciliation is an extended process requiring a long term vision of desired changes.
(The right side of Tables 1 and 2 incorporate such a vision). It needs to cut across levels,
involving both leaders and the population, and create a “sense of participation, responsibility and
ownership in the process across a broad spectrum of the population” (Lederach, 1998, p. 242).
The example of South Africa, and of Europe, with a long history of violence and
seemingly deep-seated antagonisms between countries, show that reconciliation is possible.
Hopefully, reconciliation can be brought about even in such extremely demanding conditions as
Rwanda, with its intimate genocide, with perpetrators, bystanders and survivors continuing to
live together and with the country ruled by a small minority of the population that was the victim
of the genocide.
35
Table 1: The origins and prevention of violence between groups
A: Starting points:
Difficult life conditions (economic, political, social change, war)
Conflict between groups
Consequences:
The resulting frustration of basic psychological needs;
Turning to a group for identity and support;
Scapegoating; (Destructive) Ideologies
B: History, culture, and current practices
Devaluation of the Other
Humanizing the Other
Destructive, Exclusive
Ideology
Constructive, Inclusive
Ideology
Unhealed Wounds
Healing of Past Wounds
Uncritical Respect for Authority
Moderate Respect for Authority
Monolithic Society
Pluralism
(structures; processes)
Unjust societal arrangements
Just social arrangements
Passive bystanders
Active bystanders
C. Continuous Processes:
The evolution of harmdoing (changes in perpetrators, bystanders, institutions,
social norms and culture).
The role of leaders (The role of followers)
36
Table 2: Reconciliation and the prevention of new violence
Lack of Truth
Truth (complex: shared)
Lack of Justice
Justice
Unhealed wounds
Healing of past wounds
Conflicting views of history
Shared views of history/
Shared collective memories
Lack of Contact,
Superficial Contact
Deep Contact, Shared Goals
Raising children as obedient followers
Raising inclusively caring
children with moral courage
Lack of understanding the roots of violence
37
Understanding and actions
guided it
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