IMPROVING REGULATORY RELATIONS IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES AND
MECHANISMS
G. Bruce Doern
Chancellor’s Professor of Public Policy
School of Public Policy and Administration
Carleton University, Ottawa
and
Politics Department
University of Exeter
A Paper for Presentation to the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) Expert Meeting on Regulatory Cooperation Between Levels of
Governments, Paris, June 30-July 1, 2003.
3
CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION
3
DEFINING REGULATION
4
THE SOURCES OF NEW AND EVOLVING LEVELS
OF REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
7
$
$
$
$
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Unitary states;
Federations;
Regional multi-country governance;
International relations and globalization
Interactions among core regulatory regimes
- Regime I, the sectoral regulatory regime;
- Regime II, the horizontal framework regulatory regime;
- Regime III, the overall governmental executive regime
for making and managing regulation across
the government; and
- Regime IV, the international regime.
REFORM IN MULTI-LEVEL REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS
15
$
$
$
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Principles:
harmonization;
mutual recognition,
uniformity or tacit cooperation; and
competitive regulation and best practice bench-marking.
$
$
$
$
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Mechanisms:
integration and capacity-building incentives to conform;
memoranda of understanding;
joint formal agreements or contracts;
voluntary codes;
private action by citizens to trigger enforcement or compliance
CONCLUSIONS
26
References
29
INTRODUCTION
4
As a part of the broader overall OECD work on Governance Issues in Multi-Level
Governments, the purpose of this paper is to provide a framework of principles and
mechanisms regarding improved regulatory relations in multi-level countries and
jurisdictions (OECD, 1994; 1997; 2002). It develops and examines such a framework by
drawing on the comparative experience of multi-level countries/jurisdictions and on relevant
academic literature on regulation and governance. Where appropriate, it also very briefly
provides illustrative examples from several countries of regulatory developments of these
kinds.
While the framework of issues and concepts set out in the paper is a considered one,
there are invariably some key limitations to the analysis. The brevity of the paper means that
only basic themes can be developed in a basic stock-taking manner. The range of OECD
country experiences is vast and complex and only some of these can be sampled in a very
illustrative rather than definitive way. The author’s research focus on Canada, the U.K. and
U.S. regulatory systems will undoubtedly be evident in some ways. And, it must also be
noted that regulation in the different illustrative policy fields also have unique features which
do not always translate to regulatory challenges in other policy fields.
The title of the paper refers to ways of improving multi-level regulatory governance.
In many ways, the principles and mechanisms canvassed in this paper can help improve such
relations. However, it must be stressed that what constitutes improved (or harmed) multilevel regulatory governance is itself highly contested. Some of the contested aspects of these
principles and mechanisms for improvement also emerge in the analysis.
The paper is organized into three sections. The first section deals briefly with
definitional issues about regulation as a policy instrument and governance activity. As this
section shows, definitional issues alone contribute to the problem of “levels” of regulatory
5
governance. The second section briefly traces the macro ways in which new or evolving
levels of regulatory governance are emerging in the context of: unitary states; federations;
complex regional systems of governance such as the EU; international relations and
globalization; and complex regimes of regulation or sets of regulators within countries. The
third section examines reform principles and mechanisms for the improvement of multi-level
regulatory governance, and links these briefly to examples drawn from several different
regulatory policy fields. Conclusions then follow.
DEFINING REGULATION:
While the overall focus of the paper is on regulatory relations in multi-level
governance contexts we need to deal from the outset with the challenges of: a) defining
regulation (itself a part of the “levels” problem); and b) setting out the key elements of
regulation. From these definitions some major informational problems arise which also affect
the ability of governments to assess regulatory relations and impacts of any kind, including
impacts on multi-level governance.
Regulations are rules of behaviour backed-up by the sanctions of the state (Doern,
Hill, Prince and Schultz, 1999). But such rules can take many forms including:
-constitutional or quasi-constitutional rules;
-statutes and laws;
-delegated legislation or "the regs"
-guidelines;
-standards and codes;
As one moves across these modes and levels of rulemaking, the extent and nature of the
sanctions by the state (from strong to virtually non-existent) is wide and of course the range is
itself fought over by stakeholder interests, NGOs, governments and citizens (Baldwin and
Cave, 1999). In this paper, it is necessary to err on the side of breadth in defining regulation
6
largely because political and legal reality across countries requires such a multi-level
approach.
Though the paper must err on the side of breadth, it is important to realize that a
logical and eventually empirical conundrum arises. The wider regulation is defined to be, the
more it becomes equated with government and governance as a whole. But at some point
governance is not just regulation and the state is more than just a regulatory state. It also
involves taxation, spending, persuasion and other ways of trying to ensure that diverse policy
goals and values are implemented in democratic life (Palast, Oppenheim and MacGregor,
2003; Doern, 1999).
The two main elements of regulation also need to be kept in mind: regulation making;
and compliance and enforcement. To be credible, regulations and rules must be made in a
legitimate fashion and enforced or carried out in an effective, efficient and fair manner.
Regulation making processes are the processes through which regulations are
promulgated in the first place and also amended. Firms and other stakeholders have concerns
about how speedy and effective such processes are. But such processes immediately raise
concerns and values about: who the regulators are (e.g. arms-length commissions; ministers,
a “statutory person”); which interests are represented in a regulatory body; and the
accountability and transparency of such regulatory agencies and their processes (Heritier and
Thatcher, 2002).
The second element of any regulatory system is the compliance and enforcement
process. This also involves issues regarding how stringent such enforcement is and how one
assembles national and international data on stringency. The compliance and enforcement
process includes: effective and fair actions regarding the education of persons affected by the
rules in question; the provision of incentives to comply; and the actual application of
7
penalties and sanctions, based on some system of inspection by regulators or self-policing
and auditing (Sparrow, 2000). Compliance also includes the processes for handling license
applications and renewals (or equivalent activity) and the approval of products subject to
regulation. It also covers the handling of consumer and citizen complaints and appeals and
the development of regulatory service standards. (Grabosky, 1995).
Regulation making and regulatory compliance and enforcement have both been
greatly influenced in the last decade or more by efforts to "reinvent" government, which, in
regulatory realms, has often meant the greater use of softer compliance activities and
approaches and economic or incentive-based regulation (such as tradeable pollution permits,
pollution taxes, and the greater use of voluntary codes (Hood, Scott, James and Jones, 1999;
Webb, 2003). Both elements of regulation have also been influenced by debates about the
role of science-based regulation and “sound science”, the basic norm in international trade
agreements, compared to principles such as the precautionary principle emanating from
international and national environmental agreements and protocols (Doern and Reed, 2000;
Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001; United Nations Environmental Program, 2000).
Because of the need for breadth in defining regulation and because of the need to deal
with both the elements of regulation sketched above, there are difficult empirical problems in
assessing regulation and in comparing regulatory outputs and effects among countries and
among levels of government within countries. Thus a central starting point is to stress that the
more that rule making has expanded and takes ever wider forms such as in statutes, delegated
legislation, guidelines, codes and standards, the harder it is to assess because the information
is less and less available and/or reliable. What is clear, however, is that there are more and
more levels of regulatory governance and very dense and often entangled webs of
accountability (Duane, 2002; Francis, 1998; Doern and Gattinger, 2003).
8
THE SOURCES OF NEW AND EVOLVING LEVELS
OF REGULATORY GOVERNANCE
There is no denying the fact that new and evolving levels of regulatory governance
have occurred and that they make regulatory and other governing relations more complex for
governments and confusing and even bewildering for citizens and voters (OECD, 1997;
Heritier and Thatcher, 2002). These changes can be seen in the obvious key politicalinstitutional contexts of comparative government and international relations: unitary states;
federations; regional multi-country governance; and globalization and international relations
(Hague, Harrop and Breslin, 2001; Peters, 1998). They can also be seen through an
understanding of the existence and key characteristics of regulatory regimes. Each of these
are highlighted briefly below (see Table 1) in part to show the different starting points and
lines of trajectory for the existence of levels of regulatory governance and for their current
shape. Not all countries see levels in the same way because the inherent sources of them vary
across countries. Because of this, countries will also have different views about the nature of,
and priority to be given to, such principles as harmonization, mutual recognition as well as
the mechanisms explored in the next section of the paper.
Unitary states typically imply one dominant level of governing and regulatory
authority but such states have always had to deal with other levels in a regional-spatial
context (where extensive delegation occurs) or at the local government level where
democratic demands lead to localized mandates for rule making. Most unitary states have
also had other kinds of levels of regulation in that they ceded important self-regulatory roles
to dominant professions such as law and medicine where issues regarding the regulation of
Table 1: A Summary View of Sources of Multiple “Levels”
in Regulatory Governance
9
Unitary States
- The National Government
- Regional Entities
- Local Government
- Self-Regulating Entities (e.g. the Professions)
- Independent Regulatory Agencies and Commissions
Federations
- The Federal/National Government
- State/Provincial/Lander Governments
- Regional Entities
- Local Government
- Self- Regulating Entities
- Independent Regulatory Agencies and Commissions
Regional Multi-Country Governance (e.g. EU; NAFTA)
- Central or “Community” Competences/Authorities (e.g. Majority Voting)
- National Competences
a) Unitary (see above)
b) Federation (see above)
- Special Cross - National Regions and Bodies
- Rules about Rules and Dispute-Settlement
International Relations and Globalization
- Levels of regulation due to need to coordinate a given
nation’s regulators with those of its immediate bordering neighbours
(e.g. U.S versus Canadian energy regulators)
- Levels of regulation due to need to coordinate with International bodies
(e.g. international labour standards and ILO)
Regimes of Regulation Which Interact and Collide Within Countries
- Regime I: The Sectoral Regulatory Regime
- Regime II: The Horizontal Framework Regulatory Regime
- Regime III: The Overall Governmental executive regime for managing
Regulation Across and Within the Government
- Regime IV: The International Regulatory Regime
quality of service were and are central (Dewees, 1983). Independent or arms-length
regulatory agencies and commissions are also a key source of multi-level regulation (Gilardi;
10
2002; Thatcher, 2002, Doern, Hill, Prince and Schultz, 1999).
Formal federations are a system of governance where levels are quite literally
“constitutionialized” in some fundamental way (Burgess and Gagnon, 1993; DeightonSmith, 2001; Doern and MacDonald, 1999). Sovereignty is divided and lists of powers are
assigned between the two levels of government. Some areas of governing and regulation may
be listed as concurrent powers with some kind of doctrine of paramountcy applying when
conflicts cannot be resolved. New problems regarding levels of regulation can occur when
new areas of policy emerge (e.g. the environment or the Internet) which were not envisaged
by the initial designers of federations and federal constitutions. The notion of levels of
regulation in federations can also be a function of the inherent number of constituent units
(e.g. 50 U.S. states versus 10 Canadian provinces). In addition of course, federations, like
unitary states, have further regulatory levels which emerge from other sub-regional and local
and city governments and democratic and economic pressures.
Regional multi-country governance is both an old and a new form of governance but
the most compelling forms of regulatory levels emerge from complex experiments such as
the
European Union and regional free trade areas such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). While aspirations to form a federal state may be a part of these
systems, they are by definition systems having to fashion their own sense of levels,
competences, and forms of rule-making and regulation (Heritier and Thather, 2002; Burgess,
2000; Kanishka, 2001). Here again, the inherent number of constituent countries is a further
generator of levels of regulation as are different traditions and systems of law such as
between common law traditions versus more codified legal traditions (Baldwin, 1995; Ogus,
1994).
11
Finally, it is important to mention here the dynamics of the new regionalism and of
the existence of so-called regional and local innovation systems (Storper, 1997). This refers
to conceptions of innovation and a knowledge-based economy where innovation is seen as
being a “bottom-up” and spatial dynamic of firms, communities and governments which
function through clusters and networks. Such regions and spatial areas often cross traditional
political borders and jurisdictions and require new kinds and levels of rule making or the
need to get rid of old rules.
International Relations, globalization and related forms of international governance
are a further generator of, and locus for, new levels of regulation making, deregulation, and
regulatory compliance. At the global level, there is no world government as such. But there
clearly are international institutions of both an overarching kind such as the UN and the
WTO, and also numerous sectoral or policy field entities, attempting through their member
states and through the global pressure of business, NGOs and civil society, to create new
norms and rules, eliminate others, or secure compliance through greater mixtures of
incentives and enforcement (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999; Braithwaite and
Drahos, 2000; Mattli, 2001). The need for speedier and more transparent systems of dispute
settlement has also led to more “rules about rules”.
These brief paragraphs on the first four sources or realms of regulatory levels cannot
possibly do justice to the complexity and diversity of each, or to the nature of their
interactions (Teague, 2002). But they do indicate why political and economic actors are
searching for new or revised principles and mechanisms to bring some kind of order and
greater clarity to the resulting regulatory maize.
One ordering device has been simply to expand the notions (and hence levels) of what
regulation is. Indeed, increasingly in this paper, one is forced to speak of rule-making in some
12
more generic sense. As indicated in our discussion of definitions there are myriad forms or
modes of rule-making through constitutions, statute law, delegated legislation (the “regs”),
guidelines; codes and standards.
Finally, a fifth source of levels of regulation is found in the existence of regimes of
regulation interacting within countries and across borders. A regulatory regime is a complex
interacting set of organizations, statutes, ideas, interests, and processes engaged in rule
making and implementation. By definition a regime consists of sets of regulatory bodies. The
first test of there being larger regimes of regulation is that there is some inner core of such
features and characteristics that warrant such a designation for analytical and practical
purposes. Building on and adapting earlier comparative work (Doern, 1998; Doern and
Wilks, 1998; Doern, Hill, Prince and Schultz, 1999) the regulatory system of a given country
or jurisdiction can be portrayed as an interplay among four regimes:
$
Regime I Regime I, the sectoral regulatory regime;
$
Regime II, the horizontal framework regulatory regime;
$
Regime III, the overall governmental executive regime for making and
managing regulation across the government; and
$
Regime IV, the international regime.
The concept of regimes is a useful one (Wilson, 2000; Howlett, 2000; Harrison, 1996;
Hancher and Moran, 1989). It helps us characterize more complex sets of regulators and their
rules, rule making and compliance and enforcement processes. National government
agencies have done this frequently such as through reports which focus on areas such as
health and safety regulation or deregulation in areas of heretofore monopoly and economic
regulation (Auditor General of Canada, 2000).
13
Regime I consists of sectoral regulators which historically have been characterized as
monopoly or public utility sectors in which the regulator regulates a monopoly supplier or
quasi-monopoly set of suppliers. The regime is seen as covering separate vertical sectors of
the economy such as energy, broadcasting, and transportation. At its core, Regime I regulates
entry to, and exit from, the industry and has preferred to regulate broadly through some form
of profit and/or "rate of return" regulation. Regulation is often developed as a substitute for
competition which normal markets would otherwise supply.
Regime II captures a cluster of regulators whose core inner logic is centred on the fact
that the broad intent of rule-making is to fashion horizontal or framework-oriented
regulations. In short, these rules are not intended to discriminate among sectors of the
economy or society but rather, in principle, to treat all sectors equally. In other words the
rules are not intended to create a whole host of sectorally specific rules precisely because, if
such was the result, the economy would be pock-marked with regulation-induced internal
barriers.
Often this regime has been cast broadly as "health, safety and environment" regulators
and thus encompasses drug, food, product safety, occupational health and environmental
regulators. This is also often spoken of as the realm of "science-based" regulators whose
rules deal with issues of risk and risk-benefit decisions. But Regime II also includes
"marketplace framework" regulators and includes laws and rules governing consumer
matters, competition, company law, bankruptcy, and intellectual property (patents,
trademarks and copyright).
Regime III is a set of regulators and regulatory processes whose central logic deals
with managing regulation within the state, especially within the executive-bureaucratic arena
of the government but extending beyond it as well, ultimately to legislative bodies and the
14
courts. It is a regime because the government must somehow devise ways and processes for
managing the totality of its own regulatory decisions in terms of both purposes and processes.
This is not a difficult concept to understand when one thinks of the other two main
instruments of policy making that the government seeks to manage. Taxation and spending
both have regular rhythms and cycles of decision making that are well known.
Regulation as a policy instrument and as a central cycle of activity has always
presented more problems for the central agencies of the government largely because of two
key features of regulation (however defined). The first is that the costs of regulation do not
show up mainly in the budget of the state. They show up in the private budgets of citizens,
interests and firms. The state has some costs to bear but these are small compared to those
which impact on the private sector. The second reason is that regulations are not easily
aggregated (at the centre of the political executive and also at the centre of regulatory
departments) and converted into the common denominator of money (Averill and Coe, 2000;
Doern, 1999).
These problems have not, however, stopped governments, especially in the last two
decades, from trying to devise ways in which they could manage the regulatory function
within the state. The problem has always been what criteria and values would be used to
structure such a management effort, how it would be organized as a series of decision
processes, and whose behaviour (e.g. ministers, senior officials, front-line officials) would
have to change. In some cases Regime III is trying to adjust to changes in Regime I where
deregulation is more endemic and also to Regime II where regulatory expansion is still
underway. As we see further below it is also having to take in and absorb international trade
and other rules and their imperatives. Another feature of this regime is the growing role of
“regulation inside government” (Hood, Scott, James, Jones and Travers, 1999). Such inside
15
regulation is growing apace in part because the more that the state contracts-out services and
functions the more that it must regulate them and hence the state must increasingly regulate
itself.
Regime IV can, in one sense, be seen as a virtual commonplace reflection of
contemporary globalization and of the internationalization of most areas of public policy,
including regulation. Regulators are increasingly constrained by, or must interact with, a
potential array of: a) international agencies (regulatory and otherwise); b) other countries'
national regulatory counterpart bodies; c) international rather than just national arrays and
coalitions of interest groups; and d) the existence of international rule-based dispute
settlement processes or prescribed cross-boundary consultation processes ( Trebilcock and
Howse, 1999). Regulation also quickly becomes cross-jurisdictional in other ways that defy
national boundaries and arrangements within states.
However, the starting core feature of this regime is that traditionally, for the most
part, international regulation is not "authoritative" in the sense that there is no world
government to supply compliance through direct enforcement. The international system has
typically had to rely more on persuasion and diplomacy, in short, on softer instruments of
governing. Thus, many policy fields are influenced by obligations but not usually backed by
the same array of mechanisms for ensuring compliance as exist in domestic regulation.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that governments which are signatories to the Uruguay WTO
agreement and to other regional pacts must be capable of knowing and assessing whether
they are complying not only with particular provisions but with whole systems of law and
regulation. This is again precisely why there is a conceptual and practical interest in regimes
or sets of regulations and why the issues surrounding regimes are conceptually and
empirically difficult.
16
Regulatory and policy regimes can be viewed in many different ways (Hood,
Rothstein and Baldwin, 2001, Wilson, 2000; Lodge, 2002). The above four regime
framework is profiled here not only to indicate the continuing importance of each regime-sectoral, framework, government-executive, and international–but also to indicate some of
the ways in which the four regimes are interacting, converging and colliding. Some kind of
regime-level analysis is essential in comparing a country or jurisdiction’s regulatory systems
with those of another. Regimes, as used above, are not exact categorizations but they exhibit
sufficient internal characteristics to be useful in initially locating regulation of different kinds.
It is on to this overall tapestry of regulatory complexity that political and economic actors are
seeking to find new principles and mechanisms of for improving regulatory relations in
multi-level contexts. It is, to say the least, a complex and daunting struggle.
REFORM IN MULTI-LEVEL REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS
Governments have begun to enunciate and evolve principles and use mechanisms
whose broad purpose is to improve multi-level regulation. Such principles and mechanisms
relate both to the efficiency of regulation in modern economies and their democratic efficacy
in achieving public purposes in diverse and increasingly linked substantive areas such as
health, safety and environment. In this section of the paper we briefly describe the nature of
four main principles and five mechanisms or instruments.
However, political systems have not just moved from the listed sources of multi-level
regulation examined in the previous section to a listed menu of principles and mechanisms.
The realities of multi-level regulation (and governance more broadly) have also been
propelled by the imperatives of global markets and technological change and also by general
political-philosophical concepts of governing in complex settings such as the principle of
17
subsidiarity in the case of the European Union and its member countries. Some economic
and trade imperatives drive the search for strategies for dealing with multi-level complexity
in a centralizing direction. The concept of subsidiarity seeks solutions which favour
decentralized regulation and governance. Formal federations have articulated concepts of
“cooperative federalism” which seek joint discussion and action but whose resultant
individual agreements could be centralizing or decentralizing. Federations in different policy
fields also achieve satisfactory multi-level regulatory governance by having the senior
jurisdiction make regulations and other state or provincial governments implement and
enforce regulations.
Given the diversity of situations for different OECD countries and jurisdictions it
necessarily follows that the approaches to the principles and mechanisms discussed below
will depend on the status-quo starting point extant in that given country or jurisdiction and on
the nature of the problems emerging in a given policy or regulatory field. As discussed
further below, it must also be stressed that choices from or among these lists of principles and
mechanisms are often made in the context of complex and high pressure international
negotiations and time-frames.
Reform Principles
Four reform principles have gained increased prominence in the last fifteen years or
so:
$
harmonization;
$
mutual recognition,
$
uniformity or tacit cooperation and capacity-building; and
$
competitive regulation and best practice bench-marking.
18
These are purposeful norms and ideas which indicate the possible extent and degree to which
nations or sub-national governments might give up or change their sovereign law and
regulatory policies in the interests of international and national or regional cooperation and
shared sovereignty, or under the pressure and power from global forces and so-called
hegemonic global or regional powers such as the U.S. and EU ( Howlett, 2000; Braithwaite
and Drahos, 2000) or powerful states or provinces within countries (Duane, 2002).
While it is important to list and define these principles as separate kinds of ideas for
improvement and reform, it is also important to stress that they are contested ideas with
various regulatory bodies and stakeholder interests (within countries, and among countries)
having strong and often conflicting views about which principle should prevail and also about
what exactly these principles mean in specific regulatory situations and circumstances.
It is also crucial to see at what level of expression or aggregation these principles are
enunciated and advocated. Such principles are almost by definition expressed at a fairly high
level of abstraction but when applied to specific areas of regulation or policy, they are rarely
debated alone. Other norms and ideas specific to that regulatory realm are also combined in
debate, negotiation, and decision making. For example, in the environmental policy realm,
harmonization as a principle is entwined with views about whether one is harmonizing up to
the highest level or down to the lowest common denominator. In the energy realm, ideas may
also encompass concerns about energy security and about energy as an essential service
industry and an industry with national security impacts and importance.
As we survey each of the four principles, the inevitable presence of these other
accompanying values and norms must be kept fully in mind. The four principles sketched out
here do not lead a solitary life. They almost always come with other related purposeful ideas
which countries and interests also see as principled.
19
Harmonization is a principle which would see different governments and levels of
government set the same rules. Ideas about harmonization are often tied to perceptions about
whether harmonization is occurring because of the political or economic power of a dominant
country, or jurisdiction within a country, or whether it is being arrived at through a process of
genuine consultation and consensus (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Howlett, 2000).
Trade agreements and free trade areas are a fairly obvious example of harmonization
in that key provisions of a trade agreement are intended to ensure that signatory parties adopt
the same rules and approaches such as on their external tariffs or on their approach to dispute
settlement.
But the idea of harmonization is not immediately a clear-cut idea within its own
internal realm of meaning or definition. For example, there are almost always disputes about
whether harmonization is judged against performance standards or procedural or process
standards. In other words, should the harmonized rules relate to the outcome-related
performance characteristics of a product being traded (e.g. the capacity of a product made of
lumber to be fire-resistant) or how that wood product was made and produced.
Mutual recognition is a norm or principle which implies that countries and
jurisdictions would recognize each others rules, even if they are different (Schmidt, 2002;
Nicolaidis, 1996; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Majone, 1994; ). In a North American
context this kind of principle was often referred to as the “drivers licence” example because a
simple example of mutual recognition arose where licenced drivers who moved from one
state or province to another would have their drivers license recognised. They would not be
retested nor would there be some form of fundamental challenge that another jurisdiction’s
driver training and licensing process was somehow inferior.
The drivers license analogy is easily used because its tests of competence and safety
20
are simpler. Mutual recognition becomes more difficult when one deals with countries or
jurisdictions recognition of the medical qualifications of medical doctors or other technical
professions. In these more complex realms, there are undoubtedly concerns about the nature
of medical education and actual competences (Doern and MacDonald, 1999). But objections
to another country’s rules may also be due to simple protectionism by the national or subregional medical professions.
A more recent kind of example of the mutual recognition approach is where countries
are asked to, or pressured into, recognizing whole sets of rules, in short, quite literally many
dozens of statutes and regulations. The EU attempted to do this as an alternative to full
harmonization. It met with some success but was also a slow agonizing process with different
sectoral level results and stalemates (Schmidt, 2002). Currently, in the context of North
American economic integration, there is a more open discussion of a similar need to reach
mutual recognition agreements for entire sets of regulations and laws (Standing Committee
on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2002).
Uniformity and tacit cooperation and capacity building (also often also cast as
integration and convergence) would involve rules by countries which become more similar
perhaps by setting minimum standards for goods in commerce or for other kinds of activity.
This principle can be seen in some sense as a part of the journey towards full harmonization
but not all efforts at tacit cooperation may lead to this full journey. There are any number of
examples where this principle has been put into operation.
For example, global and international telecommunications regulation has always had
some areas of technical international cooperation and uniform approaches simply to facilitate
the movement of both voice and data information (Lee, 1996). But for long periods, the
regulation of entry into the industry and also the content of broadcasting was strongly
21
national in nature and hence very much characterized by multi-level regulation. Gradually, in
the last two decades, technological change augmented by the hegemonic power of the U.S.
has exerted pressure on countries to deregulate entry, and also to regulate in certain structural
ways such as through arms-length independent regulatory bodies rather than national
monopoly entities (Thatcher, 1999; Hall, Scott and Hood, 2000).
Competitive regulation and best practice bench-marking is a norm which recognizes
that different competitive levels and approaches to regulation can produce innovations and
better approaches provided that these are benchmarked as best practices so that they can be
adopted elsewhere. This is an idea or principle which does not always resonate well,
especially in the business community, because it implies that there is some automatic virtue
in governments competing with each other. Competitive markets are seen as basically
virtuous but many would see competitive government and competitive regulation as
producing more levels of regulation rather than less and more regulatory obstacles and
complexity rather than less.
However, governments do explicitly and implicitly compete. This is certainly true
among constituent units within federations. For example, the shift from welfare programs to
workfare programs essentially involved experiments in some U.S. states and Canadian
provinces whereby previously non-conditional welfare payments to those in need were
augmented by rules in which compulsions to work or to undergo training were added (Zeitlin
and Trubek, 2003). These regulation and rule-added experiments were then expanded to other
jurisdictions. Disputes continue about whether the shift from welfare to workfare is a good or
bad idea but there is little doubt that regulatory competition was a part of the dynamic.
Industry’s have also themselves been advocates regarding competitive regulation
in some sectoral realms. For example, in the regulation of pharmaceutical drugs, the global
22
drug lobby campaigned for a form of global regulatory “league tables” whereby they could
rank countries’ drug regulators according to their relative performance in speed of approving
drug products (Doern, 2000; Vogel, 1998). The industry was concerned about the time taken
for multiple approvals in several countries. The drug industry was also simultaneously
seeking greater harmonization of regulation at the global level but there is no doubt that a
form of competitive regulation and bench-marking was central to the industry’s concern
about multi-level regulatory governance.
Another example of competitive regulation and benchmarking is the debate about
how more stringent environmental regulation might force or induce innovation in products
and production processes and indeed foster “environmental industries” or sustainable
production.
This debate arose in the United States and centred on the debate between Michael Porter and
Claas van der Linde and mainstream U.S. environmental economists (Porter and van der
Linde, 1995; Palmer, Oates and Portney, 1995). The Porter-van der Linde argument built
ultimately on Porter’s earlier work on the competitiveness of nations and brought in the
growing debates about innovation, the knowledge-based economy, and national innovation
systems. The Porter-van der Linde argument is that
“the environment-competitiveness debate has been framed incorrectly. The notion of
an inevitable struggle between ecology and the economy grows out of a static view of
environmental regulation, in which technology, products, processes and customer
needs are all fixed. In this static world where firms have already made their costminimizing choices, environmental regulation inevitably raises costs and will tend to
reduce the market share of domestic companies on global markets” (Porter and Van
der Linde, 1995, p.97.).
They go on to argue that detailed case studies of hundreds of industries in dozens of countries
reveal that internationally competitive companies are not those with the cheapest inputs or the
largest scale, but “those with the capacity to improve and innovate continually” and that
23
therefore, Porter and van der Linde argue that “properly designed environmental standards
can trigger innovation that may partially or more than fully offset the cost of complying with
them” (Porter and van der Linde, 1995, p. 98). Not unexpectedly, this line of argument
received a range of criticism and counter points. Mainline economists first defend the
traditional benefit-cost approach compared to the alleged “no cost” approach of Porter and
van der Linde (Palmer, Oates, and Portney, 1995).
As with many of the policy illustrations that can be selected to illustrate particular
principles, this one could yield different kinds of evidence about regulatory levels at different
stages of the evolution of the particular regulatory story or history involved. Early on, more
levels (and duplication) could occur as governments “compete” but at a later stage some form
of standard or improved coordinated level of regulation could also materialize.
Reform Mechanisms
Five mechanisms for the reform of multi-level regulatory governance are examined:
$
integration and capacity-building incentives to conform;
$
memoranda of understanding;
$
joint formal agreements, contracts or licenses;
$
voluntary codes;
$
private action by citizens to trigger enforcement or compliance.
As was the case with our discussion of principles, these mechanisms do not always have
clear-cut definitional boundaries and as mechanisms per se they do not always arise only out
of regulatory situations. Nor do they always remain regulatory in their content. They can
quickly become mechanisms which include bundles of policy instruments which include
regulation but also spending, taxation and exhortation (e.g. the use of guidelines).
24
Integration and capacity-building incentives to conform is a mechanism whereby
regulators at different levels are induced and encouraged to achieve more harmonized or
integrated approaches through the offer of funding and technical personnel, data acquisition
and performance studies, and time-lines and schedules for phased in compliance.
An important example of this is the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs) Agreement which became a part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the
Uruguay Round Final Act (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). While the larger purpose of the
TRIPs was to bring intellectual property into the ambit of trade rules, TRIPs itself also
contained provisions to enable developing countries several years to comply and contained
provisions for assistance and capacity-building. TRIPS was and remains controversial in part
because of the substantive debate about property rights and how far they should be extended.
It was controversial because it is an example of a mechanism which, though it contained
capacity-building incentives, was also lodged within a larger package which was aimed at
harmonizing rules at the behest of key hegemonic countries or jurisdictions such as the U.S.
and EU (Drahos and Main, 2002).
Another current and very large scale example of capacity-building is being negotiated
in the current discussions for a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) which the 34
countries of the hemisphere wish to conclude by 2005. Though the core of the negotiation is
to liberalize and consolidate hemispheric trade rules overall, the large number of developing
countries among the 34 potential FTAA parties means that large capacity-building funds and
technical assistance will be needed (Salazar-Xirinachs and Robert, 2001). Some of this larger
rubric of capacity-building support is also bound up in debates about sustainable development
which itself implies actions to deal with both pollution clean-up but also pollution prevention,
the real core of the concept of sustainable development (UNEP, 2000).
25
Both the TRIPs and the FTAA examples illustrate as well the inevitable overlaps
among policy instruments. Though the starting point for both is about regulation
(combinations of deregulation and new regulation), the actual mechanism of capacitybuilding clearly also involves spending. In essence the funding (including the provision of
human and technical resources and training) is the carrot to help make the stick work in the
long run.
Memoranda of understanding and guideline statements are a mechanism whereby
governments, departments and multiple regulators within a government, and within
international bodies establish written and publically transparent understandings in which they
acknowledge certain needs for regulatory cooperation or coordination and make broad
commitments to deal with them. Such memoranda may also contain commitments to certain
principles but without any detailed plans or legally binding undertakings.
This mechanism can be seen as an instrument of persuasion or as a set of guidelines
to clarify approaches. Such guideline-oriented mechanisms may be developed when multiple
regulators become aware of coordination problems which have to be addressed. One example
here is in the field of competition or anti-trust regulation. Competition rules dealing with
mergers have increasingly had to deal with some mergers which required assessment and
decisions by regulators in several jurisdictions (e.g. the U.S., EU and Japan). MOUs or
guidelines had to be developed as to broadly how these regulators might handle these cases in
a procedural sense. There is still no global competition or anti-trust regulator and thus this
softer mechanism of coordination among regulators became needed (Wilks, 1999).
Another example of this mechanism’s use is in federations where two levels of
government require environmental assessments or hearings to be conducted. This could and
did lead to problems of unnecessary duplication and delay in the approval of important public
26
and private projects (Harrison, 1996). One way to lessen or remedy this result was for both
sets of regulators to publish MOU-like agreements which would indicate how joint hearings
would be held or how, on occasion, one level would conduct the hearing on behalf of both
jurisdictions but under their joint legal or regulatory requirements.
Joint formal agreements or contracts and licences are mechanisms whereby national
or sub-national regulators, groups of regulators, and single regulated firms or industries
commit to formal transparent, legally-binding agreements regarding regulatory rights,
responsibilities, and reporting requirements. Examples here are numerous but one which
illustrates this mechanism is the approach of OFTEL, the UK telecommunications regulator.
OFTEL uses the license granted to a telecommunications provider (such as BT) as the main
vehicle of regulatory content, coordination and change. Unlike some other national telecom
regulators which simply pass numerous general rules which licensees must then comply with,
OFTEL approves fewer general rules and instead loads up the license itself, which is
renewed/amended every few years, with bundles of rights and obligations (Hall, Scott and
Hood, 2000; Graham, 1998).
Another example of the contract-style license agreement is found in Canada’s forestry
agreements. Most of Canada’s forests are owned by the state (mainly provincial
governments)
which then grant harvesting rights to private forestry companies. Such licenses can be for
long periods of time (15 to 20 years). Again bundles of rules, rights and obligations are built
into the license between the company and the province (Howlett, 2001).
Voluntary codes are non-legislatively required commitments developed largely by
non-state actors (Webb, 2003). As such voluntary codes can be both a solution to some
problems of multi-level governance and they can also produce yet more levels. In some cases
27
firms, industry associations and NGOs devise their own codes of behaviour on products and
production processes and then ensure their public monitoring. In other cases, government
regulatory agencies are involved in advising on both the drafting and monitoring activities
but are not directly a party to the agreement. Codes were not always well understood and thus
published guidelines were developed and are now available on how to develop and
implement effective codes (Webb, 2003). A website and listserve on voluntary codes has also
been developed with over 400 members worldwide.
The need for codes became a preferred tool for consumer advocacy in particular and
was also becoming more evident under the impetus of E-Commerce and the general
development of the Internet. This was because, voluntary codes were a faster way to respond
to marketplace change which involved global or cross-national commerce. Normal
international law-making and regulation simply took too long and hence progress could be
made more quickly through codes and related approaches (Webb, 2003). Consumer
regulatory bodies in several jurisdictions have been involved in voluntary codes on ECommerce, child pornography on the web, Debit Cards Code of Practice and the like. In
addition regulators have also also had to respond to, take part in, or monitor, other initiatives
which were emerging from other stakeholders, including combined environmental and
consumer NGOS. These groups were increasingly launching their own standard-setting and
code development processes in competition with official state-sponsored processes and then
using market forces to generate support for their preferred code or market outcome. This
occurred in areas such as forest products (Stanbury, 2000).
Private action by citizens to trigger enforcement or compliance is a mechanism which
is most associated with the U.S. political culture in an overall sense in that it refers to the
availability of rights by citizens to take private action in the courts against regulators or other
28
parties which citizens believe are failing to enforce or which are regulating in some improper
way (Fischel 1995; Peters, 1995; Eisner, 1993; Francis, 1993). In principle such legal actions
could be taken against multiple levels of regulation. The best known of these rights occurs
under U.S. anti-trust law where such rights are actively reinforced by provisions which allow
litigants to seek and obtain triple damages. But such mechanisms in the U.S. also are often
tied to the generally greater litiginous nature of U.S. legal and political institutions compared
to other countries. For other countries whose political and legal cultures are different, this
principle may seem excessive. Moreover, individual litigations or the large volume of such
challenges and actions could either: a) help solve problems of multi-level regulatory
governance; or b) create new ones.
Another example of private citizen action as a principle is found in the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), a side-agreement to the
larger North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The NAAEC’s overall provisions
are essentially aimed at fostering environmental cooperation among the three countries (the
U.S. Canada and Mexico), including enhanced compliance with environmental laws and
regulations (Robert, 2000; Tollefson, 2002). Both the cooperative efforts and key compliance
issues are dependent on the role and functioning of the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC). The CEC consists of a Council of Ministers, a Secretariat and a Joint
Public Advisory Committee of 15 members to foster public input. A central aspect of the
CEC role is its management of processes whereby citizens in any of the three countries can
trigger reviews of alleged environmental non-compliance (defined as a “persistent pattern of
failure to enforce” environmental laws or regulations). The CEC has had some successes and
garnered both support and criticism in its first decade of operation, particularly over its
citizen-centred “whistle-blowing” role (Hufbauer et.al., 2000).
29
The five mechanisms surveyed above have individual characteristics which can help
in the reform of multi-level regulatory governance. However, these mechanisms, like the
principles which often underpin their use, rarely are used in splendid isolation. They are
mechanisms which are useful but they are also being layered on to a complex underbelly of
existing regulations, rules and levels and thus citizens and key interests may not always
notice any change or reforms which might arise from their use.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper has been quite basic, namely to provide and discuss a
framework of principles and mechanisms regarding improved regulatory relations in multilevel countries and jurisdictions. It has developed such a framework by drawing on the
comparative experience of multi-level countries and contexts and on relevant academic
literature on regulation and governance. Illustrative examples from several countries have
been woven into the framework discussion of principles and mechanisms.
We have stressed the basic stock-taking nature of this framework of principles and
mechanisms. The four principles and five mechanisms have basically been defined, described
and illustrated with a view that this alone can help foster further discussion and debate about
how to improve multi-level regulatory governance. The discussion of the sources of multilevel regulatory governance shows that it is a growing unavoidable problem and challenge in
all types of macro political systems including unitary states; federations, complex multigovernance areas and free trade agreements, and international relations. The discussion of the
definitions of regulation and of the existence of complex regulatory regimes shows further
why multi-level challenges of coordination and competition exist and why concern about
such regulatory relations exist but also why they are challenging to solve or manage.
30
In many ways, the principles and mechanisms canvassed in this paper have already,
and can further help improve such relations. However, I have stressed that it is not at all a
simple journey from the listed sources of multi-level regulation examined in the first main
section of the paper to the listed menu of principles and mechanisms. Much will depend on
the status-quo starting point extant in any given country or jurisdiction and on the nature of
the problems emerging in a given policy or regulatory field. Thus solutions could move in
either a centralizing or decentralizing direction.
It must also be stressed in conclusion that what constitutes improved (or harmed)
multi-level regulatory governance is necessarily highly contested. Some of the contested
aspects of these principles and mechanisms for improvement have emerged in the analysis. It
is a simple fact that various regulatory bodies and stakeholder interests (within countries, and
among countries) have strong and often conflicting views about which principle (or
principles) should prevail and also about what exactly these principles mean in specific
contexts and in different regulatory fields.
Though principles such as harmonization and mutual recognition have some core
general meaning, they are also employed rhetorically as a way of advancing agendas whose
real meaning in particular situations of negotiation and discussion has yet to be defined. This
can arise because of tactical politics among jurisdictions or it may simply be that in complex
negotiations (especially international negotiations) the principles serve as ordering devices
because one country’s negotiators cannot simply walk into a negotiation and say to a group of
other countries’ negotiators that it wants the particular rules it has now (in several realms of
regulation) adopted everywhere. Negotiations could not successfully occur if every detail was
on the line. Principles such as harmonization and mutual recognition become surrogates as
various parties seek out their respective versions of reform and improvement, usually in
31
highly fluid and complex situations or in response to crises and unfolding events. Principles
are important and act as focus for discussion, but as the analysis has stressed they rarely
arrive alone. They are always linked with other more particular ideas important to the
regulatory field whose levels of regulation some country or powerful interest wants to change
or harmonize.
The five mechanisms examined are each important and have been used often but, like
the principles, they do not always have clear-cut definitional boundaries and as mechanisms
per se they do not always arise only out of regulatory situations. We have shown also that
they can quickly embrace or require bundles of policy instruments which include ways of
dealing with complex multi-level or multi-player regulation but also spending and
exhortation. Particular mechanisms such as the use of private action or the use of voluntary
codes can also either ameliorate the problem of levels or they can create new instances and
realms of multi-level regulatory governance.
32
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