Take note debate on the situation in Libya and the Middle East and UN Security
Council Resolution 1973- Lord Howell of Guildford, 1 April 2011
Background:
 This wide ranging debate provides Peers with licence to roam freely across the
terrain and to draw the House’s attention to issues of concern. The debate
risks, however, being a pudding without a theme.
 This is the first full debate that the Lords has had on Libya since UNSC
Resolution 1973 was agreed and military action was taken to uphold certain
provisions. A statement was read in the House on 18 March, but there was
little scope for debate.
 This is the first occasion that Lords will have had to debate the causes and
implications of the Arab Spring and to scrutinise both the government’s
handling of events and its future strategy.
Aims of intervention(s):
 To register the Church’s concern on particular issues and to ask questions of
government that might provide the basis for subsequent conversations with
Government.
 To place on record a Church position on recent events that might usefully be
built on and developed at a later date.
 To draw the House’s attention to certain contributions that the Church is
making on the ground that illustrates the importance of engaging with
religious actors in the region.
Length of intervention(s)
 Approximately 10-12 minutes.
Focus of any Intervention(s)
 The primary focus of any intervention(s) should be on Libya, but it might be
useful to also draw attention to the situation in Egypt and the implications of
recent events for wider peace in the region.
General Observations
 Events in the Middle East are happening at such a pace it is nearly impossible
to make any short term predictions. The dramatic if not historical changes that
we have witnessed over the past three months is a reminder of a saying by
Lenin, "Sometimes decades pass and nothing happens; and then sometimes
weeks pass and decades happen."
 After decades of apparent stability, recent popular uprisings in the Arab world
have changed the regional landscape dramatically. From Egypt, where
optimism runs high about the prospects for a democratic transition, to Libya,
where fears of state collapse and brutal violence are widespread, the region
seems to face dramatic and varied political change and challenge.
 The fluidity of events makes it hard if not impossible to predict what any
future status quo might look like. There are common themes between the
uprisings– spontaneity, economically frustrated youth, secularism, and aging
authoritarian leadership, but there remain important distinctions between the
countries that warn against sweeping generalisations. Understanding the
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unique characteristics of each uprising is essential to predicting the political
transitions currently underway.
Libya
 Two weeks on from the start of Operation Odyssey we still lack clarity as to
what might happen next should Gaddafi be defeated, overthrown or accidently
killed by a stray tomahawk missile. What might success look like? Is the
objectives regime change or the protection of civilians? When is a civilian not
a civilian? What is the exit strategy? Do we have a Plan B should the use of
military force not protect civilians? What is the political strategy should the
use of force contribute to a stalemate on the ground?
 These questions have for the most part been sidestepped by the Government.
Ministers have tried to answer these questions, but their responses have only
served to reveal the divisions within government and between it and other
coalition partners. The London Conference of 29 March only provides partial
answers. When responding to the pressing humanitarian situation on the
ground did the government overlook other strategic considerations?
 The Government’s handling of events from the start of this crisis draws into
focus the conclusions of a 2010 report by the House of Commons Public
Administration Select Committee titled Who does UK National Strategy? Core
to the Committee’s report is the conclusion that government has lost the
institutionalised capacity for and culture of strategic thought. The Committee
worried that if this deficit went unaddressed Britain risked muddling through
or making strategy up as it went along. Does the Government need to revisit
these conclusions and examine what steps might be needed to correct the
strategic deficit at the heart of the Whitehall machinery?
 Was the resort to military force unnecessary and pre-mature? Politics,
J.K.Galbraith once reasoned, “consists in choosing between the disastrous and
the unpalatable”. The use of military force is always unpalatable and
highlights the brokenness of human relations, but on some occasions it can
prove the lesser of two evils.
 The speed with which the Security Council moved from passing a resolution
referring Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court to securing Resolution
1973 authorising the use of military force underlines there was broad
international consensus that just cause existed.
 The high levels of abstention resulting in UNSCR 1973 shows that
considerable doubt existed that the use of military force was necessarily the
right instrument to use at that particular moment.
 The decision to use military force certainly closed of other avenues. There is
nothing to be gained now by speculating on whether alternative political
options should have been explored further. Even if alternative political options
existed it is far from clear that they could have stopped the impending
onslaught on Benghazi.
 Whatever people think about the rights and wrongs of Operation Odyssey,
UNSCR 1973 is a remarkable diplomatic achievement that no one predicted. It
gives hope that after the rancour and division of the Iraq War, it is still
possible to talk of an international community.
 The consensus underpinning 1973 remains fragile and needs to be nurtured.
This consensus needs to be sustained to provide continued political legitimacy
for this military operation. The Bishop of Exeter raised in the House on March
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18 the importance of keeping the Arab League on board less Operation
Odyssey be seen as yet another Western intervention in a Muslim country.
It also needs investment to provide a more secure and lasting foundation for
subsequent interventions in other parts of our troubled world should the need
arise in the future. Any expansion of the UNSC to include countries like Brazil
and India will make it harder to reach consensus on the use of military force.
Operation Odyssey might yet turn out to be the last hurrah for liberal
interventionism.
UNSCR 1973 shows that the international community understands it has a
responsibility to protect, but governments must also act responsibly when
implementing its provisions.
Governments must only use that force which is necessary to uphold the
relevant provisions of UNSCR 1973. Unless a convincing case can be made
otherwise, the use of military force should not be used to overthrow Colonel
Gaddafi or to assist the rebels in their political objectives.
It is important to acknowledge the humanitarian achievements of Operation
Odyssey: prevention of a massacre in Benghazi and the creation of aid
corridors to civilian areas in the east.
These humanitarian achievements risk being eclipsed by wider political debate
that UNSCR 1973 is now being interpreted broadly by the implementing
coalition to mean that Gaddafi's defeat, overthrow, or death is deemed to be
essential and indispensable to the protection of civilians from the threat of
attack.
This raises concern that the use of force in Libya is now disproportionate to
the ends agreed in UNSCR 1973. It also prevents an early exit from this
conflict by closing of other political options such as a negotiated ceasefire.
The question of where command and control responsibilities lie for Operation
Odyssey has now been resolved in NATO’s favour. But, it still remains
uncertain how the military provision of UNSCR 1973 will be implemented
with President Obama taking a back seat. This might be less of a problem
should the political objectives of UNSCR 1973 be achieved quickly.
A decade ago the US accounted for 50% of defence spending of all NATO
countries. That share is now closer to 75%. Libya is 35 times larger than
Bosnia, where NATO implemented a no-fly zone in the 1990s using around
240 aircraft from a dozen countries. The geography of the two countries is
obviously different, but it does underline the scale of military commitments
that is necessary to uphold a no-fly zone.
Last year’s Strategic Defence and Security Review assumed it unlikely that
Britain would use military force outside of a US led coalition. This assumption
now looks in question. Do the conclusions of the SDSR now need to be
revisited?
Even if Gaddafi goes, it is fanciful to think that we can just walk a way. Libya,
one of the region’s most closed societies, is very different from its North
African neighbours such as Egypt. It has no established opposition groups,
civil society groups or strong state institutions. When the regime’s hold on the
east was broken, there was no clear leadership in the so-called liberated areas.
There is no guarantee that what comes after Gaddafi will be any better. The
London Conference took place in Lancaster House, which should be
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remembered as the location for the long negotiations on Zimbabwean
independence. Not a particularly encouraging precedent.
Once the international community agreed to armed intervention in Libya, it
accepted long term responsibility for the country that might yet prove hard to
fulfil. The pre-occupation with the immediacy of current operations means
that little thought has been given to what jus post bellum might look. The
London Conference is a start but it raises as many questions as it answers.
2. The Arab Spring and the Process of Democratisation: The Case of Egypt
 Nick Grono, the Deputy President of the International Crisis Group, gave a
talk to a Wilton Park Conference on 2 March where he set out seven key
lessons on “what approaches can best support reform and improve the chances
of a transition ultimately leading to a peaceful and democratic state”.
 These include the following: reform has to happen quickly; democratisation
after protests may come more easily and rapidly in places that don’t have
traditional elites; try and get the military out of politics as quickly as possible;
get elections right; understand that outsiders are largely bystanders during the
transition; don’t try to pick winners; conflict prevention matters. It is worth
keeping these lessons in mind when thinking through recent developments in
Egypt.
 Egypt has now moved beyond revolutionary protest to constitutional reform
and political change. Four weeks after the resignation of President Mubarak,
Egyptians overwhelmingly approved constitutional changes proposed by a
committee formed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.
 The changes, approved as a single package by 77% of voters, will limit
presidents to two four-year terms and constrain their ability to declare
emergency laws for more than six months. Restrictions that had essentially
barred non-National Democratic Party candidates from running for president
will be eased.
 The referendum results indicate Egyptians favour a restoration of order to
further revolutionary agitation. The outcome suggests an informal coalition
involving the Army, the Muslim Brotherhood and remnants of the ruling
National Democratic Party have outmanoeuvred traditional opposition groups
and new groups that played a key role in the revolution.
 The next stage in the transition will be parliamentary elections, originally
scheduled for early June, followed by the presidential election in August. It is
possible the Army may announce a new timetable that would push the former
to September and the latter by year’s end.
 The existing timetable gives newcomers little time to prepare and field
candidates. It will advantage established players like the National Democratic
Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter has been excluded from formal
politics, but its candidates can run as independents.
 The Army must now decide what changes will be made to the electoral
system. Relaxation of the law governing political parties and a switch to
proportional representation, from the current winner-takes-all formula, would
allow broader political representation in Parliament. This is unlikely to
happen.
 The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces is engaged in a delicate and
uncomfortable balancing act.
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The Army assumed the position of arbiter during the uprising
and helped secure Mubarak’s departure. It has since found itself
at odds with the youth led movement. It is assuming a position
that it is culturally and politically ill-equipped to take on. It has
often used violence against protesters.
- The Army is filling the internal security vacuum left after the
police vanished from the streets and the state security service
was forcibly dissolved.
- The Army must also ensure the country's external security at a
time of extreme volatility on its borders, amid the conflict in
Libya, the division of Sudan into two, and an uncertain
situation in Gaza that could yet spill over into the Sinai.
- The Army is seeking to maintain Egypt's strategic orientation to
preserve American military aid and the peace treaty with Israel.
Despite its discomfort, the Army has resisted the idea of an interim
presidential committee combining top judges, prominent civilians and senior
officials to oversee the transition fearing that would lead to drastic political
change and to its own position being undermined. Such a sharing of power
would have given added legitimacy to the transition. The army's rejection of
this option has drawn it deeper into the very process from which it is seeking
to extricate itself.
Protesters did not leave Tahrir Square and other public spaces once Mubarak
resigned. They have been unwilling to part with a flexible instrument of
pressure. The potency of their tactics was shown not only during the chaos of
the revolution itself but also subsequently. A generational divide has appeared
between youth eager to preserve momentum for change and older people who
question the recourse to street mobilisation.
Street politics have also had a dark side.
- Women activists were attacked on International Women's Day;
- Communal violence between Copts and Muslims on the
outskirts of Cairo following an arson attack on a church on 8
March left at least 13 dead and 140 injured;
- Stick-wielding thugs bent on breaking up protests have returned
to Tahrir Square;
- The Interior Ministry has suffered from unexplained fires.
- Labour protests have paralysed industrial activity in many
places,
- The economy has also been hit by the banks' inability to
operate properly and by the collapse of tourism.
The move to parliamentary and presidential election is resulting in the
reshaping of Egyptian politics.
- The youth movement is divided between remaining as a radical
reformist movement and seeking institutional power to check
traditional parties and engage in coalition politics. They are
unlikely to become key established players in any post-military
political settlement.
- Though excluded from formal politics, a good performance in
the parliamentary elections by the Muslim Brotherhood would
influence the new constitution, in particular with regard to the
role of sharia law in framing legislation.
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The Muslim Brotherhood is aware that the mosque is not now
the only means of political mobilisation. It has to compete in a
more crowded and suspicious environment. Divisions within its
ranks have led some former members to splinter of and form
their own political parties.
- Egypt's myriad leftist groups see an opportunity to revive the
labour movement and reverse Mubarak's moves towards
economic liberalisation. They suffer from tired leadership,
inadequate organisation and infighting.
- Despite the uprising, the National Democratic Party remains a
potent force because of its extensive network and experience in
running (and rigging) elections. Minor National Democratic
Party barons are already associating themselves with the army
to preserve their position in the new order.
- Reformers within the NDP are coalescing around Hossam
Badrawi, the party's last secretary general who was critical of
Mubarak and his son Gamal.
The fluidity of events in Egypt highlight that outsiders are for the most part
bystanders in this process of political transition. Foreign governments must
avoid the temptation of picking winners.
Katherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs said on
21 March 2011: “Egypt's future lies in the hands of the Egyptians and it is the
Egyptian people alone who can establish and maintain a stable and democratic
society. However, the EU, as a neighbour and partner, stands ready to lend
support in this crucial and irreversible process."
Acknowledging that Foreign Governments are bystanders is not the same as
saying that Foreign Governments should do nothing.
- Freezing of and repatriation of the foreign assets of President
Mubarak. The EU’s Foreign Affairs Council agreed to freeze
the funds and economic resources of 19 individuals in Egypt –
including Mubarak – deemed responsible for the
misappropriation of state funds.
- Protection of human rights. It is the responsibility of the
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to ensure respect for all
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Those responsible for
loss of life and injuries, such as the 9 March arson attack on the
Coptic Church should be held accountable for their actions and
brought to justice.
- Press for free and fair elections. Foreign governments should
continue to monitor Egypt’s political transition and encourage
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to ensure that any
elections are free, fair and credible.
- Foreign Governments should ensure that their own public
diplomacy recognises the complexity of the situation in Egypt
and in turn avoids sweeping generalisations that label all
Islamist parties as extreme and reactionary.
- Egypt’s democratic transition is unlikely to meet the political
aspirations of the youth movement. It certainly won’t remedy
the high levels of economic disenfranchisement that led many
to occupy Tahrir Square. Future political unrest is therefore
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likely. Foreign Governments would be wise to start investing
now in those organisations committed to maintaining the
democratic space in Egypt. Economic assistance and
preferential trade arrangements might also prove beneficial.
3. The Arab Spring the Middle East Peace Process: If Not Now, When?
 The popular upheavals of recent months in North Africa and the Middle East
have generated substantial public commentary about what happens next. What
type of regime might replace Mubarak’s Egypt? Will the Muslim Brotherhood
come to power? Will Egypt become like Iran after the revolution? Will the
revolutions impede or accelerate the Middle East Peace Process? These
questions illustrate political uncertainty even anxiety as to how events might
play out.
 Not surprisingly these apprehensions are particularly acute in Israel. Is Israel
at risk of being encircled by an Islamist threat? Will a post-Mubarak Egypt
recognise the peace treaty with Israel? Will this strengthen the hand of Hamas
in Gaza and the West Bank? Is the revolutionary change currently sweeping
the Middle East a precursor to a wider Arab-Israeli conflict?
 The peace treaties that Israel signed with Jordan and Egypt were the result of
decisions of individual rulers. What might happen if Egypt’s foreign policy
was determined as much by popular sentiment as by realpolitik? Egyptian
foreign policy might well change to Israel, but it does not follow that Egypt
will rescind on the peace treaty or mobilise for war with Israel.
 Amidst this heightened state of anxiety opinion is divided on how best to
proceed with peace between Israel and Palestine. Israel’s President Shimon
Peres said last month: “Now is precisely the time to resume the talks between
us and the Palestinians… This storm is also an opportunity for peace.”
 A few days later Israel’s Prime Minster Benjamin Netanyahu told the Knesset:
“There may be a debate regarding the existence of a peace partner today, but
there is uncertainty regarding the existence of a partner tomorrow. We do not
know what will happen to our west, and we do not know what will happen to
our east and who can determine whether the Palestinian state – in the middle
of it all – will hold on?”
 Prime Minister Netanyahu has often claimed in the past, however, that true
Arab-Israeli peace will only come once the Arab world democratizes. With the
era of Arab autocracy now coming to end and a new era of Arab democracy
just beginning Israel has a window of opportunity to make peace with the
people of the Middle East, not just with their autocratic rulers.
 The British Foreign Secretary said following his meeting on 8 March
2011with Mahmud Abbas, the Palestinian President, that the “Peace Process
must not become a casualty of uncertainty in the region”, and that “it calls for
extraordinary efforts by the international community, for radical thinking
about the region and for bold leadership from governments within it.”
 The UK Government position is informed by two considerations. First, that
“the risk of conflict is significantly heightened in the absence of a meaningful
peace process.” Second, “a two state solution is the only lasting hope for
sustainable peace and security in the region, but it is possible to foresee that it
will have an eventual expiry date if it is not seized now.”
 The second of these two points echoes the thoughts of former Prime Minister
Ehud Olmert who has argued that “if the day comes when the two state
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solution collapses, and we face a South African-style struggle for equal voting
rights (also for the Palestinians in the territories), then, as soon as that happens
the state of Israel is finished.” Core to this thinking is the assumption that the
long term challenges facing Israel if it does not achieve peace are likely to be
far worse than the sort term risks posed to the Jewish state by pursuing such an
agreement.
The British Government holds that “that there is an escapable need for both
parties to commit to negotiations based on clear principles and for the United
States and the Quartet to set out the parameters for a future settlement.” Such a
statement should include “1967 borders with equivalent land swaps,
appropriate security arrangements for Israelis and Palestinians, a just, fair and
agreed solution for refugees and Jerusalem as the capital of both states”. (8
March 2011)
The UK, Germany and France committed themselves to such a statement at
the UN on 18 February 2011 following the US veto of a draft UNSC
Resolution condemning Israeli settlements in the occupied territory. Susan
Rice, the US Ambassador to the UN told Council members that the veto
“should not be misunderstood to mean we support settlement activity” She
worried that the draft “risks hardening the position of both sides”.
The UK is now working with its EU partners to seek wider international
support for this approach. The EU intends to table a settlement text at the next
meeting of Quartet in mid-April. The goal remains an agreement on final
states issues and the welcoming of Palestine as a full member of the United
Nations by September 2011.
The big question remains whether the US will allow the EU and the UN to
take the lead in trying to resolve the standoff and that in turn is likely to
depend on whether the Israelis give a green light. Reports emerging from
Israel suggest that should such a step be taken then Israel might take its own
unilateral steps – annexation major settlement blocks, apply Israeli law to the
West Bank.
The Church of England shares the broad concerns of the British government
and the anxiety that facts on the grounds are making the two state solution a
less than viable prospect. The current regional crisis provides a moment of
opportunity for the Middle East Peace. Regional uncertainty should not lead to
a defence of the status quo. Moments of crisis can prove to be opportunities
for peace.
The Government needs to give further reassurance that despite the ongoing
fluidity in the Middle East and its present preoccupation with Libya that it
remains committed to seeking broad international support for its strategy.
The Government should also give early indication of how it and its European
partners might respond should the September deadline pass. Are the UK and
its EU partners willing to recognise a Palestinian state and support the
Palestinian leadership’s application for membership of the UN even if
agreement on final status issues has not been secured?
It would be helpful to know what representation has been to the British
Government regarding Israel’s position to Palestine becoming a member of the
UN in September.
The Church of England has a myriad of complex and varied relationships with
the Middle East that have helped to shape over the years its response to the
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conflict. In the past there have been three complementary threads to the
Church's view:
- First, there has been the recognition that any solution to the
long-standing conflict must be based on international law and
human rights as enshrined in UN Resolutions and the Geneva
Convention. International law recognises both Israel's right to
exist within safe borders and the right of Palestinians to selfdetermination.
- Second, the recognition that the ongoing conflict has had a
detrimental effect on indigenous Christian communities, which
need support through acts of solidarity and prayer.
- Third, the Church has a responsibility to facilitate inter faith
dialogue as a way of encouraging greater understanding
between the three Abrahamic faiths. In the light of this
tradition, what can the Church of England do in the current
crisis?
With regard to the second of these two strands, the Church has become
increasingly concerned at the fragility of many Christian communities in the
region, including parts of the Holy Land. This fragility is illustrated by the
recent steep decline in the numbers of Christians living in Jerusalem and the
West Bank such that the sustainability of these communities is now in
question.
The Archbishop of Canterbury and the Archbishop of Westminster hope to
train a spotlight on the situation of Christians in the Holy Land by organising a
two day international conference in London in July 2011, with a view to
identifying ways in which Christians and others might contribute to ensuring
the long term viability of the Christian communities of the Holy Land. The
Conference is less an event and more the start of a long term commitment to
journeying in solidarity with the Christian Communities in the Holy Land and
their partners and institutions.
That the two Archbishops are organising this international conference at a
time when the British Governments and its EU partners are trying a new
political approach to break the deadlock merely reinforces the urgency of
moving towards a two state solution as soon as possible.
A political settlement might not address the pull factors leading many
Christian to leave the Holy Land, but it would certainly help to negate the
push factors. It might also encourage many who have left the region to
consider returning.
Dr Charles Reed
Foreign Policy Advisor
March 2011
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