Stop Talking and Listen:
Discourse Ethics and Care Ethics in International Political Theory
Fiona Robinson
Carleton University, Ottawa
Paper prepared for the
2010 Millennium Conference, ‘International Relations in Dialogue’
London School of Economics and Political Science
October, 16-17, 2010
Draft only; not for citation
Introduction
For over two decades, ‘dialogue’ has provided an important methodological
and normative basis for building critical and constructivist International Relations
theory. Critical theorists influenced by Habermas have relied heavily on his notions
of discourse ethics, which seek to arrive at consensus through inclusive, intersubjective dialogue. Constructivists in IR, furthermore, have focused more closely
on Habermas’ theory of communicative action in order to understand processes of
international negotiation, norm promotion and change in international politics.
These theoretical approaches have been criticized – often by other critical IR
theorists – for paying insufficient attention to power and hierarchy that are
inevitably present in all forms of dialogue among transnational actors.
Furthermore, it has been argued that the method of dialogue itself is not a neutral,
‘procedural’ ethics as its proponents claim, but has embedded within it substantive
notions of the good which do not translate across cultural divides. Finally, some
feminists have criticized the privileging of the ‘generalized’ over the ‘concrete’ other,
arguing that this leads to a particular understanding of the nature of morality that
relies heavily on notions of rights, justice and fairness.
This paper will also explore feminist critiques of discourse ethics. In
particular, it will argue that neither the critics, nor the responses, have adequately
addressed the key features of feminist ethics – particular those found in the feminist
ethics of care. Many of the substantive features of care ethics contrast directly with
discourse ethics, thereby offering a wholly different perspective on the nature and
purpose of dialogue in international politics. In order to illustrate this, this paper
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will focus specifically on Habermasian discourse ethics as employed in the critical IR
theory of Andrew Linklater.
Specifically, I will argue that the normative goal of achieving an ever more
inclusive and ultimately fully universal communication community is misplaced.
This goal assumes that if all formal barriers to inclusion were removed, the result
would be a ‘universal dialogic community’ (Linklater 1998: 220). This approach to
normative/critical international political theory assumes three things. First, that
modes of exclusion – of minorities, women, migrants etc. – are formal/legal in
nature and that they can be legislated away in order to achieve equality. Second, it
assumes an individualistic ontology whereby individuals are autonomous agents
who are free to participate in open dialogue once these barriers are removed.
Finally, it assumes that participants in the dialogue understand, and are able to
practice, what is required for effective communication; in particular, it assumes that
participants know how to listen. Listening in this sense means not just hearing the
words that are spoken, but being attentive to and understanding the concerns,
needs and aims of others in the dialogue.
I will argue, in contrast, that a feminist relational moral ontology -- in which
all persons are understood as existing in networks and webs of relations of
responsibility and care – leads to a very a different understanding of dialogue in
international ethics. From this perspective, the idea of ethics as consisting of setting
up procedures to be followed so that individuals are equally free to express their
moral claims is incoherent. Those ‘moral claims’ are constituted by our relations
with others; thus, there can be neither procedures for ethical deliberation or needs
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and interests prior to, or in the absence of, moral relations. It is through immersion
in the day-to-day moral activities of these relations, moreover, that one learns how
to act morally – how to listen, exercise patience, understand and be attentive to
needs, and consider and reconsider ones moral decisions in the light of the needs
and demands of others.
With the aim of moving towards an alternative critical methodology of
dialogue in international relations, the paper will critique the idea of ethics as
dialogue among ‘human beings as equals’ (Linklater 1998: 9) through an
elaboration of a number of important but often overlooked features of the ethics of
care: first, the importance in care ethics of ‘dependency’ and ‘vulnerability’ not as
conditions to be overcome, but rather as ways of being for normal human subjects,
second, the focus on the responsibilities for listening attentively to the voices of
others rather than on rights of individuals to be included in dialogue; third, the need
for patience and commitment in the recognition that responsibilities to others are
fulfilled over the long, rather than the short term and finally, the idea of care ethics
as a substantive, democratic ethic of responsibility. All of these arguments emerge
out of the central ideas of care ethics – that relations and responsibilities of care are
a basic and centrally important feature of human life; that care is a public value that
must be negotiated and deliberated at a variety of levels, from the household to the
international community; and that morality consists in the practices of attentive
caring for particular others. The paper will illustrate how taking seriously this
understanding of morality leads to a recognition of the limits of discourse ethics in
international political theory, and the possibility of a feminist approach to dialogue
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that is ultimately more inclusive and contains greater transformative potential over
the long term.
Habermasian Discourse Ethics and Critical IR Theory
The writings of Andrew Linklater provide a perfect focus for my analysis and
critique of dialogic methods and discourse ethics in particular for one overwhelming
reason: Linklater’s prolific body of work represents the most comprehensive and
thoughtful application of Habermasian discourse ethics to the realm of global
politics, and to IR theory specifically. Taken together, his work arguably provides
the most significant contribution to the development of Frankfurt School critical
theory in International Relations. His 1993 book, The Transformation of Political
Community, is particular important for its elaboration of the transformative
potential of discourse ethics. This paper will focus primarily on the discussion of
discourse ethics in this book, as well as in some of Linklater’s more recent articles,
including ‘Dialogic Ethics and the Civilizing Process’ (2005).
Linklater’s approach to international ethics is built directly upon Habermas’
discourse theory of morality which defends the rights of individuals to be consulted
about decisions that may affect them adversely (Linklater 2005: 142). Participants
in these dialogues must follow three basic procedures:
First, they should enter dialogue convinced that no-one can know who
will learn from whom. Second, they should strive to reach agreements
which rely on the force of the better argument and which try to reduce
overt and subtle forms of power. Third, they should think from the
standpoint of others and aim to agree on universalisable principles
which bind all together as moral equals (Linklater 2005: 142)
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The dialogic community represents the achievement of the third and final stage of
morality. Following Lawrence Kohlberg, Habermas and Linklater argue that moral
development proceeds in three stages, from self-interested behaviour, to
conventional morality and finally, to post-conventional morality. On this stage, the
moral agent is capable of transcending not only his or her personal interests, but
also the point of view of the particular temporal and socio-political context in which
he is immersed.
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development was the subject of intense criticism
from Carol Gilligan, whose key work, In a Different Voice, is now recognized as the
seminal work of the care ethics movement (see Gilligan 1993). The approach to
ethics developed by Gilligan and an array of feminist philosophers has provided the
grounds for critique of both the procedures and goals of discourse ethics. In
particular, Seyla Benhabib has argued for the need for participants in
communication to be recognised not simply in ‘generalized’ terms of universal
respect and egalitarian reciprocity, but also in their ‘concrete’ identity (Benhabib
1986, 1992). Specifically, Benhabib suggests that
our affective-emotional constitution, as well as our concrete history as
moral agents, ought to be considered accessible to moral communication,
reflection, and transformation. Inner nature, no less than the public
sphere of justice, has a historical dimension (Behabib 1986: 418).
By ‘affective-emotional constitution’ Benhabib means our ‘inner nature’; this inner
nature, moreover, is the basis of her ‘relational-interactive’ theory of identity. This
refers to the knowledge of all persons – in her words, all “I”s – that all other subjects
are likewise “I”s, and that the self only becomes an “I” in a community of other
5
selves who are also “I”s. Discourses about needs and motives, she argues, ‘unfold in
this space created by commonality and uniqueness, generally shared socialization,
and the contingency of individual life-histories’ (Benhabib 1986: 417).
While Benhabib raises an important point here – that persons have concrete
selves that are both individuated and socially-constuted by shared history and
community – I would suggest this point misses entirely the most significant
contributions of the ethics of care. In some ways, this is hardly surprising; Benhabib
is a ‘sympathetic critic’, insofar as she essentially accepts his account of the norms
inherent in communicative reason and the form the discursive validation of moral
and political principles should take (Hutchings 2005: 158-9).
The difficulty here, however, is that in addressing Benhabib’s claims in his
work, Linklater is seen to have responded to the criticisms of feminists – and care
ethicists in particular. For example, in The Transformation of Political Community,
he admits that it is important to ‘return to feminist arguments’ that his approach
devalues the moral skills which are central to the ethic of care and responsibility for
concrete others’ (Linklater 1998: 93). In the pages that follow, however, there is
very little discussion of what these skills might be, and the resources that it can
supply to critical IR theory. Instead, the analysis moves inexorably towards the
universality/difference debate, and how discourse ethics can be ‘sensitive to
difference’. Specifically, Linklater suggests that the ethics of care can be
incorporated within Habermasian discourse ethics by adding the proviso that
sensitivity to difference and social context is ‘essential whenever agents become
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involved in any dialogue about whether there are any universal principles which
ought to regulate their social interaction’ (Linklater 1998: 95).
Similarly, in ‘Dialogic Ethics and the Civilizing Process’, Linklater argues that
‘hermeneutic engagement with the specific circumstances of concrete others’ is a
crucial aspect of discourse ethics (Linklater 2005: 152). He quotes Habermas in
defending the importance of the ‘concrete’ in discourse ethics:
Moral principles must enable social actors to respond to problems which
arise in and between ‘concrete societies that are situated in space and
time’ including the harm that human beings do to each other (Linklater
2005: 152).
I would argue, however, neither Benhabib’s initial criticisms nor Linklater’s
responses actually address the core ideas that set a feminist ethics of care apart
from Habermasian discourse ethics. Simply asserting that discourse ethics requires
responding to concrete others does not demonstrate an understanding of what is
required to respond adequately to those others. Nor does it fill in the content of
what responding to those others would actually look like. In the section that
follows, I will discuss what I see as the central ideas of the ethics of care, in an effort
to demonstrate how they lead to a fundamental rethinking of the ethics of dialogue
and communication in all contexts, including the context of global politics.
Care, Dependence and the Moral Challenge of Listening
I have argued above that simply asserting the importance of ‘concrete’ selves
and others does very little to correct the deficiencies of discourse ethics, and that
other, more central features of the ethics of care are more relevant in this context. In
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a succinct and clear statement, Virginia Held argues that the ethics of care focuses
on the ‘compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of
particular others for whom we take responsibility’ (Held 2006: 10). Joan Tronto's
now well-known formulation highlights the importance in care ethics not of moral
principles as such, but of practices as constitutive of morality. These include
attentiveness, responsibility, nurturance, compassion and meeting others' needs
(Tronto 1993: 3). Moral relations, on this view, are rarely conducted among agents
with equal levels of power and autonomy; rather, there is a recognition that moral
relations are thick with unequal levels of power, voice, influence and independence.
In this way, care ethics reminds us that individual rights and autonomy are neither
fully-achievable for all persons, nor necessarily desirable as an ideal condition for
people in societies. Care ethicists have argued convincingly that dependency and
vulnerability are a natural part of the human condition, and that societies ought to
be constructed in such a way that dependence can be accepted as ‘normal’ rather
than being seen as necessarily leading to degradation and exploitation.
Despite its central place in the construction and constitution of world
politics, the notion of ‘dependence’ has not received much attention in international
political theory. Juridically, dependence is regarded as a relic of the past –
something that ceased to exist with the demise of colonialism following the second
world war. ‘Dependency’ theory – that version of neo-Marxism which regards
‘underdevelopment’ in the periphery as the inevitable and ongoing result of
‘development’ in the core -- is regarded in International Relations as a theory of
‘development’, and thus as not only outdated but largely outside of its disciplinary
8
boundaries. Of course, post-colonial and decolonial theorists have argued
convincingly that forms of economic and cultural neo-colonialism govern the
relations between the global north and the global south in spite of the end of formal
systems of imperialism. Despite their potentially enormous contribution to our
understanding of contemporary world politics, these approaches have yet to
permeate the mainstream of both International Relations theory and international
political theory (Robinson 2010: 138).
The task of redefining the nature of, and relationship between, autonomy and
dependence has been a central theoretical task of most feminist care ethicists. As
Annette Baier has argued, relationships between those who are clearly unequal in
power, such as parents and children, and large and small states, have been ‘shunted
to the bottom of the agenda and then dealt with by some sort of “promotion” of the
weaker, so that an appearance of virtual equality is achieved’ (Baier 1996: 28). The
effect of this, Baier explains, is that the question of what our moral relationships
actually are to those who are our superiors or inferiors in power is somewhat
masked (Baier 1996:28). Simply asserting that we should remove exclusions in
order to achieve equality sidesteps the fact that exclusions cannot always be
removed. Rather, there is a need to consider carefully the moral navigation of
relationships of dependence and inequality in all spheres of life.
Without such consideration, our political theory is destined to be inadequate.
As Eva Kittay has argued, as long as we continue to occlude the existence of
dependency, our political theory excludes ‘… those who are temporarily or
permanently dependent and are so inevitably … those whose labour is devoted to
9
the care of dependents … and the moral social and political importance of
relationships of dependency rooted in the facts of human vulnerability and frailty’
(Kittay 2001: 529). While refocusing our attention in these directions is an
important antidote to rights-based liberal theory, it is also crucial that we keep in
view the agency of those who are dependent, and the ways in which various forms
of dependency are socially constructed by existing norms, institutions and
structures. Placing existing relationships in a wider and longer historical
perspective also reminds us that relations of dependence are subject to constant
change. Seen in this way, our responsibilities to help alleviate poverty, for example,
arise not out of charity or even contemporary obligations of ‘development’ or
‘cosmopolitan justice’ but out of a common history and an interdependent future
(Robinson 2010: 138-9).
Sigal Ben-Porath has argued that dependence, as distinct from helplessness,
should be structured as ‘an acceptable part of international relations’. She suggests
that a ‘political ethics of care’ – citing Joan Tronto’s recent work on humanitarian
intervention -- suggests the possibility of international dependence ‘that is not
colonial, oppressive or exploitative, but rather supportive and mutually beneficial to
the states and citizens involved’ (Ben-Porath 2008: 66-67). The implication of BenPorath’s idea is that dependence is a natural feature of long-term social and political
relations, and that the nature, degree and direction of dependencies may shift over
time. Importantly, however, she is suggesting that dependence need not be
something to be avoided, but that, if understood and practiced properly, relations of
dependence, once recognized and accepted, could be mutually beneficial. Indeed,
10
her argument suggests that the overall failure to think clearly about sovereignty and
intervention may in part arise from our current inability to imagine the
relationships between states in any way other than as either relations of mutual
autonomy/sovereignty or as unequal relations of dependence, and domination – in
other words, the negation of sovereignty (Robinson 2011, forthcoming).
The idea of dependence as acceptable has important implications for the ethics
of international dialogue. First, it leads to the recognition and acceptance of power
inequalities as regular and unavoidable feature of dialogic communities. This is not,
of course, a new feminist critique. As Kimberly Hutchings has shown, both Iris
Marion Young and Gayatri Spivak have argued that discourse ethics is insufficiently
attuned to the ways in which differences in power are ‘inextricably woven into the
language through which attempts at dialogue are conducted’ (Hutchings 2005: 164).
But while Young and Spivak make the important argument in favour of
attentiveness, creativity and even poesis within the dialogic encounter (Hutchings
2005: 164) the ethics of care suggests that dependence and vulnerability may be a
regular part of human social life. Accepting this may lead to dialogic strategies that
seek not to overcome those differences in power, but to work within and through
them.
Srilatha Batliwala’s analysis of grassroots movements as transnational actors
provides an excellent example here. Batliwala argues convincingly that, in the
transnational context of global activism, ‘grassroots’ refers not to the ‘basic building
blocks of society’ (as it usually does in the domestic context), but rather to the
‘really poor and marginalized’ (Batliwala 2002: 396). Thus, she contends that
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grassroots and nongrassroots groups should be differentiated in terms of ‘the
degree of vulnerability to global policy and economic shifts’. In other words, she
continues, ‘grassroots can be a relative rather than static term, but should always
refer to those who are most severely affected in terms of the material condition of
their daily lives’ (Batliwala 2002: 396).
Clearly, the recognition and acceptance of vulnerability and relative
powerlessness is crucial here for effective interaction with grassroots groups. The
very poor and marginalized have a different relationship to the issues under
discussion than to groups who are advocating on their behalf. Their relationship to
these issues, is not, however, a feature of some ‘deficiency’ of the part of the
individuals making up these grassroots groups. Moreover, as Batliwala goes on to
explain, this recognition need not lead to a relationship of subordination or
paternalism. Many of these groups – including the two cited in her article – take
what Batliwala calls an ‘empowered stance’ (Batliwala 2002: 405).1 As she
describes, they do not ask to be heard because they are ‘downtrodden or deserving,
or out of some moral obligation on the part of the powerful’. On the contrary:
They see themselves as populations playing vital roles in both macroand microeconomic contexts, providing critical services to their cities,
and to the local, national, and global economies. This is a subtle but
important psychological shift for both themselves and the institutions
they seek to engage—it is an empowering mind-set, demanding to be
taken seriously rather than pleading for a place at the table. It is also
dramatically different from how they are often represented by those
advocating on their behalf (Batliwala 2002: 405).
Moreover, these groups have created new forms of partnership between
Batliwala discusses two grassroots organizations in her article – WIEGO (Women in the Informal
Economy Globalizing and Organizing) and SDI (Slum/Shack Dwellers International).
1
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themselves and other private and public institutions, scholars and researchers,
and state and multilateral agencies. While the grassroots organizations are
not the ‘equals’ of these other groups in many ways, there is a recognition that
each brings to the engagement a different source of power, and that power is
recognized and acknowledged by the other (Batliwala 2002: 406).
This emphasis on the need to recognize dependence and vulnerability is
not to suggest that individual rights, and claims to autonomy, equal voice, and
participatory capacity are unimportant. On the contrary, they are very
important. But as Fiona Williams has argued, it may be that these kinds of
rights are a first step. Complete autonomy, self-determination and individual
rights and freedoms are neither ‘natural’ nor sustainable in the long-term.
While rights to secure independence and a meaningful voice in political
dialogue are strategically and discursively important for individuals and
groups, true autonomy for all can only be achieved and sustained in and
through fostering societies which value interdependence and acknowledge the
vulnerability of all (Williams 2000: 481).
This, I would argue, also holds true at the international level, and particularly
in the context of dialogue. This recognition allows us to accept that allowing more
and more people into the dialogue is only the first step. It is an important step, but
once those people are allowed in, there will still be inequality, dependence and
vulnerability – all of which neither can, nor should, be legislated away. Hence, our
tasks becomes learning how to accept dependence, and recognize it not as a
weakness or an opportunity for exploitation, but as a natural feature of social
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relations. Once this has been achieved, we can turn our attention to cultivating the
values, attitudes and skills required to engage in dialogue with weaker or dependent
others in ways that are neither demeaning nor patriarchal. An ethics of care
suggests that this kind of process requires patience, and takes time. On this view,
when we consider the ‘dialogue’ of dialogic ethics, we should not understand this
dialogue to take place on a single occasion – one meeting or discussion on a topic.
Rather, dialogue should be understood as something that happens over the very
long term – something that doesn’t have a clear beginning or end, but is instead a
long process of moral learning.
Dialogue of this nature involves learning how to listen effectively. Care ethics
reminds us that listening to others is a moral practice that is developed in and
through relations with others. Effective listening requires learning how to be truly
attentive to others, as well as nurturing the virtues of patience and trust.
Surprisingly, given the emphasis on discourse and dialogue in International
Relations, there has been relatively little emphasis on the moral and political value
of effective listening. While there is much attention paid to ‘speaking’ – having ‘a
voice’ – in politics, and some attention paid to being ‘heard’ by others, it is assumed
that those others will know how to, and be inclined to, listen to those voices. In the
context of care ethics, listening is normally understood as a moral attribute that is
developed through practice; in other words, it is through caring for those with
whom we exist in relations of interdependence and responsibility that we learn how
to listen, understand and be attentive to their needs.
Of course, dialogue in the public sphere – including the international public
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sphere – rarely takes place among persons for whom relations of responsibility and
care are already established. Yet it may be that, as questions of care move
inexorably into the public – and indeed the global realm – a different set of dialogic
skills will be required to negotiate these successfully.2 Selma Sevenhuijsen makes
this argument clearly:
As a result of the relocation of care, more than ever before daily
care is the subject of political action and negotiation. At the new locations
of care, new forms of deliberation, consultation and decision-making
have come into existence regarding what sort of care is required and how
it can be best provided (Sevenhuijsen 2003: 182).
Yet as Sevenhuijsen has argued, it may be that the relocation of care into the public
sphere ‘enables a number of the values of the ethic of care to be transferred to the
public sphere, where their suitability to guide questions about the quality of care
can be determined in public debate’ (Sevenhuijsen 2003: 182). In other words,
Sevenhuijsen is arguing that the growing importance of care and, in particular, the
changing location of care from the ‘private’ to the ‘public’ sphere goes beyond the
narrow sphere of ‘care’ itself; what is required is a relocation of care from the
margins to the ‘centre of political judgement and collective action’ (Sevenhuijsen
2003: 182).
Taking seriously the practices of care to our everyday lives demands giving
them our political attention. The nature of care makes it unlike other goods,
entitlements and responsibilities that are distributed through political negotiation.
For example, as Virginia Held argues, the values of shared enjoyment or social
2
On the transnationalization of care, and the ethical and social policy issues surrounding this, see
Rianne Mahon and Fiona Robinson, eds., Feminist Ethics and Social Politics: Towards a New Global
Political Economy of Care. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press (forthcoming in 2011).
15
responsibility, or collective caring may well be worth promoting, but these are
values that cannot even be registered in calculations of maximizing individual utility
(Held 2002: 31). Adequate political consideration of care in our lives requires
cultivating new and different dialogic skills, including listening skills. In fact, policy
on care connects in fundamental ways with values and norms and the organization
of society itself (Daly 2002: 268). To this end, it may require a rethinking of the
nature and substance of democracy.
Rethinking the Universal Dialogic Community
In Linklater’s words, the ‘aim of discourse ethics is to remove the modes of
exclusion which obstruct the goal – which may never be realized – of global
arrangements which rest upon the consent of each and every member of the human
race’ (Linklater 1998: 93). Clearly, this is a democratic ethic, in the sense that it is
underwritten by the values of consent, participation and inclusion. Second, it is
universalistic ethic, insofar as it seeks the inclusion and consent of ‘each and every
member of the human race’. Third, it is a utopian or ideal ethic, given that there is a
clear recognition that the goal may never be realized. Finally, it is a negative ethic,
insofar as its goal is to remove barriers and ‘modes of exclusion’, rather than to
create, foster or enhance anything.
There can be little doubt today that any global ethic in the contemporary era
must be committed to democratic principles and practices. To support democracy
in this way is not to endorse or demand universal adherence to the particular brand
of liberal democracy prevalent in the West today; rather, it is simply to recognize
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the widespread agreement that global arrangements must be underwritten by the
ideas and practices of consent, participation, and inclusion. Furthermore, I would
argue that the utopianism of discourse ethics is not necessarily a failing. Utopianism
has an important role to play in both international ethics and critical theory.
Contrary to those who would condemn all critical theory as ‘fantasy theory’, I would
argue that imagining a different – and defensibly better – world is an indispensible
task of social and political thought.3 It is important, however, to ensure that those
imaginings rest on a coherent evaluation of the nature and source of moral action.
For example, when Linklater argues that participants in dialogue should ‘think from
the standpoint of others’, critics are understandably skeptical about how this will
come about. As an embodied ethics of practice, care ethics argues that moral
responses emerge out of the practices of caring for others, rather than being
spontaneously generated by moral maxims.
Furthermore, when its democratic and utopian aspects of discourse ethics
are defined through universalism and negativism, the result is an empty
understanding of democracy, and a misguided utopianism. To define assume that
‘consent’ will be achieved by the removal of obstacles to inclusion ignores the more
substantive values that need to be cultivated in order to ensure that dialogue, and
democracy, are meaningful. Care ethicists such as Joan Tronto have argued that
care ethics can serve as a guide to the substantive basis of a fully-democratic society.
As Tronto explains,
Caring democracy thus requires … the capacity for a meaningful
democratic discussion of the nature of responsibility in society. But often
3
See Randall Schweller, ‘Fantasy Theory’, Review of International Studies, 25(1), 1999: 147-150.
17
in contemporary discussions of democratic theory, such ends as equal
power are simply posited, without the theorist providing an account of
how society can arrive at a place of greater equality. Political theorists
usually seek procedural rather than substantive ways to address such
challenges (Tronto, forthcoming in 2011).
On this view, simply removing barriers to exclusion is not likely to achieve a fullyinclusionary, participatory and democratic dialogic community. As Tronto points
out, ‘exclusion is not the only way to rig the outcome of a circle of responsibility.
Another way is to absent oneself or one’s group from the “people” whose roles are
under discussion in the responsibility-setting game’ (Tronto, forthcoming in 2011).
This point is of obvious relevance to the question of responsibility for care work, as
Tronto explains:
Thus, when it comes to dividing up the responsibilities for managing a
household, the traditional bread-winner model allows the head of the
household (usually the husband in this traditional model) a “pass” from most
daily domestic duties because he has already brought home the money that
organizes the household. But it is important to see this mechanism both from
a moral perspective (as a way to shirking responsibility by claiming that one’s
own responsibilities lies in some other circle of responsibility) and from a
political perspective, (as a kind of power by which one is able to force others
to accept responsibilities - perhaps even too many responsibilities - without
having actually to make the case for one’s own exclusion from the discussion)
(Tronto, forthcoming in 2011).
On this view, dialogue remains ‘exclusionary’ despite the full inclusion of all
individuals and groups. If we see dialogue at all levels – from the household to the
international community – as primarily an exercise in ‘responsibility-setting’, we
can quickly see how the outcomes of these dialogues can be affected in a number of
different ways. Even in cases of ‘full inclusion’ in dialogue, questions regarding the
issues under discussion, the responsibilities to be distributed, and the question of
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eligibility for those responsibilities are often de facto sources of exclusion because
they have already been ‘decided’ by the background norms and assumptions which
precede the dialogue. While the privatization and feminization of care is not the
only example of this, the relative lack of dialogue about care provision and care
work in public spheres demonstrates the tenacity of these ‘informal’ sources of
exclusion. This suggest that it is necessary to address, challenge and possibly
transform the norms and discourses that constitute, for example, dominant or
hegemonic forms of masculinity and femininity, before effective dialogue can take
place. Ironically, dialogue may be required to achieve this; but, in all cases, that
dialogue must be supplemented by prior or concurrent attention to the structuring
and composition of institutions, and the ways in which gender essentialisms and the
public/private dichotomy are constitutive elements of the liberal social and political
order.
Conclusion
Habermasian discourse ethics has provided the foundation for an influential
strand of critical theory in International Relations. In particular, Andrew Linklater’s
impressive body of work offers a careful and detailed account of international ethics
based on inclusive dialogue as both a critical methodology and an ideal goal.
Linklater’s ‘universal dialogic community’ is a normative ideal which would ensure
that ‘global arrangements have the consent of a greater proportion of the human
race’ (Linklater 1999: 8). While it is recognized that this ideal may never be
achieved, Linklater argues that it is possible, in that such a universal community is
19
immanent in the idea of citizenship. As he explains, the obligation to enlarge the
moral boundaries of the political community in order to engage excluded aliens in
dialogue is required by the commitment to the ideals of citizenship (Linklater 1999:
7).
In this paper I have argued that the alternative approach to morality found in
the feminist ethics of care raises critical questions regarding discourse ethics, and
has important implications for our understanding of the nature of dialogue in
international relations. Certainly, feminist philosophers such as Seyla Benhabib
have critiqued Habermasian ethics – especially regarding the neglect of the
‘concrete’ other in the procedural approach of discourse ethics. While Linklater has
responded to these concerns in various works, citing the feminist argument for a
moral voice of ‘care and connectedness’, his discussion focuses on the need for
‘hermeneutic skills’ and ‘interpersonal sensibilities’ in order to address the ‘vagaries
of individual need and social context’ (Linklater 1999: 94). I have suggested that
this interchange sidesteps what are in fact more crucial issues regarding the
different voice of care and its implications for dialogue in world politics.
An ethics of care argues that the activities of caring for particular others for
whom we take responsibility are of both moral and political significance. Taking
this seriously demands not only bringing issues regarding care into the private
sphere; it also demands a rethinking of the dialogical skills required to consider care
effectively. Care ethics emphasizes the existence of dependency and vulnerability
as normal ways of ‘being human’. Learning how to listen effectively to others,
especially those who may be more vulnerable to the outcomes of dialogue than you
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are, requires the cultivation of moral attitudes of patience, attentiveness and trust.
It also requires a recognition that the feminization and privatization of caring
activities and care work has served as an informal barrier to women’s participation
in dialogue, and that it continues to do so. This allows us to recognize the ways in
which dominant norms and discourses can serve to exclude women and other
groups from dialogue even when ‘formal’ inclusion has been granted. Likewise, if
men can ‘absent’ themselves from discussion of the distribution of care work
responsibilities, as well as removing themselves from consideration of eligibility for
those responsibilities, meaningful dialogue will not occur.
In the democratic spirit of both Habermas and Linklater, I have argued that
the ethics of care can provide the substantive basis for a new vision of democracy, in
which meaningful dialogue on the nature and distribution of responsibilities for
care is of paramount importance. Care in this sense is no longer a single ‘issue’ to
be debated; rather, consideration of responsibilities for care becomes the
overarching lens through which all other questions in the public sphere are debated.
While care ethicists such as Joan Tronto and Selma Sevenhuijsen have discussed this
possibility in the context of domestic societies, I would argue that this can also serve
as a basis for understanding responsibility, dialogue and democracy in the global
context.
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