Institute of Philosophy, Warsaw University, Poland
Simple syntax and substantial pragmatics
comments on slides
The talk is a part of a program of defending categorial grammar (CG) in its simplest form,
established by Ajdukiewicz and refined by Geach [against (1) different types of grammar &
(2) sophisticated and complicated modern versions of CG]. In Szklarska I would present the
summary of what is available within this version of CG and argue that we can have quite
simple categorial account of syntax for quite complicated quantifier phrases (like: A man who
always agrees with whoever he is talking to never tells only the truth – an example from M.
Schenner’s last year talk in Szklarska + some other examples) – provided we are ready to
admit quite extensive pragmatic, informal reasoning.
PART ONE: General introduction
Semiotics: theory of language
• Ch. Morris: syntax, semantics, pragmatics
– different sets of semiotic functions of an
• N. Chomsky: syntax  semantics
• Now: „semiotic holism” – syntax,
semantics and pragmatics are aspects of
overall semiotic value of an expression;
they work always together
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
3. Traditionally, after Charles Morris (1930’s), semiotics was divided into three main areas in
which different relations and functions concerning expressions: syntax, semantics and
pragmatics. Accordingly there are three theories of language to develop: syntactic theory,
semantic theory and – if that’d be possible at all – pragmatic theory.
Noam Chomsky in (1950’s – 1960’s) introduced an order to the areas: he claimed syntactic
theory the fundamental one, giving input for semantic theory; pragmatics – as (temporarily
perhaps) unsusceptible for strict, formal treatment – would be set out of concern.
Nowadays – at least since 1980’s (due to emergence of formal pragmatics in the 1970’s) we
can witness the growing awareness of what I’d call ‘semiotic holism’: the view that the
‘meaning’ – or better to say ‘overall semiotic value’1 – of an expression is a product of factors
belonging to all the three areas simultaneously. It remains true that syntax enables semantic
interpretation of an expression and that this interpretation is an input for pragmatic theory,
saying what communicative purpose that expression could possibly serve, uttered in such and
such conditions. However, this is only half of the story, because we are aware now of the
relations the other way round: context can decide what is the meaning of an expression, and
this meaning often happens to be a necessary input for establishing syntactic structure of the
Drawbacks of semiotic holism:
temptation for a ‘total theory’
• Multitude of competing theories
• Difficulties in comparing theories, which
are often (practically) incommensurable
• Every theory sooner or later proves
empirically inadequate
• Regress in general understanding of
language: there is no view from outside
the battlefield
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
4. Semiotic holism – together with Chomskyan idea that theory of syntax should be testable
against empirical evidence – gives rise to a strong temptation to formulate a ‘total’ theory that
would explain all semiotical aspects of given expressions together, as they together really
work. Such a theory, if one could develop such a theory reasonably fine, would give us a
thorough and sound understanding of language. Alas, this seems a goal far too hard to achieve
now and in predictable future. The result is then quite the reverse: the multitude of competing
theories – each of them is intended as ‘total’ and is capable of explaining this or that
phenomenon but proves inadequate very soon outside the initial scope – theories that are
hardly comparable (even if they are not incommensurable in principle, they often are in fact,
as the task of comparing them becomes itself a difficult academic enterprise). In this state of
affairs we loose even the general understanding of what language is and how it – roughly –
works. Every ‘theory’ gives us its own perspective on the whole matter, but it gives us no
reason why to believe rather in it than in its competitor. Even if we have grounds for assessing
relative success of a theory in explaining this or that phenomenon, it does not shift for
justification of general claims.
Illocutions and perlocutions (as well as other communicative goals) are included in the ‘meaning’ which ceases
to be a purely semantic notion.
Linguistics and Philosophy 25
‘There is no doubt that the 25 years since the launching of
Linguistics and Philosophy have witnessed an explosion
in our understanding of linguistics semantics. There is,
however, one area in which we have arguably made little
progress – indeed I wish to suggest here that we have
perhaps gone backwards. And this concerns the
fundamental question of overall organization and
architecture of the grammar – in particular, how the
systems of syntax and semantics work (or don’t work)
Pauline Jacobson, The (Dis)organisation of the Grammar:
25 Years
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
Handbook of Logic and Language,
‘In the 80s, ‘‘frameworks’’ started appearing trying to change and
monopolize part of the research agenda, and authors felt the need
to present their ideas more forcefully as ‘theories’ with appealing
names, forming schools and proselytizing. Part of this may be
symptomatic for a young emerging area trying to establish itself, a
phenomenon well–documented in fields like linguistics and
computer science. This trend toward separatism and rivaling
research agendas, though it may have had positive effects in
stimulating foundational discussions, has hampered communication,
and generated much fortuitous competition’
Johan van Benthem, Alice ter Meulen, Editors’ preface
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
5–6. Its not only my opinion. These are two generalizing comments of prominent
philosophers of language, which support the picture I have presented.
Back to Morris
• I recognize the holism as a matter of fact: semiotic value
of an expression just is multiaspectual and usually one
cannot (easily) disjoin the aspects ‘in the flesh of
• I reject the holism in theory of language: one can and
should disjoin the aspects conceptually. Let us have
simple and powerful theory of syntax and idealised
semantics, motivated by general logical and
philosophical intuitions; and let us appoint pragmatics to
be the battlefield: the area for competing theories,
providing the empirical interface (on the one hand it
makes syntax and semantics more of philosophical
interest and pragmatics, on the other hand, the most
interesting field for empirical linguistics)
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
7. Whether one is allowed to do so, is a complicated methodological question. I cannot
discuss it here. Roughly, I would refer to something like ‘the hard core’ of a theory and to the
notion of conceptual frame. It is a matter of fact that contemporary methodology of empirical
sciences allows in general that parts of theories are not directly testable (they are assessed on
the grounds of fertility or plausibility etc. – cf. my book Tałasiewicz 2000).
Back to Ajdukiewicz
• We have good and extremely simple syntactic
framework, grounded in philosophical reflections
of Husserl and logical considerations of
Leśniewski. It is categorial grammar of
• The task is to clean up the philosophical issues
about categorial grammar (with the definition of
syntactic/semantic category in the first place and
including of necessary semantic component)
and delimit the field left for pragmatics
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
8. The ideas behind Ajdukiewicz’s grammar had been providing quite a constant picture of
syntax for around 70 years, form the early writings of Husserl up to the 1970’s, when they
became ‘corrupted’ in order to get in touch with the requirement of empirical testing (which
was presumably triggered by the competition with generative grammar). The other reason for
‘corruption’ however – by ‘corruption’ I mean theoretical amendments, like the idea of
category shifting, which makes CG a little bit more flexible to match the real speech, but
much more complicated and obscure – so the other reason for these amendments was that CG
really needed some philosophical refinement and correction – but rather towards further
simplifying, not complicating. The main points needing correction are the definition of
syntactic/semantic (depends on terminology) category and the capability to answer a semantic
question of how can we get syntactic information from primitive ostensive procedure. These
philosophical analyses are the main topic of my book presently being prepared (Tałasiewicz
2006). Below I will give some of the results.
PART TWO: The Core of Categorial Grammar
Functoriality Principle
One… to rule them all,
One… to find them
One… to bring them all
and in the darkness bind them
J.R.R.Tolkien, The Lord of the Rings
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
Functoriality Principle - rephrased
• In every syntactically well-formed expression
there is exactly one part (a functor) which takes
all other parts as its arguments and – binding
them (in the darkness?) - yields the whole
– The parts of an expression are not on a par among
themselves; there is always one superior to others,
one ‘to rule them’ (contrary e.g. to generative
– A functor binds its arguments iff the functor and the
arguments belong to proper syntactic/semantic
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
10–11. It is Functoriality Principle (FP) what distinguishes categorial grammars (CG), not the
notion of category itself. Categories one can find anywhere, as well in generative grammars
(GG). There is terminological mess about whether the categories in categorial grammar are
‘syntactic’ or ‘semantic’ ones. No wonder – there are three levels of FP: syntactic (in given
sentence there is exactly one syntactic operator); semantic (in the position of operator can stay
only an expression that belongs to the category of functor); and ontological: functors denote
functions that take arguments from the designata of the arguments of the functor and give
values in the set of designata of the compound expression yielded by the functor. There are
good reasons to call the categories in CG ‘semantic’.
Definition of semantic category postulates
• Interchangeability
• Primitive categories: ‘sentence’ (s) and ‘name’
• Atomic principle: given the categories of functor
and its arguments we have the category of the
compound; given the category of the compound
and the categories of the arguments of the
functor in this compound, we have the category
of the functor.
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
12. Original definition of semantic category goes as follows (Ajdukiewicz 1935/1967: 223):
‘The word or expression A, taken in sense x, and the word or expression B, taken in sense y,
belong to the same semantic category if and only if there is a sentence SA, in which A occurs
with meaning x, and which has the property that if SA is transformed into SB upon replacing A
by B (with meaning y), while retaining exactly the same meaning of the other words in
sentence SA and the same syntax of this sentence, the resultant SB will also be a sentence’
[slightly revised translation –MT].
This definition has been rightly criticized on the grounds that its definiens features terms with
unclear meaning and that any attempts to define these terms without contradicting our
intuitions require references to the concept of… semantic category. The definition of semantic
category is thus in danger of falling victim to the vicious circle. One line of amendments
required for CG (mentioned before) is to replace this definition with a protodefinition by
postulates, as a preliminary and intuitive guideline to the denotative definition by recursion.
My proposition is following:
Let us have Interchangeability Principle not as a connotative definition but as a postulate;
there being no thread of vicious circle then. It says that two expressions mutually
interchangeable ceteris paribus in a sentence salva syntactic well–formedness belong to the
same semantic category and vice versa. IP is taken as a defining principle and cannot be
confronted with any empirical evidence. It is pretty obvious that it results in discriminating
the notion of syntactic well–formedness from the notion of acceptability by native speakers. I
must and I do admit that there are syntactically (according to syntactic theory) well–formed
expressions that are ungrammatical according to traditional grammar or inacceptable for the
competent user of a given language.
The division into primitive (or basic) and derived (or functor) categories refers to Husserl’s
notion of propositional and nominal kind of intentionality. Only sentences and names can
have a meaning on their own. I reject the idea of having one or three or whatever number of
primitive categories. There are two of them. Fullstop.
Atomic Principle (AP) is popular in the first half of its formulation; I insist on the second half
(sometimes called ‘reverse’ AP). In language acquisition – on early stages there is sole
ostensive procedure involved – we are given only primitive categories of some simple and
some compound expressions. These compounds are defined ostensively as wholes: we know
their meaning and category without knowing their structure, which is to be discovered (by the
‘reverse’ AP).
Rules of syntactic analysis:
summary of the CG philosophy
1. The rule of primitive categories: the arguments
of the functor in an expression belonging to
primitive category belong as well to primitive
categories (not necessarily the same)
2. The rule of superfunctors: the arguments of a
superfunctor belong to the same category as
the functor yielded by the superfunctor or to a
primitive category
3. General guideline: at first try to get as big parts
as possible according to points 1 & 2
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
13. The rules summarize what is doable in analysis on the above grounds (and what is indeed
being done). In an expression of a basic category we are given initially the components
belonging to basic categories: we can recognize names and sentences (on ostensive grounds).
All the rest – is the functor (possibly compound itself). In a compound functor there must be a
so called superfunctor which yields the given functor out of… well, what it could possibly be?
Names and sentences, of course (as in n/n//n/n///s), but not only. Given the principle of
interchangeability we can ask if there is a part of the compound functor under analysis, which
(the part) can play the same role as the whole functor (can be interchanged with it salva
whatever there is to be sa(l)ved). If there is such a part – this part has the same category as the
whole functor (say: f); the rest is the superfunctor of the category f/f.
Simple example
| n |
| s/nn//s/nn |
|s/nn |
Mary (s)
| n |
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
14. In ‘John passionately loves Mary’, which is a sentence, we can recognize names: ‘John’
and ‘Mary’. The rest is the functor – compound, in this case: ‘passionately loves’. This
functor makes a sentence out of two names, so it belongs to the predicate category s/nn. In
this functor we cannot find any names or sentences. So we look for a part of it which would
be interchageable with the whole functor. We find ‘loves’ (wherever one can put
‘passionately loves’ one can put mere ‘loves’ as well). It belongs to the category s/nn, of
course. So the superfunctor is ‘passionately’ which makes s/nn out of s/nn – therefore it itself
belongs to the category s/nn//s/nn.
Simple example 2
John loved Mary but Mary didn’t love John
| n || s/nn|| n |
| n ||
s/nn || n |
|s/nn//s/nn|| s/nn |
John loved Mary but Mary didn’t love John
| n || ? || n || ? || n ||
|| n |
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
15. It shows that we really need to look for as big parts as possible. Sometimes we can
recognize small parts belonging to basic categories but it would leave so many incoherent
parts aside that it would become impossible to make a single functor out of these remainders.
Selected particular guidelines for semantic
interpretation of syntactic analysis
• General names are variables with the scope of variability
(x: xP); individual names are constants; generic names
could be both
• Adverbials are superfunctors over predicates; if required
they are compound and contain a nominal (usu:
temporal) variable that can be quantified over – that
amounts to what is sometimes called ‘quantification over
• Quantifiers have always the category s/s; they stand at
the beginning of the sentence and are ordered –
normally – according to the order of variables being
quantified. Often quantifiers are tacit; the user has to
quess which quantifier is applicable – on pragmatic
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
16. This point requires substantial comment – there is around 20 pages in my book on this.
The point is – roughly – that we do not need any substantial paraphrases: names are names
(not predicates nor quantifiers), the order of quantifiers (which are often implicit) is normally2
given by the order of variable names quantified over etc. What is worth stressing, I am not
very fond of quantifying over situations (although I do believe, of course, that sentences
denote situations). What is quantified over in such cases is an adverbial parameter, usually
temporal (‘always’). This parameter I would represent as a variable index at predicate.
PART THREE: A hard example
A man who always agrees with whoever he
is talking to never tells only the truth
• We have four explicit quantifiers here and – as
we will see – three more implicit. One of the
latter is an implicit general quantifier for the
name ‘a man who always agrees with… talking
• So we have:
[Every]a[never]b[only]c{[A man who…talking to]a[tell]b[truth]c}
| s/s |
| s/s |
| s/s |
|s/nn| n |
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
It means that a change in this order is possible, but requires special justification.
A man who always agrees with whoever he is talking to (n)
|……...|n/s|…………………… s ………………………….|
here we have a sentence with another implicit quantifier,
this time existential, binding the name ‘A man’:
[there is]d[always]e[whoever]f{[A man]d[agrees with]e[one (that) he is talking to]f}
| s/s |
| s/s |
| s/s
| n
| s/nn
|……| n/s |………s……….|
There we have another sentence with another implicit existential quantifier
binding the name ‘(some)one’:
[there is]g{[he][is talking to][someone]g}
| s/s |
| n |
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
19–20. The example is taken from last year’s presentation on the Workshop by Matthias
Schenner (Syntactic partioning revisited), where it is ascribed to Barbara Partee (no analysis
of it is given in Schenner’s paper, except that it is suggested there are three quantifiers in it,
whereas I would count seven).
Indexes at quantifiers are just a technical device to help to remember where the quantifiers are
applicable. Implicit quantifiers are in italics. Some quantifiers are not to be analyzed away in
the first order. It is so because there are names made out of sentences (by nominalizing
functors like ‘who’, ‘that’ etc.). Quantifiers from these sentences do not appear in the sentence
in which the name is a part.
(s) x IS TALKING TO (heconst, x)
he is talking to someone
(n) x: IS TALKING TO (he, x) - nominalizing functor ‘that’
Such a (person) to whom he is talking
(s) ytx AGREES WITHt [y: yman, x: IS TALKING TO (y, x)]
There is such a man that he always agrees with anybody he is talking to
(n) y:tx AGREES WITHt [y: yman, x: IS TALKING TO (y, x)]
- nominalizing functor ‘who’
Such a man that he always agrees with whoever he is talking to; or
A man who always agrees with whoever he is talking to
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
y ~t’ z ~ TELLt’ [y: tx AGREES WITHt (…), z: ztruth]
note: ‘only S is P’ means ‘every not-S is not P’
y t’ z TELLt’ [y: tx AGREES WITHt (…), z: ztruth]
every man who agrees with whoever he is talking to always
tells something untrue
… never tells only truth
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
21–22. Once we’ve got the syntactic atoms and the structure, we can build up the semantic
interpretation of the whole, starting from bottom – up. So, at the beginning we have a simple
situation that certain person (referred to by the pronoun ‘he’)3 is talking to someone. Then, by
the nominalizing functor ‘that’ we get the general name of such persons to whom this ‘he’ is
talking to. And we store this aside, for a while. In the meantime we consider also quite simple
situation in which a man agrees with someone. Then we substitute for the indefinite
‘someone’ the name we have built a moment ago and stored; we get situation in which a man
agrees with someone he is talking to. (And if we are smart enough we notice here, that we got
the reference for ‘he’ – it is indeed a variable, but it is quantified over somewhere else). Now
we notice a general quantifier for the interlocutors, so we understand, that our ‘a man’ agrees
with everyone (=whoever) he is talking to. And we begin to wonder, what it means, that he
(‘a man’) always agrees with whoever he is talking to. For a moment we entertain the idea
that there is a man who at every moment of time is talking to somebody and always agrees
with whoever he is talking to, but soon we get serious and assume that ‘always’ in this context
means ‘any time he talks to somebody’ (purely pragmatic reasoning). Then, by the
nominalizing functor ‘who’ we get a general name of such persons who always agree with
whoever they are talking to – and store it for a moment. In the meantime we consider third
relatively simple situation in which somebody is never telling only truth. We notice that it
means that he always tells something untrue (when ‘always’ means of course ‘at every
moment in which he tells something at all’). To this simple situation we apply the name we
have just built and stored and we get finally the interpretation saying that every man who
always agrees with whoever he is talking to never tells only the truth.
In the bottom we do not know exactly who it is; it is ‘a’ person for us, but it shall not be represented by a
variable: the pronoun informs us that when we proceed in semantic interpretation, we will find identifying
information somewhere further.
• We have analysed a very complicated sentence
with seven quantifiers involved with very simple
means of basic Categorial Grammar
• Doing so, we have been saying things quite
obvious, but nevertheless hard to be formulated
formally. This is the task for pragmatics: make a
theory for these obvious but evasive things (they
are evasive because they depend on our overall
knowledge of the world, which is vast and
partially tacit – this undermines every account of
• Let be syntax simple as it is
dr Mieszko Tałasiewicz, Institute
of Philosophy, Warsaw University
23. Not only pragmatic theory is needed to formalize the story told above about building
semantic representation. There is as well a room for linguistic analysis of traditional grammar.
Grammar plays different roles; one of them is to give information for logical syntax (e.g. what
is the order of arguments of the functor etc.), but there are other roles; for instance to embody
the lexicalized knowledge of the world (e.g. which objects are countable, or living etc.) It is a
task for linguistics to establish in general terms what information gives traditional grammar of
a given language about the logical structure of the expressions of this language (it could be
different in different languages). We have seen that in particular cases it should be simple and
easy to know what is what in an expression – thanks to general knowledge of the language
one is a competent speaker of, and to general knowledge about the world one is a competent
inhabitant of. But a general theoretic approach would be welcome (an example of such a
work: a classification of predicates according to tense and aspect in Polish by Labenz (2004).
Here are some more analyses:
A. Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam
(von Fintel 1995 after I.Heim) – source of example, not analysis, of course.
Only one class was so bad that no student passed the exam
| s/s
| n |s/nn|
|….| n |….…………..n/n………………….|
| n
| s/nn |
~x PASSED (x: xstudent, the exam)
[‘the exam’ is an individual name]
: ~x PASSED (x: xstudent, the exam) [‘colon phrase’ belonging to category n/n; a colon
in standard notation represents functor ‘such (or so) … that’]
[general name in third order of analysis – not quantified]
bad: ~x PASSED (x: xstudent, the exam)
[compound name of something bad so that
no student passed the exam; second name in second order]
y: yclass
[first name in second order]
1y WAS [y: yclass, bad: ~x PASSED (x: xstudent, the exam)]
Only one class was bad so that no student passed the exam.
What is interesting in this analysis is that it does not say the students must belong to the class
in question. We can restrict the scope of the variable x to students of this class if the context
suggests so – on the pragmatic grounds. However, context not always suggests such
restriction. Consider a case in which we decide about a certain whole (e.g. a transport of
fruits) on the basis of testing a sample. We can perfectly well say that given box of apples was
so bad that no apple would be allowed for sale – meaning no apple from the whole transport
at all: the whole transport would be rejected. The restrictions on scope are not in the syntax
B. Every linguist knows two languages. (Chomsky (?), somewhere).
It’s been told that this sentence is ambiguous according to the two possible orders of implicit
a) x 2y KNOWS (x: x linguist, y: ylanguage)
b) 2y x KNOWS (x: x linguist, y: ylanguage)
It would be a sort of counterexample to my claim that the order of names gives the order of
I would say in defence of myself that standard meaning is only (a). Meaning (b) is a
misinterpretation of conceivable interpretation (b’):
(b’) x KNOWS (x: x linguist, twolanguages)
where twolanguages is an individual name for, say, English and French together. (Exactly as
‘three musketeers’ is the name for Atos, Portos and Aramis)
C. When Kim visits her parents, she often takes the train. (von Fintel 1995)
The word ‘when’ is a functor correlating two situations denoted by two sentences; thus it is a
connective belonging to category s/ss, which semantics is close to implication. The only
temporal quantifier is the word ‘often’. We can tell this seeing that the order of ‘when’ and
‘often’ can be easily changed without change in meaning (‘Kim often takes the train when she
visits her parents’). What shall be preserved is the order of ‘when’ and ‘Kim visits her
parents’ – because the change of this order would reverse the order of arguments of
implication: ‘When Kim takes the train, she often visits her parents’ means something
completely different. So:
Often when Kim visits her parents, she takes the train.
| s/s |
| s/ss |
| n | s/nn |
|| n | s/nn | n
|n/n| n
OFTENt [VISITSt (Kim, her parents) ––> TAKESt (Kim, the train)]
All the difficulty is hidden in discussion about how to interpret the quantifier ‘often’. In this
context it is reasonably to suggest that it should be understood in a following way: the whole
compound sentence is true iff the sentence ‘Kim takes the train’ is true in many (most) times
at which the sentence ‘Kim visits her parents’ is true. (One can call it quantification over
situations, but the situations are represented here by their temporal index).
Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz (1935/1967). Syntactic Connexion. In Polish Logic 1920-1939,
Storrs McCall (ed.), 207-231. Oxford 1967: Oxford University Press. [First published in
Studia Philosophica 1 (1935) in German: Die Syntaktische Konnexität.]
- (1960/1978). Syntactical Connections between Constituents of Declarative Sentences
(1960). In The Scientific World-Perspective and Other Essays, 1931-1963. Edited and with an
Introduction by Jerzy Giedymin, p. 269-281. Synthese Library Vol. 108. Dordrecht/Boston
1978: D. Reidel. [First published in Studia Filozoficzne 6(21)/1960, p. 73–88.]
Husserl, Edmund (1901/????), Logical Investigations, [Logische Untersuchungen, 1901]
von Fintel, Kai (1995/1997), „A minimal theory of adverbial quantification”, [in:] B. Partee,
H. Kamp (eds.), Context dependence in the analysis of linguistic meaning: Proceedings of the
workshops in Prague, February 1995, Bad Teinach, May 1995, IMS Stuttgart Working
Labenz, Piotr (2004), Event–calculus semantics of Polish aspect, master’s thesis, University
of Amsterdam, http://www.illc.uva.nl/Publications/reportlist.php?Series=MoL].
Schenner, Mathias (2005), “Syntactic partioning revisited”, paper on “VI Szklarska Poreba
Tałasiewicz, Mieszko (2000), Pojęcie racjonalności nauk empirycznych [The Concept of
Rationality of Empirical Sciences], Wydawnictwo WFiS UW, Warszawa
– (2006) [in preparation], Filozofia składni [Philosophy of Syntax]