Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
A. E. Ruud, U. of Oslo
Towards an understanding of Bangladeshi political culture
This paper investigates an aspect of Bangladeshi political culture, that of the rivalry between
the two dominant political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
The rivalry is often intense and violent, and has in most views severe negative consequences
on the country’s economy and progress. The rivalry is not easily explained. In terms of socioeconomic composition of their respective groups of supporters, the two parties are close to
similar. This paper argues that theories based on presumptions about materially based patronclient relationships are insufficient explanations and that the political culture instead should be
seen as emotionally charged – that what constitutes and maintains the two separate followings
is emotional attachment and rhetoric. In the absence of any defined socio-economic difference
between the two, emotional attachment has become a constitutive element in the country’s
political culture and is expressed through shows of devotion, respect, loyalty or anger.
Bangladesh has been given a number of negative characteristics over the last few years.
‘Politics of intransigence’,1 ‘Democracy on the ground’,2 ‘Desperately seeking a responsible
opposition’,3 ‘Imperiled democracy’,4 ‘Destructive politics’,5 ‘Spiralling lawnessness’,6 and
‘Confrontational political culture’.7 Democratic consolidation in Bangladesh, writes….??,
‘has gone off-track’ and ‘the political system continues to be illiberal or at best quasi-liberal’.8
These negative characteristics refer to consequences of the rivalry between the country’s two
dominant parties, the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
These two parties have alternated in power since the return of democracy in 1991, a period
which has seen drawn out opposition boycotts of parliament, a high incidence of opposition
initiated general strikes, and increasing suppression of the opposition by the government. One
observer feels that ‘the politics of confrontation’, as it has been called, has ‘grown into a
1
Hossain 1996, 196.
Shehabuddin, 1999, 148.
3
Shehabuddin 2000, 181.
4
Jahan 2003, 222.
5
Jahan 2004, 56.
6
Rashiduzzaman 2001, 122.
7
Monem 2004, 1.
8
Check reference, s. 291.
2
1
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
frightening scale’ and is ‘causing havoc on the nation’s democracy and economic
advancement’.9 The international anti-corruption organisation Transparency International has
put Bangladesh on top of several of its yearly list of most corrupt countries, and Amnesty
International states in its report for 2003 that both torture and police brutality were
widespread in the country. Amnesty’s report highlighted political violence in particular,
stating that ‘Dozens of people died in violence during and after local elections…’ and that
‘Several opposition politicians were assassinated’.10 In May 2004 the American
newsmagazine Time characterised Bangladesh as ‘Asia’s most dysfunctional country’ in an
article with the heading ‘State of disgrace’.11 Someone else, I am yet to ascertain who,
characterised Bangladesh as a ‘failed state’.
The latest of these characterisations caused a small tempest of protest in Bangladesh. Among
other events and statements, a seminar organised by an NGO and attended by prominent
newspapermen and lawyers was held on the theme ‘Bangladesh: Dysfunctional state versus
real perspective’.12 They claimed, with some justification, that the characterisations were
misjudged and ignored the many achievements that Bangladesh has seen since attaining
independence some 30 odd years ago. They acknowledged, however, that these achievements
have come by ‘despite natural disaster, corruption and mismanagement’ and that successive
governments have failed in several public sectors. They attributed these failures to ‘misuse of
power, corruption and mismanagement’. This statement was in many ways representative of
the various Bangladesh reactions to the increased focus on the country’s poor governance and
a chaotic and often violent political culture: They objected to the characterisations of a failed
state but acknowledged the severity of the problems. In an editorial in the widely read English
language newspaper The Daily Star, the editor and publisher Mahfuz Anam wrote that the
characterisation ‘failed state’ was unjustified because it grouped Bangladesh with collapsed
states like Afghanistan, Somalia and Haiti.13 Bangladesh, he felt, was not failing or on the
verge of collapse, but he acknowledged the problems in the same vein as the seminar
participants above, and believed that a more precise characterisation was ‘failed government’,
adding that many of the country’s government institutions ‘are falling apart’.
9
Monem 2004, 1.
Amnesty International, Bangladesh 2003. web.amnesty.org (240804).
11
Time 050404, www.time.com (240804).
12
Daily Star 290604 (060904).
13
Daily Star, editorial ‘Speaking up: ‘Failed state’ and Bangladesh’’, 110604 (070904).
10
2
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
Bangladesh has no doubt seen a number of remarkable achievements since its bloody and
devastating war of independence in 1971. HDI figures from UNDP give reason for modest
optimism,14 and in terms of economic growth Bangladesh has seen a modest yet steady
growth of 4-6 percent per annum over the last 10-15 years.15 This is all the more remarkable
in view of the country’s other problems, including natural disasters, poor infrastructure, and a
very low level of economic development to start with. However, in most of the recent focus
on the country’s achievements and failures, such as in the debate mentioned here, the single
most important manmade negative variable on the country’s social stability and economic
progress pointed at is the political development and the political culture.
The purpose of this paper is to point to the development of the country’s political culture to
seek an explanation for this state of affairs. It is the rivalry of the two dominant political
parties and the charged atmosphere in which their rivalry is fought out that form the focus of
the investigation here. Other aspects of importance are left out.
The BNP—AL rivalry
The dominant feature of Bangladeshi politics is the rivalry between the two major political
parties. After military rule ended and democracy was reintroduced in 1990-91, Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) ruled from 1991-1996, Awami League (AL) from 1996-2001, and
BNP again from 2001. The two rely to some extent on alliances with a series of other minor
parties in order to secure majorities in the first-past-the-post electoral system that the country
has adopted. These other parties include the highly fragmented Jatiyo Party (established
during the last military regime), various Islamic parties including the Jamaat Islami, and a
range of leftist parties. Although these parties are interesting in themselves and speak volumes
on the country’s political history and development, the present paper focuses on the rivalry
between the two major parties.
The BNP-AL rivalry is remarkable because in socio-economic terms there is little or no
difference between the two. This is a basic point which is acknowledged by most observers,
although there are important nuances which we will return to. The economic policies are
almost similar, guided mainly by the liberalisation line that the largest donors in the country
14
15
UNDP Human Development Report 2003.
Asian Development Bank, report…?
3
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
prefer. The social composition of the supporters of the two parties are for all practical
purposes identical – both comprising poor and rich, middle class, bureaucrats, businessmen,
landless labourers, slum dwellers. There is no or only very limited class differences between
the two, and no ethnic difference (the population is 98 percent Bengali speaking and 90
percent Muslim).
For all the similarities, the rivalry is all the more intense. A serious and very common
consequence of the rivalry is the practice of parliamentary boycott. Walkouts from parliament
is another common tool of politics. Walkouts may last from a few minutes to several days,
whereas boycotts may last whole sessions or more, in some cases entire years. The most
dramatic boycott of parliament took place in 1996 when the general election was boycotted by
the opposition. This eventually forced the government to hold a new election. There are also
boycotts of by-elections, municipal elections, etc. The below summary of parliamentary
boycotts indicates that since 1994 the opposition has boycotted the parliament more than it
has participated in its proceedings.
Boycotts of the parliament
First BNP-government: AL boycotts
From March 1994, ending in resignation from parliament of all opposition members
November 1994, parliament dissolved December 1995
Boycott of general elections February 1996, new elections June 1996
AL-government: BNP boycotts:
August 1996—January 1997
August 1997—March 1998
June 1999—October 2001 (election)
Second BNP-government: AL boycott
October 2001 (election)—June 2002
June 2003—ongoing
The boycotts are the one expression of the rivalry between the BNP and the AL which mostly
worries foreign diplomats. Another expression of the rivalry is the hartal, a Bengali word
4
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
which denotes a general strike. Since the mid-1990s the general strike has been a most
popular political tool with the two parties. This expression is particularly worrisome to the
business community. Leaders of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters’
Association, representing the country’s main export commodity, complained in 1999 that one
day of hartal cost the country Tk 100 crore and ‘did irreparable damage to buyers’
confidence’.16 The list below gives nationwide general strikes in 1999.
Hartals, in 1999:
February 9-10
48 hours, extended to 60 following a death
February 23-25
3 days
May 11
8 hours
June 13
12 hours (‘dawn-to-dusk hartal’)
August 2
30 hours
August 22
12 hours
September 12
60 hours
October [date?]
12 hours
November 1, 7, 8, 9, 16 and 25
December 5-6
[?]
January 3, 1998
7 hours
Source: Shehabuddin 2000.
In addition to the nationwide hartals, local hartals are also quite common. An important aspect
to the ‘culture of hartals’ is the level of violence which is often – albeit not always –
associated with them. A not-too-uncommon sequence of events would include a hartal in
protest of high level of prices, during which someone would be beaten, arrested or killed, and
in protest a new hartal would be called.
In spite of the misgivings among the diplomatic community, aid workers and the business
community, and in spite of the increased level of violence and of corruption, all of which has
found place under the aegis of either a BNP or an AL government, voters’ support for the two
rivals does not seem to have dampened. Quite the contrary. Both have increased their share of
votes cast quite substantially from about 30 percent to about 40 percent between 1991 and
16
Shehabuddin 2000, 184. One crore is 10 million. Tk 100 crore equals approx. US$ 17 million.
5
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
2001. This increase is all the more remarkable given the increase in the proportion of voters to
the total electorate, from 55 percent to 75 percent. If calculated as ‘mobilised vote’ (i.e. the
proportion of the total electorate that each party mobilise into casting a vote), both AL and
BNP have increased their share from about 15 percent to 32 percent.
Election results, parliamentary elections
Votes
1991 February
1996 June
2001 October
AL
30,81
37,47
40,21
BNP
30,08
33,34
40,86
Jatiyo Party
11,92
16,10
Jamati Islami
12,13
8,47
Votes cast:
55,35
75,72
Sources: 1991: Maniruzzaman 1992, 212; 1996: Kochanek 1997; 2001: Rashiduzzaman
2002.
In summary: In the midst of chaos and poor governance, the two main political parties
maintain and substantially increase their popular support. What we are looking for then, is a
political culture that frightens observers but still manages to attract voters and popular
support.
Explaning the political culture in Bangladesh
Although a whole lot cannot be said to have been written on the country’s political culture, a
few Bangladesh observers have offered explanations that are likely to have wider appeals.
Stanley A. Kochanek, who has followed Bangladeshi politics for decades, holds in an article
that the problems of governance in the country ‘are deeply rooted in the country’s historical
experience and the behaviour and values of the Bangladeshi elite’.17 He mentions patrimonial
politics and patron-client relationships as among the main elements that deny a fair chance to
the parliamentary system. The elite in the country is relatively small and recent, he writes, but
it has strong roots in the countryside where it has the mainstay of its popular support. Within
17
Kochanek 2000, 530; see also Bertocci 1982.
6
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
the elite, ‘leadership is highly personalized, based on patrimonial authority and loyalty, and
maintained through a complex, informal network of patron-client relations’. It is the strength
of the patron-client relationships and of patrimonial politics which prevent the formation of
horizontal relationships and larger classbased or corporate ties. The patron-client relationships
are formed within a moral universe that legitimizes hierarchy and the right or obligation of the
superior to be superior and protect the lesser. Hence, Kochanek writes, ‘leaders are expected
to be authoritarian and authority becomes highly personalized’.18
Another theory comes out in Mobasser Monem’s question of a link between ‘confrontational
politics’ and economic liberalisation in Bangladesh. He basically answers that economic
liberalisation has aggravated the culture of confrontational politics and democratic decay.19
But the confrontational politics itself is based on two historical developments, he asserts. In
the country’s ‘duopolistic system’ the two main parties need pay no attention to allies,
supporters or even rank and file. The reason is that within a duopolistic system the voters have
no choice but to support either of the two dominant parties. A second development is, he
asserts, that ‘a class of businessmen, distributive traders, retailers and rent-seeking class’ have
entered into politics in a big way. He calculates that the business community accounts from
more than 70 percent of the membership of parliament in 2001. Previously important groups,
such as lawyers and professionals, are down from a combined 40 percent in 1973 to 17
percent in 2001. That businessmen have found politics to be an important ‘medium of
business’ has had severe consequences for the country’s political culture. These are people
who are ‘uninitiated in the art of responsible business and government’. What the country
lacks, he asserts, is ‘a competent and responsible set of people’.20
A historical explanation… [fill in]
These various theories have much to recommend themselves as they point to three central
issues: The economic elites’ dominance over the country’s political system, the destructive
consequences of the war of liberation and the subsequent military regimes, and the continued
relevance of patron-client relationships in forming hierarchical political alliances. There are
aspects of the country’s political culture, however, that cannot easily be explained by these
18
Kochanek 2000, 548.
Monem 2004, 3.
20
Monem 2004, 8-9; for similar arguments see….
19
7
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
theories. In particular two issues are interesting: The emotional intensity of the rivalry
between the AL and the BNP, and the focus on these parties’ leaders and their immediate
predecessors.
Personal rivalry, and the founders
The importance of the persons of the nation’s leaders comes out in the 2001 issue of security
for the outgoing prime minister. In June 2001, at the very end of its term (before a
technocratic caretaker government took over to prepare for the elections), prime minister
Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League government passed the ‘Father of the Nation Family
Members Security Act’. This happened at a time when Sheikh Hasina had received death
threats following the trials of those involved in her father’s assassination. Her father was
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, prime minister from 1971 until he was assassinated in 1975. Sheikh
Hasina and her sister Sheikh Rehana were the only close family members to survive the
assassination. The act passed by Sheikh Hasina’s government entitled them both to lifelong
state security by the Special Security Forces – which otherwise looked after the prime
minister, president and other high profile members of the state. The sisters were also given
houses at the state’s expense, and were entitled to some other state facilities.21 A few days
later the government stepped down and elections were held three months later under the
caretaker government. Sheikh Hasina and the AL lost the election. Fifty days into its tenure,
the next government – a BNP government – cancelled the act.
The AL protested and termed the government’s move ‘part of a conspiracy to kill Sheikh
Hasina and her sister’.22 The party also called for an 8-hour general strike in protest. This
strike was the first called by AL since its loss of power and came in spite of a promise the AL
had made while in power of not resorting to such weapons.23 However, the matter of the
personal security of the leader of the party was seemingly deemed sufficiently important for
the party to break its promise to the electorate, and to start a nationwide mobilisation of its
cadre and activists to ensure a successful general strike. In other words, the nation was asked
to stay indoors and away from shops, offices and other business in order to protest against the
removal of a special security provision for the party’s leader. Either that, or it was a flimsy
21
Daily Star 031201 (140904).
Daily Star 021201 (140904).
23
Daily Star 011201 (140904), editorial ‘Sheikh Hasina breaks her pledge on hartal’.
22
8
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
excuse exploited to regain a useful political weapon – the general strike.24 However, as we
shall see, the rhetoric of the leaders’ persons and their well being has returned on several
occasions and given opportunity for political action.
Even more important than the leaders of today, are the leaders of yesterday – with each party
hailing their founders in a ‘cult of personality’.25 In a content analysis of election speeches in
1990-91, T. Maniruzzaman found that in 87 percent of her speeches Khaleda Zia invoked the
name of her late husband – former military dictator and BNP’s founder Ziaur Rahman – and
the village development programme associated with him.26 She also made extensive use of
her election speeches to make derogatory remarks on her opponent’s father. In two out of
three speeches she found it necessary to draw attention to the AL government of 1971-75,
which she characterised as the ‘years of darkness’. Sheikh Hasina, on her part, made as much
use of her inheritance as did Khaleda. The main theme of Sheikh Hasina’s speeches was the
promise to fulfil her father Mujibur’s dream of a ‘Golden Bengal’. She also promised to
punish his killers, and depicted his government as a golden era. Maniruzzaman adds that
‘Given the abysmal poverty of the Bangladesh people there was not much discussion on the
strategy of economic development by the two parties’.
For the AL Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the present leader’s father who was assassinated in
1975, is the iconic leader. A brief background may be necessary. Sheikh Mujibur was the
leader of the political movement for Bengali autonomy within the Pakistani state since the
mid-1950s. He was undoubtedly the most prominent political figure in East Pakistan and his
party, Awami League, won almost all that could be won in the provincial and national
elections in 1970. Negotiations with the military leadership of the joint Pakistani state for
transfer of power to a democratic government stranded in March 1971, and according to the
Awami League, Mujibur declared independence on 26 March. According to standard history
books his speech amounted to a call for independence – falling short of being an actual
declaration. The point is disputed, as we shall see below. During the civil war (or liberation
war, or war of independence) that erupted, Mujibur sat imprisoned in West Pakistan. After the
24
On 21 August 2004 grenades were launched at a meeting presided over by Sheikh Hasina. 20 people were
killed and 200 injured. Sheikh Hasina, who is generally believed to have been the target, survived. The event
lends credence to the AL’s claim that the government paid insufficient attention to her security situation.
However, the event cannot be counted as a confirmation of a claim made three years earlier, nor does it in itself
explain why the AL made a political issue out of it rather than seek a solution with the government.
25
Khan 1994, 162.
26
Maniruzzaman 1992, 209-210.
9
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
war he returned to the newly independent nation, where he was hailed and installed as
president. Within a short time, however, his government showed signs of nepotism and
corruption, and in 1974 Mujibur introduced one party rule. He was killed in a bloody coup in
1975, along with most of his family. He was survived only by two daughters, of whom Sheikh
Hasina is one.
Mujibur is affectionately and officially called Bangabandhu – Bengal’s friend. In addition he
is also officially called ‘Father of the nation’. Following an ordinance issued by his daughter
when she became prime minister in 1996, portraits of her father were placed in all
government offices and schools, and the date he was assassinated (15 August) was declared a
day of national mourning. The first such mourning extended over three days. The daughter
also had the parliament repeal the Indemnity Ordinance, which had prevented persecution and
trial of those involved in the 1975 assassination, and moved to arrest those involved in the
coup.27
In addition, his party, or hers, celebrates or marks events like his birthday and his
‘homecoming day’ (his return from prison in West Pakistan). The party also celebrates with
enthusiasm all important anniversaries of the liberation war with processions and meetings at
war memorials. Such events are also used to highlight Mujibur’s role. The celebration of the
party’s founding, for instance, is used to highlight the role of Mujibur by placing a wreath
around his portrait.28
For the BNP, on the other hand, the iconic leader is Ziaur Rahman, the late husband of the
presentday BNP leader and prime minister, Khaleda Zia. Ziaur was the military leader of the
war of independence; as a major in the Bengali part of the Pakistani army and stationed in
Bengal, he mutinied against his superiors in March 1971 and soon became effective military
head of the regular military resistance throughout the war of independence. After the war he
became chief of the armed forces. A few months after Mujibur was assassinated in 1975, Zia
assumed power of the country and led it through a relatively calm and prosperous period of
about 6 years. He was assassinated in 1981.
27
28
Kochanek 1998, 140; Kochanek 2000, 535; Khan 1994, 162.
Daily Star 230603 (080803).
10
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
The BNP, the party he founded, today refer to him as Shaheed President Ziaur – ‘martyred
president’. The party regularly marks his birth and death anniversaries, mostly with extensive
programmes over several days. Such celebrations include cultural functions and processions.
In a symbolic gesture, they also distribute warm clothes to the poor and hand out the Shaheed
Zia Smriti Award (Martyr Zia’s Memorial Award). They also place a wreath at his tomb and
offer prayers.29
The founders and their memories and memorials are an important arena for political
statements and counter statements by the two parties, also when in control of the government.
To hail and promote their respective predecessors seems to have become a crucial element in
the political legitimacy of the two parties, or the two ladies. After coming to power in 2001,
the BNP government proposed to spend Tk 100 crore for the renovation of Ziaur’s tomb. At
the same time the government proposed to suspend the construction of a monument
commemorating the war of independence30 – the memory and memorials of the war of
independence constitute a domain that the AL seeks to appropriate. On its part, on coming to
power in 1996, the AL government removed the bridge that led out to the small island where
Ziaur’s tomb is located.31 The bridge was removed on the grounds that it was in poor
condition and needed repair. Police were placed on the site, allegedly to prevent trespassers.
This caused an uproar from the BNP and the bridge was later reopened. But the incident is
indicative of the importance attached to the parties’ late founders. At the same point of time,
the AL government also discussed changing the name of the Zia International Airport (in
Dhaka), although this did not happen. The government did, however, cancel the National
Solidarity Day, a public holiday established by Ziaur in 1976 and celebrated on the date that
he took power in 1975.
Quite often, the statements and counter statements take on a very personal and vindictive
colour. An instance was when Sheikh Hasina said she doubted that it was actually Ziaur who
had been buried in the tomb that the BNP leadership regularly visited and offered prayers at.
She challenged them to verify their claims with a DNA-test.32 An additional quirk is the issue
of Khaleda Zia’s birthday. BNP and Khaleda Zia hold that her birthday is 15 August, which to
them is a day of celebration. 15 August is also the date on which Sheikh Mujibur was
29
For instance Daily Star 120103, 180103.
Daily Star 200602 (180304). The sum equals Tk 1 billion, which sounds exaggerated.
31
Kochanek 1998, 137, 141.
32
Daily Star 200602 (180304).
30
11
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
murdered and to the AL and Sheikh Hasina personally a day of mourning. AL insists that it is
not the real date of birth of Khaleda Zia, but that the date has been picked as a deliberate
insult to Sheikh Hasina and to Mujibur and his memory.33
The BNP’s increased attention on Ziaur’s legacy seems to have come at least partly as a
reaction to the uncensored official honouring bestowed on the personification of the rival
party. The second Khaleda Zia government initiated a Tk 300 million Ziaur memorial (which
later turned out more costly).34
Contests over the past
An interesting aspect of the active promotion of their respective founder-heros comes out in
the issue of the ‘proclaimer’. This issue shows that not only is inheritance important to the
political legitimacy of the two parties, and something to contest over, it also shows that
political legitimacy is anchored in the 1971 war of independence.
BNP has increasingly insisted that Ziaur be treated on par with Mujibur as main mover behind
the war of liberation. The party now calls Ziaur ‘Proclaimer of independence’, and asserts that
it was he who proclaimed Bangladesh’ independence in a military radio broadcast on 26
March 1971. On the BNP website, a recorded voice says ‘I, Major Ziaur Rahman, do hereby
declare independence of Bangladesh’.35 In 2003 Ziaur’s widow Khaleda conferred the highest
national award on both Ziaur and Mujibur simultaneously, in what may have been a
reconciliatory move but equally one that conferred equal status to the two – challenging her
opponent’s view that Mujibur was supreme.36 In prime minister Khaleda Zia’s words on that
occasion, it was following Ziaur’s announcement that ‘students, teachers, journalists,
intellectuals, farmers, workers … the armed forces … were imbued with fresh confidence
[and could] stand against the occupation forces’.37 AL contests this view because in their
opinion and in their official history, this fresh confidence and the willingness of the
Bangladeshi people to fight the Pakistani forces came from the declaration of independence
that Mujibur made a few hours before Zia.
33
Kochanek 1998, 137, Daily Star 310803.
Prothom Alo 131003.
35
www.bnpbd.com.
36
The Independent 260303, Daily Star 260303.
37
The Independent 260303.
34
12
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
The effort to promote Ziaur to the heights of national pantheon was taken a step further in
July 2004 with the publication of a new edition of the official history of the war of liberation,
the voluminous printed Swadhinota Juddher Dolilpatro. The volumes contain documents and
official versions of historical events connected with the liberation war. In the 2003 edition a
new chapter has been added, entitled ‘The first proclamation of independence by Major
Zia’.38 AL countered that this statement was in violation of the constitution, which says
Mujibur declared independence, and that any other claim is liable to persecution.39 ‘Denying
the proclamation of independence by Bangabandhu equals to denial of the emergence of
Bangladesh and its constitution’, held Sheikh Hasina.40 In other word, suggesting that Ziaur
proclaimed independence first amounts to something close to treason.
The 1971 war of liberation has taken on a role as a defining event in the national rhetoric, or
in the discourse of the nation’s identity. This role seems relatively new, at least in some
respects. In a speech on national television marking her first year in power, Sheikh Hasina
said that her greatest achievement was resurrection of the history and heritage of the
Bangladesh nation and return of the ‘spirit’ of 1971.41 This was a reference to the values of
secularism, nationalism and socialism that constituted the basis of the independence
movement. At the same time it was a claim that projected herself and the AL as the best or
only custodians of these values When the AL won the election in 1996, writes Kochanek,
Sheikh Hasina ‘saw the League’s victory as a restoration to power of the rightful rulers of
Bangladesh and the defeat of the anti-liberation forces that had usurped power …’.42 The
‘Father of the Nation Family Members Security Act’, which came at the end of her
government’s tenure, legally tied the government – of whichever party – to provide
particularly extensive security measures and housing to her and her sister.43 It was the iconic
status of Mujibur as the ‘father of the nation’ that legitimised these measures. No similar
measures were awarded to family members of other assassinated state leaders, for instance of
president Ziaur Rahman. The act was politically useful in that it singled out the AL and
Sheikh Hasina for special status.
38
Daily Star 090704 (250804).
Daily Star 110704 (250804).
40
Daily Star 150704 (240804).
41
Dhaka Courier 270697, cited in Kochanek 1998, 141.
42
Kochanek 2000, 535.
43
Daily Star 010403.
39
13
Incomplete draft. Not for circulation or citation.
The AL seeks to appropriate the war of independence as its domain by portraying itself as the
custodian of its legacy and heirs of its heroes. Thus it represents the only true nationalists.
This has caused quite a grudge among members of the BNP. After all, it is only fair to keep in
mind that even if the AL claims itself to be the heir of the independence movement, Ziaur
Rahman was one of the main figures in the military resistance and a key figure in the creation
of Bangladeshi independence.
In this light the issue of the ‘proclaimer of independence’ is part of a quest and a rivalry over
which party can claim to be the more legitimate heir of the quests and the values of the
independence war. However, when the official history of the war of independence was first
conceived, by Ziaur as president, there was no effort to promote him as a co-architect of
independence alongside Mujibur. The issue of the rightful ‘proclaimer’ was introduced at a
later stage by his widow in an effort to appropriate some of the lustre of the war. Another
revealing incident shows slightly contradictory notes among BNP members. A senior BNP
politician, SQ Chowdhury, was in 2003 was forwarded by the BNP government as a
candidate for the position of secretary general of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. The
AL claimed that he had an anti-liberation background and that he had committed serious
crimes during the 1971 war.44 Eventually SQ Chowdhury lost the OIC vote, and the BNP
blamed the AL’s war crime claims for the defeat. Both the BNP and SQ Chowdury himself
argued that the AL seemed to have taken a ‘lease on patriotism’.45
Contestations over the role and importance of Mujibur and Ziaur in the war of liberation point
to the role of the war in political legitimacy in the country. As a catastrophic event with its
heros and traitors it has become a defining event in Bangladeshi politics. That the AL’s
appropriation of the war of liberation and its heritage cause envy among its opponents in the
BNP is an indication of the success of the claim.
The war as a defining event
SQ Chowdhury also claimed in a separate statement that it was possible for anyone to become
a ‘freedom fighter’, merely by joining the AL. However true this may be, the fact is that it
does not happen all that often. Most people do not change their political coats, even when
44
45
Daily Star 120603 (160603), 150603 (180603).
Daily Star 120603?
14
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their party looses an election. There are two possible reasons for this. One is that affiliation to
one’s party is conceived of in highly emotional terms, and subsequently so is any effort to
abandon one’s party. There seems to be, at least on select occasions but probably more
generally, a strong demand for loyalty to the cause and to the heroes and for emotional
attachment. Conversely, there are strong reactions to acts that may be interpreted as
‘treacherous’. More of this below. Another reason for why people do not change party often,
and one that forms a backdrop to the first, is that the war of liberation is a highly charged
theme in Bangladeshi society in general (not just the select few at the top), one which divides
the society. An illustration can be taken from the small town (large village) of Joydebpur, just
outside of Dhaka.
Afzal Hossein Kaiser’s family was wealthy by local standards and had prospered during the
Pakistan years.46 An important element in their prosperity, had been his father’s ability to
position himself in the political institutions of local government that were introduced in the
1950s and 1960s. The family maintained close contacts with local bureaucrats and other
powerfuls, and it owned land. The family did not support the war of independence, but they
probably did not actively oppose the liberation struggle either. However, after the war they
were termed collaborators and after summary court hearings lost their land, houses and
positions. All positions of influence in Joydebpur were taken over by members of the Awami
League, mostly sons of local educated middle class families. Afzal remembers them to have
been spiteful and vengeful against his family, whom they variously termed anti-national,
capitalist bourgeois or traitor. Having suffered further humiliations, Afzal’s father died a few
years later. In 1976 the family got some of the land and the houses back, except the largest
which now contained a hospital. This hospital was run by a doctor who was also one of the
front Awami Leaguers. Under the military governments of Ziaur and Ershad (1982-1990),
Afzal rebuilt his family’s position. With democracy he joined the BNP and has reasserted his
family’s position in Joydebpur, as an elected representative on the newly established
municipality board.
This lends some colour and background to Kochanek’s assertion, that many key sectors of
Bangladeshi society harbour ‘deep seated resentment’ against Hasina and her father
Mujibur.47 AL’s assertion is that the war of independence was a popular uprising of the
46
47
Various interviews Joydebpur 240999.
Kochanek 1997, 141.
15
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masses, and that it brought in the only legitimate representative of the people’s will, the
Awami League. A somewhat more nuanced picture would suggest that local leadership was
formed by the rural-based educated elite, the district lawyers, doctors, school teachers and
some traders.48 Even if most Bengalis were in favour of breaking away from the joint Pakistan
state (the extent to which the 80 percent uneducated had an idea or gave a dime is entirely in
the blue), quite a few were still against it and many were hesitant or lukewarm. Still more
were at an early point disenchanted with the chaotic and nepotistic rule of Mujibur. The
disenchanted and the neutral were easily persuaded into Ziaur’s regime a few years later, a
regime that embraced local powerfuls of most colours in order to create political stability in
the countryside. Ziaur later established the BNP on a concoction of former leftists, religious
fundamentalists, pro-Chinese radicals, wealthy landowners, businessmen and disenchanted
members of the AL.49 To a considerable extent those who had been introduced into positions
of power by Mujibur as a reward for their role in the 1971 war, were squeezed out by Ziaur in
order to benefit efficiency and professionalism in the administration. In their stead, the ‘Zia
restoration’ reintroduced those excluded by AL back into their positions of power and
influence.50 In the military governments of the late 1970s and the 1980s, former freedom
fighters played only a limited role.
A main difference between the AL and the BNP stems from this development, a difference
which is not so much a socio-economic difference as it is ideological. AL’s founder and the
republic’s first president, Mujibur, established the republic with a constitution that stated it to
be both secular and socialist. He also banned religious parties. These acts were obvious
references to Bengal’s secular and modernist traditions, dating back to the cultural and
political developments of undivided Bengal in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was a
theme popular with Bangladesh’s educated classes and had formed an important element in
the student uprising against the joint and Muslim Pakistan state. Mujibur later softened his
stand, but this is oftenmost overlooked by the AL today. Ziaur, on the other hand, expressed
slightly more conservative and Islamic values, and he inter alia permitted religious parties,
changed the official name of the language and people from Bengali to Bangladeshi, and
initiated other such symbolic measures.51
48
Kochanek 2000, 532.
Kochanek 2000, 533.
50
Bertocci 1982, 995.
51
Murshid 1997; Huque & Akhter 1987.
49
16
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This difference is significant in explaining the division of the electorate in two opposing
camps. As the story of Afzal tells us, it is partly to do with personal life histories. The story of
the war of liberation and the personal sacrifices in it, is a highly emotional, sensitive and
charged story. It has become a main arena for contestation of credentials.
In this perspective, the two leaders, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina, are not simple ‘patrons’
in the sense of being distributors of boons. A very crucial aspect of their respective position is
not formed by their dexterity as linchpins in a redistributive network. In that case they could
have been replaced at some point, or challenged, as the case very often is for village level
leaders or faction leaders of minor political parties. Rather, Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina
are irreplaceable symbols personifying the ideological foundation of Bangladesh, a
personification which to many is tied to a history of personal suffering.
The personification of the values of the freedom struggle is an important aspect of the
historical development of the country’s political culture. There are, however, still questions to
be asked. The vote percentage for the BNP and the AL was 40:40 in 2001. This figure is
unlikely to tally with ideological divisions in the 1970s. Although ‘once an AL family, always
an AL family’ is likely to be a fair description of most political loyalties, there is still other
aspects of political affiliation that cannot be accounted for by historical projections only. The
increase in mobilised vote, for instance, suggests that new voters are attracted to the two
parties. There are also the many new voters to account for, and the millions of migrants from
the countryside to less closely knit urban areas. Rather than argue that loyalties are projected
from the past, it is necessary to understand the past as an environment, a discourse, in which
political loyalty is expressed.
Patrimonial reciprocity and loyalty
In a sense the emotional element identified above is unnecessary in the exchange of votes for
material support that in one view has formed political parties and political culture in South
Asia. However, the emotional element does have a place in the model of patrimonialism.
Patron-client relationships were in the anthropological and village studies traditions of the
1950s and 1960s generally understood to be formed within a hierarchical moral universe,
where the superior protected and the inferior followed, and where strong norms tied both
parties into a long term relationship. It is for instance common for patron-client relationships
17
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in South Asia to be coated in kinship terminology, where relationships between landowners
and labourers were constructed as fictitious kinship relationships. The anthropologist Marvin
Davis challenged this view and held that such relationships were much more ‘reciprocal’, so
that the ‘inferior’ could actually exchange his patron for another if the opportunity arose.52
Davis’s own material brings out this, although it also shows that one of the ‘elements’ that are
reciprocally exchanged is respect and personal engagement. His Torkotala village politician
received the political support of the low caste village Bagdis by accepting their claim to a
higher ritual status and partaking in their ceremonies. From Nepal, Kondos shows that people
understand personal bonds to be prior to material exchange, so that a long term relationship of
trust needs to be established before requests can be made.53 Other ethnographies and historical
accounts suggest in the same vein that political loyalty is primarily based on an element of
personal engagement and involvement.
An emotional attachment to either Khaleda Zia and her late husband or to Sheikh Hasina and
her assassinated father thus becomes a necessary element in the constitution of the patronclient relationships that makes it possible for followers to make demands on their superiors. A
last set of questions that follow from this is whether the emotional element is a mere
rhetorical gloss over hard core competition for resources and positions, and whether or not the
issue of emotions and respect is what politics in Bangladesh is all about. The case of the
sacking of the president in 2002 shows that emotional attachment is a requirement beyond
mere words. It seems that the requirement for emotional attachment includes demands on
one’s time and energy, and in some cases even one’s well being.
In June 2002 the republic’s president AQM Badruddoza Chowdhury was forced to step down.
Badruddoza Chowdhury was one of the founding members of the BNP and had been member
of its leadership since then. He became the republic’s president in 2001, following the BNP’s
election victory. Seven months later, young parliamentarians in the BNP demanded
impeachment of him, and after a hefty few days he felt forced to resign from his post. His
offence and what had caused the uproar in the first place, was his ‘attitude towards the party’
(i.e. the BNP). The core of the matter was that Badruddoza had not visited Ziaur’s grave on
the 21st death anniversary of BNP’s founder Ziaur a few days earlier. Besides, in a message
which he had given on that day he had failed to mention Ziaur’s contribution to the war of
52
53
Davis 1983.
Kondos 1987.
18
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liberation. This allegedly caused great offence in the party leadership. In one report, the whole
BNP parliamentary party, and not just some hotheaded young parliamentarians, accused him
of ‘betraying the party’. The meeting that passed this resolution was presided over by prime
minister Khaleda Zia herself.
Badruddoza Chowdhury’s own defence was they he sought to be neutral, as a president
should and in accordance with the constitution. Members of the BNP, however, objected to
this and questioned how someone nominated by the party could be neutral.54
Reports suggest that there may have been other motives behind the outcry and the sacking of
Badruddoza. His son, Mani Chowdhury, who was also a BNP member of parliament, had
recently received the opposition leader Sheikh Hasina at his constituency. To some this was a
questionable behaviour. Another event during the same few days was that the prime
minister’s son, Tareque Rahman, was introduced into the party leadership as joint secretarygeneral. It was suggested that Badruddoza’s own ambitions or principles made it difficult to
accommodate the crown prince.
Although there may have been other motives behind the move to make Badruddoza resign
and that these serve as sufficient explanations, it is none the less interesting to note the kind of
language the reasoning was coated in, and that this language served as a lever. Badruddoza
had a long record of service with the BNP and was known as a ‘staunch Zia loyalist’. This,
however, was not sufficient to save him. He failed to show loyalty to the party and its
founder-hero, even in a constitutionally neutral position. In other words, the demand from the
party was that he ought to have exceeded the limits of his office in order to show his loyalty
and attachment. In a sense it seems that he had to stick his neck out and take risks in order for
his loyalty to be believed. Only when engaged beyond the call of duty is the loyalty credible.
22 September 2004
54
Daily Star 200602 (180304), Frontline 06-190702 ’The sacking of a president’ (180304).
19
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