STATE AND ECONOMY IN MODERN SOCIETY 1992
STUDENT: DAVID RISSTROM, 8120572
LECTURER: JOHN LOVE
WEBER’S THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY AND MODERN SOCIETY
How dominant have bureaucracies become in modern societies? Is Weber’s classical model still an accurate description
of the main structural properties and dynamics of bureaucracy? What criticisms have been advanced by commentators
like Luhmann and Blau?
Bureaucracies have become particularly pervasive in modern societies, and thus justifiably have attracted a
significant degree of thought concerning their existence. This essay considers some of the characteristics
Weber attributed to bureaucratic organisation and growth in modern society, critically contrasting it with
some thoughts of more recent theorists such as Luhmann, Blau and Parkin. In particular, I examine the
consequences of Weber’s ideal type methodology, suggesting it provides a significant limitation in the
application of his theory.
WEBER’S CLASSICAL THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
The classical theory of bureaucracy, derived from Weber’s work, assumes the structure of a bureaucracy is
essentially organised in a rational and efficient manner, and that it is especially designed for the carrying out
of particular ends with given means that can be specified and known. Though the ends may differ over time
and the availability of means may change, organisation should be sufficiently flexible to take these into
account.
Weber saw bureaucracy as facilitating the institutionalisation of technical rationality by the co-ordination of
large-scale public and private organisations through the specialisation of tasks, deployment of expertise, and
a hierarchy of authority.1
Weber identified the need for bureaucracy arising out of the division of labour and increasing specialisation
that separated the roles of individual producers, being the basis for the huge increase in social productivity
which many modern achievements are based upon. Weber argued that bureaucracy was the organisational
principle of modern life, and was just one way of organising modern life, not the only way, whilst
recognising the further advance of bureaucratic mechanisation was inevitable in modern society. 2
Significantly, Weber also believed this applied to socialist and capitalist societies alike, incorporating the
enterprises within them; political, religious and military which in turn were increasingly bureaucratic. 3 To
understand how the classical theory of bureaucracy sits within his general thoughts, it is necessary to
consider Weber’s theory of legitimate domination.
1
2
3
Gamble, A., 1989, An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought, 254.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, Vol. 3, 999.
Gamble, A., 1989, Op cit., 164.
The phenomena of specialisation of occupational function is central to Weber’s sociology of modern
capitalism, being by no means limited to the economic sphere.1 Separation of the labourer from control of
her means of production, seized by Marx as the most distinctive feature of modern capitalism is not seen by
Weber as being confined to industry, rather extending throughout the polity, army and other sectors of
society having prominent large scale organisations.2
LEGITIMATE DOMINATION: THE FOUNDATION OF BUREAUCRACY
Weber formed a distinction between traditional, charismatic and legal-rational types of legitimate
domination to explain why people believe they are obliged to obey the law. Traditional legal domination is
where legitimacy is claimed on the basis of belief in the sanctity of age-old rules and powers. Charismatic
legal domination is based on ‘devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an
individual person’, whilst legal-rational domination is founded on a belief in the legality of enacted rules
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands. Within the legal rational
type, which best describes modern society, the commonest form of its expression is found in bureaucracy.
Though the notion of legal-rational authority is bound up with Weber’s theory of value, which argues that
the sociologist must adopt a detached view of his subject, the important correlation is between this form of
domination and the modern bureaucratic State. Weber points out that under other forms of domination,
authority resides with people, whilst under bureaucracy it is vested in rules.
Weber saw the hallmark of legal-rational authority as its so-called impartiality3, though this depends on
what Weber calls the principle of ‘formalistic impersonality’ which requires that officials discharge their
responsibilities ‘without hatred or passion’, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. The dominant
norms are thus concepts of straightforward duty without regard to personal considerations. 4
Weber argues that whilst the legitimacy of the traditional and charismatic forms of legal domination
depends on specific relationships between ruler and subject, the source of legitimacy of legal-rational
domination is impersonal.
Obedience therefore becomes owed to the legal order, rather than to an
individual or social group. This might be set out as follows5;
DOMINATION
LEGITIMATION
LEGAL THOUGHT
JUSTICE
JUDICIAL PROCESS
OBEDIENCE
ADMINISTRATION
1
2
3
4
5
Traditional
Traditional
Formal irrationality
Substantive irrationality
Secular or theocratic empirical
Empirical and/or substantive
and/or personal (Khadi justice)
Charismatic
Charismatic
Formal irrationality
Substantive irrationality
Charismatic
Legal-rational
Legal-rational
Logical formal
rationality
Rational
Rational
Owed to legal order
Bureaucratic
professional
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
158.
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
158.
Wacks, 1990, Jurisprudence, 146.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, 225.
Wacks, 1990, Op cit., 148.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 2
Weber makes a variety of claims in support of his theory of legitimate domination. Weber’s political
domination draws its legitimacy from the existence of a system of rationally made laws that stipulate the
circumstances under which power may be exercised. Weber sees this form of legitimacy as the central core
of all stable modern societies, with legal rational rules determining the scope of its power and providing its
legitimacy.
FEATURES OF WEBER’S IDEAL TYPE BUREAUCRACY
For Weber, an organisation with a bureaucratic nature is an extension of the will of the commanding power,
with the legitimacy of the system resting ultimately upon the extent to which it is accepted. Weber’s notion
of bureaucracy, perhaps the most influential of his theories, is prefaced upon his ideal type. 1 As I will
discuss later, Weber’s tendency to abstract and accentuate selected interrelated aspects of a social
phenomenon, rather than aiming at a full description of it, has brought criticism to his theory, and has
limited its usefulness in describing more modern large scale bureaucratic phenomena. 2
In elucidating his classical model of bureaucracy, Weber identified six specific criteria. These are, firstly,
that the spheres of competence of the officials are clearly demarcated. This means that the regular activities
required for the purposes of the bureaucratically governed structure are distributed in a fixed manner as
official duties, which incorporates the authority to give commands is distributed in a stable way and is
strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise that may be
placed at the disposal of officials and that administrative activities are carried out on a regular basis,
constituting well defined ‘official duties’.3 Weber explains this by saying, “There is a principle of fixed and
official jurisdictional areas which are generally ordered by rules, that is by laws or administrative
regulations.”4
Secondly, he notes that officials gain their positions through appointment, saying, “The principles of office
hierarchy and of levels of graded authority mean a firmly ordered system if super- and subordination in
which there is a supervision of the lower offices by the higher ones.” 5
Thirdly that, “The management of the modern office is based upon written documents (the files) which are
preserved in their original or draught form.”6; Fourthly, that “office management, at least all specialised
office management and such management is distinctly modern - usually presupposes thorough and expert
training.”7; Fifthly that, “When the office is fully developed, official activity demands the full working
capacity of the official, irrespective of the fact that his obligatory time in the bureau may be firmly
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Parkin, F., 1982, Max Weber, 34.
Wrong, D., Max Weber, 133.
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
158.
Weber, M., ‘Bureaucracy and Law’ in Gerth, H., and Wright Mills, C., 1991, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
196.
Weber, M., 1991, Op cit., 197.
Ibid.
Id., 198.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 3
delimited”1, and finally that, “The management of the office follows general rules, which are more or less
stable, more or less exhaustive, and which can be learned.”2
Expanding upon the role of officials, Weber suggests they are recruited and promoted mainly on merit,
being unable to formally trade their position. Rather than being independent property owners in their
capacity as officials, people regard their work as a career in which they can expect to progress. As a
consequence, they tend to develop an ethic of service, duty and altruism, rather than being motivated
primarily by financial gain or self interest, thus sharing the orientation to work the capitalist entrepreneur
which Weber had admired.3
Weber writes, “The actual social position of the official is normally highest where, as in old civilised
countries, their is a strong demand for administration by trained experts, and a strong and stable social
differentiation or where the costliness of the required training and status conventions are binding upon
him.”4 Weber acknowledges that some institutions are only semi-bureaucratic, being aware that the ideal
type won’t always be available in pure form. Giddens believes it is only within modern capitalism that
organisations approximating Weber’s ideal type are found, the notable examples of ancient Egypt, China,
the Roman principate and the medieval Catholic church being exceptions.5
SOME THOUGHTS ON WEBER’S SCHEMA OF LEGAL-RATIONAL DOMINATION
Weber says, “In a modern state the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy…” 6 The
bureaucracy distinguishes itself from the other forms of domination described by Weber, in that authority is
vested in rules, not individuals.
Weber believes that the Middle Ages tradition of office holding being a source of exploitation has changed,
and in compensation for the nature of their employment, he says,
“Legally and actually, office holding is not considered a source to be exploited for rents or
emoluments, as was normally the case during the Middle Ages and frequently up to the threshold of
recent times.”7 Entrance into an office, including one in the private economy, is considered an
acceptance of a specific obligation of faithful management in return for a secure existence. It is
decisive for the specific nature of modern loyalty to an office that, in the pure type, it does not
establish a relationship to a person. … Modern loyalty is devoted to impersonal and functional
purposes.8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Ibid.
Ibid.
Gamble, A., 1989, An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought, 154.
Weber, M., ‘Bureaucracy and Law’ in Gerth, H., and Wright Mills, C., 1991, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
200.
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
158.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, Vol. 3, 1133.
Weber, M., 1991, Op cit., 199.
Ibid.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 4
Weber had argued that bureaucracy afforded advantages in the way it could procure a monopoly over the
means of information, being the “Supreme power instrument [in] the transformation of official information
into classified material1, but is nevertheless is critical of the exercise of this ability, citing the then activities of
the German civil service, claiming intrusion of the bureaucracy into the political spheres as an abuse of
power.2 This however, unwittingly for Weber, appears to present a dichotomy in his theory of legitimate
domination, as Weber’s conception of legal domination exhibits an unduly positivist view of law, as
evidenced by Cotterrell’s claim that “… the highly complex ideological elements of law must be analysed in
ways that cannot utilise the ideal type method, if conditions of legitimacy are to be understood in relation to
social change”.3
Parkin considers why bureaucracy should qualify as a form of domination saying, “If bureaucracy does
attempt to exercise domination it usurps the authority of a nominally superior body, or in other words it
uses its power illegitimately. Thus, in the light of Weber’s own account, bureaucracy can hardly be an
example of ‘legitimate domination’, for if the bureaucracy does attempt to exercise domination, it usurps the
authority of its superior body, and thus uses its power illegitimately. This, for Parkin, means that under
Weber’s theory of legitimate domination, if a bureaucracy acts legitimately it is not dominant, whilst if it
exercises domination is ceases to be legitimate.4
Giddens believes Weber’s position has been misunderstood, claiming Weber was not unaware of the
importance in the substantive operation of bureaucratic organisations or the existence of informal contacts
and patterns of relationship overlapping the formal designation of authority and responsibilities. 5 Giddens
says that according to Weber, prior forms of administrative organisations may be superior in dealing with a
particular case, which can be illustrated in the instance of just judicial decisions. 6
The importance Weber attached to the existence of the bureaucracy can be seen in his statement that, “It
would be an illusion to think for a moment that continuous administrative work can be carried out in any
field except by means of officials working in offices. The whole pattern of every day life is cut to fit this
framework. If bureaucratic administration is, ceteris paribus, always the most rational type from a formal,
technical point of view, the needs of mass administration make it today completely indispensable. 7
LUHMANN, BLAU’S AND PARKIN’S CRITICISMS OF WEBER’S THEORY OF BUREAUCRACY
Weber selects and emphasises the features of bureaucracy as discussed above; a formal hierarchy, consistent
application of rules, promotion by merit or seniority, strict control of files and information, etc., as being its
distinctive hallmark.8 Weber says,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Weber, M., 1968, Op cit., 1134.
Parkin, F., 1982, Max Weber, 88.
Cotterrell, cited in Sugarman, D., (ed.), 1983, Legality, Ideology and the State, 88.
Parkin, F., 1982, Max Weber, 89.
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
159.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, Vol. 2, 656.
Giddens, A, 1981, Op cit., 160.
Parkin, F., 1982, Max Weber, 34.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 5
“the fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organisations exactly as does the
machine with the nonmechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of
files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and
personal costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration.” 1
Blau and Meyer are critical of interpretations of Weber’s use of the ‘ideal type saying,
“This methodological concept does not represent an average of the attributes of all existing
bureaucracies (or other social structures), but a pure type, derived by abstracting the most
characteristic bureaucratic aspects of all known organisations.
Since perfect bureaucratisation is
never fully realised, no empirical organisation corresponds exactly to this scientific construct.” … The
criticism has been made that Weber’s analysis of an imaginary type does not provide understanding
of concrete bureaucratic structures. But this criticism obscures the fact that the ideal-type construct is
intended as a guide in empirical research, not as a substitute of it.” 2
Luhmann, in The Differentiation of Society, criticised Weber’s consideration of the operations of bureaucracies
as too simplistic, claiming Weber’s classical theory of bureaucracy assumes most organisations orient their
activities according to ends in a Western overtly rationalistic way, based on a command version of how
organisations work.
Luhmann also questions the supposition that all ends are instructive. They are often a vague and ambitious
justification of themselves, and don’t necessarily bind it to any specific ends. Means and ends schema are
often irrelevant as such, in that the goals are sometimes not able to be expressed at all, and may change with
variation in the culture.
As the ends do not specify the means unambiguously, the sub goals of the
organisation are regularly in conflict with one another, so that a structure with contrary goals may exist from
the very start, such as can occur in some welfare organisations. Luhmann also recognises that for an
organisation to function well, it doesn’t necessarily require the complete loyalty and obedience of its
employees, as a partial consensus would likely suffice.
Blau, also providing some criticism of Weber’s theory of bureaucracy for its construction upon the ideal
type, claiming its crude nature fails to differentiate between conceptual elaborations and hypotheses
concerning the relationship between analytical attributes of social systems and prototypes of the social
systems themselves.3 Blau suggests that Weber considers the three analytical principles of convention,
ethics and law underlie conformity, whilst at other times seemingly referring to political systems; traditional
political institutions, revolutionary movements, and modern governments based on rational law, suggesting
that the limitations of the ideal type may be responsible for such discrepancies. 4
Blau is also critical that Weber subsumes democracy under the legal order in his model of legal-rational
behaviour discussed previously, particularly as Weber makes it clear that bureaucracies are not necessarily
democratic. Critical that Weber never systematically differentiates the two concepts in the way he had done
1
2
3
4
Weber, M.,1968, Op cit., 973.
Blau, P., and Meyer, M., 1956, Bureaucracy in Modern Society, 24.
Blau., P., 1970, ‘Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority’ in Wrong, D., Max Weber, 164.
Id., 160.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 6
so with the other two types of authority structures, Bendix says, “power in the political struggle results from
the manipulation of interests and profitable exchanges … and does not entail legitimate authority of
protagonists over one another. Success, however, in this struggle leads to a position of legitimate authority.1
Blau notes that, “If men organise themselves and others for the purpose of realising specific objectives
assigned to or accepted by them … they establish a bureaucratic organisation. The exact form best suited for
such an organisation depends on a variety of conditions, including the kinds of skills required for the
tasks.”2
Blau notes that as the differentiating criteria between democracy and bureaucracy proposed are whether the
organisation’s purpose is to settle on common objective … and whether the governing principle of
organising social action is majority rule rooted in freedom or dissent or administrative efficiency”, the two
principles come into conflict.3 Blau consider the example of unions as a case in point to highlight the
deficiencies in Weber’s theory.
As for Blau, Parkin is critical of Weber, claiming that he has failed to measure these claims against the
existing bureaucracies, pointing to the fact that Weber appears not to present any evidence to indicate that
organisations that depart from the ideal type actually do suffer from a loss of precision, speed or ambiguity. 4
Parkin also notes that Weber’s classical model of bureaucracy is one of highly formalised and inflexible
rules, as outlined in Weber’s claim that, “Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly it is ‘dehumanised’, the
more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, hatred, and all purely personal,
irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation.”5 The issue then arises as to what happens to
the notion of taking the individual’s subjective meanings as the starting point of social enquiry; the Verstehen
approach6, if bureaucracy is viewed in this way.7 This appears to be a significant flaw in Weber’s theory.
Parkin believes that once the personal motivations and perceptions of individual incumbents are considered,
a clearer picture of why bureaucracies do not parallel the ideal type is uncovered. 8
The jump Weber appears to make using his notions of bureaucracy based on the ideal type of bureaucracy,
does not adequately address the problem that many bureaucrats do not behave in the way Weber deems
them to. The tendency for officials to accrue power to their own ends can mean the impartiality of the
bureaucracy becomes a force fiction. What would now be seen as the naivety of Weber’s outlook is shown in
Weber’s assertion that whilst it is proper for a bureaucrat to present a reasoned case in advising his minister,
he is duty bound to accept the minister’s decision and to implement it as conscientiously as though it
corresponds to his own innermost conviction.9 Based on this concern, it is possible that if Weber had
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Bendix, R., Max Weber, 439.
Blau., P., 1970, Op Cit., D., Max Weber, 163.
Blau., P., 1970, ‘Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority’ in Wrong, D., Max Weber, 163.
Parkin, F., 1982, Max Weber, 34.
Weber, M.,1968, Economy and Society, Vol. 3, 975.
Parkin, F., 1982, Op cit., 15.
Id., 35.
Id., 36.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, 1417, cited in Parkin, F., Op cit., 88.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 7
referenced his theory of bureaucracy with his Verstehen approach, the criticisms of people in the Human
Relations movement such as Mayo would be less evident.
LIMITS OF THE WEBERIAN MODEL.
Weber’s framework for bureaucracy was that of an undemocratic system that did not allow for election of
fellow employees. Nevertheless, bureaucracies are inherently efficient organisations, which is why they are
so central to modern organisations. As no alternatives to bureaucracies appeared evident for the efficient
running of large scale organisations, Weber was fearful of legal-rational thought developing into an all
encompassing ossified ‘iron cage’ of bureaucracy that thwarted the very values of freedom and liberty he
desired.1 The English bureaucracy was a case in point for Weber.
So whilst Weber wants to celebrate the Western Culture heritage that has allowed such amazing progress,
though in its last stages, we have created a new form of bureaucratic organisation which is much more
rational, coherent and stable than anything before, the question remains as to how we can retain a social
structure allowing mobility, with the tendency for bureaucracy
Weber says there is another trend at work called rationalisation, ‘the rationalisation and intellectualisation of
the world is receding regardless of what we would like. We have institutionalised economic progress and
scientific development to the extent that our culture has become totally dependent on making these
advances in one form or another.
Weber believes the formal rationality of bureaucracy whilst facilitating the technical implementation of
large-scale administrative tasks, substantially contravenes some of the most distinctive values of Western
civilisation, in subordinating individuality and spontaneity. The question arises as to whether Weber says
we should acquiesce to these principles, or rather, of whether the bureaucratic form is the most rational
becomes the issue. Nevertheless, Weber sees no rational way to escape this, it being “the fate of the times”. 2
Pusey captures this well, saying,
“In Weber’s often quoted view, “experience tends universally to show” that order of this type is:
“from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and in this
sense formally the most rational means of carrying out imperative from control over human beings. Is
it superior to any other form in precision, in stability in the stringency of its discipline, and in its
reliability.”3
Weber’s model has an inability to properly account for the informal structure within organisations; it is over
rationalistic, has a tendency to persist in a firm inconsistent with the ideal structure of the bureaucracy. This
issue remains an open question for me, and may be best outlined by Mikel Duffrenne’s words at the opening
of the International symposium on ‘Rationality Today’.
1
2
3
Gamble, A., 1989, An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought, 163.
Weber, M., 1968, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 182.
Pusey, M., 1984/5, Citing Weber, M, ‘The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation’ in Rationality,
Organisations, and Language Towards a Critical Theory of Bureaucracy’ in Thesis Eleven, No. 11, 89.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 8
The task of reason is not easy: to say No to the System is intellectually easy even if, on occasions, it
takes some heroism. But how was we to say simultaneously both Yes and No? How does one invent
a strategy without making a game of strategies?
How are we to reconcile spontaneity and
organisation? How can we want efficiency and renounce technocracy? And, further, how do we steer
a course between a rationalism which identifies rationality with rationalisation and an irrationalism
which leaves us without resources?1
Whilst Luhmann talks about the rise of horizontal connections within bureaucracies as an important
connection here, therefore making it possible that the rationalisation of society will maintain a potential
flexibility that will avoid the ‘iron cage’ effect, therefore not necessarily heading to total democracy but
organisational life needed cover the entire social life, the discomfort that encroaching bureaucracy may bring
to the liberal will probably still remain.
HOW PREVALENT ARE MODERN BUREAUCRACIES ?
The modern capitalist state is completely dependant upon bureaucratic organisation for its continued
existence. As Weber says, “The larger the state, or the more it becomes a great power state, the more
unconditionally this is the case.”2 Nevertheless, whilst the size of the administrative unit is a major factor
determining the spread of rational bureaucratic organisation, there is not a unilateral relationship between
size and bureaucratisation.3
The necessity of specialisation to fulfil specific administrative tasks is as
important as size in promoting bureaucratic specialisation.4
As Weber identified, the major reason for the encroachment of bureaucratic organisation into the
performance of routinised tasks is its efficiency.5
“The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organisations exactly as does the
machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of
the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and
personal costs - these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic organisation…” 6
Weber believes the growth of the bureaucratic state is allied with the advance of political demarcation, as the
demands made by democrats for political representation and equality before the law necessitate complex
administrative and juridical provisions to lawfully limit privilege.7 It is this very relationship between
democracy and bureaucratisation that Weber believes creates one of the most profound sources of tension in
modern capitalism. This contradiction between the formal and substantive rationality of social actions is
illustrated by development of abstract legal procedures which, in helping to eliminate privilege, reintroduce
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ibid.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, Vol. 3, 971.
Ibid., 1003.
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
159.
Ibid., 159.
Weber, M., 1968, Op cit., 973.
Giddens, A, 1981, Op cit., 180.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 9
a new form of entrenched monopoly which is in some respects more arbitrary and autonomous than that
which they influence.1
Thus, bureaucratic organisation is promoted by the democratic requirement for impersonal selection of
office bearers according to the possession of educational qualifications, but this in itself creates a
stratification as identified by Luhmann, that produces a privileged group having more administrative power
than before.
Giddens recognises that government solely by the masses is an impossible aim in large modern societies,
with direct democracy only being possible in small scale communities. As Weber says in Politics as a
Vocation, “… there is only one choice between leadership democracy with a ‘machine’ and leaderless
democracy, namely, the rule of professional politicians without a calling, without the inner charismatic
qualities that make a leader, and this means what the party insurgents in the situation usually designate as
‘the rule of the clique’.2
Bureaucracy is a consequence of not merely in the sphere of politics or government, but society in general.
In some respects, Weber’s focus on bureaucracy is his answer to the idealism of Marxism. Marxism saw
prospects for increasing freedom coming out of the most advanced social forms arising from capitalism,
whilst Weber saw great changes and threats in its allied reliance on bureaucracy.
Weber was worried by the naivety of Marx’s view in “expropriating the expropriators”, regarding this as
simply replacing a multiplicity of capitalists with a simple unified capitalist. Giddens, thus identifies the
most significant divergence between Marx and Weber as being how far the alienating consequences of the
rationalisation of society derive from bureaucratisation, which is a necessary requisite of the modern society,
whether capitalist or socialist.3 Thus, whereas Marx saw socialism as the panacea of the evils of capitalism,
Weber saw socialism would necessitate “a tremendous increase in the importance of professional
bureaucrats”4, thus exacerbating the worst evils of capitalist bureaucracy and therefore alienation.
Weber believes that once bureaucracy has become established it is extremely resistant to any attempt to
remove its powers. He says, “Such an apparatus makes ‘revolution’, in the sense of the forceful creation of
entirely new formations of authority, more and more impossible…”5 The encroachment of bureaucracy
across modern capitalism is thus both cause and consequence of the rationalisation of law, politics and
industry, being the concrete, administrative manifestation of the rationalisation of action which has
penetrated into all spheres of Western culture.6 Giddens believes this spread of rationalisation can be
indexed by the progressive ‘disenchantment of the world’; the elimination of magical thought and practice,
induced by the great religious prophets and the systematising activities of priests. 7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Ibid., 180.
Weber, M., ‘Bureaucracy and Law’ in Gerth, H., and Wright Mills, C., 1991, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
113.
Giddens, A, 1981, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber,
216.
Weber, M., 1968, Economy and Society, Vol. 1, 224.
Weber, M., 1968, Op cit., 989.
Giddens, A, 1981, Op cit., 183.
Ibid.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 10
Weber notes the connection of bureaucracy with the work ethic, as he explored in The Protestant Ethic and the
Spirit of Capitalism1, but makes the important distinction that whilst the “Puritan wanted to work in a calling;
we are forced to do so.”2 Weber believed people’s relation to work was not as mere labour, but as invariably
adopted as a form of vocation evidenced by the need for training qualifications. Weber noted that the
official takes on his/her work with a sense of carrying out a task according to a sort of spirit or ethic with
moral overtones.
The main normative issue then is not how the process of bureaucratisation can be
reversed, but, “What can we set against this mechanisation to preserve a certain section of humanity form
fragmentation of the soul, this complete ascendancy of the bureaucratic ideal of life” 3
Bureaucracy has had the effect of institutionalising expertise. The more bureaucratised a country, the more
attention was paid to expert knowledge and efficiency.
Welfare and progress became increasingly
determined using terms defined by experts. The culture becomes rationalist and utilitarian, searching out
the cheapest and effective manner for achieving stated goals, with social goals tending to become defined in
terms of the technical means that are available, with democracy becoming irksome as it is increasingly
perceived that only experts have the knowledge and experience to decide. 4
Taken to their ultimate limit, these ideas imply that industrial society is best run without a democratic
political system that may only hamper the interests of professional bureaucracies of government, and the
private sector. The realities of government meant it was impractical to implement the untested initiatives
that may evolve from a democratic political process, with modern bureaucracies having evolved to
compromise discrete and specialised sphere headed and jealously guarded by their own expert
bureaucracies.5 Given these observed pitfalls, why is it that bureaucracies have not diminished?
WHY HAVE BUREAUCRACIES BECOME SO PREVALENT?
Initially, the reasons for bureaucracy were primarily military.
Superiority of the standing army over
knightly warfare meant the first European modern bureaucracies were needed to be funded reliably. Weber
refers to the development of these bureaucracies saying,
Among purely political factors, the increasing demand for a society accustomed to absolute
pacification, for order or protection in all fields exerts an especially persevering influence in the
direction of bureaucratisation.
A steady road leads from modifications of the blood feud,
sacerdotally, or by means of arbitration, to the resent position of the policeman as the ‘representative
of God on earth’. The former means placed the guarantees for the individual’s rights and security
squarely upon the members of his sib, who are obliged to assist him with oath and vengeance.
Among other factors, primarily the manifold tasks of the so-called ‘policy of social welfare’ operate in
the direction of bureaucratisation, for these tasks are, in part, saddled upon the state by interest
1
2
3
4
5
Weber, M., 1968, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 40.
Weber, M., 1968, Op cit., 181.
Giddens, A, 1981, Op cit., 236.
Gamble, A., 1989, An Introduction to Modern Social and Political Thought, 165.
Gamble, A., 1989, Op cit., 167.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 11
groups and in part, the state usurps them, either for reasons of power policy or for ideological
motives.”1
Weber points to the connection of some of these things with purely technical aspects of modern society. For
Weber, the modern means of communication enter the picture as ‘pacemakers’ of modern bureaucracy, ie;
public lands, modern communication, railways, etc., become analogous to canals and rivers in ancient
civilisations. In contrast, for Marx, the bureaucracy was ‘a parasitic growth on the back of society’, a useless
collection of unproductive workers, who in contrast to the proletariat, make no real contribution to the
productive output of society.
A large number of studies have been done which help to critique Weber’s theory. One particularly well
known critique is that of Elton Mayo of the Harvard Business School. Mayo was interested in how to
produce a healthy work environment with morale and incentive rather than simply high wages or salaries.
These studies were prompted by some 1930’s work which had found that people not only carry out orders,
but also at times resist and obstruct the organisations aims. The recognition of informal structures has had
important implications for organisation theory. The most important initial response was the theory of
Human Relations as developed by Mayo, which sought to reconcile the formal organisation with the
informal structure, by placing a premium on the needs of the workers. Without undermining the command
structure of the formal organisation, it argued it was possible to improve the level of job satisfaction by
attending to the felt needs of the employees by job enrichment, extensive awards such as promotion and
esteem, as well as salary.
Mayo says an alternative arrangement may come into effect so that inverted power relations may occur, or
people are circumvented. Also there might be solidarity to avoid particular commands and particular work
levels to maintain. Problems exist because often the overseer is part of the system, as he wants consensus
with the workers, so sometimes people you least expect to have power, have extreme power.
This
movement sought to encourage a more meaningful participation in decision making by making
democratisation a goal of the bureaucratic structure.
This was in contrast to Weber’s view that the
bureaucratic structure is undemocratic, with people being elected on the grounds of competence rather then
popularity or support from the employees, as the assumption that competence can only be recognised by
those of greater competence.
The effect of Human Relations has only been partly successful. In more recent times, ‘organisation culture’,
or ‘culture theory’ has emerged, which gives emphasis to looking at various sometimes intangible features of
a work environment which will improve things, by changes such as office refurbishing etc. The logic of the
theory is that by altering the physical aspects of the work environment, the cultural ambience of the
environment may improve. Certain types of work were more amenable to culture theory, such as the high
technology industries, by the same notions may not work with very routine and mechanical processes are
involved. Also, there was always an underlying assumption that it was possible to reconcile the formal and
1
Weber, M., ‘Bureaucracy and Law’ in Gerth, H., and Wright Mills, C., 1991, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology,
213.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 12
informal structure into harmony, based an the assumption that you can subsume the informal structure into
the formal structure.
IN CONCLUSION: BUREAUCRACY AND DEBUREAUCRACY
The attempt to debureaucratise is occurring to some extent, by the initiative of the bureaucratic
organisations themselves. It has been found that in some circumstances, a less bureaucratic structure is
efficient, though Weber had made an implicit assumption that there will be a more or less one to one
correspondence between official sphere of competence and one’s actual functional competence. This is why
Weber believed bureaucracies would always be inherently efficient.
Bureaucratic inefficiencies nevertheless have obviously come about, as was evident in the old Soviet
Bureaucracy. As the people at the top of organisations are by no means necessarily at the peak of power in
organisations, Weber made a distinction between official and professional of functional power and
authority, which is recognised om professional associations. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that a
bureaucratic organisation is not the only way of rationalising institutions in the modern context. Probably
more significantly, in considering the disparity between Weber’s classical theory of bureaucracy and
practice, is his over reliance on the methodology of the ideal type, which as we have shown, has definite
shortcomings, and deserves much of the critique detailed to it.
Bureaucracy / David Risstrom / Page 13
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