Kyle Francis
History 6393
In The Age of Extremes Eric Hobsbawm attempts to make sense of the “short
twentieth century” in which he lived. This 600-page epic assesses the development of the
entire planet—giving slightly more weight to Europe affairs—from the period of the
outbreak of the First World War to the fall of the Soviet Union. He contrasts this period
(1914-1989) with what he deems to be the “long nineteenth century” from 1789-1914.
But whereas the longer century was an era of relative peace and prosperity, the shorter
one consisted primarily of two periods of violence and catastrophe, with a short age of
prosperity sandwiched in between. Indeed, Hobsbawm divides the short century into
three distinct periods: the Age of Catastrophe (1914-1945), the Golden Age (1950-1970),
and the Landslide (1970-1989). Although he admits in the preface that “nobody can
write the history of the twentieth century like that of any other era, if only because
nobody can write about his or her lifetime as one can write about a period known only
from outside,”1 his attempt is admirable, as he transforms this apparent shortcoming into
an advantage by combining firsthand experience with a degree of objective reality. His
primary knowledge of the culture and events that shaped this century allows him to paint
a truly organic portrait of the period which would prove impossible for any other era.
The twin disasters of two world wars on either side of a world-wide depression—
which Hobsbawm labels “The Great Slump”—comprise the Age of Catastrophe.
Following on, and resulting from, the unimaginable carnage of the First World War was
the Russian Revolution, which established the economic dichotomy of capitalism and
communism that would dominate the short-twentieth century. Paradoxically, it took a
1
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Pantheon Books,
1994), ix.
temporary détente between the two superpowers—the USA and the USSR—which
championed these opposing systems to propel the world out of the Age of Catastrophe.
By fighting as (nominal) allies during World War II, they combined to defeat the fascist
regimes of Europe and Asia; this victory heralded a short period of relative economic and
political stability throughout the world. Before the war erupted, however, the communist
system had proved its viability by managing to avoid the Great Slump which descended
on all the major capitalist economies of the world. This remarkable feat engendered a
host of communist revolutions and—after World War II—Soviet expansion that resulted
in over one-third of the world’s population living under communist rule. Hobsbawm
argues that the Great Slump, combined with the rise of communism—in another
interesting paradox—ultimately saved capitalism by forcing it to reform its vulgar laissez
faire policies. In America, Roosevelt (grudgingly) instituted Keynesian economic
reforms: he created the modern welfare programs such as social security and government
subsidies, while also heralding an age of high tariffs and overall intervention by the
federal government. The end of the Age of Catastrophe was accompanied by a massive
decolonization movement, which also resulted from the economic slump of the great
depression and wide-spread redrawing of the geographical map that followed the Second
World War.
Despite the escalating Cold War, Hobsbawm sees the years 1950-1970 as the
Golden Age of the twentieth century. The two most important aspects of this age of
relative prosperity were the death of the peasantry and the resulting rise of urbanization.
This phenomenon occurred in both capitalist and communist countries alike, and
contributed to both rising living standards and the growing importance of the individual
2
over any other collective association (notably church and kinship ties). In the West, the
rise of the individual comprised part of a larger cultural revolution, which also created a
growing importance on higher education. As a result, a new youth culture began to assert
itself through new types of media such as radio and television. In the industrial sector,
developing technology produced more jobs than it eradicated and contributed to yearly
incomes that rose steadily throughout this twenty year period. The USA could focus on
its economy because of the world-wide stabilization that followed on the heals of World
War II. Interestingly, Hobsbawm argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons in both
the USA and the USSR in actuality ensured that neither country would attack the other
and that both could concentrate on their burgeoning economies.
By 1970, however, this age of prosperity gave way to what Hobsbawm labeled
the Landslide. In capitalist countries, the creation of new jobs could no longer keep pace
with those that were eradicated by the technological explosion. In addition, as companies
became more multinational their loyalty to their country was superseded by their desire to
maximize profits—many first-world workers found their jobs outsourced to third-world
countries. As a result, inequality began to reassert itself in first- and third-world
countries. In the communist economies, the USSR was slowly losing its grip on its
dominions. In addition to its well-known break with China, its iron rule created
widespread apathy among its Russian and Eastern European subjects. Hobsbawm places
the blame for the ultimate fall of the USSR on its own internal contradictions, rather than
Regan’s neoconservative (and largely rhetorical) policies. Not only did the Soviets
champion an inefficient economic system, but their widespread human-rights atrocities—
notably under Stalin—severed the government’s ties to its people. When Gorbachev
3
introduced his policies of perestroika and glasnost it was already too late—dissidents
seized on the opportunity to overthrow the communist political structure entirely.
The decline of the capitalist and communist economies had wide-ranging
consequences for the Third World countries as well. Hobsbawm also discusses the wave
of revolutions—most importantly the 1979 Iranian revolution—that swept through these
countries in the 1970s and 80s. Interspersed throughout his monumentous work are
thoughtful discussions on fascism, totalitarianism, modernism and post-modernism.
Hobsbawm also devotes time to the billion-dollar industries of music, drugs, sports and
the arts. An underlying theme of his work is his rejection of post-modernism, which he
implicitly confirms by attempting to make sense out of the events that have dominated his
life and by placing them within an overall world framework. Despite his insightful
discussions of culture and the arts, he is first and foremost an economic historian. He
undoubtedly feels that the Russian Revolution of 1917 was the most important event of
the short twentieth century because of its influence on every aspect of world
development. Its eventual failure in 1989—far from heralding a new age of prosperity
and “the end of history”—ushered in another era of instability and nationalist
movements. “This old century,” he concludes, “has not ended well.”2
2
Hobsbawm, 17.
4