British military interference in Persia and the Russo

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Defence & Security Series
Author: John Karkazis
Issue D3, July 2004
COLONIALISM IN ASIA.
THE BRITISH MILITARY INTERFERENCE IN PERSIA
AND THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
(extracts)
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CONTENTS
THE NEW WAVE OF COLONIALISM IN ASIA
THE PERSIAN FACTOR
THE OPENING OF JAPAN TO THE WEST
THE CHINESE FACTOR
THE OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
As in the case of Africa the first to enter the race of colonialism in Asia were the
Portuguese. Portuguese colonialism was supported mainly by the royal treasury and
the colonial expeditions were planned by the government under the close supervision
of the kings. In less than 25 years, from 1505 to 1523, the Portuguese established a
dense network of trading posts and colonies in the Persian Gulf, in India (Goa), in
Indochina (Malacca), in south China (Macau) and 20 years later in south Japan
(Deshima). The rapid growth of the Portuguese Colonial System was due to the
favorable synergy of many factors: the consolidation of peace and order in mainland
Portugal, the innovative designs of Portuguese engineers in shipbuilding (faster and
bigger ocean ships equipped with advanced weapons) and the advanced logistics
(excellent maps for their time), the adventurous and daring spirit of the early
colonialists, the extremely harsh ways with which they were treating resistance and
the very able kings who were governing Portugal during that period. This colonial and
trade network did not last for long. A series of unfavorable this time reasons led the
colonial system of Portugal in Asia to a rapid collapse: incapable and megalomaniac
kings who with their extra-vacant spending leveled the royal treasury, financial
problems, problems with Spain and the technological advancements of competitive
powers (Dutch and British).
The second to enter the colonial race in Asia were the Dutch who seized, during the
first half of the 17th century, most of the colonial holdings of Portugal there (in
Ceylon, India, Malaysia, Sumatra and Guinea). In contrast to the Portuguese, Dutch
and British colonialism was company-driven. These specially chartered colonial
companies came to rule large territories, exercising military power and assuming
administrative functions, to the exclusion, gradually, of their commercial pursuits.
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The third to come (in early 18th century) were the British who by early 19th century
had been firmly established all over India, in Indochina and Indonesia. In 1819 the
British established a colony in Singapore controlling in this way the strategic passage
of Singapore Straits.
THE NEW WAVE OF COLONIALISM IN ASIA
In early 19th century all three empires of Asia (Ottoman, Persian and Chinese) were in
decay.
In the middle of 19th century the great colonial powers of Europe, Japan and USA
started a new and more intense colonial race in Asia and particularly in China which
produced fierce tensions between them and led to a series of alliances and wars.
The British added vast territories of Southeast Asia in their colonial empire: Malay
States (1800-1824), Sumatra (1819), Burma (1852-1885) and British Borneo (1888).
Britain expanded its Dominion of India northwards to Kashmir (1843) and westwards
to Beluchistan (1883) to check the advance of the Russians from Central Asia. In
1899 Lord Curzon became the Viceroy of India and stayed in this post until 1905
working hard and mobilizing his high diplomatic skills in order to check the advance
of the Russians towards the Indian Ocean. In 1907 the British extended their colonial
rule to Southeast Persia in order to counter-balance the advance of imperial Russia
into Northern Persia. Finally, Britain, in 1842, established its colonial rule over a
number of important trading posts in China: Hong Kong, Sanghai and Canton.
There is a synergy of facts which lead rather safely to the conclusion that the advance
of Russians in Afghanistan did not pose a strategic threat for Britain (at least during
Curzon’s term in India):
1. The supply lines for a Russian army operating in Afghanistan were enormous in
length covering thousands of miles through the harsh and un-hospitable
environment of Siberia and the Central Asian Steppe.
2. Russia was confronted with serious internal disorder weakening the morale of its
armed forces (the student riots in St. Petesburg in 1901 fiercely dispersed by
Cossacks, the anti-semitic pogroms in 1903 etc).
3. Russian navy was rather backward for the British standards and not a match for
the British navy.
4. The Russians during the above period were heavily pre-occupied with building
their military and economic power in the Maritime Province and the Manchuria
and making preparations for the forthcoming confrontation with the Japanese.
5. The Russian regime wanted desperately some success in the Afghan front to
distract public opinion from internal problems and to counter-balance, in the eyes
of the Russian elites, the British expansionism in the area. The question of
proceeding further south most probably was out of the minds of Russian
diplomacy during this period.
As a consequence, it is rather safe to conclude that the direction given to Lord Curzon
was to check the Russian advance strictly through diplomatic means. New York
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Times in 17 April 1885, commenting on the victorious for the Russians outcome of
the Penjdeh battle in northeast Afghanistan in 1885 reported that the British and
especially Premier Gladstone, briefing the House of Commons on this issue, reacted
rather coolly to the news that the Russians had been firmly established in Pendjeh.
During the period 1884-1907 France established itself as colonial power in French
Indochina. Also in 1896 France and Britain signed an agreement settling their
disputes over Siam.
In 1898 USA established their colonial rule in Philippines and in Guam.
During the second half of 19th century Russia extended its rule from the eastern coast
of Caspian Sea (1843) to Northeast Afghanistan (1885) threatening in this way the
British interests in the Indian sub-continent (battle of Penjdah in which Russians
defeated the Afghanis). During the same period Russia incorporated into its empire
vast areas in Siberia extending from Ural Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. In 1858
Russia extended its rule north of Amur River (Amur Province) and in 1868 took from
China the territories south of Amur River (Maritime Province with Vladivostok as its
capital). In 1912 Outer Mongolia was drawn in the Russian sphere of influence.
THE PERSIAN FACTOR
In mid 19th century Russia advanced into Northwest Persia conquering Tiflis and
Baku and immediately afterwards advanced into Northeast Persia (east of Caspian
Sea). At this point (1864) the British interfered to bolster the Persian government
against the Russia. The British granted Persian government a loan taking the customs
in Persian Gulf ports as a collateral. In 1900 a Russian flotilla, belonging to the 1st
Squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the flagship gunboat Gilyak, appeared in the
Persian Gulf to pay the first visit ever to the area. Next year the Russians sent to the
Gulf another flotilla of the Pacific Fleet under a state-of-the-art flagship, the Varyag, a
protected cruiser, to pay this time official visits to several ports of the Persian Gulf
states. The British reacted cautiously sending to Persia for a visit the Viceroy of India,
Lord Curzon, a very able and ruthless diplomat. In 1902 and 1903 the Russians
upgraded their presence in the Persian Gulf by deploying there two cruisers of the
Pacific Fleet, the Askold and the Boyarin. Local regimes welcome the deployment of
these warships seeing Russia as a counter-force to British expansionism [8].
Following the expansionist policies of Russia and Britain in Persia, a Persian
nationalist revolution broke out in 1905 leading to the establishment of the first
parliament in Tehran, putting in danger the Russian and British interests there. The
two powers solved this issue through diplomacy by dividing Persia, in 1907, into two
zones of influence, the northern assigned to Russians and the southern going to the
British. The British exploited the vast oil fields of southern Persia (under the
extremely favorable for them trade and production agreements) in order to build a
powerful navy.
The understanding developed by the two colonial competitors (Russia and Britain) in
the case of Persia came as result of the Triple Entente between Britain, France and
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Russia, signed in 1904, which had its causal roots in the growing threat imposed on
them by a new and dynamic player in the colonial affairs, the imperial Germany.
THE OPENING OF JAPAN TO THE WEST
The Portuguese and the Dutch had established trading posts in Japan since early 16th
century. In 1853 the American Commodore Perry with a number of naval vessels of
the East Indian Squadron forced his way into Yedo Bay demanding from the Japanese
government, somewhat peremptorily [1], to negotiate commercial relations with USA
and other Powers. The next year the Japanese complied and in 1867 an internal
revolution took place leading to the rapid westernization of Japan. Forcing his way to
Japan, Commodore Perry should have equipped himself with valuable information
regarding the desire of the elite classes of Japan to earn money through trade and
solve endemic financial problems, a fact making them potential allies of USA. The
Yedo Bay incident marks the beginning of the heavy involvement of USA in the Far
East affairs.
THE CHINESE FACTOR
The decaying China under the Manchu dynasty opened the imperialistic appetite of all
European colonial powers. The beginning of this intervention coincides with the
armed intervention of British and French, in mid 1850s, to protect their commercial
interests related to opium exports to China from British India and French Indochina
(the Opium Wars). On the other hand, as a result of the Aigun Treaty (1858) and the
Beijing Treaty (1860) Russians took from China the area south of Amur River making
it a province of their empire (the Maritime Province). At the same time the Russians
started an intense naval built-up in the region establishing a strong and fearful fleet
there, the Pacific Fleet, with naval headquarters in Vladivostok, the capital of
Maritime Province. Around 1870s Japan started to force Korea out of the influence of
the Manchu dynasty making efforts to place it under its own influence. A product of
these expansionist ambitions was the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) which was
won by the Japanese. Following this war Korea declared its independence from China
and Japan rushed to recognize it. The Shimonoseki Treaty of 1895 settled the disputes
of this war in favor of Japan, ceding to the Japanese the Liaodong Peninsula, a
strategic out-post in southern Manchuria. Russia, France and Germany (the latter a
newcomer in the Chinese colonial race with interests in the area opposite to Liaodong
Peninsula) reacted against this treaty and demanded from the weak Chinese
government to annul it. At that time there was a rather erroneous conception
consensus among the above three Powers that Japan was lacking the means, the nerve
and the decisiveness to defend its ambitions in China. The reaction of these Powers
led to the Triple Intervention Treaty which was signed in 1895 and annulled the
concessions of the previous treaty regarding Japan. Following the Triple Intervention
Treaty the Russians extended their sphere of (economic) influence into northeast
China (Manchuria) winning a concession (granted by the Chinese government) to
construct the Chinese Eastern Railway (or Manchuria Railway) connecting
Vladivostok with the city of Harbin in Manchuria. The concession was signed in
1896. Next year Russia concluded a 25-years lease of Liaodong Peninsula in southern
Manchuria a fact which accelerated the construction of the Manchuria Railway. In
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1897 the Russians sent a powerful fleet in the strategic out-posts of Port Arthur, in the
Liaodong Peninsula, which forced the Chinese government to conclude during the
next year a treaty with Russia under which Port Arthur was ceded to Russia. In 1900
Russia felt strong enough to annex Manchuria. The “selling” of Manchuria to the
Russians was one of the main contributing factors to the Boxers Uprising. The Boxer
Uprising was a nationalist uprising in China during the period 1898-1901 which
opposed the western imperialism and in particular the European “spheres of
influence” in China. The colonial powers of Europe and the USA sent a strong
expeditionary force in China consisting of 54 warships, 50.000 soldiers and 5.000
marines which defeated the Boxers rebellion, took Beijing and imposed on China
humiliating reparations. At that time the propaganda apparatus of western powers
(mainly of Britain and France) was advanced enough to be engaged successfully in
this war and distort its image in the West: mass killings committed by Boxers were
termed “atrocities” whereas mass killings (in a smaller scale) committed by
expeditionary forces and the humiliating colonial terms imposed on the Chinese
people were termed as “lawful acts”. As a result of the above events China initiated a
massive modernization plan.
The favorable attitude of France towards Russian ambitions in Manchuria was most
probably motivated by its hectic efforts to draw Russia into an alliance with her in
order to counter-balance the rising power and ambitions of imperial Germany in
Europe.
In 1885 the Treaty of Tientsin between France and China ended the Sino-French War
forcing China to recognize a French protectorate over Annam and Tonkin in
Southeast China (Indochina).
In 1898 the Germans extorted a 99-years lease on Kiochow Bay (Northeast China)
and exclusive rights in Shatung Peninsula opposite to Port Arthur.
To complete the colonial division of China, the British took control of the strategic
Yangtse Valley and of a series of ports.
THE OPEN DOOR DOCTRINE [1]
In late 1890s, the US (already firmly established in the Far East: Philippines and
Guam), fearing that the whole China would be divided by European colonial powers
to spheres of influence, introduced the Open Door Doctrine (ODD) to protect its
interests in China and elsewhere.
In particular, Secretary of State John Hay in 1899 sent notes to the colonial powers
having interests in China (Russia, Japan, Britain, France and Germany) asking them
to declare formally they would respect China’s territorial and administrative integrity
and they would not interfere with the free use of the ports within their spheres of
influence in China. With the exception of Japan, all other powers replied to Hey’s
request by stating that they could not commit themselves until the other powers do.
Despite this ambiguous reaction, Hay announced that European powers had granted
their consent to his request and as a consequence ODD became an international
policy.
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Wood (1921) gave a review of the genesis of ODD. See also Appendix 1 for the
articles of ODD.
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE ALLIANCE
In 1902 Japan signed a military alliance with Britain. This alliance was characterized
as controversial by many scholars in the sense that it set (secured) a favorable
diplomatic environment for the massive built-up of Japan, its expansionist policies
and its involvement in World War II [2] . This alliance ended the so called “Splendid
Isolation” of Britain and opened for the Japanese the road towards (regaining)
Manchuria an area rich in raw materials desperately needed by the fast growing
Japanese industry. See appendix 1 for the articles of the treaty.
As mentioned earlier, one of the causal roots of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of
Alliance, from the point of view of the British, most probably lied on the threat
imposed by Russians on the British interests in the Persian Gulf and in the strategic
sea passage to India. Note that this threat reached a climax in 1901-1902 with the
regular (rotating) deployment in the Persian Gulf of Russian warships belonging to
the Pacific Fleet.
After the Russo-Japanese war in 2005 and the complete annihilation of the naval
power of Russians in the Pacific (both the Pacific and the Baltic Fleet were destroyed
during this war) the Russian threat in the area practically seized to exist. Thus the
regular renewals of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Alliance up to its termination in
1923 were not motivated (at least from the side of Britain) by the Russian threat. In
the light of the above facts the second renewal of this treaty in 1911 raises questions
on the open and (probably) hidden aims of this renewal. The threat imposed on vital
British interests by USA anti-colonial policies (the Open Door, the Monroe and later
the Woodrow Wilson doctrines clearly expressed and forcefully projected an anticolonial attitude on the part of USA) was global and imminent. After the defeat of
Russia in 1905 the only power which could have, in the medium and long term, the
potential forces and the potential political reasoning to interfere, alone, with Japanese
and British interests in China and Korea was the USA. Germany and France
possessed neither the naval forces nor the incentives (their colonial holdings in China
were of secondary importance if compared with their African ones) to interfere alone
in the area. An extra reason against the interference of France with the AngloJapanese interests in China and Korea was the growing Entente between Britain and
France. The possibility that two (or more) powers would interfere with AngloJapanese interests in the area constituted a more threatening and complex for the
British geo-political game which needed special attention (article 3 of the Treaty).
Among all combinations involving two powers acting against British interests in the
area the only feasible ones were those involving USA as one of the partners. Finally
the possibility, in the long term, that the Japanese interests will interfere with the
British ones in the Indian Ocean could not be excluded as a political reasoning behind
the Treaty, but before the colonial appetite of Japan could have reached Indian Ocean
it should have tasted first the American colonial holdings along the route to India.
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As a consequence of the above remarks there exist plenty of arguments for opening a
discussion on the hypothesis that when the British were working on the AngloJapanese (Military) Alliance Treaty had in the back of their mind USA: to help Japan
to build an economic, military and colonial power base in the area which will
interfere with the ambitions of USA there (or provoke them) distracting US
attention from Europe, Africa and the Middle East (where the main interests of
Britain were lying) or even weakening USA as a result of a military
confrontation with Japan, in which case Britain (according to the article 2 of the
Treaty) would resort to the comfortable excuse of neutrality.
These arguments are also supported by the forceful intervention, 3 years after the
signing of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty, of Theodore Roosevelt during the
Portsmouth Treaty negotiations, ending the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, in favor of the
Russians and against the British interests in the Far East[12](see also next section).
THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 is considered as the first great war of the 20th
century. It was the result of the conflicting ambitions of Japan and Russia over the
geo-economic and geo-political significance of Manchuria and Korea in their imperial
designs:
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The need, on the part of Russia, of Manchuria to safeguard from the south its
Maritime Province and the strategic port of Vladivostok and at the same time
to secure Port Arthur as a warm naval base, controlling Bo Hai and Korean
Bay, for the winter season during which Vladivostok was closed. Also one
could add the need for Russia to distract internal public opinion from criticism
against the Tsar’s regime with imperialistic adventures feeding nationalistic
sentiments.
The need, on the part of Japan, of Manchuria’s raw material wealth, to feed
both its fast growing industry and its fast growing naval forces and also of
Korea’s strategic location both to safeguard access to Manchuria and also to
safeguard the strategic Korean Straits.
Having grossly underestimated the ability and resolution of Japan to provoke a new
war in the area, the Russians had been heavily involved in psychological deterrence
games against the Japanese by over-projecting the capabilities of their Pacific Fleet
deploying detachments of this fleet as far as the Persian Gulf.
Negotiations between Japan and Russia to settle the above conflicts started as early as
July 1903 when Japan handed over to Russia proposals on this issue providing for a
Russian zone of influence over Manchuria and for a Japanese zone of influence over
Korea. Although these proposals satisfied the basic Russian interests and ambitions in
Manchuria, the over-confident tsarist regime responded with a maximalistic counterproposal demanding that Korea should be left outside the interests of Japan.
As a result of the deadlock in these negotiations, on 8 February 1904, to secure the
element of surprise, the imperial Japanese navy, under the command of Admiral
Togo, attacked, three hours before the formal declaration of war, Port Arthur, the
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heavily fortified Russian naval base overlooking the bays of Korea and Bo Hai.
During the first day of the battle Japan, with an attack of a torpedo boat destroyer,
badly damaged the two strongest warships of the Pacific Fleet and also a cruiser. The
next few days, although the battle of Port Arthur was undecided, the Russians were
unfortunate enough to lose Admiral Makarov, the commander of the armed forces in
Port Arthur, who was killed in the battle.
As a result of the above events and the fact that Tsar Nicholas II had been assured by
his ministers in many occasions that Japan would not undertake an attack against
Russia, the element of surprise of the initial attack was multiplied and extended even
deeper inside Russian command apparatus in the Far East, adding also the element of
a growing de-moralization at the lower ranks of the army. The above in combination
with the endemic incompetence and inexperience of Russians over naval affairs (at
least as compared with the British, French and Germans) could explain the hesitation
of the Russians to move their fleet out of the naval base and to confront the Japanese
in the open sea, a hesitation that was proved lethal some months later during the siege
of Port Arthur by the Japanese army.
The naval attack on Port Arthur proved to be a cover for the landing of massive
Japanese (land) forces near Incheon in Korea. By April 1904 the Japanese army had
reached Yalu River, marking the borders between Korea and Manchuria, defeated the
Russians in the homonymous battle and moved inside the Russian-occupied
Manchuria. Despite the heavy losses it had suffered, by August 1904 the Japanese
army reached the outskirts of the city of Port Arthur whereas the Japanese navy
blockaded the Russian naval base. During this blockade both powers suffered
considerable losses amounting to two battleships for each one of them. Around the
end of 1904 the Japanese heavy artillery managed to take favorable positions on the
hills overlooking the city and the naval base and destroyed all capital warships of the
Russian Pacific Fleet (4 warships and 2 cruisers). This was the first incident in the
world naval history in which so many battleships are lost from land-based artillery
fire. In December 1904 general Anatoly Stessel, commander of Port Arthur garrison,
surrendered the city to the Japanese army. For his action, in 1908, Stessel was courtmartialed and sentenced to death. In the following three months the Japanese won in
Manchuria two more decisive battles, in Sandepu and Mukden, forcing the Russian
army to retreat to the north of Manchuria.
To save Manchuria the Russians decided to send to the area the powerful Baltic Fleet
in a 18.000 miles journey through Cape of Good Hope. It took the Baltic Fleet more
than four months to reach Far East. This extremely long journey tested the morale of
the sailors and created technical problems which reduced the speed capacity of the
fleet. British intelligence, on the other hand, helped Japanese by providing them with
useful information regarding the course of the Russian Armada [3]. Following a series
of tactical mistakes by the part of the fleet command, the Baltic Fleet (which included
among its warships the crème of Russian naval forces: four new Borodino class
battleships) was engaged in a fierce battle with the Combined Fleet of Japan in the
Tsushima Straits between Korea and Japan (27-28 May 1905). During this battle the
Baltic Fleet was practically annihilated loosing eight warships.
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The defeat of the Russians in the Far East intensified the internal turmoil in Russia
which turned into an open revolt at the end of 1905 in St Petersburg during which
1.000-4.000 people were massacred by Tsar’s forces.
The Russo-Japanese War was formally ended with the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905.
Under this treaty the Japanese recovered from the Russians Port Arthur and the
Liaotung Peninsula and established a sphere of influence over Manchuria, a
protectorate status over Korea and also took from the Russians the southern part of
Sakhalin island.
During the Treaty of Portsmouth negotiations USA President Theodore Roosevelt
stepped in forcefully in favor of Russia. USA, possessing the strategic out-post of
Philippines and having growing interests over China, were aiming to a balanced
outcome at these negotiations, in which Russia should not be overwhelmingly
weakened in the Far East.
Appendix 1
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE TREATY OF ALLIANCE [1]
The treaty contained the following six articles:
Article 1. The High Contracting parties, having mutually recognized the
independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced
by aggressive tendencies in either country, having in view, however, their special
interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, whilst
Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a
peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the
High Contracting parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to
take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests
if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by
disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of
either of the High Contracting parties for the protection of the lives and
properties of its subjects.
Article 2. Declaration of neutrality if either signatory becomes involved in war
through Article 1.
Article 3. Promise of support if either signatory becomes involved in war with
more than one Power.
Article 4. Signatories promise not to enter into separate agreements with other
Powers to the prejudice of this alliance.
Article 5. The signatories promise to communicate frankly and fully with each
other when any of the interests affected by this treaty are in jeopardy.
Article 6. Treaty to remain in force for five years and then at one years' notice,
unless notice was given at the end of the fourth year.
Articles 2 and 3 were most crucial concerning war and mutual defence. The treaty laid
out an acknowledgement of Japanese interests in Korea without obligating the UK to
help should a Russo-Japanese conflict arise on this account. Japan was not obligated
to defend British interests in India.
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Reference
1. Wikipedia: Anglo-Japanese Alliance
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