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The Pluralist Winter, 1963, No. 2, pp.4-13.
Scientific_stat.doc
THE SCIENTIFIC STATUS
OF PSYCHOANALYSIS
By J. J. Furedy
Most systems nowadays claim to be scientific, for it is currently fashionable to be so.
Thus we are told of scientific ways of removing hair and scientific ways of growing it,
scientific ways of losing weight, and scientific ways of gaining it, and so on.
Psychoanalysis is no exception in this regard. From the time of its inception, its claim
to a scientific status has been upheld by its originator, who called it a "mental science",
while Fliess1, to take a more recent exponent's view, describes it as the "new science". For
the purposes of this paper however, and contrary to the current fashions, I want to insist
that status and scientific status are not identical and that therefore the problem of the
scientific status of psychoanalysis is to be seen as one of demarcation rather than one of
evaluation. The question, then, with which I will deal, is not whether psychoanalysis is
"any good", but rather the one of whether psychoanalysis is scientific or not.
As a preliminary, I should make clear that the only psychoanalytic system which I
will concern myself with is the strictly Freudian sort. I have made this restriction both
because of my ignorance of the many other systems of the various "deviationists" and
because I suspect that, on account of the enormous variety of features of these other
systems, it would be extremely difficulty to make any sort of generalisation about them.
Even in terms of this restriction, it is still not easy to give invariant characterisations of the
Freudian system, for Freud, like most other system builders, often changed his mind
without actually realising this sufficiently to eliminate the ensuing inconsistency. I shall
therefore take my comments to apply to something which we could call the "spirit" of the
Freudian system, rather than claiming that my characterisations are true of whatever Freud
said at any stage of his career.
Within this framework then, I want to suggest two criteria of the scientific and see to
what extent they can be predicated of the Freudian system. In addition, I also want to put
forward some further attendant features of, or attitudes connected with, scientific enquiry,
and again consider how psychoanalysis "measures up" to these. In this regard I do not
pretend that there is universal agreement about these criteria and attitudes among
philosophers of science. Nor do I claim to give detailed arguments for their soundness
(although I shall try to indicate in an unsystematic and merely suggestive way, why I think
they are correct), since this undertaking would be far beyond the scope of this paper. It
will then be apparent that answers to the question of the scientific status of psychoanalysis
which differ from mine are also possible: answers which can only be rejected by the
acceptance of a description of the scientific which, while it seems to me to be sound,
1
Fliess, R. (ed.): The Psychoanalytic Reader. London, 1950, p. ix.
4
is not the only sort of characterisation which has been put forward by theorists.
Before considering psychoanalysis in the light of these proposed standards however, I
want to deal briefly with, and to dismiss, some obviously unsound arguments which have
been raised against the claim of psychoanalysis to be a science. Such a brief dismissal is
possible in the case of these views simply because all of them obviously lack any cogence
when one considers them at all carefully. I mention them only because these views
(which, more often than not, are only implicit rather than being openly stated in detail) are
too frequently the ones on which a theorist bases his dismissal of a particular system as
not being scientific.
In this connection, one finds that some writers would dismiss psychoanalysis as a
science on the grounds of implausibility. An example here is Eysenck's attack on
psychoanalysis on the grounds that its theories are "far-fetched"2. Now it is apparent on
consideration, that it is fallacious to take plausibility to be relevant to scientific status,
there being innumerable examples of scientific (and true) theories which were quite
implausible at the time they were put forward. To take just one of these, Galileo's denial
of the geocentric theory certainly had the epithet of "far-fetched" attached to it by many
contemporary thinkers, yet one would hardly deny it scientific status now.
A related sort of view is manifested by writers like Jastrow, who wants to dismiss
psychoanalysis because it is "unnatural"3. Again, Lynch seems to use the notion of
morality as a criterion of the scientific when first, in a somewhat flowery passage, he
states that when he read through Freud's works, the latter "seemed to be as much haunted
by the eternal sense of Sex; but through it all I was unable to find anything but the most
fugitive glimpse of science" and later complains of Freud's "prurient imagination"4. Once
more, the irrelevance of these sorts of considerations to the question of scientific status is
quite apparent.
Finally, there are certain attacks on psychoanalysis which are based on mere
metaphysical prejudices. Thus one finds the rejection of psychoanalytic concepts on
purely materialist grounds, e.g. that they are unscientific because they are intangible.
However, as we might expect, any apparent cogency of this sort of view is destroyed once
we consider such concepts as electrons which, though clearly intangible, are concepts with
an undisputable scientific status.
Returning now to what I regard as more adequate standards by which to decide the
scientific status of a system, I want to suggest the requirement of falsifiability5 as one of
my two criteria of the scientific. A falsifiable theory is one which predicts certain events
and forbids others, so that if these other events occur, the theory is falsified. Thus a
falsifiable theory is genuinely predictive and it is the forbidding of certain events which
distinguishes such a predictive theory from a post-dictive one. For a predictive theory
will foretell certain events
2
Eysenck, H.: Sense and Nonsense in Psychology. G.B., 1957, p. 238.
Jastrow, J.: The House that Freud Built. London, 1933, p. 157.
4
Lynch, A.: Science: Leading and Misleading. London, 1927, p. 254 and p. 256.
3
5
before they happen, while a post-dictive theory merely explains (or "post-diets") them
once they happen and, once any sort of events do happen, the post-dictive theory can be
used to explain any of these other events as well, since it forbids none of these. Such
post-dictive theories are, of course, unfalsifiable.
Now on his own showing, Freud does, at least in one place, suggest that the
psychoanalytic system is the latter, unfalsifiable, sort of theory. In his Collected Papers
he writes that while "it is always possible by analysis (that is, post-diction) to recognise
the causation with certainty, a prediction of it (that is, the causation) by synthesis is impossible"6. To see the import of this, take, for example, the statement, "X has an
unresolved Oedipus complex," as the theory. Then, once we know either the fact that X is
a homosexual or that X is not a homosexual, we can recognise the "causation'' (viz.,
Oedipus complex resulting in homosexuality, or, Oedipus complex resulting in nonhomosexuality) with certainty. However we cannot predict whether the unresolved
complex will lead to homosexuality or to non-homosexuality (via repression, sublimation
etc.). If, then, we are to take Freud at his own word, his system seems to be unfalsifiable
as it "predicts" (non-genuinely) all possible events, these being, in our example,
homosexuality and non-homosexuality.
However, as I have remarked above, my intention is to describe the "spirit" of the
Freudian system, rather than base my characterisation on a single quotation. Moreover, in
support of this looser, "spirit" approach, it is commonplace that most system builders do
at certain times offer wrong characterisations of their own systems. Thus, while the
appeal to these characterisations is quite sound from a strictly legalistic point of view—
from the point of view, that is, of trying to convict the accused at ail costs—this is not to
say that the system is really like the picture drawn by an isolated characterisation of its
proponent. It is very much to the point then, to look at the system itself, as well as the
descriptions of it given by its author.
. Indeed, when we do this, we do find the rejection of certain psychoanalytic
hypotheses even by Freud himself on the basis of falsifying evidence. A well-known
example is his rejection of his original view that hysteria is always caused by an earlier
actual (physical) seduction. For later he modified this view by proposing that the
seduction was in some cases merely a symbolic one. Here, then, we have a psychoanalytic
hypothesis (that of hysteria being invariably the result of physical seduction) tested and
actually falsified by empirical evidence, by events, that is, which the hypothesis has
forbidden.
Notice, however, that this physical seduction hypothesis is by no means central to the
psychoanalytic system, in contrast to such hypotheses as the existence of the libido, of
repression, of the unconscious, and so on. And it seems to me that the criterion of
falsifiability is not
5
This criterion has lately been emphasised to English speaking readers by K. R. Popper. See especially his
The Logic of Scientific Discovery, which, although it appeared in the original German as early as 1934,
was only translated and published in English in 1959.
6
Freud, S.: Collected Papers. Vol. II, London, 1933, p. 227.
6
satisfied by a system's merely changing some of its more peripheral hypotheses; the
central ones also, I would suggest, should be open to falsification, if the whole system is
to be accorded a scientific status in terms of the falsifiability criterion.
This is not so say, of course, that the requirement is that such central or basic
hypotheses as the existence of the libido should be false; it is only that there should be
some possible state of human behaviour which would, if it did occur, falsify the libido
hypothesis. The question then arises: are there such conceivable events?
Now I do not for one moment think that this question has a simple answer.
Nevertheless, I would suggest that if we look at psychoanalytic explanation as it is
generally used to account for human behaviour, we find that the conception of such
falsifying events is difficult, if not indeed^ impossible, to achieve. Before considering
attempts to conceive such events, it is as well to point out that the charge of the absence of
such falsifying events which I want to bring against the libido hypothesis has no
connection with charges relating to the unobservability, intangibility or "merely
hypothetical nature," of the libido. These sort of charges, as I have suggested above, are
irrelevant to scientific status; electricity too, for example, is unobservable, intangible and
so on. But the point about the existence-of-electricity hypothesis is that this hypothesis is
clearly falsifiable, since one can conceive events, such as the going out of all electric
lights throughout the world, which would falsify the electricity hypothesis.
To return to our quest for conceivable falsifications of the libido hypothesis, consider
three alternative ways of human behaviour which together seem to me to cover a fairly
wide range of the possible ways of behaving. The first of these is where X (a man)
commits rape. Obviously, this phenomenon would be taken by the psychoanalist as a
fairly direct confirmation of the existence of the libido; at any rate, one could hardly
expect such a conceivable event to provide a falsification of the libido hypothesis. The
second possible way of behaving, which would seem to be at the other end of the scale, is
where X becomes a monk, retires into a monastery and engages in no overt sexual activity
whatsoever. Prima facie it might seem that this event, if it were to happen, would
constitute a falsification of the libido hypothesis. However, as anyone familiar with
psychoanalytic explanation would point out, this event, too, could be taken as a
confirmation (albeit an indirect one) of the libido hypothesis by making use of such
postulated mechanisms as the influence of repression: X has behaved in this manner as a
result of his repressed libido. A third possible and more statistically normal mode of
action, is for X to engage in vigorous physical and mental activity (for example, running
round the block and trying to decide whether psychoanalysis is scientific). But this again
would only confirm the libido hypothesis, the sort of libido being involved here being a
sublimated one.
Now, I do not claim that these three conceivable events cover the whole gamut of
possible human behaviour. Nevertheless, as I have
7
suggested already, they do seem to offer a fairly representative sample of it, so that I
suspect that there may be no conceivable way of acting by which one could disown the
existence of one's libido. Note, by the way, that the difficulty is not that no matter what
one actually does, one cannot stop the analysts saying that one has a libido. For, no
matter what a person actually does (leap into the air as high as he can, for example), he
cannot stop the physicists saying that he is under the influence of gravity (since he will
always come down again). The difficulty, rather, about the libido, is that no matter what
one conceivably does, no matter what logically possible modes of behaviour one can
think of, one does not seem to be able to get rid of it, whereas, were one to hover gaily
above the city without any mechanical assistance, one could falsify the gravity
hypothesis of the physicist.
It might, however, be suggested that all this exaggerates the difficulties of falsifying
the libido hypothesis. Thus, take X's becoming a monk and engaging in no overt sexual
activity; it might be the case here that if this event were to occur and if it were also the
case that no evidence of repression could be found, then this would falsify the libido
hypothesis. But for this to constitute a falsification, one would have to be able, within the
psychoanalytic framework, to identify the mechanism of repression independently of the
particular observed instances of non-sexual behaviour which repression is supposed to
cause. This independent identification of repression is necessary if we are to ensure that
the defender of the libido hypothesis does not appeal to the presence of repression any
and every time that he needs this mechanism to save the hypothesis in the face of
evidence which, ostensibly, presents a piece of behaviour not sexually-based in origin.
In the parallel situation with the gravity hypothesis, the mechanical assistance which
would enable one to hover above the city despite the action of gravity is analogous to "the
supposed presence of repression which allows the behaviour to be non-sexual despite the
libido. And, in the former case, it is clear that one can readily specify ways of detecting
the presence or absence of mechanical assistance independently of the presence or absence
of hovering. Is this the case also with the presence or absence of repression? I suggest that
it is not. Certainly, one could argue that the trained analyst is able to detect repression in
this independent way, but even if this were so, even if the trained analyst could in this way
provide us with a conceivable falsification of the libido hypothesis, this is still not the
same as the provision of objective criteria of repression-detection, criteria that is, which
are intelligible to the intelligent non-analyst as well as the trained analyst.
It should be clear why one would want to demand such an objective set of criteria
rather than criteria intelligible only to the Freudian; for it is precisely the Freudian who
will be loth to give up the libido hypothesis. If then, he is the only possible person who is
qualified to reject it, if, that is, a necessary condition of a conceivable falsification is the
assent of a" Freudian, it would seem reasonable to conclude that, in practice at any rate,
the libido hypothesis is not really
8
a falsifiable one. It is not falsifiable because that which is essential for a possible
falsification, namely the denial of the presence of repression, can come about only
through the assent of precisely that group of people who do not believe the hypothesis to
be false and who are therefore the least likely to make the assent which is required for its
falsification.7
Now, insofar as such central hypotheses as that of the existence of the libido are
unfalsifiable in the above sense, or, in other words, insofar as one can conceive of no
possible behaviour which would falsify these hypotheses, psychoanalysis is not a
genuinely falsifiable system. And this is so despite of the many possible and actual
changes of its fringe hypotheses (such as the change in the original physical seduction
hypothesis).
Related to this conclusion of the basically unfalsifiable nature of the psychoanalytic
system is the questionable practice of those who first quote "experimental confirmations"
for psychoanalytic concepts, but then also assert that experiments are too "trivial" to really
test the "richness" of the concepts, these latter remarks being generally made when certain
experiments appear to cast doubt on the concepts. Now this is to have your cake and eat it,
too. It must be realised that if the experiments are "rich" enough to support
psychoanalysis in a genuine sense, then they should also be "rich" enough to possibly
falsify them; if, on the other hand, they are not "rich" enough in this sense, then it is
completely beside the point and quite misleading to quote "experimental confirmations"
for psychoanalysis. For there is, in this case, no meaningful relation between the
psychoanalytic system and the quoted experimentation, since the latter does not really test
the former.
With regard, then, to my first criterion of the scientific, the criterion of falsifiability, it
would seem that psychoanalysis falls short of scientific status. The second criterion which
I want to put forward is that of determinism and in this respect I suggest that Freud, in his
earlier writings at any rate, shows up most favourably. Indeed it can be argued that Freud
was the main instigator of the idea of doing away with the concept of "Personality" with a
capital P—or rejecting, that is, the notion of an undetermined Self which decides between
conflicting motives. Instead of this indeterminist view, the doctrine of the early Freud is
one of mind as a plurality, as a collection of conflicting motives, rather than of an
undetermined Mind acting freely in its "decisions" over the "lower" motives. And in line
with this doctrine, we find Freud stressing the notion of a mind whose behaviour is fully
determined by the collection of conflicting motives which go to make it up. This is the
force of such contentions as: "Now it is my assumption that the displacement (a particular
piece of behaviour) is not left to psychic
7
This is not to suggest that the Freudian analyst is necessarily dishonest in refusing to admit the absence of
repression if that admission implies a rejection of the libido hypothesis. It is commonplace that a person's
beliefs can influence him without any conscious realisation of this on his part. Honesty, then, is not a
sufficient condition for objectivity. What are needed, as I have said, are criteria of the presence or absence of
repression which are not the "private property" of, or intelligible only to, the analyst.
9
arbitrariness, but that it follows lawful and rational (that is, determined) paths".8 The
importance of this approach for a scientific study of personality cannot be overstressed.
For to the extent that psychology postulates an undetermined Self, to that extent it gives
up the possibility of any scientific explanation and prediction of behaviour.
But even with respect to this second criterion of determinism, it would simplify
matters too much to say that psychoanalysis has an indisputable claim to a scientific
status. For one thing, Freud's espousal of determinism was by no means a policy which he
consistently followed. Indeed, in his later, more metaphysical, period, Freud's formulations become clearly purposive in character. And it appears that it is the later rather than
the earlier Freud whom the Neo-Freudians have followed in this regard.
Furthermore, in the second place, even when we consider Freud's earlier, determinist,
period, we find that this very determinism gives rise to an unscientific way of theorising.
For, through emphasising that behaviour is completely determined, Freud, in postulating a
basic single determinant (viz., the libido), has, as I have suggested above, produced a
system the falsifiability of which is highly questionable. This is so because the notion of
the libido is so broad or diffuse that from it the system can predict all possible ways of
behaving. One should note here, however, that while Freud's insistence on the lawfulness
of all behaviour seems to have led him to produce a theory which it is difficult, if not
impossible, to falsify, this is not to say that un-falsifiability is a necessary consequence of
his determinism. For what seems to have lead to this state of affairs is not Freud's
determinism alone, but this combined with his monism: his view, that is, that not only is
behaviour fully determined, but that there is an underlying single determinant, the libido.
Now there is no reason why a deterministic system should necessarily also be
monistic in the above sense of postulating a single determinant. Moreover, it cannot even
be said that such a monism logically implies that the system is unfalsifiable; in physics,
the single force called gravity is taken to determine the behaviour of all bodies, yet the
gravity theory does not seem to be unfalsifiable. Thus there is clearly no logical
connection between the determinism of the early Freud and the lack of falsifiability in his
system. Nevertheless, inasmuch as this lack of falsifiability is in fact present in his system,
the claim of psychoanalysis (even if we take this to mean the system as stated by Freud in
his early, determinist, period) to be a science is grossly weakened.
How, then, does psychoanalysis measure up to our second criterion of the scientific? I
think we can say that in terms of this criterion of determinism, psychoanalysis can be
regarded as leading to a "mental science", rather than being itself a genuine "mental
science". This is so because, as we have seen, although the present-day system has become pur-posivistic and although the falsifiability of even the early form of the system is
highly questionable, one can say that through Freud's
8
Freud, S.: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life.
London, 1914, p. 2.
10
insistence on the lawfulness of all behaviour, psychoanalysis has provided a programme
for the science of the mind, though failing itself to realise its ambition of being a science.
I want now to come to some of the attitudes which I think are psychologically, if not
logically, essential to scientific enquiry. The first of these is an attitude of scepticism. By
this, I do not mean certain extreme philosophical doctrines which deny the possibility of
all knowledge, but merely the sort of attitude which is ready to subject to doubt even the
most accepted theory of a system claiming to be a science. There is an obvious connection
between this sort of attitude and the requirement of falsifiability as interpreted above in
the sense of all the hypotheses of a system having to be open to a possible rejection. For
the adoption of this sceptical attitude will at least lead to a realisation that a certain system
is not genuinely falsifiable if only its fringe hypotheses are open to disproof. Now insofar
as psychoanalysis refuses to consider the possibility of sexual explanations for certain
behavioural phenomena, and I suggest that more often than not it does refuse to do this, it
fails to measure up to this sceptical attitude which should accompany any system which
wants to claim the title of a "mental science".
The second of these accompanying features of scientific enquiry is one which I
somewhat grandiosely call the eppur si muove spirit. The notion here is that the truth of a
proposition is independent of the characteristics of the proposition maker. Thus, in
accordance with this attitude, one could still support Galileo's denial of the geocentric
theory despite the fact that what he was denying had been put forward by Aristotle
himself. This position, which can be contrasted with the "proposition-maker" view, entails
that no matter how esteemed or important certain proposition makers are, what is
ultimately at issue is always the truth of the proposition itself.
Now, in psychoanalysis, it is not hard to find statements of the "proposition-maker"
view in its various forms. Indeed, Freud himself gives one all to clear formulation of this
position in the following passage:
". . . . we do not like to give the effect of being members of a secret society carrying
on a secret science ... yet we have been obliged to recognise and state as our considered
opinion that no one has a right to a say in psychoanalysis unless he has been through
certain experiences which he can only have by being analysed himself9." This passage, I
think, speaks for itself.
As a final attitude which seems psychologically essential to scientific enquiry, I want
to suggest, though with some hesitation, the attitude of disinterestedness. By this I mean a
concern with the solution of a problem for its own sake, as against an emphasis on some
practical "use" to which such a solution could be put or on a vested interest in the
upholding of a particular solution. Now I think that this sort
9
Freud, S.: New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.
11
N.Y. 1933, pp. 93-4.
of attitude is an impossible ideal for the individual scientist. For each theorist wants his
own theory to be sound so that it will be impossible for him to be really disinterested with
respect to it. Nevertheless it would seem that such a disinterestedness is at least partially
realisable in a group of scientists where each individual is arguing for or against
particular theories in terms of objective criteria, even though the reason why person A
supports theory X may not itself be an objective one, but rather a subjective or personal
reason (namely that he himself has a vested interest in the theory being accepted).
What ensures that the group as a whole maintains a disinterested, theoretical, as
against & practical, approach is the readiness of the members to resist the imposition of
any practicalist demands in the judging of the various theories. Now I think that it is
reasonable to suggest that the practicalist pressure against such a group-disinterestedness
is likely to be at its greatest when some of the theories to be considered by the group form
the basis of certain extensive and important practical systems. If this be granted, then the
fact that psychoanalysis is the rationale underlying a widespread form of mental therapy
is of the utmost importance. For this relationship of the psychoanalytic system to what
can be described as a therapeutic tool will tend to weaken the resistance of the group as a
whole against such demands as the acceptance of psychoanalysis on the grounds that, if
rejected, a lot of practitioners would have to learn some other method of therapy.10
In this paper I have, on the whole, been extremely reluctant to accede the claim of
psychoanalysis to be a science. Without wanting to modify this reluctance, I would still
like to make a brief, and therefore dogmatic, remarks on the relation between
psychoanalysis and experimental (or, "scientific", as it is sometimes called) psychology. I
want to do this in order to counter any impression that experimental psychology can
simply be set up as a sort of scientific ideal for psychoanalysis.
This is far from being the case if we consider, for example, my first criterion of the
scientific, that of falsifiability. For one finds much the same sort of difficulty here as in
psychoanalysis. The "defence mechanisms" (against falsification) of these "scientific"
theories in experimental psychology are often equally well developed as those in
psychoanalysis for the protection of the central hypotheses. Indeed, the quantified nature
of some of these theories in itself is often just a sham for scientific status. This is so when
the forces which the theory quantifies are not only opposed to one another, but are also not
measurable independently of the effects which the combination of their conflicting activity
is supposed to cause. I have suggested above how hard it seems to conceive an event
which, if it happened, would falsify the libido hypothesis. The position with regard to such
quantified, conflicting forces is little different; one searches in vain for anything which
would count against their existence.
10
Note that such a demand is not likely ever to be explicitly stated. However, its influence as an implicit
assumption is all the stronger for not being put forward in so many words.
12
Psychoanalysis, then, is not alone in having difficulty in justifying its claim to be
a science. Nevertheless, I do not mean to suggest that with respect to this question of
scientific status the claims of psychoanalysis and experimental psychology are
equally weak. For if we consider some of the attendant attitudes of scientific enquiry
which I proposed above, it is apparent that experimental psychology measures up to
these much more favourably than psychoanalysis. One would be surprised indeed to
find as explicit a formulation of the "proposition-maker" view by an experimental
psychologist as can be found, as I have shown above, in the writings of Freud.
Thus, despite the contribution of psychoanalysis to the programme of a future
science of the mind through the early Freud's insistence on a deterministic account of
behaviour, its claim to be a science at this time is highly questionable. But, as I have
suggested at the very outset, this does not imply anything about its status per se. It
does not, in particular, entail that psychoanalysis is not efficacious as a method of
therapy. Psychoanalysis, though it may be unscientific, may still be, a present, the
best way of curing neurotics.
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