Comment on Michael Tomasello’s „Origins of Shared Intentionality“
§1
The demarcation problem
What owners of pets always knew, became only recently a well established scientific
view, namely that at least higher non-human animals are cognitively very similar to
humans. Empirical findings strongly suggest that these animals possess all the
cognitive abilities that especially philosophers considered to be unique features of
humans. Aristotle believed that only humans are rational beings. Descartes claimed
that animals don’t have any kind of consciousness. Linguistic philosophers like
Sellars or Davidson claimed that animals don’t possess a language, don’t entertain
thoughts or don’t have knowledge. Many philosophers in the continental tradition
strongly hesitate to ascribe something like self-consciousness to non-human animals.
But great apes show a complexity in their behaviour that can only be explained by
assuming that they are conscious creatures who possess belief-like states, knowledge
and at least rudimentary capacities to communicate through symbolic behaviour.
Moreover, the Rouge-test (testing whether creatures are able to recognize that their
mirror-images are reflections of themselves by looking at the behaviour of these
creatures) has established that non-human animals like dolphins, elephants and
primates display all the typical forms of behaviour of self-conscious creatures. Other
experiments suggest that higher animals are quite smart and rational beings.
So it seems as if there were no in principle, but only a gradual difference between nonhuman animals and humans. Of course, humans possess a more sophisticated language
than non-human animals, especially because of its productivity and systematicity. And
furthermore, humans are still much cleverer than non-human animals. But this merely
gradual difference does not explain the unique cultural accomplishments of human
beings. After all, only humans have social institutions, traditions and norms. There
seems to be a huge explanatory gap between these unique human phenomena and the
view that human cognition is only gradually different from non-human cognition.
§2
Tomasello’s solution to the demarcation problem
I label the problem of explaining the uniqueness of human cultural accomplishments
“the demarcation problem.” This problem is the starting point of Michael Tomasello’s
considerations. He formerly held the view that the real difference between humans and
non-human animals comes down to the fact that humans but not animals are able to
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understand the intentions of their conspecifics. Humans but not animals were
supposed to possess a theory of mind. In the meantime, Tomasello has changed his
mind. For, new empirical findings show that at least great apes are able to distinguish
mere movements from intentional actions. And they recognize quite well whether
someone intentionally withholds their food or whether he is unsuccessfully trying to
feed them, in which case they are patiently waiting for being fed. These findings
suggest that great apes even possess a rudimentary form of a theory of mind. For this
reason, Tomasello has recently offered a new explanation of the in principle difference
between humans and non-human animals. We are now told that the cognitive
difference that makes all the difference is the uniquely human motivation for
sharing psychological states with others. The human animal would then be the only
animal doing real mental teamwork. Even in very young children, Tomasello finds a
tendency to imitate others, to build up joint attention towards external objects by
pointing gestures and looking behaviour which only humans can display, to provide
others with helpful information, to share emotions and experiences with others, to reengage the adult in a common activity on which he has given up, to have shared goals
(which are known to be shared by all interactors) and to coordinate action plans and
roles within a group of interactors. In many cases, children are interested in the
common activity as such and do not see it as a mere means to their own benefit.
Tomasello points out that even very young children display genuine cooperative and
collaborative behaviour, whereas great apes, according to Tomasello, completely lack
motivation for even the most basic forms of sharing psychological states. Non-human
animals are not at all interested in taking part in true collaboration and cooperation.
They are not team-players. I quote from one of Tomasello’s recent articles: “In
general, it is almost unimaginable that two chimpanzees might spontaneously do
something as simple as carrying something together or help each other to make a tool,
that is, do something with the commitment to do it together and help each other with
their role if needed.” (Tomasello 2005, p. 685)
Thus, Tomasello defends the three following claims:
T1
Ontogenetically, in the first year of their live, children build up the ability to
understand the intentions of others (mind reading) and develop an intrinsic
motivation to share psychological states with others. These are the two sources
of their collaborative behaviour.
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T2
Their collaborative behaviour provides humans with a selective advantage over
the more competitive and individualistic behaviour of other primates.
T3
The ability for mind reading and the intrinsic motivation to share psychological
states with others are the two biological origins of the uniqueness of human
culture.
Before I present two objections to Tomasello’s view, let me set the stage by a few
general remarks. One might feel tempted to oppose to Tomasello’s claim that there are
biological sources of our having a culture. Why, one might ask, can’t human culture
just be the product of pure contingency and then has continued to exist not in virtue of
our genetic disposition to live as cultural beings but in virtue of raising our offspring
within a socio-cultural environment (acculturation)? However, this alternative story
about the origin of our culture seems to be falsified by the fact that there are biological
limits of acculturation. Apes don’t become humans just by living within a human
environment. There is, of course, the fascinating story of the bonobo “Kanzi.” Having
been raised by human researchers he shows quite a lot of characteristic human
behaviour. He is able to make and handle fire by himself; he communicates with
humans by using abstract symbols; he is interested in playing music, looking at the
yellow press etc. Nevertheless, there still remain important differences to humans. So
it seems reasonable to look for a – at least partly – biological explanation of the unique
human capacity to create a complex culture. However, I am not so sure whether there
has to be a unique cognitive skill to explain this feature. Why shouldn’t gradual
cognitive differences between humans and apes add up to some completely new
phenomenon?
§3
First objection: Tomasello’s explanation is not sufficiently justified
Tomasello’s explanation of the uniqueness of human culture can only be correct if the
following three constraints are met:
(i)
Shared goals and joint action plans with coordinated roles within group
behaviour must be a unique feature of humans.
(ii)
The intrinsic motivation for sharing intentionality must not be epiphenomenal.
It has to provide a basic explanation.
(iii)
The intrinsic motivation for sharing intentionality must (together with the
capacity for mind reading) be sufficient to explain the human cultural
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accomplishments. If it were not, then Tomasello could no longer claim that
motivation for sharing intentionality is the one mark of human animals.
Moreover, the sharing of intentionality also has to be the best explanation for
the uniqueness of human culture.
Pr. (i) Observations of wild chimpanzees show that during group hunts these animals
perform a variety of different complementary and coordinated roles, some of
them having only very low individual success rates. This suggests that every
group member is participating in a common activity with a shared goal. Other
activities have no other aim as sharing experiences or conforming to a group
norm (spread of hand-clasp grooming). There seems also to be imitation
behaviour without any direct reward (unsuccessful early nut-cracking
attempts).
But if we find at least minimal traits of collaboration with shared goals among
apes, then the in principle difference between humans and apes vanishes. We
are back to yet another merely gradual difference.
I just don’t see why the mere fact that great apes (even completely) lack
sensitivity to pointing gestures and looking behaviour, which is established by
some of Tomasello’s spectacular experiments, proves that great apes
completely lack the capacity for sharing intentions. Just as well, one might
argue that they simply use different means to communicate and collaborate
than humans do.
Pr. (ii) Tomasello seems to assume that the capacity for mind reading and the early
human interest in sharing intentionality are two independent sources of human
collaboration. However, simulation theorists hold that human understanding
relies on empathy realized in the neural activity of the so-called mirrorneurons. Simulation theory would suggest that understanding and engagement
is one and the same thing. We understand someone else by activating the same
mental state that she herself is having. So sharing intentionality and
understanding someone else comes down to the very same thing. Isn’t that the
true source of shared intentionality among humans?
Pr. (iii) I have some doubts about Tomasello’s claim that our early motivation for
sharing intentionality, together with our ability to understand others, is
sufficient to explain our cultural accomplishments. Within human social
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practice and institutions, the fact of social norms and normativity is of greatest
significance. But how can sharing intentions explain normativity? Whenever
someone violates a norm he simply seems to opt out of the shared activity.
Shared intentionality is, of course, a precondition of social norms to which all
members of the society are committed. But it does not sufficiently explain
normativity.
On the other hand, one might come up with a different explanation of the basic
features of our culture. Let us assume, with Tomasello, that collaboration and
true cooperation is one of these features. Since collaboration is a very good
means to the achievement of individual benefit, we could just as well explain
cooperative behaviour as the rational choice of a group of radical egoists. We
need not refer to any intrinsic motivation for sharing intentions. So even if
young children show this motivation, it need not be the final explanation of
adult collaboration.
§4
Second objection: the over-intellectualization of collaborative engagement
According to Tomasello, truly collaborative activities (even at the age of 12 to 14
months) require a cognitive representation not only of the shared goals but also of the
often complementary action plans and roles of all the participants. This cognitive
representation (“dialogical cognitive representation”) must be internal to any
participant of the activity.
Now here is a problem for this view: It assumes that children at the age of about one
year are able to ascribe properties to themselves and to others. But do children at that
age possess an explicit knowledge of themselves and others? Moreover, if they
represent action plans and roles of others, they must be able to ascribe instrumental
beliefs to others. But as the false-belief test shows, children cannot attribute beliefs to
others before the age of 3 or 4. So how can they be able to represent the plans of
others at the age of 1 year, as Tomasello seems to assume?
So, perhaps Tomasello’s understanding of early collaborative activities or early
sharing of intentionality among humans is the product of a massive overintellectualization of small children. Maybe there is participation involved in these
kinds of activities without the need of any prior cognitive representation of the
different roles of all the participants. Maybe knowing-how precedes knowing-that at
least in these cases, as the philosopher Gilbert Ryle would put it.
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