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ABSTRACT: Mobile Ad hoc network research is very popular due to its flexibility and independence network infrastructure.
It supports much communication functionality to follow infrastructure-less network. In MANET, there are numbers of nodes available and they play as terminal and router to communicate with other nodes in network. A main problem of MANET is its security because of its nature of dynamic and cooperative ad hoc networks that presents challenges in securing networks. A node in MANET without any protection can become an easy target for attackers. The weakness of MANET is many attributed to limited bandwidth, limited battery power and dynamic network topology. Generally active and passive attacks are the two types of security attacks.
In passive attack, normal functionality of network is not altered while in active attack; normal functionality of network is altered by malicious node. For safeguard there are different types of security such as threshold cryptography, certification authority, reputation and authentication, public and private key cryptography. There are also different efficient routing protocols available for solving this problem. But due to presence of malicious nodes networks are vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. So here, in this paper we focus on different types of routing attacks.
Keywords MANET, Security, Malicious Attacks, Selfish Behaviour, Routing Protocol.
I: I NTRODUCTION
MANET is collection of multi-hop wireless mobile nodes that could be communicated with each other without centralized control or established infrastructure. Further cheater as an overhead due to the dummy frames it sends.
In MANET, each packet needs to be passed quickly by immediate nodes and packet may traverse from source to wireless network is classified as either Infrastructure or
Infrastructure less. In Infrastructure wireless networks , mobile node can move during communicating and base stations are fixed as node goes out of the range of base station, which gets into the range of another base station. destination by using routing. So routing is very important.
But some nodes are performing as negative way. These nodes are known as malicious nodes [25], which may perform attacks in network resources. Malicious routing attacks can target the routing discovery or maintenance phase by not following specifications of routing protocols.
While in Infrastructure less or ad hoc wireless networks , during communication there is no any base stations and all nodes in network act as routers and it creates dynamically network establish during routing. But wireless link has very high error proneness and fewer infrastructures.
MANET [29] is used to achieve security goals like
In MANET, there is absence of topology and infrastructure so MANET has more vulnerable to attacks [11].
Some of the nodes may be compromised by an adversary and so it performs some malicious behaviours which are hard to authentication, integrity, availability, access control and non-repudiation. But weakness of MANET is insecure because there is no any clear line of defence due to freedom for nodes to join, leave or move inside the network. A lack detect.
The lack of central points make a detection process of attack difficult as it is hard to monitor the traffic in dynamic and large scale network [11].There are also attacks that target some particular routing protocols, like of centralized machinery may cause problems because of continuously changing network and requirement of more need of scalability of protocols and services in mobile ad hoc network. Hence as compared with wired network,
DSR or AODV [21] [22].
Sometimes nodes also try to preserve their batteries or restricted power supply can cause some problems such that these types of nodes behave selfishly. In this type, nodes do mobile ad hoc network will need more robust security scheme for security of routing protocols. In this paper we show different types of attacks such as malicious attacks and selfish behaviour. Such attacks would incur on the not forward others packets and so it maximizing their benefit at the expense of all other nodes. Nodes are assumed as to always behave rationally and cheat. These nodes are with either failing hardware or incorrect software
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not intentionally misbehave but impair working or they have to be treated like selfish nodes.
II. MALICIOUS ATTACKS
Malicious nodes can perform different types of attacks that can damage basic aspects of security like integrity, confidentiality and privacy [8]. Here there are described different types of malicious attacks.
A) MALICIOUS MISBEHAVIOR ATTACK:-
Primary aim is disruption of normal operations of the network. It includes continuously sending data to each other to deplete channel capacity in vicinity and so it prevents the other legitimate users from communicating.
I) Uplink traffic: In this we describe, a greedy station that can increase their contention window by selectively scramble frames that are sent by other stations [1]. Frames that can be targeted are following:
CTS Frames: Cheater hears RTS frame that destined to other stations and intentionally collisions has been generated and due to these losses the CTS frame prevents long frame exchange sequence. So, channel becomes idle after corrupted CTS and CW is doubled and cheater gets higher chance for sending its own data.
ACK and DATA frames: It do not affect result of saving data frame transmission time but it causes contention window of ACK destination station that can be doubled and makes latter select large back off before cheater increases its chances to get access of channel.
II) Downlink traffic:- In this type of attack, cheater attempt to increase share of traffic sent by AP and increasing the number of packets that destined in AP’s queue. So to do this we need protocols responsible for filling this queue.
TCP source: TCP traffic rate will react to channel conditions by using congestion windows and acknowledgments by receiver. So an attack can be mounted on TCP traffic by exploit congestion avoidance mechanism and reduce source rate till eventually shutting down the flow.
1) Routing Table Overflow Attack [16]:- It discovers routing information before needed and also update information periodically of proactive routing algorithm. So attacker tries to create enough routes to prevent new routes from creating and overflow victim’s routing table.
2) Routing Attack Poisoning Attack [16]:- A node overhearing any packet may add routing information contained packet header to its own route cache, although that node is not on the path. Like as malicious node want to poison route node so malicious node can broadcast spoofed packets with source node so that neighbour node overhear packet can add route to its route caches.
3) Attacks at data forwarding phase [16]:- Some attacks are on data packets like drop, modify data content ,replay or flood that could forward that malicious nodes that participate cooperatively routing protocol that don’t forward data packets according to routing attacks.
4) Attacks on particular routing protocols [16]: It can be affected on particular node in DSR in RREQ or RREP as modify source route packets. So it can delete node, add malicious node or change order of list. In AODV, attacker advertise route with small distance metric as compared to actual distance and invalidate all routing updates.
5) Other advanced attacks [16]: More sophisticated and subtle routing attacks like black hole, byzantine, wormhole attacks are described below. Other different attacks are also shown.
SYN Flooding attack: - It is like denial-of-service attack where attacker creates large number of halfopened TCP connections with victim nodes, but it never fully open the connection. Large amount of
SYN packets to victim node and spoofing the return address of SYN packets are sent by malicious nodes, and no any response of ACK packet is sent and data structure remains in victim node.
Session Hijacking:-
Attacker spoofs victim’s IP address and determines correct sequence number that is expected by target and performs DoS attack on victim.
Impersonation attack:The malicious node is considered a sophisticated attack as it proceeds by altering the MAC or IP address.
Man-In-the-Middle Attac k:-The attacker is in between source and destination and sniffs information between two ends. And sometimes breaks communication between impersonate sender and the receiver or affects impersonate receiver and to reply sender.
Pseudorandom Number attack [16]:- It is used when physical randomness is not available. It is generating random number by algorithm and noise from electronic device or position of pointer device is source of such randomness. Main drawback is its design and implementation of cryptographic pseudorandom generation.
Digital Signature attack [16]: It can suffer from blind signature attack. User can get message signature and can use it to create other fake message signature. Classification of digital signature attacks are: known-message, key-only attack and chosenmessage. In known message attack , attacker knows list of messages previously signed by victim, while in chosen-message attack , only specific message is chosen by attacker to victimize sign. The Key-Only attack is combination with hash function that needs to be collision resistant and only adversary knows public verification algorithm.
Hash Collision attack [16]: Two messages with same hash are found as collision attack however attacker cannot identify it such as SHA-0, MD4.
Collision attacks can be used to tamper with existing certificates and adversary may able to construct valid certificate for hash collision.
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B) R OUTING A TTACKS A GAINST MANET P ROTOCOLS [5]:-
Flooding Attack [5]: IN AODV protocol, malicious node sends large number of RREQ to destination node that does not exist in network. So battery power and bandwidth is consumed as denial-of-service. So flooding attack affects on battery power and disrupts routing operation which creates major degradation in network performance.
Link withholding Attack [5]: This type of attack affects on OLSR protocol where malicious node ignores requirement to advertise link of specific node or group of nodes which are loss from link.
Link Spoofing attack [5]:- A malicious node advertises fake links with non-neighbours to affect routing operations. Like in OLSR protocol, an attacker can advertise fake link to target two-hop neighbours resulting in modifying or dropping routing traffic or performing other types of Dos attacks.
Replay attack [5]: In MANET, topology gets frequently changed due to their nodes mobility stopping current network to be used in future. Replay attack [20], can misuse impersonate specific node or disturb routing operation in MANET. In this type, node records another node’s valid control messages and resends it. So other node records its routing table with stale routes.
Wormhole attack:Wormhole attack [19] is most severe attack in MANET in which using private high speed networking, pair of colluding attackers can record packet information at one location and replay then on other location. So this can be launched against all communications for providing authenticity and confidentiality. Wormhole nodes are classified as follows:
Wormhole using Encapsulation [19]: While source node broadcast RREQ packet, malicious node receive and tunnel that packet to second colluding party destination location and broadcast the RREQ. So routes between source and destination move through colluding nodes which generates wormhole between them.
Using Power Method [19]:- It affects on high power transmission in which malicious node can get RREQ and broadcasts the request at high power level; so any node that hears high-power broadcast, it rebroadcasts to the destination. So chance of malicious node of routes established between source and destination increases without participation of colluding node.
Wormhole using Packet Relay [19]: A malicious node relay the packet between two nodes and convince them as they are neighbours and so these two nodes are not within transmission range of each other.
Wormhole using Protocol Deviations [19]:- In this type of attack, in transmission of malicious nodes collision occurs and therefore node is back off for some random amount of time before forwarding and this reduces necessary MAC layer collision.
Wormhole Attack Threats [19]: This attack has two phases. In first phase, for passing traffic on routes, two malicious end points of tunnels are used, whereas in second phase wormhole nodes are used for data in different ways. Wormhole can aggregate huge number of packets for traffic analysis or encryption compromises that directly or indirectly breaking by attacker for geographic proximity. b) PASSIVE ATTACKS:-[6]
It does not affect any communication works but unauthorized person can just monitor and listen communication channel and it is hard to find these types of attacks due to its passiveness behaviour.
Attacks against privacy [6]:- In sensor network there are large numbers of information available by remote access, so any malicious node can easily gather information. Here some attacks [28] against privacy are defined:
Monitor and Eavesdropping: It is very common attack, in which, by snooping data adversary it can easily discover communication control information for sensor network configuration that contains information and affects against privacy protection.
Traffic Analysis: Though messages are transferred by encrypted, it leaves high possibility communication patterns, because of sensor activities and it can potentially affect on enable information and cause harm to sensor network.
C) ACTIVE ATTACKS:-[6]
It is like as passive attack that monitors and listens by unauthorized communication channel and it also modifies data stream in communication channel.
There are different types of active attacks a shown here.
1) Routing Attacks in Sensor Networks [6]:-
Generally in this type, attacker works at network layer.
Spoofed, altered and replayed routing information:-
Every node behaves like router so it directly affects to the routing information. It affects to create new routing loops, extend or short service routes, increase end-to-end latency and also it generates false error messages.
Selective Forwarding [7]:- Whenever, there is more traffic the malicious node drops some selective packets. In sensor networks nodes faithfully forward received messages but some nodes might refuse to forward packets.
Sinkhole Attack [7]: An adversary’s goal is to attract traffic from particular area and it effects on particular node is known as sinkhole attack. It typically affects on compromised node like attracting to surrounding nodes.
Sybil Attack [7]:- Malicious node can duplicate itself and it presence affects at multiple places. It targets fault tolerance scheme as distributed storage, multipath identities for another node, multipath routing and topology in the networks.
HELLO Flood Attack [7]: An attacker with high radio transmission range and process on power sends
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“HELLO” packets to number of sensor nodes which are isolated in wireless sensor network. So sensor prejudice adversary is their neighbour. While information is sent to the base station, then at that time, the victim nodes are trying to go via attacker resulting neighbour in higher spoofed.
2) Denial of Service [7] :- When unintentional failure of nodes or malicious nodes attack any event that diminishes network’s capability of services and also affect on destroying network, this can be affected on different layers like Physical layer and DoS attacker in jamming and tampering. While collision, unfairness and exhaustion will occur in Link Layer collision, unfairness and exhaustion. In Network
Layer DoS attacker can neglect, greed, misdirect black holes, whereas at Transport layer malicious flooding and desynchronization is performed.
3) Node Subversion [7]: A particular sensor can be captured and information store-key can be obtained as an adversary. The compromise of whole sensor can happen due to capturing of particular node and its information can disclose the cryptographic keys.
4)Node Malfunction [7]:Affected node can generate inaccurate data which can expose integrity of sensor network aggregating node like cluster leader.
5) Node Outage [7]: When a node stops functioning, then this situation happens. When cluster stops functioning then sensor network protocols become robust enough for migrating effects of node outages for providing alternate route.
6) Physical Attacks [7]:- In such environment, small factor of sensor disturbs or becomes highly susceptible to physical attacks, i.e. physical node destroying due to threats. Unlike other attacks, physical attack permanently destroys sensor and losses permanently. So attacker can affect on the encryption, security, change the program or replace with malicious sensor.
7) Message Corruption [9]: Attacker modifies messages so it affects the integrity of message.
8) False Node [9]:Intruder might add malicious data in communication channel by injecting in network spreading to all nodes that destroy whole network taking over network on behalf of an adversary.
9) Node Replication attacks [10]: It is quite simple as an attacker to add malicious node on existing sensor network by copying node ID of existing sensor node. So network is disconnecting corrupted or misrouted packets. If an attacker can add physical access to an entire network, he can copy cryptographic keys to replicated sensor nodes. An attacker can easily manipulate a specific segment of network by inserting replicated nodes to the specific network points.
10) Passive Information Gathering [10]:- Using powerful resources an opponent can collect all the information from sensor network. Interception of messages contains physical location of sensor nodes that allow an attacker to locate nodes and destroy them. In addition, opponent can observe the location of sensor nodes of the message including message IDs, timestamp and others.
11) Byzantine Attack [12]:- It affects on routing services like degradation in network. An intermediate nodes are affected when they are working alone within network that carry out attacks like creating routing loop, forwarding packets by non-optimal paths or selectively dropping packets.
12) Location Disclosure attack [12 ]:- Leakage of such information is shocking in security. By traffic analysis techniques [13] or simple probing and monitoring approach [14], an opponent can discover the location of node or structure of whole network and that can affect on the privacy requirement of network.
13) RERR Generation [12]: Malicious nodes can send RERR message to some nodes to prevent communication between two nodes, which can breakdown multiple paths between various nodes of the network causing number of link failures.
14) Jamming [12]:- An opponent can monitor through wireless medium to check frequency at source nodes as well as destination nodes. Then it transmits signals on that frequency to catch error free messages.
15) Desynchronization attack [12]:- An opponent can repeatedly forget messages of source or destination or both end points which results in transmission of missed frames. For this reason, these messages are transmitted repeatedly and if an opponent can maintain proper timing, it can prevent end points by exchanging any useful information. So it will cause considerable drainage of energy information. This will cause a considerable drainage of energy of useful nodes in network in an end-less synchronization-recovery protocol.
16) Overwhelm attack [12]:- This attack can affect on network bandwidth and drains node energy. An attacker might overwhelm network nodes that affects network to forward traffic to base station.
17) Blackmail [12]:- An attacker is applicable against routing protocols that use mechanism as identification of malicious nodes and spread messages that blacklist and propagate messages which try to blacklist the offender.
18) Gray-Hole attack [12]: It is also known as routing misbehaviour attack which drops messages.
This attack has two phases; in first phase, node promotes itself as valid route to destination and in second phase, node drops intercepted packets with some probability.
19) Selfish Nodes [12]: Node is not serving as replay to other nodes which are participating in network. Malicious node is not participating in network operations and uses the network for its advance to save its own resources like power.
20) Fabrication [15]:Attacks performed by generating false routing messages. This kind of attacks are difficult to identify as they come as valid routing constraints in the case of fabricated routing
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error message that restricts neighbour for longer contact.
III. SELFISH MISBEHAVIOUR
Selfish host [23] misbehaves to improve own performance so it includes its own hosts that reject forward packets on other nodes to conserve energy.
Selfish misbehaviour can degrade performance of network as they modify protocols to detect greedy misbehaviour. Transmissions; a selfish host may intentionally choose to wait for a smaller back off interval thereby increasing its chance of accessing the channel and hence reducing the throughout share received by well behaved users. Selfish attack has been classified as
Naïve Attack to implement simple attacks to achieve selfish goal, a misbehaviour node has no knowledge of IPS, IDS or IRS. While in Smart Attack a selfish node can easily misbehave reducing possibility of detection. Node as a complete operation of IPS, IDS or IRS; which are not capable of assuming exact parameters. a) MAC layer Misbehaviour [24]: In this, all nodes are considered as selfish. Sometimes, users trying for maximum output until network collapses. To obtain more efficient balance each node needs to assign cost for each channel access. In this all nodes are selfish and output is achieved in protocols. b) Detecting MAC layer Misbehaviour [24]: An attacker can affect the Network Allocation
Vector(NAV) and it can decrease interface spaces size by assigning large idle times to its neighbours so by selecting small back-off values. It deauthenticates their neighbouring nodes. Generally there are two types of misbehaviour of malicious node:- Selfish
Nodes(SN) that use network but not cooperate for saving its own battery life for own communication and do not damage other nodes. While another is
Malicious Nodes (MN) whose main aim is to damage other nodes by causing network outage by partitioning when battery life of saving is not priority. c) Misbehaving Node Models [24]: Selfish nodes are basically of three different models that evaluate for
DSR protocol. A selfish problem affects on mobile ad hoc network like battery power and energy which is valuable resource. There are different types of selfish nodes as explain below:
No packet forwarding: In this type of selfish node,
SN does not perform packet forwarding function [26,
27]. So whenever this type of selfishness is created at that time it disabled all packets those have different source and destination addresses from current SN.
Selfish Node operates in Route Discovery and Route
Maintenance phase of DSR protocol. As a result, proposed model of consumed energy is SN saving significant portion of its battery life to neglect the large number of data packets when contributed to the network maintenance.
No Participation: - In this type SN does not participates in Route Discovery phase of DSR protocol.
The impact of this model network maintenance and operation is more significant as compared to first one.
If node does not participating in Route Discovery
Phase, then there is no route in SN, as a result, packet forwarding function will never execute. SN uses other node energy for its own communications.
Partial packet forwarding with energy saving: - Node behaviour follows energy model that is implemented in ns-2. So for instance when simulation creates in mobile nodes it has to specify initial energy attribute of that particular node. So during normal operation, node consumes while executing network function like packet forwarding and routing.
IV. CONSLUSION
MANET is nowadays, a very useful technology that can be adopted by researchers because of its reliability in applications during various situations and different services. However it has some drawbacks like resource constrain due to limited bandwidth, lack of reliable centralized administration, computational and battery power. Hence, in this paper, we study various types of attacks are available in MANET and how they affect and either fully damage or partially in routing activities. In future, we should also focus on improving effectiveness of different security schemes and also try to minimizing cost to make MANET environment suitable. We should also work to prevent all possible attacks to make MANET secure and reliable network.
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