I apologize for the length of this package. I had originally intended to just present the
initial paper for this enterprise (thus the original title), but in fact I really need help on the larger
project, so the first fifteen pages or so are taken from my grant proposals to the U.S. Institute of
Peace and a combined program of the National Science Foundation and Department of Defense. I
had expected to know the results by now, but neither has yet decided. USIP said the project had
been favorably reviewed and that they would know by September if they had enough money to
fund it; NSF says it made its recommendations and is waiting for the Department of Defense.
Assume that I get the money; how I can use it better than I have outlined here? What
important theoretical questions have I ignored, and what do I need to learn about my cases? I
have included the paper as an appendix for those of you who are interested in some of the gory
details, but I’m more interested in future work than in past mistakes.
1
2
PROPOSAL
Until the end of the Cold War it was conventional wisdom that civil wars ended in
military victories; the standard book on war termination argued persuasively that negotiated
settlements are practically impossible in civil wars (Iklé 1971). Nonetheless, in places as
disparate as El Salvador and South Africa, such compromise settlements have ended civil wars
and have resulted in postwar regimes that are substantially more democratic than their
predecessors (Wood 2001).
We think this has occurred because military victories are increasingly difficult to achieve
for several reasons. Internally the issues in dispute now tend to involve identity rather than
ideology. In ideological wars you can imagine that a military victory can be followed by
conversion of the enemy to your position (China is an excellent example), but often identity
cannot be changed so the underlying conflict remains despite temporary military outcomes.
Genocide and ethnic cleansing have become increasingly difficult to implement, making
stalemate an increasingly likely military outcome. The end of the Cold War reduced the external
support for many Third World states, making them less able to win quick victories. Stalemate
does not necessarily result in negotiated settlements (the classic statement is Zartman 1993 and
1995), but it makes them more attractive; some studies show that long wars are more likely to end
in negotiated settlements than short ones, although given wide differences in coding onset and
termination dates in different datasets (Sambanis 2004, 855) these findings must be used with
care. The development of a complex of international and non-governmental organizations
2
dedicated to encouraging the end of mass violence has also contributed to this trend (Licklider
2001, 698-699; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Hironaka 2005).
A number of these agreements include provisions for merging fighters from the competing
forces into a single national army. But how can people who have literally been killing one
another be expected to work together for a common cause? Arming (or not disarming) such
people obviously risks continuing the very civil war which the agreement is supposed to end.
What could justify such a difficult and risky policy?
There seem to be at least three goals at different time periods. (1) It is seen as a partial
solution to one of the major immediate problems of negotiated settlements to civil war, the lack of
trust by all sides in the impartiality of the new government, particularly its military and police.
The potential risks of such settlements are often overlooked by outsiders, but persuading people to
put themselves and their families at the mercy of untried institutions controlled in part by their
deadly enemies is no small task. Having a substantial number of one’s fellows in the new
security force can be reassuring, both because they may be less likely to injure you and also
because, if the settlement collapses, you will at least have some fighters with which to start the
next round of warfare and some early warning of the event (Call and Stanley 2003, 212). The
hope, of course, is that over time this sense of vulnerability will decline and this political
insurance will be less of an imperative.
(2) In the medium term, merging armies is one way to reduce the number of former
fighters who have to be disarmed and integrated into the society. At best this is a lengthy and
expensive process, usually in countries which cannot easily afford it. Taking some of these
3
4
people into the military would presumably reduce the problem. However, in practice only a
relatively few people are usually involved since most countries need to reduce the overall size of
their military after the war and indeed the whole question of the necessity for armed forces often
comes into serious question.
(3) Of course the longer term problem is how to create a nation out of these competing
groups. Creating a working state, a governmental apparatus which can collect taxes and deliver
public goods to society, is hard enough after civil war; creating a nation, a group of people who
feel that they are part of a common loyalty group, is more difficult by an order of magnitude.
However, it is worth remembering that almost all of the major states in the current international
systems have had to do this at one point or another, although usually after victorious wars–Britain
after its civil war and then in integrating Scotland, Wales, and Ireland; France after the French
Revolution; Germany after the wars of German unification; the Soviet Union and China after their
respective revolutions; etc. The United States has done it twice, after its revolution and its civil
war.
The idea that the army could be a central tool of nationbuilding has a long history.
Alexander the Great tried to integrate Persians into his Macedonian army (and had problems
which are rather similar to some current cases). More recently, regimes from czarist Russia and
Meiji Japan to the Soviet Union and Israel have sought to use it in this way. Ronald Krebs (2004;
2005; 2006) has argued that this practice assumes that involvement in a national military will
change the values of individuals either by the example of seeing members of different groups
cooperating in the military or by direct contact with individuals from different backgrounds.
4
While Krebs concludes that there is in fact very little evidence that these processes actually work
much of the time, it is clear that many people believe that they do and so the idea of a national
army composed of people from previously competing militaries seems a worthy goal to many. A
similar disjunction of fact and belief has been found in Third World countries as well (Dietz,
Elkin, and Roumani 1991).
Another relevant literature is the study of how ethnic minorities have been integrated or
not into the militaries of states. In an impressive comparative study of South Africa, Singapore,
and Israel, Alon Peled (1998) concludes that a professional officer corps concerned about
manpower, usually in connection with wars, will generally support integration and that politicians
have to be persuaded to abandon their not entirely unjustified concern that the minorities will be a
“Trojan horse” if countries are to avoid increasing interethnic tensions possibly leading to mass
violence.
Integrating competing militaries is difficult for most outsiders to comprehend; intuitively
it seems to be impossible. But it is has become a standard item in the explosion of negotiated
settlements of civil wars since 1989 and a routine recommendation by the “international
community” for cases where violence continues. Moreover, it can be seen as one of the ultimate
tests of peace–if the country cannot produce a unified and effective military, its survival is likely
to be in doubt.
But in fact we know very little about this process—in particular whether it has been
successful and whether it has had the desired effects. This is rather puzzling considering its
obvious importance, but many people who study the military aren’t interested in the topic, and
5
6
many studying peacemaking are opposed to the local militaries. Regardless of the reasons, we
badly need to know what strategies have been used and the conditions under which different
approaches have been successful or not. This project is an effort to start such a discussion.
This brief survey suggests at least three questions worth exploring: (1) When is such an
activity more or less likely to succeed? (2) What particular strategies seem to work better under
what circumstances? (3) Has “successful” integration had the desired effects on politics? Each of
these questions is more complicated than it first appears.
We first need to establish what we are talking about. It is certainly possible for a
victorious side of a civil war to allow substantial numbers of its former enemies into its military
over time, but they are usually not restored to their prior ranks. Integration means that
individuals are brought into the new military in positions similar to the ones they occupied in
prior organizations which were in combat with their own. It is not impossible for such
integration to take place after a military victory, but the more recent examples come from the
outbreak of negotiated settlements to civil wars, particularly after the end of the Cold War.
Answering the question about success involves first defining the term. In fact the
literature suggests several different dimensions of success. (1) Military efficacy is simply what
tasks the new military can perform. It may, for example, be able to continue to exist, primarily as
a symbol of national unity, but not be reliable in combat. It may be able to wage war against
foreign adversaries at a level appropriate to its resources; it may be able to put down domestic
disturbances involving members of the groups most strongly represented in the military; it may be
able to do both or neither. Moreover, different countries have different needs so success may
6
mean different things in different times and places. South Africa, for example, does not need a
strong military to face a serious external military threat; on the other hand, several neighboring
states have effectively taken control of parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and will be
reluctant to give these up without a fight or at least a pretty strong threat of one.
(2) Much of the recent literature on security sector reform (SSR) suggests that the key
issue is whether or not the new military is subject to civilian control (Bermeo 2003, 163;
Vankovska and Wiberg 2003; Hendrickson and Karkoszka. 2005). Given the propensity for
military coups to occur in such countries, this concern is understandable, although it may be
worthwhile asking which civilians we are talking about.
(3) From the point of view of policymakers and theorists interested in the resolution of the
civil war, the critical question is whether it makes the resumption of large-scale violence more or
less likely. This issue is not resolved by the fact that such violence did or did not resume,
although this is sometimes used as a proxy in statistical studies. Instead it requires serious study
of the counterfactual, what would have happened to the country if this particular tactic had not
been used. Cross-national studies of many different cases can inform such analysis but cannot
substitute for it.
The literature suggests at least three alternate ways in which such a military might prevent
a resumption of civil war in the short-term, which we may categorize in terms of supply and
demand. On the demand side, it may reduce the security dilemma because the presence of
individuals (and sometimes entire units) from the different factions make it less threatening to
each of them. It may also give employment to some of the many demobilized fighters on all sides
7
8
of the conflict who might otherwise to available to carry on renewed hostilities (Spear 2006, 67;
Williams 2005a; Chuter 2006; Salomons 2005). On the supply side it may make it more difficult
to return to war by providing the security which postwar analysts have discovered is central to
political and economic development (Stedman 2002, 668; Salomons 2005, 19-20). (Clearly this
is related to military efficacy, but it is not the same thing. Efficacy measures the capability of a
military, but that is quite separate from the issue of behavior, how that capability is or is not used.
Similarly whether or not it is under civilian control has no necessary connection to whether it will
actually provide real security for some or all members of the society.)
DIMENSIONS OF “SUCCESS” IN INTEGRATING FIGHTERS INTO A POSTWAR
MILITARY
1. Military efficacy
a. Remain integrated in peacetime and not kill its own members in large numbers
b. Perform as well as other militaries with comparable resources in combat against
foreign enemies
c. Perform as well as other militaries with comparable resources against domestic
opponents from the groups represented in the military
2. Accept civilian control
a. On budget and personnel issues
b. When ordered into use against foreign adversaries
c. When ordered into use against domestic opponents from groups represented in the
military
3. Reduce the likelihood of the resumption of large-scale domestic violence
a. Reduce security dilemma by appearing less threatening to groups within society
b. Employing ex-combatants who might otherwise either encourage or participate in
renewed hostilities
c. Provide security for the society, making possible political and economic development
Selection of authors and commentators is now underway, in conjunction with Dr. Stephen
Burgess, assistant professor in the Department of International Security at the U.S. Air War
8
College in Alabama. Dr. Burgess has written one of the very few articles on this subject, and his
expertise in African politics and his connections with the U.S. military enable the project to look
for authors beyond the usual list of American academics. This is particularly important for this
topic since the only people who really know what happened, especially in the actual mergers, are
often military personnel who had no reason to write their experiences down. Access to these
memories, either directly through having them as authors or indirectly as subjects for interviews,
is clearly critical.
We are inviting two distinct groups of individuals to participate in the conference. The
first are country specialists, people who can credibly write about the process of integrating former
enemies into a single military in one particular country. We have developed a list of 21 countries
in which this strategy was attempted, based on lists from the research of Caroline Hartzell and
Matthew Hoddie and Stephen Burgess.
TABLE 1: MILITARY INTEGRATION CASES
CASE
SUCCESSFUL
INTEGRATION?
Sudan, 1971
Yes
Angola 1975
No
Zimbabwe 1980
Yes
Namibia 1988
Yes
Lebanon 1989
Partial
Angola 1991
No
Cambodia 1991
No
Georgia/South Ossetia 1992 Yes
Mozambique 1992
Yes
Rwanda 1993
No
Angola 1994
No
Djibouti 1994
Yes
Mali 1994
Yes
Chad 1996
Partial
Bosnia 1995
Yes
9
PEACE?
SOURCE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Burgess
Hartzell/Hoddie, Burgess
Burgess
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie, Burgess
Hartzell/Hoddie, Burgess
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie
10
Philippines 1996
Sierra Leone 1996
South Africa 1997
Sierra Leone 2000
Dem. Rep. of Congo, 2003
Burundi 2004
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Hartzell/Hoddie
Hartzell/Hoddie, Burgess
Hartzell/Hoddie, Burgess
Burgess
Burgess
Burgess
I have been reluctant to ask for definite commitments until we have some assurance of funding.
Nonetheless, the following individuals have expressed serious interest in participating.
CASE
Dem. Rep. of Congo
INDIVIDUAL
Mark Malan
Uganda
Sabiiti Mutengesa
Philippines
Rosalie Arcala Hall
Bosnia or Kosovo
Liberia or Sierra Leone
Mozambique
Lara Nettelfield
Mimmi Kovacs &
Desiree Nilsson
Andrea Bartoli
Rwanda or Angola
Ernest Harsch
POSITION OR BACKGROUND
Formerly with Institute of Strategic Studies
(South Africa) and Refugees International
Ugandan national, researcher at Conflict,
Security and Development Group, Dept. of
War Studies, Kings College London.
Associate Professor of Political Science,
Univ. of the Philippines Visayas
Assistant Professors, Department of Peace &
Conflict Research, Uppsala Univ., Sweden
Professor, George Mason University
working with Mondlane University, Maputo
Managing Editor of UN magazine African
Renewal; Research Scholar, Institute of
African Studies, Columbia University
I expect the breadth of experience of people on this short list (a journalist and people with NGO
experiences as well as academics here and abroad; several are female) to be reflected in the final
group of authors.
Given our lack of basic knowledge, such country expertise is essential. However, their
natural tendency will be to stress the unique aspects of their cases while we need to work toward
generalizations which will be useful both for theory development and for other cases. The
10
conference will link these authors with a group of commentators who will bring a variety of social
science expertise to the table including civil-military relations and state formation. Possible
candidates include Ronald Krebs (University of Minnesota), Alan Bryden (Geneva Center for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces), Henry Dietz (University of Texas), Joanna Spear (George
Washington University), Stephen Peter Rosen (Harvard), Nancy Bermeo (Princeton), Elisabeth
Wood (Yale), Jack Snyder (Columbia), and Macarten Humphreys (Columbia).
Originally this conference was planned for Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ, and
funding for this was included. More recently Tom Dempsey of the Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute at the Army War College at Carlisle PA has indicated a willingness to host it.
This would certainly increase the visibility and reach of the conference and would be my
preference. However, given potential complications in scheduling times and possible reluctance
of foreign authors to attend at this location, I have preferred to keep the Rutgers location open as
an option. If we are notified of funding the spring of 2009, we should be able to have good initial
drafts available and hold the conference in the fall of 2009.
The meeting will be organized around the country papers. In order to produce a set of
comparable cases, all authors will be asked to answer the same set of questions about their
particular case. The questions themselves have emerged from Licklider’s initial study of two
cases, South Africa and Bosnia; the project includes requests for travel money for interviews to
complete this study. This list is necessarily tentative.
11
12
QUESTIONS FOR ALL COUNTRY CASES
ORIGINS
When did the issue of merging competing militaries arise in negotiations?
Which individuals or groups supported it, which were opposed, which were uninterested?
What compromises were involved in the final outcome?
CREATION
Who determined what the new military would look like?
How were people selected for entrance?
Quotas
Military experience
Screening for human rights violations
How were officers and NCOs selected?
Who did the training?
Strategies used during training
Problems encountered during training
OUTCOME
Who really controls the force?
What can the new force actually do?
Remain in existence without its members killing one another in large numbers
Deploy to different parts of the country for symbolic reasons
Defend the state against foreign attack as well as militaries in comparable states?
Use force against all groups in society when asked to do so by legitimate political
authority?
Has the force made the resumption of large-scale violence less likely?
Is the force the “right size” for the state?
Can the state maintain this force indefinitely, economically and politically?
The paper drafts will be circulated in advance to those who will attend. The format will
be discussion of each paper in turn, led by a group of four or five commentators. The job of the
commentators will be to bring to bear social science concepts and skills to the more limited initial
papers. In particular we want people who are good at systematic comparative analysis,
knowledgeable about current theories and concepts of state formation, and experienced in serious
discussions of issues involving the military. I have a number of people in mind for this role, but I
have not contacted anyone yet. Possible candidates are listed. All sessions would be recorded for
12
future use. I have included honoraria for these people.
While the primary focus of the conference will be on improving the papers, the overall
framework will inevitably come under discussion as well. In a similar exercise two decades ago,
also funded by USIP, the framework that I had devised for studying how civil wars end was
extensively revised; the result was the book Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End.
The next stage will involve getting authors to make substantial revisions in their first
drafts. I expect that a number of authors will drop out of the project at this point, both because of
time limitations and unwillingness or inability to respond to the project’s requirements; that is
why I would like to invite a fairly large number of people at the beginning of the project. This is
also why I have included a second set of honoraria for those who complete the project. I will also
ask the commentators if they wish to submit papers which compare some aspects of the cases for
consideration in the book. The two chapters most cited from the civil war book are comparative
ones by Harrison Wagner and Harvey Waterman.
I expect the product of this grant to be an edited book from a major publisher. I believe
that it can both encourage other academics to get involved in studying this issue (as Stopping the
Killing did) and be helpful both to those who make policy decisions in this area and to those who
are given the responsibility of carrying them out. In addition Licklider and Burgess will produce
several articles, each aimed at journals with different audiences in both the policy and academic
communities. If experience is any guide, as academics become interested, the topic will make its
way into courses on peacemaking, state formation, and broader surveys of foreign policy and
international relations. Moreover, the impact is likely to reach even wider; the individual authors
13
14
are very likely to, at the least, get their findings published and discussed in the countries
concerned, which in turn is likely to generate further interest.
14
MERGING MILITARIES AFTER CIVIL WAR: SOUTH AFRICA, BOSNIA
AND A PRELIMINARY SEARCH FOR THEORY
Roy Licklider
Professor of Political Science
Rutgers University
89 George Street
New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1411 USA
licklide@rci.rutgers.edu
and
Adjunct Research Scholar
Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies
Columbia University
and
Visiting Professor of Political Science
Yale University
Paper prepared for the Association for the Study of Nationalities, April 2009, New York.
15
16
MERGING MILITARIES AFTER CIVIL WAR: SOUTH AFRICA, BOSNIA
AND A PRELIMINARY SEARCH FOR THEORY1
Roy Licklider, Rutgers University
Until the end of the Cold War it was conventional wisdom that civil wars ended in
military victories. The standard book on war termination argued persuasively that such
settlements are practically impossible in civil wars (Iklé 2005, 95). Nonetheless, in places as
disparate as El Salvador and South Africa, negotiated compromise settlements have ended civil
wars and have resulted in postwar regimes that are substantially more democratic than their
predecessors (Wood 2001).
This has occurred because military victories are increasingly difficult to achieve for
several reasons. Internally the issues in dispute now tend to involve identity rather than ideology.
In ideological wars you can imagine that a military victory can be followed by conversion of the
enemy to your position (China is an excellent example), but often identity cannot be changed so
the underlying conflict remains despite temporary military outcomes. Genocide and ethnic
cleansing have become increasingly difficult to implement so stalemate becomes an increasingly
likely military outcome, often with the government controlling urban areas and rebels in control
of substantial parts of the countryside. The end of the Cold War reduced the external support for
many Third World states, making them less able to win quick victories. Stalemate does not
necessarily result in negotiated settlements (the classic argument is Zartman 1993 and 1995), but
it makes them more attractive; some studies show that long wars are more likely to end in
negotiated settlements than short ones, although given wide differences in coding onset and
termination dates in different datasets (Sambanis 2004, 855) these findings must be used with
care. The development of a complex of international organizations dedicated to encouraging the
end of mass violence has also contributed to this trend (Licklider 2001, 698-699; Hartzell and
Hoddie 2007; Hironaka 2005).
A number of these agreements include provisions for merging fighters from the competing
forces into a single national army. But how can people who have literally been killing one
another be expected to work together for a common cause? Arming (or not disarming) such
1
Charles Tilly encouraged and critiqued the larger research enterprise of which this is a part for
twenty years. It is an honor to acknowledge with profound gratitude his contributions and those of
our colleagues in his Workshop on Contentious Politics. Special thanks also to Lara Nettlefield for
sharing her unique and important survey data on the Bosnian army and to participants at meetings
of the American Political Science Association, the Yale Workshop on International Relations, and
the International Studies Association for comments on earlier versions of this paper.
16
people obviously risks continuing the very civil war which the agreement is supposed to end.
What could justify such a difficult and risky policy?
There seem to be at least three goals at different time periods. (1) This is a partial solution
to one of the major immediate problems of negotiated settlements to civil war, the lack of trust by
all sides in the impartiality of the new government, particularly its military and police. Outsiders
often overlook the potential risks of such settlements, but persuading people to put themselves
and their families at the mercy of untried institutions controlled in part by their deadly enemies is
no small task. The guarantee that a substantial number of one’s fellows will be in the new
security force can be reassuring, both because they may be less likely to injure you and also
because, if the settlement collapses (as they often do), your side will at least have some fighters
with which to start the next round of warfare and some early warning of the event (Call and
Stanley 2003, 212). The hope, of course, is that over time this sense of vulnerability will decline
and this will be less of an imperative.
(2) In the medium term, merging armies is one way to reduce the number of former
fighters who have to be disarmed and integrated into the society. At best this is a lengthy and
expensive process, usually in countries which cannot easily afford it. Taking some of these
people into the military reduces the problem. However, relatively few people find this a longterm solution since most countries need to reduce the overall size of their military after the war.
Indeed, after a civil war the whole purpose of a national army is often unclear.
(3) Of course the longer term problem is how to create a nation out of these competing
groups. Creating a working state, a governmental apparatus which can collect taxes and deliver
public goods to society, is hard enough after civil war; creating a nation, a group of people who
feel that they are part of a common loyalty group, is more difficult by an order of magnitude.
However, it is worth remembering that almost all of the major states in the current international
systems have had to do this at one point or another, although usually after victorious wars–Britain
after its Civil War and then in integrating Scotland, Wales, and Ireland; France after the French
Revolution; Germany after the wars of German unification; the Soviet Union and China after their
respective revolutions; etc. The United States has done it twice, after its revolution and its civil
war.
One major tool in this process has been a national army. The idea that the army could be a
central tool of nationbuilding has a long history. Alexander the Great tried to integrate Persians
into his Macedonian army (and had problems which are rather similar to some current cases).
More recently regimes from czarist Russia and Meiji Japan to the Soviet Union and Israel have
sought to use it in this way. Ronald Krebs (2004 and 2005) has argued that this practice assumes
that involvement in a national military will change the values of individuals either by the example
of seeing members of different groups cooperating in the military or by direct contact with
individuals from different backgrounds. The latter process is sometimes called the “contact
hypothesis,” the idea individuals who have close contact with members of opposing groups will
17
18
be more sympathetic toward that group than individuals who have not had such contact. While
Krebs concludes that there is in fact very little evidence that these processes actually work much
of the time, many people clearly believe that they do, making a national army composed of people
from previously competing militaries seem a worthy goal. A similar disjunction of fact and belief
has been found in Third World countries as well (Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani 1991).
Another relevant literature is the study of how ethnic minorities have been integrated or
not into the militaries of states. In an impressive comparative study of South Africa, Singapore,
and Israel, Alon Peled (1998) concludes that a professional officer corps concerned about
manpower, usually in connection with wars, will generally support integration and that politicians
have to be persuaded to abandon their not entirely unjustified concern that the minorities will be a
“Trojan horse” if countries are to avoid increasing interethnic tensions possibly leading to mass
violence.
When civil wars end in some sort of negotiated settlements, two or more armed forces are
usually in being. Their fate is central for the society. In the short run, the presence of large
numbers of armed people with poor prospects in a weak civilian economy poses a major security
problem; indeed it is common for upsurges in crime rates to follow civil wars (the experience of
the American West after the American civil war is an interesting example). This in turn can
impede economic and political aspects of peacebuilding, making civil war more likely to recur.
In the longer run, such conditions obviously make it much easier for elites to return to civil war
when they encounter the inevitable frustrations of peacetime politics.
Civil-military relations are an important element in the post-war process of
democratization and transition. The recomposition of armed forces is one of the
most complicated undertakings of an international intervention (Nettlefield 2006,
266).
Integrating competing militaries is difficult for most outsiders to comprehend; intuitively it seems
to be an impossibility. But it is has become a standard item in the explosion of negotiated
settlements of civil wars since 1989 and a routine recommendation by the international
community for cases where violence continues.
Moreover, it appears to be one of the ultimate tests of peace–if the country cannot produce
a unified and effective military, its survival is likely to be in doubt. Two recent studies, using
different although overlapping databases and somewhat different analytic techniques, conclude
that the actual implementation of agreements which merge competing military forces is closely
related to preventing future violence (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). This
is particularly interesting since the second study showed that implementing political powersharing
agreements does not have the same effect.
18
We badly need to know what strategies have been used and the conditions under which
different approaches have been successful or not. This paper is a “brush-clearing” effort to start
such a discussion (for a similar effort focused on Africa see Burgess 2005).
THEORETICAL QUESTIONS
This brief survey suggests at least two theoretical questions worth exploring: (1) When is
such an activity more or less likely to be attempted? (2) When is it more or less likely to
succeed?
When is such an activity more or less like to occur? First we need to decide what we are
talking about. It is certainly possible for a victorious side of a civil war to integrate substantial
numbers of its former enemies into its military over time, but they are usually not restored to their
prior ranks. Integration means that individuals are brought into the new military in positions
similar to the ones they occupied in prior, competing organizations. It is not impossible for such
integration to take place after a military victory, but the more recent examples come from the
outbreak of negotiated settlements to civil wars, particularly after the end of the Cold War.
Answering the question about success involves first defining the term. In fact the
literature suggests several different dimensions of success. (1) Military efficacy is simply what
tasks the new military can perform. It may, for example, be able to function but not be reliable in
combat. It may be able to wage war against foreign adversaries at a level appropriate to its
resources; it may be able to put down domestic disturbances involving members of the groups
most strongly represented in the military; it may be able to do both or neither. Moreover,
different countries have different needs so success may mean different things in different times
and places. South Africa, for example, does not need a strong military to face a serious external
military threat; on the other hand, several neighboring states have effectively taken control of
parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and will be reluctant to give these up without a
fight or at least a pretty strong threat of one.
(2) Much of the recent literature on security sector reform (SSR) suggests that the key
issue is whether or not the new military is subject to civilian control (Bermeo 2003, 163;
Vankovska and Wiberg 2003; Hendrickson and Karkoszka. 2005). Given the propensity for
military coups to occur in such countries, this concern is understandable, although it may be
worthwhile asking which civilians we are talking about.
(3) From the point of view of policymakers and theorists interested in the resolution of the
civil war, the critical question is whether it makes the resumption of large-scale violence more or
less likely. It is important to note that this issue is not resolved by the fact that such violence did
or did not resume, although this is sometimes used as a proxy in statistical studies. Instead it
requires serious study of the counterfactual, what would have happened to the country if this
19
20
particular tactic had not been used. Cross-national studies of many different cases can inform
such analysis but cannot substitute for it.
The literature suggests at least three alternate ways in which such a military might prevent
a resumption of civil war in the short-term, which we may categorize in terms of supply and
demand. On the demand side, it may reduce the security dilemma because the presence of
individuals (and sometimes entire units) from the different factions make it less threatening to
each of them. It may also give employment to some of the many demobilized fighters on all sides
of the conflict who might otherwise to available to carry on renewed hostilities (Spear 2006, 67;
Williams 2005a; Chuter 2006; Salomons 2005). On the supply side it may make it more difficult
to return to war by providing the security which postwar analysts have discovered is central to
political and economic development (Stedman 2002, 668; Salomons 2005, 19-20). (Clearly this
is related to military efficacy, but it is not the same thing. Efficacy measures the capability of a
military, but that is quite separate from the issue of behavior, how that capability is or is not used.
Similarly whether or not it is under civilian control has no necessary connection to whether it will
actually provide real security for some or all members of the society.) All this suggests that the
issue of success is more complex than it may initially appear.
DIMENSIONS OF “SUCCESS” IN INTEGRATING FIGHTERS INTO A POSTWAR
MILITARY
1. Military efficacy
a. Remain integrated in peacetime and not kill its own members in large numbers
b. Perform as well as other militaries with comparable resources in combat against
foreign enemies
c. Perform as well as other militaries with comparable resources against domestic
opponents from the groups represented in the military
2. Accept civilian control
a. On budget and personnel issues
b. When ordered into use against foreign adversaries
c. When ordered into use against domestic opponents from the groups represented in the
military
3. Reduce the likelihood of the resumption of large-scale domestic violence
a. Reduce security dilemma by appearing less threatening to groups within society
b. Employing ex-combatants who might otherwise either encourage or participate in
renewed hostilities
c. Provide security for the society, making possible political and economic development
If these are the outcomes we are trying to predict, what factors seem likely to cause them
to occur? My object in this paper is to look at two cases in some depth to develop plausible
answers to this question. Hopefully they can then be tested against a wider sample at a later time.
20
CASE SELECTION
In order to build theory about why military integration might occur and be successful, it
seemed appropriate to select a few prominent cases generally seen as successes, try to sort out the
causes of this success, and then test these generalize against other cases. Caroline Hartzell and
Matthew Hoddie coded 29 negotiated settlements of civil wars2 between 1980 and 1996. Of these
18 involved military power-sharing or power-dividing, defined as:
(1) the creation of the state’s security forces through the integration of former
antagonists’ armed forces on the basis of a formula representative of the size of the
armed groups; (2) the creation of the state’s security forces on the basis of equal
numbers of troops drawn from the antagonists’ armed forces; (3) the appointment
of members of armed faction(s) that do not dominate the state, or of weaker armed
factions, to key leadership positions in the state’s security forces; and (4) the
retention by antagonists of their own armed forces or the creation of
their own security forces (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 99; cf. Burgess 2005).
They then classified these cases in terms of how completely they were implemented and whether
or not the participants returned to war by 2003. Nine cases had complete implementation and no
return to war: Bosnia 1992, Djibouti 1994, El Salvador 1992, Georgia South Ossetia 1992, Mali
1995, Mozambique 1992, Nicaragua 1989, Philippines 1996, and South Africa 1994. Of these
cases, Djibouti and El Salvador involved police forces. In Nicaragua there was no mixing; the
agreement simply allowed the contras to have their own forces (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007, 174176). Of the six remaining, it seemed easier to get information for Bosnia and South Africa, both
of which had been high-visibility.
For each case I will give a short history followed by a brief response to the following
questions to facilitate comparisons:
ORIGINS
When did the issue of merging competing militaries arise in negotiations?
Which individuals or groups supported it, which were opposed, which were uninterested?
What compromises were involved in the final outcome?
CREATION
2
In earlier work a negotiated settlement was defined as a mutual decision to stop fighting when
either side could return to war if it chose to do so (Licklider 1995, 684). Hartzell and Hoddie
(2007, 77) call these events “negotiated agreements” and divide them into two categories:
negotiated settlements, formal agreements between the sides over “how power is to be distributed
and managed in the postwar state”; and negotiated truces, simply agreements to stop fighting. The
different definitions are confusing, but the Hartzell-Hoddie approach makes more analytic sense.
21
22
Who determined what the new military would look like?
How were people selected for entrance?
Quotas
Military experience
Screening for human rights violations
How were officers and NCOs selected?
Who did the training?
Strategies used during training
Problems encountered during training
OUTCOME
Who really controls the force?
What can the new force actually do?
Remain in existence without its members killing one another in large numbers
Deploy to different parts of the country for symbolic reasons
Defend the state against foreign attack as well as militaries in comparable states?
Use force against all groups in society when asked to do so by legitimate political
authority?
Is the force the “right size” for the state?
Can the state maintain this force indefinitely, economically and politically?
It is important to note, however, that these classifications are tentative. At this point I have done a
literature search but have only done one of a projected series of interviews of people who were
actually involved in the process.
SOUTH AFRICA
South Africa has a fair claim to be the poster child of negotiated settlements of civil war,
although the level of wartime violence was fairly low by the usual measures. Analysts spent
several decades seized with the fear of a race war in a country with nuclear weapons; the eventual
settlement caught almost everyone by surprise, and the ability of the country to shift from white to
black political dominance in a peaceful, democratic manner is, in retrospect, nothing less than
astounding. Moreover, it was largely a local product; certainly international pressure and support
helped, but this was not a coerced settlement in the way that, say, Zimbabwe, Bosnia, or Kosovo
were. For all its problems, South Africa is evidence that negotiated settlements can work in very
hard cases, at least so far.
Non-whites had served in the South African armed forces before; one authority traces their
involvement as far back as the 17th Century. Most of the time they were kept in non-combat
positions, and they were almost always officered by whites. They were given limited combat
roles when manpower became a serious issue; both sides used them during the Boer War, for
22
example, and some units saw combat in World War I, despite vocal resistance by many whites.
Interestingly enough pressure to bring them into the armed forces seems to have come from high
level soldiers and civilians concerned about white manpower limitations but mindful of white
resistance; the result in the 1970s was an incremental process, starting with the formation of a
non-combat unit for coloured personnel. By 1973 coloured soldiers were receiving full-scale
training and were involved in combat operations in Namibia while a few were selected for officer
training. In the same year the Bantu Training Center was established, again ostensibly for noncombat activities, but it soon developed a full-scale combat training program and became
involved in Namibia as well (Grundy 1983). “In 1986 the SADF [South African Defence Force]
was 76% white, 12% black, 11% coloured and 1% Indian....in 1990 there were some ten black
officers...” (Mills and Wood 1993).
It is common in civil war negotiations for the issue of security, during and after the
transition, to be a major concern (Walter 2002, 104-105). Interestingly enough the issue of the
future South African military was not a major issue in the early negotiations, apparently because
all sides wanted to keep their forces available if negotiations failed. Although a ceasefire was
declared in 1990, the National Peace Accords of 1991 included some provisions about control of
the police but nothing about the military.
However, in 1991 military leaders of the SADF and MK began a series of meetings and
found common interests; each wanted to encourage control of the other side’s radical allies, to
exclude the other armed forces from the negotiation, and bypass the designated but distrusted
political mediator on its own side (Frankel 2000, 1-6; Shaw 1996, 18-19). This process led to the
formation of the Joint Military Coordinating Committee in 1993. Technically this group had no
direct power; it worked under the Sub Council on Defence of the Transitional Executive Council.
In practice the committee, dominated by the SADF and MK, devised and implemented policies;
there was remarkably little civilian involvement (Shaw 1996, 20-23).
Negotiations were intense.
Since one side had not defeated the other, the self-satisfaction of the
SADF, rooted in its superior numbers and technology, was more
than matched by the arrogance of MK in the atmosphere of political
victory (Frankel 2000, 8).
The SADF eventually agreed to establish a new military composed of all veterans from all the
eight separate military forces at all levels and to accept civilian controls from the new government
as well as British military personnel as arbiters. In return the SADF’S existing “doctrine,
personnel procedures, training structures, and equipment” were accepted as the basis for the new
South African National Defense Force (SANDF).
23
24
This simple summary, however, understates the intensity of the negotiations (more
complete discussions of this process are Frankel 2000 and Shaw 1996). The SADF wanted to
start the integration process before the national elections; the MK refused to do so. The two sides
were unable to agree on a paramilitary force to police the elections. They differed on the question
of when and how MK forces would be assembled and who would pay them and their dependents,
not to mention the definition of a member of an armed force. SADF tried to use its technical
superiority in areas like logistics to its advantage, but MK succeeded in focusing the issues on
political questions.
Over time agreement began to emerge. The new military would be modern, which in
practice meant adopting the SADF model in many ways. It would be apolitical and subject to
parliamentary control (a major change for SADF but one that its leaders supported) and include a
relatively small professional core with a larger reserve. Some MK leaders would be given high
level positions, and their rank and file would be given training and fair opportunities for
promotion. A Service Corps would be formed to ease the transition of demobilized soldiers,
particularly from MK. There would be a general amnesty. The integration process would start
after the national elections of 1994. The initial results of the negotiations suggest that the SADF
had definitely done better than its opponent, but this is deceptive because the inevitable political
victory of the African National Congress meant that many of the subsidiary agreements were
simply overridden later (Frankel 2000, 20-42; Shaw 1996, 25-28).
The new government faced the herculean task of integrating all members of the eight
separate military forces in South Africa at the time: the government’s South African Defence
Forces (SADF); the MK (‘Spear of the Nation,’ the African National Congress’s military force);
the forces of the four “homelands,” Transkei, Bophutatswana, Venda, and Ciskei; the PanAfricanist Congress (known as the Azanian People’s Liberation Army); and the militia of the
Inkhatha.Freedom Party of Kwa-Zulu Natal. (A useful history of the SADF is Sass 1996.) The
easiest cases were the homeland forces which had been established as copies of the SADF; they
were “translated” rather than “integrated.” (For more extended analyses of these forces, see
Mills and Wood 1993 and Reichardt and Cilliers 1996.) Nonetheless even here there were
difficulties. They had been better paid than the SADF; easy promotion policies had produced topheavy force structures; their local orientation made them uneasy about being deployed nationally;
and their personnel qualifications were often unclear. However, their small size, their similarity
to the SADF, and considerable training made these problems tractable. Moreover, by accepting
their credentials, the SADF was able to create black senior officers who might be expected to be
sympathetic to its own interests in the new force (Frankel 2000, 49-56).
MK and the Pan-African group (known collectively as NSF or nonstatutory force) posed a
more difficult set of challenges. They had been organized for guerilla warfare; to fight in small
groups with minimal hierarchy, very different from large-scale, high-tech, hierarchical modern
armed forces, so both their skills and their attitudes toward command and control were very
different. Many had given up chances of education to fight and now found themselves penalized
24
for the choice. The SADF saw the problem largely in terms of training, but in fact the divisions
ran much deeper than that. The NSF troops saw themselves as having fought against the SADF
and the homeland forces and as having defeated them so it was not obvious to them why they
should adapt to the SADF model. Language proved to be a major barrier as well as many of the
NSF personnel spoke neither English nor Afrikaans.
A process of integration was agreed upon at high levels. Existing military organizations
would certify individuals eligible for integration. These would go to selected sites (cantonment)
where they would be assigned new positions by placement boards, with members from the forces
themselves, the new SANDF, and the British Military Advisory and Technical Training Team
(BMATT). Non-SADF members would be given special bridge training as needed to bring them
up to “international standards”and allow for future promotions; those who were rejected or chose
not to join would be compensated.
In fact, however, the process was much less orderly than this model suggests. Everything
was done at top speed; SADF wanted to disarm the rebels, and MK wanted to get its people into
the new SANDF since it had no money to support them. People at the working levels often did
not understand the policies devised by their superiors and, as might have been expected, the
hostility between the different groups regularly produced explosive situations (Frankel 2000, 6184).
Neither side at the grass roots, British military observers noted, fully understood
the detailed mechanics of what had been decided in the JMCC. Neither had time to
transmit what little was understood down through the military hierarchy to on-site
staff....Hence, for much of its early history integration was almost entirely
haphazard, largely experimental, and a learning process for all participants
(Frankel 2000, 61-62).
The first step was to establish certified personnel rosters of all the groups. Original
estimates totaled 138,000: 90,000 from SADF, 32,000 from MK, 10,000 from the four homeland
forces, 6,000 from the Pan-Africanist Congress, and 2,000 from Inkhatha. All were asked to
report to military bases where they would be assigned a rank in the new military, but only
101,000 did so. Many of the rebels had already gone home since the fighting had ended four
years earlier, and some members of the SADF were unwilling to serve under the new government.
The placement process was fraught with conflict, but eventually went fairly well,
especially with officers. Cash was given to individuals from all groups who were not willing to
accept the new regime, although the amounts paid to former rebels were much smaller than those
to SADF veterans; despite promises relatively little was done to facilitate the return of
demobilized veterans to society (Motumi and Mckenzie 1998, 194-203). By 1998 the SANDF
had 73,000 uniformed personnel, only 16% of whom had formerly been with MK and less than
25
26
7% from the Pan-Africanist Congress; this number in turn was to be reduced for budgetary
reasons to 57,000 (Burgess 2005, 18).
While there was no large-scale violence, tensions certainly remained during the process,
hardly surprising under the circumstances. Disputes centered on issues such as placement,
salaries, and training. The process started in 1994, and matters improved over time; by 1995
things seem to have fallen into place. Several hundred training instructors resigned from the
army. There were disturbances in several places, some people walked out, at least two white
officers were apparently shot by former MK members, and a trade union movement within the
enlisted ranks was attributed in part to unhappiness over the integration process. Nonetheless, on
balance it seems to have gone fairly smoothly. (Shaw 1994; Motumi 1996, 101-102; Motumi and
Mckenzie 1998, 188-194; Frankel 2000, 70-73; Cawthra 2003, 31-43; Williams 2005b).
It was facilitated by a decision by MK to change its training routines in 1991 from guerilla
war to conventional military skills and hierarchies in preparation for the forthcoming integration
both within the country and outside; thousands of its personnel were sent abroad for conventional
command and staff training to prepare them for the coming integration process. An informal
civilian advisory group close to the MK, the Military Research Group, suggested ideas which
often entered into the negotiations (Shaw 1994, 232-233; Shaw 1996, 15-17; Burgess 2005, 15
and 17). The four homeland armies were all small and composed of SADF ethnic units which
had been handed over to the homelands by the South African governments, usually led by white
officers. They played no significant role in the negotiations and were fairly easy to integrate into
the new military. The Pan-Africanist Congress stayed out of the negotiations until the end but
finally agreed to be integrated; the Inkatha Party militias were not brought into the process until
1996 and then only as new recruits (Motumi and Mckenzie 1998, 189). Interestingly enough the
PAC cadres, although fewer in numbers and with less combat experience, fared somewhat better
in the integration process proportionately than those from MK (Frankel 2000, 75-76; a history of
this group is Lodge 1996).
Non-SADF officers were ranked by their organizations in order to go before Placement
Boards to determine their new ranks. The criteria were command experience, operational
experience, seniority, education, military training and qualifications, and length of service. Of the
approximately 15,000 individuals from MK, Pan-Africanist Congress, and Inkatha, about 1,500,
10%, became officers in the new force (Motumi and Mckenzie 1998, 193). The former MK Chief
of Staff became Chief of SANDF Staff; eight non-SADF officers were made generals and given
General Staff positions. Initially their influence was limited because they were often sent away
on training courses on the grounds that they were not experienced, because they were not
connected to informal networks within the SADF, and because Afrikaans remained the language
of the South African military. Over time these factors became somewhat less important, but it
was clear that the SANDF remained dominated by SADF personnel. By 1998 23% of the army
was composed of NSF veterans. This included 17% of the generals, 9% of officers above the
rank of major, 17% of the junior officers, and 12% of non-commissioned officers (Frankel 2000,
26
89; Williams 2004, 12-18). This underrepresentation was much more prevalent in the other
branches of the military. In 1998 the chief of staff and several other senior SADF officers were
forced to retire because of “a botched power play,” and the integration process speeded up
considerably under the new leaders. The process was formally declared completed in 2003
(Burgess 2005, 18).
Has the integration process been successful? We identified at least three important
dimensions of success: military efficacy, acceptance of civilian control, and reducing the
likelihood of the resumption of large-scale domestic violence. (1) In terms of military efficacy,
the SANDF clearly has organizational coherence and functions in peacetime. A substantial
number of people from formerly competing militaries have been merged into a single
organization, and many of the integrated units seem to have performed well in limited combat and
peacekeeping operations.
Substantial problems remain. Philip Frankel argues that SADF and NSF personnel had
different goals. The SADF people wanted to create a military up to international standards; the
NSF vision was “a legitimate and representative defense force as a facet of democratic society”
(Frankel 2000, 85). By the first set of standards it has arguably succeeded;. However, racism and
prejudice remained a major problem, particularly in the lower ranks. SADF personnel worry
about change in their military; NSF personnel worry that there is not enough change.
Psychological studies found that roughly one-sixth of all military personnel thought internal
conflicts within SANDF were caused by fundamental ethnic tensions, but many of these
individuals were older and likely to retire in any case. Moreover, former NSF personnel were
generally more optimistic. However, the same studies suggested more concern at the lower
enlisted level (Frankel 2000, 84-95).
Obviously we have only speculation about its performance in combat externally and
internally. It seems plausible that it would do well against external foes; the SADF had an
impressive reputation, and the SANDF retains much of its personnel and doctrines, although its
equipment has suffered with budget cuts. Its ability to function appropriately in renewed internal
violence is more problematic.
(2) In terms of civilian control, traditionally the SADF had been under tight civilian
control (there seems to have been no serious discussion of a military coup under apartheid).
...foreign embassies and their intelligence officers in South Africa would scurry
around, trying to find the first signs of the inevitable military threat to the
settlement process or worse, evidence of a military coup d’etat that surely had to
follow. Gradually, as the SADF became more transparent, observers grudgingly
came to accept the obvious and only explanation for the support that it provided to
the settlement process - that over decades the Afrikaner had developed an
indigenous professional military culture within the SADF that could withstand the
27
28
temptation to restore the status quo by force of arms. For years the SADF had
preached that a political instead of a military solution was needed. Now its
acceptance of change proved its belief in and support for political leadership....It
must...rank as the supreme irony that the SADF, the symbol of racial oppression
and regional destabilsation, cemented the transition from white domination when,
during the national election of April 1994, it stepped in to assist the independent
Electoral Commission in its administration and ensured the success of the election
which would inevitably bring the ANC to power (Sass 1996, 119)
The MK had also subject to political control, following the lead of the Eastern Europeans who
had helped train it. As apartheid came under increasing pressure, the SADF moved away from
civilian control, particularly in control of budget. Ironically this may have facilitated integration
since SADF was able to initiate and control the process, excluding civilians on both sides.
The new constitution clearly established civilian control, with the military reporting to the
executive and the Ministry of Defense being responsible to the Parliament, but culture was much
slower to change; many former SADF leaders quietly resisted, despite often giving lip service to
the concept. It was also difficult to create essentially a new bureaucracy big enough and
competent enough to control a large military, particularly under budgetary limitations. The first
minister of defense, Joe Modise, was also not perceived to be a strong supporter of the Ministry
when it came into conflict with the military. For similar reasons Parliament was not able to exert
much control for some considerable time, although the rise of organizations such as the Institute
for Strategic Studies has added some expertise to the civilian side of the arguments (Frankel 2000,
117-125). The role of women and trade unions in the armed forces were other hot issues in civilmilitary relations (Frankel 2000, 128-136), and civilian superiors did exert control in these areas.
After a civil war, it is often unclear why a substantial military is really needed. There is
also great pressure to reduce military spending to get a “peace dividend” to allow reconstruction
and social and economic development. Both of these factors suggest that the size of the military
should be reduced, at precisely the time when new people are being brought into the system. The
result is likely to be personal and institutional uncertainty.
Military sociologists have repeatedly emphasized the importance of a motivated
officer corps, yet in the SANDF there is no official, meaningful, and widespread
institutional dialogue of the rationale for service that interconnects with the
realities of the post apartheid dispensation....many career officers now find
themselves in a demoralizing, suspended situation without an enemy or any
discernible function....many...former SADF officers today remain only in
anticipation of an alternative career or a generous severance package.... (and) the
new SANDF has some difficult in attracting motivated and career-minded
personnel to offset the losses....The universal experience, however, clearly
28
indicates that institutional failures of this type almost inevitably generate problems
of political control... (Frankel 2000, 138-139).
Yet it was hard to see what sort of political control problem would be really significant in the long
run. The dissatisfied people were white soldiers in a black majority country with a black
government which had fought its way into power; a military coup seemed out of the question, and
it was not clear why they could not simply be fired, especially since there seemed no obvious
external threat if the military fell into confusion.
The South African military had utilized as much as 20% of total government spending
during the 1980s, not counting the secret and presumably very large Special Defence Account.
The SANDF was in a weak political position in the fight for funds under the new regime–seen as
an apartheid institution (a point dramatized by the findings of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission) with no obvious mission and no domestic constituency. Within a few years military
spending was drastically cut; estimates (because of continued secrecy) ranged from 44% to 65%
at the same time that integration was greatly increasing the numbers of soldiers. Procurement
budgets were reduced disproportionately, raising the specter of a hollow military, personnel
without equipment; the impact was particularly severe on the navy and air force. It did develop
new missions (disaster relief, border control, and working with the police to control violence), but
there was considerable resistance to them within the services on the grounds that they conflicted
with the goal of a professional, non-political military. Peacekeeping abroad remains another
possibility, but the very weak performance in Lesotho in 1998 suggests that this may not be
feasible (Frankel 2000, 150-189).
The mission of the armed forces has significantly shifted from the offensive to the
defensive, from maintaining national security–the watchword of total strategy–to
defending the nation. Yet the nation remains to be built in conditions of coinciding
race and class division that do not augur well for a newly civilianized military that
is not without its own internal tension (Frankel 2000, 209; cf. Williams 2003).
The combination of uncertain missions, integration, and budget reductions greatly reduced
morale in SANDF in the years immediately following.
Cleavage and mutual distrust in the officer corps became fairly pervasive in the
1990s in the wake of rationalization....many white officers saw themselves as
pawns in a political chess match (Frankel 2000, 199).
Former NSF personnel saw themselves at risk because of lack of formal qualifications, bias by
white superiors, fewer opportunities in the civilian economy, and lower separation bonuses than
their SADF counterparts (Frankel 2000, 206-207).
29
30
(T)he military pact built into transition has not produced what many persons of
power, in the barracks and without, consider an appropriate restructuring of the
armed forces. Neither has it produced a coherent bureaucratic formation based on
transcending professional identities resistant to the claims of power-hungry
politicians seeking to exploit the coincidence of organizational and racial
cleavages. Despite public disclaimers by senior officers that the armed forces are
beginning to fall behind other institutions, race relations in many regional
commands remain volatile, in a climate of undiscipline....many officers continue to
fear contamination should civil values become more intrusive....At this point in
time, the principles of subjective control in the NDF are still insufficiently intense
to entirely guarantee that some factions within the armed forces will not respond
positively to overtures from rogue elements in society, populists or reactionaries...
(Frankel 2000, 210-211)
(3) Obviously we have only speculation about its performance in combat externally and
internally. It seems plausible that it would do well against external foes; the SADF had an
impressive reputation, and the SANDF retains much of its personnel and doctrines, although its
equipment has suffered with budget cuts. Its ability to function appropriately in renewed internal
violence is more problematic.
Is it less likely that large-scale violence will resume because of military integration?
Again we are reduced to speculation rather than hard evidence. Nonetheless, it seems clear that
the security dilemmas of various groups in South Africa are much less with this military than
previously. On the other hand, the number of ex-combatants which it employs does not seem
very significant given the total population; by itself this doesn’t seem likely to make it more
difficult to return to violence. In terms of security for the society, crime seems to be significantly
higher now than in the prewar period, but this has not prevented a fairly high level of economic
development.
So where are we in terms of our initial questions?
ORIGINS
When did the issue of merging competing militaries arise in negotiations?
Very late
Which individuals or groups supported it, which were opposed, which were uninterested?
Leaders of two major militaries supported it; no one seems to have strongly
opposed it except Afrikaners
What compromises were involved in the final outcome?
Limited numbers of individuals were brought in; standards for promotion were
changed
CREATION
30
Who determined what the new military would look like?
The two dominant militaries
How were people selected for entrance?
Quotas
Not openly—in theory anyone could apply and be accepted
Military experience
Yes, along with education and length of service
Screening for human rights violations
Not formally
How were officers and NCOs selected?
Unknown
Who did the training?
Mostly South African Defence Force personnel, monitored by British Military
Advisory Team
Strategies used during training
Unknown
Problems encountered during training
Limited violence, many instructors replaced
OUTCOME
Who really controls the force?
Government
What can the new force actually do?
Remain in existence without its members killing one another in large numbers
Yes
Deploy to different parts of the country for symbolic reasons
Yes
Defend the state against foreign attack as well as militaries in comparable states?
Unknown
Use force against all groups in society when asked to do so by legitimate political
authority?
Unknown
Is the force the “right size” for the state?
May be too large, given lack of external opponents and domestic unpopularity
Can the state maintain this force indefinitely, economically and politically?
Yes economically but not popular politically
BOSNIA
In Yugoslavia the military occupied a particularly strong position in the government. It
was represented in the two leading institutions, the collective presidencies of the state and the
31
32
communist party, on the same basis as the eight territorial regions (Allcock 2000, 270; Woodward
2003, 283; Nettlefield 2006, 271). One of my respondents referred to it as a “first-class Third
World army” (interview #2). Concern for ethnicity was deeply ingrained in the Yugoslavian
military before the breakup.
Yugoslavia was a unique case in Europe. For many years it was also seen as an
example par excellence in terms of its policy and experience of multi-ethnic
representation in the Yugoslav People’s Army (UPA)....The measures undertaken
to provide balanced ethnic representation and equality included several
endeavours, such as an equal language policy within the armed forces at least at
declaratory level, and a quota system (“national key”), especially among the top
brass.... (Vankovska 2005, 98).
This system probably helped preserve Yugoslavia, but it also seems to have encouraged
promotion by ethnicity rather than by professionalization. Its collapse illustrates the truism that
we cannot expect a military to remain aloof when a society divides itself along ethnic lines; the
most we can hope for is that the military will not bring about such a collapse.
The process of post-conflict reconstruction in some of the Yugoslav successor
states also proves that the core problems is not the classical question of the
relationship between the political (democracy) and military spheres, but
predominantly the way the military mission is defined in regard to internal security
and the ethnic profile of the military forces (Vankovska 2005, 99).
As economic and political tensions mounted, it found itself under attack both
economically. More importantly,
At the same time, the autonomist, secessionist and nationalist rhetoric surrounding
the constitutional reform battle challenged the army’s constitutional obligations–to
defend the multinational and anti-nationalist values of the country and the
country’s territorial integrity....In many ways, the armed forces itself became a
core issue in the politics of economic reform....The result...was the army’s
disintegration into national units (and) its transformation into instruments of
civilian nationalists and their independence goals... (Woodward 2003, 283).
During the war itself the Serbs were initially successful because they had inherited most of
the JNA (Yugoslavian Army). In order to restore a military balance without requiring the
American military to undertake a task for which it had little interest and not openly violate the
United Nations arms embargo, the United States fostered an alliance between the Croats and
Bosnians and apparently solicited a training program for the Croatians by private military
companies, including Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI). The Croatians suddenly
strengthened their army and improved their strategy so much that in a few weeks they reclaimed
32
territory that the Serbs had controlled for years, although it’s not clear that MPRI really
anticipated this degree of success (interview #2). This military reversal set the stage for the
Dayton Accords of 1995 which ended the Bosnian civil wars.
Dayton established a complex political system with a weak central government and three
separate “entities,” each of which had its own defense ministry and army. Two of these
(Muslim and Croatian) were theoretically linked but in fact were militarily separate. The Accords
did not specify a united national army and did not establish a state-level ministry of defense;
instead they established a weak Standing Committee on Military Matters. The three groups were
able to successfully continue their separate military forces for several years, despite the contrary
argument was that “‘defence’ is a political function related to external security policy, and thus
primarily of a foreign policy character, which the constitution had assigned to the state-level”
(Vetschera and Damian 2006, 29; Kaldor 2003). The divisions were so great that confidencebuilding and arms control measures, based on those which had reduced Cold War military
tensions in Europe, were negotiated. Izetbegovic reportedly insisted at Dayton on a training
program for Bosniak forces modeled on the Croatian experience; the U.S. agreed in order to
create a military balance in the region. In 1996 MPRI received the contract for a “Train and
Equip” program valued at $50 million per year, in addition to a $100 million program for
equipment. Later the program was renamed “Train and Integrate,” a tacit recognition of the
distance that had to be traveled to create a single Bosnian army even of Muslims and Croats, let
alone Serbs. The program was criticized by Western Europeans as a violation of the neutrality of
the international community and an encouragement to the Bosnians to restart the war to regain
some of their lost territory (Singer 2003, 124-130; Shearer 1998, 57-62); tensions were so great
that MPRI personnel were reportedly not allowed in NATO headquarters for some time
(interview #1).
Although technically united, “in practice Croat divisions were entirely separate from their
Bosniak counterparts.” The Serbian army of the RS initially was isolated internationally and
refused cooperation with the Bosnian entity; indeed in 1996 it assisted in the covert removal of
the bodies of Bosniak victims of Serb massacres from their graves (Nettlefield 2006, 281-282).
One authority has suggested that the United States preferred separation in order to strengthen the
Croatian and Bosniak forces so that the Serbs would not dominate a new, unified military
(Woodward 2007), and it is probably true that if selection was based on strictly on military
experience and expertise the Serbs would have done very well (interview #1).
However, over time this separation decreased. The primary driver was international
pressure, symbolized by a decision by the governments charged with implementing the Dayton
Accords in 2000 to build strong institutions at the state level, thus fundamentally changing the
basis of the Dayton Accords, although not saying so (Donais 2005, 55-59; interview #1). The
process was facilitated by some internal factors as well. Keeping multiple armies in existence as
not only politically problematic but quite expensive, and there was no incentive for any one group
to reduce its forces when faced with a possible threat from the others. As more moderate
33
34
politicians took power in Croatia and Serbia, some of the security dilemma concerns eased.
Moreover, unification became a requirement for Bosnia to integrate into European and NATO
institutions, a powerful incentive for many. Recentralization of the judiciary and police force had
also made considerable progress. Muslim foreign fighters who had supported the Bosnian
government were one problem, but under pressure from outsiders, especially after 9/11, they
generally left or were expelled (Caldor 2003, 220; Nettlefield 284-285).
The military reform was driven by international rather than domestic actors (Caparini
2004, 144-146 and 152). The only international opposition came from the Russians, who limited
their response to rhetoric (interview #2). The first step was to bring the Croat and Bosniak forces
together. This process went fairly smoothly, particularly after foreign Muslim fighters were
evicted (Nettlefield 2006, 284). The major instrument was a $250 million Train and Equip
program, developed by the United States and funded by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United
Arab Emirates, Malaysia, and Brunei, to establish military parity between the Federation Army
and the RS forces. President Izetbegovic had made such a program a precondition for signing the
Dayton Accords, reportedly asking that it be run by Military Professional Resources Inc (MPRI),
the American firm which had trained the Croatian Army after the United Nations arms embargo
went into effect (Peter Singer quoted in Wayne 2002). In return the United States required that
the Bosnian and Croatian forces be integrated at the upper levels, although not at the lower ones.
The program involved substantial amounts of equipment and training and joint planning at high
levels.
By 2003 there were four Bosniak and one Croat corps totaling 13,500 men; units were not
mixed below this level. The most integrated unit was a Rapid Reaction Brigade consisting of one
Bosniak and one Croatian battalion. Another unification strategy was to encourage the Bosnians
to prepare to send unified teams for peacekeeping duties elsewhere, and a handful of individuals
actually were sent to Kosovo and Iraq (Keridis and Perry 2004, 262-265).
Breaking down the barriers of the RS forces was much more difficult and remains a work
in progress. Changes came in several distinct stages. In 1996 confidence-building measures,
based on those used in Europe during the Cold War, were introduced, including mutual limits on
heavy armaments (Keridis and Perry 2004, 262; Drewienkiewicz 2003, 31-32). Working groups
for coordination emerged in 1999 and later. A turning point may have been reached in 1999
when the Bosnian Serb military reportedly refused to obey orders from Belgrade to undertake
guerilla warfare against SFOR in retaliation for the conflict in Kosovo (Caldor 2003, 216, citing
Judah 2000).
The central factor for integration was the desire of some Bosnian leaders to join NATO’s
Partnership for Peace initiative (Caparini 2004, 144-146 and 152; interview #1), and in 2001
NATO specified that this would require a single state army. This was expected to allow a radical
downsizing of the military sector; in 2002 defense spending was limited to 2% of GNP (Orsini
2003, 85). Downsizing took place, driven in large part by an international audit of the two
34
separate defence budgets sponsored by the OSCE in 2001 which found that the budgets of the
entities, which had just been approved by the IMF, could not possibly support the existing number
of troops (Drewienkiewicz 2003). The result was a force of 12,000, with 8,000 in the Federation
and 4,000 in the RS.
The Office of the High Representative, the international institution charged with
overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, formed the Defense Reform
Commission (DRC) and charged it to recommend military reforms which would allow Bosnia to
join NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The committee consisted of two members each
from the central Bosnian government and each of three population groups with single members
from the Office of the High Representative, NATO, and OSCE as well as the commander of the
NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) (Vetschera and Damian 2006, 33-34; Office of the High
Representative 2003; Locher and Donley 2004). The DRC drafted a law which called for a
Bosnian ministry of defense to take control of forces from the entities and establish a single
command structure and a single budget (Bosnia 2003); however, the forces themselves would
remain separate (Caparini 2004, 152). These recommendations involved a major change in the
Dayton Accords and corresponding legal complexity; the “report included draft changes to the
two entity constitutions, three entity-level laws and two state-level laws, as well as proposals for
two new laws, including a state-level defense law” (Locher and Donely 2004, 2).
The Presidency of Bosnia is a collective position with one representative from each of the
three constitutive peoples. The new law gave both operational and administrative control to the
presidency. It established a state level ministry of defence with a civilian minister and two
civilian deputies; these three individuals must be from the different peoples. It also established a
military Joint Staff, headed by a Chief of Staff and two deputies with the same representation
requirement. Administratively the separate defence departments continued to be responsible for
recruitment and training (Vetschera and Damian 2006, 34). The RS refused to give up its own
armed forces, regardless of how small they were. NATO accepted this in 2002 in consideration
of the domestic politics of RS, and the situation seemed to stabilize (Vetschera and Damian 2006,
30-32 and 38; interview #2).
This compromise was short-lived. It was soon discovered that the ORAO Aviation
Institute in the RS had been smuggling MiG-21 aircraft parts and inertial guidance systems for
missiles to Iraq in violation of a UN embargo (interviews #1 and #2); this eventually caused the
resignation of the RS president and increased pressure for reform. This development also helps
explain why further reform was initiated in 2005, after the election of more nationalist political
parties, which might be expected to oppose it.
Effectively the three groups had retained control of the armed forces since they controlled
personnel, training, and logistics. The state’s authority in administrative areas was limited to
setting standards, and by the end of 2004 it had become clear that attempts to exercise even this
limited authority were meeting considerable institutional inertia. This situation, coupled with a
35
36
series of scandals that showed that elements of the operational and administrative chains of
command were not fully under either state or entity control, resulted in the Defence Reform
Commission’s new mandate to consolidate the two chains of command under full state-level
control, to transfer remaining entity defence competencies to the state, and to close entity defence
institutions (Bosnia 2005, 1-2).
The army had been essentially divided into three ethnic brigades, each technically about
4,000 strong. In December 2004 the NATO Secretary General told the Bosnians that they needed
more reforms to strengthen state-level command and control in order to fulfill the Partnership for
Peace benchmarks and possibly quality for future NATO membership. As a result the Defence
Reform Commission made another set of recommendations which were enacted into law by the
end of 2005.
In the new scheme the Operational Command structure remained intact. The major
change was to create a new, state-level Support Command which became responsible for the
functions previously given to the entities, in particular personnel and management. The policy of
requiring that the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the Joint Staff, and the head of the
Operational Command be from the three different peoples in practice had meant that, when the
civilian defence ministry changed hands, it might be necessary to change the senior military
leaders as well, making these positions both unstable and politicized; therefore this policy was
abandoned. Ethnic balance was retained by continuing the policy that the two senior deputies of
each of these three offices be of the other two peoples. The entity defense ministries were to be
disbanded. “When RS officers saw their paycheck was coming out of Sarajevo, they changed
focus very quickly” (interview #2).
36
The plan called for integration at lower levels than before. There were to be three
regiments–one each made up of Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks, and each made up of three
battalions. However, the regiments would not be operational units.
Regiments are purely ceremonial organisations and unlike brigades have no
operational, training or administrative roles. Brigades are the ‘business’
organisations...A regimental system embodies the historical military lineage of the
component from which it is descended. It reflects symbols and accomplishments
with which soldiers identity and maintain the regimental heritage....Regimental
systems have been in operation for centuries inculcating soldiers with regimental
pride and responding flexibly to the changing demands of the military (Defence
Reform Commission 2005, 25).
The basic formation of the army is to be the brigade; there would be three brigades, each
composed of one battalion from each of the three regiments (Defence Reform Commission 2005,
3-28). In theory each brigade would have about 4,000 soldiers and each battalion about 1,200.
The recommendations were accepted by the entity legislatures in 2005. At the beginning of 2006
the three separate defense ministries ceased to exist, and by 2008 the three new brigades had
come into existence (interview #1). A deliberate decision was made not to integrate below this
level, and soldiers wore the patch Bosnia/Herzegovina on one sleeve and RS or the Federation on
the other (interview #2).
The size of the military in Bosnia has been drastically reduced as a result of these
reforms. Conscription was ended in 2005. Estimates of the number of fighters in Bosnia at the
end of the war range from 400,000 (Netlefield 2006, 288-289) to 250,000 (Haupt and Saracino
2005, 60). The authorized strength is now 12,000, and the actual numbers are somewhat less
than that (interview #1). A trust fund was established by NATO in June 2006 “to provide
additional support to redundant military and civilian personnel...” (Defence Reform in BosniaHerzegovina on track, 2006). One respondent suggested that the Bosnian demobilization
allowed the worst cases to be weeded out and that the smaller size of the military changed the
perceptions of its members in a useful way (interview #2).
Obviously this was a complicated process. Interestingly the internationals seem to have
had no clear idea of what they wanted to do or how to go about it; a standard joke was that
S.O.P. in the Balkans meant seat of the pants. Even the British, who had been involved in South
Africa, felt they were really starting from scratch. Respondents agreed that the success had been
partly due to some high quality international personnel along with luck and that it would be very
difficult to replicate this process today, given the lack of unity in NATO due to expansion and
the Security Council because of tensions with Russia and China. Judging from what happened in
Iraq, it’s not clear there was much learning in the relevant outside organizations, at least in the
United States; there certainly seems to have been no attempt to try to learn from what was seen
as a “Clinton thing” before the Iraqi invasion (interviews #1 and #2).
In 2005 Lara Nettlefield was able to survey opinions of soldiers of the Bosnian army.
She found that its members had “suffered considerable trauma during the war.” 17 percent said
at least one family member had been killed, and a full 40% of them lived in a different
municipality than before the war. Soldiers were cynical about their own government and not
much more trusting of international actors. There was more support for the reforms in the
Bosnian forces supported by the international community, although the Serbs were more dubious
than others (Nettlefield 2006, 297-301).
In terms of the military merger, there had still been remarkably little actual contact
between Serbs and Bosnians or Croatians as late as the end of 2005.
When calling from one part of Mostar to schedule the survey in another, one
Major mentioned that it was the first time he had ever dialed the barracks across
the city. He doubted whether his office even had the number of the base in Bileca,
the RS military base closest to Mostar (Nettlefield 2006, 302).
Soldiers were asked if other soldiers were trustworthy, specifically whether they kept
their promises. They were fairly trusting of soldiers from their own entities; 70% of Bosniaks,
48% of Croats, and 55% of Serbs said that they kept their promises “always” or “most of the
time.” (Note that Bosniaks and Croats are in the same entity; their fairly high trust levels suggest
that ethnic divisions can be crossed with some success.). However, there was much less trust for
soldiers from the other entity; comparable figures were 10% for Bosniaks, 19% for Croats, and
18% for Serbs (Nettlefield 2007). Soldiers of each entity said that their own entity had
committed fewer war crimes during the civil war than the others, that politicians from other
entities had lied to help cause the war, and that other ethnic groups exaggerated their suffering.
Bosniaks and Croats supported further unification; only 2% of the Serbs agreed (Nettlefield
2006, 305-306, 316, and 318-319).
Given its small size and complicated background, the role of the military in Bosnia is not
entirely clear at this point. However, it has been involved in peacekeeping in Eritrea as well as
demining in Iraq. In preparation for such activities, a Peace Support Operations Training Center
was funded by twelve countries; mid-level officers from all three groups as well as a few
civilians and foreigners have trained together there with no apparent problems (Netlefield 287288; interview #1).
It is particularly difficult to judge the success of military integration in Bosnia because it
has been so recent and because no independent observers seem to have ventured opinions on the
subject. We distinguished three different dimensions of success: military efficacy, acceptance of
civilian control, and reducing the likelihood of the resumption of large-scale domestic violence.
In terms of military efficacy, the primary success story is the creation and continued
existence of a single armed force in place of three which had been killing one another–no small
accomplishment! However, the fact that the country remains essentially under NATO
occupation means that we have even less information than in South Africa about its likely
performance in different circumstances. A small demining unit was sent to Iraq where it
reportedly did very well and is scheduled to be replaced by another (interview #2). Of course
almost any “foreign” adversary is likely to represent one of the major ethnic groups in the
military. While some Croats and Serbs fought with the Bosnians during the earlier wars, the
Yugoslav Army as a whole came apart; it would not be surprising to see the Bosnian army do the
same under the same circumstances.
The Yugoslav military was generally under tight civilian control; reflecting its
communist heritage there was no tradition of military coups. Vetschera and Damian (2006, 40)
suggest that in some ways the reform was incomplete; it integrated the former enemies but did
not change the rules under which they operated to include political neutrality, mandatory human
rights training, and protections for the legal rights of soldiers.
The existence of one integrated army rather than several competing ones certainly seems
likely to have made large-scale violence less probable. Dayton allowed the RS to keep its own
military, and the fact that integration has proceeded implies that this division has become less
important. However, this is also probably irrelevant at the moment given NATO occupation.
The number of ex-combatants employed is fairly small, although Bosnia’s smaller population
makes this number more significant than in South Africa. Nonetheless it’s unlikely that this
prevents recruitment if renewed hostilities seem imminent. The high crime rate and low level of
development suggest that neither the Bosnian military nor NATO forces have been able to
provide security for the society.
More importantly, Bosnia is a clear case of imposition. Such a strategy is not
uncontroversial; one widely cited source says flatly: “If...imposition is really the only option
when implementing reform, then SSR may not be an option at all” (Chanaa 2002, 67-68). The
normal pattern seems to be that peace agreements call for a high level of integration which in
practice is difficult to achieve. The Dayton Accords did not call for military integration at all;
instead the process started several years later. It was driven by entirely by outside forces, the
representatives of the international community who had both direct power within the country
(Caldor 2003, 2006 notes that the annual budget for SFOR was greater than the entire Bosnian
gross national product) and control of the enormously important incentive of NATO/EU
membership. It is thus an extreme case of international imposition under very favorable
circumstances, an easy case for the strategy of imposition; if it doesn’t work in Bosnia, it seems
unlikely it will work elsewhere. (Susan Woodward 2003 argues that this international
involvement has been driven by American and Western European interests and has actually
made it more difficult for the Balkan countries, including Bosnia, to establish security.)
So our tentative responses to our original questions are:
ORIGINS
When did the issue of merging competing militaries arise in negotiations?
Ignored during negotiations, not included in agreement to end the war
Which individuals or groups supported it, which were opposed, which were uninterested?
International community supported it; most local elites opposed it initially but
What compromises were involved in the final outcome?
Integration at high levels, not at low levels
CREATION
Who determined what the new military would look like?
Defence Reform Commission, dominated by foreigners but with increasing local
involvement
How were people selected for entrance?
Quotas
Rigid quotas (integration by ethnic units)
Military experience
Almost all of the current soldiers are veterans of the war; recruitment has
only begun in the last year and remains at very low levels
Screening for human rights violations
Rigid screening by NATO at colonel and above; nothing formal below
How were officers and NCOs selected?
Screened at colonel and above by NATO; otherwise chosen by locals
Who did the training?
Foreigners (MPRI and similar organizations for Bosniaks; academies in Croatia
and Serbia for others)
Strategies used during training (unknown)
Problems encountered during training (unknown)
OUTCOME
Who really controls the force?
One respondent said that the army is controlled by the Defence Ministry which is
pretty good; the problem is that the ministry reports to the presidency, which he
described as “feckless” (interview #2).
What can the new force actually do?
Remain in existence without its members killing one another in large numbers
Yes
Deploy to different parts of the country for symbolic reasons
Probably
Defend the state against foreign attack as well as militaries in comparable states?
No—no real training, obsolete equipment (interview #1)
Use force against all groups in society when asked to do so by legitimate political
authority?
Unclear but doubtful
Is the force the “right size” for the state?
Probably
Can the state maintain this force indefinitely, economically and politically?
Probably
CONCLUSION
Clearly these are success cases at one level; both armies have managed to hang together
fairly well (one respondent spoke of “professionals’ reconciliation” (interview #2). There are, of
course, limitations on what general conclusions can be drawn from two distinctive cases.
It is important to note that perhaps South Africa is one of the few countries that
have engaged in a full and peaceful demobilization and integration effort that
proved successful and did not require external assistance. Nevertheless, this
example cannot be used as a lesson for future demobilization processes since
South Africa never lost either the infrastructures to support full demobilization
and integration processes nor the authority to manage the transition in peace: two
elements that seldom are present in conflict situations elsewhere (Gamba 2003,
125).
Hopefully, however, they can suggest general patterns which can be tested against other cases,
including those of failure. Several points emerge.
1.The driving factors in these cases are radically different. The South African case is
driven primarily by internal pressure; politicians reached an agreement, and after it became clear
that the agreement would stick, the two leading militaries, for their own reasons, felt that some
sort of military integration was necessary. The process was worked out by SADF with some
contributions from MK and a few local NGOs, particularly the Institute for Defence Policy.
In Bosnia, on the other hand, the impetus has come primarily from external actors. The
Dayton Accords essentially guaranteed the RS its own military force, and there seems to have
been little domestic interest in changing this. However, the “international community” which
has occupied Bosnia believed that, in order to create a working state, there should be a single
military force. It employed both carrots (particularly the possibility of NATO and/or EU
membership) and sticks (decrees from the High Representative) to get unwilling locals to make
this happen.
Why does this matter? The notion of local ownership has become something of a mantra
in recent peacebuilding literature (Donais 2009). The idea is that institutions will not become
legitimate unless the locals feel that these are theirs rather than the product of outsiders. These
two cases represent extreme cases on the ownership spectrum; South Africans (at least those in
high levels of the SADF and MK) should feel ownership since they controlled the process while
Bosnians should not. This is likely to affect both internal morale and the support it receives from
the local populations and governments. The theory behind ownership predicts that the internal
unity and military efficacy of the Bosnians will be substantially less than that of the the South
Africans. So far this remains a plausible conjecture which we have no data to test.
2. Both militaries faced a dual task. On the one hand they had to integrate individuals
and sometimes units from competing militaries. On the other hand, with the end of the civil war,
they both also had to demobilize large numbers of combatants. This imperative, in turn, was the
result of a loss of mission for the armed forces as the war ended, which added to the substantial
morale problems of the remaining personnel. This seems likely to recur in other civil war
terminations and indeed has been a major issue in Nepal (International Crisis Group 2009; I am
indebted to Betty Hanson for calling this to my attention).
3. Both new militaries were pressured to come more fully under civilian control.
Interestingly none of the prior military groups had a history of interfering directly in civilian
politics; Yugoslavia and South Africa were free of the tradition of military coups found in many
countries which experience civil war. It is true that during the war some of these groups,
particularly the SADF in South Africa, had developed the capability to make military decisions
with little or no political input, but in fact it proved willing to accept political defeat without
trying to change the government itself. The shift to more civilian control, although difficult and
certainly not complete, was probably easier in these cases than in others.
4. The resulting militaries seem to have more limited capabilities than their predecessors.
The SANDF is clearly stronger than its Bosnian counterpart in terms of facing either internal or
external foes, presumably because of the higher level of development of the country and the fact
that the basic SADF structures were retained, but both remain highly uncertain instruments of
force for their respective governments. On the other hand, both have performed perhaps their
most important task; they have shown the ability to remain in existence as integrated forces
without intense internal conflict and thus remain possible symbols of national unity in societies
that continue to be deeply divided.
So what does this suggest for theory? Clearly there are different processes at work here,
integration of individuals and integration of ethnic units, which so far both seem to have
succeeded given the current evidence. There are at least two obvious possible explanations for
the differences: internal vs. external pressures for integration and the fact that one combatant
force is much larger and more appropriately organized to be a state military. This suggests
several different hypotheses which can be tested against other cases:
1. Military integration of individuals is more likely when the primary motivation for
integration is internal than when it is external.
2. Military integration by unit (whole units of former combatants from one side or the other)
is more likely when the primary motivation for integration is external.
3. Military integration by individual is more likely when one of the combatants is both larger
and better organized to fulfill the functions of a state military than when the two sides are
generally equal in size and similar in organization.
4. Military integration of individuals is likely to be more successful than military integration
by units.
For the next stage of research, Stephen Burgess and I are trying to locate researchers with
knowledge of these processes in various countries. Our object is to get them to prepare more
case studies, organized around this set of questions. In particular we need to know more
about the actual mechanics of bringing different groups together. It is already very clear that
merging competing militaries is a hard job which takes a long time and which we don’t
understand very well. Hopefully these activities will also encourage much needed further
research in the area.
REFERENCES
Alllcock, John B. 2000. Explaining Yugoslavia. New York: Columbia University Press.
Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. What the Democratization Literature Says–Or Doesn’t Say–About
Postwar Democratization. Global Governance, 9, 159-177
Bosnia. Defence Reform Commission. 2003. The Path to Partnership for Peace. Sarajevo,
September; http://www.oscebih.org/documents/12-eng.pdf, accessed 3/29/07.
Bosnia. Defence Reform Commission. 2005. AFBIH: A Single Military Force for the 21st
Century: 2005 Report. Sarajevo, September. http://www.oscebih.org/documents/3011eng.pdf, accessed 3/29/2007
Burgess, Stephen. 2005. Fashioning Integrated Militaries and Police Forces out of Formerly
Warring Militias in Africa. Paper given at the African Studies Association.
Caldor, Mary. 2003. Security Structures in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pp. 205-231 in Gavin
Cawthra and Robin Luckham, Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and
Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies. London: Zed Books.
Call, Charles T. and William Stanley. 2003. Military and Police Reform after Civil Wars. Pp.
212-223 in John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking:
Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Caparini, Marina. 2004. Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Stabilisation: The Case of
the Western Balkans. Pp. 143-177 in Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, Reform and
Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces. Münster: Lit Verlag.
Cawthra, Gavin. 2003. Security Transformation in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Pp. 31-56 in
Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of
Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies. London: Zed Books.
Chanaa, Jane. 2002. Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects. Adelphi Paper
344, International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
Chuter, David. 2006. Understanding Security Sector Reform. Journal of Security Sector
Management, 4, 2 (April 2006).
Defence Reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina on Track. 2006. NATO Update, October 13;
www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/10-october41001a.htm, accessed 3/29/2007
Dietz, Henry, Jerrold Elkin, and Maurice Roumani. 1991. Ethnicity, Integration and the
Military. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Donais, Timothy. 2005. The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia. New
York: Routledge.
______. 2009. Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform. Geneva: Geneva Center for the
Democratic Control of Armed Forces http://www.dcaf.ch/news/index.cfm
Drewienkiewicz, John. 2003. Budgets as Arms Control–The Bosnian Experience. RUSI
Journal, 148 (April), pp. 30-35.
Frankel, Philip. 2000. Soldiers in a Storm: The Armed Forces in South Africa’s Democratic
Transition. Boulder CO: Westview Press.
Gamba, Virginia. 2003. Manging Violence: Disarmament and Demobilization. Pp. 125-136 in
John Darby and Roger MacGinty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict,
Violence and Peace Processes. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Grundy, Kenneth W. 1983. Soldiers Without Politics: Blacks in the South African Armed
Forces. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. 2007. Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and
the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. University Park PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press.
Haupt, Christian and Daniel Saracino. 2005. Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pp.
57-66 in Jos Boonstra, Defence Reform Initiative for Bosnia and Herzegovina/Serbia and
Montenegro: The DRINA Project. Center for European Security Studies, Groningen, The
Netherlands.
Hendrickson, Dylan and Andrzej Karkosaka. 2005. Security Sector Reform and Donor Policies.
Pp. 19-44 in Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Security Sector Reform and
Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. New York: United Nations Press.
Hironaka, Ann. 2005. Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the
Perpetuation of Civil War. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Hoddie, Matthew and Caroline Hartzell. 2003. Civil War Settlements and the Implementaiton
of Military Power-Sharing Arrangements,” Journal of Peace Research, 40, 3 (May), 303320.
International Crisis Group. 2009. Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process. Asia Report No. 163
(February 19).
Interview #1. 2008. Interview with a former senior NATO military official. (I expect to carry
out several more interviews. My interview policy is to allow respondents to control how
or if they are cited. When this paper is ready for publication, I will send each of them a
copy of the quotations I attribute to them and ask if they will allow me to include their
name.)
Interview #2. 2008. Interview with a former senior American diplomat.
Iklé, Fred Charles. 2005. Every War Must End. 2nd revised edition. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Jarstad, Anna K. and Desirée Nillson. 2008. From Worlds to Deeds: The Implementation of
Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 25:3,
206-233.
Kedris, Dimitris and Charles M. Perry. 2004. Defense Reform, Modernization, and Military
Cooperation in Southeastern Europe. Dulles VA: Brassey’s, Inc.
Krebs, Ronald R. 2004. A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build
Nations, and How It Might. International Security, 28, 4 (Spring), 85-124
______. 2005. One Nation under Arms? Military Participation Policy and the Politics of
Identity. Security Studies, 14, 3 (July-September), 529-564.
Licklider, Roy. 2001. Obstacles to Peace Settlements. Pp. 697-718 in Chester A. Crocker, Fen
Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (eds.), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing
International Conflict. Washington: United States of Institute Press.
Locher, James R. III and Michael Donley. 2004. Hicks and Association’s, Inc. Senior Vice
President Assists Bosnian Defense Ministry in Instituting Reform. Hicks & Associates
News Archive, November 24. http://www.hicksandassociates.com/about/archive.html,
accessed 4/11/07.
Lodge, Tom. 1996. Soldiers of the Storm: A Profile of the Azanian People’s Liberation Army.
Pp. 105-117 in Jackie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, About Turn: The Transformation of
South African Military and Intelligence. Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy..
Mills, Greg and Geoffrey Wood. 1993. Integration and the South African Armed Forces. South
African Defence Review, 12, n.p.
Motumi, Tsepe. 1996. The Spear of the Nation - The Recent History of Umkhonto We Sizwe
(MK). Pp. 84-104 in Jackie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, About Turn: The
Transformation of South African Military and Intelligence. Pretoria: Institute for
Defence Policy..
______ and Penny Mckenzie. 1998. After the War: Demoblisation in South Africa. Pp. 181207 in Jacklyn Cock and Penny Mckenzie, From Defence to Development: Redirecting
Military Resources in South Africa. Ottawa: International Development Research Center.
Nettlefield, Lara. 2006. Courting Democracy: The Hague Tribunal’s Impact on BosniaHerzegovina. Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University.
______. 2007. Personal communication.
Oakley, Robert B.; Michael J. Dziedzic; Eliot M. Goldberg. 2002. Policing the New World
Disorder : Peace Operations and Public Security. Honolulu : University Press of the
Pacific.
Office of the High Representative and European Union Special Representative. 2003. Decision
Establishing the Defense Reform Commission. Sarajevo: May 9.
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=29840, accessed
4/11/07
Orsini, Dominique. 2003. Analysis: Security-Sector Restructuring in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Addressing the Divisions? Conflict, Security and Development, 3, 1 (April), pp. 73-95.
Peled, Alon. 1998. A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States.
Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
Reichardt, Markus and Jakkie Cilliers. 1996. The History of the Homeland Armies. Pp.63-83
in Jackie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, About Turn: The Transformation of South
African Military and Intelligence. Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy..
Salomons, Dirk. Security: An Absolute Prerequisite. Pp. 19-41 in Gerd Junne and Willemijn
Verkoren (eds.), Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges. Boulder CO:
Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2004. What is Civil War? Conceptual and Operational Complexities of an
Operational Definition. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 48, 6 (December), pp. 814-858.
Sass, Bill. 1996. The Union and South African Defence Force - 1912 to 1994. Pp. 118-139 in
Jackie Cilliers and Markus Reichardt, About Turn: The Transformation of South African
Military and Intelligence. Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy..
Shaw, Mark. 1996. Negotiating Defence for a New South Africa. Pp. 9-34 in Jackie Cilliers
and Markus Reichardt, About Turn: The Transformation of South African Military and
Intelligence. Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy..
______. 1994. Biting the Bullet: Negotiating Democracy’s Defence. South African Review, 7,
228-256.
Shearer, David. 1998. Private Armies and Military Intervention. Adelphi Paper 316,
International Institute for Strategic Studies. London: Oxford University Press.
Singer, P. W. 2003. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca
NY: Cornell University Press.
Spear, Joanna. 2006. Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration in Africa.
Pp. 99-112 in Oliver Furley and Roy May, Ending Africa’s Wars: Progressing to Peace.
Burlington VT: Ashgate Publishing Company.
Stedman, Stephen John. 2002. Policy Implications. Pp. 663-672 in Stephen John Stedman,
Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of
Peace Agreements. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Vankovska, Biljana. 2005. Ethnic-military Relations in Macedonia. Pp. 93-113 in Albrecht
Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict
Peacebuilding. New York: United Nations Press.
______ and Håkan Wiberg. 2003. Between Past and Future: Civil-Military Relations in PostCommunist Balkan States. London: I.B. Tauris.
Vetschera, Heinz and Matthieu Damian. 2006. Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and
Herzegovina: The Role of the International Community. International Peacekeeping, 13,
1 (March), pp. 28-42.
Walter, Barbara. 2002. Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars.
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wayne, Leslie. 202. America’s For-Profit Secret Army. New York Times, October 13;
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/training/mercenaries.htm, accessed 4/7/07
Williams, Rocky. 2005a. African Armed Forces and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform.
Journal of Security Sector Management, 3, 2 (March 2005).
______. 2005b. Demobilization and Reintegration: The South African Experience. Journal of
Security Sector Management, 3, 2 (March 2005).
______. 2004. The Impact of “Umkhonto We Sizwe” on the Creation of the South African
National Defence Force (SANDF). Journal of Security Sector Management, 2, 1
(March).
______. 2003. Defence in a Democracy: The South African Defence Review and the
Redefinition of the Parameters of the National Defence Debate. Pp. 205-226 in Rocky
Williams, Gavin Cawthra, and Diane Abrahams (eds), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military
Relations and Defence Transformation in Souther Africa. Pretoria: Institute for Security
Studies.
Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2001. Forging Democracy From Below: Insurgent Transitions in South
Africa and El Salvador. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Woodward, Susan. 2007. Personal interview, New York City.
______. 2003. In Whose Interest Is Security Sector Reform? Lessons From the Balkans. Pp.
276-302 in Gavin Cawthra and Robin Luckham, Governing Insecurity: Democratic
Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies. London:
Zed Books.