TOPIC 4
A COMPANY AS A CORPORATE ENTITY
EFFECT OF REGISTRATION OF THE COMPANY
Why incorporate or form a company?
The reasons for and against the incorporation of a business into a company are varied.
Section 112 of the Corporations Act lists the types of companies that can be registered
under that Act. Those companies are as follows:

proprietary companies - limited by shares or unlimited with share capital;

public companies - limited by shares; limited by guarantee; unlimited with
share capital; or no liability companies. With respect to no liability companies,
note section 112(2), (3) and (4) and the need for the relevant constitution
requiring that the sole object of the company be for “mining purposes” (defined
in section 9).
With respect to proprietary companies, note section 113 of the Corporations Act.
One of the most important prohibitions contained in the Corporations Act in this regard
is set out in section 115. That section precludes a person from participating in the
formation of a partnership or association that has an object gain for itself or for any of
its members; and has more than 20 members unless the partnership or association is
incorporated under an Australian law.
Note the prohibition in section 116 of the Corporations Act.
Steps in registering a company
You should note Part 2A.2 of the Corporations Act beginning at section 117. Once an
application is lodged under section 117 ASIC may give the company an ACN and
register the company and issue a certificate setting out the matters contained in section
118(1)(c). ASIC must keep a record of the registration.
In relation to names note Part 2B.6 of the Corporations Act beginning at section 147.
However, note the need for a company to exhibit its name: section 144. In particular,
note the need to have “Limited”, “No liability” or “Proprietary” as part of the name:
(section 156) unless sections 150 or 151 apply. In relation to change its name to see
section 157 and 157A.
1
A company comes into existence on registration: section 119.
With respective jurisdiction of registration note section 119A.
A company must have at least one member: section 114. A person becomes a member,
director or company secretary on registration if the person is specified in the
application with their consent: section 120. Note also sections 121 and 122 dealing with
registered office and expenses in promoting and setting up the company. Finally, a
company may have a common seal (section 123) and this aspect is important when
dealing with the application of sections 127 and 129 which is covered in Topic 8 in this
course.
Advantages of registration
Registration of a company brings with it a number of advantages. Some of these are:
(a)
Separate legal personality
Upon incorporation the company becomes a new and independent legal entity. It is
completely separate from the subscribers who formed it and from those who manage
it. A creditor can generally only sue the company, not its members, to recover
damages. However exceptions exist to this latter point and these are outlined later in
this Topic.
(b)
Limited liability
If the company is one limited by shares (defined in section 1070A), then section 516 of
the Corporations Act provides that a member's liability is limited to the amount unpaid,
if any, on these shares. This can be contrasted with a partnership where there is,
except for limited liability partnerships, unlimited liability and therefore all the assets
of a partner are vulnerable in the event of default by another partner. The extent of a
member's liability depends on the type of company as provided in section 112 of the
Corporations Act.
It should be noted that limited liability applies only to members. A company does not
enjoy limited liability in its dealings with outsiders.
(c)
Flexibility
When drafting up the company's constitutional documents1, it is possible to give
directors and shareholders various combinations of rights. For example, it is possible
1
"Constitution" is defined in sec 9.
2
to have differing voting rights and varied entitlements to dividends and the division of
powers between members and shareholders can be established. It should be noted
that a private company, known as a proprietary company, has some restraints
imposed on its flexible structure. Some of these restraints are set out in sections 113(1)
and (3) of the Corporations Act.
(d)
Perpetual succession
A company will continue as a legal entity regardless of the death or changing
circumstances of its members. It does not exist for a specific period of time.
(e)
Transferability and transmissibility of shares
Shareholders in companies often have flexibility in being able to transfer or assign their
shares to other parties. In such cases a transfer will occur when the ownership of the
share passes from one shareholder to another resulting in the transferee becoming a
member of the company after registration of the transfer. However, companies can
impose restrictions on the ability to transfer shares and this is common with respect to
proprietary companies. In this regard section 1072G provides for a replaceable rule
that directors may refuse to register a transfer of shares in the company for any reason.
Similarly transmission of shares is possible where a shareholder dies, becomes
incapable through incapacity or becomes bankrupt. In such cases the shares vest in the
deceased shareholder's personal representative or the Official Trustee in bankruptcy.
(f)
Imputation of taxation
Companies are able to impute the tax they have paid back to shareholders. This ability
means that the same revenue is not taxed twice and that an individual can receive
dividends which may not attract any further tax.
(g)
Power to acquire, hold and dispose of property
A company being a separate legal entity can own property. This property is not
owned by the members as they only own shares in the company. In Macaura v
Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 619, Macaura owned a timber yard. He had an
effective insurance policy to cover the destruction of any timber by fire. He
subsequently formed a limited company in which he was a substantial shareholder
and assigned the timber to the company, the purchase money for the timber remaining
owing to him. He did not assign the insurance policy to the company, nor did the
company take out its own policy. A fire destroyed the timber.
The insurance company's refusal to pay the claim made by Macaura was upheld by the
3
court. The limited company, considered by law to be a legal entity separate to its
shareholders, had an insurable interest in the timber but had no policy. Macaura had a
policy, but he had no insurable interest in the timber: all he had was a debt owing to
him by the company2.
Also changes in membership of the company have no effect on the ownership of the
company's assets.
(h)
Capability of suing and being sued
As a company is a separate legal entity it may sue to enforce rights and it may be sued
by others. Importantly, members in some instances may sue on behalf of the company.
This latter aspect will be dealt with in Topic 7 under the headings, “Members Remedies”
and “Derivative Actions”.
(i)
Privilege against self-incrimination
Historically courts have preceded on the basis that a corporation could claim privilege
against self-incrimination. This was clearly an advantage. However since the recent
decision in Environment Protection Authority v Caltex Refining Co Pty Ltd (1994) 68 ALJR
127 this position is no longer clear. In this case Caltex was the holder of a licence
under the State Pollution Control Commission Act 1970 (NSW) to discharge waste into
the ocean. The Environmental Protection Authority prosecuted Caltex for discharging
oil and grease into the ocean in breach of its licence. The Authority subsequently
served Caltex with a notice under the Clean Waters Act 1970 (NSW), sec 29(2)(a)
requiring it to produce certain documents relating to its discharge of waste. Caltex
objected to the validity of the notice and the Authority then issued a notice to produce
under the Land and Environment Court Rules 1980 (NSW).
Caltex sought to have the notices set aside on the basis that a production could
incriminate them. The trial judge held that the privilege against self incrimination did
not apply to corporations but the New South Wales Court of appeal allowed the
appeal. The High Court held however, by majority, that the privilege was not
available to corporations.
1.
Disadvantages of registration
2
Now sections 16 and 17 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) require only that the
claimant suffer a "pecuniary or financial loss" through the destruction of, or damage
to, the insured property. So long as this interest exists as at the date of the loss, the
claimant is not barred from claiming on the policy by reason only of not having a legal
or equitable interest in the property. It thus seems that if the circumstances of
Macaura's case were repeated today, the claimant would be successful.
4
As opposed to these advantages in incorporating a company, there are a certain
number of disadvantages. For example:(a)
Limitations on shareholders bringing proceedings on behalf of the company
There are procedural difficulties for shareholders to bring a court action on their own
behalf and on behalf of their company. Historically, the so-called rule in Foss v
Harbottle [1843] 2 Hare 461 was illustrative of such a problem. In that case two
shareholders brought an action on behalf of themselves and all other shareholders
against the directors, solicitor and architect of their company. They alleged that the
defendants had fraudulently misapplied company property and that the board was
not properly constituted. The defendant's argued that the plaintiff's plea, even if
proved, did not entitle them to succeed.
The Court held that the injury of which the plaintiff's complained of was not an injury
to themselves but to the company. Therefore the company should sue in its own
name. According to Wigram VC:
"It was not, nor could it successfully be, argued that it was a matter of course for any
individual members of a corporation thus to assume to themselves the right of suing in
the name of the corporation. In law the corporation and the aggregate members of the
corporation are not the same thing for purposes like this; and the only question can be
whether the facts alleged in this case justify a departure from the rule which, prima facie,
would require that the corporation should sue in its own name and in its corporate
character, or in the name of someone whom the law has appointed to be its
representative."
Now this area is governed by section 236 – 242 of the Corporations Act which is covered
in Topic 7 under the headings, “Members Remedies” and “Derivative Actions”.
(b)
Limited role that shareholders have in management
A company often has a separation of powers between management and shareholders.
According to Samuels JA., in Winthrop Investments Ltd v Winns Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 666
at 683:
"...[T]he shareholders may have, ultimate control, because they can alter the articles or
remove the directors: but they cannot interfere in the conduct of the company business
where management, as here, is vested in the board ... they have no general power to
transact the company's business, or to give effective directions about its management."
The main decision in this area is Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co. Ltd v
Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34. In this case an article gave power of management to
directors "...subject to such regulations as may from time to time be made by
extraordinary resolutions." A further article gave the board power to sell property
5
owned by the company on terms it thought fit. Shareholders at a meeting purported
by ordinary resolution to direct the board to sell property and the board refused and
relied on the articles. The Court held that unless an extraordinary resolution was
passed, as provided for in the articles, the shareholders could not ignore the articles
and give directions3.
(c)
The ever-increasing penalty provisions applying to the defaulting officer and
director
(d)
Fees and paperwork associated with compliance
Under the Corporations Act there are a number of returns to be completed and some of
these require filing fees, for example, filing of the Annual Return. There is also
paperwork associated with meetings, accounts, and registers and there may be a need
for auditors or at least accountants. These bureaucratic requirements may be seen as
disadvantages to proprietors of businesses.
THE COMPANY AS A SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY
A company is an artificial legal entity which enjoys rights and is subject to duties and
obligations. It comprises a number of members, both natural and non natural persons.
The company is also a separate legal entity and can have limited liability. Separate
legal personality was firmly established in Salomon v A. Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22.
Salomon had traded on his own as a leather merchant and shoe manufacturer for over
thirty years. While his business was solvent he formed a company called "Aron
Salomon and Company Limited" and sold his business to this company. The
Companies Act 1862 (UK) required seven subscribers and Salomon, his wife and five
children each subscribed one share to satisfy the statute.
Salomon valued his business at 39,000 pounds which appeared to be an inflated figure.
However instead of taking cash for the sale of the business, Salomon took 20,000 fully
paid one pound shares in addition to debentures to the value of 10,000 pounds. These
debentures were secured by a floating charge. The balance of the purchase price
remained as an unsecured debt.
Soon after the company came into financial difficulties and needed an injection of
funds. In response, Salomon borrowed 5000 pounds from Broderip which he
advanced to the company. To obtain this loan, Salomon had his debentures cancelled
and reissued to Broderip, but on terms that he should obtain a residual benefit after the
debt was discharged.
3
See also NRMA v Parker (1986) 4 ACLC 609.
6
Payments to Broderip fell into arrears and Broderip enforced his security. The
company's liquidation followed. After Broderip was paid, there remained a balance of
indebtedness secured by the debentures.
Salomon claimed his reversionary
entitlement. However if this claim was satisfied there would be no funds left to pay
out the other unsecured creditors. The liquidator attempted to resist the claim by
arguing that the debentures were invalid on the ground of fraud.
At first instance, Vaughan Williams J4, held that the company was merely acting as
Salomon's nominee and agent and therefore Salomon as principal had to indemnify
the company's creditors personally. On appeal, the Court of Appeal in rejecting
Salomon's appeal, held that Salomon was a trustee for the company which was his
mere shadow.
Salomon appealed to the House of Lords which rejected the lower courts' rulings.
According to Lord MacNaghten5:
"The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the
Memorandum and, although it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands
receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for
them. Nor are subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the extent
and in the manner provided by the Act. That is, I think, the declared intention of the
enactment".
Lord Watson emphasised6 that the creditors of the company could have searched the
Companies Register to ascertain the names of the shareholders and the number of
shares which they held. However the failure to do this should not impute a charge of
fraud against Salomon.
Lord Herschell7 looked at the intention of the statute in that it sought to protect
shareholders by limiting their liability.
Lord Halsbury LC had a similar view. According to his Lordship there was no right to
add to the requirements of the statute, nor to take from the requirements which had
been enacted. "The sole guide must be the statute itself." Once a person was a shareholder they were shareholders for all purposes and the statute was silent as to the
extent or degree of interest which had to be held by the individual corporators.
Importantly Lord Halsbury added an important qualifier to the immutability of the
4
[1895] 2 Ch 323.
5
[1897] AC 22 at 51.
6
[1897] AC 22 at 40.
7
[1897] AC 22 at 45.
7
separate legal entity doctrine. His Lordship said;
"I am simply here dealing with the provisions of the statute, and it seems to me to be
essential to the artificial creation that the law should recognise only that artificial
existence - quite apart from the motives or conduct of individual corporators. In saying
this, I do not at all mean to suggest that if it could be established that this provision of
the statute to which I am adverting had not been complied with, you could not go
behind the certificate of incorporation to show that a fraud had been committed upon the
officer entrusted with the duty of giving the certificate and that by some proceeding in
the nature of scire facias you could not prove the fact that the company had no legal
existence. But short of such proof it seems to me impossible to dispute that once the
company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent person
with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself and that the motives of those who took
part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those
rights and liabilities are..."
From this judgment by the House of Lords the concept of "a company" was seen as a
legal entity in its own right. The very heart of separation and independence from
those involved in the company's management and structure was established as a result
of Salomon's case. If creditors dealt with the company it was to the latter to which
recourse had to be made, not to those who were behind the entity. Over time this
traditional perception would be severely eroded. Recent illustrations of the principle
in Salomon's case appear in Lee v Lee's Air Farming [1961] AC 12 and Industrial Equity
Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 52 ALJR 89.
In Lee v Lee's Air Farming (1961) AC 12, Lee formed a company, Lee's Air Farming Ltd,
to carry on the business of aerial top-dressing. Lee held all the shares except for one
which was held by his solicitor. Lee was governing director of the company and
employed as its chief pilot. Lee was killed while working for the company when an
aeroplane crashed. His widow sued under the company's workers' compensation
insurance. The New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the claim on the basis that since
Lee was the governing director of the company, he could not also be its employee. His
widow appealed to the Privy Council.
The Court held that the company was a separate legal entity. According to Lord
Morris:
"A contractual relationship could only exist on the basis that there was consensus
between two contracting parties. It was never suggested (nor in their Lordships' view
could it reasonably have been suggested) that the company was a sham or a mere
simulacrum. It is well established that the mere fact someone is a director of a company
is no impediment to his entering into a contract to serve the company. If, then, it be
accepted that the respondent company was a legal entity their Lordships see no reason to
challenge the validity of any contractual obligations which were created between the
company and the deceased."
Lord Morris also said:
8
"Always assuming that the company was not a sham then the capacity of the company
to make a contract with the deceased could not be impugned merely because the deceased
was the agent of the company in its negotiation. The deceased might have made a firm
contract to serve the company for a fixed period of years. If within such period he had
retired from the office of governing director and other directors had been appointed his
contract would not have been affected. The circumstance that in his capacity as a
shareholder he could control the course of events would not in itself affect the validity of
his contractual relationship with the company. When, therefore, it is said that `one of
his first acts was to appoint himself the only pilot of the company', it must be recognised
that the appointment was made by the company, and that it was none the less a valid
appointment because it was the deceased himself who acted as the agent of the company
in arranging it. In their Lordships' view it is a logical consequence of the decision in
Salomon's case that one person may function in dual capacities."
In Industrial Equity v Blackburn (1977) 52 ALJR 89, the High Court refused to treat a
subsidiary company as merely part of its holding company for the purposes of
determining the profits of the holding company because of the separate legal entity
concept. In this case the question arose "whether in ascertaining the amount of profits
available for distribution by a holding company by way of dividend, it is correct to
look at the profit of the holding company itself or to the group profit as disclosed by
the consolidated accounts." The court held that it was correct to do this. According to
Mason J:
"However, it can scarcely be contended that the provisions of the Act operate to deny the
separate legal personality of each company in a group. Thus, in the absence of contract
creating some additional right, the creditors of company A, a subsidiary company
within a group, can look only to that company for payment of their debts. They cannot
look to company B, the holding company, for payment."
It should be noted that the provisions contained in sec 588V-588X of the Corporations
Law allows a liquidator to recover compensation from a holding company where its
subsidiary has been involved in insolvent trading. This is discussed later in this Topic.
MITIGATING THE RIGOUR OF THE SEPARATE LEGAL ENTITY DOCTRINE
Once it was acknowledged that a company enjoyed a separate and legal existence
apart from its members, another consideration needed to be dealt with, namely the
rights of creditors. The fact that many companies were incorporated with limited
liability further entrenched the notion that creditor's rights were limited. If creditors
dealt with this separate legal entity in which members had limited liability, then any
recourse which they may have had would be to the company itself. Thus the separate
legal entity doctrine was a two-edged sword. On the one side the rights of members
were limited and on the other side, a creditor practical ability to seek redress was
limited. Courts and the legislature then had to balance these respective rights to
prevent abuse. A starting point to analysing the quest for a balance can be found by
9
examining the chequered history of limited liability in the corporation confine.
Limited liability found its inception with regards to companies in 1854 in the Limited
Liability Act8. The justification for its inception can be found in arguments conveniently
summarised by Farrar9 as follows:

limited liability allowed small capital to be turned to profitable employment;

it was a question of free trade against monopoly;

unlimited liability was impracticable and impeded work such as railways,
canals and docks;

unlimited liability prevented prudent men from becoming members of
companies which were consequently being formed by the rash and reckless.
Interestingly, there were a number of arguments against the introduction of limited
liability10. Some of these arguments were:

limited liability was not a privilege to be given to partners but it was a right to
be taken from creditors;

it encouraged people to trade beyond their means;

it led to speculation and fraud;

there was adequate capital available without it.
Up until the passing of the Limited Liability Act 1854, a form of limited liability existed
in a practical sense in particular circumstances. For instance, it was common for
clauses to be included in deeds of settlement and prospectuses11 which limited the
liability of those behind the scheme. According to Gower12:
..."[U]nlimited liability, though a danger to the risk taker, was often a snare and a
delusion rather than a protection to the public and no handicap at all to the dishonest
8
18 & 19 Vict. c133. This Act was repealed soon after and later incorporated in the Joint
Stock Companies Act 1856.
9
Farrar, J.H., Company Law, Butterworths 1985 ed. London, at 18.
10
Farrar, J.H., Company Law, Butterworths 1985 ed. London, at 18.
11
Such limiting clauses were held to be ineffective from 1854.
12
Gower LCB, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4th ed. 1979, Stevens & Sons
London at 36.
10
promoter. The difficulties of suing a fluctuating body and the even greater difficulties of
levying execution made the personal liability of the members largely illusory.
Moreover, the investor was supposed to become a member by signing the deed of
settlement and until he did so his identity would not be known by the creditors. But in
fact `stags' would deal in allotment letters or scrip certificates to bearer without signing
the deed and often before any formal deed was in existence, and dishonest promoters,
who alone might be under any legal liability, might disappear with the subscription
moneys."
Despite these convenient ways of introducing limited liability and the arguments
against it, Government intervention was not far away and the introduction of statutory
limited liability was a by-product of such intervention. The form of this limited
liability introduced by the Limited Liability Act 1854 was, however, subject to certain
qualifications and it could be argued that right from the beginning, limited liability as
it applied to companies was not going to be absolute.
The qualifications to enjoying limited liability were built into this initial legislation. For
example:

the company needed to have at least 25 members holding 10 pound shares of
which 20% had been paid up;

three-quarters of the company's capital needed to have been subscribed;

the word "limited" was to have been included as part of the company's name;

directors of such limited liability companies were personally liable when they
paid a dividend knowing the company to be insolvent or made loans to the
members;

the company had to wind up if three-quarters of the capital was lost.
The Limited Liability Act 1854 was soon repealed and later its provisions were
incorporated in the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856. This latter Act allowed
incorporation with limited liability with minimal restrictions and it removed most of
the qualifications contained under the 1854 Act mentioned above, although directors
were still to be liable for payment of dividends when the company was insolvent. In
fact, all that was necessary to incorporate was for a minimum of seven persons to sign
and register a memorandum of association. According to Gower13:
..."[T]he legislature had adopted Lord Bramwell's recommendations and accepted his
view that those who dealt with companies knowing them to be limited had only
themselves to blame if they burnt their fingers. The mystic word `Limited' was
13
Gower LCB, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4th ed. 1979, Stevens & Sons
London at 48.
11
intended to act as a red flag warning the public of the perils which they faced if they
had dealings with the dangerous new invention." [bold added]
The question which can be asked is whether the colour of this `red flag' has faded?
Historically, creditors have been precluded from recovering from shareholders or
directors an amount in excess of the unpaid amounts on their shares, yet both the
courts and the legislature have widened the gaps in the corporate veil. As mentioned
at the beginning of this Chapter a number of situations now exist whereby directors
and others who take part in management of a corporation will be personally liable for
debts incurred by the company. This liability may be exclusive personal liability or
concurrent liability with the company. Whatever the liability, the distinct legal
personality pronounced in Salomon's case14 by the House of Lords has been shown, on
occasions, not to be an immutable principle. Both the legislators and the courts lift the
corporate veil and seek out the realities of the situation. They may deny the usual
legal consequences of incorporation and of the red flag. Further legislation directly
imposes personal liability upon management. Limited liability is not sacrosanct and
the principle in Salomon's case no longer rules.
Since the decision in Salomon's case there has been a steady stream of common law
decisions and legislative enactments which have eroded the immutability of the
separate legal entity doctrine and have thus exposed officers to personal liability to a
company's creditors. These decisions and enactments are conveniently seen as ways to
`lift or pierce the corporate veil'15.
According to Easterbrook and Fischel, "piercing seems to happen freakishly ... like
lightning, it is rare, severe and unprincipled."16 But this so called freakish happening has
occurred on a number of grounds. Farrar notes that17:
14
[1897] AC 22.
15
In Qintex Australia finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 109, Rogers CJ
suggested that the whole issue of the separateness of the corporate legal entity be reexamined in the light of the so-called tension between the realities of commercial life
and the applicable law. Although his Honour in the case at hand had to determine
which company in the Qintex group of companies should be able to claim the benefit
of the contract entered into, a number of more general remarks were made concerning
the separate legal entity doctrine. According to his Honour, (at p 111) it may be
desirable "for Parliament to consider whether this distinction between the law and commercial
practice should be maintained. This is especially the case today when the many corporate
collapses of conglomerates occasion many disputes."
16
Easterbrook FH and Fischel DR., Limited Liability and the Corporation, (1985) Uni of
Chicago Law Review 7 at 89.
17
Farrar JH., Company Law, 1985 ed, Butterworths, London at 57. This categorisation was
accepted by Young J, in Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1987) 5 ACLC 467
at 474.
12
"... [I]t is difficult to rationalise the cases except under the broad, rather questionbegging heading of policy and by describing the main categories under which they fall.
These are:

agency;

fraud;

group enterprises;

trusts;

enemy;

tax;

the Companies Act itself."
We will now analyse some of these grounds under the convenient headings of
"common law" and "statute".
(1)
Common Law
(a)
Fraudulent use of the corporate form
Lord Halsbury in Salomon's case acknowledged that the corporate veil will not protect
a fraudulent person hiding behind the corporate structure. Illustrative of this is the
decision in Gilford Motors Co Ltd v Horne [1933] 1 Ch D 935.
In this case the defendant was employed under a service contract as managing director
of the plaintiff company. As part of this contract he was forbidden, when ceasing his
employment with the company, from taking away the plaintiff's customers. The
defendant left the plaintiff company, formed a competitive business and a company in
which he was one of three shareholders. The new company solicited the plaintiff's
customers and the plaintiff sought an injunction restraining this conduct. The
defendant argued that he was not soliciting customers of the plaintiff and that if there
was any solicitation, it was from a separate legal entity, namely the new company
which had no contract with the plaintiff. This argument was rejected by the Court.
According to Lord Hanworth MR18, the new company was a "mere cloak or sham" for
the defendant, its purpose was to enable the defendant to engage in a business in
breach of the covenant contained in his contract with the plaintiff.
In Re FG (Films) Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 483, an American company owned most of the
18
[1933] 1 Ch D 935 at 956.
13
shares in an English company and exercised control over it. The American company
financed and produced a film in India and then caused the English company to apply
for a subsidy under the Cinematograph Films Act 1938 (UK). A subsidy would have
been paid if the film was made by a British film maker. It was held that no subsidy
should be paid as the British company had acted as a mere nominee and agent of the
American company. According to Vaisey J19:
"[T]he British company's intervention in the matter was purely colourable. They were
brought into existence for the sole purpose of being put forward as having undertaken
the very elaborate arrangements necessary for the making of this film and of enabling it
to qualify as a British film."
Similarly in Jones v Lipman [1962] 1 WLR 832, Lipman agreed to sell land to Jones.
Before completion of the contract, Lipman transferred the land to a company of which
he and a clerk employed by his solicitors were the only shareholders and directors.
Jones brought an action for specific performance of the contract against both Lipman
and the company.
The Court held that the company was a sham and ordered specific performance of the
contract. According to Russell J:
"The defendant company is the creature of the first defendant, a device and a sham, a
mask which he holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of
equity."
In Creasey v Breachwood Motors Ltd (1992) 10 ACLC 3052, Creasey worked for
Breachwood Welwyn Ltd as its general manager pursuant to a written contract. This
company carried on the business of a garage trading in cars from premises owned by
Breachwood Motors Ltd. F and S were the shareholders and directors of both these
companies. In 1988, Creasey was dismissed by Breachwood Welwyn Ltd and he
claimed damages for wrongful dismissal against this company.
In November 1988, Breachwood Welwyn Ltd ceased trading and in December 1988
Breachwood Motors Ltd took over its business and continued its operations under the
same trading name. This takeover was carried out without regard to the separate
entity of Breachwood Welwyn Ltd and the interests of its creditors, especially Creasey,
if his claim for wrongful dismissal were to succeed.
As a result of the actions of F, S and Breachwood Motors Ltd, Creasey found himself
with a judgement against Breachwood Welwyn Ltd, an insolvent company, the assets
of which had been removed to Breachwood Motors Ltd. Breachwood Motors Ltd
refused to meet any part of the judgement. One of the questions which had to be
decided was whether the corporate veil could be pierced?
19
[1953] 1 WLR 483 at p 486.
14
The Court held that the corporate veil could be pierced. Nothing could justify F and
S's conduct in deliberately shifting Breachwood Welwyn Ltd's assets and business into
Breachwood Motors Ltd in total disregard of their duties as directors and
shareholders. This meant that Breachwood Motors Ltd were liable for the liability of
Breachwood Welwyn.
(b)
Agency
In some circumstances a company may act as an agent for others, for example,
shipping agents or investment brokers. Moreover, it is possible for a company to act
as the agent for its own shareholders. This may be done by express contract or
impliedly.
In Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corp [1939] 4 All ER 116, Birmingham
Corporation, a local council, compulsorily acquired premises owned by the
Birmingham Waste Co. Ltd. This company was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Smith,
Stone & Knight Ltd. Indeed, of the 502 issued shares in the waste company, 497 were
held by Smith, Stone & Knight and the other 5 were held on its behalf. The Waste
Company had no staff, no separate books of account and on the evidence it was
treated like one of Smith, Stone & Knight's departments. Accordingly a claim for
compensation for loss of business was made by Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd.
Birmingham Corporation argued that Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. could not succeed
because the loss had been sustained by the waste company - a separate legal entity.
The Court held that compensation was payable as the Waste Company was carrying
on no business of its own but was in fact carrying on the Smith, Stone & Knight
business as agent for them.
Atkinson J held that the following six factors must be proven in order to show the
requisite agency relationship and thus be able to lift the corporate veil:

Profits of the subsidiary must be treated as profits of the holding company;

Those conducting the subsidiary's business must be appointed by the holding
company;

The holding company must be the head and brain of the trading venture;

The holding company must be in control of the venture and must decide what
capital should be spent and what should be done;

The profits made by the subsidiary's business must be made by the holding
company's skill and direction; and

The holding company must be in constant and effective control.
15
This decision was adopted in Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd & ors (1987) 5
ACLC 467. In this case a dispute occurred between major competitors in a concreting
industry. Hi-Quality Concrete (Holdings) Pty Ltd was the holding company for a
large group of companies, known as the Hi-Quality group. This group was under the
control of Messrs Hargreaves, Ward and Armstrong. Hi-Quality Concrete (NSW) was
part of this group and was a fully-owned subsidiary of the holding company.
In 1982 Hargreaves, Ward and Armstrong together with Hi-Quality Concrete (NSW)
Pty Ltd and Hi-Quality Concrete (Holdings) Pty Ltd entered into a deed with the
plaintiff. In the deed "Hi-Quality" was defined as Hi-Quality Concrete (NSW) Pty Ltd.
In 1985 the holding company entered into transactions which were alleged to be in
breach of this deed. The other members of the group denied any breach of the
agreement on the basis that they were not parties to the 1985 transactions and that the
holding company was not a party to the 1982 deed.
The Supreme Court of New South Wales held that the specific provision defining "HiQuality" meant that the holding company was specifically excluded from the promises
in the 1982 deed and therefore could not be in breach of the deed. Young J
acknowledged the separateness of the legal entities involved and held that on the facts
there could be no imputation of the promise by the subsidiary to the holding company.
In other words the corporate veil could not be lifted. Importantly the court could not
infer an agency agreement, nor could they find a partnership between the companies
in the group or a sham or a facade20. Further there was "no question of a corporation
being formed for the sole purpose or for the dominant purpose of evading ... a
contractual or fiduciary obligation."21
According to Young J22, the corporate veil would not be lifted when it appears that
"there was a good commercial purpose for having separate companies in the group performing
different functions even though the ultimate controllers would very naturally lapse into
speaking of the whole group as `us'."
This issue was also examined in Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1987) 7 ACLC 841.
In this case Briggs suffered from a medical condition allegedly caused by negligence of
his employer. His employer was a subsidiary of the defendant. In an action against
both his employer and its holding company, one argument which had to be addressed
was whether the corporate veil could be lifted so as to find the holding company liable.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal admitted to the possibility of the veil being
lifted and remitted the case back for determination.
20
(1987) 5 ACLC 467 at 476.
21
(1987) 5 ACLC 467 at 477.
22
(1987) 5 ACLC 467 at 476.
16
(c)
Groups of companies
Companies may form part of a group of companies where for example, they operate
with a holding company and subsidiaries. On occasion, courts will regard the entities
as one. In DHN Food Distributors Ltd v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1
WLR 852, three companies in a group of food distributors were treated by the court as
one23. In this case one company, D.H.N. Food Distributors [DHN], owned and
controlled a business of importing and distributing groceries. It operated out of a
warehouse which was owned by a subsidiary, called Bronze Investments Ltd.
Vehicles which were used in the business were owned by another subsidiary, D.H.N.
Food Transport Ltd. DHN held all the shares in both the subsidiaries and the
companies had common directors.
In 1969 the local council, known as Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, made a
compulsory purchase order so as to acquire the land on which was built the
warehouse. DHN was unable to relocate and the business subsequently closed down.
On the issue of compensation, there were two factors to consider. First, the value of
the land and secondly compensation for disturbance in having the business closed
down. On the first issue, the council offered and paid an agreed sum to Bronze
Investments Ltd. However with regards to the "disturbance value", the council argued
that none was payable as Bronze Investments were not disturbed. The council
admitted that both DHN and DHN Food Distributors Ltd were disturbed, however
they argued that those two companies were not entitled to any compensation at all
because they had no interest in the land. The council argued that DHN was only a
licensee of Bronze Investments Ltd. Under the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (UK) if a
person has no greater interest than a tenant from year to year in the land, then he is
only entitled to compensation for that lesser interest. As a licensee can be evicted on
short notice, the compensation payable to DHN would be negligible.
The English Court of Appeal treated the companies as one economic entity and
following from this, DHN could be treated as owner of the property and was thus
entitled to compensation for disturbance to its business24. According to Lord
Denning25:
"We all know that in many respects a group of companies are treated together for the
purpose of general accounts, balance sheet, and profit and loss account. They are treated
as one concern. Professor Gower in Modern Company Law (3rd ed., 1969), p 216 says:
... `there is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the separate legal entities of various
23
Indeed Lord Denning described the case as the "three in one". Three companies in one
or alternatively as the "one in three". One group of three companies. See [1976] 1
WLR 852 at 857.
24
For a discussion on this point see Re Securitbank Ltd [1978] 1 NZLR 97 at 133 and
Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567.
25
[1976] 1 WLR 852 at 860.
17
companies within a group, and to look instead at the economic entity of the whole
group.' This is especially the case when a parent company owns all the shares of the
subsidiaries - so much so that it can control every movement of the subsidiaries. These
subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to the parent company and must do just what the
parent says ... They should not be treated separately so as to be defeated on a technical
point. They should not be deprived of the compensation which should justly be payable
for disturbance. The three companies should, for present purposes, be treated as one,
and the parent company DHN should be treated as that one26."
Lord Goff also believed that this was a case in which one was entitled to look at the
realities of the situation and to pierce the corporate veil. In his Lordship's opinion27:
"I would not at this juncture accept that in every case where one has a group of
companies one is entitled to pierce the veil, but in this case the two subsidiaries were
both wholly-owned; further they had no separate business operations whatsoever; third,
in my judgment, the nature of the question involved is highly relevant, namely, whether
the owners of this business have been disturbed in their possession and enjoyment of it."
An Australian illustration of this "group enterprise" circumstance occurred in Hobart
Bridge Co Ltd (in liq) v Commissioner of Taxation (1951-52) 25 ALJ 225. In this case the
appellant was granted a franchise to build a bridge across the Derwent river in
Tasmania. The company's source of revenue was to include profit from the
subdivision and sale of land adjacent to the bridge. The promoter had secured options
over the land and a subsidiary company was formed to purchase it. The appellant
held approximately nine-tenths of the shares in the subsidiary. No sales of land were
made by the subsidiary, however some preparatory work was done. An Act was
passed whereby the government acquired all the undertaking of the appellant and
later they acquired all of the shares in the subsidiary company.
By the share
transactions the appellant made a substantial profit.
The respondent treated this profit as assessable income earned pursuant to a profitmaking scheme of which the subsidiary was the "collecting medium".
The High Court rejected this and held that the subsidiary was not to be deemed the
medium or machinery for a scheme. There was to be no lifting of the corporate veil
simply because the formation of the subsidiary reduces tax liability. The subsidiary
had a real existence and a valid reason for its incorporation.
26
The decision in DHN was approved in Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd (in
liq) v Texas Commerce International Bank Ltd [1983] QB 84. However the case was
distinguished in Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council (1978) 38 P & CR 521. Lord
Keith of Kinkel at 526 expressed doubt as to whether the decision in DHN correctly
applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where
special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere facade concealing the true facts.
27
[1976] 1 WLR 852 at 861.
18
Kitto J referred28 to the judgment of Lord Sumner in Gas Light Improvement Co v Inland
Revenue Commissioners29 where his Lordship stated:
"It is said that all this was `Machinery' but that is true of all participations in limited
liability companies. They and their operations are simply the machinery, in an
economic sense, by which natural persons, who desire to limit their liability, participate
in undertakings which they cannot manage to carry on themselves, either alone or in
partnership, but, legally speaking, this machinery is not impersonal though it is
inanimate. Between the investor, who participates as a shareholder, and the
undertaking carried on, the law interposes another person, real though artificial, the
company itself, and the business carried on is the business of that company, and the
capital employed is its capital and not in either case the business or the capital of the
shareholders. Assuming, of course, that the company is duly formed and is not a sham
(of which there is no suggestion here), the idea that it is mere machinery for effecting the
purposes of the shareholders is a layman's fallacy. It is a figure of speech, which cannot
alter the legal aspects of the facts."
In Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd (1991) 9 ACLC 109, Rogers CJ
suggested that the whole issue of the separateness of the corporate legal entity be reexamined in the light of the so-called tension between the realities of commercial life
and the applicable law. Although the court in the case at hand had to determine which
company in the Qintex group of companies should be able to claim the benefit of the
contract entered into, a number of more general remarks were made concerning the
separate legal entity doctrine. According to Rogers CJ it may be desirable30:
"... [F]or Parliament to consider whether this distinction between the law and
commercial practice should be maintained. This is especially the case today when the
many corporate collapses of conglomerates occasion many disputes."
In Briggs v James Hardie Co Pty Ltd (1989) 7 ACLC 841 Rogers AJA noted that complete
domination or control over a subsidiary may not by itself lead to the corporate veil
being lifted. Further the judge suggested31 that different considerations should apply
when this veil is to be lifted in tortious situation as compared with actions based in
contract and taxation.
2.
Statute - Corporations Act
28
(1951-52) 25 ALJR 225 at 228.
29
[1923] AC 723 at 740-741.
30
(1991) 9 ACLC 109 at 111.
31
(1989) 7 ACLC 841 at 863. This was also the view of Lord Goff in DHN Food distributors
v Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852.
19
Under the Corporations Act there are numerous illustrations of personal liability
attaching to management despite the company structure being in existence and
perhaps being the entity which contractually dealt with a third party.
(a)
Section 183
Promoters who enter pre-registration contacts32 may incur personal liability to those
with whom they dealt on behalf of a non-existent entity, irrespective of any contractual
intention. This is due to the operation of section 131of the Corporations Act. Bay v
Illawong Stationery Pty Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 429. See also sections 711, 728 and 729.
(b)
Section 153
This section requires a company to set out its name on all its public documents and
negotiable instruments. It is a strict liability offence for breach. In an English case,
Jenice Pty Ltd v Dan (1994) 12 ACLC 3209 a company's cheques bore the name
"Primkeen Limited" when its name was "Primekeen Ltd". A cheque which was later
dishonoured was issued and signed by a director and the payee attempted to make the
director liable. The Court held that the director was not liable. The company's name
was mentioned notwithstanding the typographical error. This was different from
omitting the whole name.
(c)
Sections 588G-588Z and 592-593 (Insolvent Trading)
Introduction to sections 588G-588Z
When a company has a liquidity crisis its directors and officers need to take special
care in their dealings with those outside the company. Directors need to consider their
company's ability to pay all its debts as and when they become due. This is
particularly so when the company is in financial difficulty and some form of financial
management structure is in place. If a reasonably competent director would conclude
that the company lacks that capacity or would lack that capacity after incurring the
debt, they should not cause the company to incur further debts.
The relevant provisions of the Corporations Act regulating insolvent trading are
contained in sections 588G-Z. Those provisions contain a complete code for the
regulation of such trading. Sections 588G-588Z of the Corporations Act are provisions
which commenced operation on and from the 23 June 1993. These sections were
designed to replace the insolvent trading provisions contained in sections 592-593 of
32
Courtney, W., “Failed Pre-registration Contracts and the Statutory Remedy”, (2007) 25 C
& SLJ 226.
20
the Corporations Law33. However these latter provisions will continue to apply to debts
incurred prior to 23 June 1993 in circumstances amounting to insolvent trading.
The duty
Section 588G(1) imposes a duty upon directors to prevent a company from engaging
in insolvent trading. The heading to Division 3 of the Corporations Act refers to this
duty and this heading is regarded as part of the Corporations Act because of the
operation of sec 109D.
Section 588G(1) applies if:
(a)
the director was a director of the company at the time when the company incurs
a debt; and
(b)
the company is insolvent at the time of the incurring the debt or becomes
insolvent by incurring that debt or by incurring at that time debts including that
debt; and
(c)
at the time there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the company was
insolvent or would become insolvent as a result of the transaction; and
(d)
that time is at or after the commencement of this Part, that is 23 June 1993.
Section 588G(3) provides that by failing to prevent the company from incurring the
debt, the person will contravene the section if they were aware at the time that there
are such grounds for so suspecting or a reasonable person in a like position in a
company in the company circumstances would be so aware.
Further, section 588G(3) provides that a person commits an offence if:
33
(a)
the company incurs a debt at a particular time; and
(b)
at that time, the person is a director of the company; and
(c)
the company is insolvent at that time, or becomes insolvent by
incurring that debt, or by incurring at that time debts including that
debt; and
It should be noted that sections 592(6) and 593(2) of the Corporations Act also deals with
conduct known as fraudulent trading. These provisions have not been replaced and
this means that these parts of sections 592 and 593 are still operative in regards to
fraudulent trading notwithstanding that the debts were incurred after the 23 June
1993. However with regards to insolvent trading, a preliminary issue of ascertaining
the date the debt was incurred must be made. If debts were incurred after 23 June
1993 in these circumstances sections 588G-588Z will apply. For debts incurred prior to
this date in similar circumstances, sections 592(1)-(5),(7),(8), 593(1) and (4)-(8) apply.
21
(d)
the person suspected at the time when the company incurred the debt
that the company was insolvent or would become insolvent as a result
of incurring that debt or other debts; and
(e)
the person’s failure to prevent the company incurring the debt was
dishonest.
(a)
If either section 588G(2) or (3) is satisfied, then section 588M can be
used to enable a creditor to recover compensation for loss resulting
from insolvent trading as long as section 588R or section 588S are
satisfied.
It should be noted that both those who contravene the section and those "involved in
the contravention" (section 79) can be caught.
Relevantly, section 588M provides that if:
(a)
a person (director) has contravened section 588G(2) or (3) in relation to
the incurring of a debt by a company; and
(b)
the person (creditor) to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or
damage in relation to the debt because of the company’s insolvency;
and
(c)
the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was
suffered; and
(d)
the company is being wound up,
then a creditor may, if they have satisfied either section 588R or section 588S, recover
from the director, as a debt due to the creditor, an amount equal to the amount of the
loss or damage.
Section 588R enables a creditor to commence proceedings with the written consent of
the company’s liquidator.
Section 588S enables a creditor to sue for compensation without the liquidator’s
consent but only after giving notice to the liquidator.
Section 588M(4) provides that proceedings under section 588M may only begun
within six years after the beginning of the winding up. Further, section 588M has the
effect in addition to, and not in derogation of, any rule of law about the duty or
liability of a person because of the person’s office or employment in relation to the
company and does not prevent proceedings from being instituted in respect of a
breach of such a duty or in respect of such a liability (section 588P).
22
According to para 1229 of the Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied these
provisions:
"[A] court would be expected to look at two separate issues when considering whether
the duty had been breached. The first matter would be what circumstances that
particular company was in, including the size of the company, the type of the company,
the nature of its enterprise, the provisions of its articles, the composition of its board and
the distribution of work between the board and other officers. The second matter that a
court would be expected to look at would be, in the light of the circumstances referred to,
what would a reasonable person in the position of director normally be expected to do to
ensure that he or she would be aware of any insolvency problem. In particular a court
might expect the following:

that directors of a large company would ensure that among their number there
should be one or more who are talented in the field of corporate financial
management;

that directors of a large company should read, be able to understand and seek
any necessary clarification of the key financial information put before the board,
such as a balance sheet and a profit and loss statement;

that the board ensure that appropriately skilled people are engaged to carry out
the company's accounting functions;

that the board would require relevant accounting information to be supplied
ahead of regular board meetings at which key financial decisions are to be made,
and that, where a significant borrowing is to be undertaken, the management
should supply the board with a statement of the company's current financial
position as well as the particulars of the way in which the principle, interest and
other charges are to be serviced over the anticipated term of the loan;

that the board make arrangements for monitoring the use of any authorisation
granted in relation to the use of the company seal, the entering into contracts
with financiers or the signing of cheques and bills of exchange; and

where the nature of the business may expose the company to a high risk of
sudden liquidity restriction, or the company is known by the director to be in a
delicate financial position, that extra care and more rigorous safeguards may be
adopted."
Importantly, there is nothing in section 588G which necessitates the winding up of the
company as a precondition to activating the section, however it can be argued that the
heading to Part 5.7 (including Part 5.7B in which sections 588G-588Z is located) of the
23
Corporations Act makes it clear that section 588G is part of particular legislation
concerned with the recovery of property or compensation after a winding up has
begun. Furthermore some of the sections related to section 588G, such as sections
588M and 588R, reinforce the view that they operate only where the company is being
wound up. In contrast, other related sections such as sections 588J and 588K, are not
expressed to be contingent upon winding up occurring and it is arguable that these
particular sections are not confined to winding up situations.
Taking each of the elements in section 588G(1) in turn, the following can be stated:
(1)
Directors
With respect to `directors', section 9 of the Corporations Act provides that a "director"
would include any person occupying or acting in the position of director by whatever
name called and whether or not validly appointed or authorised and any person in
accordance with whose directions or instructions the directors are accustomed to act so called "defacto" directors. See Taylormaid Marine Industries Pty Ltd v Beaurepaire &
Ors (1987) 5 ACLC 253. Further persons dealing with a company can assume that a
person is a director in certain situations [sec 129].
The definition may also include alternate directors if called upon to act. See Playcorp
Pty Ltd v Shaw & ors (1993) 11 ACLC 641.
(2)
Incurring of a “debt”
Another requirement to found a cause of action under section 588G(1) is proof that
"the company incurred a debt." This involves an examination of two requirements.
First, what qualifies as a `debt' for the purposes of the section and secondly, what is
involved in the `incurring' of a debt.
(a)
The meaning of `debt'
The meaning of the word “debt” is not defined in the legislation. However it has
been interpreted to bear its ordinary technical meaning as something recoverable by
an action for debt and thus must be ascertained or capable of being ascertained:
Ogden’s Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 LT 567; Hussein v Good (1990) 1 ACSR 710.
Therefore, a “debt” refers to an obligation for the payment of money or money’s
worth and there is authority to suggest that the obligation must be for an ascertained
liquidated sum: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Watt (1984) 9 ACLR 503; Jelin v Johnson (1987)
5 ACLC 463.
In CAC v Shapowloff (1974) CLC 27,964, the defendant, by telephone, allegedly ordered
5,000 shares from a broker on behalf of his company. The terms were that the
company would pay for them only when the broker received the scrip. In other
words, the liability remained contingent until the scrip was received. The broker
24
obtained these shares in 29 transactions and 29 contract notes were forwarded to the
company. The shares were not paid for and the company was wound up. The
defendant was charged with knowingly being a party to contracting a debt provable in
the winding up of that company having, at the time the debt was contracted, no
reasonable or probable ground of expectation of the company being able to pay.
A declaration was sought from the Supreme Court. Before any evidence was taken, as
to the meaning of the word `debt' in the section, Jacobs P in the Court of Appeal (1974)
CLC 27,974 declared at 27,977:
"[T]hat for the purposes of sec 303(3) of the Companies Act where a series of contracts is
made from time to time which result in a liability on behalf of the company to pay in
respect of each of them, then each such liability constitutes a debt; and the time when
each such debt is contracted is the time when each respective liability arises, and not the
time or times when the balance is declared or computed."
The Magistrate, believed that contingent debts should be included within the meaning
of the word "debt". Here liability arose when the contract notes were delivered to the
company. This view was affirmed by Cantor J in the Supreme Court and by Mahoney
JA in the Court of Appeal.
Notwithstanding these comments on contingent debts, it appears that some
divergence of opinion has developed because of the lack of clarity in the section as to
whether these debts are "debts" within the meaning of sec 592 Corporations Law. The
section does not expressly state whether "debt" includes a contingent debt and this
omission could lead to unsatisfactory results. Illustrative of these concerns is the
Victorian Supreme Court decision in Hussein v Good (1990) 8 ACLC 390. In this case
the defendant, a director of a clothing retail company ordered a range of clothing from
the plaintiff, a manufacturer. The date of delivery was originally to be March 1988 but
this, by agreement, was changed to 3 May 1988. Payment was to be made upon
delivery.
Part of the total goods were delivered on 3 May 1988 but no payment was made. A
few days later money was collected by the plaintiff, however one of the cheques used
for payment was dishonoured. Before notice of dishonour was given, the remainder of
the goods were delivered. No further payment was made.
On 16 May 1988 the defendant's accountant advised the defendant to put the company
into voluntary liquidation. The company was placed under the control of a liquidator.
The company was placed under the control of a liquidator. The plaintiff claimed
against the defendant pursuant to section 556 of the Companies Code (now section 588G
Corporations Act).
The Court held that the date to determine whether there were reasonable grounds to
expect that the company could not pay all its debts as and when they became due was
in May 1988 and that at that date the defendant did not expect the debt would be paid.
25
A debt it was held,34 meant "what is owed, state of owing something". Here nothing
was owed until the delivery of the manufactured garments.
According to Southwell J, Shapowloff was distinguishable from the present case:
"I see some difficulty in drawing an analogy between the particular circumstances
surrounding transaction between a purchaser of shares and his agent, the broker, where
the creation of a contingent liability can usually be expected to become a present
indebtedness very quickly, perhaps upon the same day, and a case where, as in the
present case, a trader in goods places an order with a manufacturer in circumstances
where any contingent liability, if there was one, would not become a present
indebtedness until some months thereafter."
The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the date on which the debt was incurred
was November 1987, when the goods were ordered.
In Standard Chartered Bank v Antico (1995) 131 ALR 1 at 57 Hodgson J stated that:
“a company incurs a debt when, by its choice, it does or omit something which, as a
matter of substance and commercial reality, renders it liable for a debt which it
otherwise would not have been liable.”
Further, in ASIC v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 46 ACSR 126 Mandie J noted at 247:
“the weight of authority shows that a debt can be incurred when the contract giving
rise to the debt is entered into, even if contingencies affect the debt or the debt is a
future debt. In the case of a future debt, it may be incurred at the time of entering the
contract if it is then an ascertained or an ascertainable amount. By the same token, a
debt may in appropriate circumstances be incurred within the meaning of the section
at a time later than the entry of the contract under which the debt arises or may arise.
Although it is necessary to consider the terms of the relevant contract, the question
when the debt is incurred within the meaning of this section does not depend on strict
legal analysis but turns on when, in substance and commercial reality, the company
is exposed to the relevant liability.”
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edwards (2005) 220 ALR 148; 54
ACSR 583; [2005] NSWSC 831 Barrett J stated that incurring, a debt involves any
"act, omission or other circumstance which causes the company to owe the debt”.
In Hawkins & ors v Bank of China (1992) 10 ACLC 588, it was held that "debts" can
include a contingent liability35. According to Gleeson CJ:
"`Debt' is capable of including a contingent liability. The word was used in that sense
in sec 291 of the Companies Act 1961, which referred to `debts payable on a
34
35
(1990) 8 ACLC 390 at 397.
(1992) 10 ACLC 588 at 595. Kirby P also agreed at 599 with this conclusion.
26
contingency'. That expression did not involve a contradiction in terms. Dictionaries
define `debt' as a liability or obligation to pay or render something. Such a liability may
be conditional as well as present and absolute.
Likewise a contractual obligation to supply goods even after they have been paid for,
will not constitute a debt for the purposes of the section. This is because as at the time of
the contract all that could be claimed if the goods were not supplied would be an action
for damages. "A potential liability for damages does not constitute the incurring of a
debt for the purposes of sec 592."36
In Deputy Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Abbott & Anor (1980) CLC 34,428 it was
held that37:
"The word `debts' means something recoverable by an action for debt and nothing can
be recovered in an action for debts except that which is ascertained or can be
ascertained.; see Ogden's Ltd v Weinberg (1906) 95 L.T. per Lord Davey at p.567".
This view was accepted and followed by Master Seaman in Jelin Pty Ltd v Johnstone &
Anor (1987) 5 ACLC 463 and it appears that the word is used in its ordinary sense38 and
therefore claims for unliquidated damages39 and outstanding interest would be
excluded40. In addition taxes which are due and payable and which may even be
deemed to be debts owing to the crown are not `debts' for the purposes of section
588G41. However, claims for outstanding workers compensation premiums are debts
within the meaning of the section.42 Finally, the fact that a company's liability to pay a
debt has been extinguished (subject to proofs of debt) upon a winding up, does not
mean that directors and management will avoid liability43 as creditors have a vested
right to sue the officer.
(b)
The meaning of “incurring” a debt
Section 588G(1A) contains a “debt” table which is designed to assist ascertain the
point in time when a debt was incurred. It is non-exhaustive.
Predecessor legislation covered situations where the defendant was knowingly a party
to the contracting of a debt by the company. For example, the purchase of shares via a
telephone order44; purchase of goods and services45; entering into contracts to help
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
Reed International Books Australia v King (1993) 11 ACLC 935 at 938.
(1980) CLC 34,428 at p 34,430.
See 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Watt & Anor; NEC Home Electronics Australia Pty Ltd v White
& Anor (1984) 2 ACLC 621.
See Jelin Pty Ltd v Johnstone & Anor (1987) 5 ACLC 463.
See BL Lange & Co v Bird (1991) 9 ACLC 1015.
See Castrisios v McManus; McManus v Castrisios (1991) 9 ACLC 287.
State Government Insurance Corp v. Pollock (1993) 11 ACLC 839.
See Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co. Pty Ltd (in liq) v Ross & Ors (1985) 5 ACLC 326 at 329.
Shapowloff v Dunn (1981) ACLC 33,127.
Deputy Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Abbott & anor (1980) CLC 34,428 and DeRossi
27
build project homes46; arranging for advances to be made to the company. The
question is, is section 588G of the Corporations Act restricted to debts which have been
contracted47?
In Jelin Pty Ltd v Johnson & Anor (1987) 5 ACLC 463, the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the defendant because it had been deprived of a judgment debt. This
judgment debt was given by the Federal Court in relation to misleading statements
made by servants of the company. The plaintiff submitted that the relevant debt was
incurred either when the plaintiff introduced funds into the business on the faith of the
misleading statements of the servants or agents or when the Federal Court gave its
judgment.
Master Seaman QC said that neither on the day on which the
misrepresentations were made, nor on the day when judgment was given by the court
awarding damages, nor on any day between these two days, did the company `incur a
debt'48.
"The incurring of a liability in damages is not the same as `incurring a debt' under the
section".
A similar conclusion was reached in relation to a liability to pay taxation49.
In Hawkins & ors v Bank of China (1992) 10 ACLC 588 it was held that the giving of
guarantee constituted the incurring of a debt. The liability incurred under the
guarantee was to pay an already-accrued sum which was a liquidated amount. Even
though it was unusual to say that the company may not have incurred a debt at the
time when it had given the guarantee, nevertheless according to Gleeson CJ and
Sheller JA it was proper to say that the company incurred a debt to the bank at some
stage. Their Honours noted:
"[T]hat the words `incurs' and `debt' are not words of precise and inflexible denotation.
Where they appear in sec 556 they are to be applied in a practical and commonsense
fashion, consistent with the context and with the statutory purposes."
According to Gleeson CJ50:
"the word `incurs' takes its meaning from its context and is apt to describe, in an
appropriate case, the undertaking of an engagement to pay a sum of money at a future
time, even if the engagement is conditional and the amount involved is uncertain. Once
it is accepted that `debt' may include a contingent debt then there is no obstacle to the
conclusion that, in the present context, a debt may have been taken to have been
incurred when a company entered a contract by which it subjected itself to a conditional
46
47
48
49
50
v Hamilton (1982) 7 ACLR 40 and Flavel v Day (1985) 3 ACLC 320.
Southern Highlands Building Co. Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act (1979) ACLC
32,074.
Metal Component Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) v Clark & Anor (1980) ACLR 862.
(1987) 5 ACLC 463 at 465.
See Castrisios v McManus; McManus v Castrisios (1991) 9 ACLC 287 at 296.
(1992) 10 ACLC 588 at 595.
28
but unavoidable obligation to pay a sum of money at a future time."
Kirby P adopted a similar view and held51 that:
"The act of `incurring' happens when the corporation so acts as to expose itself
contractually to an obligation to make a future payment of a sum of money as a debt.
The mere fact that such a sum of money will only be paid upon a future contingency
does not make the assumption of the obligation any less `incurring' a `debt'."
Associated with ascertaining whether a company has incurred a debt is the
concomitant task of being able to specify the particular time when the debt was
incurred.
In Russell Halpern Nominees Pty Ltd v Martin & Anor52, the plaintiff company agreed to
lease premises to two other companies. Rent was not received and it was found that
immediately before and at the time of entering into the agreement for lease, both
tenants were unable to pay their debts as and when they fell due. A writ based upon
sec 556 was struck out on the basis that it did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.
The Supreme Court by majority, dismissed the appeal.
According to Burt CJ.53:
"[W]hatever the expression `incurs a debt' might mean, it is clearly descriptive of an act
which when done by the company in the stated circumstances exposes a director of the
company and a person who took part in the management of the company when the debt
was incurred, [sic] when the act was done, to a criminal liability. The incurring of the
debt by the company in the stated circumstances is the act which constitutes the offence
created by the subsection and that act is done at a particular and identifiable point of
time, [sic] `when the debt was incurred.' ... To hold otherwise would be to say that if a
company when in all respects financially sound were to enter into a lease for a term of
years and at some time thereafter and for reasons which could not be anticipated it were
to fall on bad times and be unable to pay its debts, the directors would thereafter and on
every rent day within the remainder of the term be guilty of an offence for the reason
that on the rent day the company `incurs a debt'. I am unable to accept that".
(3)
“Insolvent” at the time of the incurring the debt or becomes insolvent
The definition of “insolvency” is central to the operation of the insolvent trading
provisions. Liability is not triggered under the insolvent trading provisions unless
the company was insolvent at the time the particular debt was incurred, or became
insolvent by incurring that debt or other debts: section 588G(1)(b).
(1992) 10 ACLC 588 at 598.
(1986) 4 ACLC 393.
53(1986) 4 ACLC 393 at 396.
51
52
29
Prior to 23 June 1993, no statutory definition of insolvency existed. However the
Corporations Act now contains section 95A which provides definitions of both
solvency and insolvency. Those definitions have been argued54 as representing:
“a particularly important reform … in relation to Part 5.7B because it refines
and partly codifies the complex law surrounding the situation which arises
when a company is insolvent.”
Under section 95A(1) a person is deemed solvent, “if and only if, the person is able to
pay all the person’s debts as and when they become due and payable.”
Under section 95A(2) a person who is not solvent is insolvent.
It has been held that the definition contained in section 95A suggests that a cash
flow test is intended rather than a simple balance of assets over liabilities: Leslie v
Howship Holdings Pty Ltd (1997) 15 ACLC 459. This was reinforced by Prior J in
Powell v Fryer (2000) 18 ACLC 480 at 482 where his Honour stated that the primary
cash flow test of insolvency was as follows:
“The commercial solvency of the company is not proved by merely looking at its
accounts and making a mechanical comparison of its assets and liabilities.
Insolvency is a question of fact falling to be decided as a matter of commercial reality
in the light of all the circumstances with things being viewed as it would by someone
operating in a practical business environment. The statutory focus is on solvency,
not liquidity. Thus it is appropriate to consider the terms of credit or financial
support available to the company with which to defray any debts owed to creditors.
The question is not to be answered merely by looking at the financial statements.”
Similar views were expressed by Palmer J in Hall v Poolman (2008) 65 ACSR 123 and
in Lewis v Doran (2004) 50 ACSR 175.
The definition of insolvency contained in section 95A differs from the pre-existing
law which had developed around its predecessors in insolvency legislation as those
predecessor provisions defined insolvency as an ability to pay the debtor’s debts
“from his own monies”: see, for example, section 122 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966
(Cth) and section 451 of the Companies (NSW) Code 1981. However, those sections
have had some influence over what is required to be satisfied to prove solvency.
Cases such as Sandell v Porter (1966) 115 CLR 666 held that a debtor’s ability to pay
“from his own monies”, as required by section 95 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth),
included an ability to raise money by its sale, pledge or mortgage of his assets.
However, money obtained by unsecured borrowings was not treated by the Courts
as the debtor’s “own money”: see Armour; Ex parte Official Receiver v Commonwealth
Trading Bank (1956) 18 ABC 69 at 74; Kyra Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v National Australia
Bank Ltd (1986) 4 ACLC 400 at 405; Norfolk Plumbing Supplies Pty Ltd v Commonwealth
54
Pollard SM., “Fear and Loathing in the Boardroom: Directors Confront New Insolvent
Trading Provisions” (1994) 22 ABLR 392.
30
Bank of Australia (1992) 6 ACSR 61 at 615.
It appears to be the case that the Courts, prior to the enactment of section 95A of the
Corporations Act were heavily in support of the view that the requirement that a
debtor be able to pay “from his own money” in order to demonstrate solvency
excluded from consideration the debtor’s ability to obtain unsecured loans.
The Exposure Draft Bill of the Corporate Law Reform Bill (Cth) published in
February 1992, in the clause that ultimately became section 95A, defined insolvency
as a debtor’s inability to pay his or her debts as they became due and payable “from
his or her own money”. In the light of that, Palmer J noted in Lewis v Doran (2004) 50
ACSR 175 at 193-194, “it is legitimate to assume that the inclusion of those words was
intended to convey that the case law which had developed around those words in prior
insolvency legislation was to continue to be applicable”. However, when the Bill became
law, the words “from his or her own money” were dropped and no explanation of
why those words were omitted from section 95A as enacted is to be found in the
Harmer Report or in the Explanatory Memorandum.
In Southern Cross Interiors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation , (2001) 39
ACSR 305; (2001) 53 NSWLR 213 at [54] Palmer J summarised the law in this area by
setting out the following principles55:
55
“i)
whether or not a company is insolvent for the purposes of CA ss.95A, 459B,
588FC or 588G(1)(b) is a question of fact to be ascertained from a
consideration of the company’s financial position taken as a whole: Sandell v
Porter, Pegulan Floor Coverings Pty Ltd v Carter (1997) 24 ACSR 651 and
Powell v Fryer;
ii)
in considering the company’s financial position as a whole, the Court must
have regard to commercial realities. Commercial realities will be relevant in
considering what resources are available to the company to meet its liabilities
as they fall due, whether resources other than cash are realisable by sale or
borrowing upon security, and when such realisations are achievable: Sandell
v. Porter, Taylor v. ANZ, Newark and Sheahan v. Hertz.
iii)
in assessing whether a company’s position as a whole reveals surmountable
temporary illiquidity or insurmountable endemic illiquidity resulting in
insolvency, it is proper to have regard to the commercial reality that, in
normal circumstances, creditors will not always insist on payment strictly in
accordance with their terms of trade but that does not result in the company
thereby having a cash or credit resource which can be taken into account in
determining solvency: Bank of Australasia v. Hall [1907] HCA 78; (1907) 4
CLR 1514, at 1528; Norfolk Plumbing at 615; Taylor v ANZ at 784; Guthrie
v. Radio Frequency Systems Pty Ltd (2000) 34 ACSR 572, at 575;
Although Palmer J’s decision in that case was overturned on appeal, it was done so
on grounds not impacting on the statements quoted.
31
iv)
the commercial reality that creditors will normally allow some latitude in time
for payment of their debts does not, in itself, warrant a conclusion that the
debts are not payable at the times contractually stipulated and have become
debts payable only upon demand: Antico at 331; Hall v Aust-Amec (supra);
Melbase (supra) at 199; Carrier (supra) at 253; Cuthbertson & Richards
Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (supra) at 320; Lee Kong (supra) at 112;
v)
in assessing solvency, the Court acts upon the basis that a contract debt is
payable at the time stipulated for payment in the contract unless there is
evidence, proving to the Court’s satisfaction, that:
vi)
•
there has been an express or implied agreement between the company
and the creditor for an extension of the time stipulated for payment; or
•
there is a course of conduct between the company and the creditor
sufficient to give rise to an estoppel preventing the creditor from
relying upon the stipulated time for payment; or
•
there has been a well established and recognised course of conduct in
the industry in which the company operates, or as between the
company and its creditors as a body, whereby debts are payable at a
time other than that stipulated in the creditors’ terms of trade or are
payable only on demand:
it is for the party asserting that a company’s contract debts are not payable at
the times contractually stipulated to make good that assertion by satisfactory
evidence: Powell v Fryer (supra) at 600; Melbase (supra); Cuthbertson &
Richards Sawmills Pty Ltd v Thomas (supra).”
In Lewis v Doran (2004) 50 ACSR 175 Palmer J reiterated the above views by stating
at 198:
“I think that I must approach the application of s.95A [of the Corporations Act] with
two considerations in mind. First, the words of s.95A must be construed as they
stand, without addition or subtraction. Second, the law both before and after the
enactment of s.95A is unequivocally and emphatically clear that insolvency is, first
and last, a question of fact “to be ascertained from a consideration of the company’s
financial position taken as a whole. In considering the company’s financial position as
a whole, the Court must have regard to commercial realities. Commercial realities will
be relevant in considering what resources are available to the company to meet its
liabilities as they fall due, whether resources other than cash are realisable by sale or
borrowing upon security, and when such realisations are achievable.”
His Honour added at 199:
“In my opinion, the omission of the words “from its own monies” from the definition
32
of insolvency in s.95A now leaves the Court free to determine the question
retrospective insolvency free of a qualification which might well be appropriate
determine only prospective insolvency. The omission leaves the Court free
determine insolvency, whether retrospective or prospective, as a question
commercial reality having regard to the particular facts of the case.”
of
to
to
of
Later in his judgment Palmer J stated (at 200)56:
“I conclude that section 95A of the Corporations Act has changed the pre-existing law
as to the definition of insolvency as stated in cases such as Sandell v Porter, and that
it is no longer necessary in order to assess solvency to ascertain whether the company
is able to pay all of its debts “from its own monies”, in the sense discussed in those
cases. In my opinion, section 95A requires the Court to decide whether the company
is able, as at the alleged date of insolvency, to pay all of its debts as they become
payable by reference to the commercial realities. If the Court is satisfied that as a
matter of commercial reality the company has a resource available to pay all its debts
as they become payable that it will not matter that the resource is an unsecured
borrowing or a voluntary extension of credit by another party.”
Therefore it is the case that all cash resources available to a company including credit
resources are to be taken into account when assessing solvency: See Metropolitan Fire
Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699. This would include promises of
financial support: see Dunn v Shapowloff [1978] 2 NSWLR 235 and should include
unsecured borrowings or voluntary extensions of credit. It could also be argued that
it would include the anticipated proceeds of a fully underwritten equity raising.
It is to be noted however that the "commercial realities approach" appears to carry
greater weight in New South Wales than it does in other states: see Emanuel
Management Pty Ltd v Foster's Brewing Group Ltd (2003) 178 FLR 1, [2003] QSC 205;
Powell v Fryer (2001) 159 FLR 433; 37 ACSR 589; [2001] SASC 59.
The test of insolvency in section 95A is directed towards paying all its debts as and
when they become due and payable. The inquiry under section 95A, and
consequently the inquiry under section 588G(1)(b), concerns the company’s ability to
discharge all its debts rather than merely particular debts, on their respective dates
of payment, at the time when a particular debt is incurred. It is therefore the case
that liability can be established under section 588G(1)(b) without reference to the
particular debt incurred if, at the time the particular debt was incurred, the company
was unable to pay other debts.
In Fliway transport Pty Ltd v Soper (1988) 21 NSWLR 19; 14 ACLR 690; 7 ACLC 129, it
was held that for a debt to fall due it must at least be recoverable by legal action and,
56
This was confirmed on appeal: see Lewis (as liquidator of Doran Constructions Pty Ltd)
v Doran (2005) 219 ALR 555; 54 ACSR 410. Special leave to appeal was refused by
the High Court. The case was also approved in Reynolds v Neumedix Biotechnology
Pty Ltd [2006] QSC 302.
33
it would appear, that mere inaction by a creditor in enforcing its rights against a
debtor is not usually influence whether or not the debt has become due: Pioneer
Concrete Ltd v Ellston (1985) 10 ACLR 289 at 301. However, if the creditor has
allowed, or created a reasonable expectation for a period of grace for repayment, this
may impact upon the determination of whether the debt has become due: Re Newark
Pty Ltd (in liq) [1993] 1 Qd R 409 and therefore impact upon the debtor company’s
insolvency. Thus it may be permissible to take into account a course of dealing
between the parties: see also Manpac Industries Pty Ltd v Ceccattini (2002) 20 ACLC
1304; See also Southern Cross interiors Pty Ltd (in liq) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation
, (2001) 39 ACSR 305; (2001) 53 NSWLR 213.
Further, the inclusion of the words “as they become due” also indicates that insolvency
must be determined with reference to a consideration of the company’s position over
a period of time and not a particular instance: Re Universal Management Ltd (in liq)
(1981) NZCLC 95-026. A temporary lack of liquidity does not always mean that the
company is insolvent: see Hymix Concrete v Garrity (1977) 13 ALR 321. The Courts
have recognized that the ability of the company to procure funding from other
sources to meet its liabilities can be taken into account to determine that the
company is in fact solvent. However the authorities suggest that directors will need
to prove that there was a legitimate basis for the belief that funds would become
available.
In ASIC v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 46 ACSR at 386 a number of common indicators of
insolvency were identified including the following:
(a)
Continuing losses;
(b)
Liquidity ratios below 1;
(c)
Overdue Commonwealth and State taxes;
(d)
Poor relationship with primary bank, including inability to borrow
further funds;
(e)
No access to alternative finance;
(f)
Inability to raise further equity capital;
(g)
Suppliers placing the company on cash- on-demand terms, or
otherwise demanding special payments before resuming supply;
(h)
Creditors unpaid outside trading terms;
(i)
Issuing of post-dated cheques;
(j)
Dishonoured cheques;
34
(a)
(k)
Special arrangements with selected creditors;
(l)
Solicitor’s letters, summonses, judgments or warrants issued against
the company;
(m)
Payments to creditors of rounded sums which are not reconcilable to
specific invoices;
(n)
Inability to produce timely and accurate financial information to
display the company’s trading performance and financial position, and
make reliable forecasts.
Rebuttable presumptions of insolvency
A major difficulty in finding directors liable under the insolvent trading provisions
has been proof of insolvency on the day that the particular debt was incurred. It is
sometimes the case that the financial records of the company are inadequate or they
enable proof of insolvency on dates other than the one required. According to the
Australian Law Reform Commission in its General Insolvency Inquiry57, in many
situations,
“the liquidator is a stranger to the past business operations of the company, and is
often confronted with considerable difficulty in affirmatively establishing that a
company was insolvent at a time prior to the winding up, even though there may be
every indication that this was the case.”
In order to overcome the problem and to assist in determining whether or not a
company was insolvent at the time a debt is incurred or becomes insolvent by
incurring that debt or by incurring at that time debts including that debt, section
588E(3) and 588E(4) of the Corporations Act contain two rebuttable presumptions of
insolvency in civil recovery proceedings and, if applicable, reverse the onus of proof.
Thus section 95A will only be relied on where the statutory presumptions of
insolvency are unable to be relied upon or are able to be rebutted.
Section 588E relevantly provides:
Presumptions to be made in recovery proceedings
(1)
In this section:
"recovery proceeding" , in relation to a company means:
…
a)
57
proceedings for a contravention of subsection 588G(2) in relation to
the incurring of a debt by the company including proceedings under
See Report number 45, volume 1 (1988), [290].
35
section 588M in relation to the incurring of the debt but not including
proceedings for an offence); or
(2)
…
(3)
If:
(a)
the company is being wound up; and
(b)
it is proved, or because of subsection (4) or (8) it must be presumed,
that the company was insolvent at a particular time during the 12
months ending on the relation-back day (bold added);
it must be presumed that the company was insolvent throughout the period
beginning at that time and ending on that day.
(4)
Subject to subsections (5) to (7), if it is proved that the company:
(a)
has failed to keep financial records in relation to a period as required by
subsection 286(1); or
(b)
has failed to retain financial records in relation to a period for the 7
years required by subsection 286(2);
The company is to be presumed to have been insolvent throughout the period.
(5)
…
(6)
…
(7)
…
(8)
…
(9)
A presumption for which this section provides operates except so far as the
contrary is proved that the purposes of the preceding concerned.
Section 9 of the Corporations Act defines "relation-back day", (referred to above in
section 588(3)(b)) in relation to a winding up of a company or Part 5.7 body, as
meaning:
(a)
if, because of Division 1A of Part 5.6, the winding up is taken to have begun
on the day when an order that the company or body be wound up was made the day on which the application for the order was filed; or
(b)
otherwise - the day on which the winding up is taken because of Division 1A
of Part 5.6 to have begun.
Division 1A of Part 5.6 of the Corporations Act sets out when a winding up is taken to
begin. Section 513A within that Division deals with a winding up ordered by the
Court under sections 233, 459A, 459B or 461. Section 513B within that Division
however deals with a voluntary winding up and relevantly provides that where a
company resolves by special resolution that it be wound up voluntarily, the winding
36
up is taken to have begun or commenced:
“if, immediately before the resolution was passed, the company was under
administration – on the section 513C day in relation to the administration.”
(underlining added) (section 513B(b))
The “section 513C day” in relation to an administration of a company is the day on
which the administration begins (see section 513C(b)). Therefore, under the
presumption in section 588E(3), where it is proved that a company which is being
wound up was insolvent at a particular time during the 12 months prior to the
relation-back day, it is presumed that the company was insolvent from that time
until the relation-back day.
(b)
Reasonable grounds to suspect insolvency
Section 588G(1)(c) provides that a director of an insolvent company is exposed to
liability for insolvent trading if, at the time the debts are incurred:
“… there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company is insolvent or
would so become insolvent .”
The test described by section 588G(1)(c) is an objective one (Powell v Fryer (2001) 37
ACSR 589, at [76]-[77]) per Olsson J (with whom Duggan and Williams JJ agreed):
“… the state of knowledge of a particular director and any assessment which he may
have made as to the ability of the company to pay its debts is irrelevant. The court
must make its own judgment on the basis of facts as they existed at the relevant time
and without the benefit of hindsight.
By reason of section 588G(2)(b) it is sufficient that a reasonable person in a like
position in a company in the company's circumstances would be so aware. Regard is
to be had to the facts and circumstances that the director ought to have known, as well
as to the facts and circumstances that were actually known to him: Credit Corp
Australia Pty Ltd v Atkins (1999) 30 ACSR 727 at 769.”
See also Hall v Poolman (2008) 65 ACSR 123 and Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v
Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699; [1997] FCA 399.
According to Kitto J in Queensland Bacon Pty Ltd v Rees (1966) 115 CLR 266; 40 ALJR
13 at 303:
“A suspicion that something exists is more than a mere idle wondering whether it
exists or not; it is a positive feeling of actual apprehension or mistrust,
amounting to `a slight opinion, but without sufficient evidence' ...
Consequently, a reason to suspect that a fact exists is more than a reason to
consider or look into the possibility of its existence.”
37
Kitto J’s comments were endorsed by Palmer J in Hall v Poolman (2008) 65 ACSR 123
at [234], where his Honour held that a suspicion of insolvency falls somewhere
between a belief that insolvency exists, on the one hand, and a mere wondering
whether it exists, on the other. Suspicion is a positive feeling of apprehension, an
admittedly tentative belief, without sufficient evidence to form a concluded and
supportable opinion.
Aligned with demonstrating whether there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
company is insolvent or would so become insolvent, section 588G(2) provides for two distinct
ways in which a director can be found to have had the requisite suspicion:

Actual awareness, that is if the person is aware at that time that there are such grounds for
so suspecting; (section 588G(2)(a)) or

Where a reasonable person in that position would have been so aware (section 588G
(2)(b)).
The test set out in section 588G(2)(a) is a subjective test. The test set out in section 588G(2)(b) is an
objective test58.
Thus, if it cannot be established that the director had actual awareness of reasonable grounds for
suspecting insolvency, a director can still be liable if a reasonable person in their position would
have been aware. Whether a reasonable person in the director’s position would have been aware
is assessed by the objective standard of a director of ordinary competence. According to Einfeld J
in Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR 699 at 703:
“[the test is] one of objectively reasonable grounds which must be judged by the
standard appropriate to a director of ordinary competence… Questions of
knowledge of and participation in the incurring of the relevant debt are now
relegated to the status of factual matters which may arise should the directors seek
to establish one of the statutory defences afforded by the legislation. The
establishment of liability is therefore not contingent on elements personal to the
respondents.”
In Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Plymin (No 1) (2003) 175 FLR
124; 21 ACLC 700; 46 ACSR 126 Mandie J held at [426]:
“What s 588G(2)(a) requires is proof of a subjective awareness by the director of
58
A number of cases have reiterated this view in relation to predecessor legislation. See
Shapowloff v Dunn (1981) ACLC 33,127 at 33,133 - 33,134; Pioneer Concrete Pty Ltd v
Ellston (1985) 10 ACLR 289 at 301; 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 4 ACLC 185 at
187 and 191; Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 8 ACLC 827 at 831;
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich & Ors (1991) 9 ACLC 946 at 953; State
Government Insurance Corp v Pollock (1993) 11 ACLC 839 at 846; Rema Industries &
Services Pty Ltd v Coad (1992) 10 ACLC 530 at 536-537; Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd v
Kurda (1992) 10 ACLC 773 at 775.
38
grounds, whether or not the director had a "subjective suspicion" of insolvency,
which grounds may be objectively be characterised as "reasonable grounds" for
suspecting such insolvency.”
In the same case, his Honour held at [325] that:
“It would seem to follow ... the essence of a failure by a director to prevent a
company from incurring a debt is a failure by that director to take all reasonable
steps within his power to prevent the company from incurring such debt. The effect of
the provisions, shortly stated, is that if the requirements of s 558G(1) are proved in
circumstances where either subsection (a) or subsection (b) of s 588G(2) is also
proved, a director will be taken to have failed to prevent the company from
incurring the debt, unless it is proved that the director- took all reasonable steps to
prevent the company from incurring the debt.”
In Elliott v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2004) 10 VR 369; 22
ACLC 458; 48 ACSR 621; [the Victorian Court of Appeal considered at length the
requirements of section 588G(2)] and held at [116]:
“It is in our view clear that the effect of s 588G(2) is that a director contravenes the
section "by not preventing" or "by failing to prevent" a company from incurring
a debt, and that a director will be taken to have so failed if debts are incurred by a
company at a time when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the company
is insolvent.”
At [117] the Court in Elliot said that section 588G(2) does not require proof that an
individual director failed in his or her duty to take a step which would have been
effective to prevent the company incurring the debt.
The inclusion of the term “in a like position in a company in the company’s
circumstances” allows the court to have regard to a wide range of factors including,
the size of the company; the type of business conducted by the company; the
composition of the board; whether the director was an executive or non-executive
director; the delegation of functions and responsibilities between directors; the
distribution of work between board members and management and professional
qualifications and special expertise held by the director: see Commonwealth Bank of
Australia v Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115.
The time that awareness of the director is assessed is immediately before the
particular debt was incurred: Metropolitan Fire Systems Pty Ltd v Miller (1997) 23 ACSR
699: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 10 ACLR 371; 4 ACLC 185.
As noted above, the issue of whether or not there existed reasonable grounds to expect
that the company can pay all its debts is determined objectively. Continuing in
business at the risk of creditors or taking no steps to save the company from
39
insolvency59, when the person knows that there is no objectively reasonable
expectation of the company being able to meet its obligations, could bring about
personal liability. This will be despite the fact that the director or person involved in
management is working long hours so as to rehabilitate the company and that the
reasons for the collapse of the company's business were substantially beyond their
control60.
In Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich (1991) 9 ACLC 946, Eise was the honorary
and part-time chairman of the National Safety Council of Australia Victorian Division
(NSC), a non-profit company limited by guarantee. Friedrich was the chief executive
officer of the NSC. The State Bank of Victoria lent money to the NSC at a time when its
liabilities exceeded assets. However the NSC's accounts showed an excess of assets
over liabilities. This was due to the fraudulent activities of Friedrich. The annual
accounts for two successive financial years were the subject of qualified auditor's
reports, which Eise had not seen and the directors' reports had been signed by Eise on
the day of the annual general meeting and were purportedly approved by the board.
In fact the board had not considered the matter. Subsequently the State Bank lent
large sums of money to the NSC and through its legal successor, the Commonwealth
Bank, lodged a claim against each member of the NSC board under sec 556(1)
Companies Code 1981. All of the directors except Eise settled.
One of the three issues61 in contention was whether immediately before the time when
each of the debts were incurred there were reasonable grounds to expect that the
company would not be able to pay all its debts as and when they became due?
According to the Victorian Supreme Court, the existence of "reasonable grounds" for
the purposes of sec 556(2) [sec 592(2) Corporations Law] is to be determined by a wholly
objective test. Tadgell J stated62, that "the sub-section does not require proof that
anyone would not have reasonable grounds to expect and it does not refer to the
defendant's state of knowledge." The Judge added that63:
"[T]he plaintiff must prove facts which, immediately before the time when the company
incurred the relevant debt, gave a person seeking properly to perform the duties of a
non-executive director of that company reasonable grounds to say: `I expect that the
company will not be able to pay all its debts as and when they become due'."
The situations where a defendant would have no reasonable or probable ground of
expectation of the company being able to pay the debt can be summarised as follows:
59
60
61
62
63
Deputy Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Caratti (1980) ACLC 34,155 at 34,158.
Southern Highlands Building Co. Pty Ltd (in liq) and the Companies Act (1979) CLC 32,074.
The other two issues in contention were first, whether at the time when the debts were
incurred Eise did not have reasonable cause to expect that the company would not be
able to pay all its debts as and when they became due and secondly, whether Eise
could obtain relief under section 535(1) (now section 1318 Corporations Act)?
(1991) 9 ACLC 946 at 954.
(1991) 9 ACLC 946 at p 955.
40
1.
Where an officer has not adverted to the matter and there exists an objective
belief that there is no reasonable or probable ground of expectation.
2.
Where the officer has a subjective expectation but there is no objective ground
for this expectation.
3.
Where the officer has a subjective expectation that the company cannot pay but
there exists an objective expectation of being able to pay.
4.
Where the officer does not care whether the debt will be paid and objectively
there was no ground of expectation.
Statutory defences available to directors
Under predecessor legislation to section 588H, there were only two defences which
were available to directors or managers to enable them to escape liability for insolvent
trading. Those defences were: first, the debt was incurred without their authority or
consent; or second, at the time when the debt was incurred, they did not have
reasonable cause to expect that the company would not be able to pay its debts. The
required standard of proof of the defences provided by the predecessor section was on
the balance of probabilities.
In Metal Manufactures Ltd v Lewis (1988) 6 ACLC 725, Mr and Mrs Lewis were the only
directors of Primary Metals and Resources Pty Ltd (the company). In September 1993
the company had agreed to buy goods from the plaintiff and later it breached this
contract resulting in an award of damages being made against it. However in
September 1984, Primary Metals and Resources Pty Ltd was ordered to be wound up.
The plaintiff thereupon sued Mr and Mrs Lewis under the then insolvent trading
provisions contained in section 556 of the Companies (NSW) Code.
Mr and Mrs Lewis were the only directors of the company. Mr Lewis was its
managing director and it was he who entered into the contract on behalf of the
company with the plaintiff in his capacity as managing director. The court noted that
it was not clear how or when Mr Lewis became managing director. At the time the
contract was made the company could not pay its debts, but at no stage was Mrs Lewis
involved in the day to day running of the business and was in fact only regarded as a
"director for signing purposes only". Mrs Lewis had no knowledge of the particular
debt to the plaintiff and whenever she made inquiries with Mr Lewis about possible
difficulties of the company she was told not to concern herself. In particular Mrs Lewis
did not know or even address the issue of whether the company could pay its debts.
Mr Lewis did not contest liability under section 556 of the Companies (NSW) Code and
consented to the judgment, however Mrs Lewis raised the defence in sec 556(2)(a) and
was successful before the trial judge. The plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal in a
two to one majority dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. Kirby P was in dissent.
41
The question arose as to the liability of silent directors for contracts entered into by a
managing director of their company. The trial judge, Hodgson J64, held that the
defence in sec 556(2)(a) would be satisfied if a defendant proved first, that they did not
participate in the incurring of the debt and secondly that none of the actual
participants in incurring the debt had the defendant's express or implied authority or
consent to incur the debt. On the issue of "inaction" by a defendant, the Judge said, if a
defendant's inaction implies authority or consent, then the defence is not available,
however this was not the case here.
In the New South Wales Court of Appeal, McHugh JA described the giving of consent
by a director as equivalent to the signifying of `approval or assent' to the incurring of
debt whether that is done expressly or by implication. Furthermore his Honour
described the concept of "authority" as involving both the knowledge or reason to
suspect that a debt would be incurred and the power to prevent it from being incurred.
Integral to this view was that "authority", had to relate to the specific debt incurred
and not merely be an authority to incur debts generally. Knowledge or reason to
suspect that a particular debt would be incurred had to be disproved on this view.
Here it was said that Mrs Lewis could not have assented and furthermore she had no
power to prevent the debt from being incurred.
Mahoney JA held that the word "without" in sec 556(2)(a) did not mean that Mrs Lewis
had to forbid the making of the contract. What the word meant, his Honour said65,
was simply "the absence of the relevant authority or consent." Importantly the judge
rejected the view that liability could attach to a person simply because they let
someone else act as managing director and therefore anything which the managing
director did was done with that other person's authority or consent. In these
circumstances Mrs Lewis did not consent or give her authority to the incurring of the
debt.
In contrast to Metal Manufactures Ltd, is the Victorian Supreme Court decision in
Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 8 ACLC 827 (Supreme Court) and (1992)
10 ACLC 1233. In this latter case the critical question again was whether a silent
director who left the conduct of the business entirely to another director could make
out the defence under the then section 556(2)(a) of the Companies Code. The defendant
also raised the defence under sec 556(2)(b) of the Companies Code.
The facts of Morley's case were as follows. KM Trading Pty Ltd was a small family
company which ran tobacco kiosks in Melbourne. For the first twenty years of the
company's existence it was controlled by Keith Morley, the company's governing
director who was appointed pursuant to the articles. However in 1978 Ian Morley,
who was Keith Morley's son, took over management of the business temporarily at the
request of Mrs Morley, Ian Morley's mother. Keith Morley died in 1979 and soon
afterwards there was an informal meeting between Mrs Morley, Ian Morley and his
sister Jan Sloan. These three were now the only shareholders and directors of the
64
65
(1986) 4 ACLC 739.
(1988) 6 ACLC 725 at 732.
42
company with Mrs Morley holding the majority of shares. At the request of Mrs
Morley and her daughter, Ian Morley was asked to take control of the management of
the company. Ian Morley agreed to this. Neither Mrs Morley or her daughter
involved themselves in the day to day running of the business and Ian Morley did not
keep them informed or provide them with annual reports. Ian Morley continued to
run the business until the company was placed in liquidation in 1988.
Mrs Morley signed some returns, including the annual return and she made a
directors' statement. At some stage whilst her son was in control Mrs Morley also
signed a guarantee to the bank so as to secure overdraft facilities for the company. No
directors' meetings were held and no formal dividends were paid although for a
period of time Mrs Morley did receive $300 per week described as her living expenses.
Mrs Morley knew that the company sold tobacco and like products to customers and
that suppliers of these products sometimes extended time for the company to pay. She
saw no invoices, statements or books of account and she did not ask to be provided
with relevant financial information. As a result she was unaware of the company's
inability to pay its debts.
A supplier of tobacco products supplied goods to the company at a time when the
company was insolvent and this supplier was owed in excess of $165,000. This
amount was still outstanding when the company went into liquidation. The supplier
instituted proceedings against Mrs Morley for the recovery of this amount under
section 556 of the Companies Code. Mrs Morley sought to avoid liability by reliance
upon each of the statutory defences in section 556(2). Success in either would enable
her to escape responsibility for the debt. The trial judge found that neither defence
was made out. Ormiston J stated66:
"The conclusions I have reached may be summarised as follows. Where:
(1)
a director, such as the defendant, takes no effective part in the management of a
company which continues to trade while insolvent and, in particular, that
director does not seek to obtain regular trading accounts of the company; and
(2)
that director has participated in the conferring of general authority upon an
executive director, employee or agent incurs debts to a creditor on behalf of the
company in the course of the insolvency;
then the director will have committed an offence and may be liable to that creditor for
those debts of the company pursuant to s.556(1) of the Code and is not entitled to rely
on any of the defences under s.556(2)."
"In the context of this section, which requires proof of want of `authority', the authority
in question is that which is conferred by the act of one or more directors, whether
participating in the grant of the company's authority as a member of the board of
directors or in his role as managing or executive director. If a director did not so
66
(1990) 8 ACLC 827 at 837.
43
participate in the conferring of authority, whether express or implied, only then can it be
said that the particular debt was incurred `without his express or implied authority'. To
conclude otherwise would ignore the realities of the day-to-day management of
companies."
The judge noted that Ian Morley had not been appointed managing director pursuant
to the articles, that Mrs Morley had power to determine her son's employment and
knew that in the ordinary course of his duties her son was incurring debts of the very
nature which were now under consideration. Ian Morley, it was held, had no more
power than any other member "of the board who had the functions of management
delegated to him by his fellow directors. He held no formal office under the articles
and was dependent upon the continuation of the authority informally given by the
other two directors. They were therefore jointly responsible and thus acted for this
purpose as joint `principals'. If either of these directors, including Mrs Morley,
changed their minds and acted accordingly to withdraw his authority, his authority
would thereupon cease." In these circumstances she gave authority to her son to incur
the debts67.
The Appeal division of the Supreme Court of Victoria agreed with this finding68. Mrs
Morley gave her implied consent and therefore could not avail herself of the defence in
sec 556(2)(a).
A similar decision occurred in Group Four Industries Pty Ltd v Brosnan (1992) 10 ACLC
1437. In this case Mr and Mrs Brosnan, were the only shareholders and directors of a
company called Madras Pty Ltd (Madras) which acted as the trustee for the Brosnan
Family Trust. The trust was a trading trust and its business was the sale and
distribution of airconditioners. The plaintiff supplied airconditioning equipment
between November 1985 and March 1986 to Madras and at the end of that period a
balance of approximately $72,000 was owing to the plaintiff. Madras was wound up in
April 1987. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were jointly and severally liable
for the amount by virtue of section 556 of the Companies (SA) Code.
At the time of these purchases from the plaintiff, Madras was insolvent. The trial
judge69 found that Mr Brosnan was liable for payment of the debt but dismissed the
case against Mrs Brosnan. The plaintiff appealed against this and the Full Court of the
South Australian Supreme Court allowed the appeal.
Mr Brosnan ran the company although there was no formal appointment of him as
managing director. He appeared to just take de facto control. Mrs Brosnan was
sometimes involved in taking delivery of goods, she signed some cheques and did
occasional banking. Every year she signed the company's annual return. Although
Mrs Brosnan knew that the company was having financial difficulties at the time it
67
68
69
Ormiston J distinguished Metal Manufactures on this point because in that case Mr
Lewis was the managing director and there was no evidence that Mrs Lewis
appointed or participated in the appointment of him.
(1992) 10 ACLC 1233 at 1241.
(1991) 9 ACLC 1181.
44
incurred the debt to the plaintiff, she claimed that she did not know that it was
insolvent at that time.
The Full Court approved of Morley's case and held that she could avail herself of the
defence in section 556(2)(a) as she had consented to her husband incurring the debt.
According to Olsson J, Mrs Brosnan had to show that she bore no relevant
responsibility for the authority given to incur the debt and this could only be shown if
the director did not participate as a member of the board or as managing or executive
director, in the conferring of authority upon the person who incurred the debt.
Debelle J noted that she took no step to attempt to prevent the incurring of the debt
and by acquiescing, she gave implied authority or consent.
As a result of the decisions in Lewis, Morley and Brosnan it is apparent that the
position in New South Wales is in conflict with the Victorian and South Australian
position.
The second defence which was previously available to directors appeared in section
592(2)(b). Pursuant to that section it must be proven that the defendant did not have a
reasonable expectation that the company would not be able to pay its debts. The want
of reasonable expectation needed to have been shown.
In Metal Manufactures Ltd v Lewis (1986) 4 ACLC 73970, the interpretation of section
556(2)(b) was argued in detail before the trial judge although not on appeal. In this
case, Hodgson J held that the defence under sec 556(2)(a) had been established but not
that under sec 556(2)(b). With regard to sec 556(2)(b), Hodgson J considered that, in
determining whether a defendant has made out a reasonable cause within the meaning
of the subsection, it was relevant to consider facts and circumstances known to the
defendant and also facts and circumstances which, by reason of the defendant's duties,
ought to have been known to the defendant. His Honour pointed out that in
determining a defendant's state of knowledge71:
"... [O]ne can have regard to matters such as illness and absence of a person in order to
decide whether or not he has reasonable cause to expect something, but I do not think
one can have regard to a person's complete ignorance of his duties as a director of a
company and his complete neglect of such duties."
Ormiston J in Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 9 ACLC 827 took a similar
approach. The question of a director's reasonable cause of expectation was, according
to the Court, related to the extent of the inquiries that the director has made and
should have made about the company's solvency. Ormiston J made it clear that
director's should not be able to hide behind ignorance of the company's affairs which
are of their own making, or, which has been contributed to by their failure to make
further necessary inquiries. The judge went on to state that although directors are not
required to have omniscience, each director is expected to take a diligent and
70
71
On appeal, the only question raised was the application of the first defence.
(1986) 4 ACLC 739 at 749.
45
intelligent interest in the information either available to them or which they might with
fairness demand from the executives or other employees and agents of the company.
The Full Court agreed with this interpretation.
In Group Four Industries Pty Ltd v Brosnan (1992) 10 ACLC 1437, Mrs Brosnan could not
rely on the sec 592(2)(b) defence and emphasis was placed upon what a director ought
to know and the facts which were known to Mrs Brosnan would have led any
reasonable, intelligent person of average competence to suspect that all was not well
with the company and to seek information. According to Olsson J "she was not entitled
merely to sit back in self-imposed ignorance and then to seek relief based on that ignorance."
The above decisions still have relevance for the defences now contained in section
588H of the Corporations Act. This Act provides four defences to allegations of
insolvent trading which, if established, would excuse a director from the
consequences of insolvent trading. The defences are contained in section 588H(2),
section 588H(3), section 588H(4) and section 588H(5) and are as follows:
First, it is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the
person had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the company was
solvent at that time and would remain solvent even if it incurred that debt and any
other debts that it incurred at that time (section 588H(2)).
Second, section 588H(3) provides that it is a defence if it is proved that, at the time
when the debt was incurred, the person:
A.
B.
had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe:
(i)
that a competent and reliable person (the other person) was
responsible for providing to the first mentioned person adequate
information about whether the company was solvent; and
(ii)
that the other person was fulfilling that responsibility; and
expected, on the basis of information provided to the first mentioned
person by the other person, that the company was solvent at that time
and would remain solvent even if it incurred that debt and any other
debts that it incurred at that time.
Third, if the person was a director of the company at the time when the debt was
incurred, it is a defence it is proved that, because of illness or for some other good
reason, he or she did not take part at that time in the management of the company (s
588G(4)).
Fourth, it is a defence if it is proved that the person took all reasonable steps to
prevent the company from incurring the debt (s 588G(5)).
Further, section 1317S enables the court to relieve a person wholly or partly from a
46
liability to which the person would otherwise be subject where they have acted
honestly and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the person ought
fairly to be excused from the contravention.
Section 1318 is a similar provision to section 1317S and it enables the court to relieve
a person wholly or partly from liability where, in civil proceedings for negligence,
default, breach of trust or breach of duty, it appears to the court that the person has
acted honestly and having regard to all the circumstances of the case the person
ought fairly be excused for that negligence, default or breach.
Looking at two of these defences the following can be said:
Section 588H(2)
It is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the person
had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the company was solvent at
that time and would remain solvent even giving incurred that debt and any other
debts that it incurred at that time.
There are therefore two essential elements to establishing that defence:
(a)
The requirement that there be reasonable grounds to expect the
company will remain solvent; and,
(b)
That the director did, in fact, have that expectation.
In determining whether a director had reasonable grounds to expect the company
was solvent, an objective standard is applied to the facts known to the defendant.
The word “expectation” is taken to mean a higher degree of certainty than a mere
hope possibility or suspicion: 3M Australia Pty Ltd v Kemish (1986) 10 ACLR 371; 4
ACLC 185. According to Austin J in Tourprint International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Bott
(1999) 32 ACSR 201, at [67] an “expectation” of solvency, as required by the section,
means:
“… a higher degree of certainty than ‘mere hope or possibility’ or ‘suspecting’.
The defence requires an actual expectation that the company was and would
continue to be solvent, and that the grounds for so expecting are reasonable. A
director cannot rely on a complete ignorance of or neglect of duty and cannot
hide behind ignorance of the company's affairs which is of their own making
or, if not entirely of their own making, has been contributed to by their own
failure to make further necessary inquiries.”
Einfeld J made a similar point in Metropolitan Fire Systems Ply Ltd v Miller (1997) 23
ACSR 699 at 703. In that case his Honour held (at 703) found that the phrase
requires that the directors have reasonable grounds for being confident that the
47
company is solvent.
Therefore the defence requires the director to establish not only an expectation that
the company was and would continue to be solvent, but that the grounds that that
expectation were reasonable. In practical terms this means that the expectation of
solvency must outweigh any factors which would give rise to a suspicion of
insolvency.
In order for the defence to succeed, there must be an expectation, held on reasonable
grounds, that recourse to assets will enable debts to be paid, not at some indefinite
time in the future, but so as to keep the companies solvent according to the definition
in section 95A, namely, as the debts fall due for payment. According to Palmer J in
Poolman v Hall, it is not appropriate to base an expectation of solvency:
“… upon the prospect that [the company] might trade profitably in the future
thereby restoring its financial position. … The question is whether the
company at the relevant time is able to pay its debts as they become due not
whether it might be able to do so in the future if given time to trade profitably
…”: Sheahan v Hertz Australia Pty Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 765, at 769;
Powell v Fryer (supra) at [75].”
Palmer J also stated the following in Poolman:
“The law recognises that there is sometimes no clear dividing line between
solvency and insolvency from the perspective of the directors of a trading
company which is in difficulties. There is a difference between temporary
illiquidity and “an endemic shortage of working capital whereby liquidity can
only restored by a successful outcome of business ventures in which the
existing working capital has been deployed”: Hymix Concrete Pty Ltd v
Garritty (1977) 2 ACLR 559, at 566; Re Newark Pty Ltd (in liq); Taylor v
Carroll (1991) 6 ACSR 255. The first is an embarrassment, the second is a
disaster. It is easy enough to tell the difference in hindsight, when the
company has either weathered the storm or foundered with all hands;
sometimes it is not so easy when the company is still contending with the
waves. Lack of liquidity is not conclusive of insolvency, neither is availability
of assets conclusive of solvency: Expo International Pty Ltd (in liq) v Chant
[1979] 2 NSWLR 820, at 837.
Where a company has assets which, if realised, will pay outstanding debts and
will enable debts incurred during the period of realisation to be paid as they
fall due, the critical question for solvency is: how soon will the proceeds of
realisation be available: see the authorities cited at para 187 above. Bearing in
mind the commercial reality that creditors will usually prefer to wait a
reasonable time to have their debts paid in full rather than insist on putting
the company into insolvency if it fails to pay strictly on time, I think it can be
said, as a very broad general rule, that a director would be justified in
“expecting solvency” if an asset could be realised to pay accrued and future
48
creditors in full within about ninety days.
The position becomes murkier the less certain are the outcomes. The market
value of the asset may not be ascertainable until the market is tested, so that it
is not certain that the realisation will pay in full both existing debts and those
to be accrued during the realisation period. The time at which the proceeds of
realisation become available may depend upon the state of the market and the
complexity of the transaction.
There comes a point where the reasonable director must inform himself or
herself as fully as possible of all relevant facts and then ask himself or herself
and the other directors: “How sure are we that this asset can be turned into
cash to pay all our debts, present and to be incurred, within three months? Is
that outcome certain, probable, more likely than not, possible, possible with a
bit of luck, possible with a lot of luck, remote, or is there is no real way of
knowing?
If the honest and reasonable answer is “certain” or “probable”, the director
can have a reasonable expectation of solvency.
If the honest and reasonable answer is anywhere from “possible” to “no way of
knowing”, the director can have no reasonable expectation of solvency.
If the honest and reasonable answer is “more likely than not”, the director
runs the risk that a Court will hold to the contrary in an insolvent trading
claim.
If the honest and reasonable answer is “no way of knowing yet, we need more
information”, the director must then ask: “How long before we have the
information so that we can give a final answer?”
If the honest and reasonable answer to that question is: “By a definite date
which will not extend the realisation period (if there is to be one) beyond three
months”, the director may reasonably say: “Let’s wait until then before
deciding”.
If the honest and reasonable answer is “there is no way of knowing yet when
we will have the information to make a decision”, the director must say: “Then
there is no way that we can now have a reasonable expectation of solvency and
there is no way we can reasonably justify continuing to trade without
knowing when we will know whether the company is insolvent. Call the
administrators”. By this series of questions and answers I do not mean to lay
down some pro forma test of directors’ liability for insolvent trading. Each
case depends on its particular facts. These questions and answers merely serve
to illustrate that when a company is struggling to pay its debts, the directors
must face up to the issue of insolvent trading directly and with brutal honesty:
49
they must not shirk from asking themselves the hard questions and from
acting resolutely in accordance with the honest answers to those questions.”
Section 588H(3)
The defence in section 588H(3) allows a director to escape liability under the
insolvent trading provisions if he or she expected that the company was solvent at
the time the debt was incurred as a result of relying on information provided by a
competent and reliable person who was responsible for providing information
pertaining to the solvency of the company. According to the Australian Law Reform
Commission72, the defence is intended to encourage directors to ensure that proper
and adequate financial management systems are in place and thus promote legal
compliance.
This defence has two limbs, each of which must be satisfied. Section 588H(3)(a)
requires a director to establish his or her belief in the existence of a proper and
adequate system for managing and monitoring the financial status and solvency of
the company. It also requires a belief that the delegate responsible for those matters
was continuing to fulfil that responsibility. These beliefs must be based on
reasonable grounds. The focus of this limb is not on ascertaining whether the
delegate is in fact competent and reliable, but that the director actually believed on
reasonable grounds that this was the case.
Section 588H(3((b) requires the director to establish their expectation of continuing
solvency on the basis of information provided by the delegate.
If it is accepted that any of the defences in section 588H have been made out, than
the applicant’s claim in so far as it is based on insolvent trading will fail.
Section 1317S and 1318
Thus if the Court rejects the application of both of the pleaded defences contained in
section 588H, then directors may need to rely on section 1317S and 1318 to avoid
liability.
Section 1317S provides a basis for relief from liability under a civil penalty provision
where the person has acted honestly and the person ought fairly to be excused in the
circumstances of the case.
Section 1318 allows the court to relieve certain persons from liability in civil
proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust, if the person
establishes that he or she acted honestly, and that he or she ought fairly to be
excused for the negligence, default, breach of duty or trust having regard to all the
circumstances of the case. And application pursuant to section 1318 was rejected in
72
Australian Law Reform Commission, General insolvency Inquiry (1988), Vol 1, [307].
50
Kenna and Brown Pty Ltd (in liq) v Kenna (1999) 32 ACSR 430.
An order under either section is discretionary.
CONSEQUENCES FOR INSOLVENT TRADING WHERE THE STATUTORY
DEFENCES DO NOT APPLY
Criminal penalty
A breach of the duty to prevent insolvent trading will constitute a criminal offence
only if the director has permitted insolvent trading knowingly and with a dishonest
intention (section 1317FA).
Civil penalty order
As section 588G is expressed to be a civil penalty provision under section 1317DA, an
application for a civil penalty order may be made to the Federal Court or Supreme
Court (sec 1317EA) by any one of the following entities (sec 1317EB):
(a)
(b)
(c)
ASIC;
a Commission's delegate; or
some other person authorised in writing by the Minister.
If the Court finds on the balance of probabilities (section 1317ED (1)) that a person has
contravened section 588G, the Court must declare that the person has contravened the
provision (section 1317EA (2)) and, in addition, it has a discretion to make an order
prohibiting the person from managing a corporation for a specified time and or
requiring the person to pay the Commonwealth a pecuniary penalty not exceeding
$200,000 (sec 1317EA (3)(a) and (b)). Where an order is made that a person is not to
manage a corporation this order must be complied with (section 1317EF) and any
penalty is payable to ASIC and is enforceable by ASIC or the Commonwealth as if it
were a judgment of the Court (section 1317EG).
An application for a civil penalty order cannot be made more than six years after the
contravention (sec 1317EC).
Compensation
When ordered by the Court when a civil penalty has been applied for:
Whether or not a Court makes a civil penalty order, the court can order a person
against whom a civil penalty order is sought to pay compensation to the company
(section 588J (1)). The Court can do that when satisfied on the balance of probabilities
(section 1317ED) that:
(1)
the person committed a contravention of section 588G in relation to the
51
incurring of a debt by a company; and
(2)
the debt is wholly or partly unsecured: and
(3)
the person to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to
the debt because of the company's insolvency.
Compensation is set at equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by the person
and is payable to the company rather than the person who suffered the loss or damage
which gave rise to the liability.
An application for a civil penalty order would normally be made by ASIC (section
1317EB (l)), however the liquidator has an entitlement to be heard only if the court is
satisfied that the person committed a contravention of section 588G and only on the
question whether the Court should order compensation to the company (section 588J
(3)).
It must be emphasised that compensation is payable to the company not to the person
who has suffered the loss or damage.
When ordered by a court of criminal jurisdiction:
If a Court finds a person guilty73 of an offence by contravening section 588G of the
Corporations Act in the circumstances set out in section 1317FA (1) that is, knowingly,
intentionally or recklessly and either:

dishonestly and intending to gain an advantage; or

intending to deceive or defraud someone,
the Court may order the person to pay compensation to the company if it is satisfied
that the debt is wholly or partly unsecured and the person to whom the debt is owed
has suffered loss or damage in relation to the debt because of the company's
insolvency (section 588K). The amount of compensation will be equal to the loss or
damage and it may be ordered whether the Court imposes a penalty.
The time limit for criminal proceedings is five years from the act or omission
constituting the offence unless the Minister extends the period (section 1316).
When ordered by a Court after a liquidator applies:
73
Finding a person guilty of an offence will occur, if and only if, the court convicts the
person or where the court finds the offence proven but does not proceed to convict
(section 73A).
52
A person may be liable to pay compensation in the circumstances set out in section
588M when proceedings are commenced by the company's liquidator. Under this
provision:

where a director has contravened section 588G; and

the creditor to whom the debt is owed has suffered loss or damage in relation to
the debt because of the company's insolvency; and

the debt was wholly or partly unsecured when the loss or damage was suffered;
and

the company is being wound up;
then whether or not the director has been convicted of an offence in relation to the
contravention or whether or not a civil penalty order has been made against the
director, the liquidator may recover from the director an amount equal to the amount
of the loss or damage, as a debt due to the company. Proceedings under this section
may only be begun within six years after the beginning of the winding up.
When ordered by a Court on application of the creditor:
In addition to liquidators having rights against directors in these circumstances,
creditors may also be able to claim compensation. The Act provides that creditors of
companies that are being wound up, may, with the consent of the liquidator, begin
proceedings in relation to the incurring by the company of a debt that is owed to the
creditor (section 588R). Such creditors may give to the company's liquidator written
notice within six months of winding up indicating that they intend to bring
proceedings under section 588M in relation to a specified debt and requesting the
liquidator's consent (section 588S). Where consent by the liquidator has not been given
within three months of a request from a creditor, the creditor may apply to the Court
for leave to commence the action under section 588M (section 588T).
However a creditor of a company that is being wound up cannot begin proceedings
under section 588M if:
(a)
the liquidator has applied to the Court in relation to the debt being a voidable
transaction under section 588FF; or
(b)
the liquidator has commenced proceedings under section 588M; or
(c)
the liquidator has intervened in an application for a civil penalty order against a
person in relation to the incurring of the debt in relation to a contravention of
section 588G. (section 588U).
53
It should be noted that there cannot be double recovery by both a creditor and the
liquidator (section 588N).
Compensation ordered by the Court in all these circumstances is not available to pay
secured debts unless all the unsecured debts have been paid in full (section 588Y(1)).
HOLDING COMPANY LIABILITY
Liability is also imposed upon holding companies for insolvent trading committed by
subsidiaries74. Where a holding company permits one of its subsidiaries to trade while
insolvent, then the subsidiary's liquidator may recover from the holding company
amounts equal to the amount of loss or damage suffered by the unsecured creditors of
the subsidiary.
Under Division 5 of Part 5.7B of the Corporations Act, a company contravenes section
588V if:

the company is a holding company at the time when the subsidiary incurs a
debt; and

the subsidiary is insolvent at that time, or the subsidiary becomes insolvent by
incurring that debt or by incurring at that time debts including that debt; and

there are reasonable grounds at the time for suspecting that the subsidiary is
insolvent or will become insolvent; and

that either the holding company or one or more of its directors were aware of
these grounds or, having regard to the nature and extent of the corporation's
control over the subsidiaries affairs, it is reasonable to expect that a corporation
in the holding company's circumstances would have been aware of those
grounds or that one or more of the holding company's directors would have
been aware of those grounds; and

that time is at or after the commencement of this Part, that is 23 June 1993.
The test involves an assessment both of whether reasonable grounds exist and whether
the holding company or one of its directors should have been aware of those grounds.
A corporation which contravenes the section is not guilty of an offence but civil
penalties can be imposed (section 588V(2).
A liquidator of a subsidiary can take proceedings against the holding company to
74
Liability of a holding company for the insolvent trading of a subsidiary is set out in
section 588V of the Corporations Act. Recovery of compensation is contained in
sections 588W, 588Y and 588Z.
54
recover for the benefit of the unsecured creditors of the subsidiary, loss or damage
suffered. The limitation period for these proceedings is six years (section 588W(2)).
Holding company defences
A holding company does have defences to an action commenced under section 588V.
These defences are contained in section 588X of the Corporations Act and provide:
(a)
if it is proved that when the debt was incurred the holding company and each
relevant director had reasonable grounds to expect, and did expect, that the
company was solvent at the time and would remain solvent even if it incurred
that debt and any other debts that it incurred at that time, then a defence will
have been made out (section 588X(2)).
(b)
it is a defence if it is proved that, at the time when the debt was incurred, the
holding company, and each relevant director:

had reasonable grounds to believe, and did believe:

that a competent and reliable person was responsible for
providing to the holding company adequate information about
whether the subsidiary was solvent; and

that the person was fulfilling that responsibility; and

expected, on the basis of the information provided to the holding
company by the person, that the company was solvent at the time
and would remain solvent even if it incurred that debt and any
other debts that it incurred at that time (section 588X(3)).
(c)
if it is proved that, because of illness or for some other good reason, a particular
relevant director did not take part in the management of the holding company
at the time when the company incurred the debt, the fact that the director was
aware is to be disregarded (section 588X(4)).
(d)
it is a defence if it is proved that the holding company took all reasonable steps
to prevent the subsidiary from incurring the debt (section 588X(5)).
(d)
Section 461(k)
A company may be wound up by the court if it considers it to be "just and equitable" to
do so. In Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd [1973] AC 360, two men conducted a
carpet laying business in partnership. Both equally participated in management and
profits. Sometime later they formed a company carrying on in much the same fashion.
55
No dividends were paid and all profits were distributed as directors remuneration.
Both men held 500 shares each and were the only two directors.
Later one of the men's sons came into the business and the two men transferred 100
shares each to the son. The son eventually became a director and he and his father
voted the other man (Ebrahimi) off the board of directors. Ebrahimi thereupon
petitioned the court either to wind the company up on the "just and equitable" ground
or to order that the father and son be made to buy out his interest. The House of Lords
took the former approach. It was argued by Ebrahimi that the "veil of incorporation"
should be lifted to see the real relationship between the parties.
The Court stated that a winding up would be ordered if one or more of the following
elements was present. First, showing that the company was formed on the basis of a
personal relationship, of mutual confidence, and this relationship had broken down.
Secondly proving that there existed an understanding that the aggrieved shareholder
would participate in the management and profits and that this arrangement was
broken. Thirdly, that a restriction on the transfer of shares was present so that a
shareholder could not simply sell out.
In this case there had been a pre-existing partnership which had lasted thirteen years.
Ebrahimi had started out as a partner, and expected to continue to participate in
management profits. As this was thwarted it was just and equitable to have the
company wound up.
56