Dr Clara PORTELA
Singapore Management University
September 2009
WORKSHOP MEMORANDUM:
Measuring the Effects of Sanctions
In sanctions research, it is commonplace to assume that the modification of the conduct of
the target is its primary objective of sanctions, and that success should be measured against this
criterion. Hence, success is judged on the basis of whether they “appeared to contribute to the
achievement of stated policy goals” (Elliot 1995:52). This criterion appears unsatisfactory if we
take into account that sanctions fulfil several functions and that the accomplishment of stated
goals is only one of these.
1/ From “Compliance” to “Multiple Goals”
The multiplicity of functions fulfilled by sanctions was recognised at a relatively early
stage in sanctions scholarship (Barber 1979, Lindsay 1986, Elliot 1995, Wilde unpublished). It
acknowledges that sanctions do not exclusively pursue the target’s compliance with the
sender’s goals. Recognising the multiplicity of goals of sanctions entails recognising that
different goals should be measured separately. This strand of the literature thus discusses the
feasibility of measuring success in accomplishing each of these goals.
In his seminal article, Galtung posited that punishment is one of the objectives of
sanctions: “to punish the receivers by depriving them of some value and/or to make the
receivers comply with certain norms” (Galtung 1967:409). Thus, Galtung measures success
against two criteria: the extent of deprivation to which the target is subjected as well as the
modifications observed in its behaviour.
Barber identified a variety of possible roles for sanctions beyond their coercive purpose
(Barber 1979). He distinguishes between primary, secondary and tertiary objectives of
sanctions. Primary objectives are concerned with the actions and behaviour of the target state
or regime. Secondary objectives relate to the status, reputation and position of the sender
government(s), and are directed at both domestic and international audiences. The primary
function consists in obtaining “compliance” with the declared policy objectives of sanctions,
while the secondary and tertiary functions correspond respectively to “domestic” and
“international” symbolism (Barber 1979). “Positively, they are intended to demonstrate the
effectiveness of the imposing government. […] The purpose of sanctions here is to demonstrate
a willingness and capacity to act. Negatively, the purpose may simply be to anticipate or deflect
criticism” (p.380). Tertiary objectives are concerned with broader international considerations.
They may include efforts by the senders to ensure “a certain pattern of behaviour in
international affairs”, or “support for a particular international structure, such as the League of
Nations” (p.382). Barber’s distinction of functions refers to different addressees. The primary
function is directed at the target entity, the secondary at the domestic public, and the tertiary at
the wider international community. Given that “success” is defined as the fulfilment of
objectives, it is first necessary to determine what these objectives are in order to measure the
success of sanctions.
This categorisation by Barber constitutes a useful analytical point of departure, although
it suffers from some deficiencies. Firstly, it places all three categories at the same level.
Arguably, the objectives of sanctions are what he calls “primary” objectives, while “secondary”
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and “tertiary” might be best described as “functions” rather than objectives. The imposition of
sanctions with the objective of bringing about change in another state can simultaneously
perform other functions: that of satisfying public opinion, on the one hand, and supporting
multilateral norms, on the other. Secondly, the distinction drawn between the secondary and
tertiary objectives is not neat. It is unclear whether the function of upholding international
norms is a secondary or a tertiary objective. He claims that secondary objectives “often contain
a substantial symbolic element”, as they give expression to “a sense of morality” (p.380).
However, Barber explicitly labels efforts to ensure a certain pattern of behaviour as tertiary
objectives. Finally, central functions of sanctions are omitted from the categorisation: notably,
the punitive function identified by Galtung.
Nevertheless, Barber provides some interesting insights into the relationship between these
kinds of objectives. Firstly, the realisation of secondary objectives can be enhanced by the
accomplishment of the primary objectives (i.e. goals), yet, they are not dependent on their
success: “Although primary objectives have not been achieved it does not follow that secondary
objectives have also failed to be realised” (p.381). Secondly, Barber points out that the relative
weight of the different categories of objectives may shift when sanctions are applied over a
lengthy period (p.372). This draws attention to the fact that the different functions of sanctions
have, by definition, long-term effects whose importance may go well beyond the realisation of
the stated – or primary - objectives.
Following up on the identification of a multiplicity of goals, Lindsay posits that states pursue
five aims when they impose sanctions, adding “subversion” and “deterrence” to the categories
put forward by Barber (Lindsay 1986). There is some disagreement as to whether the punitive
effect of sanctions qualifies as a goal. While punishment is regarded as one of the objectives of
sanctions by Galtung (1967), Lindsay argues that punishment is more adequately characterised
as a means for the operation of sanctions (Lindsay 1986:156). For Barber, the assessment of the
secondary and tertiary functions of sanctions is virtually dismissed as unfeasible. Lindsay, by
contrast, attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of all five of the goals he identifies. He also
defines some basic criteria for the assessment of the efficacy of sanctions. By contrast, the HSE
study published in the same year sets out to assess the efficacy of sanctions exclusively in terms
of achieving compliance.
In conclusion, an increasingly optimistic trend towards the feasibility of assessing
success is apparent. Over time, scholars grew confident that the efficacy of sanctions can be
assessed, and indeed attempted some tentative evaluations. Nevertheless, the fact that HSE
only examined compliance suggests that part of the wealth of the findings in the field has been
lost.
2/ Distinguishing “Goals” from “Functions”
The central contributions of Barber and Lindsay are their recognition that sanctions
pursue multiple objectives and their attempt to evaluate them. The acknowledgement that
sanctions have goals other than “compliance” constitutes a meaningful basis for the study of
their success, while helping to assuage the concerns of a strand of scholarship dismayed at the
continued use of sanctions despite their alleged ineffectiveness. Barber and Lindsay not only
concede that compliance is far from being the only goal of sanctions, and that the importance
allocated by senders to the different objectives pursued through sanctions might vary over time
(Barber 1979), they also suggest that compliance might not be the most important goal, or that
it may not even be among the objectives of a sanctions regime (Lindsay 1986). In order to
estimate the percentage of sanctions episodes that achieved the goal of compelling a policy
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change, it would first be necessary to ascertain which of these were actually aiming to bring
about such changes.
The relevance of Barber’s and Lindsay’s approaches does not end here. Their works
constitute a useful starting point for the distinction between functions and goals, as well as for
the definition of standards of success. Although the articles by both authors display a clear
thematic continuity, Barber speaks about “functions” while Lindsay refers to “goals”. Building up
on these labels, the “functions” of sanctions can be regarded as those which are fulfilled by their
very imposition. Functions encompass the symbolic effects in both the domestic and the
international sphere. They correspond to what Barber calls secondary and tertiary functions:
increasing the popularity of decision-makers with domestic audiences, upholding international
legal norms, demonstrating resolve to allies, and deterring comparable objectionable behaviour
by third states. By contrast, the goal of compliance is only realised when the target modifies its
behaviour in the way desired by the sender. Compliance is unmistakably a goal, as it is possible
to ascertain when it is achieved. Here, methodological difficulties in the measurement of
success more often lie in the establishment of a causal link between sanctions and policy change
than with ascertaining the occurrence of such a change. The qualification of success becomes
primarily a question of degree.
The fact that “functions” are realised through the mere imposition of sanctions does not
preclude the measurement of these effects. Lindsay, for example, attempts to evaluate the
deterrent effect of the grain embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980, or the increase in popularity
of certain US presidential candidates in the aftermath of the imposition of sanctions. However,
functions are not dependent on a particular outcome, and a minimum degree of effectiveness
can be almost assumed to be fulfilled automatically upon the announcement of the measures.
The functions of enhancing a government’s popularity, upholding international norms and
deterring future wrongdoings may well be automatically fulfilled.
Where does this leave Lindsay’s “subversion” and “impairment of the military potential
of the target”, also called “economic warfare” by Pape (1997)? Arguably, both could qualify as
goals rather than as functions, given that they are as susceptible to producing a negative as a
positive outcome. However, since they are not geared towards changing the target’s conduct,
these goals must be kept analytically separate from the goal of compliance. Whether a sanctions
regime succeeds in reducing the military capacity of a state to wage war is not dependent on the
behaviour of the target. As for “subversion”, its very definition excludes the possibility that this
goal could be accomplished with the consent of the targeted government. Therefore,
compliance is distinct from other goals of sanctions precisely in that its success depends on a
choice made by the target.
3/ Distinguishing “Means” from “Goals”
Lindsay defines the goal of compliance as the use of sanctions which “rests on the belief
that the resulting economic costs will exceed the benefits the target leadership derives from the
disputed policy” (Lindsay 1986:155). The question remains, though, of how precisely the target
decision-maker conducts his or her calculations, and how he weighs up the harm caused by
sanctions as compared to the benefits of non-compliance.
Where does “economic warfare” fit into the picture? HSE defines it as “sanctions
imposed to impair the economic capability of the target country, thereby limiting its potential
for military activity” (HSE 1985:5). However, Pape conceptualizes economic warfare as distinct
from economic sanctions: “economic warfare seeks to weaken an adversary’s…economic
potential in order to weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an
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ongoing war”. He explains this conceptual distinction by pointing out that unlike economic
sanctions, economic warfare “does not seek to coerce the target by inflicting economic pain”
(Pape 1997:94). Therefore, the difference between economic warfare and economic sanctions is
one of purpose. While this differentiation is insightful, it is even more useful to characterise
economic warfare not as a means of economic statecraft distinct from economic sanctions, but
as a function of economic sanctions. Undoubtedly, a close link can be found between the use of
force and the employment of sanctions. Historically, the imposition of sanctions has often been
a prelude to, or has taken place in conjunction with, the use of force. In the current debate, the
application of sanctions continues to be regarded as a substitute for the use of force. Sanctions
regimes have often been imposed with a view to exhausting the military resources of the target
by purely economic means. Such a policy paves the way for the easy defeat of what is a likely
future adversary. While conceptually different, economic warfare and economic sanctions occur
simultaneously and are part of the same strategy with two separate - albeit complementary finalities. If sanctions fail to coerce a change in the target’s behaviour, the sender can still resort
to force against a militarily and economically debilitated adversary. The case of Iraq serves as a
perfect illustration of how both aims are pursued in conjunction. Cortright and Lopez claim that,
in addition to weapons inspections, sanctions prevented Iraq from developing weapons of mass
destruction by drastically reducing the revenue available to Iraqi authorities and blocking the
import of vital materials and technologies for their production (Cortright and Lopez 2004).
Whether economic warfare is best considered as a function of economic sanctions or as
a separate means of economic statecraft, the degree to which sanctions impair the military
potential of the target cannot serve as an indicator for success. The successful fulfilment of the
function of economic warfare can be conducive to the ultimate success of sanctions by
compelling the target government to acquiesce to the sender’s demands. As with all sanctions,
their impact on the economy of the target country is relevant to the extent that it contributes to
forcing the target government into complying with the sender’s objectives. The effects of
economic warfare can be measured as part of an evaluation of the economic impact of
sanctions. However, its measurement is not an indicator of the efficacy of sanctions in terms of
compliance.
The goals of “subversion” and “economic warfare”, apart from being a “goal” in
themselves, can also represent a “means” contributing to the achievement of the goal of
compliance. The realisation that continuing sanctions have the potential to destabilise a
government, or reduce its capacity to wage war, may coerce target decision-makers into
complying with the sender’s demands. To the extent that efforts at destabilisation and/or
economic warfare can compel a policy change in the leadership, it remains a means rather than
a goal. The same is true for what Lindsay calls “international symbolism” and what Barber has
labelled the “tertiary function” of sanctions. These effects of sanctions are supposedly intended
for third states, or the wider international community. However, it may well be the
stigmatisation resulting from the condition or “status” of being the target of sanctions,
accentuated by the publicity associated with the imposition of such measures, which causes the
target to change its behaviour. Indeed, our knowledge of the perceptions and values of most
targets is so scarce that it is difficult to quantify the relative weight of each of these factors in
the target’s decision-making.
Different factors identified as functions and goals of sanctions can influence the
calculations of the targets and cause them to change their behaviour: the fear of being
overthrown (destabilisation), the prospects of a substantial weakening of the country’s military
capacity and the embarrassment produced by the international publicity of sanctions. From this
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perspective, scholars have successfully identified and kept separate a variety of the diverse
effects of sanctions. However, they have so far failed to establish their relationship to one
another. Compliance stands out as a goal not because it is meant to be the primary goal of
sanctions, or even because it is consistently envisaged as such. Sanctions regimes geared
towards subversion may never have been intended to persuade the targeted leader to comply,
but simply to unseat them. What makes compliance different from all other goals is that
virtually all other functions and goals may be used as means towards its achievement. In
conclusion, sanctions fulfil functions which may constitute either a means of coercing the target
into compliance, or an end in itself. Sanctions can also fulfil both roles simultaneously. The
following table illustrates this - a cross indicates which role each of these motives can take on:
International symbolism (tertiary f.)
Domestic symbolism (second f.)
Deterrence
Destabilisation
Economic warfare
Compliance (primary f.)
Means (for compliance)
X
X
X
-
Function
X
X
X
Goal
X
X
X
References:
Barber, J. (1979) “Economic sanctions as a policy instrument”, International Affairs No. 55 (July 1979),
pp.367-384.
Cortright, D. and Lopez, GA. (2004) “Containing Iraq: Sanctions worked”, Foreign Affairs (July-August)
Elliot, KA. (1998a) “Factors affecting the success of sanctions”, in D Cortright and GA Lopez (eds.)
Economic Sanctions. Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post-Cold War World?, Boulder: Westview Press
Galtung, J. (1967), “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with examples from the case of
Rhodesia”, World Politics 19
Hufbauer, GC., Schott JJ. and Elliot, KA. (1985) Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and current
policy. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics
Lindsay, JM. (1986) “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: a Re-examination”, International Studies
Quarterly 30, pp.153-173
Pape, RA. (1997) “Why Economic Sanctions do not Work”, International Security 22 (2), fall 1997, pp.90136
Wilde d'Estmael, T. de (unpublished) “The Sanctions Policy of the EU: Evolutions and Effectiveness
Assessment”, Paper presented at FORNET workshop, Copenhagen, 14 November 2004
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