Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power?
Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power? Global Transformation
and Its Reflection in Asia-Pacific Region
Yang Yuanfuyi
3120000042
Abstract: This essay proposes a structural view for analyzing global transformation. With the
booming of multilateral institutions and democratization, global transformation therefore should
not be confined to the scope as “power shift”. This essay argues that global transformation is
embedded in the tide of evolving globalization, defined as the stage shits of globalization.
Through the dichotomy between material and idea, this essay explicates how to examine global
transformation and its reflection in Asia-Pacific region. Facing global transformation, China should
make herself understandable and build benign relations with other regional players.
Global Transformation: Definition and Periodization
With the end of Cold War and the build-up of American’s position as the only
superpower, the rise of China has provoked a concern about global transformation.
Some argue that the global transformation is the power shift between China and
America which may lead to a bipolar future and inflamed regional conflicts1. But that
does not address the whole story. China is not a nasty child who wants to get the
best toy from the declining brother. Neither does the word “declining” make any
sense. America still enjoys the overwhelming military, economic and cultural
advantage.2 Global transformation should imply more than power shift while deeply
embedded in the process of globalization. In this essay, I argue that the global
transformation is the stage shift of globalization. To clarify my statement, a brief
definition about globalization and different stages of globalization are helpful.
Globalization itself does present a complex, even confusing picture under
examination from different perspectives. Globalization can be an evolutionary
process in the making for an extended period of human history as part of a longue
durée.3 It can also be a unique occurrence that started in the latter part of the
twentieth century. 4 Some also consider it as the process of how extensional
modernity developed into the whole world. Others may take an instrumental way of
the new technic invention and the following intensified interaction. What I argue
See 门洪华：
《权力转移、问题转移与范式转移——关于霸权解释模式的探索》
，
《美国研究》
，2005 年第
3 期；唐健：
《权力转移与战争： 国际体系、国家模式与中国崛起》
，
《当代亚太》
，2014 年第 3 期；沈丁立：
《全球与区域阶层的权力转移:兼论中国的和平崛起》
，
《复旦大学学报（社会科学版）》
，2009 年第 5 期；罗
伯特·S.罗斯：
《中国崛起、地区权力转移与东亚安全:从 1949 年到 21 世纪》
，
《世界经济与政治》
，2009 年
第 11 期；马荣久：
《中美权力转移与亚洲地区体系》
，
《当代亚太》
，2014 年第 1 期。
2 See Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 87, Issue 3 (2008).
3 Barry K Gills and William R.Thompson, “Globalization and Global History”, (New York and London: Routledge,
2006), p210-215.
4 Peter N. Stearns,” Globalization in World History”, (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), p1-12.
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Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power?
here is not the technic invention nor modernity, but a structural change as the
consequence of globalization. I will follow the old-fashioned philosophical dichotomy
of material and ideational to examine the stages of globalization and to show how
they shift as structural changes(good). The reason is twofold. Firstly, material factors,
whether political power or economic power, are the primacy in global transformation
and they are commonly believed by many scholars as what is playing currently in the
global stage, like the terminology as “power shift”. Secondly, the influence of idea
can never be diminished. We are in a game with UN Security Council, multilateral
frameworks and intergovernmental institutions all due to the spread and acceptance
of western idea like liberalism, democratic legitimacy and international norms. Those
ideas largely constitute how the rising power plays with the dominant power and
other players by mutually intensified interactions with material factors. As the
constructivists put, ideas defines the intersubjective meaning of material.5 Therefore,
simple diminishment that takes idea as a prerequisite or the consequence of material
changes is not desirable in this essay. As for the measurement of globalization, I
borrowed the concept of decentered/centered globalism from Barry Buzan. 6
However, here I want to present a more complex picture of decentered/centered
globalism through the interaction between material and ideational factors. At the risk
of oversimplification, I build the 2d coordinates to show the different stages of
globalization7. (See picture1)
Picture1: Different Stages of Globalization (Good!)
【美】亚历山大﹒温特：
《国际政治的社会理论》
（影印版），北京：北京大学出版社，第 92-134 页。
Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentered Globalism”, International Relations, 25:1
(2011), p3-25.
7 The material here mainly refers to political and economic power, while the ideational here refers to institutional
and cultural factors.
2
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Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power?
One remaining question is the birth of globalization. Starting with different
disciplines, we get the different chronology of globalization, with anthropology of
3000 BC, sociology of 1800s, economics of 1970s, etc.8 In this essay, I take the early
19th century as the start point of analysis. The reason is threefold.9 First, it is the
period that the west really touched the east through the wave of colonization.
Second, the establishment of market and the new invented mode of state-building
has significantly shape the picture of modern society. Finally, it is the period
accumulated with the birthdays of ideologies prevailing in modern context. Following
this chronology, the whole process of globalization until now can be divided into
three phases: from the early 19th century to the end of Cold War, the very short
period from the end of Cold War to 2008, and from 2008 until now. (Also see
picture1) But it needs attention that this periodization is quite ambiguous which
requires further discussion. Furthermore, what I want to explicate through
periodization is the continuously gradual accumulation and decumulation of the two
factors, therefore, any clear-cut chronology may be misleading.
During the first phase (when?), we get a centered globalization in both material and
ideational sides. In material, a periphery-core structure has come into mature with
huge power gap both in political and economic between the core and the
periphery. 10 In ideational, although institutional idea like multilateralism had
stepped forward, the simplification of ideology symbolized as the line between
capitalism and communism came into climax during the Cold War. Also, the global
culture was under the process of westernization or, more precisely, Americanization.
Therefore, the idea was highly centered in the first phase. In the second phase
(between ? and ?), the gap between core and periphery did not make too much
change while the idea made a difference. The reactivation of multilateral frameworks
and the Third Wave of Democratization 11 had created huge divergence. In the
meanwhile, anti-Americanization gained much louder voice and peaked with the
disastrous 9/11 . In the third stage, the power gap is shrinking with the rise of the
rest, so leading to the power diffusion.12 However, the idea is undergoing a centered
trend. That is not to say the cultural divergence and religious conflicts do not exist
anymore. What I want to address is its unchanging existence in cultural side and new
breakthroughs in institutional side. It is true, that the Al Qaeda are still threatening to
扬·内德温·彼埃特思：
《分期中的全球化: 全球化的诸历史》
，张广、周思成译，
《国外理论动态》
，2013
年第 1 期，第 11 页。
9 See Barry K Gills and William R.Thompson, “Globalization and Global History”, (New York and London:
Routledge, 2006); Peter N. Stearns,” Globalization in World History”, (New York and London: Routledge, 2010);
A.G.Hopkins, “Globalization in World History”, (London: Pimlico, 2002); Barry Buzan and George Lawson,
“Capitalism and the Emergent World Order”, International Affairs, 90:1(2014); 巴里﹒布赞、理查德﹒利特尔：
《世界历史中的国际体系——国际关系研究的再构建》
，刘德斌主译，北京：高等教育出版社。
10 Paul Krugman, “What's new about the new economic geography?”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy ,Volume
14, Issue 2 (1998), p7-17.
11 Samule P. Huntington, “The Third Wave, Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century”, (Norman and
London :University of Oklahoma Press , 1991), p3-5.
12 See Alice H. Amsden, “The Rise of "the Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-industrializing Economies”,
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).
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Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power?
put America into fire and the newborn IRIS does get some attention. But their
influences have got limited. On the contrary, multilateralism as an institutional
arrangement is reshaping how actors play regardless of their cultural and religious
background through its gigantic influence of legitimizing players’ actions in
international affairs. Other institutional ideas as democracy and market even start to
break the absolute border between domestic and international areas. This centered
ideational trend is a relay of international socialization since the end of WWII.
Asia-Pacific Region: Regional Episode as Stage Shift
Asia-Pacific is the stage where most shifts take place. It contains most “big players” in
world politics except for EU. It is obviously true, as Barry Buzan put 13, that a
decentered globalism leading to regionalized international order will render those
great powers more possibility to play regional hegemony. However, Asia-Pacific is
possible to jump out of that regionalized hegemonic future for two reasons. First, the
players in Asia-Pacific are big enough to resist one dominant player in this region
where the main rising powers, like China and India, and main declining powers, like
America and Japan, are crowding together. Second, the multilateral institutions like
ASEAN and APEC, has come into mature and are playing a more active role in this
region, which will be address more precisely in the following part. Therefore, it is
reasonable to believe that the future of this region can be explicated in the above
framework: decentered material (power) and centered idea.
The picture of decentered material (power) in Asia-Pacific cannot be more
perceptible. America is declining but still vigorous with the advantaged military cover,
technical leadership and enormous global economic share, remaining as an attraction
for immigration, capital and foreign investment.14 Japan, although keeping static
economic growth for 20 years, still has the capability to play as a great power with a
good reputation of transparent market, democratic government and technic
leadership. The curative effect of abeconomics is just about to work.15 As for the
rising power, China has the second largest national economy and by far the world’s
largest current account surplus and foreign exchange reserves, therefore, some take
China as a global economic superpower with rising military capability characterized
with the Dongfeng series of missile and submarine.16 In the meanwhile, India will
reach? the demographic dividend from 2025 which may fuele her economy.17 In the
meanwhile, other great powers like Australia and ASEAN with more possible
13
Barry Buzan, “A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentered Globalism”, International Relations, 25:1
(2011), p3-25.
14 See Fareed Zakaria, “The Future of American Power: How America Can Survive the Rise of the Rest”, Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 87, Issue 3 (2008).
15 王志刚，周永刚等：
《经济刺激计划能否将日本带出通货紧缩泥沼？——基于安倍经济学的政策效果评
价》
，
《教学与研究》
，2014 年第 3 期，第 12-18 页。
16 C. Fred Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell, “China’s Rise: Challenges and
Opportunities”,(Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), p9-33.
17 C. P. Chandrasekhar, Jayati Ghosh and Anamitra Roychowdhury, “The 'Demographic Dividend' and Young
India's Economic Future”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 41, No. 49 (2006), p5055-5064.
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Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power?
executive capability in the future will make the picture more complicated under the
unprecedentedly integrated economic interdependence.18
However, the decentered material (power) is associated with centered idea which
cannot be diminished by explosively cultural diversity. Centered idea in Asia-Pacific
region is the microcosm of grand international socialization since the end of WWII.
First, institutional norms like democracy and multilateralism have gradually shaped
regional affairs through the cooperation and legitimation both domestic and
international. Since the late 20th century, the establishment of multilateral
institutions were booming, tackling a wide range of issues gradually from economic
cooperation to transnational challenges with the shrinking of bilateralism.19 In the
meanwhile, under the influence of Third Wave of Democratization, democratic
transition has occurred in many Asia-Pacific states. 20 Second, the increasing
challenges proposed by non-traditional security have put all the states in the same
boat. The environmental cooperation and disaster management in Northeast Asia
have provoked profound influence in reconstitution of regional cooperation.21 The
tsunami happened in Indonesia also provided a new picture to show how states can
cooperate under disastrous common threat. Under the influence of dual function
combined institutional norms and external common threat, states must play the
similar way and share responsibility together, following the logic of multilateralism in
politics and market in economy regardless of cultural background.
Conclusion: China’s Response Facing Global Transformation
The question is what we should do. Before answering to that, a simple clarification of
two facts may shed a light. The first thing is that it is impossible for China to players
hegemony or rewrite the rule, neither political nor economic. Both big plays and
small players are extremely alert to any expansive motion. And AIIB is just a new
game initiated by China following the settled economic rule. The second thing is that
it is impossible to exclude America from this region nor to expect America to play
Monroe doctrine again. Therefore, given the global trend and those facts, what we
can do is to play with them rather than play against. First, China should at least
makes herself understandable. This contains two factors: subtraction and addition.
The former implies China should consider twice before claiming any Chinese
characteristic which may easily make others confused and distance those potential
collaborators. The later asks for more multilateral involvement and constitution,
where the AIIB and APEC can be took as good examples. Second, China should build
benign relations with other players by deepening domestic reforms and bringing into
some new thinking about America. Cursed by the tradition of nationalism, rising
China always faces the danger of losing control in dealing with territory disputes.
Under this circumstances, the military existence of America does have some positive
18
Amitav Acharya, “Power Shift or Paradigm Shift? China's Rise and Asia's Emerging Security Order”,International
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58 Issue 1(2014), p158-173.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Shunji Cui, “Beyond History: non-traditional security cooperation and the construction of Northeast Asian
international society”, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 22(2013), p868-886.
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Standardized Idea and Decentralized Power?
meaning as external constraints forcing China to behave more calmly. On the other
hand, appropriate concessions to ensure moderate relationship with America can
engender more space in dealing with conflictual disputes with neighbors.
China has deeply involved in the process of global transformation, where there is no
way to escape and no hope for subversion. However, the role is waiting for to be
chosen. What can we expect, an constructive initiator or a passive conformist?
Comments:
It is an outstanding essay, with some creative thinking. Well done!
Shunji Cui
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