“The Fixation of Belief”
1. few care to study logic
1.1. the power of drawing inference is the “last of all our faculties” which comes
through “long and difficult art”
1.2. “history of its practice”
1.2.1. medieval: easiest: “knowledge rests on either authority or reason”
“ultimately authority”
1.2.2. Roger Bacon “experience alone teaches”: the best kind “was interior
illumination” which teaches e.g. transubstantiation
1.2.3. Francis Bacon “must be opened to verification and re-examination”
1.2.3.1. “inadequacy of his view of scientific procedure”
1.2.3.2. “physical science would be finished up”
1.2.4. Copernicus etc. “methods more like” the moderns
1.2.4.1. Kepler “thing to be done” “find out what the curve, in truth, was”
1.2.4.1.1. “fell by mere exhaustion of his invention” on the orbit which
“weapons of modern logic” would have tried first
1.2.5. all great science exemplifies defective art of reasoning of the time
1.2.5.1.“each chief step in science has been a lesson in logic”
1.2.5.2. Lavoisier: “not to read and pray” or publish “the last dream”
1.2.5.2.1. “make of his alembics …instruments of thought”
1.2.5.2.2. reasoning as “something ..to be done with one’s eyes open, by
manipulating things instead of words and fancies”
1.2.6. “Darwinian controversy…a question of logic”
1.2.6.1.“statistical method to biology”
1.2.6.2. already done in they theory of gases using the “doctrine of
probabilities” to make specific predictions
1.2.6.3. Darwin: “operation of variation and natural selection…in the long run
… will adapt animals to their circumstances”
1.2.6.4. “questions of fact and question of logic are curiously interlaced”
2.
2.1. reasoning to find out from what we know “something which we do not know”
2.1.1. good reasoning iff “true conclusion from true premises”
2.1.2. “Thus the question of validity is purely one of fact and not of thinking”:
[it is not clear how this follows]
2.1.3. not “whether, when the premises are accepted by the mind, we feel an
impulse to accept the conclusion also” even though we “do generally reason
correctly by nature”
2.2. we are mainly “logical animals” but “not perfectly so”
2.2.1. we are more “hopeful than logic would justify”
2.2.2. we are “happy and self-satisfied” without factual backup, and even after a
lifetime of disappointments
2.2.3. “Logicality in regard to practical matters is the most useful quality an
animal can possess” [if so, then why are we illogically hopeful?] and might,
thus, “result from natural selection”
2.2.4. outside practical matters, it is more advantageous to have one’s “mind
filled with pleasing and encouraging visions” regardless of their truth
2.2.5. thus in this area natural selection might lead us to fallacies [wouldn’t this
be a problem for a Darwinian? how does a Darwinian distinguish between
the practical and the not practical?]
2.3. A “habit of mind” determines us to draw one inference rather than another.
2.3.1. a good habit “produces true conclusions from true premises”
2.3.2. an inference is valid if the habit which produces it generally produces true
conclusions [very different view of “valid” than our own]
2.3.3. a “guiding principle of inference” is a proposition describing a habit of
mind that governs inference: the truth of that proposition depends on the
validity of said inferences
2.3.4. example: “what is true of one piece of copper is true of another” i.e. in its
relation to a magnet when rotating
2.4. A book could be written covering the most important of these principles,
although it would be of little practical use except for someone venturing in an
unfamiliar field where confusion is common
2.5. “almost any fact may serve as a guiding principle”: but there is a class of facts
which consists of the guiding principles which determine whether certain
conclusions follow from certain premises.
2.6. there are certain facts already assumed
2.6.1. “there are such states of mind as doubt and belief”
2.6.2. “a passage from one to the other is possible” while the object of thought
remains the same
2.6.3. “this transition is subject to some rules” which bind all minds
2.6.4. we must know these facts to have a “clear conception of reasoning”
2.6.5. thus it is not interesting to inquire into their truth
2.7. it is “easy to believe” that these rules of reasoning are “the most essential”
2.7.1. if reasoning follows these it will not go from true premises to false
conclusions
2.8. this is even more important for several reasons, one of which is that conceptions
produced by logical reflection mingle with ordinary thoughts, and this causes
confusion
2.8.1. For example, a quality “as such is never an object of observation”: we do
not see the quality of being blue: the quality is a “product of logical
reflection.”
2.8.2. Common sense at the practical level is “imbued” with a “bad logical
quality” i.e. a metaphysical quality, which can only be cleared up by a
“severe course of logic.”
3. We are able to distinguish between “the sensation of doubting and that of believing”
for we know when we wish to ask a question or wish to make a judgment. [I find this
very confusing. I do think that I know a bit before asking a question that I will ask a
question, but I am not sure this is connected necessarily with a sensation, or
specifically with a sensation of doubt. I also seem to believe all sorts of things
without having any sensations about them at all, although again, I suppose I do know
ahead of time if I am going to make a statement of belief.]
3.1. there is also a practical difference: “our beliefs guide our desires and shape our
actions”
3.1.1. had the Assassins doubted then they would not have acted as they did.
3.1.2. “The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being
established in our nature some habit which will determine our action.”
3.2. “Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free
ourselves and pass into the state of belief.” [Is this true? I myself tend to enjoy
being in a state of doubt. I doubt that I get much satisfaction from belief. Why
can’t belief be uneasy and dissatisfied?]
3.3. belief is “a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid” [I have
trouble picturing how this works: for example I believe that abortion should be a
right for women…but that belief does not make me feel calm or satisfied.]
3.4. we do not wish to change a belief “to a belief in anything else.” [Peirce seems
worried about this as he qualifies it with the only substantive footnote.]
3.5. “both doubt and belief have positive effects on us” [speaking as though they are
distinct from us…but aren’t we largely made up of our doubts, beliefs, desires,
etc.?]
3.6. “Belief …puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way…”
[Why doesn’t he just say that it is that condition? He seems to want to
distinguish between belief and whatever causes the behavior.]
3.7. “Doubt has not the least effect….” [Wouldn’t doubt be just a form of belief.
For instance an agnostic doubts that God exists and this is his belief and it causes
him to say that he doubts God exists in certain circumstances.]
3.7.1. “Doubt …stimulates us to action until it is destroyed.” [I just have trouble
seeing myself as eagerly trying to destroy doubt within myself.]
3.7.2. it is like the “irritation of a nerve” and the reflex action it produces [This
analogy seems bizarre to me. How is doubt like a sharp pain or an itch?]
3.7.3. whereas a belief is like our mouth watering after the smell of a peach [This
analogy is equally bizarre. Peirce must have really enjoyed belief. This
leads me to agree with James that differences between philosophers is a
matter of personality. Paradoxes make my mouth water…but apparently
they act as an irritant to Peirce.]
4. I call the struggle to “attain a state of belief” and escape the “irritation of doubt”
“inquiry.” [Why couldn’t one equally call it the struggle to escape from boring belief
to achieve the stimulating experience of true and productive doubt?]
579
591
Peirce's Account of Inquiry
Harry G. Frankfurt
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 55, No. 14. (Jul. 3, 1958), pp. 588-592.
JSTOR
673
Peirce's Theory of Inquiry
Idus Murphree
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 56, No. 16. (Jul. 30, 1959), pp. 667-678.
4.1. “the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion” [What an odd way to put
it…why not the attainment of truth? or the development of a systematic way of
knowing? or having fun on the way?]
4.2. we may fancy that we want more, i.e. true opinion, but in reality, “as soon as a
firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied” [but that is hardly true if we think
it might not be true! He seems to be playing with words here. If you firmly
believe something, that means you believe it is true. You don’t think you just
have a settled opinion: you believe you have the truth.]
4.3. “nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object” i.e. the “motive
for our mental effort”: [This is obscure. He seems to be saying that to believe
that we really want truth is to believe we want something beyond our own
experienced world…something transcendent. But I’m not sure.]
4.4. or, at most, “we seek for a belief that we shall think to be true.” [But if I say “I
think this is true” that usually means I have some doubt about it! Whereas if I
just say it is true, or even leave out the word “true” then I exhibit no doubt.]
4.5. He rejects the following “erroneous conceptions of proof”
4.5.1. Some philosophers have suggested we begin by “questioning everything.”
[Sure, one can’t do that. But one can work at questioning everything
systematically, which is what Descartes did…and I think Descartes is right
that this is a useful method.]
4.5.1.1. “mere putting of a proposition into the interrogative form does not
stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief” [I suppose it depends
on the mind and the situation. I could certainly imagine a philosophy
game in which propositions were pulled randomly out of philosophy
books and each person’s task would be to question the proposition. It
sounds like it would be a lot of fun, very stimulating.]
4.5.1.2. “There must be a real and living doubt.” [OK that would probably be
better, although how to tell whether a doubt is real or living is another
question. What if one gets really interested in the doubt generated by
the game?]
4.5.2. idea that “a demonstration must rest on some ultimate and absolutely
indubitable propositions” [Perhaps when Peirce says that the goal of inquiry
is not truth what he is really after is this proposition. I agree that a
demonstration need not rest on such propositions. Descartes is also the
target here, although he also mentions empiricists who speak of “first
sensations.”]
4.5.2.1. but for an inquiry to result in demonstration it only need “start with
propositions perfectly free from all actual doubt” [hmmm.. how are we
supposed to tell actual doubt from the other kind?] [What about people
who tend not to doubt? They may be satisfied with premises that are
not at all satisfactory to me.]
4.5.3. some love to argue “after all the world is fully convinced of it” [one could
think of the global warming case, or the case for evolution… on the other
hand why would someone love to argue if they are fully convinced?]
5. why shouldn’t we then take any answer we fancy and just constantly repeat it
5.1. this method is pursued by many
5.2. example of the person who encouraged him not to read a newspaper on a matter
of economics lest he might be entrapped by fallacies
5.3. more often, our instinctive dislike for doubt, can be exaggerated to a “vague
dread”
5.4. “steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind” although it “may lead to
inconvenience, but such a person would hold that he holds to the truth which is
always wholesome
5.4.1. and his “calm faith” may overcome the inconveniences based on untruth
5.5. if death is annihilation the person who believes he will go to heaven gains a
“cheap pleasure” which will not be disappointed
5.6. people say they could not believe something because doing so would make them
wretched
5.7. [they are like an ostrich] who puts its head in the sand
5.8. P. cannot see what can be said against a person who is successful in avoiding
what might change his opinion [isn’t this a bit disingenuous…after all, the ostrich
dies if he ignores the danger, and the Christian who thinks he goes to heaven is
still deluded]
5.8.1. “would be an egotistical impertinence to object that his procedure is
irrational” [I don’t see why it would be] which simply means that it is not
ours
5.8.2. nor does he “propose to himself to be rational” [but if he doesn’t then why
are be to avoid calling him irrational? Peirce seems to be indulging himself
here…sounding like someone much more liberal than he really is]
5.9. this method of fixing belief is called the method of tenacity
5.9.1. but we cannot hold to it in practice as “the social impulse is against it”
5.9.1.1. the adopter may observe that others’ opinions “are as good as his
own,” and this will shake his confidence
5.9.1.2. conception that “another man’s thought or sentiment may be as good
as one’s own” arises from an insuppressible impulse
5.9.1.3. the problem is “how to fix belief…in the community”
5.10.
“will of the state act”
5.10.1. an institution would be needed to repeat, teach, and guarantee the correct
doctrines, suppressing contrary doctrines, encouraging ignorance, making
people look at unusual opinions with horror, terrifying and punishing those
who think forbidden beliefs, or killing them, or require the faithful to accept
views no independent mind would accept
5.10.2. this method has been practiced, especially in Rome from its founding to
the current Pope, or wherever there is a priesthood, and often where there is
aristocracy, and it is a “natural product of social feeling”
5.10.3. cruelties always attend it, and atrocities, since the officer would not
surrender “the interests of society” for mercy
5.11.
this method, “the method of authority,” is superior to the method of
tenacity, and so is more successful, majestic even, for example in the sublimity
of its stone structures: although the creeds it generates do change, they do so
slowly
5.12.
for most men, “there is perhaps no better method than this. If it is their
highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves they ought to remain.” 73
5.13.
but no institution can regulate opinions on every subject, only on the most
important, and this will not be a problem as long as men do not influence each
other’s opinions, but some individuals will rise above this, noting that men
elsewhere have held other opinions, and that their own belief is a matter of
accident, and they doubt
5.14.
and this doubt extends to every belief resting on caprice, and they will
give up willful adherence to belief, a new method is needed to decide which
propositions should be believed, beliefs “in harmony with natural causes” 73
5.15.
this new method is found in metaphysics, the systems of which do not rest
on fact but are seen as “agreeable to reason,” which means “that which we find
ourselves inclined to believe,” as when Plato argues for heavenly harmony
5.16.
but, through shock of conflicting opinions, this leads to preferences of a
“more universal nature,” for example that man only acts selfishly for pleasure
5.17.
this method is “more intellectual” and rationally respectable than the
others, but its failure is more obvious since inquiry is then a matter of taste,
which is always just fashion: and this is why metaphysicians have never agreed,
but have swung between more material and more spiritual philosophy
5.17.1. from this, a priori, method we are driven to “true induction,” but although
the a priori method was supposed to deliver us from caprice, it is not
essentially different from the method of authority,
5.17.2. for example my preference for monogamy over polygamy may come up
against the fact that Hindoos reject Christianity because they morally object
to the way we treat women, and so I see that even here my feeling is
determined by accident, and hence will arise doubt for some
5.18.
to “satisfy our doubts” we must find a method for our beliefs to “be caused
by nothing human, but by some external permanency,” 74
5.18.1. “some mystics imagine that they have such a method in private
inspiration” but this is just the method of tenacity and does not yet see truth
as “something public”: not being public, this is not “external permanency”
[this is clearly anti Emerson]
5.18.2. “external permanency” must affect, or might affect, every man
5.18.3. in this method “the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same”
or would be if the inquiry persisted: this is “the method of science”
5.18.4. “its ultimate hypothesis” is that “there are real things, whose characters are
entirely independent of our opinions about them” [philosophers today call
this “realism”]
5.18.5. that “those realities affect our senses according to regular laws”
5.18.6. that “by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can ascertain by
reasoning how things really are” [this is his empiricism]
5.18.7. and any man with sufficient reason and experience will be led to the “one
true conclusion”
5.18.8. someone might argue that it would be circular to support these
assumptions by the very method on offer
5.18.9. my reply is
5.18.9.1. at least the method and the conception on which it is based are in
harmony: unlike the other methods, no doubts arise necessarily from
its practice
5.18.9.2. in the other methods there is already some vague feeling that
“there is some one thing to which a proposition should conform”: no
one can doubt that there are realities if doubt is a source of
dissatisfaction: “the social impulse” does not cause men to doubt
[realism]
5.18.9.3. everyone uses the scientific method sometimes and when he knows
how
5.18.9.4. scientific investigation has led to wonderful triumphs, which is
why I do not doubt the method or hypothesis [realism] on which it is
based
5.18.10.
this series will describe this method
5.19.
points of contrast
5.19.1. it is the only one which distinguishes a right and wrong way
5.19.2. [After showing how each of the other methods fails to do this, he turns to
Hegel, I think as an example of the a priori method.]
5.19.2.1. Hegel thinks metaphysicians will at last get it right, and P agrees
5.19.2.2. Hegel used the natural science of his time, but..
5.19.2.3. in scientific method I might not follow rules that would be
approved by [metaphysical?] investigation:
5.19.2.4. to know whether I am truly following the method I must apply it
5.19.3. each of the first three methods has its own advantage
5.19.3.1. the a priori method gives comfortable conclusions and pleases our
vanity
5.19.3.2. the method of authority governs most men and ensures peace [but
then he goes on for a while about the suppression of nonconformists
under this method]
5.19.3.3. method of tenacity has strength, simplicity, directness, and
decisiveness [I can’t help but think of George W. Bush here.] and one
might think rejecting a belief is unwholesome
5.19.4. one can overcome the force of habit through reflection on the case
5.19.4.1. consider how one would respond to a reformed Muslim or
Catholic: “consider the matter fully, and clearly understand it in its
entirety”
5.19.4.2. what is most wholesome is “integrity of belief,” and not to look
into the support of a belief we doubt is not only impractical but
immoral
5.19.4.3. truth is this: if we act on the belief “it should, on full
consideration, carry us to the point we aim at and not astray”
[pragmatism?]
5.19.5. yet “a clear logical conscience does cost something,” as does any virtue
5.19.5.1. we should love the genius of our logical method
5.19.5.2. one may honor the others deeply [this is really odd… again, why
should one?] even though one has chosen her, will champion her, and
be inspired by her.
Short, T. L. Peirce on the Aim of Inquiry: Another Reading of "Fixation." Transactions
of the Charles S. Peirce Society Winter 2000 36:1 1-23
8
9
How to Make Our Ideas Clear
I
1. logic textbooks distinguish between clear and obscure and between distinct and
confused conceptions
1.1. clear idea: “one which is so apprehended that it will be recognized wherever it is
met” and will not be mistaken for any other
1.2. but this would require a seldom met “force and clearness of intellect”
1.3. and “mere acquaintance” with an idea so that one can recognize it in ordinary
cases is too common, and is really only a “subjective feeling of mastery”
1.4. logicians seem to mean by “clarity” the latter, as they require clarity to be
supplemented by distinctness
1.5. distinct idea: “one which contains nothing [in its definition] which is not clear”
so that something is distinctly apprehended if we can define it in abstract terms
1.6. but logicians have not considered that modern thought can improve logic
1.7. the “doctrine that familiar use and abstract distinctness” constitute perfect
apprehension belongs in extinct philosophies
1.8. we need a method “for a more perfect clearness of thought”
2. Descartes allowed skepticism and rejected authority as the ultimate source, finding a
more natural source of principles in the human mind, i.e. the method of apriority,
through self-consciousness
2.1. he required that all infallible ideas should be clear (not distinguishing between
seeming clear and really clear, as he trusted introspection for knowledge of the
contents of our minds) but, seeing that other men disagreed with him about
fundamental principles, he added that ideas must be distinct, which meant that
they “must sustain the test of dialectical examination” which they would do if
that examination did not reveal any obscurity in them
3. Leibniz “did not understand that the machinery of the mind can only transform
knowledge, but never originate it” unless fed with observed facts
3.1. he missed that we cannot help accepting propositions that seem evident to us
3.2. instead, he tried to reduce first principles to formulas “which cannot be denied
without self-contradiction,” unlike Descartes
3.3. so he reverted to “old formalities of logic,” in particular abstract definitions, and
he required one for every important term as a remedy for the problem with
clearness
3.4. distinct for him meant “clear apprehension of everything contained in the
definition”
3.5. but this is a chimerical scheme: nothing new can be learned from analyzing
definitions, although our beliefs can thereby be set in order
4. familiarity is the first step to clearness, and defining is the second: but there is a
higher clearness of thought, and we should relegate this “ornament of logic” to the
cabinet of curiosities
5. logic should teach us how to make our ideas clear, “to know what we think, to be
masters of our own meaning”
5.1. it is, however, easier learned by people with meager and restricted ideas
5.2. a nation with a “rich mud of conceptions” can overcome, over time, the
disadvantage of a wealth of language and ideas, perfecting literary form and
leaving behind metaphysics, and attain excellence: yet it is not clear whether
such a nation will prevail over one that has a few but clear ideas.
5.3. for an individual, a few clear ideas is better than many confused ones: muddled
heads seldom see the need to sacrifice thoughts
5.3.1. such a person has a “congenital defect”: and his intellectual maturity will
come late after his errors have already had their effect
5.4. a single unclear idea can hinder the nutrition of the young man’s mind even
where there is intellectual plenty: many have cherished a vague idea “too
meaningless to be positively false” but passionately loved, and then woken one
morning to find it gone, and with it his life, e.g. metaphysicians and astrologers
[I think that Peirce would have perceived Emerson as falling in this category]
II
1. the principle set forth in the first paper leads us to a better method than that of
distinctness… here Peirce repeats his previous stated position, adding that although
Doubt and Belief often are related to religious matters, he intends them to refer to
“the starting of any question” even to deciding to pay a fare with a nickel or five
pennies, and he recognizes that “Doubt,” “Belief,” and “irritation” may seem
inappropriate terms for this
1.1. if there is a “least hesitation” (absence a habit) or “small mental activity” needed
for decision, then [this is doubt]
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.2. I can also generate doubt by merely fancying “myself to be in a state of
hesitancy”: such “feigned hesitancy” is valuable in science
1.3. the mind is then stimulated to activity that can be either slight or energetic
1.4. [in the energetic version] “images pass rapidly through consciousness” one
“melting into another” until decision/belief is attained
in a piece of music there are both the separate notes and the tune: the note exists as
perfectly at one time as in the whole [e.g. of an hour’s play], whereas a tune consists
of “orderliness in the succession of sounds,” and to perceive it requires “continuity of
consciousness” for the stretch of time to be present
2.1. we do not directly perceive the tune (or any orderliness in succession), only the
separate notes “present at an instant”
2.2. so consciousness contains two kinds of objects: what we perceive immediately
and what we perceive mediately: sensations are present as long as they last, but
thoughts (like tunes) have beginning, middle, and end, and thus consist of a
succession of sensations that must cover some past and future
2.3. also “various systems of relationship of succession [having different motives,
ideas, and functions] subsist together between the same sensations”: thought is
one of these, its function being the fixation of belief
2.3.1. thought might also amuse us, and some thinkers might be upset with the
idea that some issue that amuses might finally get settled: but this is
“debauchery of thought”
2.3.2. the “soul and meaning of thought” is fixation of belief
what is belief? It is what “closes a musical phrase in our intellectual life”
3.1. it is something we are aware of, it appeases irritation of doubt, it establishes habit
3.2. thought rests when we achieve belief
3.3. but “belief is a rule for action,” and so it calls for further doubt and thought: it is
thought at rest, although thought is essentially action
3.4. thinking results finally in willing, which has no thought in it
the essence of belief is establishment of habit: different beliefs are distinguished by
different modes of action, and “no mere differences in the manner of consciousness”
can make beliefs different
4.1. people often imagine differences between beliefs, which differences are only a
matter of mode of expression, but this causes conflict
4.2. fig. 1 and 2 are differently arranged but they are really the same
4.3. “such false distinctions cause as much harm as the confusion of beliefs” that are
really different especially in metaphysics
4.4. we often mistake our sensation of unclearness in our own thought for the nature
of the object itself: this sensation is subjective but we infer a mysterious quality
in the object
4.5. and we do not recognize the same conception when it is presented to us in a clear
form as it no longer has the feeling of unintelligibility
4.6. the opponents of rational thought try to perpetuate this deception
one must also distinguish between inconsistency and grammatical vagueness and not
mistake a grammatical difference with a difference between ideas
keep in mind that the function of thought is to produce habits of action: “what a thing
means is simply what habits it involves”
6.1. a habit depends not only on probable but possible but improbable circumstances
6.2. “what is tangible and practical [is] the root of every real distinction of thought”:
distinctions of meaning consist of possible differences in practice
7. example of transubstantiation: Protestant (metaphorically flesh and blood) vs.
Catholic (literally meat and blood)
7.1. our conception of wine is nothing more than that these things are wine and that
wine possesses certain properties
7.2. we can mean nothing by wine than the impact on our senses
7.3. so to speak of it as in reality blood is “senseless jargon”
7.4. we cannot have an idea which relates to anything but conceived sensible effects
of things: our idea of something is an idea of its sensible effects
7.5. so it is foolish of the Protestants and Catholics to disagree [one would think that
he could live with the Protestant view but not with the Catholic]
8. “consider what effects, which might conceivable have practical bearings, we conceive
the object of our conception to have” the conception of the effects is the conception
of the object
III
1. what do we mean by calling a thing hard? it will not be scratched
1.1. no distinction between soft and hard if not brought to test
1.2. suppose a diamond cushioned
1.2.1. foolish question except in the realm of logic
1.3. what prevents us from saying that all bodies are soft until touched
1.3.1. there would be no falsity in such speech, only a modification of our way
of speaking
1.3.2. question of what would occur in circumstances that do not actually hold is
not a question of fact but of arrangement of fact
2. the question of free will and fate is somewhat like this
2.1.1. could I have done something different
2.1.2. this is not a question of fact but of the arrangement of facts
2.1.3. arranged one way: it is true that if I had willed I could have done
otherwise
2.1.4. arranging them another way: the temptation will have its effect
2.1.5. inclined to say that determinism denies important facts
2.1.6. but the original question is solved in this manner
3. Weight: in the absence of opposing force a body will fall
4. Force: the use of it is to account for changes in motion
4.1. to understand a fact [which he describes] is to understand what Force is
4.2. wrong to speak of it as a mysterious entity
4.3. wrong to say that we understand the effect of force and not force itself
4.4. if we know the effects of force there is nothing more to know
IV
1. reality
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
1.4.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
consider relation to fiction
figment has such characters as his thought impresses upon it
a dream has a real existence as a mental phenomenon
the real: that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them
to be
reality consists in the peculiar, sensible effects which things partaking of it produce
2.1. ideas of true and false pertain only to the scientific method of settling opinion
2.2. Scotus Erigena adopts and teaches a random opinion without a perhaps
2.3. contrast the real Socrates would delights in discussion
2.4. period in which philosophers sallied forth from entrenched positions
2.5. Abelard: a spirit of combat: the truth is simply his stronghold
2.6. period of method of authority
2.7. follower of apriori method
scientific method: one certain solution
reality is independent not so much of thought in general but on what you or I may
thing
4.1. true opinion the one they would come ultimately to
4.2. reality of that which is real depends on the real fact that investigation is destined
to lead to belief in it
what of minute facts hidden
5.1. any question with any clear meaning bring to solution
5.2. how can we say there is any question that will not be solved
why consider these remote things when you say only practical distinctions have
meaning?
6.1. gems at bottom of sea, more a matter of arrangement of language
metaphysics: know of it to keep clear of it
our ideas might be clear without being true