Genetic Enhancement: Why Its Implementation Promotes Egalitarianism
Most individuals do not take moral issue with the practice of altering a human
being’s genetic makeup in lieu of other medical interventions; we can employ it when the
aim is to cure or control the expression of disease. These persons view such genetic
alterations in a similar light as surgery and vaccinations: the health of the individual is
at stake and thus medical interventions are acceptable. This practice is commonly known
as genetic therapy. Genetic therapy should be contrasted with genetic enhancement,
which is the changing or improving the characteristics or traits of an otherwise healthy
fetus. This essay will focus on genetic enhancement. “Strong” proponents of genetic
enhancement hold that morality is best served by opting to genetically enhance future
generations. “Mild” proponents hold that there is nothing inherently immoral about
genetically enhancing future generations, but nonetheless we should proceed with
extreme caution for the implementations of genetic enhancement might be immoral.
Opponents of genetic enhancement maintain that the process, product (results), or
combination of the two provides sufficient reason that genetic enhancement is morally
unacceptable. In this essay, I will take a “strong” proponent position and argue that
genetic enhancement is moral, for it will bring about a more egalitarian society.
Through making a case for the morality of genetic enhancement, I assimilate the “weak”
proponent position (we must proceed cautiously) insofar as genetic enhancement should
be a decision made by individual parents and not governments. At the conclusion, I
discuss three key objections levied against my position.
Genetic Enhancement as Type of Genetic Intervention
Before showing why genetic enhancement is morally desirable, some widely
known distinctions must be reinforced. These distinctions are quite useful in general, but
they are particularly useful in sorting out whether a given ethical concern is relevant to a
given procedure. Some ethical concerns relevant to one type of genetic engineering may
not apply to another type.
There are four categories of genetic enhancement as applied to human beings.
The first type is commonly referred to as negative somatic genetic intervention. The term
‘negative’ here indicates that the aim of intervention is to cure or control the expression
of some disease. The term ‘somatic’ indicates that the effects of genetic treatment are not
inherited by future generations. The second type, positive somatic genetic intervention,
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is practiced with the aim of bringing about some change or improvement (hence the term
‘positive’) in an otherwise healthy individual. The term ‘somatic’ (again) indicates that
the effects of genetic treatment are not inherited by future generations. The third type is
known as negative germ-line genetic intervention. Here, the aim is to cure or control the
expression of some disease. Its effects are inherited by future generations (hence the
term ‘germ-line’). The fourth type, positive germ-line genetic intervention, is practiced
with the aim of bringing about some change or improvement in an otherwise healthy
individual. Its effects likewise are inherited.
While each of these carries with it certain ethical questions, the questions often
differ. For instance, the question “Should human beings decide which idiosyncrasies
they want future generations to have?” is only applicable to positive germ-line genetic
intervention. “Should human beings decide which idiosyncrasies they their direct
offspring to have?” is applicable to positive somatic genetic intervention, but may have
extension to positive germ-line interventions depending on the consequences of
intervening with the immediate generation. (It might be that procedures intended only for
the next generation affect future generations as well.) The question “Should human
beings seek to stop the expression of disease?” is only directly relevant to the negative
genetic therapies. Of course, the question “Should human beings genetically intervene at
all?” is relevant to all types of genetic intervention. This essay will almost exclusively
focus on positive genetic interventions (hereafter referred to as genetic enhancement)
where the aim is to change or improve an otherwise healthy fetus. Genetic enhancement
has moral merit, and this merit should not be judged upon its inheritability potential.
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Genetic Enhancement and Egalitarianism
Genetic enhancement will bring about a more egalitarian society. It will have the
desirable effect of “leveling the playing field.” To illustrate the potential to create a more
equal state of affairs, let us consider a hypothetical example. In our example, we must be
careful to choose an example of a trait considered inessential for “normal” human
functioning, otherwise our example would only apply to negative gene therapies and not
to positive ones. To this end, let us now take for granted that the condition of having
imperfect pitch has no real bearing on an individual’s normal functioning. Thus,
imperfect pitch serves as a reliable candidate for an enhancable trait as distinguished
from a diseased trait.
Suppose that a woman, Anna, loves to play the violin. Ever since she was young
she has had a passion for the instrument and dreams of one day becoming a concert
violinist. Directly due to her passions and aspirations, she practices between eight and
ten hours a day. Now imagine that her pitch is slightly below perfect. Her passion and
her hard work alone, though, do not qualify her for a reasonable chance at the career of a
concert violinist: she lacks perfect pitch. In fact, she is held back from realizing her
dreams solely due to her imperfect pitch.
Now, imagine that another woman of the same age, Beatrice, does have perfect
pitch. Ever since Beatrice was young, she was always annoyed with having to take violin
lessons, but nevertheless was quite good due to her abilities to anticipate in her mind the
precise notes of the tunes. She practices considerably less than Anna and does not really
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care what she does for a career. As it turns out, Beatrice becomes a concert violinist
despite her lack of passion and work ethic.1
If Anna’s parents could have had the option of enhancing Anna, she could have
been endowed with the proper tools to compete and possibly surpass Beatrice for the
concert violinist position.2 Anna would receive the same biological advantage that
Beatrice already has. Thus, not only will her genetic makeup receive enhancement;
Anna’s options to compete and realize goals become greatly enhanced.
Our society certainly values actions aimed at bettering the chances of our
offspring. Moreover, we consider such actions morally good. Parents often sacrifice
money for trust funds, private schools, and family vacations. They also give their time to
teach their children life skills, how to read and reason, as well as support them as they
pursue athletic or other recreational interests. It obviously would be a mistake to criticize
these methods of parental intervention, yet these interventions clearly enhance the
opportunities of offspring. Genetic enhancement, parentally determined, amounts to the
same thing as these other supported and encouraged interventions.
In fact, a child has good reason to actually expect at least a minimal positive
intervention from her caretakers. Suppose that when Anna was five years old, her doctor
notified her family that Anna has a remarkable condition that will last until she is seven
years old: her long-term memory is enhanced by eating grapes. With each grape, Anna
would increase her long-term memory capacity by .001 percent up to a ceiling of 10
percent improvement. Upon running tests, that same doctor found her memory at that
This example is a derivation of the example that Torbjorn Tannsjo uses in his essay “Should We Change
the Human Genome?”; p. 233.
2
It is important to note that while it is only possible, and not “predetermined” that Anna should surpass
Beatrice for the violinist position.
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time to be above normal capacity, so increasing her memory function was not medically
or functionally necessary. Anna’s family would surely be under some obligation, given
their knowledge, to include grapes in Anna’s diet. Knowledge of the special
circumstances does at times yield increased responsibility. The glaring exception to this,
of course, would be if grapes caused some adverse negative reaction that was not
countered by the benefits of eating grapes. Of course, like with genetic enhancement, the
negative and positive repercussions could be weighed against each other to discern the
proper way to proceed.
A similar “knowledge yields responsibility” maxim applies to other enhancable
traits as well. Some other enhancable phenotypes might include cognition, temperament,
coordination, overall health, and life span. Parents could better prepare their offspring to
compete in a technical job market by enhancing memory and concentration.3 The
popular army slogan “Be all that you can be” could actually be realized. The obstacle of
biological inferiority would no longer hinder an individual’s active pursuit of desires and
goals.
Adversaries here may object that such biological “equalizing” is undesirable for
we would be unable to distinguish the excellent from the ordinary. Our concept of what
it means to be excellent here receives a serious challenge: a society comprised of
individuals possessing the most excellent traits paradoxically renders those same traits
unexceptional. In other words, the traits themselves become less excellent precisely
because most people possess them.
See William Gardner’s “Human Genetic Enhancement.” He writes: “cognitive enhancements may
become increasingly attractive” due to “the need of future workers to bring a competitive set of cognitive
abilities into the labor market”; p., 73.
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An example of this might run as follows: let us imagine that we genetically
enhance fifty one percent of new individuals to exhibit the same strength and agility of
Michael Jordan. Would not, then, those attributes of Jordan become ordinary and less
excellent? This seems like a fair criticism especially in light that the occurrence of
Jordan’s genetic codes might easily occur in a majority of persons. But to stop here is
misleading. Upon closer look, we can see this criticism fails to challenge the position at
hand (that enhancement is optimal). At best, it merely commentates upon our
conceptions about traits.
Michael Jordan is exceptional because of his personal commitment to putting his
biological endowments into expression. Certainly many people are as strong or stronger
than Jordan is. Many of those same people also possess at least the level of quickness,
agility, and coordination that Jordan possesses. They may even have a higher
IQ, which equips them with a superior capacity for reliable and efficient decisionmaking. Excellence cannot be “all in the genes.” If we only admired Jordan because of
his gene phenotypes, we would truly miss the central reason why he is such a remarkable
athlete. Jordan is more than a strong, quick, agile, coordinated, and smart athlete. He
exhibits a combination of “gifted” biology and personal dedication to excellence.
Some Answers to Objections Against Genetic Enhancement
Those who object to genetic enhancement do so for at least one and perhaps both
of the following reasons:
1. The process of genetically enhancing our offspring is morally flawed.
2. The end product or outcome of genetic enhancement is morally flawed.
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Of course, sometimes the borders between one and two (above) are somewhat blurred.
That is, some claims against the process of genetic enhancement are also essentially
claims against the final product as well. While I do not have the space to deal with all of
the potential objections from these two categories, I will here deal with what I see as the
three most damaging criticisms of my position. These are the fetal rights concern, the
eugenics concern, and the discrimination concern.
Criticisms that fetuses deserve to inherit unmanipulated genetic code are
essentially “process” criticisms. The fetal rights concern highlights that we have no right
to practice genetic enhancement on our offspring since we have not obtained their
consent.4 If we think of all of the times a good parent acts without obtaining her child’s
consent, we can see the foolishness of this criticism. Must we obtain our child’s
permission to feed him when he is a baby? Or how about obtaining his consent to make
him sit in time out? Most children do not give their consent to attend school, yet we
intervene. This list might continue indefinitely. It is obvious that consent is not always
an option, let alone a preferable option. In a particularly relevant remark, Ray Moseley
rightly observes: “When a couple produces a child, that child gives no consent to its
genetic makeup.”5 The main aim of genetic enhancement should be concern for the
offspring. Here, then, we would follow something close to the rules laid out by the
Helsinki declaration.6 We should realize that consent is not always obtainable or
necessary for acting morally.
Lisa Peterangelo, in a debate (3/30/99), calls such manipulation “child abuse.” Of course, this tag is
unwarranted for it conjures up images of an unfit authority figure that imposes his will. It thus distorts an
objective understanding of genetic enhancement.
5
Mosely, pp. 642-643.
6
Tannsjo, p. 237.
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The next criticism, which I will discuss, is the concern over eugenics. Talk of
genetic enhancement often leads one to think of Brave New World or Nazi eugenics
scenarios. The claim focuses on the “product” of genetic engineering: a gene pool
fashioned by the whims of a government. Is this concern applicable? The charge clearly
deals with how we might implement genetic enhancement, not genetic enhancement per
se. Problems of implementation are matters of public health policy and should be
considered by the proper agencies. If we are not wholly satisfied that the public health
system could deal with implementation properly, we can get around the problem by
having parents making enhancement decisions for their offspring. Here, the focus is on
the individual and not fashioning of a specific gene pool. We thus can get around any
governmental “willing” of certain attributes upon its population.
Of course, we are still left with parental “willing” of certain attributes upon
offspring. This should not pose a problem, though. In a very real way, parents do
already “will” certain attributes of their offspring. Obviously parents raise their children
in different ways from other parents because they more or less believe that their methods
work. Parents have different strategies for tolerating misbehavior, encouraging
academics, and demanding responsibility. A world where parents have a greater role in
shaping idiosyncrasies is still a diverse world, one without the conformism of eugenics.7
The third objection, the discrimination concern, touches upon a few points. It
pertains to the “product” of genetic enhancement. A broad discrimination charge
suggests that either enhanced persons or non-enhanced persons will experience
discrimination because of their respective genetic codes. A narrower one suggests that
unenhanced persons will experience discrimination because they will be seen as
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genetically imperfect. Both the broad and narrow views seem to ignore two closely
related facts. The first is that “prejudice and discrimination seem to flourish quite well”
without genetic manipulation.8 The attitudes of prejudice and the actions of
discrimination are societal problems, not genetic enhancement problems. Secondly, the
latter (discrimination) can easily be legislated against and, in fact, there is an international
consensus on the following anti-discrimination code:
No one may be subjected to discrimination on the basis of genetic
characteristics that aims or has effect of injuring the recognition of human
dignity or the enjoyment of his or her rights on the ground of equality.9
Since it deals with action, the legal sphere can adequately handle potential discrimination
issues.
In a slightly different perspective of prospective discrimination, some might
consider certain parents as discriminated against. This view would maintain that since
the financial cost of genetic enhancement will undoubtedly eliminate some persons from
participating in the technology, all practice of it should be outlawed. Even if we assume
that some persons will not have access to this technology, we must recognize that there
are many technologies and opportunities that only some persons have access to. Many
people do not have the money to pay for in vitro fertilization, surgeries, little league
recreation, or certain types of food for their children. Does it follow that we should
deprive these from those who do have access to these things? Probably not.
7
Tannsjo, p. 236.
Peters, p. 373.
9
See Hughes’ “Embracing Change With All Four Arms: A Post Humanist Defense of Genetic
Engineering”, p. 98. This is contained in the Preliminary Draft of a Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights [UNESCO International Bioethics Conference, 1995.]
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In closing, let me reiterate that genetic enhancement should join the already
lengthy list of reproductive options available to parents. Such positive genetic therapy
should be practiced with caution and constant ethical monitoring to ensure that the
benefit of the individual always has central priority. Different ethical concerns will
undoubtedly arise depending on whether the enhancement will be somatic or germ-line
and again, these considerations must be dealt with as they show themselves. Its status as
being somatic or germ-line should not automatically include or exclude a given genetic
procedure as morally acceptable. Some somatic therapies might not be sought to benefit
the individual and some germ-line therapies might have important benefits for future
individuals. While the benefit to the individual is primary, a more egalitarian society will
be an inadvertent but welcomed consequence.
Works Cited
Gardner, William.: 1995, “Can Human Genetic Enhancement Be Prohibited?” The
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 20: 65-84.
Hughes, J.:1996, “Embracing Change with All Four Arms: A Post-Humanist Defense of
Genetic Engineering”, Eubios Journal of Asian and International Bioethics, 6 (4): 94101.
Moseley, Ray.: 1991, “Commentary: Maintaining the Somatic/Germ-Line Distinction:
Some Ethical Drawbacks”, The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 16:641-647.
Peters, Ted.: 1995, “Playing God and Germline Intervention.” The Journal of Medicine
and Philosophy, 20: 365-386.
Torbjorn, Tannsjo.: 1993, :Should We Change the Human Genome?” Theoretical
Medicine, 14: 231-247.