Indonesia Country Paper on Illegal Logging
Executive Summary and Recommendations
Prepared for the World Bank-WWF Workshop on
Control of Illegal Logging in East Asia
Jakarta, 28 August 2000
Written by: Neil Scotland (Department for International Development, DFID)
with contributions from: Joyotee Smith (Centre for International Forest Research,
CIFOR); Hikma Lisa, Marc Hiller, Ben Jarvis, Charlotte Kaiser, Mark Leighton,
Laura Paulson, Edward Pollard, Dessy Ratnasari, Ramsey Ravanell, Scott Stanley
(Proyek HKM, Gunung Palung, West Kalimantan); Erwidodo (Ministry of Forestry
and Estate Crops, Centre for Research and Development); Dave Currey
(Environmental Investigation Agency, EIA); Agus Setyarso (WWF - Indonesia)
Introduction
This paper was prepared for the World Bank-WWF workshop on Control of Illegal Logging in
East Asia, held in Jakarta on 28-29 August 2000 by drawing together material from a number of
sources in an attempt to present a comprehensive overview of the problem of illegal logging in
Indonesia.
In recent years illegal logging has emerged as a major threat to sustainable forest management
and rural livelihoods in Indonesia. The problem has become manifest in a number of ways
ranging from outright criminal activity through to manipulation of existing laws. It is also clear
that many existing policies and land use allocation leave people with little choice but to operate
outside the law.
Although many manifestations of illegal logging exist, there are common causal threads which
underlie the problem. The first is a demand (both domestic and international) for timber which
greatly exceeds the sustainable supply. The second is corruption, particularly within the military,
police and elements of the bureaucracy, which are themselves heavily involved in the illegal
trade. The third is the misuse of forests by politicians for purposes of political patronage. These
problems, when taken together, provide conditions under which illegal activity thrives.
Common causes

Supply and demand: National and international dimensions
Illegal logging is essentially driven by an imbalance between supply and demand for timber.
Export-oriented wood-processing industries have been allowed to expand without any reference
to the sustainable supply of timber, while domestic demand, in a country of more than 200
million people, has been almost entirely neglected by planners. Access to the timber resource has
been unrestricted, and since the official log supply is controlled by the export industries, domestic
needs have come to be met largely by illegal logging. In recent years there has also been a
marked increase in illegal exports of roundwood and sawnwood of the more desirable species and
an increasing amount of industry exports are produced using illegally harvest timber. While
estimates of the extent of illegal logging vary considerably, there is a general consensus that
between one half and two thirds (30-50m cubic metres) of wood consumed by Indonesia’s wood
processing industry is from illegal sources
The effects of excessive domestic demand are being compounded by a strong international
dimension to the problem, related both to the direct demand for timber in international markets,
and to policies in other countries which restrict the domestic supply of timber, leading to spillover effects in neighbouring countries which do not have effective controls. A surprising number
of countries in Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region have imposed restrictions on timber
harvesting in natural forests as a result of severe environmental degradation. Furthermore, trade
data show that Asian countries are a significant market for Asian timber producers, which
compounds the pressure exerted on countries with no restrictions when restrictions are introduced
elsewhere. For example there is strong evidence of a substantial cross border trade in illegal
timber from Indonesia to Malaysia, and to a lesser extent China, in part as a result of stricter
harvesting regulations and quotas in these countries.

Corruption: Backing for unlicensed sawmills in Sumatra
The entrenched nature of illegal logging and the difficulties likely to be faced in tackling the
problem were made clear by a recent survey of unlicensed sawmills around the Bukit Tigapuluh
National Park, conducted in 1999 by the Indonesia office of the Worldwide Fund for Nature
(WWF Indonesia). The park and the surrounding forest concessions are threatened by illegal
logging. The survey, conducted by the local office of WWF, discovered 25 unlicensed sawmills
in the immediate vicinity of the park.
These sawmills have no official supply of timber, and therefore rely upon an illegal supply from
the surrounding forests, some of which lie in the national park and some of which are on
concession land. Typical management arrangements for a sawmill in the area include the
provision of capital by the local business community, with the backing of either government
employees or members of the military. The involvement of uniformed officials as backers – and
particularly members of the security forces – effectively puts the mills beyond the reach of the
law. The logging gangs themselves are often made up of people from the forest fringe
communities who lost access rights to the forest when industrial harvesting licences were granted
to logging companies in the 1970s and 1980s. Of 25 sawmills visited, 13 had the backing of
members of the military, the police (1), and the regional forestry department / service (3). These
findings are backed up by evidence from elsewhere in Indonesia, which taken together suggest
overwhelming military / police involvement in illegal logging.

Political patronage and forest concession ownership
Problems in the sector are compounded by the political connections (and powerful lobby) of the
major timber groups, and the use of forestry rents by politicians and political parties to further
their agendas. A study by Brown (1999) demonstrates the highly politicised nature of the forestry
sector in Indonesia – in 1997/98 the largest 10 timber groups held 47% of the 51.3 million ha
allocated as production forest under concession. That such few companies could exert such
control over these vast holdings is in a large part attributable to the mutually supportive
arrangements their owners shared with the Soeharto government, which provided backing in
exchange for financial support delivered through a variety of mechanisms ranging from
shareholdings to donations. The owners of these holdings enjoyed (and still enjoy) direct access
to the very top of government, effectively stifling any meaningful reform in the sector and
maintaining a very corrupt environment in which illegality thrives. Furthermore, the
concentration of such a bountiful resource in the hands of a small number of companies has
excluded many people, including forest fringe communities, from legitimate access to the forest
resource. If forests are an important asset in local livelihoods then people have had little choice
but to exploit forests in violation of the law.
Illegal logging: A multi-faceted problem
Although these three common conditions underlie illegal logging, the problem presents itself in a
complex array of different manifestations:

Illegal logging by concessionaires
Forest exploitation in Indonesia is based on a system of forest concession licences (HPH) which
has been subject to widespread abuse. Illegal logging by concessionaires includes encroachment
into other concessions, protection forest areas and national parks. The most common form of
illegal logging by concessionaires is over-harvesting, encouraged by a system of self-reporting
and the complicity of inspectors.
These illegal actions are encouraged by many perverse incentives, including the requirement to
manage a 20-year concession on a 35-year cycle, the absence of secure tenure, and the frequent
reallocation to other uses (such as plantations and transmigration schemes) of forest that has been
logged over early in the management cycle. These factors negate the possibility of managing the
concession over a second cycle and encourage management aimed only at short-term gain.

Small-scale illegal logging by local people
Timber harvesting without a licence is illegal, and until recently the law explicitly made it
impossible for forest fringe communities to obtain rights to exploit adjacent forest areas. Under
New Order industrial policy, rights to exploit huge forest areas were granted to big business and
export-oriented industries, and village lands (often including the settlements themselves) were
officially reclassified as forest concessions. Overnight and without consultation, timber resources
once taken for granted were – according to the law – placed beyond reach. In the case of some
national parks a similar state of affairs exists. This sort of law invites “unlawful” behaviour by its
victims. Subsequently, among forest fringe communities, the introduction of chainsaws, the
erosion of informal local laws, and the rising influence of the market economy have increased
both the desire and the ability to harvest timber for commercial gain.
Small-scale logging by local people is possibly the most intractable manifestation of the illegal
logging problem, given the large number of operators and the diverse motives (including poverty
and a lack of alternatives) that drive illegal behaviour. The problem is also complicated by the
frequent involvement of outside capital and military / police backing. Cases have been
documented where loggers end up in debt to middlemen, and must continue logging to pay back
loans by deductions from the low wages they earn for their labour. In other cases, however,
timber harvesting simply provides an occasional and supplementary form of income, undertaken
free from the interference of outside parties.

Large-scale illegal logging by third parties
There is a blurred distinction between illegal logging by third parties and illegal logging by local
people, since in both cases the loggers themselves are poor, mostly local people. Timber
exploitation for commercial gain is nearly always orchestrated by local businessmen, government
officials, and the security forces. The difference between this type of illegal logging and what is
thought of as “local” lies in the degree of outside organisation, the scale of operation, and the
distribution of the benefits. A well known example of this “third party” type of logging is to be
found in the Tanjung Puting National Park in Central Kalimantan, where a large Ramin exporting
business is known to be operating illegally with powerful local backing.

Bending the rules
A number of existing laws are being perverted to gain access to commercial volumes of timber, to
the detriment of both the environment and rural livelihoods. For example, recent legislation
district government the right to grant local communities organised in co-operatives the right to
clear small parcels of forest (of up to 100ha in size) for agricultural purposes. Recently,
irregularities have been documented in the issue and management of these permits, and the
system is clearly being manipulated to obtain commercial volumes of clear-felled timber by large
business ventures – in clear contravention of the objective of the legislation, which is designed to
provide a boost to smallholder rural livelihoods.

Illegal logging under regional autonomy
Regency (Kabupaten) and municipality (Kotamadya) governments have been vested with
considerable powers under legislation on regional autonomy which became effective on Jan. 1st
2001. Amidst the administrative confusion and centralised bureaucratic resistance which has
surrounded this decentralisation process, there has been a growing tendency for local government
officials to take the initiative into their own hands and in particular to take unilateral action to
assert their authority over natural resources under their jurisdiction. In the forestry sector, to
generate much needed income, local governments appear to be levying unofficial taxes on illegal
timber – which effectively legalises the trade. In parts of Kalimantan there are anecdotal reports
of Regents (Bupati, who hold the state executive power in each Kabupaten) taxing shipments of
timber that leave the areas under their jurisdictions. There is a risk that short term revenue-raising
activities of this nature will take precedence over the need to manage local natural resources on a
sustainable base, and thus induce further forest degradation over large areas.

Encroachment by small scale and subsistence agriculture
Encroachment by smallholder farmers into forest areas is both a serious and an emotive issue.
While each farmer clears only a small area of land, the net impact of many farmers clearing small
plots or practising shifting agriculture is very damaging to the natural forest. However, this
particular form of unlicensed logging and forest clearance is practised by people who are often
poor and rarely have any choice over the way in which they earn a living. Clearing land by
burning, which is the usual method, contributes to the annual haze which covers parts of
Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia, but small farmers have in the past also been used as
scapegoats for the larger and more destructive fires set by large plantation companies.
The absence of secure land title provides a further incentive to clear forest and establish crops.
This is particularly true in the face of external threats, including that of forest land being
consumed in central government projects, such as the issuance of industrial forest concessions.
Transition to a market and cash-based economy has also contributed to the environmental impact
which small-scale agriculture has on the natural forest. Cultivated plots were formerly left fallow
on a rotation typically of 10−15 years. This allowed secondary forest to recover before farmers
returned to once again cultivate crops in the area. However, the need for cash income now
encourages farmers to plant cash crops, particularly rubber, on the fallow. The productive life of
these plantations is longer than that of the old fallow, meaning that farmers must continually clear
new areas of natural forest for food crop cultivation (Norindra, 1993).

Corporate encroachment
Encroachment into forest areas by corporate entities is a serious problem in Indonesia. It takes
many forms, including encroachment into national parks and conservation areas. Sometimes
encroachment is outright illegal, sometimes it is backed up by the correct permits but in areas for
which permits should not have been allocated to commercial land uses.
A range of perverse incentives encourage corporate encroachment into the forest estate. Weak
property rights over forested land provide ample incentive to replace forest with plantation crops
and obtain the stronger land title which accompanies such changes. In addition, companies that
develop plantations commonly receive windfall profits from the sale of cleared timber. Until
1998, industrial forest plantation projects (as opposed to agricultural tree crops like rubber or oil
palm) had the added attraction of milking highly perverse subsidies from the reforestation fund,
which acted to encourage further clearance of natural forest. These perverse subsidies helped to
push the proportion of timber recovered from clear-felling operations up from to 20% of the total
harvest in 1994/95 to34% in 1997/98 and nearly 32% in 1998/99.
While this paper is primarily about illegal logging, another violation of forest law – arson – is
also associated, on a very large scale, with the development of oil palm on the forest estate.
Impact of illegal logging on Indonesia

Economic
The secretary-general of the Ministry of Forestry estimates that the annual loss of revenue from
illegal logging amounts to $96-$120 million. However, for many years Indonesia has undervalued
its timber resources by protecting the domestic market for roundwood, and if valued at
international prices, losses are more likely to be measured in billions of dollars every year. The
costs of public subsidies advanced to enterprises which illegally damage the forest must also be
factored into more comprehensive calculations of the cost to the state of illegal logging. These
subsidies include substantial capital subsidies for pulp and paper projects and direct subsidies
from the reforestation fund to help firms establish pulpwood plantations.
Indirect subsidies have also been advanced to large, politically well-connected conglomerates by
allowing them to borrow large sums of money from state banks. This excessive and unregulated
borrowing has driven banks and business ventures owned by timber conglomerates to the brink of
bankruptcy and they have been rescued at vast public expense. Much of the money borrowed will
also be written off in debt restructuring procedures, again at taxpayers expense, representing a
further subsidy to the timber industry and a further cost to the national economy.

Forest fires
Perverse subsidies which encourage land clearance, and the manipulation of legislation to allow
land clearing are linked intimately to the problems posed by forest fires. Fires are the favoured
method of clearing land in Indonesia, and in dry years, such as 1997/98, caused enormous
damage. The National Planning Board (Bappenas) reports that in 1997/98 xxxm ha were burnt,
releasing over 700 million tonnes of carbon and on the basis of a benefit transfer model employed
by Bappenas, resulting in losses of approximately $9.3 billion.
Logging in protected areas makes their forests more vulnerable to damage or destruction by fire.
Studies have shown that fires in logged-over forests cause more damage than those in unlogged
forest because of the additional fuel, in the form of rotting wood and logging slash, which litters
the floor after logging.

Wildlife poaching
Wildlife poaching is a significant and tragic side effect of illegal logging – many “charismatic”
species, including the orang-utan, Sumatran tiger, several species of gibbon, Javan and Sumatran
rhinoceros, the Sumatran elephant, and the clouded leopard are now highly endangered. Falling
populations among these species are attributed to increased human–animal contact which results
from logging, encroachment into forest areas, and habitat loss.

Social
Illegal logging also has many adverse social impacts. Loggers work for poor wages and are often
indebted to their middlemen bosses. Work undertaken by loggers and sawmillers is heavy and
dangerous, and there are no health and safety regulations to offer protection. In the event of
crackdowns on illegal logging it is often the poor and vulnerable who are targeted, while those
who reap the greatest benefit from the violation of the law go unpunished. This has a very
negative social impact and undermines faith in state justice. The operations of illegal logging
gangs sometimes divide communities between those for and against them, and in the long run
such conflicts can undermine rural support networks, customary (adat) laws governing natural
resource use, and ultimately lead to weaker social ties between neighbours. Controversy over
logging operations can also provoke inter-village conflict.

Benefits
Illegal logging generates important social and economic benefits in the rural economy, such as
employment, an additional source of income, and security in the event of crop failures. However,
these benefits also serve to attract migrants to forested areas, which can result in conflict with
indigenous inhabitants and customary management regimes, leading to increased degradation.
Government strategy

Prevention
A number of policy initiatives and measures have been launched to tackle problems in the forest
sector, particularly over the last two years. The new Forestry Law, No. 41/1999, which replaced
the Basic Forestry Law of 1967, takes a first step towards addressing some of the underlying
causes of illegal logging, as well as outlining legal action against violations of forest law and the
penalties that may be imposed. Law No. 22/1999 on Regional Autonomy, and Law No. 25/1999
on the Fiscal Balance Between the Centre and the Regions, may in the longer run also provide
direct incentives for local government and local constituencies to control illegal logging, although
this process of decentralisation also carries substantial risk (see above).
The government's commitment to tackling the problem is also reflected in the establishment by
ministerial decree of an inter-agency team (P2LPHHI), to combat illegal logging and the illegal
trade in forest products. Team members come from a number of agencies including the Ministry
of Forestry, the National Police and the Navy.
Steps are also being taken to tackle the international dimensions of the illegal trade in timber,
although difficulties encountered with efforts directed both at prevention and suppression are
bound up in the broader problems facing Indonesia's legal system. The basis of all enforcement
activities is legislation, but capacity to enforce existing legislation is limited by a number of
factors, including inadequate human resources, weak judicial support to field staff, inadequate
legislation, a failure to vest enforcement powers in appropriate agencies, and a lack of resources
for field enforcement personnel. The number of forest guards (jagawana hutan) is reportedly only
one for every 20,000 ha of forest (ITTO 1990; Callister 2000). Infrastructural support and
facilities for forest officers in the field are very poor, so that they may even have to rely on
concession holders for basic needs such as transport and housing. This puts the officers into an
excessively dependent relationship with the concession holders and creates an environment
conducive to collusion and corruption (Callister 2000). Protection for officers who do attempt to
enforce the law is non-existent, leaving them with little choice but to comply with the status quo.
While efforts to prevent illegal logging by the conventional methods of enforcement, patrols and
prosecutions have been limited by these obvious constraints, there have been almost no attempts
to reduce illegal logging by more innovative policies which address the fundamental causes of the
problem, such as land ownership reform, a review of access rights, involving local communities
in forest management and forest law enforcement, and employing third party monitors.
Government policy has yet to address the problem of over-harvesting and excess capacity in the
timber industry, and the pulp industry continues to expand with official blessing despite growing
awareness of the potential for excessive forest loss to seriously damage Indonesia’s economy.

Detection
A systematic procedure is needed for collecting and analysing data on illegal activity. Detection
has been improved by the P2LPHHI team, but most efforts to tackle illegal logging to date have
been based on information provided by donors, student groups, NGOs and researchers. It is not
that the government does not have the means of detecting illegal logging – problems with
detection are hampered by the complicity of local officials, and the involvement of elements of
the military and the police also intimidates officials who would otherwise take action. Any future
system for detecting illegal activity in the forest sector must take this complicity into account, and
protected against subversion by officials involved in the trade.

Suppression
While many of the issues required to address illegal logging require longer-term action and a
more considered approach, prosecuting those responsible for flagrant illegal logging does not.
Elevation of systematic and flagrant abuses of environmental law, such as documented in
Tanjung Puting National Park, provide an opportunity for decisive action to be taken against
those backing illegal logging. However, the problems of pushing even high profile test cases
through Indonesia's legal system illustrate the difficulties which the government faces when
trying to prosecute any cases involving breaches of environmental law.
The formation of the P2LPHHI team has helped somewhat, and a number of operations against
illegal logging operations have ended with the successful impoundment of stolen timber.
However, these operations often provoke a violent response, placing forestry officials in personal
danger. To date no senior figures involved in the illegal logging industry have been successfully
prosecuted and their operations closed.
Conclusions
The problem of illegal logging in Indonesia is highly complex. Although the problem is as yet
poorly understood, it is clear that a strategy based only on improved enforcement is unlikely to
work, and must be supported by policies that address the underlying causes of the problem.
Case studies presented in the paper highlight the importance of demand-side factors, complicated
more recently by rising demand from abroad. Evidence from the case studies also suggests that
the legal framework and past and current policy may encourage illegal logging by providing no
legal role for small-scale logging and no incentives for control and management of forest
resources within provincial and district government or within informal village institutions.
The case studies show that although employment in the illegal sector is unpredictable and
dangerous, it provides employment to a wide range of people with few other alternatives. These
people supplement their incomes from illegal logging and use it as an income diversification and
risk reduction strategy. Policies to stamp out illegal logging will have to take this trade-off into
account and provide alternative livelihood strategies.
The case studies also show the key role that has been played by interested parties at the district
and local level in controlling what goes on in the forests, indicating that decentralisation of
control over forest resources, if correctly implemented, could contribute to solving the problem.
While decentralization and the new forestry law are moves in the right direction, the laws on their
own, without supporting policies and institutions, will in all likelihood serve to exacerbate illegal
and unsustainable management of forest resources
Evidence suggests that a strategy based primarily on better enforcement has had relatively little
success. Illegal logging appears to be driven by a large and varied set of dispersed interests,
united only by the desire to make money. The line between legality and illegality is often unclear,
and some illegal operators have functioned with a fig leaf of legality, or even purported
benevolence. Some of the people who are formally responsible for enforcement at local level
have benefited illegally from their high capacity to subvert enforcement directives from the
centre.
There are demands for illegally logged timber from a wide range of species and for a variety of
end uses. Policies for bringing demand into line with sustainable supply will have to consider
demand from not only the sawn timber and plywood sectors, but also other growing sectors like
pulp and paper. The available data also highlight the growing importance of demand from abroad
and show that policies confined to bringing domestic industrial capacity in line with domestic
sustainable yield are unlikely to control the illegal logging problem.
Recommendations
Despite the complexity of the problem, there are a number of steps which the could be taken in
the short to medium term to begin addressing the problem. These measures have been structured
around three key elements of any law enforcement strategy – prevention, detection and
suppression.
Prevention
Prevention is the basis of any law enforcement strategy. Successful prevention requires political
commitment, a sound policy framework, and well co-ordinated action between the agencies
responsible for enforcing the law.
Short term

Political will. Immediate, high level commitment from national, provincial and district
government structures to address problems in the forest sector.

Co-ordinated response. Encourage early interaction between forest management and forest
protection staff.

Strong deterrent. Increase perceived risk of illegal activity through quick wins on detection
and enforcement.

Innovative solutions. Provide political and legislative backing for community forest
management and evaluate the potential of this type of management model to mitigate forest
law violations and environmental bad practice.
Long term

Further research. If control is to be sustainable, better (more comprehensive) understanding
of the problem is needed. Comprehensive and sustainable solutions cannot be based solely on
anecdotal evidence.

Further research. Analyse existing policies to establish if they are causing illegal logging
and increased rural vulnerability. Establish who benefits, who loses and what incentives are
created which induce illegal activity and environmental degradation.

Further research. Comprehensive analysis of proposed policy actions is needed to avoid
unwanted consequences.

Industry restructuring. Steps should be taken to rationalise the balance between the supply
and demand for timber, including international demand for timber.

Governance. Corruption and systemic weaknesses in the legal system need to be addressed
to discourage abuse of power leading to violations of environmental law.

Governance. Policy action must consider the political economy of forestry, and the manner
in which political agendas are linked to illegalities.

Governance. A review should be conducted to determine how the on-going process of
decentralisation can be used to combat illegal logging, and also to highlight the dangers
which it presents to environmental good practice.

Governance. Introduce a system of independent inspection for forest concessions.

Good policy. Policies need to be drafted to ensure that loggers and enforcement staff are
provided with incentives to operate within the bounds of the existing law.

Innovative management. Give greater consideration to innovative measures which may
reduce illegal logging, including addressing problems with land tenure and ownership,
granting local communities a greater role in management and law enforcement, and possibly
even legalising certain types of illegal logging, as currently defined, in restricted areas

Public education. A public relations programme is needed to change the views of both the
government, the public, the judiciary, and the state security apparatus.

International initiatives. There is a need to strengthen regional co-operation in suppression
of illegal logging, both from government to government and among private sector entities.
Trans-boundary agreements should be set up to develop a system to collect transparent
information on the international trade in timber, which should be placed in the public domain.

Good business practice. Codes of conduct for the investment industry and multinational
companies should be established. The potential for certification and chain of custody
monitoring and trade to provide incentives not to log illegally should be reviewed.

Good business practice. Legislation to ban the purchase of illegally harvest wood should be
drafted.
Detection
Detection is the second major element of an enforcement strategy. There are a variety of ways to
detect illegal logging – a particularly important aspect of the debate for Indonesia revolves around
the merits (or otherwise) of investing heavily in expensive, high-technology solutions when
simple, less costly, labour-intensive methods would perhaps be more appropriate and effective.

Good policy. Organisations responsible for fighting illegal logging must be identified, and a
clear division of responsibilities, equipment needs, staffing and areas of co-operation
established.

Good management. Operational practice must be defined, including how to handle
confiscated material, management systems, inter-agency co-ordination protocols and practice,
and training requirements.

Political will. More vigorous action backed by stronger political will. To do this increased
awareness among politicians and policy makers is needed along with specific policies
targeted at country and regional levels. Increased public awareness is also essential.

Governance. There is a pressing need for reliable documentation verified by a third
(independent) party. A comprehensive log tracking system and a clear and systematic
procedure for collecting and managing information is also necessary.

International co-operation. The potential for making use of international assistance needs to
be evaluated, including the potential for regional approaches, bilateral initiatives, and NGO
involvement.

Co-ordinated approaches. Donors should avoid individual initiatives and consider coordinated, sector-wide approaches to assistance.

International co-operation. Regional experience offers some interesting lessons for
Indonesia. In Cambodia, a computerised tracking system has been developed to monitor
illegal logging, corruption and arson. A system has been developed to facilitate the flow of
information from the provinces to the central government, leading to charges being brought
against illegal loggers. Good information is being recovered from areas where the “fear
factor” has been overcome – not everywhere – demonstrating the importance of providing
adequate protection for those involved in combating illegal logging.

Good policy. Government resources will always be inadequate, and civil society must be
drawn into detection networks. Basic training to this end is required on the law, basic forest
legislation, and basic guidance on how to gather evidence.

Independent civil society monitoring. Third party monitoring has been successful in both
Cambodia (through Global Witness) and in the Philippines (through Multi-Sectoral Forest
Protection (MSFP) committees, which involve rural populations and local NGOs).
Suppression
Suppression is reactive. If prevention and detection work, very little suppression is needed. It is
still, however, an important part of any strategy to combat illegal logging.

Strong institutions. Authority must be clearly designated and a lead agency identified. The
agency will need to have some central co-ordination with a strong regional and local
presence. It may be necessary to create and adequately finance an organisation which deals
specifically with forest crime.

Cross-sectoral approach. Suppression strategies must be linked to the judicial system, local
government and the media.

Governance. Suppression must take place in a transparent and impartial manner.

Capacity building. Training is required in a range of skills, including in pursuing criminal
investigations and resource management laws.

Capacity building. Training is also required for prosecutors and judges to gain a heightened
understanding of the issues which arise in crimes related to the exploitation of natural
resources.

Quick wins. Test cases are a vital first step to moving forward. High profile test cases
brought to a successful conclusion will provide a strong symbol of determination to tackle the
problem and will begin the process of rebuilding confidence among the agencies responsible
for enforcing the law.