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***AFF Ups ............................................................................................................................................................ 2
A2 e-Loran CP ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
A/2 Threaten China CP ........................................................................................................................................... 3
Conditions Bad........................................................................................................................................................ 4
China will say yes ................................................................................................................................................... 5
***On the Ground CP*** ....................................................................................................................................... 6
2ac AT: On the Ground CP..................................................................................................................................... 6
Ground Defense Causes Russian Miscalc............................................................................................................... 8
Ground Defense Bad—Relations ............................................................................................................................ 9
Ground Based Defense Bad .................................................................................................................................. 10
***A2 Treaty CPs*** ........................................................................................................................................... 11
A2 WSP Treaty .................................................................................................................................................... 13
A2 PSI treaty ......................................................................................................................................................... 14
AT: Heg sustainable .............................................................................................................................................. 17
AT: No Iran Strike ................................................................................................................................................ 18
AT: Black Budget ................................................................................................................................................. 22
*** 2AC Ks**....................................................................................................................................................... 23
2AC - Cap K ......................................................................................................................................................... 24
Bataille 2AC.......................................................................................................................................................... 27
2AC A/2 Securitization Criticism SHORT ........................................................................................................... 31
2AC A/2 Securitization Criticism LONG ............................................................................................................. 33
***Case** ............................................................................................................................................................. 38
China—Militarization ........................................................................................................................................... 42
China Will Be Aggressive .................................................................................................................................... 46
A2 Tracking Capabilities ...................................................................................................................................... 47
Ground Based Systems Ineffective ....................................................................................................................... 48
Faulty Missile Defense Doesn’t Deter .................................................................................................................. 49
***Realism—China .............................................................................................................................................. 51
Fisher Prodites ...................................................................................................................................................... 52
***Space Mil Neg Ups ......................................................................................................................................... 53
Indict To Richard Fisher “China’s Military Modernization” ............................................................................... 55
Uniqueness CP—Deter ......................................................................................................................................... 56
Transition Reduces Conflict Frontline .................................................................................................................. 57
Hegemony Declining Frontline............................................................................................................................. 58
Hegemony Declining Extensions .......................................................................................................................... 59
AT Asian Prolif Bad – Nuclear Use ..................................................................................................................... 61
Nuclear Weapons Deter ........................................................................................................................................ 62
Nuclear Weapons Deter ........................................................................................................................................ 63
WEAPONS SPEC................................................................................................................................................. 65
China Won’t Attack Taiwan ................................................................................................................................. 66
Lasers Don’t Work ................................................................................................................................................ 67
Document is Dolman-Free
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***AFF Ups
A2 e-Loran CP
Can’t solve China first-strike
Federation of American Scientists NO DATE GIVEN “Cruise Missiles” http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/cm/
In the absence of GPS, the reliability of the cruise missile targeting philosophy becomes increasingly more problematic. As an
alternative, a country may attempt to fly its cruise missile with radio guidance or other commands. Usually radio guidance uses
frequencies high enough to operate only on line-of-sight reception. If the country expects to operate in hostile territory or attack at
very long ranges, it must control the intervening repeater station to contact these missiles by real-time transmission of flight controls
signals and position information.
Loran only applies to North America
A Presentation To The Air
Navigation Commission of The International Civil Aviation Organization Wednesday, 23 Feb 2000 Montreal,
"LORAN AND GPS IN AVIATION" LANGHORNE BOND PITTSBORO, NC USA
PQ, CANADA
http://www.loran.org/ILAArchive/LanghorneBondPapers/13LoranAndGPSInNavigation.pdf
LORAN. The great value of the LORAN system lies in the nature of its signal. The LORAN signal follows the surface of the planet
(land and water) and is therefore available at low altitudes for terminal maneuvering and for non-precision approach. It is also a very
long range signal and therefore cheap to operate. All of the North American land mass is covered by 29 LORAN stations. LORAN is
the en route navigation system of the future.
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A/2 Threaten China CP
Perm – Do Both.
They will take the deal - China hates the plan more than the PSI
Aaron L Friedberg, Fall 05, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, “The Future of U.S.-China
Relations Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security, Volume 30, Number 2, pg 7-45, Project Muse
As regards Taiwan, China’s goal may be only to prevent that island from sliding toward independence. The PRC’s
leaders may be perfectly willing to live with the status quo indeanitely, but they may believe that they have to is- sue
periodic threats to prevent Taiwan from breaking free. The U.S. objective may be only to prevent forceful reuniacation.
But China’s threats and ongoing military buildup may increase fears that Beijing will eventually feel capable of achieving
its objectives through the use of force. To maintain deterrence, Wash- ington may then feel compelled to increase
military assistance to Taipei and to take other measures designed to make it appear more likely that the United States
would intervene if Taiwan were attacked. But these steps will almost certainly make the PRC more fearful of a
Taiwanese bolt for independence, which will cause Beijing to further intensify its military efforts and heighten its
rhetoric, and so on.43 China’s aim in deploying large numbers of theater ballistic missiles may be primarily to deter
Taiwan from declaring independence. But those deploy- ments inevitably appear threatening not only to Taiwan but also to
Japan, the United States, and others in the region. Conversely, the U.S. aim in moving to- ward deployment of some kind
of theater missile defense (TMD) system may be to provide a measure of protection to U.S. friends and allies and to
its bases and forces in the Western Paciac. But the possibility of such a deployment is obviously deeply threatening
to the Chinese, who see it as undermining their ability to prevent unfavorable regional developments, especially if a U.S.orchestrated TMD system is extended to include Taiwan. Beijing’s concerns about TMD will be further heightened by the
deployment of a U.S. national missile defense system, which the Chinese could see as reducing their ability to deter an
attack on their own territory. The Chinese response to these developments is likely to include steps to augment both
their theater- and intercontinental-range strike forces, which will tend to heighten U.S. anxieties about their
intentions
China will say yes to the PSI—they haven’t signed yet but are changing their attitude
Mark R. Shulman, 2006, Assistant Dean and Adjunct Professor at Pace Law School and a Visiting Scholar at Yale University's
International Security Studies Program, “The proliferation security initiative and the evolution of the law on the use of force”,
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+proliferation+security+initiative+and+the+evolution+of+the+law+on...-a0147302387
According to The Economist, China has "said a few kind words" about the PSI. (81) China is the only member of the U.N.
Security Council's permanent five members that has not signed on. (82) Unlike Russia, China does not appear to pose a
significant risk as a source of loose nukes. While it has a significant nuclear arsenal, these weapons appear to be relatively
well secured. For China, then, there are really two significant issues. First is the role China can play in bolstering or
denying legality and legitimacy to the PSI. At the most obvious level, with China's support, the U.N. Security Council
could pass a resolution that would explicitly authorize the use of all necessary means to halt the proliferation of WMD--a
"super" Resolution 1540 that would alleviate any concern about the PSI's legality. The second issue arises out of China's
role as the principal patron of North Korea. Without China's protection, North Korea's government would face the full force
of the international community. It seems, however, that absent the emergence of a new threat to China from a non-state
entity with access to WMD, the People's Republic will not fully endorse the PSI.
Perm – Do Both.
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A/2 threaten china 2/
U.S. commitment to ITAR and MTCR blocks U.S.-Indo relations
Garretson 10, Peter Garretson, chief, future science and technology exploration, for the U.S. Air Force. He has
studied advanced space and energy concepts for the U.S. Department of Defense, 2010, “Sky’s No Limit”, IDSA,
Ebsco
Discussions with policy-makers and implementers on the Indian side base their scepticism chiefly on what they see as
the US’s own self-defeating technology control regimes, specifically the International Trafficking in Arms Regulations
(ITAR), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), both of which, it is felt, impede meaningful cooperation
and are not particularly effective in preventing proliferation but are quite effective in losing business for the US.
India also has concerns that it could relax its stance on autonomy and become dependent on US technology only to
come under sanctions or a technology control or denial regime at some later time. India also has active technical
partnerships with other technically advanced countries that it has strong incentives to preserve. which governs civilian
satellite and launch, Despite the concerns of sceptics, the Indo-US strategic partnership seems to rest on very sound
fundamentals that are not likely to change over several decades. First, is a shared cultural history in colonialism, with the
attendant struggle for freedom, and the important influence of the enlightenment thought, British political organisation,
commerce and trade routes and prominence of the English language in matters of science, state-craft and commerce.
Second, the significant and growing bilateral trade. Third is the asymmetric but aligned economic needs–where India needs
investment today to maintain a high rate of growth for development and cohesion, and the US is looking for high growth
places to invest, and places that provide both a market for its own goods and a cost- competitive manufacturing base to
manufacture the ideas it conceives and finances. Fourth is the large and politically active diaspora that is actively seeking to
build closer ties. Fifth is a shared interest in limiting the damage of those extremists that undermine pluralism and sew
extremism and violence. Finally, both wish to take part in the the economic rise of a vibrant Asian market where a
normative rule set prevails that allow all members to benefit from the use of global commons and work on collective
problems and human security is possible. Within this framework, both nations see the need to make space for and engage
China as it evolves as a responsible stakeholder with greater transparency, but to ensure that accommodation takes place
respecting important equities of themselves and their neighbours, and is free of any element of coercion.
Conditions Bad
1. It’s infinitely regressive – we can’t predict all the different conditions the plan can place on other
countries to solve. Shifts the debate away from the resolution to unpredictable small net benefits
and small policy differences
2. Steals all Aff Offense – Conditions make it impossible to read offensive arguments because they are
unpredictable which means we can’t find answers and the neg will always win
3. CP is Plan Plus: The counterplan is plan plus, it just specifies an additional portion of the plan that the aff
did not.
4. Time and strat skew – Steals all offense from the 1AC by proposing some condition before we can enact the
plan
5. Theory is a voter for Fairness and Education
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China will say yes
Worldwide support proves that more and more countries are supporting the PSI
Heritage Foundation, 2008, “33 Minutes: Protecting America In The New Missile Age”, http://www.33minutes.com/report/PDF/33_Minutes.pdf
While not all states have joined, the level of support for the PSI demonstrates worldwide agreement that stronger measures
and international cooperation are needed to defeat the threat from pro- liferation of WMD and ballistic missiles. With North
Korea already a nuclear weapons state, Iran likely to go nuclear in the near future, and al-Qaeda still interested in acquiring
WMD, the threat to U.S. interests at home and overseas is real. States clearly need to work together to prevent the trade in
WMD and ballistic missiles, or at least to make it more costly and difficult, whether the proliferators’ motivation is
financial or strategic. In a dangerous world, in addition to developing and deploying missile defense, the PSI provides
another dynamic, proactive tool for enhanc- ing our national security against the prevailing threat of WMD and ballistic
missiles and those that would use them.
China is fiercely opposed to the plan and always has been
Research Machines, 2009, “Strategic Defense Initiative”, http://encyclopedia.farlex.com/Brilliant+Pebbles
US programme (1983–93) to explore the technical feasibility of developing a comprehensive defence system against
incoming nuclear missiles, based in part outside the Earth's atmosphere. The programme was started by President Ronald
Reagan in March 1983, and was overseen by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO). In May 1993, the SDIO
changed its name to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), to reflect its focus on defence against short-range
rather than long-range missiles. SDI lives on today in the less ambitious National Missile Defense (NMD) programme. The
aim of SDI was to create a ‘defence shield’ that would protect the USA from a full nuclear missile attack by the Soviet
Union or other hostile nuclear powers. This would end reliance on offense-dominated deterrence (‘Mutually Assured
Destruction’) through a balance of terror. Enemy missiles would be attacked at several different stages of their trajectory,
using advanced laser and particle-beam technology, thus increasing the chances of disabling them. The programme drew
support from Republicans, but faced strong opposition on technical, economic, and diplomatic grounds. Some scientists
maintained that SDI was unworkable, as a 100% strike rate against incoming missiles would be impossible to achieve. In
1988 the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that they expected to be able to intercept no more than 30% of incoming missiles.
SDI was criticized on cost grounds, being both hugely expensive – by 1993 US$25 billion had been spent on SDI research
– and vulnerable to cheaper counter-measures designed by missile developers to confuse the missiles's interceptors.
Diplomatically, Russia and China both fiercely opposed SDI, and the deployment of such a system would have been a
breach of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) treaty. However, SDI's supporters believed it to be a valuable bargaining
chip in arms reduction negotations with Russia, which (despite attempting to develop its own version of SDI) realized it
could not match the USA in a race in this high technology area. SDI research led to development of ‘hit-to-kill’ (HTK)
technology and miniaturization of rocket components. Israel, Japan, and the UK were among the nations that assisted in
SDI research and development. The ending of the Cold War in 1990 led to reduced US–Russian tensions, which led to a US
decision, in 1991, to scale down SDI. However, a new threat emerged: the spread of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction to smaller states such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. A new approach of Global Protection Against Limited
Strikes (GPALS) was adopted by President George Bush, with the goal of defending the USA against limited missile
attacks, and protect deployed US forces and allies against shorter-range ballistic missiles. It was based on three
components: a global, space-based system of Brilliant Pebbles interceptors; the ground- and sea-based Theatre Missile
Defense; and a limited, ground-based national missile defence element.
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***On the Ground CP***
2ac AT: On the Ground CP
1. Space basing key-- better observation and signals
Grego et al 5 (Laura, Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright, "The Physics of Space Security: a reference manual,"
Space basing is uniquely well suited to a wide range of civilian and military applications. (Sections 5, 6, 7) Space offers
several features not available from the ground or air. Satellitebased sensors can see much larger areas of the Earth than
sensors closer to the Earth can see. This allows large-scale simultaneous observation of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere,
and communication between and simultaneous broadcast to large parts of the earth. Because the atmosphere blocks
transmission of many types of electromagnetic waves, some kinds of astronomical observations can only be made from
space. Moreover, space is much better suited to some types of operations than to others. Electromagnetic signals (light and
radio waves) can be transmitted over large distances almost instantaneously and with very little energy cost. Space
therefore favors activities that entail sending and receiving electromagnetic signals over activities that involve transporting
large amounts of mass from the Earth into space or that involve significant maneuvering in space, which can require a large
mass of propellant.
2. Space defense is more efficient at hitting targets
Pfaltzgraff 7, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. “Space and Missile Defense” presented at Missile Defense and Space Security organized by
The Federalist Society held at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. June 20, 2007, http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/FedSoc_062007.pdf
Because of the numbers of Brilliant Pebbles and their deployment in space, they would have had multiple opportunities for
interception, thus increasing their potential for success either in boost-phase, midcourse, or even high in the earth’s
atmosphere during reentry or the terminal phase. In contrast, the deployment of ground-based interceptors in the limited
numbers presently planned in the ongoing missile 4 defense programs may not provide more than one intercept opportunity.
They will need to be placed within a more robust layered missile defense architecture if we are to keep ahead of the
emerging missile threat. Technology advances over the past decade furnish the basis for such an architecture for less mass,
lower cost, and higher performance in space-based kinetic energy missile defense, provided necessary investments are
made in Brilliant Pebbles-type technology for the twentyfirst century. This should be high on the missile defense agenda for
the way ahead. In sum, the key to moving forward would be, first, to identify programs that were under development more
than a decade ago as a basis for reviving a viable space-based interceptor program and the technologies that undergird it.
Iran proliferating now
Hague 11 (William, 7/11/11, " Iran's nuclear threat is escalating Plans to increase production of enriched uranium emphasise why
we must continue to exert pressure on Iran," http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jul/11/iran-nuclear-weapons-uraniumproduction)
On 8 June, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organisation, Fereydoun Abbasi Davani, announced plans to triple Iran's
capacity to produce 20% enriched uranium, transferring enrichment from Natanz to the Fordo plant. Inside Iran this
announcement by a discredited regime drew little comment and was quickly overshadowed by the domestic political theatre
of the latest high-profile tussles between Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But it was an
important statement because it makes even clearer the fact that Iran's programme is not designed for purely peaceful
purposes. Iran has one civilian nuclear power station and is seeking to build more. All of these power stations need uranium
enriched to about 3.5% for fuel. So plans to enrich any further rightly prompt questions. Uranium enriched to up to 20% does
have some civilian uses. But not in the civilian nuclear power stations that Iran claims to desire. Predominantly it is used as
fuel for research reactors, producing among other things isotopes for medical use. These are very efficient: one research
reactor in Belgium is capable of producing almost all the medical isotopes needed across the whole of western Europe. Iran
has one research reactor. The plans announced by Davani would provide more than four times its annual fuel requirements.
Yet this reactor is already capable of producing enough radioisotopes for up to 1m medical investigations per year – already
comparable to the UK and much more than Iran needs. The plan would also require diverting at least half of Iran's current
annual output of 3.5% enriched uranium, and so deny it to Iran's nuclear power stations. If Iran is serious about developing
civil nuclear energy, why divert limited materials and resources away from the civil energy programme in this way, while
spurning offers of technological assistance for Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy from the outside world, including the
E3+3 countries of the UK, China, France, Germany, Russia and the US? Yet there is one clear purpose for this enriched
uranium. Enrichment from natural uranium to 20% is the most time consuming and resource-intensive step in making the
highly enriched uranium required for a nuclear weapon. And when enough 20% enriched uranium is accumulated at the
underground facility at Qom, it would take only two or three months of additional work to convert this into weapons grade
material. There would remain technical challenges to actually producing a bomb, but Iran would be a significant step closer.
CARD CONTINUES CARD CONTINUES
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A2 on the ground cp 2/
Iran's intensified uranium enrichment is envisaged to take place at a previously covert site, buried deep beneath the
mountains. That it claims to allow International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring is not a safeguard. Iran has a persistent
record of evasion and obfuscation with the IAEA. It has failed to provide the IAEA with access to relevant locations,
equipment, persons or documents. It has not replied to questions from the IAEA on its procurement of nuclear-related items
and aspects of its work that could be useful only for developing a nuclear weapon – such as multipoint detonation for the
initiation of hemispherical explosive charges or, in plain English, detonators for an atom bomb. It has an active ballistic
missile programme, including the development of missiles with a range of over a thousand kilometres, and carried out a
range of missile tests in June. A reasonable observer cannot help but join the dots. This is not an abstract issue: Iran's nuclear
programme could lead to a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, already the world's most volatile region. It would be both
naive and a derogation of duty to give them – once again – the benefit of the doubt.
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Ground Defense Causes Russian Miscalc
Ground Defense Causes Russian Miscalculation
Interviewee: Charles A. Kupchan, CFR Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow Interviewer: Bernard Gwertzman, Consulting
Editor, CFR.org October 20 2010 “Can NATO Nudge Russia Westward?” http://www.cfr.org/europerussia/can-nato-nudge-russiawestward/p23191
You mean mostly the former members of the Soviet bloc? That's correct. So, this summit was an effort to discuss the issue
in a smaller forum, to get the major European powers to brainstorm about new linkages between Europe and the Russian
Federation. On the table was discussion of a European Union-Russia consultative council that might look a little bit like the
existing NATO-Russia consultative council. But Russia doesn't like the NATO council because it feels like a second-class
citizen; it feels as if it is one country meeting with twenty-eight NATO members. In its discussions with the EU, it hopes to
be able to carve out a more elevated status. The discussion over missile defense is a proxy for a much broader discussion
about whether NATO and the EU are still hedges against Russia or whether these institutions are sincerely interested in
opening their doors to Russia and making Russia a card-carrying member of the Euro-Atlantic community. At the recent
NATO foreign and defense ministers' meeting in Brussels, there was considerable discussion about a proposed European
missile defense, which will be a main topic in Lisbon. The effort to bring Russia into the missile defense system began even
before Obama took office. While the Bush administration was still running the show, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice went to Moscow and spoke to the Russians about this issue but didn't make much
progress. Obama has revamped the missile defense program, and as part of that overhaul the administration is now working
with its NATO allies, both to get unanimous approval for this system from NATO and to get the Russians to participate.
That goal has not yet been achieved. The discussion over missile defense is a proxy for a much broader discussion about
whether NATO and the European Union are still hedges against Russia or whether these institutions are sincerely interested
in opening their doors to Russia and making Russia a card-carrying member of the Euro-Atlantic community. Russia
remains suspicious, and that's why it continues to keep its distance from missile defense and from NATO. It's safe to say
this is an issue that provokes great domestic controversy in Moscow. Even Medvedev, who may be more forward-leaning
on these issues, faces Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, the military, and a bureaucracy that still harbors resentment and
suspicion, particularly toward the NATO alliance. The Russian military has often talked about the European missile
defense, particularly when it was proposed in the Bush administration, as a possible cover for a first strike against Russia.
Right? Russian objections are primarily a function of paranoia and perception. That's to say, they're uncomfortable seeing
missile interceptors and radar systems deployed in central Europe, not far from their borders. It's a sign of how much Russia
has been cut out of European security. There is a degree of legitimacy in Russian objections, in as much as it is possible
that the radar deployed for the missile defense system could be used to look into Russia, and that the installations used for
the interceptors could be used for missiles that could be targeted against Russia. Those are some of the objections that the
Russians have voiced. But their real objections are much more about symbolism than concern about the impact of the
missile defense system on Russia's deterrent because, frankly, the size and scope of this system under consideration would
have no effect whatsoever on the integrity of Russia's deterrent.
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Ground Defense Bad—Relations
GBI causes backlash in relations
Defense Industry Daily April
17 2011 “BMD, in from
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/Land-Based-SM-3s-for-Israel-04986/
the
Sea:
SM-3
Missiles
Going
Ashore”
Land-based deployment of SM-3 missiles was seen as a political move, and that is partly true. The proposed GBI missile was so
powerful that it could be fitted with a nuclear warhead, and become a serviceable MRBM itself. That made Russia very uneasy. Then,
too, a massive investment in fixed site deployments, in countries that could cave in to pressure and ask to have them removed, was
both politically and financially problematic.
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Ground Based Defense Bad
Ground defense bad – multiple warrants
Bill Sweetman has authored over 30 books on military aircraft, and now edits Defense Technology International, a monthly
magazine put out by Aviation Week. Few journalists today know more about tactical aircraft. Dec 7, 2009 “No Easy Answers To
Missile Defense” Aviation Week
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/MISDEF120709.xml&headline=No%20Easy
%20Answers%20To%20Missile%20Defense
The U.S. has changed course rapidly on missile defense in recent months. First was the shift in emphasis from mid-course
defeat to “early intercept” and from heavy ground-based interceptors (GBIs) to sea-based and land-based versions of the
U.S. Navy/Raytheon SM-3. Nobody was surprised when this was followed in September by the scrapping of plans to install
Boeing’s GBIs in Poland and announcement of a phased adaptive approach (PAA) based on SM-3. The changes have
proven too fast for NATO allies to follow, leaving some observers wondering whether the U.S. administration is sensitive
to allied concerns. A late-October conference in Warsaw, organized by Defense IQ, underlined the complexity of the
picture. For example, in three days of the U.S. missile defense conference in Huntsville, Ala., last summer, the term
“consequences of intercept” was never mentioned. No so in Warsaw. Quite simply, observes David Sparks, group lead for
missile defense in NATO’s Command, Control and Communications Agency, “you may hit the missile over a country
that’s not targeted, and the interceptor booster will fall many hundreds of kilometers from the launch site.” Even a
successful intercept “could result in a shower of dead or live submunitions.” While it is popular in U.S. circles to argue that
the “consequences of non-interception” are far worse, it is questionable whether the Balkans would be happy about taking a
hit for Germany, let alone a U.S. base. The speed of a missile defense engagement leaves no option but to delegate launch
authority to a commander on the scene, whether virtually or in reality. “Will that commander be American or European, is
he in the U.S. or in Europe? If there’s one subject that creates more discussion than the consequences of interception, it’s
this,” Sparks told the conference. Again, that topic was never addressed in Huntsville. The PAA is in four phases,
determined by a new assessment of the threat (principally from Iran) that downplays the imminence of long-range missile
development. Phase 1 in 2011 will derive from the current sea-based SM-3 Block 1A, with “engage-on-remote” guidance
from TPY-2 radar. Land-based SM-3 Block 1B missiles (with a new kill vehicle) will be added in Phase 2 in 2015 to
expand the defended area, along with new sensors, possibly airborne infrared devices. The big-booster Block IIA SM-3
arrives in Phase 3 in 2018, followed two years later by the Block IIB, a further development—possibly spawned from the
U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s classified budget—which has some capability against intercontinental missiles. One
question is how these phases mesh with European NATO plans. NATO is following a three-track approach to missile
defense: continued assessment of the U.S. PAA, exploration of cooperation with Russia and NATO’s Active Layered
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, which is aimed at protecting deployed forces from weapons up to
3,000 km. (1,865 mi.) in range. ALTBMD is envisioned mainly as a C2 system connecting weapons and sensors, says
Jacek Bylica, head of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Center in NATO’s secretariat, but “it could be the hub for the next
NATO territorial ballistic missile defense system.” This could bring together many assets, including Aster and SAMP/T
missiles, SM-3s from European Aegis ships and sensors, including a new 2,000-km.-range radar under development by
Thales Nederland. In a test scheduled for late November, a simulation of the new radar—designed as a drop-in replacement
for the widely used Smart-L—was to take place in joint intercepts off Crete, using Greek and German Patriot missiles, with
Greek F-16s being directed to attack launch sites. It seems likely that the U.S. will expect European navies to join the PAA
program—Spain and Norway have Aegis ships, the Netherlands’ four latest frigates will carry SM-3s, and it is unlikely that
the U.S. Navy will be enthused about filling a permanent duty station in the eastern Mediterranean or the Black Sea. So,
Bylica wonders, “is the U.S. seeking a U.S. system with NATO assets, or a NATO system with U.S. assets?” Neither will
political issues go away with PAA. A land-based radar—which the Russians disliked because of its potential to provide
improved coverage of their own missile fields—is still part of Phase 1, and subsequent phases will include land-based
missiles. “Even if they’re relocatable,” Bylica notes, “they have to be somewhere.” A meeting of NATO foreign ministers
this month is expected to work on these problems.
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***A2 Treaty CPs***
Treaty is massively unpopular
Jinyuan Su “The “peaceful purposes” principle in outer space and the Russiae China PPWT Proposal” Space Policy (peer reviewed
journal) 2010 http://www.macalester.edu/internationalstudies/Su%202010.pdfx
Meanwhile, the PPWT does not prohibit ballistic missiles which, by temporarily flying through outer space before returning to the
atmosphere, do not qualify as being “placed” in outer space.58 Neither are terrestrial-based missile defense-related weapons
constrained or limited in terms of research, development, testing, production, storage, deployment or operations.59
The USA takes the PPWT as contrary to its policy that consis- tently opposes arms control concepts, proposals and legal regimes that
seek prohibitions on military or intelligence uses of space, and that fail to preserve the rights of the USA to conduct research,
development, testing, and operation in space for military, intelli- gence, civil, or commercial purposes.60 Ambassador Rocca defends
this by arguing that many understandings of US space policy are inaccurate. She has said that “[President Bush's] space policy does
not advocate, nor direct the development or deployment of weapons in space”, “the policy is not about establishing a US monopoly of
space”, and “there is a significant emphasis on inter- national cooperation”.61 Although the USA has not specified any weaponization
plan, it does not want to have the door to space weaponization closed just as it, and the USSR, did not want to have that of
militarization closed 40 years ago.
Treaty embroilment crushes federal legitimacy
Curtis W. Caine No Date Given, Dr. Caine is an anesthesiologist in Jackson, Mississippi, and a member of the Editorial Board of
the Medical Sentinel. MD “Treaties” http://www.haciendapub.com/article4.html
All civil magistrates are bound by oath to abide by the U.S. Constitution, and nowhere in the U.S. Constitution is any authority given
for these United States to be subject to and bound by any earthly piece of paper that abrogates or is alien to the Constitution of the
United States. As a matter of fact, Article VI, paragraph 2, the latter half of which is quoted at the outset above, in its first half, says
only three (3) pronouncements are "the supreme Law of the Land": (1) "THIS [the U.S.] Constitution," (2) "the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof" (i.e., as permitted by, in conformity with, and to implement this Constitution), and
(3) "all treaties made....under the Authority of the United States" ("under" designates that treaties are not over, not above, and not even
equal to the authority of the United States granted to it by the States via the U.S. Constitution - but remain under, inferior to its
jurisdiction). A treaty may not do or exceed what the Congress is charged to do or what it is forbidden to do. Constitutional authority
supersedes, overrules, and precludes any contrary treaty authority. Thus, if a proposed treaty would violate any provision of the
Constitution, it may not even be seriously considered or debated, much less be ratified and implemented because the same restrictions
that were placed by the Constitution on the U.S. Federal government are also imposed on any treaty provision. Treaty embroilment is
so dangerous and so important, that to further limit and restrict their making, Article II, Section 2, Paragraph 2 orders that the
President: "...shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur; [Emphasis added.]" This provision accomplishes two things: 1) it prohibits the President alone to commit the
United States to an agreement with other nations (the Senate must advise, consent, concur, and ratify). And 2), why is the Senate
singled out, and not the House of Representatives, or both Houses? Because the Senate is the branch of the Congress whose Senators'
constituencies are not "my people back home," but "my State government back home."(1) Before the destabilizing Seventeenth
Amendment was deceptively promoted and irrationally ratified in 1913, each State Legislature appointed its Senators. A Senator is
sent to Washington to uphold, defend, represent, and guard the retained rights, jurisdiction, and interests of his individual State. If a
proposed treaty would adversely effect the States, their Senators are to protect their respective States by not consenting/ratifying.
Treaties are potentially so threatening to the sovereignty of the individual States and the Union of These States that two thirds of the
Senators are required to be convinced that the treaty under consideration does not contravene the U.S. Constitution and/or adversely
impact on the retained functions and interests of the States before they consent/ratify. In 1789, the States directly ratified the
Constitution --- as per Article VII. Since then, the States through their representatives (their Senators) must also ratify any treaty --Article II, Section 2, paragraph 2 --- for the same reason, namely, that the creators (the States) must have the final say. There is a
pecking order: God made People, People made States, States made the Union. Therefore, the Union is beholden to the States, the
States are beholden to the People, and all three are beholden to God. Further, Article VI, paragraph 2 quoted above commands that if
and when all of the above requirements for a treaty are met --- that is, a) it does not contradict the Constitution; b) it is negotiated by
the President who has sworn to not violate, and who in fact is not violating the Constitution; and
CARD
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c) it is ratified by two thirds of the State-defending-Senators who have sworn to not violate, and who do not by their vote violate the
Constitution --- then, and only then, may the treaty in question go into full force and effect for the Union and for all of the individual
States in the Union. This latter consequence is the reason for Article VI, paragraph 2 to conclude: "...and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the [not "this"] Constitution [ of any State] or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[Emphasis added.]" So, the Judges in each State must obey a bona fide treaty, even if the treaty is contrary to that state's Constitution
or contrary to any law of that state. Thus, a properly/legally concluded U.S. treaty overrules any STATE law and any STATE
Constitution, but a properly/legally framed U.S. treaty does not, may not, can not, and is forbidden to overrule the U.S. Constitution or
abrogate the Sovereignty of the United States. If it does, it is not bona fide. It is a usurpation. It is not "under the Authority of the
United States" to make such a treaty. Ergo, treaties ("made, or which shall be made") that violate the U.S. Constitution by subjugating
the United States to an outside power ARE PROHIBITED, of no effect, and thus, null and void. For a Senator to violate his sworn
oath is perjury, a felony, an impeachable offense. Since treaties are compacts between/among " the powers of the earth" of "separate
and equal station" as stipulated in the Declaration of Independence, treaties may not be consummated with other than sovereign
nations. Consequently, for at least these two reasons --- 1) because the U.S. Senate in 1945 ratified the United Nations (UN) Charter as
a treaty and the UN is not a sovereign nation, and 2) because membership in the UN makes the U.S. inferior to the UN --- U.S.
"membership" in the United Nations is unconstitutional, FORBIDDEN, and thus declared null and void. Ditto for the World Court and
the nebulous entanglements of the New World Order. Thomas Jefferson was clear on this point: "If the treaty power is unlimited, then
we don't have a Constitution. Surely the President and the Senate cannot do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from
doing in any way." Alexander Hamilton agreed: "a treaty cannot be made which alters the Constitution of the country or which
infringes any express exceptions to the power of the Constitution of the United States."(2)
treaties are non-binder – so there are no enforcer – Kyoto is an example
Treaties fail – ABM proves
David M. Ackerman, Legislative Attorney American Law Division Updated December 31, 2002 “CRS Report for Congress”
Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty: Legal Considerations http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/3544.pdf
On December 13, 2001, President Bush exercised the right conferred by Article XV and announced the intention of the U.S. to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty. In diplomatic notes sent to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine, the State Department
described the reasons for withdrawal as follows: Since the Treaty entered into force in 1972, a number of state and non-state entities
have acquired or are actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. It is clear, and has recently been demonstrated, that
some of these entities are prepared to employ these weapons against the United States. Moreover, a number of states are developing
ballistic missiles, including long-range ballistic missiles, as a means of delivering weapons of mass destruction. These events pose a
direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and jeopardize its supreme interests. As a result, the United States has
concluded that it must develop, test, and deploy anti- ballistic missile systems for the defense of its national territory, of its forces
outside the United States, and of its friends and allies. Pursuant to Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States has decided that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Therefore, in the exercise of the
right to withdraw from the Treaty provided in Article XV, paragraph 2, the United States hereby gives notice of its withdrawal from
the Treaty. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty, withdrawal will be effective six months from the date of this notice.5
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A2 WSP Treaty
They don't ban technology that's already been developed-- means countries that already have antisatellite tech still retain their power and our assets are still vulnerable
World Space Preservation Treaty
PERMANENT BAN ON BASING OF WEAPONS IN SPACE 1. Each State Party to this Treaty shall: (1) Implement a ban
on space-based weapons; and (2) Implement a ban on the use of weapons to destroy or damage objects in space that are in
orbit; and (3) Immediately order the permanent termination of research and development, testing, manufacturing, production,
and deployment of all space-based weapons of such State Party. 2. Each State Party to this Treaty shall immediately work
toward supporting other non-signatory State Parties in negotiating, signing, ratifying, and implementing this world agreement
banning space-based weapons. 3. The Secretary General of the United Nations shall submit to the General Assembly of the
United Nations within 90 days of the date that three (3) State Parties have signed this Treaty, and every 90 days thereafter, a
report on: (1) The implementation of the permanent ban on space-based weapons required by Section 1 of this Article I; and
(2) Progress toward negotiating, signing, ratifying, and implementing this Treaty as set out in Section 2 of this Article I. 4.
Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed to prohibit the following activities, provided such activities are not related to spacebased weapons: (1) Space exploration; (2) Space research and development; (3) Testing, manufacturing or deployment that is
not related to space-based weapons or systems; or (4) Civil, commercial, or defense activities (including communications,
navigation, surveillance, reconnaissance, early warning, or remote sensing) that are not related to space-based weapons or
systems.
The treaty doesn't ban ground based ASATs, just those in space
World Space Preservation Treaty
Article V As used in Article I, the terms: 1. "Space" or "Outer Space" includes all space extending upward from an altitude
greater that 60 kilometers above the surface of the earth, and includes any celestial body in Space. 2. "Weapon" means any
device capable of damaging or destroying an object or person by kinetic projectile, nuclear, conventional or other detonation,
chemical or biological agents, directed energy sources, electronic, electromagnetic, sonic, laser, psychotronic, gravity or zero
point energy, or as yet unacknowledged or undeveloped means, including exotic weapons systems. 3. "Exotic weapons"
systems include: electronic, psychotronic, or information weapons; chemtrails; high altitude extra low frequency weapons
systems; plasma, electromagnetic, sonic, or ultrasonic weapons; laser weapons systems; tactical, theatre, strategic or
extraterrestrial weapons systems; chemical, biological, environmental, climate or tectonic weapons; weapons systems which
inflict damage by misusing natural and space ecosystems, including the upper atmosphere and ionosphere, climate, weather,
and tectonic systems. 4. "Space-based weapon" and "weapon system" means any tactical, theatre or strategic weapon, weapon
system or component that is based in space, on the moon, on the planets or on any celestial body, or on any object in space. 5.
"Object" means any manufactured object, whether land, sea, air, or spaced-based. 6. "Person" means any person, whether
land, sea, air, or spaced-based. 7. "Development" means that phase in the evolution of a weapon system or component of a
weapon system that is beyond basic research, including the acquisition of materials and services, or the building of any
subcomponents of the system necessary to conduct research and development, testing, experiments, or deployment outside a
laboratory, even if such activities are not capable of damaging or destroying the class of targets against which the weapon
system is designed to be used. 8. "Unacknowledged" means an organization, entity, program, or weapon system that is
covertly planned, funded, developed, administered or implemented for the beneficial interest of any State or other organized
entity using fraud, secrecy, false cover, subterfuge, compartmentalization, and any other means of deception.
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A2 PSI treaty
PSI ineffective-- legal problems and limited capabilities
Prosser and Scoville 04 (Andrew, Herbert, Jr., Peace Fellow, 6/16/04, "The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective,"
Center for Defense Information)
Participant countries of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.-led effort to stem the illicit trafficking of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems, met on the first anniversary of the initiative, from May 31 to June 1 in
Krakow, Poland. Russia announced on the first day of the meeting its decision to participate in the PSI, a move that U.S.
officials had supported as an important step in augmenting the effectiveness of the initiative. However, Russia’s
participation will only occur, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, as long as PSI activities do not violate national or
international law.1 Russian officials have similarly expressed concerns that the PSI’s land, sea, and air-based WMD
interdiction activities could endanger international commerce, and give unwarranted powers to the U.S. Navy to act as a
global police force.2 Russia’s reservations are symptomatic of a much larger set of apprehensions and uncertainties that
have rightfully stirred doubts that the PSI will indeed contribute to nonproliferation goals without undermining
international peace and cooperation. Fundamental legal, operational, and budgetary questions remain unanswered regarding
the PSI, damaging its prospects for international support and effectiveness. PSI states remain secretive about the methods
being employed and the number of actual interdictions being carried out. Under such conditions, it has been difficult to
evaluate the success of the endeavor. The PSI will not help curtail the spread of WMD or related technologies and delivery
systems if it is made the centerpiece of international strategy to counteract proliferation. As an informal “non-organization”
acting upon partial intelligence with limited national resources, and with no independent budget or coordinating
mechanism, the PSI’s capabilities are significantly constrained. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton envisioned in
Krakow on May 31 that the PSI would evolve to the point where it “will have shut down the ability of persons, companies,
or other entities to engage in this deadly trade.”3 Such high expectations are unrealistic, and could undercut potential
attention to other essential nonproliferation measures.
PSI can't stop WMD transport
Prosser and Scoville 04 (Andrew, Herbert, Jr., Peace Fellow, 6/16/04, "The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective,"
Center for Defense Information)
In short, where a suspected WMD cargo is transported under the flag of a foreign state that does not wish to grant PSI
member countries permission to board its ship, PSI participants will usually not have the authority to act. Similar legal
obstacles exist for airborne cargo and shipments traveling through another state’s land territory, which is in violable as a
matter of state sovereignty, a principle enshrined in customary law and in the UN Charter. China’s opposition to the PSI
represents a glaring weakness of the PSI in this respect. It can be assumed that states or non-state actors wishing to
circumvent any possible interdiction efforts would be clever enough to utilize transport routes to smuggle WMD through
the territory of countries not likely to cooperate with PSI interdiction efforts. As the law stands at present, states not bound
by an international treaty prohibiting the transfer of WMD technologies – including the PSI’s ostensible main target, the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)30 – are permitted to transport mass destruction weapons cargoes.31 Even
more controversial would be any attempts to intercept missile shipments, the transfer of which is not subject to any formal
international treaty prohibition.
No deterrence-- proliferators pass PSI gaps
Prosser and Scoville 04 (Andrew, Herbert, Jr., Peace Fellow, 6/16/04, "The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective,"
Center for Defense Information)
The prospect of the PSI deterring WMD traffickers from carrying out illicit transfers is an unlikely one, especially where
terrorists would seek to smuggle these weapons. Instead, it would appear more likely that states and non-state proliferators
would simply innovate new methods and patterns of operation to exploit the manifold legal gaps which restrict the PSI’s
reach. Such prospects lend themselves to the need for sensible augmentation of current national and international legal
frameworks to criminalize WMD trafficking and enhancement of law enforcement capabilities.
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PSI ineffective-- no global support
Prosser and Scoville 04 (Andrew, Herbert, Jr., Peace Fellow, 6/16/04, "The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective,"
Center for Defense Information)
Reservations about the PSI’s potential to curb the illicit WMD trade are due, in no small part, to the fact that the PSI
strategy requires global participation to achieve full effectiveness, whereas the PSI maintains a less-than-universal
membership. Without active worldwide support, the PSI will find it difficult to achieve the effects to which Bolton has
alluded. Currently, even a critical shipping “choke point” as the Malacca Strait, through which a considerable percentage of
the world’s sea-based cargo passes each year, remains inaccessible to PSI operations due to Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s
opposition to the initiative. Meanwhile, the naval forces of the latter region, which is known to be rife with piracy and a
hotbed of terrorist activity, lack the capability to monitor and patrol even those extensive Southeast Asian coastal waters
adjacent to the strait. An organization, that has shown an interest in WMD capabilities (such as al Qaeda), can be expected
to employ methods of transport that have a low likelihood of being thwarted. Rather than being deterred by the threat of
interdiction, terrorist operatives could simply pursue alternative transport routes that are essentially out of reach to the PSI.
The South Caucasus is a particular region of concern, where borders are porous, and law enforcement is notoriously
ineffective and corrupt at times. Smuggling routes traditionally used to smuggle conventional arms, drugs and humans,
flow from Russia into the Caucasus, and then on to Iran, or to Turkey and then into Europe by way of the Balkans.35 These
routes should be expected to be targeted as easy thoroughfares for unconventional weapons smuggling as well.36
Furthermore, if traffickers were to view the seas or land routes as a PSI interdiction risk, then WMD transfers could be
conducted by airplane. In much of Africa, air traffic monitoring is poor to nonexistent; a situation that is frequently
exploited by conventional arms traffickers.37
PSI fails-- no legitimate assessment
Prosser and Scoville 04 (Andrew, Herbert, Jr., Peace Fellow, 6/16/04, "The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective,"
Center for Defense Information)
As it stands now, the PSI will have trouble both convincing outsiders to support its activities and soliciting the cooperation
of even its own participant countries. Part of this difficulty can be attributed to the PSI’s secretive nature, which arouses
suspicion of its intentions, and makes problematic any assessment of the degree to which the initiative is achieving its goals
while abiding by international standards of conduct. But questions about PSI legitimacy and effectiveness may also be
blamed upon the inexistence of a PSI coordinating mechanism to agree a common list of specific items or circumstances
warranting participant action. Put simply, PSI effectiveness in any given situation depends upon each participant country’s
position regarding the relative threat posed by a specific illicit transfer. However, as Michael Beck, executive director of the
Center for International Trade and Security, writes, “[N]o countries are known to be exporting ready-made WMD. The
problem is the export of components, technologies, and production materials associated with WMD – items which are far
more elusive because they have civilian as well as military end-uses and their trade is not illegal ... 95 percent of the
ingredients for WMD are dual-use in nature, having both civilian and WMD applications.”38 In this context, participants
may find it difficult to make legitimate claims about the danger posed by specific cases of NBC trafficking, as such risk
assessments will often be subjective, politically influenced decisions, centered around the question of whether a dual-use
technology will be put to peaceful uses, as claimed, or will be used in a weapon.
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No verification methods means miscalc, arms race, and lack of enforcement
Bruneau and Lofquist-Morgan 06 (Richard A., Scott G., March 2006, " VERIFICATION MODELS FOR SPACE
WEAPONS TREATIES: A FLEXIBLE, LAYERED APPROACH AS A NEGOTIATING TOOL," Published in Building the
Architecture for Sustainable Space Security—Conference Report, 30–31, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
(UNIDIR))
The purpose of verification is to increase confidence in the implementation of a treaty. An effective verification system
reliably detects non-compliance and allows abiding states to credibly demonstrate their compliance. It can also deter noncompliance, depending on the strength of enforcement measures within the treaty. Verification is necessary for an effective
treaty in that it provides an objective trigger for enforcement measures and legitimizes those measures when they are
implemented. In the context of space security, official multilateral treaty verification is necessary for three further reasons.
The first is the hazardous nature of the space environment. There are natural and man-made threats to satellites and spacecraft
that can cause temporary or permanent damage, including solar radiation and orbital debris. Without a verification system it
is difficult to credibly distinguish between natural causes of satellite failure and the effects of weapons use. The second
reason emerges from dual-use problems of space verification technology: unilateral monitoring activities by individual states
may be interpreted as offensive in nature and potentially provoke a protection-negation arms race. For example, a
closeproximity fly-by to inspect a satellite could easily be interpreted as an interception attempt or surveillance for military
advantage. The only way to engage in such sensitive activities in a non-provocative manner is to do so multilaterally. And
third, there are many dozens of state and commercial actors with space assets, yet current capabilities for knowing what is
happening in space are limited to only a handful of states. This means that verification of any allegations of illicit space
weapon deployment or use is at the moment dependent upon the national technical means (NTM) of a select few.
Space tech is inherently dual use-- can't stop space weaponization
Hsu 10 (Jeremy, 5/5/10, " Is a New Space Weapon Race Heating Up?" http://www.space.com/8342-space-weapon-raceheating.html)
Some space technology demonstrations are more obviously space weapons, such as the anti-satellite missile capabilities
tested by the U.S. and China in recent years. India has also begun developing its own anti-satellite program which would
combine lasers and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle, as announced at the beginning of 2010. The U.S. military and others
have also long developed and deployed more neutral space assets such as rockets and satellites for military purposes. In that
sense, both the Air Force's X-37B robotic space plane and the HTV-2 hypersonic glider prototype of the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) could represent similarly ambiguous technologies which may or may not lead to
weapons. "Space has been militarized since before NASA was even created," said Joan Johnson-Freese, a space policy
analyst at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. Yet she sees weaponization as a different issue from militarization because
"so much space technology is dual use" in terms of having both civilian and military purposes, as well as offensive or
defensive use. Such uncertainty regarding space technology can make it tricky for nations to gauge the purpose or intentions
behind new prototypes, including the X-37B space plane or the HTV-2 hypersonic glider. The U.S. military could even be
using the cloak of mystery to deliberately bamboozle and confuse rival militaries, according to John Pike, a military and
security analyst who runs GlobalSecurity.org. He suggested that the X-37B and HTV-2 projects could represent the tip of a
space weapons program hidden within the Pentagon's secret "black budget," or they might be nothing more than smoke and
mirrors. The devil is in the details Many existing space technologies play dual roles in both military and civilian life. The
Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) system which started out as military-only has since become common in consumer
smartphones and car navigation systems. Modern rocketry grew in part from the technology and scientific minds behind Nazi
Germany's V-2 rockets of World War II, and continued to evolve alongside ballistic missile technology. Even something as
basic as a satellite image can be used for either military weapons targeting or civilian crop rotation, Johnson-Freese said.
Space plane technology can seem equally ambiguous ? the Air Force deputy undersecretary of space programs scoffed at the
notion of X-37B paving the way for future space weapons. "The whole issue is further complicated because beyond
technologies like lasers, Rods from God, explosives, etc.... virtually any object traveling in space can be a weapon if it can be
maneuvered to run into another object," Johnson-Freese told SPACE.com. Uncertainty matters a great deal for how other
nations view the recent U.S. space plane and hypersonic glider tests, regardless of whether or not the technologies lead to
future weapons. "They are testing capabilities that could certainly be useful to the military if it chose to use them in an
offensive manner," Johnson-Freese said. "And the military has been silent on intent." Intrigue and deception Pike said the
current work under way by the U.S. military leaves plenty of room for misinterpretations or even outright deception, which
could be a ploy to distract other nations with military space projects.
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AT: Heg sustainable
Military dominance is key to heg
Kagan and Kristol 2001 (Robert and William, The Weekly Standard, Lexis)
So call it a two-war standard or call it a banana: To preserve our superpower status, to remain the guarantor of international
peace and stability, and to defend our own vital interests, the United States must be able to fight and defeat different
aggressors in different parts of the world -- and at the same time. For a "one-war" strategy is really a "no-war" strategy. An
American president will be reluctant to commit forces in one part of the world if he knows that by doing so he leaves the
United States and its allies defenseless against aggression in another. Is it so far-fetched to imagine that a Saddam Hussein,
seeing the United States throw its entire force into some conflict in East Asia, might choose that moment to launch a new
aggression in the Middle East? As the Clinton Pentagon's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review stated: "If the United States
were to forgo its ability to defeat aggression in more than one theater at a time, our standing as a global power, as the security
partner of choice, and [as] the leader of the international community would be called into question. Indeed, some allies would
undoubtedly read a one-war capability as a signal that the United States, if heavily engaged elsewhere, would no longer be
able to defend their interests."
Military readiness is critical to deter a global power rival
Khalilzad 95 (, policy analyst at Rand and Afghanistan specialist for CSIS, 1995, Zalmay, The Washington Quarterly, Lexis)
A global rival to the United States could emerge for several reasons. Because the main deterrent to the rise of another global
rival is the military power of the United States, an inadequate level of U.S. military capability could facilitate such an event.
This capability should be measured not only in terms of the strength of other countries, but also in terms of the U.S. ability to
carry out the strategy outlined here. U.S. tradition makes the prospect of defense cuts below this level a serious possibility:
historically, the United States has made this error on several occasions by downsizing excessively. It faces the same danger
again for the longer term. To discourage the rise of another global rival or to be in a strong position to deal with the problem
should one arise, focusing U.S. military planning for the future on Korea and the Persian Gulf, plus increased ability for LRC
operations, is inadequate. Over time, although the threat from North Korea will probably disappear, other larger threats could
emerge. As an alternative, the United States should consider moving toward sizing its forces largely by adopting the
requirement that they be capable of simultaneously defeating the most plausible military challenges to critical U.S. interests
that might be created by the two next most powerful military forces in the world that are not allied with the United States.
Such a force should allow the United States to protect its interests in Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf. Such a force-sizing
principle does not mean that U.S. forces have to be numerically as large as the combined forces of these two powers. It
means that they should be capable of defeating them given relatively specific near simultaneous scenarios of great importance
to the United States -- a Gulf and Asia scenario; a Europe and Asia scenario; or Asian and Gulf scenarios nearly
simultaneously. Such an approach would give the United States a flexible global capability for substantial operations.
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AT: No Iran Strike
Iran strikes first: blames US and Israel for internal dissent
Tinnerman 05 (Kenneth R., " The Day after Iran Gets the Bomb," " GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN,"
Edited by Henry Sokolski Patrick Clawson October 2005)
Conclusion 4: The Regime’s Core Values will Drive It Ineluctably toward Aggressive Military Action, Not
Responsibility. Until recently, U.S. policy toward Iran has been driven by two underlying assumptions. The first
assumption was that there were “moderates” within the ruling elite who sincerely wanted to cooperate with the United
States, and who had serious differences with hard-liners in areas of critical U.S. interest 14 . The second was that the
United States could offer them sufficient incentives (or inflict enough pain on the hard-liners) to convince the clerics to
change those policies the United States found objectionable: in this case, to freeze and ultimately abandon nuclear
weapons development. For nearly 2 decades, these assumptions have rarely been debated, let alone challenged, except
by a select group of analysts. But as I have argued elsewhere, 15 the drive to obtain nuclear weapons and a broad
spectrum of WMD capabilities is only one of five goals that unite the ruling clerical elite. These are the core values that
form the bedrock of this regime, and will shape the actions of a nuclear-ready Iran. The remaining four are: 1.
Maintaining the Islamic Republic at all costs, starting with the system of Velayat-e faghih (absolute clerical rule). Iran’s
ruling clerics understand that their regime is increasingly unpopular at home. In July 1999, students at universities
across the country revolted. While the regime has managed through heavy-handed repression to break the back of
organized opposition, the signs that trouble is brewing just beneath the surface are many. On the eve of the February
2004 parliamentary elections, 117 reformist members of Parliament resigned en masse to protest having been barred
from running. The reformers had been seeking a “kinder, gentler” Islamic Republic, not an end to absolute clerical rule.
The resulting election sweep by hard-liners effectively marked the end of the reform movement mirage. Iranian voters
massively boycotted the elections but as of yet have not managed to otherwise challenge the regime, which has emerged
emboldened from the election crisis. At the same time, regime leaders fear foreign support for the prodemocracy
movement, and increasingly view the proliferation of satellite radio and television broadcasts into Iran from abroad with
alarm. As the United States contemplates providing support for the pro-democracy movement, we must understand that
Iran’s new nuclear capabilities increase the stakes. A nuclear-ready Iran will not stop at violently suppressing domestic
dissent, but will actively seek ways of lashing out at what it sees as the sources of that dissent: the United States and
Israel. Similarly, any outbreak of dissent inside Iran, whether fueled by outside forces or not, will be blamed on the
United States and Israel. 2. Aggressive expansion of Iran’s influence in the Persian Gulf region to become the
predominant power, militarily, politically, and eventually economically. The Islamic Republic has a long history of
using terror and subversion against neighboring states to achieve its goals. With a real or virtual nuclear arsenal at its
disposal, Iran’s leaders may be emboldened to take more aggressive steps to assert its pre-eminence and to weaken
competitors.
Iran will first strike: political factions, nuclear weapons prove
Eisenstadt 05 (Michael, " The Day after Iran Gets the Bomb," " GETTING READY FOR A NUCLEAR-READY IRAN," Edited
by Henry Sokolski Patrick Clawson October 2005)
Political Factionalism. Political factionalism has sometimes led to dramatic zig-zags in Iranian policy, as different
personalities, factions or branches of the government worked at cross purposes, sought to subvert their rivals, or pressed
the government to take actions inconsistent with its general policy line. Accordingly, Iranian policy has often been
inconsistent and unpredictable. Such behavior would seriously complicate efforts to establish a stable deterrent
relationship with a nuclear Iran. Recent examples of this tendency can be seen in Iranian policy toward Afghanistan and
Iraq. According to U.S. officials, while Iranian diplomats played a constructive role at the Bonn Conference in
December 2001 and the subsequent creation of an Afghan Interim Authority, members of the Revolutionary Guard
Qods Force were working to undermine the authority of the nascent central government by arming and training the
Afghan Shiite Sepah-e-Mohammad militia and cultivating the warlord Ismail Khan in Herat. 12 Likewise, in the wake
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Iranian government apparently encouraged Shi‘i parties such as the Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq to cooperate with coalition forces and to participate in the U.S.-backed Iraq
government, while supporting and arming groups engaged in attacks on Iraqi and coalition forces. This tendency has
CARD CONTINUES
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even expressed itself in the economic domain. Revolutionary Guards shut down a new Tehran airport operated by a
Turkish-Austrian consortium only one day after it opened in May 2004—claiming that the Turkish firm did business in
Israel (a charge it denied). In September 2004, the Majlis froze a $2.5 billion deal with a Turkish consortium to create a
privately-owned cell phone network, only days after the contract was signed. Finally, a $390 million deal with the
French company Renault to build cars in Iran came under attack by critical legislators in October 2004, though the
Majlis has not blocked this contract. This ongoing struggle between advocates and opponents of foreign investment in
Iran—part of the broader political struggle among factions of the dominant conservative bloc—is likely to continue. 14
Propensity for Risk-Taking. There are two schools of thought regarding how nuclear weapons affect the behavior of
states. One argues that the acquisition of nuclear weapons induces greater prudence and caution among possessor states,
and adduces U.S. and Soviet behavior during the Cold War as proof. However, post-Cold War revelations about the
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and other Cold War crises have shown how close the superpowers came to nuclear war on
several occasions, thereby diminishing the appeal of this model. The other school of thought argues that the acquisition
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in general and nuclear weapons in particular can lead to an increased
propensity for risk-taking. Iraq’s maturing chemical and biological weapons programs may have emboldened Saddam
Hussein to pursue a more aggressive regional policy in 1989-90, and ultimately to invade Kuwait. Similarly, the
confidence that Pakistan’s leadership drew from its May 1998 nuclear weapons test may have emboldened it to attempt
to seize a portion of Kashmir from India, in the mistaken belief that India would be deterred from responding militarily,
leading to the Kargil Crisis of May-July 1999. Thus, Iranian decisionmakers might convince themselves that the
possession of nuclear weapons could provide them with greater latitude to pursue more aggressive policies against their
neighbors, the United States, or Israel. Iran is unlikely to engage in outright military aggression against any of its
neighbors; its conventional military forces are weak, and there are few scenarios in which a conventional military move
would make sense—at least under current conditions (although a civil war in Iraq might generate pressure for Iran to
intervene, particularly if coalition forces were to leave Iraq). For now, however, surrounded by potential enemies and
U.S. forces on all sides, Tehran seems more interested in preserving the political and territorial status quo in the Gulf,
than in altering it. A nuclear Iran might, however, increase support for antiAmerican or anti-Israeli terrorist groups, or
be tempted to resume efforts to export the revolution to places where there are large Shi‘i communities. Iran’s past
successes in obscuring its involvement in terrorism or avoiding retribution (e.g., the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks
bombing, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing), might lead some Iranian decisionmakers to believe that they could
encourage or sponsor terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel or interests with impunity—and that their possession of “the
bomb” would protect them from retaliation. Such reasoning could lead to miscalculations and imprudent risk-taking.
Such a scenario is not far-fetched: an attack by Pakistani-based extremists on the Indian Parliament in December 2001
sparked a prolonged crisis and nearly led to war between the two countries.
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A2 PPWT CP
1. Not verifiable or equitable
Stout 11 (Mark, researcher and analyst at Air University’s National Space Studies Center, 4/16/11, “You can’t get blood from a
satellite”, http://spacewonk.com/you-cant-get-blood-from-a-satellite.php)
A proposed space weapons ban, 2008’s Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat
of Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (that’s really its name but because that would create an unwieldy and
unpronounceable acronym, it’s referred to as the PPWT) has been hailed by some of the leading voices in the arms control
community. While it’s been described as a “welcome step toward the non-weaponization of space” which fills a “normative
void in the current space security treaty regime,” the reality is the PPWT is wholly inconsistent with the National Space
Policy in three ways: it isn’t verifiable, it isn’t equitable, and it isn’t in the best interest of the United States or its allies. Why
isn’t the PPWT verifiable? That’s because the PPWT’s Article VI calls for ‘transparency and confidence-building measures’
which are to be practiced on a voluntary basis. First, it’s perhaps a self-evident disconnect that if you’re going to do
something on a voluntary basis, there’s little purpose served in having a treaty to direct you to do the very thing you’ve
already agreed to do. Next, these sort of vague arms control provisions have been well-characterized as ‘dangerously empty’
and ‘too imprecise to be tested.’ The result of this sort of unverifiable language makes it exceedingly difficult to reach
conclusions about arms control violations. This means violators are free to pursue their miscreant behavior effectively
unimpeded. Why isn’t the PPWT equitable? The PPWT’s Article I says a weapon in outer space is anything that’s designed
to eliminate, damage, or disrupt the normal function of objects in outer space. Since North Korean and Iranian ICBMs will
function in (that is, fly through) outer space, the PPWT would prohibit space-based missile defense. The PPWT, as with
much arms control, tries to make us all equal by making us all equally vulnerable rather than allowing us to move towards
assured survivability. For these reasons (along with its unlimited duration which might constrain space-using technological
breakthroughs in other significant and yet wholly unknown ways), the PPWT is not in the best interest of the United States or
its allies. Consider the fact there are no known or claimed space weapons today, and the conclusion that can be drawn is this:
there is no arms race in outer space. As such, there’s no problem for the PPWT or its intellectual heirs to “solve.” Even the
asserted significance of keeping space a “weapons-free” environment is itself unproven. How so? Well, let’s slide all the
way down the slippery slope and ponder the significance of arms control to make the seas, land, and airspace weapons-free as
well. Instead of viewing space as a museum or sanctuary, it should instead be held to be a traditional operating environment
like land, sea, and air, which are all largely used to provide resources for mankind and to make people’s lives better, to
include increasing their security. Agreeing to the PPWT (or agreeing to follow many of the principles therein), is to self-limit
a possible U.S. space future that does not need to be ceded away. Honoring the PPWT might well prevent prudent future
space investments that could provide huge national security benefits but would be blocked under the guise of arms control.
2. Treaty will allow PRC to aggressively exploit space
Listner 11 (Michael, 4/25/11, "An exercise in the Art of War: China’s National Defense white paper, outer space, and the
PPWT," The Space Review, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1828/1)
The combined open source material and information gleaned from official diplomatic communications suggest the PRC
is following a two-pronged approach to address outer space security. The first prong of the PRC’s strategy is to
publically denounce the weaponization of outer space and advocate the international community to enter into formal
treaties banning space weapons as defined by the PRC thereby leaving the outer space systems belonging to its potential
adversaries open to exploitation. The second prong of the PRC’s strategy is to continue to pursue the development and
deployment of infrastructure both to deny an adversary the use of outer space while establishing an advantage in outer
space.15 Given this, the PRC’s white paper concerning outer space could be a pretense to a more aggressive policy that
could be phrased—hypothetically—as follows: To promote and actively engage foreign space powers in negotiations
leading to legally binding international agreement(s) through the PPWT and its successors that would limit the defense
and use of their space assets in the case of conflict. The People’s Republic of China will pursue these agreements while
maintaining and improving its technical ability to defend its outer space assets and deny foreign space powers the access
and use of outer space.16 If this reflects the true face of the PRC’s policy, then its white paper position towards outer
space has more in common with the PRC’s perceptions of the greatly criticized National Space Policy authorized by the
Bush Administration, making the PRC’s true stance anything other than the peaceful intentions as its white paper extols.
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3. PPWT hurts heg
Listner 11 (Michael, analyst for the Examiner, 4/25/11, “An Exercise in the Art of War: China’s national defense white paper,
outer space, and the PPWT”, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1828/1)
The United States is in a unique position among the nations of the world regarding the development of and the reliance upon
its outer space systems. These systems not only provide national security functions, but also support the economy and civilian
sector as well. It is this reliance that makes those outer space systems particularly vulnerable. The PRC recognizes both this
reliance and vulnerability. A 2007 report to Congress from the State Department’s Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Division3 addressing the PRC’s January 11, 2007, ASAT test quoted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time,
General Peter Pace. At a March 7, 2007, news conference regarding the ASAT test, General Pace notes several comments
made by PRC military and foreign policy personnel concerning the threat of the United States’ outer-space systems to the
PRC’s national security: “Various comments by PLA officers and PRC civilian analysts have justified the ASAT test as
needed to counter perceived U.S. ‘hegemony’ in space and target the vulnerability of U.S. dependence on satellites.” “A PLA
Air Force colonel wrote in late 2006 that U.S. military power, including long-range strikes, have relied on superiority in
space and that leveraging space technology can allow a rising power to close the gap with advanced countries more rapidly
than trying to catch up.” “A PRC specialist at Fudan University indicated that China’s ASAT program is developed partly to
maintain China’s nuclear deterrence, perceived as undermined by U.S. space assets.” The PRC understands the advantage the
United States has with it space systems, and that they are critical to its military operations. The PRC also understands that the
best way to counter this advantage is to deny the United States the use of its space systems. These open-source statements are
not all-inclusive and raise the question of whether they actually reflect the true policy of the PRC. While it is difficult to rely
solely on open source literature and commentary from the PRC as a persuasive warning that United States’ outer space
systems are vulnerable, neither should they be idly be dismissed.
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AT: Black Budget
Black budget is not secret-- leaks, accidental disclosure
Patton 04 (Phil, "Exposing the Black Budget: The Cold War is over. So why, Paul McGinnis wanted to know, are major CIA, NSA,
and Department of Defense programs still being kept secret from Congress and US taxpayers?", Steve Aftergood is a senior research
analyst at the Federation of American Scientists, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/3.11/patton_pr.html)
Classification can be viewed as the information equivalent of the national debt. Information we put off releasing is like debt
we put off paying. Like the fiscal deficit, it costs a lot to service and maintain. Keeping things secret requires guards, vaults,
background checks. A General Accounting Office study placed the cost at $2.2 billion, but the office pointedly noted that
its calculations had been hampered by the refusal of the CIA to cooperate. Private industry spends an estimated $13 billion
more adhering to government security standards. There is evidence that the secrecy structure may collapse of its own
weight before anything is done to fix it. Says Steve Aftergood, "The more secrecy you have, the thinner your security
resources are spread, and there is a loss of respect for the system. That promotes leaks. It's hard to keep things secret. It's
work. People have to sit and read boring hearing records and black things out. It's easy to imagine they would miss stuff."
Aftergood believes that accidental disclosure has been growing. Part of the reason is incompetence, part is semi-official
policy. He wrote in the Bulletin that "'accidental' disclosure has the great advantage that it does not require anyone to
exercise leadership or to take responsibility. It has now become the preferred policy particularly since classification reform
is not working. If current trends are taken to the limit, everything may eventually be classified - but nothing will be secret."
Aftergood concludes the leaks are a sign of institutional decadence. "The government has found it easier to let the
classification system disintegrate than to establish new standards that command respect and loyalty," he writes.
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*** 2AC Ks**
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2AC - Cap K
Perm – Do both but don’t reject the state
Protesting outside of the state only serves to legitimize its authority – only the permutation solves
Zizek 2007 Slavoj, researcher at the Institute of Sociology @ Univ. of Ljubljana , Resistance is Surrender, London Review of
Books, 11/15 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v29/n22/zize01_.html
So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state,
leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he
were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’
one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in
confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The
ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it
(or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way?
Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, ‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to
account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to
better it or attenuate its malicious effect’? These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the
dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the
ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent
acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands,
the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open
dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles. The
big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of
this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were
satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on
Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made
decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his
visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against
their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’
Of course capitalism has its problems – however, it’s short-sighted to reject the free market without a
specific and viable solution
Norberg 3 Johan Norberg, Fellow at Timbro and CATO, MA with a focus in economics and philosophy, In Defense of Global
Capitalism, pg. 98
Capitalism is not a perfect system, and it is not good for everyone all the time. Critics of globalization are good at
pointing out individual harms—a factory that has closed down, a wage that has been reduced. Such things do happen, but
by concentrating solely on individual instances, one may miss the larger reality of how a political or economic
system generally works and what fantastic values it confers on the great majority compared with other alternatives.
Problems are found in every political and economic system, but rejecting all systems is not an option. Hunting down
negative examples of what can happen in a market economy is easy enough. By that method water or fire can be
proved to be bad things, because some people drown and some get burned to death, but this isn't the full picture. A
myopic focus on capitalism's imperfections ignores the freedom and independence that it confers on people who
have never experienced anything but oppression. It also disregards the calm and steady progress that is the basic rule of
a society with a market economy. There is nothing wrong with identifying problems and mishaps in a predominantly
successful system if one does so with the constructive intent of rectifying or alleviating them. But someone who
condemns the system as such is obligated to answer this question: What political and economic system could manage things
better? Never before in human history has prosperity grown so rapidly and poverty declined so heavily. Is there any
evidence, either in history or in the world around us, to suggest that another system could do as well?
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2ac cap 2/
Alternatives to Capitalism end in war and genocide
Rummel 4 Rudolph Rummel, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, The Killing
Machine that is Marxism, < http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41944>
Of all religions, secular and otherwise, that of Marxism has been by far the bloodiest – bloodier than the Catholic
Inquisition, the various Catholic crusades, and the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants. In practice,
Marxism has meant bloody terrorism, deadly purges, lethal prison camps and murderous forced labor, fatal deportations,
man-made famines, extrajudicial executions and fraudulent show trials, outright mass murder and genocide. In total,
Marxist regimes murdered nearly 110 million people from 1917 to 1987. For perspective on this incredible toll, note
that all domestic and foreign wars during the 20th century killed around 35 million. That is, when Marxists control
states, Marxism is more deadly then all the wars of the 20th century, including World Wars I and II, and the
Korean and Vietnam Wars. And what did Marxism, this greatest of human social experiments, achieve for its poor
citizens, at this most bloody cost in lives? Nothing positive. It left in its wake an economic, environmental, social and
cultural disaster. The Khmer Rouge – (Cambodian communists) who ruled Cambodia for four years – provide insight
into why Marxists believed it necessary and moral to massacre so many of their fellow humans. Their Marxism was
married to absolute power. They believed without a shred of doubt that they knew the truth, that they would bring
about the greatest human welfare and happiness, and that to realize this utopia, they had to mercilessly tear down
the old feudal or capitalist order and Buddhist culture, and then totally rebuild a communist society. Nothing could be
allowed to stand in the way of this achievement. Government – the Communist Party – was above any law. All other
institutions, religions, cultural norms, traditions and sentiments were expendable. The Marxists saw the construction of
this utopia as a war on poverty, exploitation, imperialism and inequality – and, as in a real war, noncombatants would
unfortunately get caught in the battle. There would be necessary enemy casualties: the clergy, bourgeoisie, capitalists,
"wreckers," intellectuals, counterrevolutionaries, rightists, tyrants, the rich and landlords. As in a war, millions might die,
but these deaths would be justified by the end, as in the defeat of Hitler in World War II. To the ruling Marxists, the goal of
a communist utopia was enough to justify all the deaths. The irony is that in practice, even after decades of total
control, Marxism did not improve the lot of the average person, but usually made living conditions worse than before
the revolution. It is not by chance that the world's greatest famines have happened within the Soviet Union (about 5
million dead from 1921-23 and 7 million from 1932-3, including 2 million outside Ukraine) and communist China (about
30 million dead from 1959-61). Overall, in the last century almost 55 million people died in various Marxist famines and
associated epidemics – a little over 10 million of them were intentionally starved to death, and the rest died as an
unintended result of Marxist collectivization and agricultural policies. What is astonishing is that this "currency" of
death by Marxism is not thousands or even hundreds of thousands, but millions of deaths. This is almost
incomprehensible – it is as though the whole population of the American New England and Middle Atlantic States, or
California and Texas, had been wiped out. And that around 35 million people escaped Marxist countries as refugees
was an unequaled vote against Marxist utopian pretensions. Its equivalent would be everyone fleeing California,
emptying it of all human beings. There is a supremely important lesson for human life and welfare to be learned from this
horrendous sacrifice to one ideology: No one can be trusted with unlimited power. The more power a government has to
impose the beliefs of an ideological or religious elite, or decree the whims of a dictator, the more likely human lives and
welfare will be sacrificed. As a government's power is more unrestrained, as its power reaches into all corners of
culture and society, the more likely it is to kill its own citizens.
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The alternative leads to militaristic violence
Robinson, PhD, School of Politics, and Tormey, Prof Politics and Critical Theory at U of Nottingham, 2003
(Andrew and Simon, What is Not to be Done! Everything you wanted to know about Lenin, and (sadly)
weren’t afraid to ask Zizek, http://homepage.ntlworld.com/simon.tormey/articles/Zizeklenin.pdf )
Zizek’s Lenin takes his place amongst the various elements in Zizek’s theory which operate as a conservative pull on the
possibility of a transformative politics. Basically, Zizek is telling left radicals to abandon the notion of the state - even an
authoritarian or totalitarian state - as a source of unwanted violence and oppression. Instead, he urges his readers to see the state as part of
the solution to, rather than the problem of, reorganising social life. The state is a useful ally because it is the instrument through which to
impose the Good Terror. Zizek denounces anti-statism as idealistic and hypocritical (RL 16, FA 171, DSST 271), and he attacks the anticapitalist movement for its lack of political centralisation (RL 20). He does not offer any alternative to the violence of the
existing state, or rather, the alternative he offers is (in his own phrase) a replacement of Bad with Worse. In Zizek’s world, to
misquote an anarchist slogan, ‘whoever you fight for, the state always wins’. Opponents of imperialist war and the arms trade, of
police racism and repression against demonstrators, will find no alternative in Zizek; while he may oppose the acts of existing
states, his own preferred institutions look remarkably similar. He offers no alternative to statist violence, only a new militarism, a
Good Terror and yet another Cheka. In this, he goes further even than Lenin, who in The State and Revolution committed himself, at
least on paper, to the eventual elimination of the state. Here is one absolute Zizek never suspends, the universal which remains operative
at the very heart of his own theory. In a memorable cartoon, Wildcat insists: ‘I don’t just want freedom from the capitalists. I also want
freedom from people fit to take over’ (ABC 24). This sums up what is wrong with Zizek’s position: for all his radical posturing, he
restores the same kind of oppressive logic which operates in the present social system. Granted, he wishes it to operate under
the banner of a new master-signifier, and to achieve such a displacement there needs to be a revolution. However, his entire project is
geared towards the creation of people ‘fit to take over’, prepared to do what is necessary to restore order and make sure that
the core dogmas of the Lacanian schema are not threatened by revolutionary energies which exceed ‘order’. In this way,
Zizek acts as a representative of the strand of psychoanalysis which operates as a normalising practice, entrapping desire
and existence within the Oedipal cage. This places him firmly within the ‘party of order’, not within the ‘party of anarchy’, the
proletariat (see Marx, 18th Brumaire p. 19). He may not be a ‘liberal’, but he still has little to offer politically, besides a politics of
domination. Perhaps, then, there is a need to take up against Zizek the clarion-call he sounds against other theorists. He expects his
reader to respond to his blackmail: stop shirking the Act, or you are not a committed revolutionary! He counterposes this to
the rightist blackmail: stop supporting revolution, or you are a totalitarian! In this context, one should remember his call, during the
Balkans wars, to reject the ‘double blackmail’ (****). The path to a committed radicalism, Zizek rightly observes, does not
lead through the ‘moderation’ and ‘reasonableness’ of quasi-liberal politics. At the same time, however, it does not lead through the
Zizekian Act either. It lies in the flows of desire and activity which exceed Zizek just as much as they exceed his opponents
in their rejection of the traps of state, Party and master-signifier. It lies with a demand for the ‘impossible’ which is not a
demand for Nothingness, but for new openings, greater possibilities and a freedom which is lived actively and without the
hierarchy and subordination we would argue is implicit to any Zizekian schema.
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Bataille 2AC
Bataille votes aff. When genuine large-scale violence is at stake the aesthetic games must end
Kenneth Itzkowitz, Department of Philosophy, Marietta College, “To witness spectacles of pain: The
hypermorality of Georges Bataille,” College Literature, Winter, 1999
Yet in our lives there are also limits. It is unlikely that Bataille would applaud Manson for the same reason he ultimately
rejects Sade. They are both indiscriminate; they both go too far. "Continuity is what we are after," Bataille confirms, but
generally only if that continuity which the death of discontinuous beings can alone establish is not the victor in the long run.
What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain. De Sade's
aberration exceeds that limit. (Bataille 1962, 13) In other words, our wasteful consumption must also have limits. To
actually approve of our own self-destruction goes too far. Later on in Death and Sensuality, Bataille continues, Short of a
paradoxical capacity to defend the indefensible, no one would suggest that the cruelty of the heroes of Justine and Juliette
should not be whole-heartedly abominated. We are bound to reject something that would need in the ruin of all our works.
If instinct urges us to destroy the very thing we are building we must condemn those instincts and defend ourselves from
them. (Bataille 1962, 179-80) This passage is crucial for understanding Bataille's ethics. Usually Bataille writes on behalf
of the violence that remains unaffected by absolute prohibitions. Prohibitions cannot obviate this transformative violence.
There is always ample time to produce the experiences of sacred transformation, i.e., to transgress the prohibitions. Yet self
preservation is also a fundamental value for Bataille; there is also ample motive to resist the violence that denies the value
of the well being of life itself. As he says in the second of the above passages, we must condemn what threatens to destroy
us; our sovereign aspirations can be taken too far. In another passage he speaks of our need "to become aware of..
[ourselves] and to know clearly what… [our] sovereign aspirations are in order to limit their possibly disastrous
consequences" (1962, 181). It is when we are ignorant of these aspirations that we are most vulnerable to them, enacting
them anyway, albeit inattentively.
- Case outweighs. The capacity to exercise sovereign will depends on a background of liberal freedom.
People killed in wars or stamped under the boot of authoritarian regimes have no capacity to exercise
their capacity for glorious expenditure.
- They link to their own critique.
A. They can’t articulate a reason to vote negative that doesn’t fall back into the trap of repression. Why
reject the aff? Why be concerned with our radical potential? Every answer to these questions
reproduces a logic of future value
B. Choice is key. The K proposes a radical individuality, based on absolute sovereignty of decision. Even
if they’re right that this is true, it’s a choice they can only make for themselves. Demanding that the
whole world die to prove their point is the pinnacle of representational logic.
They impose a static meaning to the world, where all questions must be sublimated under the ‘struggle against problematic
excess.’ This is the antithesis of genuine sovereign decision
- Perm – vote aff for no reason
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- Perm. Vote aff to provide the background of stability against which disruption becomes possible.
Radical rejection eliminates the capacity for transgression to have purchase
Bataille says that perpetual chaos is more boring than strict adherence to rules, which means we
outweigh both in a policy AND an aesthetic framework
John Fortuna, Ph.d candidate in Political Philosophy and International Relations, UC-Santa Barbara, “Loss
and Sacrifice in the Thought of Georges Bataille (And their Political Implications),” Prepared for the
Conference of the Western Political Science Association, March 19-21, 2009,
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p317285_index.html
While it is certainly the case that Bataille’s position does require some sort of re-working of our practices (or perhaps more
importantly, the way in which we understand those we currently have) in order to accommodate the experience of sacrificial loss,
this does not necessarily entail a complete upheaval of society and politics. As disruptive as sacrifice may be to the stable and
logical forms which tend to comprise profane existence, it does not seem to be the case that Bataille is recommending that we
simply overturn all things profane. In fact, Bataille specifically argues against such action where, in Guilty, he says, Life is a
result of disequilibrium and instability. Stable forms are needed to make it possible however….To shrink from fundamental
stability isn’t less cowardly than to hesitate about shattering it. Perpetual instability is more boring than adhering strictly to a
rule, and only what’s in existence can be made to come into disequilibrium, that is, to be sacrificed. The more equilibrium the
object has, the more complete it is, and the greater the disequilibrium or sacrifice that can result (Bataille 1988b, 28-29). Perhaps
the most important insight to take from this quote is that sacrifice (here emphasized as that which disrupts what is) depends upon
the logical and stable forms that are marks of the profane world of work and utility. Because sacrifice might be said to represent
a transgression of the norms of the profane world, it follows that these norms must exist in order for such a transgression to occur
in the first place. While I have been emphasizing the importance for Bataille of sacrificial loss (and to the extent that it follows
from it—disruption), in this passage he seems to be affording some sort of recognition to the importance of values like stability,
that are associated not with the sacred but rather the profane.
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- They treat extinction as an aesthetic idea, refusing to answer the material question of what it means.
But this is precisely the repression of meaning they criticize, and when the painting comes to life they
have real blood on their hands
C. Michael Minkoff, “Existence is Sacrificeable, But It Is Not Sacrifice,” April 25, 2007,
http://smartech.gatech.edu/dspace/bitstream/1853/14446/8/Michael%20Minkoff--LCC%204100-Animal_Sacrifice.pdf
What Nancy admits is that “strictly speaking we know nothing decisive about the old sacrifice” and that “the Western
economy of sacrifice has come to a close…it is closed by the decomposition of the sacrificial apparatus itself” (Nancy, 35).
These confessions are significant because it indicates the fear that Nancy has of appropriating a symbol which has a
remainder and a vector he cannot predict or control. What Bataille wanted from sacrifice was one thing, but Nancy fears
that sacrifice carries its own valence. It is like the art that accedes to extinction, but suspends above it indefinitely. The
force to accede to extinction is not guaranteed to suspend. The force that Bataille borrows from sacrifice is not guaranteed
to behave in the way atheism dictates. Nancy reasserts that Western sacrifice always knew it sacrificed to nothing, but this
latent knowledge makes the institution of sacrifice absurd, and Nancy is not willing to deny that sacrifice “sustained and
gave meaning to billions of individual and collective existences” (Nancy, 35) What Nancy fears is this ignorance. He
knows he does not understand the significance of the old sacrifice. If sacrifice was to no one and everyone knew it; why
was and is it so universal and why have so many been tempted into believing its significance? But if one assumes that there
is no one to whom one sacrifices, Bataille may not use sacrifice as the centerpiece of his philosophy because if sacrifice is
not to anyone, it is not truly significant. If it is not significant or meaningful, it has no power. It becomes comedic. And it
becomes massacre. That is why Nancy spends much of his time talking about the sacrifice of the Jews at Auschwitz.
Without over-determining the significance, the sacrifice becomes a genocide or a holocaust. Bataille is trapped between two
uncomfortable positions—let the blood continue to spill to make sacrifice real and significant and concrete, or deny the
death the status of sacrifice, which in Bataille’s mind, would be to deny it realization. Nancy asks if Bataille’s “dialectical
negativity expunges blood or whether, on the contrary, blood must ineluctably continue to spurt” (Nancy, 27). If Bataille
spiritualizes sacrifice, it no longer has the power of real death, the concreteness of finiteness and the ability to rupture
finitude. But if Bataille insists on the real death, he necessitates the constant spilling of blood in mimetic repetition until
history is completed in the Sage.
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- Their willingness to sacrifice the world for the sake of self-inquiry isn’t a coincidence. It’s built into the
very structure of Bataille’s theory. Their attempt to struggle with excess only valorizes itself as the new
excessive truth. But that proves that sacrifice itself is the only thing they’re unable to sacrifice
Elisabeth Arnould, lecturer at Johns Hopkins University, “The Impossible Sacrifice of Poetry: Bataille and the
Nancian Critique of Sacrifice,” Diacritics 26.2, 1996
Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent … access to a moment of disappropriation," then we must also call it
"unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].
Sacrifice is unquestionably the most prominent model in Bataille's thinking of finitude. But it is also, if one accepts Nancy's
allegations, the most problematic. While hoping to find in the exemplarity of sacrifice a new paradigm for the thinking of
finitude, Nancy explains in "The Unsacrificeable," Bataille does nothing but resubmit this finitude to the most traditional
determinations of ontotheology. Sacrifice remains, in Bataille's thought, a deficient model for finitude insofar as it
continues to be conceptually dependent on traditional philosophical and Christian interpretations of sacrifice. Thus, Nancy
asserts that the characteristic valorization Bataille grants to the finite and cruel moment of immolation in his rethinking of
sacrifice does nothing but repeat, by simply inverting its valence, the classical interpretation of an occidental sacrifice that
conceives itself as the ideal sublation of this same moment. The philosophical and Christian version of sacrifice is
understood as the spiritual transformation of a sacrificial moment the finite nature of which it denounces even as it
appropriates its power. The Bataillian version, on the contrary, insists upon this finite moment in order to escape the
dialectical comedy that transforms sacrifice into an ideal process. Performed in the name of spiritual rebirth, the sacrifices
of Plato and Christ, for instance, reappropriate death by transfiguring it as resurrection. Grotesque and replete with horrors,
death in Bataille appears alone on a stage whose cruelty is neither explained nor redeemed through transfiguration. Thus,
Bataille withholds nothing from the scene of sacrifice but lets it emerge in the fullness of its amorphous violence. He
valorizes its sanguinary horror in order to denounce the dialectic idealization of a death nothing should domesticate. He
exhibits it "as it is": opaque, silent, and without meaning. According to Nancy, however, the valorization itself remains
caught in the sacrificial logic of the idealist tradition. For, he argues, only in light of its ontotheological conceptualization
can sacrifice become at once the infinite process of dialectical sublation and the blood-spattered moment this process both
negates and sublates, simultaneously avers and contests. The Bataillian thesis, granting efficacy and truth (reality) to
sacrificial cruelty, is irremediably linked to the processes of dialecticization and spiritualization through which the
philosophical and Christian West appropriates the power of sacrifice. It is the cruel counterpart of its idealization. And if
this conception gives to sacrificial death an importance proportionally opposite to that which it receives from the Christian
and philosophical transfiguration-since the finite truth of death plays at present the role of the infinite truth of resurrection-it
still does nothing but repeat its ontotheological scheme. For it also pretends to find, on the cruel stage of sacrifice, a
singular and more "real" truth of death. The stage of the torment is, for Bataille, that place where death appears with the full
strength of a nonmeaning that can be exposed only through the immolation of the sacrificial victim. If this is so, then should
we not suppose that this immolation pretending to give us the "inappropriable" truth of death's rapture appropri- ates in its
turn the excess of the "excessive" meaning of this rapture? Does it not transform its excess into an "excessive truth," to be
sure a negative one, though no less absolute than the philosophical and spiritual truths to which it opposes itself? At the
heart of modern theories of sacrifice is thus, as Nancy puts it, a "transappropriation of sacrifice" by itself, even when, as is
the case for Bataille, this theory tries to overcome sacrifice's spiritual operation through an excessive and volatile
negativity. As soon as sacrifice thinks itself as revelation, be it that of a spiritual beyond or its negative counterpart, it
remains a sacrifice in the name of its own transcendence, a loophole to a finitude powerless to think itself in terms other
than those of a revelation: the revelation of a clear or obscure god, symbol of resurrection or of death's blind horror. If one
wants to think finitude according to a model different from that of its sacrificial appropriation, one should think "apart
from" sacrifice. If finitude is, as Bataille has himself wanted to think, an "access without access to a moment of
disappropriation," then we must also call it "unsacrificeable" [Nancy 30].
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1) Perm – Do Both
2) Critiquing existing security structures isn’t enough – political action is necessary and the perm solves
Pinar Bilgin (Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara) 2005 “Regional Security in the Middle East” p. 601
Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative
projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective,
self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of
practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in
both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory
practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find
and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking
and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security
communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the
theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go
further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about
doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but,
more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important
for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help
humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of
existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War
Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think
security in both theory and practice.
3) Turn—any move away from realism relies on a leap of faith that would lead to more violence.
Murray, 97. Alastair, Professor of International Relations. Reconstructing Realism: Between
Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics.
This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt’s constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the
possibility of effective a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international
institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, what is problematic is his faith that such
change, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt’s entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic
elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be
reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything, in his
account, is up for grabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearnt, disposed of.
This generates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the
difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the
intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes it reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that
states adopt a strategy of ‘altercasting’, a strategy which ‘tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist
alter in ego’s effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity’. Wendt’s position effectively
culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its
opponent might not take its overtures seriously, might not be interested in reformulating its own
construction of the world, or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited, are
completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a system transformation simply outweighs any adverse
consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have
overdosed on ‘Gorbimania’.
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4) Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power
Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”,
p pq
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by
substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political
sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political
left. Yet, despite
their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality
and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist
politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects
conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them.
Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip
service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic
Has there ever been a historical era
characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours?
Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has [have] become a lazy
academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of
Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of
language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the
trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and,
therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can
think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of
society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not
to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms.
It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the
rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites
for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4)
Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the
discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material
circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals
manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments:
(Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its
consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that " the
justice that working
people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing
the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete
situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American
difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities
of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances
that create lived experience. People
whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic
discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities,
because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and
current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not
appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas
have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless
represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception
and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of
the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.
5) Perm do the plan, then the alt
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2AC A/2 Securitization Criticism LONG
1) Perm – Do Both
2) Critiquing existing security structures isn’t enough – political action is necessary and the perm solves
Pinar Bilgin (Department of International Relations Bilkent University Ankara) 2005 “Regional Security in the Middle East” p. 601
Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative
projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective,
self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of
practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in
both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory
practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find
and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking
and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security
communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the
theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go
further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about
doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997:114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but,
more urgently, so is thinking about doing…. Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important
for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help
humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of
existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War
Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re-think
security in both theory and practice.
3) Turn—any move away from realism relies on a leap of faith that would lead to more violence.
Murray, 97. Alastair, Professor of International Relations. Reconstructing Realism: Between
Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics.
This highlights the central difficulty with Wendt’s constructivism. It is not any form of unfounded idealism about the
possibility of effective a change in international politics. Wendt accepts that the intersubjective character of international
institutions such as self-help render them relatively hard social facts. Rather, what is problematic is his faith that such
change, if it could be achieved, implies progress. Wendt’s entire approach is governed by the belief that the problematic
elements of international politics can be transcended, that the competitive identities which create these elements can be
reconditioned, and that the predatory policies which underlie these identities can be eliminated. Everything, in his
account, is up for grabs: there is no core of recalcitrance to human conduct which cannot be reformed, unlearnt, disposed of.
This generates a stance that so privileges the possibility of a systemic transformation that it simply puts aside the
difficulties which it recognises to be inherent in its achievement. Thus, even though Wendt acknowledges that the
intersubjective basis of the self-help system makes it reform difficult, this does not dissuade him. He simply demands that
states adopt a strategy of ‘altercasting’, a strategy which ‘tries to induce alter to take on a new identity (and thereby enlist
alter in ego’s effort to change itself) by treating alter as if it already had that identity’. Wendt’s position effectively
culminates in a demand that the state undertake nothing less than a giant leap of faith. The fact that its
opponent might not take its overtures seriously, might not be interested in reformulating its own
construction of the world, or might simply see such an opening as a weakness to be exploited, are
completely discounted. The prospect of achieving a system transformation simply outweighs any adverse
consequences which might arise from the effort to achieve it. Wendt ultimately appears, in the final analysis, to have
overdosed on ‘Gorbimania’.
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4) Policy analysis should precede discourse – most effective way to challenge power
Jill Taft-Kaufman, Speech prof @ CMU, 1995, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”,
p pq
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by
substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political
sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political
left. Yet, despite
their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality
and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist
politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects
conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them.
Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip
service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic
Has there ever been a historical era
characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours?
Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has [have] become a lazy
academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of
Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of
language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the
trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and,
therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can
think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of
society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not
to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms.
It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the
rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites
for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4)
Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the
discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material
circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals
manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments:
(Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its
consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that " the
justice that working
people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing
the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete
situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American
difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities
of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances
that create lived experience. People
whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic
discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities,
because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and
current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not
appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas
have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless
represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception
and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of
the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.
\
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5) Our methodology of planning out hypothetical scenarios is key to prevent an actual nuclear war. We
can assume some scenarios might not be real, but we need to talk about every possibility to avert the risk
of a single disaster.
6) There are no prior questions to problem oriented IR- empirical validity is a sufficient justification for
action. Emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and
guiding action
Owen 02 - David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7
Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often
signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed
or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one
respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation
involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such
reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical
positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a
confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn . The first danger with the
philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over
explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the
former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of
its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had
any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus,
for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of
certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It
may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this
type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit
features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a
philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems,
rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical
judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind
of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by
the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theoryconstruction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problemdriven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is
always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to
decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon
in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a
reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the
explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy
rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to
characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to
misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for
classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before
conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of
generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to
encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in
cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional
temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages
this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea
that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right , namely, the theoretical
approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and
second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.
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7) Perm—Do the plan, then the alt
8) Perm solves—includes realism.
Recchia, 2007 (Stefano Recchia, Constellations: An International Journal of Critical and Democratic Theory,
“Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” Volume 15, No 4,
EBSCO Host)
In conclusion, twentieth-century realism represents a rich and inspiring, although largely negative tradition of argument
in international ethics: it counsels against imperial hubris by advocating prudence and moral restraint, and it
displays an overall healthy skepticism concerning the perfectibility of social and political relationships. However,
the utter pessimism on human nature and politics more broadly – often bordering on outright cynicism – of influential
realist figures, such as Morgenthau in particular, appears largely unwarranted today and was probably in large part a
disillusioned reaction to the experience ofWorldWar II. Perhaps most crucially from a normative viewpoint, the traditional
realists all greatly underestimated our moral duties towards other fellow human beings across national borders. Given the
awareness of such duties by American citizens, and the influence this awareness has had on U.S. foreign policy, the
traditional realists’ quite dogmatic denial that such international duties exist ultimately reduced their ability to engage in a
fruitful dialogue on the ethical underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy. As E.H. Carr, the founder of modern Anglo-American
realism and one of the most eclectic IR theorists ever put it roughly seventy years ago: in order to develop “purposive or
meaningful” international thought, followed by action that aims beyond mere self-preservation, realist notions of
prudence and restraint ultimately need to be supplemented with the aspirations of liberal universalism; in other
words, “utopianism” needs to penetrate the citadel of realism.75 Contemporary realists ought to cherish this advice, by
reengaging with and further developing the normative theory of their forebears, to ensure the paradigm’s
continued relevance in the future.
9) Securitization is good in the context of China—they are actively militarizing against US space assets
Fred Stakelbeck, Senior Asia Fellow at Center for Security Policy and expert on the implications
of China’s emerging regional and global strategic influence, 1-3-2007, “Red Skies,” lexis
A targeted attack in September on orbiting U.S. intelligence satellites by a ground-based laser has only
added to Washington’s concern over potential EU-China technology exchanges, with sensors located at the Reagan Test Site
on Kwajalein atoll in the South Pacific confirming the attacks originated from mainland China. The immediate response from the Communist Party’s Central
Committee to allegations of laser attacks was not surprising. “The United States exaggeration of China’s counter-satellite technology is only an attempt to seek an excuse to
justify its development of space weapons,” a public statement said. However, unconfirmed reports have noted that the U.S. has already detected
“mini-Chinese satellites” placed in orbit near U.S. military communications and imaging satellites,
proving once again that Beijing is gaining confidence in satellite countermeasures. Attempting to allay fears of the growing
military aspects of its space program, China took a group of western reporters recently for a tour of its mission control center located on the outskirts of Beijing. Stressing the “peaceful development of
space,” Col. Yang Liwei, China’s first astronaut in orbit, noted, “We hope to further our exchanges with our counterparts in foreign countries and learn from each other.” But how can China, a country
only a few weeks after the attack on U.S.
satellites, high-level EU officials announced the creation of a strategic partnership designed to foster
the exchange of information with China involving the advanced Galileo satellite navigational system . A
known more for stealing technology than inventing it, help the West advance its various space programs? Amazingly,
purely civilian application for most of its history, EU officials announced the system would now be used for military purposes. “The idea of using Galileo for civilian purposes will not persist into the future
because I think that our military cannot do without some sort of navigation system,” Jacques Barrot, EU Commissioner for transport, noted. A key participant in the EU’s Galileo navigational system –
the control of space and related
technologies is imperative for U.S. military supremacy and that China in particular was an obstacle to this objective. “China is the
country with the greatest potential to compete militarily with the U.S. and field disruptive military technologies that could
over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter strategies ,” the report noted. The report went on to say that
communist China. The U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report released in February 2006 was clear in its position that
China will continue to invest in asymmetric military capabilities that include advances in “counter-space operations” and “sophisticated land and sea-based systems.” The National Defense Strategy of the
United States of America released in March 2005 supported the position that U.S. dominance of space was indeed under attack from other countries. “Disruptive challenges may come from adversaries who
adversaries in the future such as
Russia, Iran, North Korea and China could combine advanced military capabilities and future
technologies to deny U.S. access to space and threaten the capacity to project power, minimizing U.S.
influence throughout the world.
develop and use break-through technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.” The report also specified that
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10) Conflicts among the states and realism are inevitable – nations will always act according to their own
self-interests.
Mearsheimer 90. John J., co-director of the International Security Policy at the University of Chicago. Summer 1990. Google
Books. “Theories of War and Peace”, edited by Michael E. Brown.
First, states in the international system fear each other. They regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war
might be in the offing. They anticipate danger. There is little room for trust among states. Although the level of fear varies
across time and space, it can never be reduced to a trivial level. The basis of this fear is that in a world where states have the
capability to offend against each other, and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least
suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them. Add to this the assumption that there is no central authority that a
threatened state can turn to for help, and states have even greater incentive to fear each other. Moreover, there is no
mechanism - other than the possible self-interest of third parties - for punishing an aggressor. Because it is often difficult to
deter potential aggressors, states have ample reason to take steps to be prepared for war. The possible consequences of
falling victim to aggression further illustrate why fear is a potent force in world politics. States do not compete with each
other as if international politics were simply an economic marketplace. Political competition among states is a much more
dangerous business than economic intercourse; it can lead to war, and war often means mass killing on the battlefield and
even mass murder of civilians. In extreme cases, war can even lead to the total destruction of a state. The horrible
consequences of war sometimes cause states to view each other not just as competitors, but as potentially deadly enemies.
Second, each state in the international system aims to guarantee its own survival. Because other states are potential threats,
and because there is no higher authority to rescue them when danger arises, states cannot depend on others for their
security. Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. As
Kenneth Waltz puts it, states operate in a "self-help" system. This emphasis on self-help does not preclude states from
forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary marriages of convenience, where today's alliance partner might be
tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner. States operating in a self-help world should
always act according to their own self-interest, because it pays to be selfish in a self-help world. This is true in the short
term as well as the long term, because if a state loses in the short run, it may not be around for the long haul. Third, states
in the international system aim to maximize their relative power positions over other states. The reason is simple: the
greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is. Every state would like to be the most
formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to guarantee survival in a world that can be very
dangerous. This logic creates strong incentives for states to take advantage of one another, including going to war if the
circumstances are right and victory seems likely. The aim is to acquire more military power at the expense of potential
rivals. The ideal outcome would be to end up as the hegemon in the system. Survival would then be almost guaranteed. All
states are influenced by this logic, which means not only that they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another,
but also that they work to insure that other states do not take advantage of them. States are, in other words, both
offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented. They think about conquest themselves, and they balance against aggressors;
this inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, with the possibility of war always in the background.
Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.
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Non-Unique: China already perceives the US as Militarizing space
(MacDonald 11, Bruce W. MacDonald is a member of the United States Institute of Peace, former member of CFR, see 1st line of
card, 5-11-11, gd, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/bmacdonald_testimony.pdf)
. China's most recent defense white paper, released two months ago, acknowledges once again that space plays a prominent
role in its security thinking. The paper notes, among other national defense taskings, to maintain China’s “security interests
in space, electromagnetic space and cyber space.” The website of the daily newspaper of the Central Military Commission
recently criticized Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy Greg Schulte’s citing of China’s “anti-space
weaponry.” I am particularly struck by the fact that the CMC newspaper, though it countered that some countries are
worried about U.S. “anti-space” capabilities, did not deny the accuracy of Ambassador Schulte’s statement, as China
usually does. This is quite a change, one I believe is noteworthy given its origin. The PLA views last year’s revised U.S.
space policy as “seeking space hegemony” as a “core U.S. objective,” and claims that “developing and deploying spacebased weapons is America’s established strategy,” according to published accounts. These and other distorted PLA views
must be called out and refuted, lest more junior PLA officers, and others who read PLA publications accept them
uncritically. The key questions are what Chinese intentions are for these capabilities, and what the implications are for the
United States. Chinese Military Space Intentions A fundamental problem we face is that China says little at an official level
about its military space policy and doctrine. Chinese counterspace capabilities may be intended purely for deterrence
purposes, to be used in warfare at a time of their choosing, or some combination of the two. PLA leaders have informally
told U.S. officials and others that it is in the interest of an inferior power to keep secret information about its weaknesses
and strengths, and they appear to be following this advice quite strictly. Time and again the U.S. has been rebuffed in
seeking greater openness and transparency in Chinese space and larger defense strategy. That said, the PLA publishes an
increasing number of papers on these issues that have not received enough attention, the problem, I am told, being a
resource constraint. There is a sizable PLA literature on space conflict, but it is unclear how well this reflects Chinese
government thinking, any more than U.S. military journals reflect official U.S. policy. However, China’s ASAT and missile
defense tests and this literature demonstrate a PLA awareness of the importance of offensive counterspace (OCS)
capabilities and strongly suggest that such capabilities are part of China’s larger plans for the future – and perhaps missile
defense capabilities as well. It is also unclear whether this reflects PLA interest in OCS for warfighting or just for
deterrence, though I suspect it is likely a mixture of both. Should China choose to deploy its demonstrated ASAT system,
or more advanced versions of it, U.S. space assets and the military and economic infrastructures they support would be put
at risk. One thing is certain – more clarity on PLA and Chinese government thinking on space deterrence, doctrine, space
stability, and related issues – and Russian thinking, too -- are urgently needed and are important to U.S. security.
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Plan won’t scare Russia or China
Obering 2005 Obering (ret.) is the former Director of the Missile Defense Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Washington, Interview by Wade Boese and Miles A. Pomper “Interview With Missile Defense Agency Director Lt. Gen. Henry
Obering”Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2844
ACT:What about the concerns of Russia, China, and others that this could set off an arms race in space?
Obering: The Russians and the Chinese understand, or at least should understand, that the scale of what we are doing
nowhere near matches what they can amass in terms of attack profiles and quantities. We are not talking about a massive
Brilliant Pebbles[12] or a massive space-based interceptor constellation that would come anywhere near close to countering
a Russian or Chinese threat. We are not talking about that. We are talking about a modest layer to help us engage emerging
threats that could occur around the world over the next decade. Now, some people also describe this as the weaponization
of space. That is a term that we do not do enough examination of. What we are talking about doing—if this pans out—is
putting very small-scale interceptors into space that would be defensive weapons. They would have no offensive capability.
They would have no ability to attack anything on the ground. They would not have the survivability to come back through
the atmosphere.
Link Turn: Plan is Popular with Republicans and the Armed Services Committee
(Scully 07, Megan Scully writes for Government Executive, 1/31/07, gd,
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0107/013107cdpm1.htm)
Republican leaders on the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday launched a push for more spending on
classified space programs, stating that China's recent anti-satellite missile test ushered in a "new era of military
competition."House Armed Services ranking member Duncan Hunter, R-Calif., told reporters that the military needs a "new
dimension" in its space capabilities after China successfully destroyed a low-orbit weather satellite in a test earlier this
month. "That should sharpen our focus and redouble our efforts," Hunter said.Neither Hunter nor House Armed Services
Strategic Forces Subcommittee ranking member Terry Everett, R-Ala., would discuss specific programs that could receive
increased investments. But the United States must be prepared to pre-empt threats, shield U.S. military assets in space from
adversaries and quickly replace destroyed systems, Hunter said. Hunter also emphasized that the United States should lean
on European allies to halt sales to China of any technologies that could be used to attack U.S. space technologies.
Armed Services Committee K2 Agenda: Ability to do politically unpopular things proves
(Aziz 10, Haniffa Aziz writes for India Abroad’s New York Office, 10/15/10, gd,
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices/15205350-1.html)
United States Senator Carl Levin, the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee's influential and respected chairman, has
blasted Islamabad for its hypocrisy in privately condoning the US predator drone attacks within Pakistan, and then publicly
condemning them as a violation of that country's sovereignty. During the interaction that followed his remarks to the
Council on Foreign Relations on The Way Forward in Afghanistan', Levin argued that these public protestations were a
bigger problem than Pakistan's expectation that since the US may exit Afghanistan come next July, it effectively constrains
the US to accept Pakistan's concept of what Afghanistan ought to look like after the withdrawal of American troops.
Particularly, Islamabad's priority is to minimize or eliminate any Indian influence in Afghanistan, even more than a
continuing Al Qaeda presence in that country.
The costs of space weaponization are often overstated
Brian C. Ruhm, April 2003, researcher for the U.S. Air Force, “Finding the Middle Ground: The U.S. Air Force, Space
Weaponization, and Arms Control”, pg. 29
Additional considerations also suggest that concerns regarding the net cost of space weapons could be overstated. Space
weapons such as CAVs or orbital bombardment systems employing precision conventional or kinetic strike weapons might
render unnecessary whole classes of strategic nuclear systems.4 Replacing US strategic nuclear forces with conventional
space surrogates would have two beneficial effects in terms of costs. First, it would help to dissuade other countries from
pursing a nuclear capability and thus reduce the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat against which the US needs to
defend.5 Second, the promise of conventional space weapons as a more effective and useful deterrent force may
substantially reduce the likelihood of even smaller, regional wars.
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No Tradeoff
(Dolman and Cooper 11, Everett Dolman and Henry Cooper, Everett Dolman is Phd and Prof. Military studies at USAF SAAS,
former NSA analyst where he received the Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award. Henry Cooper is former DoD deputy executive
and Chairman of the High Frontier think-tank and journal. This appeared in Chapter 19 of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower”, edited
by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, ISBN 978-1780393858, 03-07-11, gd,
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf)
. Opponents say that space weapons would make individuals afraid to do business in space or travel there for pleasure, for
fear of being blown to smithereens. This is an emotional appeal that has no basis in fact. Currently, for example, weapons
are pervasive on the seas, in the air, and on land, but wherever there is a dominating power, commerce and travel are
secure. America's Navy has dominated the open oceans for the last half-century, ensuring that commerce is fair and free for
all nations, as has its Air Force in nonterritorial airspace. A ship leaving port today is more likely than ever to make it to its
destination, safer from pirates, rogue states, navigational hazards, and even weather—all due to the enforcement of the rule
of law on the seas and the assistance of sea- and space-based navigational assistance. Why would American dominance in
space be different? Space weapons advocates oppose treaties and obligations and want outer space ruled at the whim of
whoever holds military power. This is a false argument, completely unsupportable. There is no dichotomy demanding law
or order. Solutions lie in the most effective combination of law and order. There is no desire for a legal free-for-all or an
arbitrary and capricious wielding of power by one state over all others. What we advocate is a new international legal
regime that recognizes the lawful use of space by all nations, to include its commercial exploitation under appropriate rules
of property and responsible free market values, to be enforced where necessary by the United States and its allies.
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***Case**
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Soft Power Takeout
Hard power is greater than soft power – Osama bin Laden
Dale 11 Helle, Heritage Foundation's Senior Fellow in Public Diplomacy studies. Febuary 2011. ” A New National Narrative: Three
Cheers for Hard Power” <http://blog.heritage.org/2011/05/02/a-new-national-narrative-three-cheers-for-hard-power/>
A fascinating paradox emerges from the news that U.S. Special Forces on Sunday killed terrorist mastermind Osama bin
Laden in a superbly well-planned and executed raid on his Pakistani compound. The Obama administration rightfully
celebrates the most important victory in the 10-year global war on terrorism, basking in the glory of justice done to a man
who plotted the murder of more than 3,000 people on U.S. soil—mostly American citizens, but also citizens of many other
nations. “His demise should be welcomed by all who believe in peace and human dignity,” said President Obama in his late
evening address from the White House. Yet at the very same time, the Administration finds itself contradicting the
“national narrative” it has been carefully constructing since President Obama took office. This narrative is a Carteresque
story of a nation in decline, forced toward international compromise and debilitating cuts in its military budget. But it was
not multilateralism that brought Osama bin Laden down, nor was it “soft” or even “smart” power. What happened Sunday
cannot be described as anything but a triumph of “hard power,” of military intelligence, skill, precision, and courage. It was
also an outstanding example of the United States “going it alone.” All of the above flies in the face of the recent
publication of “A National Strategic Narrative” by the Woodrow Wilson Center and enthusiastically endorsed and prefaced
by Anne-Marie Slaughter, who from 2009 to 2011 served as director of policy planning at the State Department. Though
not an official document, it is certainly fair to say that this document falls entirely into line with the Clinton State
Department’s Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, with which Slaughter was closely associated. A “national
narrative” (a catch phrase of our times) is the story by which a people understand their country’s role in the world. “The
American dream” is one such foundational narrative of the United States; so is the narrative of “American exceptionalism.”
The “national strategic narrative” document authored by Navy Captain Wayne Porter and Marine Colonel Mark Mykleby
(under the pseudonym Mr. Y) aspires to play a role similar to that of George Kennan’s famous “Mr. X” 1947 Foreign
Affairs article. However, while Kennan promoted American global leadership in the containment of the Soviet Union,
defeatism is the order of today if you believe Porter and Mykleby. In other words, Mr. Y is no Mr. X. “Consider the
description of the U.S. president as ‘the leader of the free world,’ a phrase that encapsulated U.S. power and the structure of
the global order for decades. Yet anyone under thirty today, a majority of the world’s population, likely has no idea what it
means,” writes Slaughter. This is a highly dubious assertion. The U.S. in her view is entering into a period of “declinism,”
defined as “the periodic certainty that we are losing all the things that have made us a great nation.” Given this
understanding of today’s United States, Porter and Mykleby provide a blueprint for a not-very-assertive future foreign
policy posture. The elements of this strategic narrative include abandoning any notion that this country can control or
dominate global events, reliance on multilateralism, “sustainment”—by which is meant focusing on domestic resources—
and cutting defense to fund global engagement. Yet the fact is that “soft power” (or even “smart power”) has not delivered
the promised results for the Obama Administration, but “hard power” has. The President’s policy of increased drone attacks
on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border have had far more impact on the activity of terrorists than mountains of foreign aid
given to Afghanistan and Pakistan. And the death of Osama bin Laden at the hands of U.S. Special Forces will add fresh
arguments for resisting deep and crippling defense cuts. Hopefully, even the President will be struck by the irony of it all
as he continues to bask in the glow of Sunday’s successful raid.
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China—Militarization
China militarizing quickly
Richard D. Fisher, Jr, Book “China’s Military Modernization”, Praeger Security International, Ch. 1, Pg. 3-4, is a Senior Fellow,
International Assessment and Strategy Center (June 2004 to present) and the Director of the Center’s Project on Asian Security and
Democracy. He was formerly an Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China
Brief, a Senior Fellow with the Republican Policy Committee of the House of Representatives and Director of the Asian Studies
Center of the Heritage Foundation. His articles and reports have appeared in numerous national newspapers and journals.Published by
Praeger Security International, September 2008
In 2007 China was the only country that was pursuing all of these expensive military construction and development programs. Each
program requires an extensive research, development, and production base, plus generations of engi- neers to develop follow-on
systems. In many cases the United States and Russia developed these capabilities only after several decades of effort, while China in
most cases is able to compress its development-production cycle into two decades, thanks to access to foreign technologies. Russia has
more money for its military after energy price spikes and, in 2007, announced plans for six nuclear 4 China’s Military Modernization
aircraft carriers and a manned moon program, though there is considerable reason to doubt these will succeed. But Russia does not
have plans for a long range amphibious projection fleet. The United States, by choice, has no active space weapons program.
Furthermore, the United States is modernizing only one solid-fuel ICBM (which will be armed with only one warhead) and is not
building any nuclear ballistic-missile submarines. Each of these programs listed above also represents an aspiration to global, not just
regional military power. Although a permanent Chinese manned moon presence may not happen until 2020 to 2030, most of these
PLA programs either are being realized now, or could be by the end of the next decade. The aspects of China’s military buildup that
can be identified in 2007 may constitute only the beginning of a military competition that could severely challenge Asia and the
United States sooner rather than later. When realized, the PLA pro- grams listed above may only allow China to approach an
American level of military capability circa 2007 to 2010. But China is accumulating this similar spread of capabilities, with depth in
some areas, at a breakneck pace. Chinese, U.S., and other universities have trained a new generation of Chinese military engineers,
many of whom are responsible for current military-technical break- throughs for China and have long careers ahead of them.
American policy makers should consider that, increasingly, it may be China that first develops the next-generation weapon system, not
the United States or Russia.
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Dictatorship causes militarism
Richard D. Fisher, Jr, Book “China’s Military Modernization”, Praeger Security International, Ch. 1, Pg. 4-5, is a Senior Fellow,
International Assessment and Strategy Center (June 2004 to present) and the Director of the Center’s Project on Asian Security and
Democracy. He was formerly an Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China
Brief, a Senior Fellow with the Republican Policy Committee of the House of Representatives and Director of the Asian Studies
Center of the Heritage Foundation. His articles and reports have appeared in numerous national newspapers and journals.Published by
Praeger Security International, September 2008
An additional concern is that what China may or may not do with its acceler- ating military and political power will be determined by
the very few Chinese who lead the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 2007 all 1.3 billion citizens of the PRC were beholden to only
73.36 million CCP members.4 The CCP, in turn, is ultimately controlled by about 300 people selected from its ranks: the 300 or so
members of the Central Committee, who produce a twenty- to twenty-five- member Politburo, which is dominated by its eight- or somember Standing Committee, which is in turn usually dominated by its single Chairman. The CCP tolerates no political competition
and ruthlessly employs internal police and security services in cooperation with organs of the CCP to search out, co-opt, or destroy
political opposition. Such resistance to political reform may be accelerating China’s path to a series of internal crises. Looming crises
such as a potential collapse of a weak financial system, deepening resentments from endemic corruption, a mounting burden from
environmental disasters, a growing economic and social disparity between the prosperous coastal regions and the majority, who do not
share in this wealth, plus outright opposition as demonstrated by Tibetians in March and April 2008, or the insistence of the majority
of Taiwanese to be governed by their own democracy and not by Beijing, may eventually spur events that could overwhelm a CCP
regime with thin legitimacy. In April and May 2008 Chinese at home and abroad demonstrated a resentful and at times threatening
nationalist anger in response to Western protests against Chinese behavior in Tibet and the Sudan, organized around the China’s
global Olympic Torch relay. This anger was abruptly arrested by the need to respond to the devastating May 12 earthquake in
Sichuan. While the government and the PLA won respect for their rapid response to the disaster, and there was a rare openness in
media reports, it is not clear that openness will grow following these incidents. In the months prior to the November 2007 Party
Congress, current CCP Secretary Hu Jintao made clear he would tolerate neither calls from the left for imposing Maoist like discipline or calls for internal CCP reforms toward representative democracy. Ultimately the power position of the CCP depends on the
loyal support of the 2.25 million members of the PLA, the 1.5 million People’s Armed Police (PAP), and 800,000 other internal
security forces. In short, the CCP maintains a polit- ical dictatorship enforced by security services, police, and the armed forces. This
will require that the CCP maintain its largely martial character and pay increas- ing heed to the priorities of the PLA and the security
services. This means, most likely, that the CCP will continue to strengthen policies designed to control Chinese, while giving the PLA
the means to obtain greater global military influence. Threatening Foreign Policy Choices The aforementioned circumstances also
mean that China’s military and for- eign policies will proceed without the potentially moderating influences of coun- tervailing
institutions, such as legislatures or a free press. Indeed, China has a large press, and there are many government-sponsored and
academic institu- tions, which have voluminous output on foreign affairs and military subjects, and individual Chinese do express a
wide range of views on their Internet. But there is little to suggest that there are major identifiable opinion centers that offer fundamentally different choices to those made by the CCP. China’s penchant for secrecy and deception stratagems, based on venerated
historic treatises of state- craft such as that of Sun Zi, dating back to the sixth century B.C., further com- pound the task of analysis of
Chinese actions. Such a lack of honest debate is at least in part responsible for China’s pursuit of policies or actions that can only be
viewed as counterproductive for most Chinese: • Preparing for a war against democratic Taiwan, thus also risking war with the United
States, possibly resulting in long-term hostility between China and the West, even though such a war may fail and still imperil China’s
political stability and continued economic growth • Pursuing political-military hegemony in Asia, specifically trying to push out
American influence, with little regard to the potential to spur an Asian arms race that ultimately may force non-nuclear states such as
Japan, Taiwan, and Australia to seek nuclear weapons or other major deterrent capabilities China’s Military Modernization
Proliferating nuclear weapon and missile technology to Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran, with no regard for their potential to give this
same tech- nology to terrorist groups who, in turn, may well attack Israel, the West, and eventually China too Resisting efforts by the
United States and its allies to mobilize decisive political and economic pressures against North Korea’s and Iran’s nuclear weapons
programs, indicating China’s potential to “protect” future nuclear weapons programs undertaken by its friends Making common cause
with and becoming an increasing source of support to belligerently antidemocratic dictatorial regimes such as North Korea, Cuba,
Venezuela, Iran, Burma, Zimbabwe, and Sudan—all of which fuel suspicion of China’s future goals and prompt resentment against
China as seen during its 2008 Olympic Torch relay. Pursuing an increasingly active military entente with an increasingly authoritarian
Russia while also leading the countries of Central Asia in its Shanghai Cooperation Organization down the path to an eventual military
CARD CONTINUES CARD CONTINUES CARD CONTINUES
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alliance designed to preserve dictatorships, exclude Western influences from the Eurasian heartland, and further isolate India
Undertaking a massive program of global cyberespionage and surveillance that has resulted in growing alarm in capitols around the
world, in which China has wrecked cyber networks in Taiwan, has likely caused power outages in the United States, and has likely
positioned its cyber forces to launch instant and devastating attacks against the American electronic infrastructure. This list indicates
that China is making quite disturbing choices regarding its use of global influence. There is of course, much that appears positive.
China has created new institutions and regulations that appear to signal a greater interest in stopping its own nuclear and missile
proliferation, yet the proliferation con- tinues. China’s leadership in helping to convince North Korea to end its nuclear weapons
program is praised by many in Washington, yet the material effect of the Six-Party Talks China has led since 2005 has been
minimal—North Korea even tested nuclear weapons in 2006. China professes a willingness to forge a peaceful future with the people
of Taiwan, yet it ignored Taiwan’s democrati- cally elected government from 2000 to 2008, works to divide Taiwan politics between
the older sympathetic Kuomintang Party from the “independence” leaning Democratic Progressive Party, and shows no interest in
slowing its accelerating military buildup near Taiwan. Most commercially oriented countries, which include most of Asia, greatly
value their economic ties with China, which contribute increasingly to their growth. Yet for Asians, China’s military buildup causes
fear, and they are wary of China’s subtle but increasing push that they choose between Chinese and American leadership. Beijing has
long sought to convince Japan and Australia to end missile defense cooperation with the United States. However, both continue this
pursuit, and Japan and the United States have sought to deepen strategic relations with India in the hopes of balancing China. In July
2007 an Australian defense strategy paper noted, “China’s emergence as a major market and driver China’s Strategic Challenge 7 of
economic activity both regionally and globally has benefited the expansion of economic growth in the Asia-Pacific and globally. But
the pace and scope of its military modernisation, particularly the development of new and disruptive capabilities such as the antisatellite missile (tested in January 2007), could create misunderstandings and instability in the region.”5
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China Will Be Aggressive
China will attack Taiwan and try to crush American hegemony through space leadership
Richard D. Fisher, Jr, Book “China’s Military Modernization”, Praeger Security International, Ch. 1, Pg. 4-5, is a Senior Fellow,
International Assessment and Strategy Center (June 2004 to present) and the Director of the Center’s Project on Asian Security and
Democracy. He was formerly an Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China
Brief, a Senior Fellow with the Republican Policy Committee of the House of Representatives and Director of the Asian Studies
Center of the Heritage Foundation. His articles and reports have appeared in numerous national newspapers and journals.Published by
Praeger Security International, September 2008
Current PLA preparations for cyberwarfare that could cripple the U.S. economy, for space warfare that could eliminate the U.S.
military’s primary means of surveillance and communication, as well as for a high-casualty war to conquer Taiwan, therefore, are not
historic aberrations. Given China’s record of prolifer- ation to regimes with terrorist connections, it is also necessary to ask, How
would China respond to a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States? Would China join those hunting the terrorists or instead
seize the moment to attack Taiwan? The recent record also shows that China has been willing to engage in offen- sive wars that entail
great risk and sacrifice.12 China is also willing to define “victory” in geostrategic as well as operational results. Estimates that Mao
Zedong lost over 250,000 troops during the Korean War demonstrated his will- ingness to take great risks and sacrifice lives. During
World War II Mao had waged a lackluster war against the Japanese invaders, hoping to waste and exhaust his greater foe, the
Kuomintang, but barely a year after winning his revolution he moved to commit hundreds of thousands of troops to invade North
Korea, in order to impress Stalin, deliver a “defeat” to the Americans, and  China’s Strategic Challenge 9 reassert China’s
authority over Korea. Deng Xiaoping’s 1979 war against Vietnam cost China about 20,000 lives, yet did little damage to Vietnam’s
defenses. Yet this war advanced Deng’s domestic political power consolidation, embarrassed Hanoi’s allies in Moscow, and
encouraged the United States and its NATO allies to join China in an anti-Soviet entente. Would Hu Jintao be willing to use the PLA
in a similar large-scale offensive manner, perhaps against Taiwan? It is reported that Deng’s decision to select Hu to succeed Jiang
Zemin was influenced by Hu’s willingness to lead police forces and up to 170,000 troops from the Chengdu Military Region to
suppress political protests in Tibet violently in March 1989.13 One unconfirmed report notes that as a Red Guard during the Cultural
Revolution, Hu may have led students to burn down the British Embassy in August 1967.14 Thirty-two years later, in May 1999, just
after Chinese students attacked the U.S. embassy in Beijing and burned down the consulate in Chengdu following the mistaken U.S.
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, it was Hu, then vice president, who gave the first Chinese government
comment, saying, “The Chinese government firmly supports and protects, in accordance with the law, all legal protest activities.”15
While it is possible that China’s leaders will resort to external wars to deflect internal strife, others argue that the final decision
depends more on a leader’s calculation of strategic opportunity versus cost.16 Nevertheless, it appears that in Hu Jintao the PLA has a
leader who is not afraid to use force. Thus, there are compelling reasons to consider that Chinese lead- ers may conclude that attacking
Taiwan is worth risking international oppro- brium, economic and political boycotts, and even large-scale loss of life, if it could secure
a “victory” that would in any way force an end to Taiwan’s demo- cratic era and thus reshape the geostrategic balance of power in
Asia against the United States. This should serve as a warning. The Chinese Communist Party–led govern- ment is not satisfied with a
world order in which the United States is the dom- inant power. While Chinese leaders acknowledge their growing dependence upon
global good will for vital commercial and resource access, recent experi- ence shows that CCP leaders will seize opportunities to alter
power relation- ships and power balances. Their actions will very likely include the calculated but decisive use of military force. A
Chinese decision to use force will depend on numerous factors, but perhaps among the most important is whether Chinese political
and military leaders believe they possess the raw military power to prevail.
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A2 Tracking Capabilities
Missile tracking is outstanding and only improving
Turner Brinton, Turner is responsible for covering military space and missile defense for Space News. His contacts within the
industry have given him the inside track on all the latest breaking military news before it reaches others in the industry. Turner
contributes to the Military Space Quarterly and the Military Satellite Communications Special Report and is responsible for the
Integrated Battlespace special report as well as other editorial features.26 July, 2010 “STSS Satellites Track Three Missiles in Initial
Testing” Space News http://www.spacenews.com/military/100726-stss-satellites-track-three.html
WASHINGTON — Two U.S. missile tracking demonstration satellites in June successfully detected and tracked three missiles in the
early stages of flight, and later this year will attempt to track missiles as they coast through space following motor burnout. The
Pentagon for decades has operated infrared satellites able to detect potentially threatening missile launches worldwide, but these
satellites are only to track missiles in the early boost phase of flight, when their motors produce a significant heat signature. The
experimental Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites, on the other hand, are intended to demonstrate so-called
birth-to-death missile tracking. As part of a proposed operational constellation, these kinds of satellites would be an important cuing
tool for missile defense systems. After years of delay, the STSS satellites, built by Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems of Los
Angeles, were launched into low Earth orbit last September. The spacecraft were initially dogged by attitude control problems, and
on-orbit checkout took longer than anticipated. The satellites’ acquisition sensors, used for initial detection and tracking of missile
launches, completed calibration in May, and the satellites observed three U.S. missile tests in June, Debra Christman, a spokeswoman
for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) said in a July 16 e-mail. On June 6, the twin STSS satellites observed the debut of the
MDA’s two-stage interceptor for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system as it lifted off from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.,
and flew over the Pacific Ocean, Christman said. Ten days later, they observed an ICBM test launched from the same location. On
June 28, the satellites observed a target missile that was launched from a mobile platform in the Pacific Ocean as part of a test of the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system. The data gleaned from the tests have been remarkable, said Gabe Watson, Northrop
Grumman’s vice president of missile defense and missile warning programs. “These tests in June, the results are outstanding,” Watson
said in a July 21 interview. “There were some folks out there who were thinking these things would be launched and never work.
We’ve seen that in the press, even. “I’m really excited that we’re providing objective evidence that this STSS demonstration system is
not only working, but if the acquisition sensor data is any kind of leading indicator of what the integrated acquisition and track sensor
performance is going to be, this will be revolutionary for the ballistic missile defense system.” In addition to the acquisition sensors
used in the June flight tests, the spacecraft are outfitted with tracking sensors that are still undergoing calibration, Watson said. It is
these tracking sensors that will attempt the most difficult part of the demonstration: tracking missiles that have gone cold after their
propulsion systems have shut off. In theory, the low-orbiting STSS craft will be able to track these cold missile bodies against the
colder background of deep space. Calibration of the tracking sensors is nearly complete, and plans call for using them to observe
missile flights starting later this year, Watson said. Last year, the MDA overhauled its entire ballistic missile defense test program,
eliminating launches dedicated to the STSS demonstration. The satellites will instead take part in tests with other primary objectives,
such as intercept tests involving the emerging U.S. ballistic missile defense system — assuming they are in position to observe these
flights when they take place. The MDA plans to conduct an intercept test of the Airborne Laser Test Bed late this year, and tests of the
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense and Ground-based Midcourse Defense systems early next year, MDA spokesman Rick Lehner said
July 22. The satellites may also be used to track the space shuttle and possibly even jet aircraft, Watson said. Northrop Grumman
hopes its work on the STSS satellites will give the company a leg up in the MDA’s planned competition to build an operational
constellation of missile tracking satellites. MDA has tapped the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, Md.,
to lead a prototyping effort for the new Precision Tracking Space System. As many as five industry teams may be chosen in 2011 to
provide input for the system’s design.
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Ground Based Systems Ineffective
Ground systems fail to stop ICBM launches
Steven Lambakis February 19, 2007 Real Clear Politics “Missile Defense From Space”
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/02/missile_defense_from_space.html
Conversely, ground interceptors that are near the target can defend only a small area, but they can potentially protect that point from
launches anywhere in the world. Yet it is simply unaffordable to do a point defense for every place you want to defend in the United
States, every place that U.S. forces go, or everywhere that our allies are. The ability to do area defense -- to defend against multiple
launch points as opposed to doing point defense of a very limited area -- is fundamental to successful missile defense. Political,
strategic, and technological uncertainties could change the missile defense scenario by causing a shift in the threat from one region to
another. Given that it takes years to field, test, and make operational new fixed interceptor and sensor sites, a shift in the threat could
leave the nation vulnerable. Because many of the interceptors and sensors in the current system are fixed to geographic points, we are
limited in our ability to defend the homeland, for example, against missiles launched from surprise locations such as a ship off our
shoreline. We also might face an adversary tomorrow that deploys tens or even hundreds of ballistic missiles or one that has more
sophisticated countermeasure and reentry technologies. Those, too, would be expected to stress the current system, which is designed
at the moment to deal with more limited threats. Planned transportable land-based and mobile sea-based and airborne systems also
suffer limitations. The need to base sensors and interceptors forward, closer to threat launch sites, in order to enlarge the engagement
battle space makes our security dependent on political decisions by foreign governments. Projected boost defense systems, which may
be deployed to the periphery or littoral of an adversary, would have very limited or no utility against a ballistic missile launched from
several hundred miles inside a threat country's border. The inability to engage a missile in boost means we would be left with only
midcourse or terminal intercept possibilities, if those are available, and this removes a layer from the effectiveness calculations.
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Faulty Missile Defense Doesn’t Deter
Lasers act as an ineffective deterrent and increase militarization
Martha Clark, 2002 Scoville Fellow a false sense of security The Role of Missile Defenses in Counterproliferation Doctrine
http://action.psr.org/documents/full03.pdf
In theory, as the Bush administration argues, missile defense acts as the active defense required by counterproliferation doctrine. This
argument states that as an active defense, missile defense deters adversary WMD proliferation and/or attacks by theoretically
rendering such proliferation or attack useless. Missile defense also theoretically acts as a shield to protect against retaliation for U.S.
preemptive strikes. However, in reality, missile defense does the opposite of what it is intended to do in its counterproliferation role.
In the long term, it could hinder U.S. national security by encouraging en- emy proliferation of WMD and by providing a false sense
of security that will encourage the United States to engage in preemptive strikes, possibly with the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Thus, in its counterproliferation role, missile defense is an ineffective deterrent entangled in the shift of U.S. nuclear doctrine from one
of stra- tegic non-use (classical deterrence) to one of tac- tical use. Projected effects of the role of missile defense in
counterproliferation strategy include: (1) a hindrance of diplomatic relations with many other countries who question the morality of
preemptive strikes, as well as our right to hypo- critically use nuclear weapons to prevent oth- ers from possessing WMD; (2) a false
sense of security provided by a system which is techno- logically unproven and infeasible; (3) the encouragement of the use of tactical
nuclear weapons such as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP, or “bunker-buster”), and the resulting health effects on civilian
populations; and (4) ironically, the encouragement of proliferation as enemy states strive to develop countermeasures and other means
of overwhelming limited and ineffective U.S. missile defenses.
Missile defense increases proliferation – our evidence indicts their warrants
Martha Clark, 2002 Scoville Fellow a false sense of security The Role of Missile Defenses in Counterproliferation Doctrine
http://action.psr.org/documents/full03.pdf
Kerry Kartchner, the Senior Adviser for Mis- sile Defense Policy in the Office of Strategic and Theater Defense at the U.S.
Department of State elaborates upon the theory that missile defenses will enhance the U.S. deterrent posture: “Put simply, effective
missile defenses can diminish the threat of missile at- tack against us or our allies by raising the costs required to make such an attack
successful, and by threatening to defeat such an attack should it oc- cur. Deterrence would be strength- ened because an attack would
be seen both as futile and as triggering a dev- astating response.”46 To the contrary, missile defense will actually encourage rogue
state proliferation. Either these countries will strive to develop weapons and countermeasures capable of overwhelming a U.S. missile
defense system, or they will simply employ delivery means incapable of being intercepted by a missile defense system. These
concepts will be explored further in the section on the Nega- tive Impacts of Utilizing Missile Defense as a Counterproliferation Tool.
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Deterrence 2ac 2/
Faulty missile defense doesn’t deter
Martha Clark, 2002 Scoville Fellow a false sense of security The Role of Missile Defenses in Counterproliferation Doctrine
http://action.psr.org/documents/full03.pdf
A second negative impact of missile defenses in counterproliferation policy results from the fact that missile defenses are
technologically un- proven and are subject to different types of en- emy countermeasures. Enemy missiles can be very inexpensively
designed to employ counter- measures to fool a missile defense system, includ- ing objects identical to the warhead that are re- leased
from the missile launcher simultaneously in the outer atmosphere. The lack of atmospheric resistance allows these decoys to fly at the
same speed and altitude as the true warhead, even if they are extremely light. Mylar balloons are con- sidered the most common
element of effective decoys. The warhead could be wrapped in a mylar balloon and released along with many other mylar balloons, all
flying at the same speed. The shiny mylar reflects the missile defense radars trying to detect the warhead. Furthermore, each balloon
can be equipped with a small motor or heater to make it spin and have the same tem- perature as the warhead in order to avoid detection by heat-sensing radars.51 Another countermeasure comes in the form of bomblets, which are multiple “warheads” carrying
chemical or biological agents. Because hun- dreds of bomblets are released at once, it is im- possible for a defensive interceptor
missile to de- stroy all of them. Developing countermeasures is much easier and less expensive than developing ways to overcome
them with missile defenses. Thus, it is likely that even a rogue state could get a missile past U.S. defenses relatively easily if it chose
to do so. and immoral. There have also been many failed tests of mis- sile defense technology in the past several years. One such
failure occurred on December 13, 2001: “The booster rocket, launched from Vandenburg Air Force base in Califor- nia,
malfunctioned about thirty sec- onds into its flight, veered off course, and plunged into the Pacific Ocean about one mile off the coast
of the base, about fifty five miles north of Santa Barbara, California.”52 Whether a small technical glitch or the use of enemy
countermeasures, a missile defense sys- tem has a high potential for ineffectiveness be- cause it can never be fully tested until it is
used in an emergency or combat situation of real mis- sile launch against the United States. This fact is summed up by George Lewis,
Lisbeth Gronlund, and David Wright: “Given today’s technology, the United States can certainly build a system that ould destroy one
or several ICBM warheads under controlled conditions, in which the characteristics of the tar- get warhead are known and no seri- ous
effort is made to defeat the system. However, the essential question is whether the system will be operation- ally effective—that is,
whether the de- fense would be effective in the real world, where the characteristics of the attack would not be completely known in
advance and where the attacker would take steps to defeat the defense. An additional problem is that an NMD system must work the
first time it is actually used. If a nuclear ICBM attack occurs, there will be no opportunity to learn on the job.” (emphasis added)53
Because other states are aware of the shortcom- ings of the missile defense technology currently being developed in the United States,
any missile defense deployed by the United States will not ad- equately deter an enemy attack.
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***Realism—China
China is realist
Richard D. Fisher, Jr, , is a Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center (June 2004 to present) and the Director of
the Center’s Project on Asian Security and Democracy. He was formerly an Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy,
editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, a Senior Fellow with the Republican Policy Committee of the House of
Representatives and Director of the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation. His articles and reports have appeared in
numerous national newspapers and journals.Published by Praeger Security International, September 2008 “China’s Military
Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach” International Assesment and Strategy Center”
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pageID.48/default.asp
China's rise to global economic and strategic eminence, with the potential for achieving pre-eminence in the greater-Asian
region, is one of the defining characteristics of the post-Cold War period. For students contemplating a broad range of
business, social science, journalist or military science curricula, it is critical to possess a basic understanding of the
military-strategic basis and trajectory of a Rising China. This work is intended to be attractive to a range of courses that
require a volume that can provide background and outline current and future issues concerning China's rise in strategicmilitary influence. The next decade may witness China's assertion of military or strategic pressure on Japan, the Korean
Peninsula, India, the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, Central Asia, or even on behalf of future allies in Africa and Latin
America. While conflict is not a foregone conclusion, as indicated by China's increasing participation in many benign
international organizations, it is a fact that China's leadership will pursue its interests as it sees them, which may not always
coincide with those of the United States, its friends, and allies. Until now, no single volume existed that provides an
authoritative, comprehensive, and concise description of China's evolving geo-strategy or of how China is transforming its
military to carry out this strategy. Fisher examines how China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) remains critical to the
existence of the Chinese Communist government and looks at China's political and military actions designed to protect its
expanded strategic interests in both the Asia-Pacific and Central to Near-Asian regions. Using open sources, including over
a decade of unique interview sources, Fisher documents China’s efforts to build a larger nuclear force that may soon be
protected by missile defenses, modern high technology systems for space, air and naval forces, and how China is now
beginning to assemble naval, air and ground forces for future “power projection” missions. His work also examines how the
United States and other governments simultaneously seek greater "engagement" with China on strategic concerns, while
also "hedging" against its rising power. Although China faces both internal and external constraints on its "rise" to global
eminence, it cannot be denied that China's government is pursuing a far-reaching strategic agenda.
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Fisher Prodites
BOOK RECOMMENDATIONS:
"A useful assessment for those concerned with Taiwan's security and with maintaining America's leadership role in Asia."
Dr. Michael M. Tsai, former Minister of National Defense of Taiwan, Vice Minister of National Defense, Deputy Secretary of the
Taiwan National Security Council and founder of the Taiwan Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies
***
"China's ongoing military build-up is of great concern to Japan. Rick Fisher's very useful analysis reveals much of what China seeks
to conceal."
Ota Fumio, Vice Admiral, Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (ret.), former Director, Japanese Defense Intelligence Headquarters
***
“…a must read for all those who are seriously assessing China’s military modernization overdrive which is definitely offensive.”
Bhaskar Roy, foreign policy analyst with a special interest in China, former intelligence analyst with the Indian government, with
service in Indian Embassy in Washington, and a regular contributor and consultant to the South Asia Analysis Group.
Rick Fisher is a Senior Fellow on Asian Military Affairs. Fisher is a recognized authority on the PRC military and the Asian military
balance and their implications for Asia and the United States. His most recent book is China’s Military Modernization: Building for
Regional and Global Reach (Praeger Security International). Fisher has worked on Asian security matters for over 20 years in a range
of critical positions -- as Asian Studies Director at the Heritage Foundation, Senior Analyst for Chairman Chris Cox’s Policy
Committee in support of the report of the Select Committee for US National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the
People’s Republic of China, and a consultant on PLA issues for the Congressionally chartered US China Security & Economic
Review Commission. The author of nearly 200 studies on challenges to American security, economic and foreign policy in Asia,
Fisher is a frequent commentator on Asian issues for radio and television and has testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, the House International Relations Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the U.S. China Security
Commission, on the modernization of China’s military. Fisher has been Editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, and a
regular contributor to publications such as the Wall Street Journal, Far Eastern Economic Review, Jane’s Intelligence Review,
National Interest, Air Forces Monthly, and World Airpower Journal. He has served as an election observer in Cambodia, the
Philippines, South Korea and Taiwan, and performed field research in China, Taiwan, Russia, India and Pakistan. Fisher studied at
Georgetown University and at Eisenhower College where he received his BA with honors. He is currently President of Pacific
Strategies, Inc.
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***Space Mil Neg Ups
China won’t be deterred, they’re developing space bmd now
Richard D. Fisher, Jr, Book “China’s Military Modernization”, Praeger Security International, Ch. 1, Pg. 2-4, is a Senior Fellow,
International Assessment and Strategy Center (June 2004 to present) and the Director of the Center’s Project on Asian Security and
Democracy. He was formerly an Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China
Brief, a Senior Fellow with the Republican Policy Committee of the House of Representatives and Director of the Asian Studies
Center of the Heritage Foundation. His articles and reports have appeared in numerous national newspapers and journals.Published by
Praeger Security International, September 2008
For example, on January 11, 2007, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) destroyed a Chinese weather satellite with a direct-ascent
antisatellite (ASAT) missile. While China’s two previous attempts to destroy the satellite in July 2005 and February 2006 were known
to a small number of intelligence and military personnel in the United States and perhaps a few other countries,2 the successful test
was a shock to the world when revealed about six days later. It took the Chinese government twelve days even to acknowledge what
the world had already long known. This event illustrates several aspects of China’s accelerating military challenge: • China’s military
action in space signals that, when its interests dictate, China will not be bound by U.S. or Western conventions, in space or on Earth,
and that it will not cede the strategic “high ground” to another power. • China has cloaked its military growth in denial and secrecy
and will con- tinue to do so. Since the 1980s China has loudly championed the idea of a treaty to ban weapons in space, but since that
same period it has been devel- oping missile and laser space weapons. Former Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping once told
Richard Nixon that China “is against whoever goes in for development of outer space weapons.”3 • China is making very rapid
progress in applying high technology to gain new military capabilities, and future demonstrations in the areas of energy weapons,
nanoweapons, unmanned weapons, and cyberwarfare are very possible. • China is able to gather and assimilate advanced foreign
military technology rapidly. The DF-21 intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), which forms the basis for the PLA’s SC-19
ASAT and its new antiship ballistic missile, was perfected after China obtained U.S. missile motor technology. • China is focusing on
attacking key “asymmetric” vulnerabilities of the U.S. military, such as its growing dependence on space information systems, without
which the U.S. military cannot wage war. China’s Strategic Challenge 3 China’s construction of a military capability in outer space is
but one dimension of China’s future military-strategic challenge. For most of the years since 1992 China’s official military budget has
grown by double digits, or more than 10 percent, per year. In 2007 the official defense spending figure grew 17.8 percent, to an
official total of $44.9 billion. The U.S. Department of Defense has long disputed China’s bookkeeping and estimates the total is closer
to $125 billion. China strongly disputes this, and in mid-2007 former PLA intelligence chief Lt. General Zhang Qinsheng stated that
the annual increase “is mostly used to make up the retail price, improve welfare of the military personnel, and for better logistical
support.” Yet China’s military spending is also paying for the following programs: • Space warfare: Missile, space plane, and laserbased space weapons • Space information architecture: Surveillance, navigation, communications, and electronic intelligence (ELINT)
satellites • Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses: China is most likely developing an ABM system which could be deployed after
2020. • Manned moon presence: To secure China’s potential military and economic interests • Nuclear missiles: Three types of new
solid-fuel intercontinental and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (ICBMs/SLBMs) in or near deployment • Energy weapons: Highpower microwave weapons now deployed (lasers to follow?) • Fifth-generation combat jets: Two, possibly three fifth-generation
programs under way • Unmanned combat and surveillance jets: Three air companies have active programs. • Nuclear submarines:
New nuclear attack and ballistic-missile subs now being built • Aircraft carriers: Chinese naval officers, informally, say four to six
may be built. • Antiship ballistic missiles: A revolutionary weapon that only China is building • Large amphibious assault ships:
20,000-ton LPDs being built and an LHD in development • Large (60-ton capacity) airlifters: Proposals from both of China’s air
consortia • Airmobile army forces: developing new family of airmobile wheeled combat vehicles. In 2007 China was the only country
that was pursuing all of these expensive military construction and development programs. Each program requires an extensive
research, development, and production base, plus generations of engi- neers to develop follow-on systems. In many cases the United
States and Russia developed these capabilities only after several decades of effort, while China in most cases is able to compress its
development-production cycle into two decades, thanks to access to foreign technologies. Russia has more money for its military after
energy price spikes and, in 2007, announced plans for six nuclear 4 China’s Military Modernization aircraft carriers and a manned
moon program, though there is considerable reason to doubt these will succeed. But Russia does not have plans for a long range
amphibious projection fleet. The United States, by choice, has no active space weapons program. Furthermore, the United States is
modernizing only one solid-fuel ICBM (which will be armed with only one warhead) and is not building any nuclear ballistic-missile
submarines. Each of these programs listed above also represents an aspiration to global, not just regional military power. Although a
CARD CONTINUES
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China wont be deterred 2ac 2/
permanent Chinese manned moon presence may not happen until 2020 to 2030, most of these PLA programs either are being realized
now, or could be by the end of the next decade. The aspects of China’s military buildup that can be identified in 2007 may constitute
only the beginning of a military competition that could severely challenge Asia and the United States sooner rather than later. When
realized, the PLA pro- grams listed above may only allow China to approach an American level of military capability circa 2007 to
2010. But China is accumulating this similar spread of capabilities, with depth in some areas, at a breakneck pace. Chinese, U.S., and
other universities have trained a new generation of Chinese military engineers, many of whom are responsible for current militarytechnical break- throughs for China and have long careers ahead of them. American policy makers should consider that, increasingly,
it may be China that first develops the next-generation weapon system, not the United States or Russia.
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Indict To Richard Fisher “China’s Military Modernization”
Fisher’s Analysis about China is biased
Bo Hu, 18 May 2010 Journal of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies 2010, Book Review “Richard D.
Fisher Jr., ed. China’s Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach”
Fisher’s study makes two significant contributions to studies of CMM. First, his work provides invaluable descriptive information
about China’s military systems and capabilities as vividly illustrated by a number of data tables in his book. Fischer not only exploits
publicly available material such as speeches, news articles, expert analyses, and governments’ reports, but also draws upon materials
amassed during several visits to China. Besides his abundant details, he has also painted a comprehensive image of CMM. For
example, he provides a solid treatment of the PLA’s significant role in PRC’s politics as a pillar of the government and its foreign
policy. As well, he gives rich background on the revolutions in the PLA’s doctrines, operations, as well as high-technology and
military-industrial sectors. His analysis of the PLA’s weapons systems’ modernization is especially strong not only in documenting
the PLA’s achievements, but also in revealing the diverse paths the PLA has followed to modernize. Fischer is one of the few to give
such a comprehensive snapshot. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about some of his assessments. One reason is that he tends to
exaggerate the PLA’s capabilities. Looking at China’s air force, for instance, he draws conclusions about a possible China’s fifth
generation fighter using speculative media reports even though China’s third generation fighter (the J-10) has just achieved battle
effectiveness. There are other areas, too, where Fischer makes problematic analytical leaps. Moreover, in thinking about China’s
military capabilities, Fischer does not account for the PLA’s limited experience (relative to other major powers) in fighting modern
war. Fisher’s assessment about PLA intentions also is contestable. It is true that over the past fifteen years top PRC officials have paid
much attention to CMM and allocated considerable resources to modernize the PLA. It is also true that China has transformed its
military and will continue to do so. Even so, CMM hardly implies an intention to dominate Asia and control the world. Fischer should
have acknowledged two other factors driving CMM. One is a series of (perceived) hostile Western activities toward China since the
end of 1980s—e.g., the US intervention in the 1995–1996 Taiwan Crisis; the 1999 Belgrade Embassy bombing; and the 2001 EP-3
incident. Another driver of CMM is the great gap between the PLA’s capabilities and those of the developed world. A third problem
with the book which undermines its appeal is its somewhat biased treatment of China. Despite the focus on military “nuts and bolts,”
the book concludes that China is a potential adversary of the US and its allies merely because of its non-democratic regime.
Furthermore, he singles out CMM for the risk it poses to regional and global stability even though Japan and India also have ambitious
military modernization plans.d
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Uniqueness CP—Deter
The United States federal government should help Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and India develop
military self-sufficiency.
CP deters China and ensures security
Richard D. Fisher, Jr, Book “China’s Military Modernization”, Praeger Security International, Ch. 1, Pg. xiii, is a Senior Fellow,
International Assessment and Strategy Center (June 2004 to present) and the Director of the Center’s Project on Asian Security and
Democracy. He was formerly an Asian Security Fellow at the Center for Security Policy, editor of the Jamestown Foundation’s China
Brief, a Senior Fellow with the Republican Policy Committee of the House of Representatives and Director of the Asian Studies
Center of the Heritage Foundation. His articles and reports have appeared in numerous national newspapers and journals.Published by
Praeger Security International, September 2008
At present the United States is the security guarantor for South Korea and Japan explicitly, and implicitly for Taiwan. American
forces, however, have proved incapable of coping with the relatively minor military challenge of Iraq; our numbers of combatants and
platforms are steadily moving downward, and one suspects that after Iraq, overseas military operations will be so unpopular that
undertaking them—even those required by binding treaty—will be politi- cally impracticable. I find it inconceivable, for example, that
Washington would go into a major war, let alone a nuclear war, to defend Japan against China. By the same token, the United States is
singularly unenthusiastic about gen- uine military self-sufficiency on the part of her allies. Washington has prevented Seoul from
developing nuclear weapons, while China has acquiesced and most likely aided Pyongyang in the same pursuit. Washington has twice
prevented Taiwan from developing nuclear weapons, though the island state now has suf- ficient nuclear know-how to become
operational within six months. If and when Japan develops nuclear weapons, as she must unless she is willing to be coerced by the
nuclear states around her, Washington is likely to exert powerful nega- tive pressure (as in the Korean and Taiwanese cases) even
though the United States is no longer capable of ensuring the security of those states. The United States navy and air force will
continue to be decisive weights in Asian security. So too will American strategic and intelligence cooperation with countries such as
India, Australia, Taiwan, the Koreas, and Japan. But the United States by itself cannot and should not attempt to take on the task of
deterring China single-handed. Ultimately such deterrence can be accomplished only by states who will clearly take whatever
measures are necessary for their own defense. Japan or Taiwan would use weapons of mass destruction, if necessary, to defeat a
Chinese attack, as would Vietnam or India. But the United States would not, whatever the treaties may say. And short of that sort of
robust and credible capability China will not be deterred. The United States, then, has a largely offshore and cooperative role in the
maintenance of peace in Asia. The danger, ironically enough, is that she will become so convinced that China can be controlled absent
military deterrent that she will undermine the attempts of her own allies to become strong—as in the Korean and Taiwanese cases
mentioned. Time was when major wars began in Europe and spread to Asia. The failure to deter Japan in the 1930s led to the first allout Pacific War. Today the danger is that failure to deter China may have the same effect.
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Transition Reduces Conflict Frontline
Transition reduces conflict
Sapolsky, Friedman, Gholz Fall 2009 Harvey M. Sapolsky is a professor of public policy and organization at MIT. Benjamin
H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at Cato Institute. Eugene Gholz is an associate professor of
public affairs at the University of Texas at Austin. Daryl G. Press is an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College. Daryl
G. Press World Affairs “Restraining Order: For Strategic Modesty”
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Fall/full-Sapolsky-etal-Fall-2009.html
Restraint also rejects the idea that fixing failed states is a good way to protect America. Failed states are rarely hospitable
sanctuaries for terrorists—they inevitably get dragged into local fighting. The Afghanistan example is often deployed to
warn of the danger of failed states, but al-Qaeda was a guest of the country’s leaders, the Taliban. The problem was not
state failure, but state support. Equally important, failed states are usually produced by deep political cleavages, which the
United States cannot easily fix with a military intervention. Rather than try to solve the problem of state failure—which
needlessly ensnares the United States in faraway disputes—Washington should act against terrorist groups who plan to
attack Americans. A more preventive approach will simply produce hostility and run up bills. A common objection to the
strategy of restraint is that the absence of U.S. security guarantees and troops abroad will impel more nations to fend for
themselves and therefore build nuclear weapons, heightening proliferation. What this view misses is that U.S. military
hegemony is as likely to encourage nuclear proliferation, as states balance against us, as to prevent it. In addition, this
objection exaggerates the dangers of proliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons does not necessarily threaten the United
States. Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear forces by some of our friends will enhance their security and dampen their desire
for American guarantees. Even the spread of nuclear weapons to so-called rogue states is not overly threatening because we
can deter them. America’s non-proliferation efforts should focus on terrorists, whom we doubt can be reliably deterred.
Fortunately, developing nuclear weapons is not easy for a terrorist group. They face financial constraints, major technical
challenges (Pyongyang’s experience refutes the canard that it is simple to build an A-bomb), and trouble hiding their
activities from intelligence and police surveillance. U.S. intelligence agencies should continue to exploit these difficulties—
launching sting operations to catch rogue states or individuals who seek to pass nuclear material to terror groups and direct
action against terrorists who demonstrate an interest in obtaining such weapons.
ach of the two main strategic alternatives
to restraint, primacy and global engagement, suffers from major flaws. Primacists seek to contain peer-
competitors to
America, especially China. They hope to dissuade Beijing from building a military to match its growing economic power.
Some even want to destabilize the Beijing government by accelerating China’s liberalization in ways that would make
modernization difficult to control, or by trying to embarrass the government (militarily or otherwise) in a way that would
cause decades of political and economic disarray. Such an anti-China strategy is unwise. First, it is far from guaranteed that
China will continue its economic rise or successfully manage the social strains that its government already faces. And a
policy of active containment (let alone a policy of destabilization) may even make it easy for leaders in Beijing to rally
nationalist sentiment against the United States and distract attention from their own failings. This sort of anti-China strategy
accomplishes only one thing for sure: it turns tomorrow’s potential adversary into today’s certain one. A second strategic
alternative to restraint is to continue America’s muddled approach to international politics: global engagement, often
mistakenly called “selective engagement.” Advocates of this policy seek to protect the U.S. economy, as well as other
overseas interests, by enhancing international law and order. In this telling, the United States is the sheriff, working with
locals to keep the outlaws at bay while institutions for global governance take root. This strategy vastly overstates
America’s ability to engineer the global system. We lack the expertise to manage distant corners of the world, and our
efforts too often fan nationalist and tribal opposition. Ordering the world according to our liking involves picking winners
and losers. The losers will blame us for their problems, the winners will resent our role in their success, and both sides will
blame us when things go awry. Global activism costs us in two other crucial ways. First, it forces us to violate our values
when local stability requires tactical alliances with unsavory regimes. Second, it discourages our friends from becoming
self-reliant, leaving us with weaker partners when we truly need them. Restraint better protects American interests.
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Hegemony Declining Frontline
American leadership will inevitably decline
Jeremy Warner July 29 2011, The Telegraph “A US debt deal will be done, but it will offer only temporary respite”
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/jeremywarner/100011220/a-us-debt-deal-will-be-done-but-it-will-offer-only-temporary-respite/
It’s conceivable that the Federal Reserve could act to monetise the deficit by printing dollars to finance it, or simply cancel
the government debt it already has on its balance sheet, but many would think that a default in all but name. These are
nuclear options. The fallout would be extreme. Once default is viewed as inevitable, the interbank lending market would
freeze anew, prompting a second, global credit crunch on top of the violent contraction going on in the core of the US
economy. It would be the 1930s all over again. All this makes it pretty much unconscionable that a borrowing freeze will
be allowed to happen. Somehow or other, a way will be found to raise the debt ceiling. It may not be by much, but it will
buy a little time. A sticking plaster solution is better than no solution at all, but it won’t address the US’s underlying fiscal
problem and if the political stalemate continues in the meantime, we’ll only be back at the same point in six months to a
year’s time. A credit downgrade already looks pretty much a done deal. Uncertainty feeds economic stagnation, and so long
as nothing is done to reach a lasting solution, decisions on whether to build that new factory, take on extra workers, or
purchase the new automobile won’t get taken. Dollar hegemony has been under threat for a long time now, but whatever
the outcome of this latest political charade, it will come to be seen as a watershed moment when America finally lost the
plot and condemned herself to lasting decline. Can a country that puts political bickering before the interests of economic
and financial stability really be trusted with the world’s major reserve currency. I think not. The spell is broken. The age of
the mighty dollar is over. According to Winston Churchill, the US can in the end always be relied on to do the right thing,
but only after all other possibilities have been exhausted. I wish we could be sure it was still true.
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Hegemony Declining Extensions
Heg declining now
PROF. BÜLENT GÖKAY June 30 2011, Keele University, Turkish Review, Crisis exposes irresistible shift of economic power
eastwards, http://www.turkishreview.org/tr/newsDetail_getNewsById.action?newsId=223105
All indicators suggest the current financial crisis and economic downturn will confirm, and possibly accelerate, another
major shift in economic power; this time to emerging economies, China and India in particular. The acceleration of the
global economic power shift toward emerging economies is one of the most interesting results of the global economic
crisis. The economies to watch now are the so-called Emerging Seven (E-7): China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico,
Indonesia and Turkey. One could also add South Korea, South Africa, Vietnam and Nigeria to this group. According to a
PwC forecast, the combined GDP of the E-7 (corrected for purchasing power parity, or PPP) could overtake that of the G-7
countries by 2020. But they will not stop there; due to their much stronger growth potential, the E-7 economies are forecast
to then draw further ahead of the G-7, with combined E-7 GDP, again corrected for PPP, projected by PwC as being around
30 percent higher by 2030 than total G-7 GDP. The IMF predicts that despite the emerging economies’ cooling momentum,
they will still provide a source of resilience well into the future, benefiting from strong growth in productivity and
improved policy frameworks. In its November 2008 report, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,” the US National
Intelligence Council stated: “The international system – as constructed following the Second World War – will be almost
unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, an historic transfer of relative wealth
and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of nonstate actors.” At the conclusion of his widely
popular 1987 study of the global political economy, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,” English-born and Oxfordtrained Yale historian Paul Kennedy observed: “The task facing American statesmen over the next decades […] is to
recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the
United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly” (“The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000,” 1989). In chronicling the decline of the US as a global power, Kennedy compared
measures of US economic health, such as its levels of industrialization and growth of real GNP, against those of Europe,
Russia and Japan. What he found was a shift in the global political economy over the last 50 years, generated by underlying
structural changes in the organization of its financial and trading systems. Kennedy’s theory about a structural decline in
US power is shared by other critical thinkers, who similarly view global political economy through a historic lens. Andre
Gunder Frank (“ReOrient,” 1998), Emmanuel Todd (“After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order,” 2002),
Giovanni Arrighi (“Adam Smith in Beijing: Lineages of the Twenty-First Century,” 2007), Niall Ferguson (“The Ascent of
Money,” 2008), and Fareed Zakaria (“The Post-American World,” 2008) all used history to argue that US power is
declining in parallel to a rise of regional powers, particularly China. In their view, this decline is not the consequence of
“bad behavior,” even if bad behavior has occurred, but is the function of structural changes that have occurred as the global
economy attempts to adapt to changing historical circumstances.
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No Asian Prolif
Asia prolif is stable – small arsenals guarantee and command and control systems are fine.
Cha, 2001
[Victor, Associate Prof. Gov. and School of Foreign Service – Georgetown U., Journal of Strategic Studies,
“The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, 24:4,
InformaWorld]
These arguments also fail to comprehend how the bipolar superpower experience has greatly prejudiced our thinking on nuclear
deterrence and stability. As Goldstein notes, the conventional wisdom demonstrates an insufficient appreciation of the uniqueness
rather than generalizability of the superpower experience.78 For example, organizational arguments assume that the profile of the
Asian programs as small and underdeveloped make them more prone to accidents, 'loose nukes', or inadvertent use. However, if the
arsenals are small in size and few in number, they are, as a general rule, easier to monitor and control. In addition, many of the
organizational pathologies made famous by Sagan require complexity in the nuclear infrastructure and decision-making trees - a
precondition that is irrelevant in Asia because the infrastructures are basic and in many cases, divorced from the military bureaucracy
(another pathology often mentioned).79 In a similar vein, poor command, control, and communications infrastructures in Asia
empirically have not resulted in 'use-or-lose' mentalities but have bred more caution (e.g. Indo-Pakistan conflicts). Limited overhead
and reconnaissance capabilities have not encouraged confidence in the ability to hide one's arsenals but have discouraged confidence
in carrying out successful first strikes. In addition, many of these small fledgling programs, by virtue of resource constraints, remain at
underdeveloped stages (i.e., dealerted, de-targeting, disassembled weapons systems, separated warheads from delivery vehicles).80
Therefore, until an accident or outcome confirms the organizational school's view in the second nuclear age, and given what is now
being unearthed about the near-misses and near-disasters in the first nuclear age, there is no a priori reason to assume a necessary
causal connection between small programs and de-stabilizing outcomes.
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AT Asian Prolif Bad – Nuclear Use
Nuclear taboo will still apply
Cha, 2001
[Victor, Associate Prof. Gov. and School of Foreign Service – Georgetown U., Journal of Strategic Studies,
“The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia”, 24:4,
InformaWorld]
Proliferation pessimists do not deny the existence of the nuclear taboo; they do, nevertheless, see this taboo as shared only by First
World proliferators. Is this a fair assessment? As Tannenwald argues, a taboo takes effect when the agent realizes (1) the
exceptionalist nature of the weapon (i.e., in terms of its destructive power); (2) the absence of effective defenses (i.e., vulnerability);
(3) and fears the political and social consequences of taking such an action. All of these conditions readily hold for new nuclear
powers. Moreover, the revulsion against nuclear weapons use (first-use) has become so institutionalized in an array of international
agreements and practices such that new NWS states operate in an environment that severely circumscribes the realm of legitimate
nuclear use.90 Proliferation pessimists therefore underestimate the transformative effects of nuclear weapons on these new
proliferators. They assume that the interests for aspiring nuclear powers remain constant in the pre- and post-acquisition phases. They
do not consider that once states cross the nuclear threshold, they become acutely aware of the dangers and responsibilities that come
with these new awesome capabilities. The likelihood of such a learning process occurring is even higher if nuclear weapons are valued
for their political currency. As noted above, while security needs certainly drive proliferation in Asia, a predominant factor that cannot
be disentangled from this dynamic is the striving for prestige and international recognition as an NWS state. Moreover, if the taboo
equates the use of nuclear weapons with an 'uncivilized' or 'barbarian' state," then those states that are status-conscious will be that
much more attuned to the taboo. The effects of the taboo on Asian proliferators are therefore both regulative and constitutive. In the
former sense, as these states further embed themselves in the international community (discussed below), this change heightens the
costs of breaking any rules regarding nuclear use. The taboo's constitutive effects also are evident in that any use would undermine
one of the primary purposes for which the capabilities were sought (e.g., prestige, badge of modernity). Although it is still relatively
early in the game, there is some evidence that the acquisition of nuclear capabilities has been accompanied by a change in preferences
about what is acceptable behavior. While India has rejected any notions that it might roll back its newfound capability, it had readily
admitted that as an incipient nuclear weapons state, it now has certain responsibilities that include a no-first-use policy and not sharing
nuclear weapons technology with other irresponsible states.92 Similarly, Pakistan previously placed little value and even resented
nonproliferation norms as these were seen as inhibiting and degrading to the national character.93 Otherwise, they might have been
swayed by the benefits of not responding to the Indian tests as a shining example of a country adhering to nuclear nonproliferation
norms. Arguably it is only after becoming an incipient nuclear weapons state that such arguments about nonproliferation gain value.
Nowhere is this perverse dynamic more evident than in both sides' views of the CTBT. Previously perceived as an instrument intended
to preempt nuclear spread beyond the first age, the CTBT is now arguably seen by India and Pakistan in less antagonistic terms, and
even among some, as a responsibility to be borne as a nuclear state.
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Nuclear Weapons Deter
Nuclear weapons have an important stabilizing role in Asia
Alagappa, 2008
[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and
Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa, p. x]
A chief conclusion of the study is that although they are not in the forefront, nuclear weapons continue to be important. They cast a
long shadow that informs in fundamental ways the strategic policies of the major powers and their allies with far-reaching
consequences for security and stability in the Asian security region. Although strategic defense and the counterforce role may increase
in significance, deterrence will continue to be the dominant role and strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons. Deterrence,
however, operates largely in a condition of asymmetry and with smaller nuclear forces. Some view this condition and the increase in
the number of non-Western nuclear weapons states as destabilizing. The study argues that although it is possible to envisage
destabilizing situations and consequences, thus far nuclear weapons have had a stabilizing effect in Asian security region. They have
contributed to regional stability by assuaging the national security concerns of vulnerable states, strengthening deterrence and the
status quo, inducing caution, preventing the outbreak and escalation of major hostilities, and reinforcing the trend in the region that
deemphasizes the offense role of force and increases the salience of defense, deterrence, and assurance. Extended deterrence and
assurance continue to be crucial in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. The study posits that the Cold War
nuclear order is not in sync with present realities and must be substantially adapted or constructed anew with a focus on Asia to
address five key issues: sustaining deterrence in a condition of asymmetry and discouraging destabilizing capabilities and strategies;
accommodating new nuclear weapon states; preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states; preventing proliferation to
nonstate actors; and supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy with adequate safeguards. These and other fidning of the study may
be controversial and contested by those who see nuclear weapons as the primary drivers of insecurity and perceive the world through
the dangers of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.
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Nuclear Weapons Deter
Asian proliferation promotes stability – they compensate strategic vulnerabilities
Alagappa, 2009
[Distinguished Senior Fellow at the East-West Center, Spring 2009, Muthiah, Journal of the East Asia
Foundation, “Nuclear Weapons Reinforce Security and Stability in 21st Century Asia,”
http://globalasia.org/articles/issue9/iss9_17.html]
NO FUNDAMENTAL DISRUPTION IN POWER DISTRIBUTION OR INTENSIFICATION OF SECURITY
DILEMMAS
Nuclear weapons have not disrupted or destabilized the overall distribution of power or fundamentally altered the patterns
of amity and enmity in the Asian security region. The unipolar structure of the present system and the anticipated changes
in the distribution of power in the Asian security region are consequences of change in the overall national power of states
that has several dimensions. Military power is an important component of national power; and having nuclear weapon s
makes a significant difference in national military capability. However, military power by itself is not a sufficient basis for
major power status. The enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons is also less fungible and less relevant to the
pursuit of high priority non-traditional security goals. Nuclear weapons add to but are not a sufficient basis of national
power. The present dominance of the United States, the decline in the position of Russia, and the rise of China and India are
not due to their nuclear weapon capabilities. U.S. dominance is grounded in its vast lead in several dimensions of power.
Although Russia still has a formidable nuclear arsenal, it is not a superpower or even a top-tier regional power in Asia.
China has long had nuclear weapons but only since the mid-1990s has it been recognized as a major power. The rapid and
substantial increase in China’s national power and the apprehension it creates are primarily due to its sustained high rate of
economic growth, which in turn produces the resources for accumulating and exercising international power and influence.
Likewise, the rise in the power and status of India is due in large measure to its economic growth, political stability, change
in foreign policy, technological advancement, and human resource potential. Although they do not affect the regional
distribution of power, nuclear weapons strengthen weaker powers by canceling or mitigating the effects of imbalance in
conventional and nuclear weapon capability and thereby reducing their strategic vulnerability. By threatening nuclear
retaliation and catastrophic damage in the event of large-scale conventional or nuclear attack, and exploiting the risk of
escalation to nuclear war, weaker powers with nuclear weapons constrain the military options of a stronger adversary. This
is most evident in the cases of Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. Pakistan is much weaker than India in several dimensions
of national power. It suffered defeats in two of the three conventional wars it fought with India in the prenuclear era, with
the 1971 war resulting in humiliating defeat and dismemberment. In the nuclear era, which dates from the late 1980s,
Islamabad has been able to deter India from crossing into Pakistan proper and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir even in the
context of Pakistani military infiltration into Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1999. India did not follow through with the
limited-war option in 2001–02 because of the grave risk it entailed. India was also forced in part by the risk of nuclear war
to engage in a comprehensive dialogue to explore settlement of disputes between the two countries, including the Kashmir
conflict. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal has blunted the potency of India’s large conventional military force. Although it has not
canceled out all the consequences of the large power differential between the two countries, it has had significant
constraining impact on India’s military options and assuaged Pakistan’s concern about the Indian threat. The leveling and
cautionary effects of nuclear weapons are also evident in the relationship of the weak and isolated North Korea with the
vastly superior United States. Although North Korea does not have an operational nuclear arsenal and the United States can
destroy that country many times over, the risk of quick and substantial damage to its forces and allies in the region induces
caution and constrains U.S. military options. If in the future North Korea develops nuclear weapons and marries them to its
missile capability, the risks associated with preventive military action against that country would multiply. Instead of
simply suffering the will of the mighty United States, North Korea’s nascent capability has provided it with security and
bargaining leverage in its negotiations with major powers in the region (Park and Lee 2008). The security effect of an
opaque nuclear force like that of Israel is more difficult to demonstrate, especially as that country also has superior
conventional military capability.
Card continues card continues
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Nukes deter 2/
Nevertheless it is possible to argue that the Arab countries’ tacit acceptance of Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture has
contributed to Israel’s security and to regional stability by lowering the intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in some
instances even contributed to peace settlements, like that between Israel and Egypt (Cohen 2008). Israel perceives nuclear
weapons are the ultimate security guarantee. They enhance Israel’s self-confidence and demonstrate its resolve to survive.
For non-nuclear weapon states like Japan and South Korea, the U.S. extended deterrence commitments have been a
significant factor in assuaging their security vulnerabilities in the wake of the North Korean nuclear test. Both countries
insisted on reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment, and Japan is exploring measures to increase the credibility of that
commitment. In reassuring Japan, the U.S. commitment is a significant factor along with others in forestalling exploration
of an independent nuclear option by that country. The U.S. commitment enables South Korea to maintain a nonnuclear
posture, provides time to build a self-reliant defense capability, and is a fallback in dealing with a nuclear-armed North
Korea.
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WEAPONS SPEC
The aff must define what a space weapon is
Oberg, 7 --22-year veteran of NASA mission control (James, the space review, “Phony space weaponization: the case of Radarsat-2.”
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/886/1_)
Diplomats know it is hard enough defining what is and is not a “space weapon”, and that this difficulty has stymied productive
discussions of treaty controls over their proliferation (see“Space weapons: hardware, paperware, beware?”, The Space Review, November
13, 2006). Something as innocuous as a screwdriver, thrust through a pressure hose, becomes a means of destruction—a “weapon”. But
something as dangerous as a handgun, packed into a Soyuz survival kit, gets treated (by Russian demand) as a “survival tool” exempt
from any weapons treaty. Now, to add to the murkiness, there’s the phenomenon of falsely accusing a space vehicle of being a
“weapon”. For domestic or international political propaganda profits, innuendo or outright accusations against a project can be issued,
perhaps significantly degrading the project’s international partnerships and agreements. It’s even possible that the accusations are
sincere, based on delusions and misconceptions about space flight on the part of the accusers. However, more likely the propagandists are
relying on exploiting the biases and misconceptions they know exist in their target audiences.
Standards
a) Logical policymakers can’t enact vague plans
b) Education – key to in-depth clash over specific actions of the plan
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China Won’t Attack Taiwan
China invasion won’t happen
Ivan Eland February 5, 2003 “The China-Taiwan Military Balance Implications for the United States”
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb74.pdf
Because China’s highest priority is economic growth, the disruption of such economic relationships is a disincentive for China to take
aggressive actions vis-à-vis Taiwan. Any attack short of invasion (splashing more mis- siles or instituting a naval blockade) would
likely harm the Taiwanese economy and dis- rupt Chinese trade and financial contacts with Taiwan and other developed nations
without getting China what it most wants— control of Taiwan. An amphibious invasion, in the unlikely event that it succeeded, would
provide such control but would cause even greater disruption in China’s commercial links to developed nations—probably result- ing
in economic sanctions against China and a reduction of vital foreign investment there. Even the Pentagon notes: “China apparently . . .
is sensitive to the potential political and economic costs that it could incur from war with Taiwan. . . . To that end, Beijing has avoided
activities that might threaten its eco- nomic growth and access to foreign markets, investments, and technology.”3 In addition, an
examination of the most likely conflict scenarios indicates that China’s ability to succeed in intimidating or overrunning Taiwan has
been overstated. Amphibious Assault An amphibious assault on Taiwan is the least likely Chinese military option because of its low
probability of success. Even with- out U.S. assistance, the Taiwanese have the advantage of defending an island. An amphibious
assault—that is, attacking over water and landing against defended posi- tions—is one of the hardest and most risky military
operations to execute. In the Normandy invasion of 1944, the Allies had strategic surprise, air and naval supremacy, crushing naval
gunfire support, and a ground force coming ashore that was vastly superior in numbers to that of the Germans. Yet even with all those
advantages, the Allies had some difficulty establishing beachheads. In any amphibious assault on Taiwan, China would be unlikely to
have strategic surprise, air or naval supremacy (Taiwan’s air and naval forces are currently superior to those of the Chinese),4 or
sufficient naval gunfire support, and its landing force would be dwarfed by the Taiwanese army and reserves. Furthermore, the
inhospitable Taiwan Strait and the limited number of Taiwanese beaches are likely to make such an attack difficult.
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CO Space Mil Updates
DDI 2011
1
Lasers Don’t Work
Lasers are ineffective
Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell “Star Crossed” IEEE Spectrum March 2005 INT
www.princeton.edu/.../IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf
For satellites with a reach shorter than 3000 km, such as kineticenergy weapons, the number of satellites escalates. For a 500-km
range, one would need 600 satellites for global coverage. The main point is that many weapons need to be orbiting to ensure that just
one weapon is available to strike any possible target at any given time. A particular challenge for space-based lasers is their vulnerability to countermeasures. As mentioned before, even the highest power lasers do not penetrate clouds or smoke. Some wavelengths
cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere, including those used by the hydrogen-fluorine chemical laser currently proposed for the spacebased laser for missile defense. For ground targets, smoke pots could disrupt an attack already in progress. Vulnerability is increased
by the need to keep the laser on tar- get for, typically, tens of seconds at least. The target could move in an unpredictable path or
simply be covered with reflective coating or paint, which could increase the time required for a successful kill by a factor of 10 or
more. A layer of titanium oxide powder, for instance, could reflect 99.9 percent of the incident laser energy. Even a shallow pool of
dyed water would offer serious protection. Since a 20-MW laser boils water at a rate of 10 kg/s, a pool of water about 3 centimeters
deep on the flat roof of a two-car garage would protect against 100 seconds of illumination by a space-based laser. This all adds up to
abundant opportunity to thwart laser weapons. Meanwhile, the laser would be burning its supply of hydrogen and fluorine at a rate of
500 kg/s. Over the course of 100 seconds, it would consume 50 tons of fuel, for which the launch costs alone are about half a billion
dollars. The issue of energy requirements warrants a closer look. Today, the most efficient high-power lasers typically consume 2 to 3
kg of chemical fuel per megawatt-second. So a pulse of 20 seconds from a 10-MW laser corresponds to about 400 to 600 kg of fuel
per tar- get in the absence of any countermeasures. At current launch costs of some $22 000/kg into low-Earth orbit, each 20-second
laser shot would cost approximately $11 million.
Lasers fail to cause damage
Richard L. Garwin, R. Scott Kemp, and Jeremy C. Marwell “Star Crossed” IEEE Spectrum March 2005 INT
www.princeton.edu/.../IEEE%20Spectrum%20-%20Star%20Crossed.pdf
Directed-energy weapons propagate their energy at the speed of light, so their effects begin with no appreciable delay beyond the time
necessary to acquire a target and point the laser. However, to have the desired effect, the beam must remain on target for some time.
For example, to attack a ballistic missile, a space-based 3-MW laser with a 3-meter diameter mirror stationed 1000 kilometers above
Earth’s surface, in low-Earth orbit (LEO), requires an impractical 2 hours and 13 minutes to burn through the rocket casing at a range
of 3000 km; a 30-MW laser with a 10-meter diameter mirror in the same orbit and at the same range would take a more reasonable 80
seconds [see illus- tration, “Light Saber”]. For comparison, the entire flight of an intercontinental ballistic missile, from launch to
impact, would last only about 45 minutes. “Burn” time aside, directed-energy weapons’ speed-of- light propagation cannot be matched
by any other weapon. This feature suits them well for targets in remote locations or beyond the reach of conventional forces, such as
the launch facil- ity described in the opening scenario. But even if the target’s loca- tion is known precisely, the laser is useless if
clouds or smoke inter- vene; it has other shortcomings, too, which will be described later.
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