University of Gothenburg
Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science
Unity Among Environmentalists?
A critical examination of Bryan Norton's
Convergence Hypothesis
Bachelor's Thesis in Practical Philosophy
Spring 2011
Author: Andreas Ott
Advisor: Joakim Sandberg
1
The environment is man's first right
We should not allow it to suffer blight
The air we breathe we must not poison
They who do should be sent to prison
Our streams must remain clean all season
Polluting them is clearly treason
The land is life for man and flora,
Fauna and all: should wear that aura,
Protected from the greed and folly
Of man and companies unholy.
By Ken Saro-Wiwa1
1 Ken Saro-Wiwa, ”Right Livelihood Award Acceptance Speech”, Stockholm, Sweden, 9 December 1994.
2
Table of contents
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1. Purpose of the paper ............................................................................................................ 4
2. Background: Differing worldviews among environmentalists ........................................................ 5
2.1. What is the convergence hypothesis? .................................................................................. 5
3. The arguments for the convergence hypothesis ............................................................................... 7
3.1. Agreement on a scientific approach .................................................................................... 7
3.2. Agreement about the value of future generations................................................................ 8
3.3. Agreement on risk management ........................................................................................ 10
4. Criticism against the Convergence Hypothesis.............................................................................. 10
4.1. Weak anthropocentrism? ................................................................................................... 10
4.1.1. Is ”weak anthropocentrism” anthropocentrism at all? ........................................... 11
4.2. The proposed convergence is only contingent .................................................................. 12
4.3. Weak anthropocentism is not a moral stance .................................................................... 12
4.4. Anthropocentism and non-anthropocentrism will not converge ....................................... 14
4.5. Differences regarding risk management............................................................................ 16
4.5.1. A dilemma regarding the scientific uncertainty .....................................................20
4.6. There are no obligations to preserve all of “our” current species ..................................... 22
5. Summary ........................................................................................................................................ 23
6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 25
7. Bibliography................................................................................................................................... 26
7.1. Articles .............................................................................................................................. 26
3
1. Introduction
The environmental movement has often been seen as a motley collection of interest groups,
displaying a wide range of worldviews and value conceptions. These groups have long been
debating about which is the ”correct” worldview and how we ought to act toward non-human
entities and nature.
Refusing to take stance in their debate, the pragmatist Bryan G. Norton seeks to find their
common denominator, in an attempt to understand why all these different groups champion
environmentalism. Indeed he finds commonalities and he finds them so fortunately alike, that he
argues for an emerging unity between these diverse groups. The unity is not total though, their value
conceptions and goals differ too much for this to be possible, but what Norton proposes is that they
will (and should) converge regarding what policies to promote for society in its relation to nature.
It is this, Norton's theory of an emerging consensus on policies between a wide range of different
environmentalist groups, provided they are ”consistent and reasonable”, that is called the
convergence hypothesis.
1.1. Purpose of the paper
I intend to examine the convergence hypothesis, as well as some of the criticism that is raised
against it, in order to find out whether such a convergence seem plausible or not.
In order to do this, I will not do any empirical research to see if this is likely, even though the
hypothesis in question is indeed an empirical thesis, based as it is on a conception of
environmentalists' faith (their value conceptions). Instead I will focus my attention to his
axiological claims about environmentalists2, which he insist prove the emerging convergence. I will
not so much question these claims, but instead find out if they offer sufficient grounds for his thesis.
2 That is, Norton's claims regarding what environmentalists judge as good and right.
4
2. Background: Differing worldviews among environmentalists
Environmentalists can be classified into two3 different types, or groups: anthropocentrist and nonanthropocentrists. Where they differ is in their value conceptions. Anthropocentrists, who can also
be called human-centered, believe that only4 humans are bearers of value for their own sake. Other
entities can have value only if they are somehow valuable for humans. It is however often thought
that weather something has value or not depends on if it is, in fact, valued by humans or not, we can
call this “strong anthropocentrism”, but this does not necessarily have to be the case.
Non-anthropocentrists on the other hand claim that there are values that are independent of
humans. Entities can have intrinsic5 value, that is value for their own sake. This group can in turn be
divided into several subgroups who differ in what can have intrinsic value and thereby moral status.
Sentientists claim that all animals (individuals) with the ability to have (feel) experiences can have
moral status. Biocentrists promote all living entities (all animals as well as plants) as having moral
status as individuals. Ecocentrists extend the moral status, in a way, even further in claiming that
ecosystems as such are of the most central importance and thereby have the supreme moral status.
Other living individual entities (or species) might have moral status but this status is still inferior to
those of the ecosystems as wholes. At last we can also note the Deep ecologists who see nature as a
spiritual source and share both the ecocentrists' and the biocentrists' claim of who has moral status
but also include non-living objects such as rock formations or other natural wholes that can be seen
as spiritual shrines as well as species as such. Even though it appears quite obvious that these claims
cannot be given equal status, an answer to the question of which is the most valued or important one
is hard to find.
2.1. What is the convergence hypothesis?
Since both anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists exist and cooperate within the environmental movement there is obviously something that they both strive for, that is, some goal they
have in common. As an answer to what this is, Norton accentuates that both anthropocentrists and
3 It is of course possible to find many groups or types of people and worldviews among environmentalists but all of
these can be classified as either anthropocentrists or non-anthropocentrists.
4 There are however some anthropocentrists who holds that other beings can have value for their own sake but still
consider human values superior to the values of other entities. On this view it is still plausible to let human
preferences and goods override the perhaps greater preferences and goods of other, lesser valued, beings.
5 Intrinsic value can have some different meanings but as for my purpose with the paper it suffices to note that it is
independent of humans, weather as valuers or source for a derived value.
5
non-anthropocentrists are dependent on (at least some) preservation of the environment on which
their valued entities/beings are dependent, and so they should all agree to preserve the integrity6 of
the environment. Norton writes:
Environmentalists emphasize “total diversity”7 and biological complexity because the complex
processes that constitute biological systems are the larger context of all life, human and nonhuman. Rapid alternation of those larger systems will cause serious disruption of both human
and nonhuman activities. Land must therefore be used according to patterns that protect the
complex processes of nature, so as to avoid destabilizing changes, changes in environing
systems that are too rapid to allow human activities and nonhuman processes to respond and
adapt. (Norton, 1991 p.189)
This shared desire to preserve the necessary processes in our environment that make it possible for
our values to persist and thrive, is by Norton recognized as a will to preserve our (and/or others)
context. He calls this contextualism.
Considering this common denominator and that environmentalists also share a belief in our
having obligations toward future generations and their well being, Norton proposes his theory of an
emerging unity between anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists – The convergence hypothesis.
Norton suggests that this hypothesis has a dual status: (i) an empirical and practical one which is
easily observable because both anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists will in reality promote
the same principles. (ii) an axiological one8 which springs from the fact that both anthropocentrists
and non-anthropocentrists (at least those Norton considers reasonable) share the same value axioms
and also embrace the same definition of ecosystem health.
The convergence hypothesis is limited to what policies the environmentalists promote and
should promote, given their worldview. But even if the environmentalists are united in their policy
goals, there is still plenty, though limited, room for internal disputes concerning priorities and
definitions of the policies' strength and meaning.
The convergence hypothesis, or rather its grounds, explain why both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric environmentalists ought to embrace and promote contextual thinking and the “Safe
6 The integrity of an ecosystem should be understood as “the complex, interrelated levels, changing in different scales
of time”. (Norton, 1991 p.145)
7 ”Total diversity” is a product of both within-habitat diversity and cross-habitat diversity and is considered the most
important measure of biological variation in a geographical region. (Norton, 1991 p.145)
8 Norton calls it ”an article of environmentalists' faith” (Norton, 1991 p.240) It is important to note that while it is not
labeled as empirical, environmentalists' conceptions of value are of course possible to empirically determine too.
This empirical knowledge is however harder to get as it requires interviews or some other method of collecting
reliable data, in contrast the empirical research needed in (i) is more simple as it only require that one study their
actual proposals and work.
6
Minimum Standard of Conservation” (or SMS) strategy (which will be explained in below) - their
values (which indeed differ) both rely on preserving the context on which they (or the subjects of
their concern) are dependent.
3. The arguments for the convergence hypothesis
Though it is not an argument, it is important to be aware of that what Norton is referring to as
anthropocentrism is a special sort of anthropocentism which he calls “weak anthropocentrism”. It is
weak in the sense that it does not always suggest the actions or principles that humans actually
prefer or want (their preferences) nor does it rely on what would promote the greatest happiness for
humans (at least this is not the reason for choosing it). Instead, what weak anthropocentrism is
about is to promote humanity as a species or, more specifically, any chosen culture over time. What
is right is what is best for mankind or those in that culture in the long run. This is similar to critical
ethical theories (or considered judgments) that promote only those actions or characteristics that in
fact are the best for the agent(s) but it is not on an individual but on a holistic level.
3.1. Agreement on a scientific approach
Norton accentuates that environmentalists, when they formulate policies, embrace a scientific
worldview which relies heavily on ecology. He lists five axioms, which in conjunction with an
associated definition of ecosystem health (explained below) constitute a common ground for both
anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists. They are also the reasons for the both environmentalist
camps to unite on promoting contextualism. The axioms are:
1.The Axiom of Dynamism. Nature is more profoundly a set of processes than a collection of
objects; all is in flux.
2.The Axiom of Relatedness. All processes are related to all other processes.
3.The Axiom of Systematicity. Processes are not related equally, but unfold in systems within
systems, which differ mainly regarding the temporal and spatial scale on which they are
organized.
4.The Axiom of Creativity. The autonomous processes of nature are creative and represent the
basis for all biologically based productivity.
5.The Axiom of Differential Fragility. Ecological systems, which form the context of all human
activities, vary in the extent to which they can absorb and equilibrate human-caused disruptions
in their autonomous processes. (Norton, 1991 p.193)
7
The definition of ecosystem health is: ”An ecological system is healthy only when its creative
processes, represented by the free flow of energy and active competition to utilize it, remain
intact.” (Norton, 1991 p.193)
A point Norton stresses, is the sort of relativism imbedded in the contextualism:
Contextual thinking encourages us to value actions differently depending on the contexts in
which they are analyzed. This scientific model provides the general structure for an integrated
system of value9, with different values taking precedence in different management contexts.
This approach to environmental ethics has the considerable advantage that it localizes and
regionalizes the environmental ethic. (Norton, 1991 p.242)
As a result of this, a failure to formulate and live according to such an ethic would result in a
cultural suicide. As Norton writes: “The culture of an area can be passed on only if the
autonomously functioning context that gives meaning to that culture is preserved.” (Norton, 1991
p.242) This argument gains further strength when it is combined with the axiom for Future Value
that will be explained below.
3.2. Agreement about the value of future generations
An important concern is whether environmentalists care or if they even should care about future
generations. Norton claims that all (at least all reasonable and consistent) environmentalists in fact
do care about future generations and that his contexualist model is the best suited one to properly
explain this, because of its holism.
In addition to contextualism, Norton needs an explanation for inter-temporal obligations that fits
the environmentalists' concern for future generations. He thereby proposes the individual value
axiom:
The Axiom for Future Value: The continuance and thriving of the human species (and its
9 For monistic value theories the question of how to prioritize different possible actions (or sets of actions/policies) is
(or at least should be) a non-existing question as the different outcomes appears on the same value scale. However a
pluralist value system need some directions or policies for what to do when different values (on different scales)
promote different actions. If for example a pluralist system acknowledges two different value scales right-wrong and
good-bad it might be that a right option promotes bad consequences but the wrong option promotes good
consequences. If there is no guidelines for what to pick in a situation like that a pluralist theory of value looks quite
implausible. However if there exist directions or policies that points to what value scale to promote in different
situations it certainly seems more plausible. This is what Norton refers to as an “integrated” system of value, that
though it is a pluralistic value system, it has guidelines for what actions one should promote in different situations.
8
evolutionary successors) is a good thing, and every generation is obliged to do what is necessary
to perpetuate that good. The obligation to perpetuate and protect the human species is therefore
accepted as a fundamental moral axiom, which exists independently of obligations to
individuals. (Norton, 1991 p.216)
This axiom completes what Norton ascribes to environmentalists:
environmentalists believe that there are biological and climatological constraints and that these
correspond to moral constraints limiting the extent to which any generation could fairly degrade
the world's resources. Believing this, it is not surprising that environmentalists also believe that
we are morally required to undertake stabilizing actions when projections show that trends in
individual behavior threaten a biological or climatological threshold and institute accelerating
changes in the environing systems. (Norton, 1991 p.218)
In order to understand and describe how such constraints could be formulated, Norton suggests a
modified version of John Rawls' Veil of Ignorance, where a self-interested individual from behind a
veil of intergenational ignorance “must design a society that he would be willing to live in without
knowing the generation in which he is going to live.” (Norton, 1991 p.217) It is Norton's strong
belief that such ignorance and circumstances would make this individual ”choose a society that
would struggle to delineate parameters and thresholds, based on the best models of biology,
ecology, climatology, and so on.” (Norton, 1991 p.217) This indeed seems to be in accordance with
his listed axioms.
The fact that Norton exemplifies with Rawls' Veil of Ignorance should not be understood as if he
intends such normative force as Rawls intends. Norton's point is rather to show how policies
regarding obligations to future generations, formulated by weak anthropocentric (or nonanthropocentric) environmentalists would look like.
In a later work Norton argue that future generations have a birthright to wilderness and
presumably also (at least certain) wild species. In an article about wolf policies in Norway he argue:
I believe that the loss of wolves and bears from Norway would be a terrible loss to future
Norwegians. Members of future generations of Norwegians, if they feel profoundly the loss of
wilderness experiences, might judge harshly those who have sacrificed their birthright of
wildness for a few sheep. [...] we ought not to destroy forever the possibility of humans having
the experience of hearing a wild wolf howl. [...] We must recognize that wildlife belongs just not
to that particular “timeslice” of a human community that currently occupies a place, but to a
9
multigenerational community including persons not yet born. (Norton, 1999 p.397-398)
Norton stresses “the importance of holding opportunities and options open for the future, and on the
necessity in some cases for environmentalists to be advocates for people not yet born, when the
interests of the future clash to sharply with current attitudes of some communities.” (Norton, 1999
p.398)
3.3. Agreement on risk management
If we accept that Norton ascribes environmentalists the axioms above, it is clear that they will all
share contextualism and have a scientific approach. Furthermore, Norton argues, given the constant
scientific uncertainty (even if we indeed can claim to know much we can never claim to know all
there is to know), all environmentalists will also promote what he calls ”the Safe Minimum
Standard of Conservation” (SMS). This is because SMS has both scientific support and is intended
to protect the context. SMS is a policy that tells us to protect species and ecological systems
provided that the costs are bearable10. What shall be considered ”bearable” here is of course a
ground for controversy between different groups, and of course Norton recognizes that. What is
important to note is that the groups, while they might be battling how bearable is to be understood,
still agree on the policy. And that is Norton's point.
4. Criticism against the Convergence Hypothesis
The emerging unity and the convergence hypothesis that Norton suggest has received quite much
critique. Most criticism, at least of what I have read, has come from non-anthropocentrists. The
criticism regards both Norton's assumptions and whether there really are any prospects for his
suggested unity on policies. I have primarily looked at, and examined, three responses to Norton
from three different philosophers, Holmes Rolston III, Brian K. Steverson and Laura Westra, who
all three come with interesting thoughts and I will of course both comment on these and write some
own thoughts about the hypothesis and other relevant issues.
4.1. Weak anthropocentrism?
Holmes Rolston III finds Norton's weak anthropocentrism to be remarkably controversial which has
to be considered a bit odd for a pragmatic stance. For as he accentuates, it is necessary to soften up
10 Norton, 1991 p.225
10
the anthropocentrism, which Norton finds less demanding to defend than any non-anthropocentric
counterpart, in order to make a union with non-anthropocentrism possible. Rolston writes:
Norton does not make his anthropomorphism easy or classical at all. He demands a radically
transcending vision, first of the individual self on behalf of the larger goods of the human
community, and, equally radically, of what is good for the human community. (Rolston, 2009
p.99)
Even if weak anthropocentrism might seem radical and controversial, this stance is just the result of
what Norton identifies as the ”natural” goal for the environmentalist movement when all their
values have been identified and assembled into a coherent theory. Weak anthropocentrism is
therefore no more controversial than environmental movement itself, provided that their values,
identified by Norton, are correct and that it can still remain within the boundaries of
anthropocentrism (which will be examined in the following section).
4.1.1. Is ”weak anthropocentrism” anthropocentrism at all?
Laura Westra is doubtful whether Norton's “weak anthropocentrism” is anthropocentrism at all and
can not find any significant difference between weak anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism:
in some sense, Norton is right: there is a commonality between the two positions, but this
commonality only emerges when we subordinate”human economic, recreational, aesthetic and
spiritual values,” whatever these might be, to the imperative of survival. This imperative
represents the common denominator we share with the rest of life. When we recognize the
primacy of that commonality and the ways in which ecological integrity supports it for all,
globally, then we are ecocentrists […] because our anthropocentrism has been so weakened as to
be nonexistent, dissolved into the reality of our presence first and foremost, as part of the biota
of natural systems. (Westra,1997 p.291)
Even though this might be the most probable understanding of weak anthropocentrism, I disagree
with Westra here. As I see it, it might still be possible to maintain an anthropocentric worldview
even though one promote the integrity of ecosystems before human preferences in many cases. As it
is still possible [at least in theory] to choose which ecosystems to give protection to and maintain
from anthropocentric interests only. We can, at least hypothetically, choose to promote ecosystems
that we see greater utility in while sacrificing others that might not provide us with as much utility,
11
given of course that the resulting landscape mosaic still is a resilient and healthy one, that is an
ecosystem with great integrity. That would simply not be an option at all for an ecocentrist as that
would be to destroy a life supporting system that already has the primary of values, as such.
An example that illustrates the possible11 conflict would be a small swamp ecosystem out on a
plain that provides humans little or no use and is not needed for the surrounding ecosystem nor
serves as a habitat for any unique species etc. If the swamp safely could be replaced by fertile
farmland (we imagine that this has been done several times before under similar conditions without
any negative consequences for humans or its surroundings whatsoever). Would not a weak
anthropocentrist be in favor of this change? It is my belief that she would. An ecocentrist on the
other hand would, as far as I believe, not accept such a change that would delete one thriving
(though small) ecosystem in favor of an extension of another because it is more valuable to humans.
4.2. The proposed convergence is only contingent
Laura Westra questions12 whether Norton's weak anthropocentrism is a viable, or even existing,
stance and wonders what separates this stance from her ecocentrist (or as she prefers calling it
biocentric holist) stance. She argues:
Norton describes their salient characteristics: they would appreciate ”scientific evidence,” and
thus be disposed to share with the ecocentrists the ”objective of protecting ecological
contexts.”13 But this characterization is only trivially true. That is, they would be willing to
follow that path if and only if they were convinced that no other path would support their
interests equally well. (Westra, 1997 p.290)
Since all Norton himself claim, is that his hypothesis is a contingent truth14, no harm is imposed. At
least as long as the scientific knowledge remains too limited for any deliberative sacrifices of
species or ecosystems that would have been “bearable”.
11 Weather it is a real possibility or just a hypothetical thought that such alternation of ecosystems is possible, in
accordance with SMS or the precautionary principle, with regard to the scientific knowledge of today is unknown to
me. If it is not possible, Norton can of course answer with a reminder that the convergence hypothesis is only about
real world cases and not hypothetical ones – that he do practical, not applied philosophy.
12 In her article ”Why Norton's Approach is Insufficient for Environmental Ethics” (1997)
13 Norton, 1991 p.246
14 Norton, 1997 p.99
12
4.3. Weak anthropocentism is not a moral stance
Recognizing that weak anthropocentism only focuses on human well being, and that this is
supposed to be the motivational factor, Rolston argues that weak anthropocentrism is not a moral
stance at all, it is rather a stance of (considered) self-interest. Rolston writes:
Even if Norton were right that the various schools of environmentalism all come out desiring the
same policy, it is still important to clarify motives. An ethicist wants the best reasons for action,
not simply those that are good enough. Perhaps a political pragmatist will be satisfied to get the
policy right, no matter who the supporters are and what their motives, as long as they are
conserving the environment: John saves the whales because he respect and admires their skills;
Jack saves the whales because he runs the tour boat and makes money taking John and others to
see them. Susan cares for her aging mother because she loves her; Sally cares lest she be cut out
of her mother's will.
Behaviors converge, but we are more impressed with John's motive than Jack's; we admire
Susan's behavior and are depressed by Sally's. (Rolston, 2009 p.107-108)
As I have understood Norton, he is not concerned whether the result from his convergence
hypothesis is an ethical stance or not. He is primarily concerned with understanding and describing
the environmentalist movement, be their motives ethical or not. Therefore it is my belief that
Norton does not get to depressed to find himself as the “political pragmatist”, described by Rolston.
Rolston's argument does not impose any damage on Norton's weak anthropocentrism nor his
convergence hypothesis as it is accusing them for not being something that they were never meant
to be.
I am also reluctant to dismiss weak anthropocentrism as an ethic, sure its focus is on human well
being (humanity, or the culture, as a whole) but this motive still implies constraints upon human
individuals and therefore constitute a social code – an ethic. Indeed most moral constraints are like
this; one shall not steal because stealing would be bad for society as a whole.
Rolston's problem with weak anthropocentrism and the proposed convergence is that he does not
“think it high moral ground to celebrate something else in your own self-interest, no matter how
enlightened those interests (analogously to helping others in order to get a kick out of it).” (Rolston,
2009 p.111)
With regard to his proposed virtue-ethical approach it is, in a way, easy to see why Rolston has a
problem with such a convergence. From the viewpoint of a beholder that is ignorant of the actor's
motives both the agent acting out of self-interest and the truly virtuous agent will probably look the
same. But considering that the virtuous agent is in fact acting in accordance to the virtues (out of
13
love for non-human entities in Rolston's case) it must on his view be better to be virtuous than not.
In fact, acts that converge with those significant of the virtuous character can be seen quite often
and it is indeed hard from the viewpoint of an ignorant beholder to tell whether an agent is acting
out of virtue or any other motive. Why should this be an object of great concern for Rolston? Is it
not a good thing that the virtuous acts can also be done by agents who are not virtuous, and thereby
most probably have a more friendly and well functioning society?
4.4. Anthropocentism and non-anthropocentrism will not converge
Rolston doubts that Norton's weak anthropocentrism provides strong enough reasons to act to both
preserve species and promote animal welfare, which are both causes that environmentalists have
fought for. He argues that in the struggles for animal welfare, human interests are simply not
enough to explain the environmentalists' commitment. He exemplifies with ducks:
Ducks feed on spent shot that fall into their ponds, needing grit for their gizzards, and afterward
die slowly from lead poisoning. Two to three million ducks and geese were dying this way each
year. This had little effect on the total duck population, since ducks reproduce amply. Steel shot
are a little more expensive, wear the bore a little faster, and were unfamiliar to hunters, who
must adjust to the weight difference. Weapon manufacturers and hunters resisted steel shot for
decades; federal agencies increasingly required their use for waterfowl hunting. If one is
anthropocentrist, why count the duck suffering, since ducks have no intrinsic value on their own
sakes? Non-anthropocentrists disagree; duck suffering is a bad thing.
Perhaps one can enlighten the these anthropocentrist hunters; they would get concerned if the
lead shot were reducing waterfowl populations, or if some humans also ingested lead shot
perhaps embedded in the flesh of the eaten ducks. Perhaps some hunters feel bad about the
needlessly killed ducks. But most of these lead-poisoned ducks die out of sight and out of mind.
Why feel bad about it, if the ducks do not count morally? The ducks need to count to stop lead
shot. Those non-anthropocentrists concerned about suffering waterfowl were the drivers in this
policy change, even if they managed to convince anthropocentric hunters only so far as some
supposed better self-interest. (Rolston, 2009 p.104)
He also argues that it is the non-anthropocentrists that often lead the way and are the first among the
environmentalists to breach new ground in suggesting policies. In addition to the duck example
above, this is also the case considering the emerging convergence on experimentation on animals, in
particular testing on primates. The possible human gains resulting from avoiding to cause severe
14
pain and suffering to primates through experiments, is simply not enough to explain why there is
such a big resistance to such experiments. It is their suffering that makes this practice morally bad,
that is, we are converging because we are moving toward a non-anthropocentric view.
It can be argued that this is not environmental ethics (and that anthropocentrism is a sufficient
ground for environmental ethics), that might be true, but it is still striking that humans are in fact
moving away from anthropocentism in some cases and thereby recognizing, at least, some nonhuman values. If we can recognize non-human value in some cases, why should it not be possible
that we can find other cases where anthropocentrism is turned down in favor of nonanthropocentrism?
Regarding animal welfare I think one strength of the emphasis on the context that is related to
one's culture is that non-anthropocentric environmentalists that disagree with animal use that are
“environmental friendly” can still criticize this phenomenon within the frames of Norton's
convergence hypothesis. Though it might appear that they disagree about polices regarding our
relation to non-human animals, it is rather the culture they are criticizing. They want the survival
and thriving of another culture, not a culture with integrated animal (ab)use.
Rolston writes about another example where anthropocentism seems to be turned down, or at
least seem insufficient to enact policies strong enough to motivate anything close to convergence.
His example is about the Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal, a primary sanctuary for Bengal
tigers and half a dozen of other extremely endangered species. There is a large population, 8.6
million in 1991, living just in the vicinity of the park of which 90% are poor and 50% desperately
poor.15 Even though the park produces some badly needed income from tourism, Rolston writes;
“probably, however, the park would not have come into existence and been maintained except for
the non-anthropocentric concern of groups such as World Wildlife Fund to save the endangered
species there.” (Rolston, 2009 p.105) He also suggests that:
Norton will have to find anthropocentric reasons to save the tigers. Some are not far to seek:
tourist income, a biodiversity reserve, some national pride in tigers. But enough anthropocentric
benefit to justify keeping tens of thousands of persons hungry in order to save the tiger could be
hard to find. (Rolston, 2009 p.105)
Considering that Norton ”wants to be ”contextual” and ”pragmatic,” helping communities ”to refine
goals through iterative discussions among stakeholders.”16 Rolston argues that Norton ”should
15 All facts about the park and the nearby population, as well as the whole example, is taken from Rolston, 2009 p.104
16 Bryan G Norton, ”Pragmatism, Adaptive Management, and Sustainability”, Environmental Values 8 (1999) p.459
15
realize that his enlightened anthropocentism is not going to save the tigers in Nepal. […] Only if
there are effective advocates who care for the tiger and other endangered species placing some
check on local desires (and enlightening them too when they can) do the tigers have a chance.”
(Rolston, 2009 p.105)
In short, Rolston then argues that it is highly probable that poaching the animals, clearing the
park and instead cultivate crops would not be a viable option if one gives sufficient weight to future
generations because the land in the park is probably most valuable in the long run for humans if it is
indeed protected as a wilderness area. The current situation can be explained as a result of
overpopulation and a result of bad social structures. But even if this might very well be the case,
those people living there now would hardly suggest their own starvation with reference to future
benefits of others no matter how enlightened they may be. If the choice is between their dire needs
and the tiger an anthropocentric choice would most likely result in the tigers demise.
I think Rolston is here making the situation too simple, that it is a choice between on the one
hand preserve wilderness and the tiger and thereby suffer from lack of food and on the other hand
clear wilderness and eliminate the tiger but, at least for their generation, being able to feed more
people. In reality there is of course (at least I believe and hope) more options available. Large
amounts of money are raised around the world to protect and preserve the Bengal tiger and even
though I have no facts, I would be very surprised if the money was spent solely on guards, barriers
etc. to scare people away from the park. Much more likely, a large share of the money goes to
projects decreasing the threat from neighboring humans by increasing their living standard, creating
alternative food supplies etc. There can thus be said to be at least one other way, and this is arguably
better for both humans and non-humans in the long run and I am quite convinced that at least a
weak anthropocentrist would choose this third way.
4.5. Differences regarding risk management
Scientific uncertainty is an important and highly recognized factor, both by Norton and those of his
critics that I will examine in this paper. The limits of our knowledge about our environing systems
gives rise to the SMS on Norton's view and the precautionary principle on Westra's. Westra also
highlights another troubling and highly related difficulty, that of determining reasons for the
decline, or even loss, of populations of different species which consequently affects our ability to
determine the limits to what is sustainable use of natural resources and what is not.
From the scientific perspective of the ecosystem approach (and of complex systems theory),
16
there is no guaranteed “safe”, commercial, sustainable catch, but there is also no clear linear
causality showing the connection between the overfishing of resources such as cod and their
extinction. Such factors as climatic changes, increases in ultraviolet rays because of ozone
depletion, increased pollution and dumping in the oceans, and toxic rain, may all be
contributing causes. (Westra, 1997 p.281)
In addition to the total diversity, explained above, that Norton writes about, Westra stresses the need
to look at another type of diversity, functional diversity, that could perhaps be understood as the
result of integrating integrity of ecosystems into the diversity term.
“Whereas species diversity is a property at the population level, the functional diversity ,what
the organisms do and the variety of responses to environmental changes, especially the diverse
space and time scales to which organisms react to each other and the environment,is a property
of the ecosystem.” (Westra, 1997 p.281)
Westra argues that an ethic that fully recognizes the need for functional diversity and its importance
for the stability of our environment will be an ecocentric one. With the further difficulties to totally
understand the functions of many of the species (functions, that in many cases is hidden from us,
and might only show under rare or extreme circumstances) in the ecosystems she argues for the
primary focus on ecosystems as wholes and to use great precaution in our dealings with them. The
preservation of the necessary functional diversity will only be possible (with sufficient certainty) if
we preserve sufficient areas of wilderness.
Westra stresses two points where Norton's weak anthropocentrism and ecocentrism differs: (i)
Ecocentrists, she argues, ”begin by questioning any intrusive or risky practices and shift the burden
of proof on the would be risk imposers.” (Westra, 1997 p.290) This, she believes, would result in
that ”most technological intrusion would be excluded from the wild, core areas, as required in order
to protect their role and function.” (Westra, 1997 p.291) Norton in contrast argues, as mentioned
above, that ”Environmental constraints apply only when limits are approached.” (Norton, 1991
p.241). These might not be incompatible in practice but they sure seem to put the burden of proof
on different actors. And that might of course have an impact on the success of the respective
policies.
She also argues that (ii):
given the primary value of preserving or restoring natural, evolutionary function in certain
designated areas, and the necessity to ensure this function through human activities compatible
17
with this goal, the non-anthropocentric holists would use the precautionary principle17 to decide
on all economic and technological issues. (Westra, 1997 p.291)
Concerning the precautionary principle I am not sure what Westra think that a weak
anthropocentrist would promote instead. I find the precautionary principle suitable for weak
anthropocentrism. What Norton has proposed that is related, but not completely comparable18 is the
Safe Minimum Standard of Conservation (SMS). This is a rather strong policy for precaution as I
see it even if what count as acceptable costs might be subject for great debate. This would however
not be significantly more troubling than how one should judge what is “cost-effective measure to
prevent environmental damage” and what is not, as is stated in the precautionary principle.
I am not convinced that the SMS-criterion, Norton claims that the weak anthropocentrists would
promote, would differ much from the precautionary principle in practice. However, it is certainly a
fact that it might differ if humans could be sure that a change would not harm any of their (long
term) considered interests. That would however definitely have to do with the bias toward human
interests and the subordinating (or neglecting) of non-human interests than in any differences
between SMS and the precautionary principle. Furthermore as the uncertainty leading to the SMS
seem to be, quite unquestionably, very much the case of today Norton's claim suffer no harm.
Brian K. Steverson also criticize the convergence hypothesis but do so in a different, though
highly related way. He agrees with Norton that non-anthropocentrists (or more specifically deep
ecologists) would likely promote the SMS criterion or something similar, but he is very doubtful
that Norton's “longsighted” (weak) anthropocentrists really would accept the SMS because:
there is room within contextualism for the environmental manager to adopt a decision criterion
that lowers the acceptability standard for species loss below the “bearability” level; species
losses may be acceptable even if the costs of preservation are bearable, or are not prohibitive.
(Steverson,1995 p.144)
Because ecosystems can withstand losses of species as long as breaching of critical thresholds are
avoided, or not too imminent (making them too fragile to disturbances) Steverson notes that:
17 The precautionary principle states: ”In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely
applied by States, according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
damage.” (Westra, 1997 p.291)
18 SMS is more about conserving species and biodiversity, than a general principle about how to act in our relation to
our environing life-bearing systems.
18
“if the decline or loss of individual species poses no threat to the “health” of the larger system,
then calls for intervention to prevent further decline or to prevent the local (or global) extinction
of such species, though not prohibited, are ecologically “unnecessary”.” (Steverson, 1995 p.145)
Steverson claims that weak anthropocentrists' most likely decision criterion would instead be “to
avoid trends in species decline or loss unless the costs of doing so would be prohibitive, which
clearly marks a move away from assigning presumptive protection to species on an individual
basis.” (Steverson, 1995 p.146) He notes that “this commitment, given the quantitative vagueness of
many, is far different from a presumptive commitment to preserve all species if possible, and, quite
different from a commitment to preserve as many species as possible.” (Steverson, 1995 p.146)
Norton's answer to this is that, given the scientific uncertainty that actually exist today, both
anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists will agree on the SMS. Even if Steverson's proposed
avoidance of negative trends policy would hypothetically be a more viable this is still a
hypothetical. He also stresses the need for a scientific approach and states:
I have taken it as obvious , based on my reading of biology and ecology, that species are
important and that ecosystem processes are important; however, I doubt that the question of
which is most important in particular contexts can be resolved with intuitions regarding what
objects in nature have intrinsic value. […] I hope that scientific information, such as the
importance of a given species to ecological processes, whether the species is indigenous to the
system or not, and other empirical questions will at least be relevant to the resolution of these
difficult issues. If I were, in some contexts, to advocate protecting ecological processes at the
cost of increasing risk for some identified and protected species, it would be on the grounds of
scientific understanding of the case, and based on a hypothesis about what policy is most likely
to be most effective (Norton, 1997 p.92)
This is in my opinion an excellent reply and I totally agree with this myself. But the question is,
however, whether all (consistent and reasonable) different environmentalist groups will too? It is
my belief that they would. What might be a difference between different environmental groups is
whether those groups that places intrinsic value on species would allow species that can be argued
to be past their “evolutionary time”, to go extinct even if human society could bear the costs of
keeping them alive.
One such case might be that of the California Condor:
California condor […] flourished during the time when woolly mamoths and other Pleistocene
19
megafauna roamed the western plains and there were lots of carrion to eat. Now only smaller
animals populate the landscape, turkey vultures, magpies, crows and other smaller scavengers
apparently forage more efficiently than do condors. We're spending a lot of money to breed and
release condors without much success in restoring a self-reproducing population. Losing
condors may not have any ecological effect. (Cunningham, 2008, p.246)
Provided that we can be sufficiently sure that a species decline has been going on for a long time
and can be considered and explained not because of human activity but instead its evolutionary role
is passed, I think it is fair to let the species go extinct, and I presume that also non-anthropocentrists
that ascribes intrinsic value to species would agree under those circumstances.19
One reason for not saving such a species would be that it is always more economical to work
with nature than against its processes. The resources needed to avoid this species to become extinct
could most probably have much better uses. Also species come and species go. All species cannot
be “saved” from extinction, some will have to make place for newer more fitting ones. One will
have to accept this, it is the process of “nature”.
4.5.1. A dilemma regarding the scientific uncertainty
Steverson raises another problem with the scientific uncertainty that leads to the acceptance of the
SMS strategy. He questions what the reason for the scientific uncertainty is: “Are we suffering from
temporary or permanent ecological blindness?” (Steverson, 1995 p.148) Steverson then makes a
point that if our ignorance is only temporary, then only a weaker form of the SMS (or a principle for
avoiding negative trends) will be reasonable for anthropocentrists. If on the other hand sufficient
ecological knowledge is an impossibility, “then environmental management becomes a practical
impossibility in the same way that managing human health would have been impossible without the
tremendous advances made by medical science.” (Steverson, 1995 p.149)
In a reply, Norton claims that the hypothetical of full (or sufficient) knowledge is nothing but a
hypothetical. It is impossible that we could know with reasonable certainty that a species is
redundant:
The case that worries Steverson is a case in which a contextualist might conclude with sufficient
19 I am not sure that deep-ecologists would agree if the resources needed to save the condor in this case were easily
spared and that no other important (for an ecosystem's functional diversity) species would not get proper funding to
ensure its survival. However, I find it probable that deep-ecologists would agree given the situation in the real world,
where many species are threatened by extinction and funding is not sufficient to meet the needs. Surely there are
species that should have higher priority to save than the California condor.
20
certainty that an extinction will cause no cascading impacts on other species or ecological
systems and in which it is judged by the contextualist that it is safe to dispatch a species. But
such a case could not occur in a situation so permeated with uncertainty as our present situations
always are. (Norton, 1997 p.95)
Norton also refers to what he calls “Whittaker's Law”, saying that “any loss of species increases the
likelihood of further losses, justifying the general presupposition in favor of resource protection that
is embodied in the safe minimum standard criterion.” (Norton, 1997 p.95) This further strengthen
his point that full knowledge, and the possible trouble such knowledge would cause to a converging
environmentalist movement, is not of any concern since it is just hypothetical. Bearing in mind that
Norton distinguishes himself as a practical philosopher it is clear that the criticism does not inflict
any harm to his standpoint.
But even though, given the uncertainty and only looking at real world cases, it might still be
reasonable to question whether weak anthropocentrists should promote the SMS strategy or not. I
think Steverson's reply deserves some attention:
“no contextualist manager can predict with absolute certainty what the effects of species loss
will be on ecosystems. Nonetheless, contextualist managers must make decisions about how to
proceed, and must make those decisions based on the knowledge that they do have, no matter
how incomplete it is.” (Steverson, 1997 p.336)
How they decide will of course involve an estimation of the risks and then compare these to the
costs to avoid this risk taking. If the calculated risk that a loss of a certain species will affect the
ecosystem badly is judged very low and the costs for saving the species is considered very large,
though bearable it seems more probable that a weak anthropocentrist would let the species go
extinct than that a deep-ecologists would. This difference (if it actually exist) is however not
because of any difference regarding policy. It is instead a manifestation of the differing conceptions
of what is considered bearable and how the different factors are weighed against each other.
Considering the other possibility Steverson proposes, that we are unable to get sufficient
knowledge at all – that the ecological blindness is permanent, Norton finds it unproblematic for
contextualists since they focus on the characteristics at the ecosystem-level (a holistic view).
While we do not, and probably cannot have, sufficient knowledge to predict the impacts of
proposed policies on the survivability of all other species, we may be able to recognize
ecosystematic trends, trends that are good indicators of ecosystemic health. If so, then it is
21
possible to manage “contextually” by applying less fine-grained models and criteria, models that
measure ecosystem-level characteristics. Indeed, one of the advantages of contextualism is that
it reduces the information demands of good management by focusing not so much on the detail
of interspecific interactions within the system, but rather on observable system-level
characteristics. (Norton, 1997 p.97)
4.6. There are no obligations to preserve all of “our” current species
Considering Norton's claim about future generations' birthrights to wildness, Rolston concludes:
“To often, local communities have acted on the basis of short-term interests, only to learn that
they have irretrievably deprived their children of something of great value.”20 People should
want wolves on the landscape lest future generations “feel profoundly the loss of wilderness
experiences.”21 The wolves are gone; what a pity – my grandchildren cannot have a real
wilderness experience. They will never shiver in their sleeping bag when the wolves howl. So
what are wolves good for? Making my grandchildren shiver. The “something of great value” is
not the wolves; intrinsically they are of no value at all. The something of great value is the
tingle in our grandchildren. We would not give a damn about sacrificing the wolves where it not
that sacrificing them sacrifices our grandchildren's right to stand in their awe. (Rolston, 2009
p.100)
Even if I am quite certain that Norton have more pleasurable experiences of wildlife on his mind
than awe. I am curious about what criteria should decide whether a species is to be considered
valuable for future generations. If it has to do with which species is likely to give pleasant
experiences to future generations, which I think is the most plausible interpretation of Norton, it can
of course be argued both that we ought to save species that we today find creepy and disgusting or
even rarely experience at all, because we are too ignorant about them to appreciate them as they
deserve. On the other hand consider again the case of the California condor, the largest land bird in
Northern America and surely a mighty sight. If it is the case that its time on earth is about to end,
not because of human activity but because of being the least fit of its ecosystem niche, outrivaled by
other more effective and fit species. Should we have an obligation toward future humans to do our
best to save it? There can surely be argued to be aesthetic reasons for such an obligation but should
that be reason enough? I am very skeptical to such obligations and find it sufficient to record as
much about them as possible in order to enrich future knowledge of natural history. In my opinion
20 Norton, 1999 p.398
21 Norton, 1999 p.397
22
our obligations should rather be to conserve and improve the functional diversity. But of course,
there might be strategical, rather than purely moral, reasons for preserving species like the
California condor, should that improve the public approval of spending great resources on
conservation and preservation of wilderness and species.
I think Rolston summarizes and judges Norton's position well when he write:
Given his convictions about how anthropocentism can be enlightened, stretched, wolves to
spiders, I fear that it might become pointless to offer Norton any more examples of direct caring
for nature; he is going to cut all the evidence to fit his paradigm. “In the long run, what is good
for our species will also be good for other species, taken as species,”22 and vice versa.
[...]
I too claim that no species among the five or ten million on Earth is worthless; each has a
good of its kind; each is a good kind. But it is going to be quite a stretch to show that each and
every one of them is some good to us. Norton himself backs off from his good-for-our-species,
good-for-all-species claim above: “The convergence hypothesis does not, of course, claim that
the interests of humans and the interests of other species never diverge, but only that they
usually converge.”23 Usually they do, but often they do not. In fact, I think many of them are of
little or no use to us. […] If there is often divergence, we will need some nonanthropocentric
convictions to save such species. (Rolston, 2009 p.100-101)
To sum up this birthright claim, I find it too troublesome to be part of the convergence theory. I
have not seen any attempt by Norton to derive it from any of the axioms nor from any observations
regarding environmentalists' convictions, which would have given it sort of immunity from critique
within the frames of his practical philosophy. I am also doubtful whether it is needed at all. With
respect to the great uncertainty concerning species preservation, I think that contextual thinking and
the SMS, or something similar, should be enough to save enough species, at least if the policies are
respected and impacts the behavior of society.
5. Summary
Starting with examinations and experiences of environmentalists' faith, their most basic value
conceptions, Norton finds enough common-denominators to launch his theory about an emerging
consensus between different environmental groups - the convergence hypothesis. Even if their
22 Bryan G. Norton, Michael Hutchins, Elizabeth F. Stevens, and Terry L. Maple, eds. , Ethics on the Ark: Zoos Animal
Welfare, and Wildlife Conservation, Washington DC, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995, p.115.
23 Norton, 1997 p.100
23
values indeed differ a lot, especially regarding what has ultimate value Norton argue, that in order
to promote their respective values they all need to promote the same policies regarding human
interaction with the environment. There will still be differences between the diverse groups but
these differences will rather be about how to weigh different factors against each other while still
following and promoting the same policies.
The common ground of environmentalists' groups can be quite well exemplified in these lines
regarding wetlands:
a generally ecological argument has driven these diverse groups into the same policy camp;
whether one likes wildfowl to shoot at or look at, whether one touts the rights of birds, or
whether one sees migratory waterfowl as an important part of the ”whole” ecological context,
our expanding understanding of ecological systems enforces on all these groups the commondenominator objective of protecting and restoring wetland habitats on [...] flyway corridors.
(Norton, 1991 p.202)
Norton's thesis receives a lot of criticism, both his ”weak anthropocentism” and suggested unity
regarding which policy should be promoted for dealing with the scientific uncertainty is criticized.
Norton's idea about future generations' birthrights to wildness is also questioned and.
Even though the critique is number-some, his hypothesis stands strong and is rather corroborated
than weakened. Most of the criticism is either misdirected, criticizing the hypothesis for claims that
it does not even make. Other argument fails because they are ”applied philosophy” and makes
assumptions that are not actually the case in the real world, Norton is clear about the fact that his
thesis is only about actual cases in the real world, what he calls ”practical philosophy”.
Still other arguments fail because they are pointing to failures or differences in how one can
interpret and apply the environmental policies in practice, policies that still can be recognized as
common goals for both anthropocentrists and non-anthropocentrists.
There is however criticism that does not fail and indeed hits Norton's arguments but most of this
can be severely mitigated or even incorporated in the convergence theory. This is the case about
Westra's argument for functional diversity instead (or beside) Norton's proposed total diversity, that
can be considered a better conservation target. Another case where this might be true is whether the
precautionary principle might be better than just SMS and contextualism, but this can be argued to
already be sort of inherent in the policies that Norton suggests will be promoted by all
environmentalists.
24
Regarding Norton's suggested birthrights to wildness, I find that it does not have sufficient
support to survive the criticism. I argue that this claim should be abandoned but also that this would
not hurt his overall theory at all.
6. Conclusion
In 1997, Norton wrote:
The convergence hypothesis is a contingent truth; a very general empirical hypothesis that
shapes solutions sought by adaptive managers in particular situations. It is supported by facts,
both directly and indirectly; it could be falsified, but so far it has not been. (Norton, 1997 p.99)
Though I am ignorant of whether it has been falsified by any other writer, I can conclude that I see
no reason to declare it false. On the contrary, I think it is an interesting theory about the
environmental movement and its goals. It may at least serve as a temporary declaration of our
obligations to future generations and in regulating our interactions with all our environing systems.
I am, however, reluctant to give it any more value than that. The convergence hypothesis does
not give any normative reasons to care about the environment unless one agree to the value axioms
leading to the convergence theory. And even if many do agree to those axioms an environmental
ethic, in my opinion, should point to why one should care about the environment, regardless of
which value axioms one currently have. It might indeed be our foundational value axioms that
needs to converge in order to get an effective and widespread care for the environment.
What we need is an environmental ethic that is normative and give reasons for all people to
consent to and promote powerful policies regarding our interactions with our environing systems.
One can question whether the axioms he has attributed to environmentalists are accurate. They
match my own beliefs about the environmental movement but I would not regard neither mine nor
Norton's intuitions as truth. I have not made any effort to investigate their veraciousness here and I
know of none who has done so either. If they are not accurate there might also be reason to question
the grounds for the convergence.
Even though the criticism raised against the hypothesis fails at the moment (and perhaps for
quite a considerable time), it sure points to the lurking threats to this unity. What if we gain
sufficient knowledge to make more accurate judgments regarding species preservation? I do not
find this thought unlikely at all. Then there is definitely ground for controversy regarding principles.
25
Thus we appear to have a unity about principles regarding environmental interaction but it is a
fragile unity that can end quickly, should we ever get sufficient knowledge about our environing
systems.
26
7. Bibliography
Norton, Bryan. Toward Unity Among Environmentalists, New York, Oxford University Press, 1991
Cunningham & Cunningham, William P. & Mary Ann. Environmental Science A Global Concern
10th Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2008
7.1. Articles
Norton, Bryan G. ”Convergence and Contextualism: Some Clarifications and a Reply to Steverson”,
Environmental Ethics, Vol. 19, Spring 1997
Norton, Bryan G. “Convergence Corroborated: A Comment on Arne Naess on Wolf Policies” p.394401 in Witoszek, Nina and Brennan, Andrew, Philosophical Dialogues: Arne Naess and the
Progress of Ecophilosophy, Lanham, MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 1999
Rolston III, Holmes. “Converging versus Reconstituting Environmental Ethics” p. 97-117 in Ben A.
Minteer, ed. Nature in Common: Environmental Ethics and the Contested Foundations of
Environmental Policy, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 2009
Steverson, Brian K. “Contextualism and Norton's Convergence Hypothesis”, Environmental Ethics,
Vol. 17, Summer 1995
Steverson, Brian K. “On Norton's reply to Steverson”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 19, Fall 1997
Westra, Laura. “Why Norton's Approach is Insufficient for Environmental Ethics”, Environmental
Ethics, Vol. 19, Fall 1997
27