Walter Mischel
Born in 1930 in Vienna, fled Nazi’s with family in 1938, came to NYC. Studied clinical
psychology at City College of New York, worked as social worker, completed doctoral work at
Ohio State in 1935. Influenced by Kelly, Julian Rotter. Taught at Stanford from 1962 - 1983,
moved to Columbia, where he still is.
1. Summary of issues in Personality and Assessment.
Two questions:
Are traits real? Allport regarded traits as “heuristically” real. They are perhaps not the “real”
organizational properties of personality, but they do illuminate perspectives and make it possible
to observe important relationships we could not observe without using them. Allport divided
traits into cardinal, central, peripheral. (Say a bit about Cattell’s surface and source traits; 16-PF.
Eysenck reduced to three: (introversion - extraversion; neuroticism - emotionally stable;
psychoticism - superego; big five added conscientiousness, openness, agreeableness; dropped
psychoticism) Related question: 2. Are they useful (for prediction, selection, etc.)?
Most assumed “yes” to both questions until Mischel’s organized critique in 1968. Four points:
1. Traits usually lack the internal consistency and cross-situational generality which are assumed
by the trait name. Examples: (a) Hartshorne & May’s Studies of Deceit. Average correlation
across situations was less than .3. (b) Newcomb examined boys at summer camp on ten traits
related to extroversion, several sub behaviors, found average correlation of .14. (c) Dudycha
(1963) studies of punctuality of 300 college students across situations, over 15,000 observations
(on time for class, appointments, vespers, entertainment, etc.). Average r = .19. Similar work on
dominance and submission, field dependence, creativity, attitudes toward authority.
2. There is low agreement in the trait structure of individuals (a) as described by multiple raters,
or (b) as defined by multiple methods (self-rating vs. observer rating vs. experimental
assessment). This casts doubt on the validity of trait assessment.
3. The correlation between any general trait and a specific behavior rarely exceeds .3 or so (9%
of the variance). Such low correlations have little predictive usefulness.
4. Specific behaviors are best predicted by other methods. Both samples of similar behavior and
self-ratings work better. Examples: (a) Mischel, using Cattell-like specification equation, tried to
predict success of Peace Corp volunteers in Nigeria by battery of personality assessment. Six
criterion measures of success (all highly intercorrelated) correlated with this prediction only .13.
(b) Army tried to assess traits that would predict which soldiers could serve best in arctic
conditions. What finally worked best was to just ask them!
Conclusion: Traits are in the mind of the psychologist, not in the reality of the individual. Their
validity and usefulness are low.
“With the possible exception of intelligence, highly generalized behavioral consistencies have
not been demonstrated, and the concept of personality traits as broad predispositions is thus
untenable.” (Mischel, 1968, p. 146)
This book set the structure for American discussion of traits for the next 25 years.
II.
Responses to Mischel:
A. Aggregation
1. Reanalysis of Hartshorne and May. “When Hartshorne and May combined several tests
of honesty into a single score, the reliability coefficient increased to .73. Burton (1963)
found that a general factor of honesty accounted for 50% of the variance.
“Just as one test is an insufficient and unreliable measure in the case of intelligence, so
one test of deception is quite incapable of measuring a subject’s tendency to deceive.
That is, we cannot predict from what a pupil does on one test what he will do on another.
If we use ten tests of classroom deception, we can safely predict what a subject will do on
the average whenever ten similar situations are presented.” (H & M, 1928, p. 135)
2.
3.
4.
Epstein’s four studies (JPSP, 37, 1097f):
A.
Stability of self-recorded data. One month, students recorded daily 60 positive
and negative emotions, behavior, impulses. Correlated successive days and all
odd-even days. Exemplary results:
All
Successive
Emotion: Happy
.92
-.03
Tense
.77
.26
Impulse: Affiliation
.68
.36
Achievement
.58
.10
Mental Escape
.68
-.06
Behavior: Nurturance
.95
.06
Pleasure
.89
-.28
Mean
.76
.19
B.
Ratings by others over a month of the same dispositions produced similar results.
C.
Directly observed behavior. Recorded daily tallies of social telephone calls,
letters written, forgetting instructions (to bring a pencil), errors and omissions on
instruction sheets, erasures, etc.
Erasures:
.60
.10
Entertainment
.70
-.11
Phone calls
.91
.43
Lateness
.94
.53
D.
Correlations with standard scales. (Mischel says rarely above .30).
Extroversion predicted # of summed social contacts .52
Self-esteem predicted summed optimism .55, worthiness .47
Average across a number of scales was .50.
Diener & Larsen (1984, JPSP, 47, 871f) showed that activity level on one day correlated
just .08 with activity level on another. But the average across two three-week periods
correlated .66.
Weigell & Newmann, JPSP, 33, 1976, p. 793f,
Showed same principle extends to attitudes. Students given measurement of attitudes
toward environmentalism. Over next 8 months, “unrelated” persons offered them 14
opportunities to participate in environmental causes (petition drive, help with recycling
program. Average r with single acts was .24; with the sum of 14 acts was .62.
McAdams, The Person text also cites Moskowitz (1982), Rushton, Brainerd, & Presley’s
(1983) review of aggregation from the Hartshorne & May data.
B. Selecting individually relevant traits.
1. Bem & Allen (1974) “On predicting some of the people some of the time.”
Allport’s comment on Hartshorne & May: Some motivated by social acceptance,
pleasing the teacher, not hurting other’s feelings. So are they consistent or inconsistent?
Can’t just impose a trait measure from the outside, but must first discover what trait is
relevant to a person. Not all traits are relevant to all people.
Studied Friendliness (23 items, “Do you strike up conversation with sales clerk at a
store”) and Conscientiousness (23 items, “How carefully do you check your papers for
spelling errors?”) Each one was asked (a) their trait, & how consistent they were on this
trait across situations.
Each measured six ways: Both traits: self-report, mother’s report, father’s report, peer’s
report, Friendliness: group discussion, spontaneous friendliness in waiting room;
Conscientiousness: Course readings, Neatness.
Divided into high and low “consistency” groups.
Correlations across measures
For friendliness, the six methods correlated an average of .27 for low
consistency group, .57 for high group. Example: self-report and spontaneous
friendliness: .06 for lows; .61 for highs. For conscientiousness, the six methods
correlated .09 for lows, .45 for the highs.
Mean correlation for the six friendliness measures with Eysenck’s extroversion:
.31 for low consistency group, .51 for highs.
2.
C.
Kenrich & Springfield, Psych. Review (1980) Asked self and peers which was their most
consistent trait on the 16PF.
Average self-other correlations:
Self-chosen most consistent:
Peer-chosen:
Self-parent: .26
.62
.57
Self-peer
.27
.61
.63
Parent-peer .21
.61
.61
Baumeister & Tice (1988) referred to this as the metatrait of “traited” vs. “untraited.”
Imprecision in Measurement of Traits (McFarland & Sparks, 1985, JPSP, 49, 16921702): Summarize from article.
Used the most popular six trait measures from the 60's, 70's & 80's. N = 600. Used
standard deviation (-) as measure of consistency. Found that age (13 - 25) predicted 6%
of variance in internal consistency; among adults, education level predicted 14%. Among
adults, education level, words not understood, and private self-consciousness accounted
for 25% of variance in internal consistency.
Moral: The systematic trait-behavior correlations would average about .07 - .12 higher
for educated than for non-educated adults, .05 to.08 higher for all adults as contrasted
with teenagers.
D.
Traits Predict Single Act Well -- When situational pressures are weak.
1. Monson, JPSP, 1982, 43, 385-399. Students measured on extroversion.
Study 1:
Waiting room behavior in forced-extroversion, forced-introversion, and
neutral conditions (created by double-blind stooge). Correlations between
extroversion and extraverted behavior:
Forced Introversion: .36
Neutral:
.63
Forced extroversion .25
Study 2:
Students given a choice of 5-page paper or giving a talk in front of the
class. Pressure to do one or the other was varied. Correlations of
choosing speech with extroversion:
Strong pressure for speech:
.41
Moderate pressure for speech .45
No pressure for either
.52
Moderate pressure for paper
.49
Strong pressure for paper
.09
Similar pattern on three other behaviors.
2. Gormley, PSPB, (1983), 9, 267-270.
Gave persons a free choice of how to become acquainted with others:
Interact, watch a videotape of them. Extroversion correlated .53 with choosing to
interact.
Gave persons a free choice of “Performing physical tasks, like lifting and
moving objects” vs. “fine motor tasks like tracing patterns, sorting nuts and
bolts.” A trait measure of “energetic” correlated .62 with choosing the first task.
Moral: When people are free to select situations and behaviors without external
pressures, personality traits can be quite predictive; when situtational pressures are
strong, traits are far less predictive of behavior.
E.
Interaction of Traits and Situations:
Aries, et. al. JPSP, (1983), 44, 779-786.
Administered Social Dominance Scale. Placed students in either same-sex or mixed-sex
groups of 6 for conversation on ethical dilemma (doctor giving a drug to a student to
improve performance on a medical school exam). Independent judges scored socially
dominant behaviors:
Total time talking
Verbal acts initiated
Interruptions
Interrupter continues
Interrupted continues
Continues after overlap
Arms away from body
Open legs
Lean backward
Same sex: Mean correlation with single behaviors: .31 and .29 for males and females;
with sum, .67 for males and 66 for females..
Mixed sex: With single behaviors:-.05, and with sum, .02
Moral: The trait of social dominance predicted socially dominant behaviors well when in
the situation of same-sex groups, but not when in mixed-sex groups, a different situation
entirely.
F.
One variable as moderator of relationship between two other variables.
1.
Underwood and Moore, JPSP, (1981) 40, 780f. Also showed that private selfconsciousness and item response variability predicted correlation between selfrated sociability and social behavior in situation:
High private self-consciousness
.44
Low private self-consciousness
.03
Low response variability
.38
High response variability
.07
Joint (high PC and low variability)
.63
Some moderators are person-specific (private self-consciousness), others are traitspecific.
Yet Chaplin’s (1991) review said that moderators improve trait-behavior prediction on
average by just .10.
Mischel’s response to the issue of aggregation: Issue of longitudinal vs. cross situational
consistency.
Mischel & Peake (1982) (show table on p. 734)
Single behaviors
Temporal
.29
Cross-situational
.08
Aggregation
.65
.13
Connley (1984) argues that cross situation aggregation was inappropriate. Temporals were
correlations of sums; cross situations were sums of means. When done appropriately:
Hartshorne & May data
Single behavior
Aggregation
Temporal
.21
.75
Across situation
.23
.73
Also true for data from Mischel & Peake, Dudycha, Newcomb data.
Mischel’s current view:
1. Habitual cognitive interpretation of environmental events is the most central feature of
personality to Mischel. People have “an impressive ability to discriminate between situations.”
“Idiosyncratic social learning histories produce idiosyncratic stimulus meanings.” Personality
must account for the variation in behavior (e.g. aggressiveness, extroversion) across situations as
well as the central tendency. Most “traits” (e.g. aggressiveness, extroversion) are manifest in
particular situations. An “if ... then” analysis of situation-behavior patterns, and thus of
personality.
3. Research example:
Mischel, Shota, & Peake (1988). The nature of adolescent competencies predicted by
preschool delay of gratification. J.P.S.P., 54, 687-696.
Studied delay of gratification in kindergarten children in 1968-1974. Two (vs. one)
marshmallows “if you can wait until I come back.” Left for up to 15 minutes.
What is needed for a 5-year-old to delay?
If you have them focus on “hot” qualities (taste), they can’t wait very long; on “cold” qualities
(shape) or distractors, they can wait much longer. Kids who wait, can “purposely self-distract,”
and they know the “metacognitive” knowledge that to delay gratification they can shift attention
and generate delay-enhancing thoughts. Mischel, et. al., thought that this competency was a
precursor for later planfulness, effectiveness in pursuit of goals, and adaptive coping to
frustration and stress.
Method: Each of 95 children was given the “marshmallow test” and assigned a delay of
gratification score on the basis of this single behavior. Ten years later, strongly predicted
indices of ego-resiliency. Impressive from a single act, span of ten years, but reflected the same
psychological competency. “Ability to delay gratification (appears to) play an increasingly
powerful and pervasive role in cognitive and social coping as the child matures.” See article.
Comparisons to Funder, Block & Block (1983). Delay of gratification: some longitudinal
personality correlates. J.P.S.P., 53, 1198-1213. Funder used gift earned, attractive toys.
See table 5, discussion, in Mischel, Shota, & Peake (1988), p. 694. Subtle differences in two
types of gratification delay (first, larger outcome was contingent upon waiting; second, reward
already earned, just had to wait to be given it). The first was predicted by “ego resilience,” the
second by “ego-undercontrol” (tries to stretch limits, emotionally labile, rapid personal tempo,
inpersistent, has transient friendships). Little cross-over prediction.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Wright, J. C. (1994). Intraindividual stability in the
organization and patterning of behavior: Incorporating psychological situations into the
idiographic analysis of personality J.P.S.P., 67, 674-687.
“Relatively enduring person variables within the individual interact with situational
characteristics to generate stable but discriminative patters of behavior.” (p. 674).
Fundamental unit for analysis: behavior in a particular psychological situation (behavioral
observation, not self-reports. Then, looking at how individuals’ behavior varies consistently
from psychological situation to situation. Situations can be described in either nominal (physical
similarity) or psychological similarities (being teased, provoked by a peer).
Research:
Extensive observation of 84 kids for a six-week summer camp, using 77 adults to record an
average of 167 hours per child. Recorded setting, nominal situation, interpersonal situation,
psychological features, child’s behavior on five dimensions (verbal aggression, physical
aggression, whining, compliance, prosocial talk). Each child had to be in each situation
repeatedly. Tons of data.
Calculation of individual profiles: p. 678.
Calculation of mean stability of individual profiles (Table 2, p. 680)
Verbal aggression: .47
Physical aggression: .32
Compliance: .41
Whining: .28
Prosocial talk: .19
Calculation of cross-situational consistencies: Table 3
Compare situations in terms of similarity (peer vs. adult; positive vs. negative). Assumed
that them ore features they shared in common, the greater the similarity in reaction from the
child. Found that in Figure 2.
Discussion:
These stable, distinctive intraindividual patterns of variability necessarily limit the level of crosssituational consistency.
Aggregation necessarily treats stable situation-to-situation variability as “error.”
My Problem: Most work on children, still does not get at motivational roots.
Rather than conceiving stability in terms of traits, Mischel thinks we have five types of
mediating “cognitive-affective units” (Summarized a bit differently in McAdams, p. 203-204)
a. Encodings -- constructs of self, people, events, situations
b. Expectancies and beliefs -- concerning outcome of behavior, meaning of stimuli in a
particular situation, confidence of ability in a particular situation.
c. Competencies -- what one knows and can do.
d. Goals and values -- both positive and negative outcomes, affective states, life projects.
e. Self-regulatory plans -- like Bandura’s self-efficacies.
Cognative-affective mediating units:
Affects, beliefs, competencies, encodings, goals, needs, values (article, p. 587).
1. People are sensitive to situation variability, enhances accuracy of prediction.
2. People infer goals, aims, plans, competencies, beliefs, motives.
When do people infer traits vs. CAU’s?
1. When asked to empathize as opposed to predict future behavior.
2. When asked to infer why one behaved as he did.
3. When one has an implicit theory that others are malleable as opposed to fixed entities
(Dweck’s work).
Mischel adds:
4. Degree of familiarity (study 1)
5. Importance of the target (study 2)
Mischel, Shota, & Peake (1988). The nature of adolescent
competencies predicted by preschool delay of gratification. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 687-696. An example of
a “competency and self-regulatory plan.”
95 kindergartners were given the “marshmallow test” and assigned a
“delay of gratification” score on the basis of this single behavior.
They could have one marshmallow now or “two if you can wait
until I come back.” They were left alone for 15 minutes.
Mischel reasoned that kids who wait, “purposely self-distract,” that
is, they know to shift attention to other things to generate “delayenhancing thoughts.” Mischel, et. al., thought that this competency
to be a precursor for later planfulness, effectiveness in pursuit of
goals, and adaptive coping to frustration and stress.
Ten years later, the marshmallow test strongly predicted indices of
“ego-resiliency.” Correlations with “marshmallow test” at age 5 and
ego-resiliency measures at age 15 include:
“Tends to go to pieces under stress”
“Uses and responds to reason”
“Is attentive and able to concentrate”
“Is planful, thinks ahead”
“Feels unworthy, thinks of self as “bad”
Overall ego-resiliency
-.47
.47
.46
.42
-.43
.53
This is impressive prediction from a single act, span of ten years, but
both reflect the same psychological competency. “Ability to delay
gratification (appears to) play an increasingly powerful and
pervasive role in cognitive and social coping as the child matures.”
Compare to Funder’s test of Ego-undercontrol: Waiting for
attractive toy already earned.
Ego-undercontrol: “tries to stretch limits,” “emotionally labile,”
“rapid personal tempo,” “lacking persistence,” “has transient
friendships”
Ego-resiliency
Ego-undercontrol
Marshmallow test
.53*
.11
Waiting for reward
-.18
-.32*
*Statistically significant
Moral: Ego-resiliency and ego-control are subtly distinct, but quite
distinct, skills. And the have quite distinct developmental
consequences.
Shoda, Y., Mischel, W., & Wright, J. C. (1994).
Intraindividual stability in the organization and patterning of
behavior: Incorporating psychological situations into the idiographic
analysis of personality Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 67, 674-687.
Key idea to be tested: “Relatively enduring person variables
within the individual interact with situational characteristics to
generate stable but discriminative patterns of behavior.” (p. 674).
Research: A detailed look at how behavior varies consistently across
time from psychological situation (ex.: teased by a peer) to
psychological situation (warned by an adult).
Extensive observation of 84 kids (average age: 10) for a six-week
summer camp, using 77 adults to record an average of 167 hours per
child. Recorded interpersonal situation, psychological features,
child’s behavior on five dimensions (verbal aggression, physical
aggression, whining, compliance, prosocial talk). Each child was in
each situation repeatedly.
Individual profiles were calculated as deviation from group norm on
each behavior for each psychological situation. (Show Graph)
Mean stability of individual profiles:
Verbal aggression: .47
Physical aggression: .32
Compliance: .41
Whining: .28
Prosocial talk: .19
Cross-situational consistencies were much lower (Table 3).
Compared situations in terms of similarity (peer vs. adult;
positive vs. negative), assumed that the more features they shared in
common, the greater the similarity in reaction from the child. Found
that was so for four of the five behaviors (all except prosocial talk.
Discussion:
These stable, distinctive intraindividual patterns of variability
necessarily limit the level of cross-situational consistency.
Aggregation necessarily treats stable situation-to-situation
variability as “error.”
Mischel’s Personality and Assessment (1968)
Summary of Key Ideas
1.
Traits usually lack the consistency and cross-situational
generality that is assumed by the trait name. Examples:
Hartshorne & May’s Studies of Deceit found correlations
between honest behaviors of pre-teens to be .2 to .3.
Dudycha (1963) found that college students’ “punctuality”
correlations from one situation to another correlated on average
.19.
2.
There is low agreement in trait ratings of individuals (a) as
described by multiple raters, (b) as determined by different
methods (self-ratings, observer ratings, experimental tests). So
even if traits are real, how can they be assessed accurately?
3.
The correlation between any general trait measure and specific
behavior rarely exceeds .3 (9% of the variance). Such low
correlations have little predictive usefulness.
4.
Specific behaviors can best be predicted by other methods.
Conclusion: Traits are in the mind of the psychologist, not in the
reality of the individual. Their validity and usefulness, if any, are
low.
Mischel’s Enduring Characteristics
(Alternative to traits)
a. Encodings -- constructs of self, people, events, situations
b. Expectancies and beliefs -- concerning outcome of
behavior, meaning of stimuli in a particular situation,
confidence of ability in a particular situation.
c. Competencies -- what one knows and can do.
d. Goals and values -- both positive and negative outcomes,
affective states, life projects.
e. Self-regulatory plans -- like Bandura’s self-efficacies.