Conflict and development
Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier
The goal of this course is to explore the determinants and consequences of civil war
and state failure at the macroeconomic level. Lectures will cover eight topic areas that
together provide comprehensive coverage of the literature on conflict. Lectures will
present the predictions of the theoretical literature and the empirical evidence as well
as the policy implications. The course is organized around two parts: Part I-Civil war
and Failing States (Lisa Chauvet) and Part II-The Economics of Conflict (Paul
Collier). During the first part of the course, we will explore the causes of state failure
and the political economy of reform in these countries. During the second part of the
course, we will focus on countries at war and explore the causes and consequences of
conflict.
Part I. Civil War and Failing States: Lisa Chauvet
1.
Introduction and definitions
Collier P. and A. Hoeffler, 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford
Economic Papers 56, 663-595.
Fearon J.D. and D.D. Laitin, 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. American
Political Science Review 97(1), 75-90.
Dollar D. and V. Levin, 2005. The Forgotten States: Aid Volumes and Volatility in
Difficult Partnership Countries (1992-2002). Prepared for the “DAC Learning and
Advisory Process On Difficult Partnership”, London, January 2005.
Gleditsch N.P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, H. Strand, 2002. Armed
Conflict 1946-2001 : A New Dataset. Journal of Peace Research 39(5), 615-637.
Lacina B. and N.P. Gleditsch, 2005. Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New
Dataset of Battle Deaths. European Journal of Population21, 145-166.
Small M. and J.D. Singer, 1982. Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 18161980. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA.
2.
Reform in Failing States: Theory and Evidence
Brautigam, D.A., and S. Knack, 2004. Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in
Sub-Saharan Africa. Economic Development and Cultural Change.
Chauvet, L., P. Collier and A. Fuster, 2006. Supervision and Project performance: a
principal-agent approach. DIAL and University of Oxford, mimeo.
Chauvet L. and P. Collier, 2008. What are the preconditions for turnarounds in failing
states, Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(4), p. 332 - 348.
Chauvet L. and P. Collier, 2006. Helping hand? Aid to failing states. DIAL Working
Paper 2006/14.
Dollar, David, and Jacob Svensson (2000), “What Explains the Success or Failure of
Structural Adjustment Programs?”, Economic Journal, 110: 894-917.
Tavares, J., 2003. Does Foreign Aid Corrupt?. Economics Letters 79: 9-106.
3.
Democracy and development
Acemoglu D., Johnson S., Robinson J.A., YaredP., 2008. Income and Democracy.
American Economic Review 98(3),808-843.
Chauvet L. and P. Collier, 2009. Elections and economic policy in developing
countries, Economic Policy 24(59), June.
Collier P. and A. Hoeffler, 2009. Testing the Neocon Agenda: Democracy in
Resource-Rich Societies. European Economic Review 53, 293-308.
Papaioannou E. and G. Siourounis, 2008. Democratisation and Growth. Economic
Journal 118, 1520-1551.
Persson T. and G. Tabellini, 2006. Democracy and Development: The Devil is in the
Details. American Economic Review 96(2), 319-24.
Rodrik D. and R. Wacziarg, 2005. Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic
Outcomes. Amercian Economic Review 95(2), 50-55.
Tavares J. and R. Wacziarg, 2001. How Democracy affects growth. European
Economic Review 45(8), 134-178.
Part II. The Economics of Conflict: Paul Collier
4.
Overview
Collier, The Bottom Billion, OUP, 2007
Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes, Random House, 2009.
Blattman and Miguel, Civil War, Journal of Economic Literature, 2009.
Collier and Hoeffler, Civil War, in Handbook of Defence Economics, (on my website)
Besley and Persson, The Origins of State Capacity, American Economic Review,
2009.
5.
Causes of Conflict
Collier and Hoeffler 'Greed and Grievance' Oxford Economic Papers, 2004
Fearon and Laitin, American Journal of Political Science, 2003
Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War
(Oxford Economic Papers, 2009 (on my website)
Collier and Rohner, Democracy, Development and Conflict, Journal of the European
Economic Association, 2008 (on my website)
6.
Duration of Conflict and the Costs of Conflict
(Special issue of Journal of Peace Research, 2004, especially ‘On the Duration of
Civil War’, Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom)
Collier and Hoeffler, Copenhagen Consensus paper, ‘Conflict’ in Global Crises.
Global Solutions, Cambridge University Press, 2004
Collier, Peacekeeping, in Copenhagen Consensus 2, Cambridge University Press,
2008.
On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, Oxford Economic Papers, 1999
The Costs of Failing States and the Limits to Sovereignty, (on my website)
Collier and Hoeffler, Unintended Consequences, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, 2007 (on my website)
7.
Post-Conflict
Collier and Hoeffler, Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies, European
Economic Review, 2004
Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom, Post-Conflict Risks, Journal of Peace Research
2008, (on my website)
Adam, Collier and Davies, Post-Conflict Monetary Reconstruction, World Bank
Economic Review, 2008, (on my website)
Collier, Chauvet and Hegre, Post-Conflict Peacekeeping, in Lomberg, ed.
Copenhagen Consensus 2, Cambridge, 2009.
Collier and Hoeffler, Military Spending in Post-conflict Societies, Economics of
Governance, 2006
8.
Crooked Elections
Collier and Vicente, 2011, Violence, Bribery and Fraud: the Political Economy of
Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, forthcoming, Public Choice (on my website).
Collier and Vicente, 2010, Votes and Violence, (on my website)
Chauvet and Collier, Elections and Economic Policy in Developing Countries,
Economic Policy, July 2009.
Collier and Hoeffler, 2010, Do Elections Matter for Economic Performance? (on my
website)