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Aristotle’s Theory of Actuality
(SUNY Press, 1995)
Introduction: The idea of anti-informationism
1. Tradition: forms into forces
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2. Nonseparabiltiy and its consequences
2
3. A note on the translations
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Chapter one: Aristotle’s explanation of natural motion
1.1. The natural motion puzzle and the two potentialities
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1.1.1. Soul as first actuality
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1.1.2. The definition of motion and the aspects of the potential
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1.1.3. The two potentials
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1.1.4. Genuine potentiality is one with actuality
12
1.1.5. Consistency-potentials are noneffectual and nonreal
18
1.1.6 A role for consistency-potentials: dispute with the Megarians
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1.1.7. Plato’s Forms and the nature of consistency-potential
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1.1.8. Aristotle’s principle of the priority of the actual
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1.2. The explanation of natural motion
1.2.1. Is everything moved by another in Aristotle’s physics?
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1.2.2. The official interpretation and the energizer theory
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1.2.3. The natural motion of living creatures is uncaused motion
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1.2.4. Is “nature” the mover in the natural motion of the elements?
34
1.2.5. How can potentiality be the mover in natural motion?
36
1.2.6. Practical syllogism and the necessity of action
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1.2.7. Desire and motion
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1.2.8. The mover in natural motion is a logical mover
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1.3. Logical causality and teleology
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1.3.1. Form and end are logical causes
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1.3.2. Efficient causes and logical causality
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1.3.3. Is causal necessity really different from teleological necessity?
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1.3.4. Hypothetical and categorical necessities are the same
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1.3.5. Means and ends are strictly convertible
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1.3.6. Aristotle’s teleology “strictly speaking”
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Chapter two: Logical causality and the priority of the actual:
consequences and illustrations
2.1. Coincidence, relationality and the ontology of potentiality
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2.1.1. Coincidentality entails non-causality
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2.1.2. Why is the coincidental necessarily causeless?
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2.1.3. The nullity of the coincidental
2.1.4. Clustering, instantaneity and the relativity of the coincidental
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2.1.5. The identity of the relative and the coincidental
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2.1.6. Lack and the coincidental
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2.1.7. The potentiality connection
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2.2. The first mover fiasco
2.2.1. The ontology of Met 12
76
2.2.2. Redundancy: “why need we seek any further principles?”
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2.2.3. Contradicting the priority of the actual
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2.2.4. How, then, can separate form be possible?
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2.3. Substance and causality
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2.3.1. The unity of substance
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2.3.2. The unity of causal action
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2.3.3. The inconsistency of Aristotle’s actualism
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2.3.4. The notion of particular-form: A.C. Lloyd
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2.4. Logical determinism
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2.4.1. Plenitude and the necessity of eternal motion
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2.4.2. The necessity of all states
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2.4.3. Necessity into contingency
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2.4.4. The future sea-battle: physical indeterminism and logical determinism 109
2.5. The continuum
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2.5.1. The instantaneity of actualization
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2.5.2. The nature of the infinite
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2.5.3. Potential infinity and Zeno’s Achilles
120
2.5.4. Homogeneous analysis and the impossibility of continuous change
122
2.5.5. Continuous motion and abrupt change
126
Chapter three: Necessity, syllogism and scientific knowledge
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3.1. Two kinds of necessity
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3.2. Deductive necessity and group inclusion
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3.3. Propositional necessary truth
132
3.4. Deductive necessity and the circularity of the syllogism
134
3.5. Accepting circularity 1: syllogistic demonstration
135
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3.6. Nominalism and Aristotle’s essentialism: seeing the universal
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3.7. Aristotle’s demon: potentiality and the scientific syllogism
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3.8. Accepting circularity 2: knowing that and what and why
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3.9. Convertibility and noninformativity
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3.10. Necessity by construction
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3.11. Objective identity and noninformativity
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3.12. Aristotle on noninformative questions
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3.13. Noninformativity and error
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3.14. Summary
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Chapter four: Inconsistent potentials and the philosophy of mathematics
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4.1. Some conditions for a philosophy of mathematics
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4.2. The potentiality of mathematical objects
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4.3. The puzzle of the exactness of mathematics
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4.4. Qua and the relativity of the essence-matter distinction
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4.5. Construction and absolute potentiality
166
4.6. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (1) Annas
170
4.7. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (2) Lear
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4.8. Objections to a constructionist interpretation: (3) Hussey
175
4.9. Intelligible matter:
the triangle is neither a “this,” nor a triangle, nor triangular
177
4.10. The nondenotativity of mathematics according to
Aristotle’s philosophy: a short review
179
4.11. The a priority of Aristotle’s philosophy of essence and mathematics
181
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4.12. The formality and emptiness of mathematics
according to Aristotle’s philosophy
183
4.13. The a priority of qua and the nature of mixed science
184
4.14. Aristotle’s concept of universal mathematics
186
Endnotes
190
Bibliography
231
Index of passages
259
General index
267