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Australian Journal of Psychology, Vol 40, No 1. 1988
releva88.doc
On the Relevance of Philosophy for
Psychological Research: A
Preliminary Analysis of some
Influences of Andersonian
Realism
John J. Furedy University of Toronto
The emancipation of psychology from philosophy was appropriate because issues in psychological
research are not reducible to philosophical ones However, the view held by many modern
psychologists — that philosophy is irrelevant for psychological research--- is also false, although it is
true that many of the issues pursued by philosophical psychologists are unrelated to those which
interest research psychologists. Philosophical considerations can significantly affect psychology. The
influence of realism as put forward by the Sydney philosopher. John Anderson is a case in point. This
paper offers a preliminary analysis of Andersonian influences on psychology. I first discuss the context
of Anderson’s philosophy and its relevance to contemporary psychological issues, and then offer an
appraisal of the work of J.R. Maze, a theoretical psychologist who arguably is the most thoroughgoing
contemporary exponent of Andersonian realism, an who has recently presented a systematic exposition
of his view in book form. The paper concludes by suggesting that although reflective “arm-chair”
theorizing is not sufficient for genuine scientific progress in psychology, it is important to consider such
philosophical issues whether one is engaged in empirical or theoretical psychological research.
Research and professional psychologists are the heirs of the emancipation
of psychology from philosophical bondage. one aspect, of which was the
assumption that empirical questions in psychology could be resolved solely through
logical (“arm-chair") analysis without controlled observation. The struggle of
experimental psychology against philosophical imperialism was bitter, and. in
some cases. relatively recent. For example, as late as 1948, the young experimental
psychologist, D. E. Berlyne, chafed under the rule of a Hegelian philosopher who
insisted that issues concerning behaviour and motivation were the province of moral
philosophy rather than of psychology (Furedy & Furedy, 1981).
It often happens that a political struggle generates counter views that are as
extreme and misguided is the view being opposed. The counter view prevalent
especially among North American research psychologists is that logical and
philosophical considerations are utterly irrelevant for "empirical" science, and that
philosophical assumptions are like religious ones: personal, not open to critical
The preparation of this paper was supported in part by the a Grant to JJF by the National Science and
Engineering Council of Canada. The analysis of Maze (1983) is based on parts of an unpublished
extended critical review of prepared with Diane M. Riley, copies of which are available from the
author on request. I am also indebted to Christine Furedy and Hal Scher for comments on earlier
drafts of the present paper.
Requests for reprints should be sent to John J. Furedy, Department of Psychology, University of
Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A1.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol.40, No. l. 1988 pp. 71-77
72
Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research
examination, and solely matters of individual preference. So one finds in many
leading empirical psychological journals experiments designed and performed
with considerable methodological rigour, but interpreted with concepts chat
exhibit philosophical sloppiness. Yet "the basic conceptual parameters" of
psychology "still call for clarification. and pose many problems of a logical, net
merely empirical nature," while most psychologists "are in large measure
uninformed . . . in their approach to these matters, and bravely hurl themselves
into venerable philosophic blunders,(Maze, 1983, p.2).
The perceived irrelevance of philosophy for psychology a reinforced by the fact
that much of the work in philosophical psychology has hid little apparent logical
relation to issues that concern research psychologists. One notable exception to this
are the writings (mostly in the thirties) and the oral communications of the r ealist
philosopher, John Anderson. who held the Challis Chair of Philosophy at the
University of Sydney from 1937 to 1958. In my view, his considerable influence
extended well beyond his department, and was particularly strong in the Department
of Psychology, where, from 1945, William O’Neil held the only chair for two
decades. However, the thorough tracing of his influence that: would be required to
support my view is beyond the scope of the preliminary analysis that I offer here In
the first of two sections of this preliminary analysis, I discuss the context of
Anderson's philosophy and its relevance to contemporary psychological issues.
Anderson, Philosophy, and Contemporary Psychological Issues
Anderson's international reputation among professional philosophers is slight,
because he published almost solely in Australian Journals. and produced no
systematic exposition of his views in book form. However, this is essentially
available in a collection of his papers (Anderson 1962). along with a very clear
philosophical summary of his position by Passmore 1962), who, in another work
(Passmore. I957) has-also indicated that the philosophical sources of Anderson's
position lay in those of earlier realist philosophers like William James, W. T.
Marvin, R. B. Perry, and. most importantly. the Australian-born philosopher, S.
Alexander.
Perhaps the most important characteristic of Andersonianism is its
thoroughgoing anti-dualist stance. This is both ontological ( i n denying me
possibility of separate realms of existence, i.e. mind and body) and
epistemological (in denying the possibility of different sorts of knowledge or
method of enquiry, e.g.. different logics of enquiry and method: of investigation
in the physical and psychological sciences).
A related tenet is the denial of the doctrine of intrinsic relations, which is the
view that there can be a relation. aRb, where being in the aRb relation is intrinsic
to or a property of. R itself. This philosophical issue, which was extensively
discussed by Anderson {see. e.g. Anderson. 1927, 1930), becomes most relevant to
psychology when the relation in question is that of knowing. The relevance is both to
the content and form of psychology.
Concerning content, modern. so-called -cognitive" psychology is purportedly
concerned with the study of the knower and of the known. However, most cognitive.
psychologists do not nave a clear definition. of what distinguishes cognitive from
non-cognitive processes, but rather implicitly) employ broad. all-inclusive, and
positively evaluative rather than specific definitions Furedy, 1980: Furedy &
Riley. I984: Riley & Furedy, 1983). Such an all-inclusive use of die term
"cognitive~ excludes the possibility of mating distinctions such as that between
the knower and the known, and also between the known and (say) the felt. so that
many cognitive
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol.40, No. l. 1988 pp. 71-77
Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research
73
psychologists tend to downplay the interesting role of affective motivational factors
i n functioning that is. in fact, never purely cognitive in origin, because any
phenomenon is always “the interaction of complex- [and differentiable] things”
(Anderson. 1962. p. 59).
As to form. the issue is whether what is blown in psychology — its data — are
separable from the knowers. or whether, as is held by moil research
psychologists all data are "theory bound." or conditioned by the psychologists
themselves. More generally, on the question of the "cognitive status" of theories
(Nagel. 1960, Andersonian realism stands on the extreme realist Side of the issue
along with philosophers of science like Popper 1959, 1983), and opposed to
instrumentalism as exemplified by Kuhn (1962). whose doctrine has been
enthusiastically espoused by research psychologists (e.g.. Segal & Lachman, 1972)
and introductory psychology textbooks.
Anderson and Maze
This second section offers an appraisal of the work of J. R, Maze, a
theoretical psychologist who arguably is the most thoroughgoing contemporary
exponent of Andersonian realism, and who has recently presented a systematic
exposition of his views in book form (Maze, 1983).
In the early fifties, two papers were published in the Psychological Review, then
and now the primary journal of theoretical psychology. One paper (Maze, 1953)
attacked the teleological indeterminist approach as applied to homeostasis. along
the anti-dualist lines of argument sketched by Anderson, Anderson's influence is
evident in this paper not only in the citation of Anderson (1934) in the reference list,
but also, more subtly but importantly, in the reference to the pre-Socratic thinker.
Heraclitus in the first paragraph (Maze. 1952, p. 405). Heraclitus, by whom
Anderson was "particularly fascinated", and whose philosophy Anderson made
"particularly fascinating" (Passmore, 1962, p. xxii), emphasised the importance of
opposing forced and Maze's complaint is that "in many recent treatments of
homeostasis. . - the constituent opposing processes arc lost sight of." (Maze, 1953, p.
405).
The other paper (Maze, 1954) dealt with the famous intervening variable hypothetical construct distinction that had been recently introduced by MacCarquodale
and Meehl (1948). Citing papers on realism (Anderson, 1930) and on causality
(Anderson, 1938) , it employed the Andersonian arguments against constitutive or
intrinsic relations, and contended that an intervening variable could not intervene,
or do anything else. because, by definition, it had no properties. In particular, being
an intervening relation does not constitute; a property, so that if we wish to infer the
properties of unobservables, these must x specified as hypothetical constructsHence the move from hypothetical constructs to intervening variables. which
M MacCorquodale and Meehl regarded as a sign of explanatory progress was in fact
a regress to explanations that were empty.
In my view, these to papers are classical examples of the application to
psychology of Andersonian realism. Unfortunately, like Anderson's papers. Mazes
articles constituted: reactions to other thinkers rather than a systematic statement of
a position. Furthermore, the two papers ARE not well known. The paper on
homeostasis (Maze, 1953), beyond drawing a somewhat tetchy reply from the
person criticised (Stagner, 1954), appears to have had little impact. This is
undeserved, because its logical relevance to current psychological issues is obvious.
In a recent: commentary on Skinner's opposition to all brands of cognitive ( o r
"mentalistic") psychology, we indicated that Maze's (1953) paper provides an
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol.40, No. l. 1988 pp. 71-77
74
Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research
example of a "mechanistic (ateological)" position, and hence shows that the 'link
between ideology and mentalism [as in Tolman’s position] . . . is historical rather than
logical" (Furedy & Riley, 1984, p, 625),
The paper on intervening variables I Maze 1954) is one of many hundreds that were
written on this topic, following the MacCorquodale-Meehl article, and, as is common
in such cases, only the original MacCorquodale paper is really well known. Yet just as
Ritchie's (1953} largely ignored reductio ad absurdum refutation of Kendler's (1952)
well-known defence of both the S-R and instrumentalist approaches pointed to logical
difficulties in psychology that have not been resolved (for an analysts of the KendlerRitchie papers, see also Furedy & Furedy. (1982. Pp. 15-16), so the problems that
Maze’s (1954) paper raised for the hypothetical construct/intervening variable
distinction have merely been shelved rather than solved by current researchers.
In what is the first systematic exposition of Andersonian realism as it relates to
psychology. Maze (1983) reiterates the thesis that psychology cannot resolve
philosophical problems merely by shelving them "The general theme is expressed in
remarks like that cited at the outset of the present article, The thesis is applied more
specifically, to problems that recent psychological research has addressed, and the
implications are clear, if uncomfortable, for many current areas of psychology. The
cognitive/information processing area is perhaps the most influential at present, and
Maze gives a good account of some fundamental difficulties (see also Heil 1981). Of
these, the most obvious is that many cognitive psychological researchers have adopted
the computer an analogy (as evidenced not only by the assumption that cognition is to
be explained as computations, but also by the use of such terms as “processing”,
"storage", and “program”) without any regard for the fact that the (unexamined)
assumption that the mind is a computer is false.2 The Andersonian {and Socratic point
here is that analogies (or models) may be useful for generating theories about
phenomena, but the analogies (or models) should not be viewed as a substitute for
theories, just as arguments from analogy should not be viewed as a substitute for valid
arguments. Of course, the Andersonian point loses much of its force if (as
contemporary research psychologists have done) one accepts an instrumentalist rather
than a realistic view of science, and therefore assumes that objective considerations
rather than those of logic and the evidence should be used to evaluate rival theoretical
positions. On an instrumentalist account, the invalidity of arguments by analogy is
of little concern, as long as the argument (and the analogy or model is "fruitful" in the
sense of generating research. However, the realist would ask how much that research
in cognitive psychology has contributed to an understanding of the process of
cognition, if indeed cognitive psychology appears to “rest on a mistake” (Heil, 1981).
In social psychology, the problems are especially acute from an Andersonian
perspective for those recent theoretical accounts that nave proposed "agency" as a
causal explanatory concept (Gould & Shotter. 1977; Harre, 1979). Maze's opposition to
such teleological explanations was developed against the teleological physiological
concept of homeostasis in his early paper (Maze, 1953), which, in turn, was based on
Anderson's anti-dualistic principle that explanatory concepts should not be in a
different "realm" from the phenomena they are used to explain, but should themselves
be open to explanation in the sense of deterministic causal analysis. The symptom, in
the end, of all teleological explanations is that of circularity. a symptom that indicates
That the purported explanation is no explanation at all
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol.40, No. l. 1988 pp. 71-77
Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research
75
More generally, there is one key feature of Maze's (1983) work that is clearly
Andersonian and represents the greatest strength of this ion of philosophical
analysis. This feature is that which espouses a return to the ancient Greek concern
with disinterested enquiry: an intrinsic interest In the phenomena themselves. And in
that tradition, Maze is concerned with "saving the appearances" (Burnet, 1930),
which means that he is impelled to attempt to give an account of all appearances,
even if that account sometimes involves refusing to accept them as they initially
appear. So, for example, he writes:
Now, I have admitted from the beginning that the behaviour of organisms has distinctive
characteristics, those which are (however misleadingly) referred to as being goal
directed. and my own goal is not to explain them out of existence but to give
an empirically understandable account of how they came about The first step is to
get rid of “intentions”.
The focus on disinterested enquiry, which was emphasised by Anderson, is a
tradition that is Socratic in origin, in which critical and continuing discussion of
issues is a primary aim (Furedy & Furedy, 1982; Furedy, Riley, & Furedy, 1981;
Kimble(1984). An important feature, of such continuing discussion is that
participants try to carefully delineate the areas of disagreement as well as those
of agreement. Such discussion may sometimes be politically undesirable, but
the most important tenet of Anderson for research psychologists is that it is
nevertheless the only way to ensure that their research is cumulative and
progressive, rather than merely faddish.
It is, however, also a part of that tradition that enquiry proceeds best through
criticism of work that, in many other respects, one admires, and we have
elsewhere (see acknowledgements note) provided that sort of criticism of Maze's
book. In brief, the main thrust of that criticism is that Maze has not taken a
sufficient account of certain psychological facts. In addition, however, there is one
other problem with Maze's (1983) account that is appropriate for the present paper
to raise in more detail.
This problem is that Maze's (1983) work is incomplete inasmuch as there is no
examination at all of the relation between Maze's and Anderson's views, Whereas in
the restively brief papers of the fifties Maze referred explicitly to Anderson (as noted
above, the more extensive work (Maze, 1983) does not even cite any of Anderson’s
papers. In my view, this omission on Maze's part is not just a matter of scholarly
form. As I have tried to indicate, Maze's book is an important contribution in the
application of philosophical realism to research psychology. It is of relevance,
therefore, to try to understand in what respect his views are elaborations of and
departures from, the ideas of earlier realists. This is especially important in the
case of Anderson, since, his views were so sketchily and unsystematically
presented.
Another reason why it is unfortunate that Maze has not explicitly commented on
the similarities and differences between his and Anderson's positions is that there
are few psychologists who are as familiar as Maze is with Anderson's orally
expounded ideas. Such a commentary by Maze would be a unique and
worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the relation of philosophy to
psychology, and would begin to take us beyond the preliminary sort of analysis that
I have been restricted to in this paper.
Conclusion
No assertion is made here that reflective "armchair" theorizing is sufficient for
scientific advance. Empirical research is also necessary, even though it is important
to remember that conclusions based on that research arc never completely firm. or.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol.40, No. l. 1988 pp. 71-77
76
Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research
as another Andersonian psychologist has put it "to shovel sand you have to stand on sand"
(O' Neil, 1957). What also has to be remembered is that some time has also to be spent in
the arm chair, if we wish the research enterprise to be genuinely progressive and
cumulative from an epistemological point of view.
References
Anderson. J. (1927). The knower and the known. Proceedings of the Aristoielian
Society, 27, 61-84.
Anderson. J (1930), Realism and some of its critics. Australian Journal of
Psychology and Philosophy, 8,113-114.
Anderson. J. (1934). Mind as Feeling. Australian Journal of Psychology and
Philosophy, 12. 31-94.
Anderson, J. (1938). The problem of causality. Australian Journal of Psychology
and Philosophy, 16. 127-142.
Anderson, J. (1962). Studies in empirical philosophy. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
Burnet, J. (1930) Early Greek Philosophy. London: Adam & Charles Black.
Furedy, J.J. (1980). Cognition is bodily: but cognition is what? [Review of F.J.
McGuigan's Cognitive Psychophysiology]. Contemporary Psychology, 25. 10-11.
Furedy. J. J. & Furedy, C. P. (1981) “My first interest is interest": Berlyne as an exemplar
of the curiosity drive. In H. Day (Ed.) Advances in Intrinsic Motivation (pp. 117). New York: Plenum.
Furedy, J. J. & Furedy. C. (1982) Socratic versus Sophistic strains in the teaching of
undergraduate psychology: Implicit conflicts made explicit Teaching of Psychology,
9, 14-20.
Furedy. J. J., & Riley, D. M. (1984), Undifferentiated and “moat beam” percepts
in Watsonian-Skinnerian behaviourism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7. 625-6.
Furedy. J. J. Riley. D. M & Furedy, C. P. (1981). Teaching undergraduates the
philosophy of psychology: The method of criticised introspection Teaching of
Psychology, 3. 47-19.
Gauld, A., & Shotter, J. (1977). Human action and its psychological investigation.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Harre, R. (1979). Social being: a theory for social psychology. Oxford:
Blackwell
Heil J.(1981). Does cognitive psychology rest on a mistake? Mind, 90, 321-342.
Kendler. H. H, (1952}. What is learned: A theoretical blind alley. Psychological
Review 59, 169-177.
Kimble. G. A. (I984). Psychology’s two cultures. American Pschologist,8, 833839.
Kuhn, T. W (l962) , The structure of scientific revolutionaries. Chicago IL:
University of Chicago Press.
MacCorquodale, K., & Meehl, P.E. (1948). On a distinction between hypothetical
constructs and intervening variables. Psychological Review 55, 95-107.
Maze, J. R. (1953). On some corruptions the doctrine of homeostasis, Psychological
Review, 60, 405-412
Maze, J. R.. (1954). Do intervening variables intervene? Psychological Review, 61 22634.
Maze, J. R_ (1983). The meaning of behaviour. London, Allen and Unwin.
Nagel, E. (1960). Preface, In A. Danto & S, Morgenbesser (Eds.), Philosophy of science.
New York, World.
O’ Neil W. M. (1957). Introduction to method in psychology. Melbourne:
Melbourne University Press.
Passmore, J.A. (1957). A hundred years of philosophy. London: Duckworth.
Passmore, J. A. (1962). John Anderson ad twentieth century philosophy. in J.
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Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research
77
Anderson (Ed,). Studies in empirical philosophy. Sydney: Angus & Robertson.
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchison.
Popper, K. R. (1983). Realism and the aim of science. Totowa, NJ: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Riley, D. M. & Furedy, J. J . (1983). Psychological and physiological systems:
Modes of operation and interaction. In S.R. Burchfield (Ed.), Stress: Psychological
and physiological interactions. New York: Hemisphere.
Ritchie L.(1953). Circumnavigation of cognition. Psychological Review, 60, 206-211
Segal E. M. & Lachman R. (1973). Complex behaviour or higher mental processes: Is
there a paradigm shift? American Psychologist, 27, 46-55.
Stagner R. (1954) Homeostasis: Corruptions or misconceptions?—a reply.
Psychological Review, 61. 226-34.
Received 14 July 1987.
1
A particularly Striking illustration of this view is the anecdote regarding the
influential philosopher of science, G. Bergman, who was arguably in charge of the
philosophy of science of K. W. Spence and his S-R oriented students at the
University of Iowa during the forties, fifties and early sixties. At the end of the year,
Bergman would conclude a very detailed graduate course on theoretical psychology
by saying: "Boys now that you have finished my course, the best thing you can do is go
back to your labs and forget everything that I have taught you.” Needless to say, from
such a source this was a powerful license for the practising scientist to forget
philosophy.
2
Note that the assumption is not that the minds is like a computer. That assumption is not
specific enough to serve as a genuine hypothesis. It is rather, an analogy which may be
useful in the formulation of genuine hypotheses concerning the mind, hypotheses
which may originate from the thinking of specific features of computers, and
asserting that minds have those specific features. See also immediately following
text.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol.40, No. l. 1988 pp. 71-77
The Relevance of Philosophy
to Psychology: Response to J.
Furedy
Peter Slezak
University of New South Wales
Philosophy Naturalised: Epistemology as Psychology
It may not be widely known outside of the discipline that philosophers are no longer
(professionally at least) troubled by worries concerning the reality of the external world.
Indeed, the discipline of philosophy has undergone dramatic and revolutionary changes in
only t he last 20 years, and for this reason the attitudes among those outside the Held are
likely to be founded on irrelevant and outmoded notions. This is a pity if only because
philosophy has become {once again) of the most direct relevance lo the empirical sciences
in general and to psychology in particular.
Indeed psychology, above alt. has become central to the philosophical enterprise in ways
I will attempt 10 sketch. The most abstract and traditional philosophical concerns o!
epistemology itself have come to be seen as questions of empirical psychology, rather than
being a priori, metaphysical questions. This is the important doctrine of W, V. Quine known
as 'epistemology naturalised" which heralded the significant changes in the practice of
philosophy Quine explained:
epistemology still goes on. though in a new setting and a clarified status.
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology
and hence of natural science. It studies a natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human
subject... The old epistemology aspired to contain, in a sense, natural science: it would
construct ii somehow from sense data. Epistemology in its new setting, conversely, is
contained in natural science, as a chapter <ii~ psychology. (1969. p. 82-3)
This principle enunciated by Quine 20 years ago has, in the meantime, become
incorporated into the practice of philosophers (see Goldman. 1986; Kornblith. 1985).
Accordingly my concern is to give some him of recent technical developments in academic
philosophy which will be of particular interest to psychologists. This exercise seems to be
worthwhile if the recent discussion by Furedy (1988) is any indication. Writing "On the
Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research", Furedy's article conveys a seriously
misleading picture of this matter today and it would appear to be of some importance to
counterbalance It. While Furedy does, admittedly, argue in pan for the positive value of
philosophy for psychologists, the philosophy he chooses to discuss, whatever its intrinsic
interest, is hardly representative of the discipline today. Thus, his account does little to
encourage the kind of mutual interest and collaborative spirit which has become
characteristic of philosophers and psychologists elsewhere in the world. In particular, he
fails to indicate anything of the revolutionary developments within philosophy which are of
Requests for reprints should be sent lo P. Slezak. Centre for Cognitive Science.
University of New South Wales. PO Box 1. Kensington N.S.W. 2D33. Australia.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 123-130
124
P. Slezak
the mast direct interest to psychologists. Furedy's specific concern is to illustrate the
relevance of Andersonian realism to psychology, but whatever the intrinsic interest
and relevance of t h i s matter, it is precisely because he presents it as a "notable
exception" to the perceived irrelevance of philosophy in general that his article
conveys a distorted picture Thus it is the impression Furedy> creates by what he
neglects as much as what he actually does which is (he basis of my criticism.
Irrelevance of Philosophy?
Furedy Writes of the view which he says is "prevalent especially among North
American research psychologists'"...
that logical and philosophical considerations are utterly irrelevant for "empirical"
science, and that philosophical assumptions are l i ke religious ones: personal, not
open to critical examination, and solely matters of individual preference...
The perceived irrelevance of philosophy for psychology is reinforced by the
fact that much of" the work in philosophical psychology has had little apparent
logical relation lo issues that concern research psychologists, pp. 71-72)
It is undeniable that there was considerable warrant for this perception of the
irrelevance of much earlier philosophy (though it must be said that this cannot be the
only criterion of the importance of the philosophical concerns. However puzzling
the problems of sense-data, private languages and other such philosophical
esoterica. they were arguably of no consequence for the progress of empirical
research. Even SO. n is difficult u> see how this or any other kind of mainstream
academic philosophy} could justly be described as being "like religious"
assumptions. "personal, not open to critical examination, and solely matters of
individual preference". Since Furedy fails to indicate explicitly, what kind of
philosophy he is specifically referring to, the object and justice of these charges
remains unclear at best. Whatever Furedy may have had in mind, the perceived
irrelevance of philosophy he refers to could only be on the part of those
psychologists who are entirely unfamiliar with the developments in the discipline
during the past 20 years or so. Just as in any other discipline, in philosophy too.
fashions change and philosophers eventually became tired of a priori speculation,
ordinary language hair-splitting and conceptual nitpicking. The remarks of the
philosopher Patricia Churchland, 1986) are typical:
In the mid-seventies, I discovered that my patience with most mainstream
philosophy had run out. What had instead begun to seem promising was the new
wave in philosophical method, which ceased to pander to "ordinary language"
and which began in earnest lo reverse the antiscientific bias typical of "linguistic
analysis", p. ix}
In his historical survey of the field ten years ago now. the philosopher Daniel
Dennett (1978) described these changes:
The philosophy of mind is one of t he most active fields in philosophy today, and it
has changed so drastically in the last twenty years, that many of the traditionally
central topics and theories have been transformed almost beyond recognition,
and new concerns now loom that have no clear ancestors in the old tradition,
(p. 249)
With the wisdom of hindsight, philosophers now look with se I deprecating
scorn at their own former concerns. Dennett (1978) describes the tradition of
"ordinary language philosophy" as one whi ch "can be comfortably viewed as a
h historical phenomenon" which "was bound to die of its own success when it had run
out of important errors and contusions to diagnose, while its infirmities became
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 123-130
Response to Furedy
125
more apparent as it descended into trivia" (p. 2501. He succinctly explains the sequiae:
The traditional theorists were guilty. as charged, of making aprioristic generalisations,
which were nothing if not the products of fill-considered and un-self-consciously
conceptual analysis, mixing these with a handful of casual introspections and
observations about normal people's experiences and powers, and promoting the
mixture to (he status of metaphysical verities about the essence of things mental, (p.
2501
The Relevance of Andersonian Realism
Although Furedy’s concern to demonstrate the value of philosophy for psychology may
appear, at first sight, to be a welcome attempt to correct the picture and restore a balance, he
attempts to do so through a discussion of Andersonian Realism, which he singles out and
cites as a "notable exception" 10 the general irrelevance of philosophy However
intrinsically worthy of study, it is relevant to note that Anderson's realism has had a
negligible impact on the character and content pi academic philosophy. While Furedy does
acknowledge that "Anderson's international reputation among professional philosophers is
slight" (1988, p. 72), this is an understatement. Not only is Anderson's influence negligible
among the current generation of philosophers even within Australia itself but whatever might
he the relevance of his work to psychology, it is neither contemporary nor generally
representative of philosophy as Furedy's discussion suggests.
The notion that Anderson's realism, of all things, might be a “notable exception” lo the
general irrelevance of philosophy can only be sustained by simultaneously conveying a quite
unrepresentative picture of contemporary philosophy. Indeed. Furedy's discussion fails to
mention anything at all which has been most central to philosophy in the past 50 years.
However, the philosophy of psychology has not been plodding on quietly. but has
actually undergone the most explosive developments in this period specifically in its
attention to psychology Just one important symptom of this has been the flourishing of
philosophical titles under the heading of "cognitive science' in the lists of all major academic
publishers, A notable example has been the Bradford series of philosophical publications of
MIT Press during the last decade or so.
Thus, in these heady days of hype for the interdisciplinary "cognitive revolution", it is
anomalous for Furedy to omit any mention whatever of (he dramatic changes within
philosophy through which it has became intimately intertwined with psychology. Ten
years ago Dennett explained the general character of these changes which followed the
demise of ordinary language philosophy:
If there were to be theories of mind at all. they were not to be produced by the old
armchair methods, so the philosopher of mind had three choices: abandon philosophy
and pursue empirical theories in the domain of psychology or brain science, abandon
theory and settle for the modest illumination and confusion cures of purely linguistic
analysis, or become a son of meta-theorist, a conceptual critic of the empirical theories
advanced by the relevant sciences. It is this last conception of the enterprise, where it is
seen as a branch of philosophy of science, that dominates the best work in the fie id
today. Its most salient difference from both the traditional theorising and the ordinary
language approach is its interest in the theories and data of psychology, the brain
sciences, artificial intelligence and linguistics. (1978. p, 250)
The blurring of disciplinary borders is actually part of the quite general trend in
philosophy which came to see itself as an integral pan of the scientific enterprise.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 123-130
126
P. Slezak
Thus, the philosophy of physics or the philosophy of economics arc no longer
meaningfully distinguishable from substantive theoretical speculator, in these
disciplines (see Hausman, I980: Thagard, 1982). In the same way the philosophy of
psychology has become a form of theorising about the substance, principles, and
foundations of empirical psychology. Although still in the armchair, philosophers can no
longer remain ignorant of the empirical research as they could until very recently (see
Churchland. 1986; Slezak 9881. A characteristic example of this is the recent collaborative
publication of Holland, Holy oak, Nisbett and Thagard 11936) in which the philosopher is
directly involved in the detailed scientific developments m partnership with psychologists and
computer scientists. Other notable examples or this kind include the work of Jerry
Fodor, whose seminal contributions to philosophy have been integrally connected
with his collaborative work with psychologists (Fodor, Bever & Carrett. 1974) and
linguists (Katz & Fodor 1963) Fodor's most recent paper (Fodor & Pylyshyn. I98S)
concerns the detailed substance claims surrounding "the new connectionism" or
“parallel distributed processing" and appears in the journal Cognition, An equally notable
example of such direct involvement of philosophers with psychology is to be seen in the work
of Stephen Stich (Stich & Nisbett, 1980), whose earlier work was concerned with the
theoretical and methodological debates surrounding Chomsky's generative; grammar. Typical
of this concern of philosophers with the details of theory and research in psychology have been
the recent intense debates concerning experimental work on mental imagery (Block. 1981.
In this case, too, the issue between "iconic " and "propositional" representations, or the
debate over a "tacit knowledge" account of the experiments, is not meaningfully
designated "philosophical" rather that "psychological" Such intertwining of formal,
philosophical and empirical, psychological matters is also 10 be seen in the extensive
literature of decision theory (Kahneman. Slovik, & Tvesrky, 1982).
Thus, it is in the light of these developments within academic philosophy that the
discussion by Furedy appears anomalous. though it may perhaps reflect a still widespread
impression among many psychologists. The contemporary relevance of philosophy to
psychology is partially conveyed by the titles of the seminal books going back at least to
Fodor's (1968) Psychological Explanation, which began to articulate the implications of
computer simulation and information processing approaches to psychology. Fodor's (1975)
The Language of Thought was also a landmark in philosophy which he described as
"speculative psychology". This term was intended to capture the kind of scientifically
sensitive philosophy which has since become standard in the philosophical literature. Fodor
explained: "This book, in any event, is unabashedly an essay in speculative psychology. More
specifically, it is an attempt to say how the mind works insofar as answers to that question
emerge from recent empirical studies or "language and cognition" (1975, p. viii). The novel
character of such philosophy is in marked contrast to previous approaches, and Fodor
explicitly spells out the reciprocal implicationsm of such philosophy for empirical
research in psychology. His book demonstrated the manner in which, as he put it, “We
ascend, in science, by tugging one another's bootstraps” (1975, pp. viii, ix).
Dualism
We see that in expounding the relevance of John Anderson's philosophy "to
contemporary psychological issues" (p. 72), Furedy (1988) explains that “Perhaps the most
important characteristic of Arrdersonianism is its thoroughgoing anti-dualist stance”
However, dualism has not been a serious topic of professional
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 123-130
Response to Furedy
127
philosophical concern at feast since Ryles (1949) Concept of Mind. To suggest that Andersons
work gains any contemporary importance through its anti-dualism conveys an unrealistic
picture of philosophy today. Furedy'5 remarks here disguise the notorious late of dualism with
the rise of materialist philosophies of mind. culminating in the computer-inspired "machinestate functional ism" of Fodor, Putnam and others As far as psychology is concerned, it is true
that J.B. Watson was explicitly concerned to avoid the bogey of dualism, but it is entirely unclear
how Andersonian anti-dualism might be of any relevance to psychology today.
The Computer "Analogy" for the Mind
Ryle's attack on Cartesian dualism was based on a version of behaviourism and was a precursor lo
the materialism which came to dominate philosophy of mind (see Armstrong, [968; Place. 1956;
Smart. 1959), However, this materialism itself has been superseded by (he more subtle view of
mind generally referred to as "functionalism" which was articulated by Fodor (1968) and Putnam
f I960), among others. Of particular relevance here is the fact that Fodor's account gave expression
lo a view of mind which was entailed by research in psychology, especially the highly abstract
theories of linguistics such as Chomsky’s (1957, 1965) grammars and the models of artificial
intelligence. The functionalist conception was now freed from the problems inherent in the direct
identification of mind with brain. Mind was identified, not with the "hardware" but with the
"software" of the brain and was explicitly seen as being independent of the substrate altogether
computers and brains were merely different possible realisations or embodiments of abstract,
computational states. In this sense, computers came to be seen not merely as an analogy or
metaphor for the mind but as Pylyshyn (1984) has argued, "as a literal model of cognition" (p.
xv). Though hardly uncontroversial, it is important to note here that this functionalist,
computational conception of mind was explicit in the works of psychologists such as G. A.
Miller (1967) and has become the dominant Orthodoxy among philosophers in recent times,
largely due to its rigorous, technically informed articulation by Putnam, Fodor. Dennett,
Pylyshyn and others. Furedy's (1988) brief mention of the computational or information
processing approach within psychology cues Maze's (1983) Andersonian critique, hut his
summary treatment here amply reinforces the general criticism 1 have been making. Thus, Furedy
explains that cognitive psychologists have used the computational notions “without any regard for
the fact that the [unexamined)[sic!] assumption that the mind is a computer is false" (p. 74). In
view of the voluminous discussion of this matter in the philosophical literature (Anderson, 1964;
Boden, 1976; Dreyfus, 1972; Haugeland, 1981, 1985; Hofstadter, 1979; Pylyshyn, 1980, 1984;
Searle, 1980), Furedy's assertion that the issue is "unexamined" is surprising and not warranted:
Not least of all, Simon and Newell (1964) have been important in spelling out the idea of
computer programmes as literal psychological theories; and Fodor, who has been described as the
Pope of MIT High Church Computationalism (Dennett, 1987), gave perhaps the first
important articulation of the computational view of mind which had underpinned research
strategies and theories in psychology, linguistics, computer science, and neurophysiological.
This account (Fodor, 1975, 1988) was a landmark in making explicit the assumptions of a
computational view of cognition and it has been this view which has been further debated and
refined over the intervening decade or so. The most recent discussions of "parallel distributed
processing" within psychology1 and philosophy are part of the evolution of the computational
view of mind (see Thagard, I986). In this context, Furedy’s further assertion that the
computer analogy is false is scarcely adequate, and is not
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 123-130
126
P. Slezak
strengthened by merely cuing Anderson's point that "analogies (or models) should not be
viewed as a substitute for theories" (p. 74), In view of the technical sophistication of the
current computational point of view, it is surprising that it is dismissed in such a way. Fully
cognisant of the distinction between literal theories and "mere" analogies, I he current view:
takes the computational account in an appropriately subtle though literal sense. Pylyshyn's
(1980) extended discussion explicitly addresses the issue of "simulations" as "mere" analogies
and articulates the precise force of taking mental activity "literally as the execution of
algorithms" (p.115) Likewise, the psychologist Johnson-Laird ff9S3) specifically responds to
the common, if naive, charge that the computer ii merely the latest in a long series of
technological analogies:
It is often said that the computer is merely the latest in a long line of inventions wax tablets,
clockwork, steam engines, telephone switchboards that have been taken as metaphors for the
brain. What is often overlooked, however, is that no one has yet succeeded in refuting the
thesis that any explicit description of an algorithm is computable. If that thesis is true, then all
that needs to be discovered is what functions the brain computes and how it computes them.
The computer is the last metaphor for the mind. (p. 507)
The thesis' referred to here is presumably the Church-Turing thesis, and in view of its
status, together with the vastness of the literature within psychology, artificial intelligence, and
philosophy, it is ironic that Furedy should assert that the assumption that the mind is like a
computer "is not specific enough to serve as it genuine hypothesis" (1988, p. 77).
Conclusion
As I have tried to indicate. Furedy’s (1988) lesson that armchair theorising is insufficient for
progress in scientific knowledge is one which philosophers have taken to heart long ago. Even
though Furedy sees himself recommending the virtues of philosophical analysis for
psychological research, his account of such philosophy is still unlikely to appear very pertinent
to the interests of psychologists. If, as a result, psychologists are discouraged from looking at
the quite different contemporary philosophical literature, this would be a loss for all concerned
since we can learn from one another.
1
In view of the specific relevance of Furedy's paper to the Australian scene, it is perhaps not
without interest to note that this naturalistic center of philosophy within cognitive science is to
be seen with the publication of the most recent volume in the series Australasian Studies in the
History and Philosophy of Science (Slezak & Albury. I988). The philosophical papers
collected here deal with the broad range of empirical, theoretical issues of current interest
within psychology such as language, imagery, motor control, and in particular, the
computational account of mind, Anderson’s philosophical concerns are nowhere to be seen.
References
Anderson. A. R. {Ed. M1964). Minds and machines. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall
Armstrong D. M. (1963). A materialist theory of she mind. London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul.
Block. N. (Ed.). (1981). Imagery- Cambridge, MA: Bradford/ MIT Press.
Boden. M. (1976). Artificial intelligence and natural man. Sussex: Harvester Press.
Chomsky, N. (1957). Syntactic structures. The Hague; Mouton.
Chomsky. N. (1965). Aspects of theory of syntax. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
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Churchland, P.S. (1986). Neurophilosophy: Toward a unified science of the mind/brain.
Cambridge, MA; Bradford. MIT Press.
Dennett, D. (1978). Current issues in the philosophy of mind. American Philosophical
Quarterly. 15.. 249-261.
Dennett, D. 1987). Logical geography of computational approaches. In M. Brand & R.
Harnish (Eds.), The representation of knowledge and belief. Tucson: The University of
Arizona Press.
Dreyfus, H. 11972). What compute can't do. New York: Harper & Row.
Fodor, J. (1968). Psychological explanation New York; Random
Fodor, J. (1975). The language 9) thought, New York: Crowell.
Fodor, J. (1988). Why there STILL has 10 be a language of thought. In P. Slezak & W. R.
Albury (Eds.). Computers, brains and minds: Essays in cognitive science. Dordrecht: Reidel:
Kluwer.
Fodor, J., Bever. T C. & Garrett, M. F (1974). The psychology of language New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Fodor, J. & Pylyshyn. Z. (1988). Connectionism and cognitive architecture; A critical
analysis. Cognition, 28, 3-71.
Furedy. J. (1988). On the relevance of philosophy for psychological research: A preliminary
analysis of some influences of Andersonian realism. Australian Journal of Psychology, 40, 7177.
Goldman. A. (1986). Epistemology and Cognition- Cambridge, MA; Harvard
Press.
Haugeland, J. (Ed.). (1981). Mind design. Cambridge. MA; Bradford MIT Press.
Haugeland. J. (1985}. Artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA Bradford MIT Press.
Hausman, D. (1980) How to do philosophy of economics PSA 1980, 353-562.
Hofstadter. D, (1979). Godel. Esther and Bach. New York: Basic Books.
Holland, J. H., Holyoak, K. J, Nisbett. R. E., &. Thagard, P.R. (1986) Induction: Processes of
inference, teaming and discovery, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Johnson-Laird, P N. ((983). A computational analysis of consciousness- Cognitive and
Brain Theory, 6, 499-508.
Katz J. J..& Fodor, J A. (1963). The structure of a semantic theory Language, 39,170-210.
Kahneman. D., Slovic. P. &. Tversky, A. (Eds.), f I9S2). Judgement under uncertainty.
Heuristics and biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kornblith. H. (Ed). (1985). Naturalizing epistemology, Cambridge, MA: Bradford MIT
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Maze, J, R. (1983). The meaning of behaviour. London: Allen & Unwin.
Miller. G. A. (1967). Computers, communication, and cognition. in The psychology of
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Pylyshyn, Z. (1980). Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive
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Ryle. G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes and Noble.
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Slezak. P. {1988). How NOT to naturalize-the philosophy of action. In P. Slezak & W. R.
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Slezak & W. R. Albury (Eds.), Computers, brains and minds: Essays in cognitive science.
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Received 20 August
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No. 2, 1989 pp. 123-130
On the Relevance of Philosophy
to Psychological Research:
Fashions Versus Fundamentals
John J, Furedy University of
Toronto
Throughout his paper, and especially in the concluding paragraph, Dr Slezak
communicates quite dearly that he found little to admire in my paper (Furedy, 1988).
and he may well be right to imply that I have not kept up with the details of the latest
fashions in cognitive science. My concern, however, is with more fundamental issues. In
this brief reply, I discuss three distinctions that should clarify important differences in our
concerns.
Psychological Research Versus Psychology
The title of my article referred to "psychological research", whereas his title refers to
"psychology" The difference is important. The former refers to enquiry that relies
predominantly on controlled observation to resolve disputes. These observations are usually
based on experiments that manipulate independent variables, but can also be based on nonexperimental methods, as long as those methods use control for the variables under study.
Psychology, more broadly conceived, includes areas where the enquiry is less empirically
oriented. Psychoanalysis, spate of cognitive psychology, and much of cognitive science may
all involve observations, but these observations are not viewed as critical in the resolution of
disputes concerning rival theoretical positions.
Testing Theories Versus Mailing Metaphors/ Models: Scientific Procedures Versus
Sectarian Apologetics
The "computational or information processing approach" has, in Dr Slezak's own words,
"become the dominant orthodoxy (italics added) among philosophers in recent times" (p. 127).
Fodor, who is one of the workers said to provide "rigorous, technically informed articulation"
is approvingly described as "the Pope of MIT High Church Computationalism" (p. 127, italics
added]. The theological flavour of these sorts of comments is obvious.
Similarly, the cited passage from Johnson-Laird (p. 128) smacks of arguing from authority.
Based on passages such as those in Revelation, some theologians have argued that Christ is
both the alpha and the omega, and Johnson-Laird tells us that the computer is the “last
metaphor”. But last, second-last, or whatever
The preparation of this reply was supported in part by a grant by the National Sciences and Engineering
Council of Canada. I am indebted to G, B, Biederman, M. Feak, and Christine Furedy for comments.
Requests for reprints should be sent to John J Furedy, Department of Psychology. University of
Toronto, Toronto. Ontario. Canada M5S l A 1 .
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No.2, 1989 pp, 131-133
132
JJ. Furedy
the ordinal position, the point remains that the computational position is a metaphor,
analogy, or model, rather than a genuine, testable theory. Note also that the same passage
argues for the computational "thesis' on the grounds that "no one has yet succeeded in
refuting" it. However, just as among psychoanalysts, the Freudian thesis had considerable
"status" but little testability, so it appears for the computational “thesis”.
The distinction, in the end. is whether one is interested in actually measuring cognitive
processes, and hence in also differentiating them from other psychological processes (e.g..
Furedy. 1989a, 1989b, 1989c; Furedy & Riley, 1987, 1989; Furedy, Shulhan, & Randall,
1989; Michell, 1988), or whether the interest is only in modelling these processes in such a
way that they are, by definition, said to be the "last metaphor for the mind". These arc
quite different interests, and in my view, the latter approach does not, in the long run,
contribute to psychological research, just because "it is not specific enough to serve as a
genuine hypothesis" (Furedy, 1988. p. 77).
Differing Conceptions of Philosophy
The philosophy that I suggested was relevant for "research and professional psychologists"
(Furedy, 1988. p. 7I) is the 250 decades of reflection on fundamental issues. This contrasts
with the two-decades view said by Dr Slezak to "have been incorporated into the practice
of philosophers" (p.123). This view is grounded on quotations from philosophers who
report that "in the mid-seventies I discovered that my patience with most mainstream
philosophy had run out" (p. 124), and Dr Slezak also asserts that "with the wisdom of
hindsight, philosophers now look with self-deprecating scorn at their own former
concerns" (p. 124), But in addition to these "development in the discipline during the past
twenty years or so" being rather brief relative to the 2.500 years or so that philosophy has
been around, it is also not the case that all philosophers are convinced that this particular
"revolution" is soundly based. For example, to take a writer whom I cited in Furedy (1988.
p. 74). Heil (1981) has argued in Mind that cognitive psychology of the sort espoused by
Fodor (1975) rests on a mistake, and Heil, as far as I know, has not had his philosophical
licence revoked.
Philosophy, more broadly conceived, deals with reflections an fundamental issues, and
those reflections are relevant for "research and professional psychologists" because both
the conduct and evaluation of research is influenced by one's (examined or unexamined)
position on these issues, i have more recently provided an autobiographical illustration of
how such philosophical concerns, and the adoption of some conclusions espoused by
Anderson, can influence a particular research programme (Furedy, 1989c), Another more
thorough illustration for the implications of Andersonian realism for current cognitive
research has been provided by Michel I (1988), while Baker (1986) has provided a
philosopher's perspective on the influence of Anderson's philosophical thinking. Finally, a
reviewer of Baker's book has suggested that "Anderson's philosophy, especially in its
critical aspects, remains a stimulating and expansive body of thought, with clear
contemporary import in its censure of those idealist and relativist theses which seem to be
enjoying another of their periodic resurgences" (McLaughlin, 1989, p. 95). So the fact that
in Slezak and Albury's (1988) book. "Anderson's philosophical concerns are nowhere to be
seen" (p. 10) is of relevance only to those who believe that it is more important to have an
impact on the thinking of some current psychologists and philosophers, than to propose
ideas which, in the long run are sound.
Australian Journal of Psychology Vol. 41, No.2, 1989 pp, 131-133
133
JJ. Furedy
In my view, then, provided one keeps the above sorts of distinctions in mind, it
seems that at least I two points are clear. First, philosophical considerations need to be
taken up "if we wish the research enterprise to be genuinely progressive and
cumulative from an epistemological point of view" (Furedy, 1988, p. 76). Second,
despite its low citation count in the current literature, Andersonian, "Australian"
(Baker, 1986) or "direct" (Michell, 1988) realism does have something of interest to
say to psychological researchers, to those researchers, that is, who are more concerned
with progress in understanding the principles of behaviour than with being at the
cutting edge of current cognitive fashions.
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Received 3 April 1989.
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