Bergmann’s Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists
Forthcoming in Philosophical Studies
By Jason Rogers and Jonathan Matheson
ABSTRACT: Michael Bergmann claims that all versions of epistemic
internalism face an irresolvable dilemma. We show that there are many plausible
versions of internalism that falsify this claim. First, we demonstrate that there are
versions of “weak awareness internalism” that, contra Bergmann, do not succumb
to the “Subject’s Perspective Objection” horn of the dilemma. Second, we show
that there are versions of “strong awareness internalism” that do not fall prey to
the dilemma’s “vicious regress” horn. We note along the way that these versions
of internalism do not, in avoiding one horn of the dilemma, succumb to the
dilemma’s other horn. The upshot is that internalists have many available
strategies for avoiding dilemmatic defeat.
I. INTRODUCTION: A DILEMMA FOR INTERNALISM
Internalism is the genus for a certain class of views about epistemic justification. The
defining characteristic of this genus, according to Michael Bergmann (2006a), is its claim that
there is an awareness requirement on justification.
This awareness requirement is the
requirement that, for a belief to be justified for some person at some time, the person holding the
belief at that time be “aware (or at least potentially aware) of something contributing to its
justification” (Bergmann 2006a, 9).1 Put more precisely, internalism about justification endorses
the following thesis:
The Awareness Requirement (AR): S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something,
X, that contributes to the justification of B—e.g., evidence for B or a truth-indicator for B
or the satisfaction of some necessary condition of B’s justification—and (ii) S is aware
(or potentially aware) of X (Bergmann 2006a, 9).
The conditions mentioned in AR can be further specified in various ways. Specific versions of
internalism will endorse AR and differentiate themselves by specifying either the sort of
1
Note that, as it is formulated here, the awareness requirement is a requirement on doxastic justification, not on
propositional justification.
1
awareness mentioned in AR’s condition (ii), or the sorts of things that can be the “justificationcontributors”2 mentioned in AR’s condition (i), or both.
Bergmann claims that all versions of internalism face an irresolvable dilemma.3 Every
version of internalism maintains that a necessary condition for some belief’s being justified is
that the subject possess actual or potential awareness of some justification-contributor for the
belief (as per AR, above). The required awareness will be either “strong awareness” or “weak
awareness.”4 If the required awareness is strong awareness, then, Bergmann argues, internalism
“has vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism” (Bergmann 2006a, 14). If the
required awareness is weak awareness, then, alleges Bergmann, internalism is vulnerable to the
“Subject’s Perspective Objection” (SPO). In either case, the argument goes, we should not
endorse internalism.
It will be helpful to present this dilemma a bit more formally, so as to better consider its
premises. The following presentation of the dilemma is Bergmann’s:
A Dilemma for Internalism
I.
II.
III.
IV.
An essential feature of internalism is that it makes a subject’s actual or potential
awareness of some justification-contributor a necessary condition for the
justification of any belief held by that subject.
The awareness required by internalism is either strong awareness or weak
awareness.
If the awareness required by internalism is strong awareness, then internalism has
vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism.
If the awareness required by internalism is weak awareness, then internalism is
vulnerable to the SPO, in which case internalism loses its main motivation for
imposing the awareness requirement.
The term “justification-contributor” comes from Bergmann (2006a). For consistency’s sake, we follow Bergmann
in using this term despite our qualms about it. As the following discussion bears out, some things that are called
“justification-contributors” do not actually contribute at all to justification by themselves—some additional kind of
awareness or conceptualization of them is required, and only then do they contribute. As such, we would have
preferred to call such things “potential justification-contributors.”
3
The presentation of the dilemma that follows in this paragraph is an encapsulation of Bergmann’s more formal
presentation in Bergmann (2006a, 13-14), which is reproduced in the next paragraph of this paper.
4
These terms come from Bergmann (2006a). We provide brief explanations of each after presenting the dilemma.
2
2
V.
VI.
If internalism either leads to radical skepticism or loses its main motivation for
imposing the awareness requirement (i.e., avoiding the SPO), then we should not
endorse internalism.
Therefore, we should not endorse internalism.
Premise I of the dilemma simply follows from our description of the awareness requirement as
an essential feature of internalism.5 We accept premise V for the sake of argument.6 Premise II
follows from the fact that strong awareness and weak awareness are exhaustive and exclusive
kinds of awareness. Briefly,7 strong awareness is awareness that involves “conceiving of the
justification-contributor [mentioned in AR’s condition (i)] . . . as being in some way relevant to
the justification or truth of the belief [B]” (Bergmann 2006a, 13; emphasis in original), where
this “conceiving” involves a certain kind of conceptualization of the justification-contributor8—it
involves the application to that contributor of the concept being in some way relevant to the
appropriateness of B.9 In contrast, weak awareness is awareness that does not involve this
conceptualization.10 Having accepted the preceding premises for the foregoing reasons, we will
focus our attention in what follows on premises III and IV of the dilemma. We will argue that
each premise is false, showing in the process that both internalists who construe AR as requiring
5
We pause to note, however, that there is some dispute as to whether or not the awareness requirement really is an
essential feature of internalism. Conee and Feldman (2001), for example, have an apparently different view
regarding the essential feature(s) of internalism. Instead of entering this dispute, we simply accept premise I for the
purposes of this paper.
6
Bergmann considers objections to this premise and goes to some length to defend it in his (2006a). We will not
address these issues here.
7
We give more extended characterizations of these kinds of awareness later in this paper.
8
On Bergmann’s view, “conceiving of” the justification-contributor as relevant may or may not amount to belief.
If a version of internalism requiring such conceiving holds that it does amount to belief, then it is a version of
doxastic strong awareness internalism. If it does not hold that it amounts to belief, then it is a version of nondoxastic
strong awareness internalism. See Bergmann (2006a, 14-19). We remain non-committal on this issue in what
follows, though see our note 27.
9
See Bergmann (2006a, 17). There is some indication that Bergmann takes the concept being in some way relevant
to the appropriateness of B to be a ‘dummy’ concept, one that can be replaced by other appropriate concepts. For
example, Bonjour’s (2006) view seems to require applying the concept being descriptively captured by B to the
object of awareness, and yet Bergmann classifies this as a strong awareness. What is really needed, then, is just
some concept that appropriately “connects” the belief to the object of awareness in such a way that the subject
conceives of the object of awareness as justifying (or, alternatively, as making true) the belief in question.
10
As we note later, weak awareness may involve some conceptualization of the object of awareness—it does not,
however, involve a conceptualization of the object of awareness as justifying the belief in question, in the ways
discussed in this paper (particularly in our footnote 9, above).
3
only weak awareness and internalists who construe AR as requiring strong awareness can avoid
Bergmann’s dilemma.
II. REJECTING PREMISE IV: WEAK AWARENESS INTERNALISM AND THE SPO
What reasons are there for thinking that premise IV of the dilemma is true? Bergmann
offers several considerations, all of which turn on the nature of the SPO and the nature of weak
awareness.
We begin with some words about the SPO. The SPO is an objection often leveled by
internalists against externalist theories of epistemic justification. The SPO claims the following:
The Subject’s Perspective Objection (SPO): If the subject holding a belief isn’t aware of
what that belief has going for it, then she isn’t aware of how its status is any different
from a stray hunch or an arbitrary conviction. From that we may conclude that from her
perspective it is an accident that her belief is true. And that implies that it isn’t a justified
belief.11
To take just one example, Laurence Bonjour offers something like the SPO against reliabilist
theories of justification in his presentation of the well-known case of Norman the clairvoyant.12
After describing that case, Bonjour writes (in language very close to the preceding formulation
of the SPO) that
Norman will in fact not go wrong in accepting the belief [resulting from his
clairvoyant powers], and it is, in a sense, not an accident that this is so: it would
not be an accident from the standpoint of [a] hypothetical external observer who
knows all the relevant facts and the laws. But how is this supposed to justify
Norman’s belief? From his subjective perspective it is an accident that the belief
is true. And the suggestion here is that the rationality or justifiability of Norman’s
belief should be judged from Norman’s own perspective rather than from one
which is unavailable to him (Bonjour 1985, 43-44; emphasis in original).
Using the SPO in this way, Bonjour takes himself to have provided a counterexample to
externalist theories of justification that attribute justification to Norman.
11
12
This phrasing of the SPO is Bergmann’s; see (2006a, p. 12).
For a full discussion of this case, see Bonjour (1985, pp. 41-44).
4
The central idea behind the SPO appears to be that it is a necessary condition for
(doxastic) epistemic justification that the subject holding a belief be aware in some way of what
that belief “has going for it,” in a way that makes it the case that it is not just an accident, from
the subject’s perspective, that his belief is true. A belief’s truth is an accident from a subject’s
perspective, we suggest,13 if it is not the case that there is something of which he is aware in a
way that makes it reasonable for him to suspect that the belief is true. Given this understanding
of the objection, internalists may press the SPO against externalist views about justification that
fail to require such awareness. In addition, they may also use the SPO to directly motivate their
own views. Internalists may suggest that if a subject is appropriately aware of the justificationcontributor for the relevant belief, as AR requires, then the subject is aware of something that
makes the truth of the belief non-accidental, from his perspective. If this is correct, then
internalism meets the SPO in a way that versions of externalism do not. This is allegedly some
reason to accept internalism over externalism.
Premise IV of Bergmann’s dilemma denies that any version of weak awareness
internalism (hereafter, WAI) has this reason in its favor.14 It contends that versions of WAI fail
to meet the demands of the SPO. The reason that they allegedly fail is that the awareness of the
justification-contributor that versions of WAI require is not strong enough—it is not sufficient to
make it the case that the subject who possesses said awareness of the justification-contributor is
aware of something that the belief has going for it in a way that makes it the case that the belief’s
truth, from the subject’s perspective, is non-accidental.
The possession of merely weak
What exactly it is for it to be “an accident, from the subject’s perspective, that his belief is true” is somewhat
unclear to us; Bergmann, unfortunately, does not say much about this. We offer these suggestive remarks here,
returning to a more thorough consideration of this issue later in the paper.
14
Weak awareness internalism is just internalism that construes AR as requiring only weak awareness.
13
5
awareness supposedly allows that it is just an accident, from the subject’s perspective, that his or
her belief is true.
Consider, first, what Bergmann calls “nonconceptual” versions of WAI. Nonconceptual
versions of WAI require, for the justification of a subject’s belief, that there be some
justification-contributor for the belief of which the subject is weakly aware, and they allow that
such awareness may consist in an awareness that does not involve conceiving of the justificationcontributor at all.15
According to Bergmann, it is precisely this fact about nonconceptual
versions of WAI that makes them vulnerable to the SPO. He contends that,
[S]ince the awareness required is nonconceptual, a person can have the required
awareness of [the justification-contributor] without conceiving of [it] in any
way—without categorizing it according to any classificatory scheme. But then [a
subject] can be nonconceptually aware of [the justification-contributor] without
conceiving of [it] as relevant at all to the appropriateness of his belief . . . [I]f [a
subject] does not conceive of [the justification-contributor] as something relevant
to the appropriateness of his belief, it is an accident from [the subject’s]
perspective that his belief is true (Bergmann 2006a, 20).
From the alleged fact that all nonconceptual versions of WAI allow cases of justified belief
where it is an accident, from the subject’s perspective, that the belief is true, it follows that they
are vulnerable to the SPO.
Similar comments apply to “conceptual” versions of WAI. While conceptual versions of
WAI require that the awareness of the justification-contributor involve conceiving of that
contributor in some way, they still do not require that the awareness involve conceiving of the
justification-contributor as in any way relevant to the appropriateness of the pertinent belief.16
Bergmann’s objection to nonconceptual versions of WAI thus applies here as well: “If [a subject]
15
Again, as we go on to note, some versions of WAI may require conceptualization, albeit not conceptualization that
“connects” the object of awareness to the relevant belief in the way required by strong awareness (e.g., as justifying
the conceptualization or belief in question). Nonconceptual versions of WAI do not require even this “weaker” sort
of conceptualization.
16
The latter requirement would make the awareness strong awareness. The important feature of weak awareness is
that it does not involve conceiving of the justification-contributor as justifying the belief in question. Other
conceptualizations may be involved in weak awareness. (On this, see also our footnotes 9, 10 and 15.)
6
does not conceive of [the justification-contributor] as something relevant to the appropriateness
of his belief, it is an accident from [the subject’s] perspective that his belief is true.” And then
the SPO straightforwardly applies.
That said, if the reasoning of the preceding two paragraphs succeeds, and both
nonconceptual and conceptual versions of weak awareness internalism do allow that, possibly, a
subject’s belief is justified while it is an accident from his perspective that the belief is true, then
both versions of WAI succumb to the SPO, and premise IV of Bergmann’s dilemma is true.17
No version of WAI could then avoid the dilemma.
We will argue, however, that the reasoning of the aforementioned paragraphs does not
succeed. It is not the case that all versions of WAI allow that, possibly, a subject’s belief is
justified while it is an accident from his or her perspective that the belief is true. There are
versions of WAI that can avoid the SPO and escape Bergmann’s dilemma.
Consider, as an example, a version of nonconceptual WAI that appeals to “seemings” as
justification-contributors.18
The idea behind such a view might go as follows.
Certain
propositions seem true to us, where a given proposition’s seeming true to us consists in our being
spontaneously inclined to form a belief in the proposition in response to being immediately
acquainted with (i.e., immediately weakly aware of) some object of awareness.19
These
spontaneous inclinations are identified by the view as “seemings.” We emphasize that seemings
are mere inclinations to form beliefs, by which we mean only that they are themselves
nonconceptual psychological states—they are neither instances of concept-application nor of
We are hereby accepting the claim that its ability to avoid the SPO is the main motivation for internalism’s
imposition of the awareness requirement, as Bergmann’s statement of premise IV claims.
18
Something like this general idea is defended ably by Michael Huemer (2001).
19
This characterization of a “seeming” as a certain sort of inclination follows the characterization offered by Earl
Conee in his defense of “seeming evidentialism” (2004, 15), albeit with some minor differences in phrasing.
Huemer (2001) does not agree that seemings are inclinations to believe.
17
7
outright belief. Such seemings may be in certain respects conceptual—for example, they may
arise as the results of noticing certain conceptual relationships (e.g., “inclusion” relationships)
between the constituents of propositions under consideration—but the important point is that a
subject hosting such seemings need not additionally conceive of the seemings themselves, or of
the first-order objects of awareness that cause the seemings, as justifying any particular belief(s).
A subject may “host” a seeming without conceiving of—or even having higher-order awareness
of—the seeming itself in any way. Likewise, the seeming may result for the subject as a result of
merely weak awareness of some object of first-order awareness.20 This being the case, an
individual can be in a state wherein he hosts the seeming that some proposition is true while
remaining in a state of weak—and even nonconceptual—awareness of that seeming, or while
having no higher-order awareness of the seeming at all, and all while remaining in a state of
weak awareness concerning the object of first-order awareness that gives rise to that seeming.
But despite the fact that all of these states have been described as states of (at most) weak
awareness, it is readily apparent that they can make a relevant difference from the subject’s
perspective—specifically, they can make it the case that, from the subject’s perspective, the
relevant belief is appropriate to hold.
A subject hosting these mental states concerning a
particular belief is reasonable (assuming he possesses no justification defeaters) in expecting that
belief to be true,21 and so the belief’s truth, from his perspective, is non-accidental. There is a
That is, the subject in such a case need not conceptualize—in Bergmann’s sense of forming beliefs about or
applying concepts to—the object of first-order awareness as justifying any particular belief. Even if the object of
weak awareness is a proposition, and the seeming results from noticing conceptual relationships within that
proposition, the proposition (together with its interior conceptual relationships) remains an object of weak
awareness, since any conceptualization involved is not a conceptualization of the proposition (or of the conceptual
relationships within the proposition) as justifying some belief. One can notice, for example, that the subject term of
the sentence “every golden trumpet is a trumpet” conceptually includes the predicate term, without thereby applying
to the sentence, or to the proposition that it expresses, the concept justifying the belief that every golden trumpet is a
trumpet.
21
Indeed, Bergmann himself endorses the view that a proposition’s merely seeming true is a good reason for
believing that it is true (see Bergmann 2006a, 176).
20
8
clear subjective difference, for example, between the belief that inexplicably (from his own
perspective) pops into Norman the clairvoyant’s head as a result of the operation of his
clairvoyant powers, on the one hand, and a subject’s belief in some proposition as a result of the
proposition’s actually seeming true to him upon his understandingly considering it and being
weakly aware of some object of awareness (e.g., conceptual inclusion relationships), on the
other. After all, in the latter case, the proposition seems true to the subject—to use the language
of Plantinga (1993), the subject feels “pulled toward” believing it.22 That said, the subject who
22
Some may doubt that the case wherein the subject hosts the relevant seeming is importantly different from the
case of Norman in the ways just suggested. How, one might ask, are seemings (mere inclinations to believe)
different from—and apparently in some way epistemically better than—outright beliefs, in a way that makes it such
that their possession prevents the subject from being in an SPO-vulnerable state, while Norman’s outright belief
does not? The answer is as follows. In the case of Norman’s outright belief, there is nothing from his perspective
that independently grounds the belief in question, or that independently indicates to him that his belief is true, or that
he might (reasonably) cite as his basis for regarding it as true. In the case of a subject who hosts a belief in a
proposition together with the seeming that the proposition is true, however, the subject does have something from
his perspective—the seeming itself—that (assuming a typical, non-deviant causal chain) independently grounds the
belief in question, that “pulls” or “impels” the subject toward that belief, and that he can cite as his basis for
regarding the belief as true; and this is so even if the subject does not occurrently conceptualize the seeming as being
related to the truth or justification of that belief (we elaborate upon this last claim in the next few paragraphs in the
body of this paper). In short, the seeming, unlike the belief itself, is an occurrent experience that from the subject’s
perspective makes a substantial difference concerning the subject’s stance toward that belief. The subject’s
inclination to believe as he does is precisely what makes him reasonably expect that his belief is true. (For a full
defense of the view that seemings provide reasons, the reader is again directed to Huemer (2001).)
Persistent inquirers might wonder whether what we have just said is enough to mark an important
difference between “seemings” and beliefs. Don’t subjects who merely believe propositions also expect that their
beliefs are true? And doesn’t this mean that their mere beliefs should be enough to make it the case that those
beliefs are non-accidentally true from their perspectives? If so, then there is still no SPO-relevant difference
between the subjects who host “seemings” and the subjects who, like Norman, host mere beliefs.
But the answer to the second of the preceding questions is ‘No.’ Even if there is some sense in which
subjects who believe propositions also always expect that their beliefs are true, there is nothing from the perspective
of a subject who hosts a mere belief upon which he bases his expectation that his belief is true (there is, in other
words, no “ground” within his perspective for this expectation—nothing which might be cited as making the
expectation reasonable). In the case of a subject who hosts a seeming together with a belief, however, there is
something that grounds his expectation: namely, the fact that the belief seems true.
Here a final, important question may arise. Don’t all believed propositions seem true to those who believe
them, so that, again, there is no real difference between “seeming” and believing? Again, the answer is ‘No.’
Seemings are importantly distinct from, and are not always correlated with, beliefs. Their conceptual distinctness
from beliefs follows from their definition as inclinations to believe. Such inclinations are experienced in a way that
beliefs are not—they typically force themselves upon us, with a particular (but hard to describe) phenomenology,
much like perceptions. Further, that these inclinations or “seemings” do not always correlate with beliefs is evident
from a consideration of cases. Some people evidently believe that their spouses are not cheating on them, or that
their current cancer will not be terminal, or that the two lines in the Muller-Lyer Illusion are not different in size,
even despite propositions incompatible with these seeming strongly to be true. On the other hand, there are
propositions that do seem true but that are not believed: rational and appropriately-informed people do not believe at
least one of the propositions constituting the axioms of Frege’s naïve set theory, and this despite the fact that each of
9
forms a belief in such a case does not (assuming a non-deviant causal chain) do so in such a way
that it is an accident, from his perspective, that his belief is true. Given that the proposition
seems true to him, it is not surprising or accidental, from his perspective, that it is true. If this is
right, then (and this is the crucial point) one’s merely being in a state like the one described is
sufficient to make it the case that it is not an accident, from one’s own perspective, that one’s
belief in the relevant proposition is true.
Importantly, no (higher-order) awareness of or
conceptualization of the seeming itself is required for the subject’s belief to be relevantly “nonaccidental” from his perspective—it is enough that the belief seem true to the subject (by virtue
of his hosting the relevant seeming).23 But then the view just described is a version of WAI that
avoids the SPO.
One response to this defense of WAI may be to deny that the view defended is really a
version of internalism, since, as just presented, it does not even require awareness of all of the
relevant justification-contributors (it does not require higher-order awareness of the seeming
itself, for example). But it is worth noting, first, that lacking such a requirement is entirely
consistent with Bergmann’s characterization of internalism. The view just presented requires
awareness of something contributing to the justification of the relevant belief (namely, the object
of weak awareness that causes the seeming), and so conforms to Bergmann’s formulation of
internalism’s AR—it needn’t require awareness of everything contributing to the belief’s
the propositions does seem true. This means that there are believed propositions that do not seem true and that there
are propositions that do seem true but that are not believed. In short, the spontaneously experienced inclinations
with particular phenomenologies of “impulsion” toward believing certain propositions (resultant upon awareness of
certain objects of first-order awareness) do not always accompany beliefs. It is precisely such experienced
phenomenology, however, that makes the subjective difference that puts our hypothetical subject into an SPOinvulnerable state unlike Norman’s. To use Bergmann’s language, that the belief seems true is something that it
“has going for it” from the subject’s perspective. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this point.)
23
Putting a similar point in slightly different words, Huemer says that the view that a higher-order awareness of
one’s seeming is required in order for the seeming to be relevant to the justification of one’s belief “commits . . . a
level confusion” (2001, 177). As he puts it, “By hypothesis, F is what makes x justified—not the awareness of F . . .
In the case of my version of foundationalism, F would be the property of seeming to be the case . . . [T]he thesis is
not that a belief is justified because one believes, or knows, or is aware that its content seems to be true, but just
because its content does seem to be true” (2001, 177; emphasis in original).
10
justification.24 And second, we can readily add to the view the requirement that the subject also
have some weak (higher-order) awareness of the seeming itself in order for his particular belief
to be justified. There can be no qualms about this latter view’s internalist credentials—it is fullblown weak awareness internalism. Still, this view also clearly avoids the SPO. It remains
intuitively the case that the seeming still makes a difference (plausibly an even greater
difference, given the subject’s higher-order awareness of it) from the subject’s perspective. The
believed proposition still seems true to the subject, and so is not accidentally true from his
perspective, and this is so even while the subject does not conceptualize the seeming, or the
object of first-order weak awareness, as justifying the belief in question. This is enough to show
that there are plausible versions of WAI that do not succumb to the SPO. So, premise IV of
Bergmann’s dilemma is false.
Though we have just argued against Premise IV on the basis of a view appealing to
“seemings” as justifiers, we note that this appeal is not essential to our argument. Versions of
internalism that deny that seemings are justifiers, but that appeal to other appropriate mental
states, can employ our general strategy of argument for defending themselves against
Bergmann's dilemma. The central idea behind this strategy is that there are some internal states
which are such that merely being in those states is enough to make it the case that it is no
accident, from one's own perspective, that the relevant belief is true; no higher-order
conceptualization of such states as justifying the belief in question is required.25 We find it
According to Bergmann’s informal characterization of internalism, cited at the beginning of this paper,
internalism endorses the awareness requirement that the subject holding a given belief must be “aware (or at least
potentially aware) of something contributing to its justification.” According to his more formal statement of the
awareness requirement (AR), “S’s belief B is justified only if (i) there is something, X, that contributes to the
justification of B . . . and (ii) S is aware (or at least potentially aware) of X.” Both statements of internalism have it
that the view requires that there is at least one justification-contributor of which the subject is aware.
25
It is worth noting here that this fact about versions of WAI allows them to avoid the “vicious regress” horn of
Bergmann’s dilemma that we discuss in the next section of this paper. Since no such higher-order
conceptualizations are required, there is no inevitable regress of conceptualizations in need of additional justification
24
11
plausible to think that seemings are such states, but we also think it is plausible that there are
other kinds of internal states that share this feature—i.e., that are such that one’s merely being in
those states is sufficient to put one in a significantly better epistemic situation regarding the truth
of the relevant belief than is Norman regarding his belief. Apparently appealing to direct
acquaintance states as states with this feature, Richard Fumerton plausibly remarks that “there is
surely an enormous difference between the intellectual satisfaction one achieves [by being in
such states, as compared with] . . . being in a belief state that [like Norman's] may or may not
have the relevant causal pedigree.”26 In our view, both direct acquaintance states and seeming
states are kinds of internal states to which the weak awareness internalist can appeal as making
such an “enormous difference.” And, since these states do make this difference, versions of
WAI that require such states for justification are invulnerable to the SPO. Again, this falsifies
premise IV of Bergmann’s dilemma.
We close this section with some brief considerations about “accidentality.” Earlier, we
suggested that what it is for it to be “an accident, from the subject’s perspective, that his belief is
true” is for it to be the case that the subject lacks the kind of awareness of some justificationcontributor that makes it reasonable for him to suspect that his belief is true. Both Bonjour and
Fumerton consider the case of Norman as a case of such accidentality. One thing worth noting,
in the ways that Bergmann suggests (concerning versions of strong awareness internalism). Even when some
conceptualizations are involved in the states of weak awareness—perhaps, e.g., when the object of weak awareness
is a proposition or the noticed relationships between its conceptual constituents—WAI requires neither that such
conceptualizations themselves be justified (since it is, for example, just the seeming that results from the noticing of
conceptual relationships that is relevant to justification, and not the various conceptualizations that may themselves
give rise to the seeming), nor that the justification for such conceptualizations, should it obtain, itself be
conceptualized in some way (ad infinitum). (For more on these issues, see the next section of this paper, particularly
our notes 33.)
26
Fumerton (2007). Fumerton's version of WAI can employ our defensive strategy with respect to direct
acquaintance states by arguing that it is intuitively the case that the truth of the relevant belief is not “accidental”
from the subject's perspective in the case where a subject is in a state of direct acquaintance with (i) that belief, (ii)
the fact that makes the belief true, and (iii) the correspondence between these two things. Indeed, Fumerton appears
actually to endorse this defensive strategy, in his (2007). We take our remarks to be elucidating that sort of
response, identifying the general strategy underlying it, and showing how it applies to various versions of WAI.
12
though, is that Norman’s case is not a case wherein he is aware of some justification-contributor
for his belief that the President is in New York City, albeit in an allegedly insufficient way.
Norman simply has no awareness whatsoever of a justification-contributor for his belief.
This being the case, internalists are not committed to claiming that the accidentality to
which externalist views are specially subject is an accidentality having to do with an
inappropriate sort of awareness of justification-contributors. Rather, they may instead claim that
the bad sort of accidentality infecting cases like Norman’s is a result of the subject’s having no
awareness whatsoever of anything contributing to his belief’s justification. Such internalists
could then employ this notion of accidentality in pressing the SPO against externalists. And
even the very weakest version of internalism could avoid this sort of accidentality (and thus this
“revised” SPO) simply by requiring some mere awareness of a relevant justification-contributor,
and nothing else. Non-accidentality would be achieved, according to such views, when one
simply has some awareness of a relevant justification-contributor(s), as one does not in cases like
Norman’s. We point this out in order to suggest another way in which versions of WAI might
avoid Bergmann’s dilemma.
If the preceding considerations are right, then Bergmann’s
characterization of what is required to avoid the “accidentality” of the SPO may simply be
wrong-headed, and there will then be many more versions of WAI that can meet the SPO.
III. REJECTING PREMISE III: STRONG AWARENESS INTERNALISM AND
“VICIOUS REGRESS”
In this section, we move to dispute premise III of Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism in
order to show that versions of strong awareness internalism (SAI) can also avoid it. That
premise claims:
III.
If the awareness required by internalists is strong awareness, then internalism has
vicious regress problems leading to radical skepticism.
13
Why might one think that versions of SAI lead to vicious regress? Recall that SAI
requires that the justification-contributors of a belief be conceived of as related to the truth or
justification of that belief in order for them to actually justify it. As Bergmann notes, such
conceptualization of a justification-contributor can itself be justified or unjustified (Bergmann
2006a, 17).27 Any plausible version of SAI will hold that only justified conceptualizations will
be sufficient. So, there must be some justification for the relevant concept-application. That
said, suppose that we are considering whether some subject, S, is justified in holding some
belief, B, given his awareness of some potential justification-contributor, X1. According to SAI,
S’s belief will be justified only if there is a justified occurrence of A1:
A1:
S’s application to X1 of the concept being in some way related to the
appropriateness of B.
However, S’s conceptualization of X1 in this way, A1, is itself justified only if there is some
justification-contributor for A1, X2, of which S is aware, together with a justified occurrence of
A2:
A2:
S’s application to X2 of the concept being in some way related to the
appropriateness of A1.
But like A1, A2 is also in need of being justified, which will require a further (justified) conceptapplication, A3, and so forth (Bergmann 2006a, 18). It thus appears that there are at least three
regresses threatening versions of SAI.
First, there is a regress of instances of concept–
application; second, there is a regress of justification-contributors needed to justify those
concept-applications; third, there is a regress involving the increasing complexity of the concepts
that are being applied.28 Bergmann’s challenge to versions of SAI focuses on the third of these
27
We mentioned in our note 8 that such conceiving may or may not amount to belief. If it does not, we hereby
register some uncertainty that it requires justification, though we will not press this concern here.
28
The complexity of the concepts being applied is ever increasing, since each new concept-application refers to the
prior concept-application. To see the complexity most clearly, note that the ‘A1’ in A2 is simply a place-holder for
14
regresses—he explicitly says that the regress problem for SAI that he has in mind in his premise
III is a “complexity regress,” and that “the issue is the complexity of, not the number of,
beliefs.”29 That being so, we will be focusing on falsifying this premise of Bergmann’s dilemma
by showing that versions of SAI can avoid the complexity regress, though we will also suggest
ways in which such views might also avoid the other two regresses.
In fact, we will first address the regress of justification-contributors, which we will call
the “contributor regress.” We do this in order to locate a particular justification-contributor that
will do substantial work in our later defense of versions of SAI from the complexity regress.
In seeking to stop a similar regress of justification-contributors, many defenders of
foundationalism appeal (plausibly, we think) to experiences as regress-stopping conferrers of
justification. This appeal to experiences is made for a number of reasons. First, experiences are
not themselves the type of thing that can be epistemically justified or unjustified, so if
experiences can justify beliefs, they will be suitable regress-stoppers—they will be able to confer
justification upon a belief without themselves needing to be justified. And second, it seems that
experiences are otherwise well-suited to play a justificatory role.30 Intuitively, experiences can
provide good reasons to believe propositions. When one has an experience as of there being a
dark green triangular shape within one’s visual field, for example, one seems to have at least part
of a good reason to believe that there is a dark green triangular shape within one’s visual field.
the content of A1 itself. So, stated more explicitly, A2 is: S’s application to X2 of the concept being in some way
related to the appropriateness of S’s application to X1 of the concept being in some way related to the
appropriateness of B. The complexity increases for each step of the regress. See Bergmann (2006a, 18).
Some may think that we have already shown that the complexity regress does not go through by simply
naming the prior levels of conceptualizations, rather than referring to them by their complex contents. After all,
couldn’t any subject do this, and so avoid having to form increasingly complex conceptualizations? The answer
appears to us to be ‘No’ (and so we hereby disagree with the direct reference solution to the complexity regress as it
is formulated by Crisp (2009)). This is because each of these conceptualizations must be justified for the subject. In
order for them to be justified for the subject, the subject will (at least typically) have to give explicit consideration to
their complex contents in the ways that we go on to suggest.
29
Bergmann (2006a, 16).
30
For one contemporary example of the appeal to experiences as regress-stopping justifiers, and of the claim that
experiences neither can be nor need to be justified, see Pryor (2005).
15
A defender of SAI cannot be satisfied with the mere appeal to experiences as regressstoppers, however. According to SAI, in order for an experience to justify a belief for an
individual, that individual must also conceive of that experience as relating to the truth or
justification of that belief. So, regarding the above example, one’s having an experience as of
there being a dark green triangular shape in one’s visual field is itself insufficient to justify one’s
belief that there is a dark green triangular shape in one’s visual field. One also needs to conceive
of that experience as relevant to the truth or justification of that belief.
We can represent this central idea of SAI formally. Suppose that our subject, S, has the
aforementioned experience and belief. Let us call the experience ‘E1’ and the belief ‘B1’:
E1:
S’s experience as of there being a dark green triangular shape within S’s visual
field.
B1:
S’s belief that there is a dark green triangular shape within S’s visual field.
In addition to having E1, SAI requires that S also conceive of E1 as being related to the truth or
justification of B1 in order for E1 to actually act as a justifier of B1 for S. That is, SAI requires a
justified occurrence of C1:
C1:
S’s application to E1 of the concept being in some way related to the
appropriateness of B1.
For ease of expression, let us call the appropriate relation mentioned in C1 the “justifies”
relation, so that C1 is S’s conceiving of E1 as justifying B1.31 As indicated above, it is precisely
at the point of requiring a justification for C1 that SAI encounters the contributor regress
problem. SAI will maintain that S must be justified in conceiving of his experience, E1, as
justifying his belief, B1, in order for that experience to act as a justifier for that belief. But now
It is important to note that, as we will be understanding the term here and in what follows, “justifies” does not
mean on-balance justifies. Rather, it simply means provides a reason for believing. We would use the latter
expression, were it not so wordy.
31
16
it seems that the regress is on its way, for E1 by itself is no longer sufficient for stopping the
contributor regress, as was originally hoped.
In our view, the defender of SAI has the resources to respond to this concern. Even if S
must be justified in conceiving of E1 as justifying B1, it is possible that the justification for this
conceptualization can itself have a regress-stopping justification-contributor. As we have noted,
any suitable regress-stopper will be such that it confers justification while not itself being subject
to being justified or unjustified. And we have already seen that experiences can be such as to
confer justification while not being subject to being justified or unjustified. We might thus think
of experiences as being ‘ultimate evidence’.32 That said, the defender of SAI might be able to
appeal to some further experience had by S that could justify S’s conceiving of his initial
experience as justifying the belief in question. What is needed is an experience that justifies S in
conceiving of his object-level experience as justifying his belief.
But are there such experiences? Quite plausibly, there are. The “seemings” mentioned
earlier in this paper constitute a kind of experience with which many people are familiar. Many
people experience such seemings upon considering allegedly “self-evident” propositions, such as
the proposition that every golden trumpet is a trumpet. When one considers this proposition and
it seems true to one, one hosts a certain difficult-to-describe experience which we earlier called
“an inclination to believe.” Such seemings might be—indeed, seem to us actually to be—present
exactly where the defender of SAI needs them. For there seem to exist seemings regarding
evidential relations. Sometimes it seems to us that something of which we are aware, X, is
evidence for (i.e., reason to believe) a particular proposition, p.
Such experiences can be
described as its seeming to us to be the case that X justifies (is evidence for) p.
32
As do Feldman and Conee (2008), for example.
17
Supposing that such experiences are available to the defender of SAI, let us return to our
consideration of the example of S, above. Suppose that, in addition to S’s having E1 as data, S
also has an experience, E2, in which it seems to S that E1 justifies B1:
E2:
Its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1.
Plausibly, E2 can play some role in justifying S in conceiving of E1 as justifying B1. Indeed,
such seemings appear to be potential providers of foundational justification.33 E2 can play some
role in justifying S in conceiving of E1 as justifying B1, and yet E2 itself is not subject to being
justified or unjustified. E2 thus appears to be an available regress-stopper for the contributor
regress.
But unfortunately, the work for the defender of SAI with respect to this regress does not
end so readily. E2, though it is not itself in need of being justified, must, according to SAI, be
justifiably conceived of as justifying C1 in order for it actually to justify C1 for S. What is
required, then, is a justified occurrence of C2:
C2:
S’s conceiving of E2 as justifying C1.
An experience analogous to E2 could do the justificatory work here, but the worry is that this
would only lead to an infinite regress of further requisite experiences, thus continuing the
contributor regress. In order to prevent such a regress, one thing that the defender of SAI seems
to need is an experience that justifies some belief while at the same time justifying the higher33
We will not provide a further defense of the view that seemings can be foundational justification-contributors
here. Our goal is just to indicate plausible strategies that internalists can employ in avoiding Bergmann’s dilemma.
The idea that seemings are providers of justification is a prevalent and seemingly plausible view defended by
Huemer (2001), Conee (2004), and others; Bergmann himself takes seemings to provide reasons in the way that we
suggest (see our note 21). The idea that seemings can be foundational justifiers is also prevalent and plausible.
Seemings, as we have characterized them, are experiences (they are experienced inclinations). Being experiences,
they are not themselves subject to being justified or unjustified. As Conee and Feldman recently put it, “Its seeming
to S that E supports P is a non-doxastic state, not a belief that E supports P . . . [A] seeming is not the sort of thing
that needs justification. So, if a seeming justifies, then it is capable of stopping a regress of justifiers that are in need
of justification” (2008, p. 96). Huemer (2001) endorses this idea, too.
As an aside, we note that the preceding remarks about seemings give some indication why the “seeming”
version of WAI that we defended straightforwardly avoids the regresses facing versions of SAI.
18
order conceptualization of itself as justifying this belief, thus stopping the need for any further
experience.
We believe that such an experience is available to the defender of SAI. Suppose that S
considers the universal proposition that for all p, its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief
that p.34 Suppose, further, that it seems to S (as it does to us) that this universal proposition is
true.35 S thus has the following experience, E*:
E*:
Its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief (or
conceptualization) that p.36
Recall that what we are looking for here is a justification-contributor that justifies C2—S’s
conceptualization of E2 as justifying C1—for S. The first relatum of C2, E2, is simply its
seeming to S that E1 justifies B1. The second relatum, C1, is just the conceptualization by S that
E1 justifies B1. It appears, therefore, that E* can justify S in conceiving of this first relatum as
justifying the second, i.e., in conceiving of E2 as justifying C1, which is to say that it can justify
C2 for S. For notice that the propositional contents of the relata specified in C2 are the same.
S’s experience E* can justify C2 because (substituting the contents of C2’s relata, E2 and C1,
for ‘p’ in the above schema) E* gives S a reason for taking its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1
(the content of E2) as a reason for believing (or conceptualizing) that E1 justifies B1 (the content
of C1). So, E* justifies C2.
But, given the requirements of SAI, in order for E* to stop the contributor regress, it must
also be the case that E* justifies the conceptualization of itself as justifying C2. That is, E* must
justify C3:
We urge the reader to recall our cautionary note regarding the word “justifies” (see our note 31).
We again defer to Huemer (2001) and Conee (2004) for defenses of something near to this universal proposition.
36
Two notes are worthwhile here. First, it may seem to some readers that the parenthetical remark is ill-formed—
what might it be for one to conceptualize that p? In our terminology, conceptualizing that p amounts to conceiving
of the subject of p in the way that p suggests (e.g., conceiving of the subject of p as falling under the predicateconcept of p). Second, we simply note that, here and in what follows, we often forego explicitly stating the
universal quantifier for the sake of ease of expression.
34
35
19
C3:
S’s conceiving of E* as justifying C2.
It may not be immediately obvious how E* could do this. But there is a way. Notice that C3,
spelled out explicitly, amounts to the following:
C3’:
S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s
belief that p] as justifying [S’s conceiving of (its seeming to S that E1 justifies
B1) as justifying (S’s conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1)].37
In other words, what S needs to justify C3 is a reason for taking the first relatum of C3’, its
seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that p, to justify his conceiving of
[its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1] as justifying his conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1.
But this reason is already available to S in the form of E*. For E* justifies S in taking it that
seemings justify beliefs when those seemings and beliefs have the same contents (this is what
allowed E* to justify C2). But then E* justifies S in taking the experience mentioned in the first
relatum of C3’, its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that p, to
justify his belief that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that p.
And then,
transparently, this justified proposition that [its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that p]
justifies him in conceiving of the seeming that E1 justifies B1 as justifying the belief that E1
justifies B1—the very “conceiving” mentioned in the second relatum of C3’—for that
conceptualization is just an instance of the more general schema. In other words, E* justifies S
in conceiving of the experience mentioned in the first half of C3 as justifying the
conceptualization mentioned in the second half, which is to say that it justifies C3 for S. So E*
The brackets here and elsewhere are offered as a reader’s aid. The first bracketed clause is the content of E*. The
second bracketed clause is the content of C2, which contains two other bracketed clauses that are, respectively, the
contents of E2 and C1, i.e., the relata mentioned in C2.
37
20
justifies C3 in just the way the defender of SAI should hope. No additional experience is
needed; the contributor regress stops here.38
This way of stopping the contributor regress provides a general strategy for all versions
of SAI concerned by it. The strategy involves locating a particular justification-contributor that
both non-inferentially justifies some belief and non-inferentially justifies the conceptualization
of itself as being related to the truth or justification of that belief. It is this feature of the
justification-contributor that allows for the avoidance of the contributor regress. The particular
justification-contributor need not be a seeming (or even an experience) of the sort that we have
identified; it can be any justification-contributor that, according to the particular version of SAI,
has the requisite features.
Having thus defended the preceding version of SAI from the contributor regress, our
central concern now is whether the view can avoid the “complexity regress” leveled against
versions of SAI in premise III of Bergmann’s dilemma. It initially appears that it cannot. For
even if it is the case that E* justifies C2 as well as C3, and so on, the view, as a version of SAI,
requires in every case that E* additionally be conceived of as justifying whatever it allegedly
justifies. In other words, taking C3 as our example, it must be that there is an additional justified
conceptualization, C4:
C4:
S’s conceiving of E* as justifying C3.
And even if E* can justify C4, there will then need to be an additional justified
conceptualization, C5:
C5:
S’s conceiving of E* as justifying C4.
38
The reader may worry that additional experiences will still be needed, since S will have to justifiably conceive of
E* as relevant to C3, and so on. We address this worry in what follows.
21
And so on. Since ‘C3’ and ‘C4’ serve as mere placeholders referring to earlier levels of
conceptualization, these additional conceptualizations are increasingly complex.39 The worry is
that this complexity will increase to such an extent that S cannot possibly have the requisite
conceptualizations, given his finite conceptual abilities, and thus will ultimately lack the
justification he needs. Can the preceding version of SAI avoid this regress in complexity, and if
so, how?
To answer this question, we should first consider the explicit contents of C4 and C5.40
C4’:
S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s
belief that p] as justifying <S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to
one that p justifies one’s belief that p] as justifying [S’s conceiving of (its seeming
to S that E1 justifies B1) as justifying (S’s conceptualization of E1 as justifying
B1)]>.
C5’:
S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s
belief that p] as justifying {S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to
one that p justifies one’s belief that p] as justifying <S’s conceiving of [its
seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that p] as
justifying [S’s conceiving of (its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1) as justifying
(S’s conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1)]>}.
A careful examination of C3’, C4’, and C5’ reveals that each one simply includes an additional
iteration of the clause, “S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies
one’s belief that p] as justifying,” before the clause, “S’s conceiving of (its seeming to S that E1
justifies B1) as justifying (S’s conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1).” (The reader should
note that these two clauses together constitute the whole of C3’.) This is the crucial point to
notice, for these additional clauses are ultimately “superfluous,” in the way that the following
examination of the way in which E* justifies C4’ indicates.
For an example of this complexity, and of Bergmann’s understanding of the complexity regress in this way, the
reader is directed to our note 28.
40
It is not terribly important that the reader perfectly grasp these contents, for reasons that will become apparent in
what follows. The most important thing for the reader to note is that, as we go on to say, C4 and C5 involve
repeated iterations of the same partial contents.
39
22
E* justifies C4’ in the following manner. E* justifies S in taking it that seemings justify
beliefs (again, this is what allowed it to justify C2). But then E* justifies S in taking the
experience mentioned in the very first clause of C4’, its seeming to S that its seeming to one that
p justifies one’s belief that p, to justify his belief that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s
belief that p. The question is then whether this can justify S in “conceiving of [its seeming to S
that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that p] as justifying [S’s conceiving of (its
seeming to S that E1 justifies B1) as justifying (S’s conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1)].”
But the clause, “S’s conceiving of [its seeming to S that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s
belief that p],” simply mentions experience E* all over again. By our prior reasoning, we
already know that, given S’s justified belief that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief
that p, this experience justifies S’s belief that its seeming to one that p justifies one’s belief that
p. And then all that we are left with in C4’ is the question of whether or not this latter justified
belief justifies S in “conceiving of (its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1) as justifying (S’s
conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1).” But that is the very same question asked in our
examination of C3’ above, and we already know the answer (‘yes’). In other words, C4’, like
every conceptualization beyond C3’, simply redundantly mentions E* over and over again until
returning to the issue of taking E* to justify the final conceptualization mentioned in C3’ (i.e.,
the conceptualization by S of (its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1) as justifying (S’s
conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1)).
This fact allows the defender of SAI to say at least two things about the complexity
regress. First, the apparent complexity of conceptualizations is a trivial sort of complexity. Each
conceptualization beyond C3 simply redundantly reiterates E* over and over again and then
claims that E* justifies S’s conceptualization of [its seeming to S that E1 justifies B1] as
23
justifying [S’s conceptualization of E1 as justifying B1].
And reasoning our way to the
conclusion that this latter claim is correct is not difficult (as shown above). So, in effect, S can
readily see, via that reasoning, that E* will trivially justify all conceptualizations above C3, even
though such conceptualizations are ever increasing in complexity.41
This much shows that the “complexity” of such additional conceptualizations does not in
principle prevent S from being justified in making them, or from being justified in taking his
experience to justify them. But there remains a more pressing worry behind the complexity
regress: although there is no problem with complexity that prevents S, in principle, from being
justified in making these further conceptualizations, it still might be the case that the increasing
complexity of these conceptualizations is such that, ultimately, finite minds (such as S’s) are
unable to grasp them. That is, it might be that, even though the added complexity is redundant or
superfluous (in the sense we have articulated), it nonetheless results in conceptualizations that
quickly become too large and complicated for S’s finite mind to grasp. And, in that case (the
worry goes), there would be some level of conceptualization at which S simply could no longer
conceive of E* as relevant to that conceptualization’s justification, simply because he could not
In effect, the reiterations involved here are analogous to reiterations of the “it is true that” clause of “it is true that
p” to get (e.g.) “it is true that it is true that it is true that it is true that p,” in at least the respect that the reiterations in
either case add nothing that requires additional substantive justification. Essentially the same reasoning and
evidence that justifies C4’, for example, will justify C5’, and so on, just as essentially the same reasoning and
evidence will justify “it is true that it is true that p” and “it is true that it is true that it is true that p.” This is true
even if the resulting propositions are in some ways more difficult to comprehend. Any individual who goes through
the reasoning that we have just exhibited will see that the more complex propositions are readily justified in the
same manner as the less complex ones, thereby eliminating his need to explicitly grasp the particular contents of
each in order to be justified in (at least de re) believing them to be true. We explain this further in the body of the
paper. For further defense of these ideas, see our note 43.
As an additional dialectical point here, we note that Bergmann himself, in addressing the view of Evan
Fales (1996), considers the “it is true that” iterations that we have just mentioned and concedes that they do not
involve “any harmful increase in complexity” (2006a, 41; emphasis added). We take it that the conceptualizations
mentioned in this paper also ought not to be regarded as “harmfully” complex, for the reasons just given. Thus,
though we think that Bergmann is right that Fales’ view—which is similar to the one discussed here, in that it also
involves the claim that internalism will require allegedly harmless conceptual iterations—generates unbearably
complex propositions (via iteration of the clause, “it is transparent that…”), which themselves require additional
substantive justification, we think that the view that we defend here avoids this difficulty entirely.
41
24
grasp the conceptualization’s content. This failure of S to conceive of E* as relevant to the
justification of that conceptualization would have SAI render the verdict that this
conceptualization is unjustified for S.
And this lack of justification would affect S’s
conceptualizations at earlier levels, so that SAI would ultimately judge that S is unjustified in his
initial, object-level belief. The specter of skepticism appears to loom.
But here is where the very same reasoning that could in principle justify S in conceiving
of E* as relevant to his additional conceptualizations can once more play a role, thereby allowing
him to avoid the complexity regress entirely. That reasoning will justify S in the general belief
that E* justifies all conceptualizations beyond C3. From this general belief, S can then readily
infer any number of de re beliefs about conceptualizations at levels “higher than” C3, even if S
cannot explicitly grasp the contents of these conceptualizations due to their complexity. This
will allow S to form justified beliefs about each higher level of conceptualization—including the
belief (required by SAI) that E* justifies that conceptualization—without his having to form
increasingly complex de dicto beliefs explicitly including those conceptualizations’ contents. A
version of SAI could thus maintain the requirement that S form additional beliefs regarding
increasingly higher-level conceptualizations without falling prey to Bergmann's charge that this
requires S to form unintelligibly complex beliefs. Instead of requiring that S justifiably believe
de dicto that E* justifies C24, for example (where, again, ‘C24’ is a mere placeholder for C24’s
content), a version of SAI could require simply that S justifiably believe, of C24, that E* justifies
it.42 This latter belief can apparently be justified for S without his having to explicitly entertain
C24's content, since he can use the reasoning mentioned above to note that whatever additional
We note that our characterization of strong awareness (following Bergmann’s own characterization) makes no
requirement that any belief or conceptualization be de dicto rather than de re, nor do we see why it should. Justified
de re beliefs such as the one described here seem clearly to make it the case that the subject takes the object of
awareness to be justificatorily relevant to his belief in a way that avoids the SPO. The subject’s object-level belief
clearly does not remain “accidental’ from his perspective when his perspective includes such justified beliefs.
42
25
content C24 has will be trivial (in our aforementioned sense) and will be justified by E* (as will
any higher-level conceptualization beyond C3).43 So, the increasing complexity is harmless on
all fronts. First, the increasingly complex propositions (e.g., that E* justifies C24) are still
justified for S by E*, and second, it needn’t be that S form de dicto beliefs in these propositions
and thereby grasp explicitly their contents. That being the case, versions of SAI can avoid all
elements of the complexity regress leading to radical skepticism; premise III of Bergmann’s
argument is false.44
Having shown this much, we acknowledge that there remains another regress confronting
versions of SAI that many readers will likely think is bad enough (perhaps bad enough to make it
the case that SAI still leads to radical skepticism, even if not in the way that Bergmann claims).
There is still a regress of instances of belief or conceptualization. That is, it appears that
versions of SAI end up requiring that a subject actually hold an infinite number of beliefs or
conceptualizations in order to be justified. That might seem to be an implausible and, more
importantly, unsatisfiable requirement. If this requirement is unsatisfiable, then one might worry
that the SPO has not in fact been avoided.
43
The case is in this respect analogous to a case where S knows that p and that the Double Negation replacement
rule is truth-preserving. Suppose that S contemplates whether [it is not the case that it is not the case that p] is true.
Knowing that p itself is true, S concludes that the more complex proposition is true. Suppose that S then continues
this pursuit, thinking about the propositions created by continuing to add two negations to the propositions at earlier
levels. At some point in the not too distant future, these propositions will become too complex for S to believe de
dicto, but it still seems that S can justifiably believe things about these complex propositions. For instance, since S
knows that at each stage two negations are being added to the preceding proposition, and since S knows that such a
maneuver is truth-preserving (and that p is true), it seems that S can justifiably believe de re that the increasingly
complex propositions are true as well. S can justifiably believe this about these propositions even though S's mind
cannot grasp these propositions due to their complex contents. Likewise, S can justifiably believe de re, as a result
of undergoing the reasoning that we present, that the increasingly complex propositions we mention in this paper are
true, and this without needing to outright grasp their complex contents.
44
We reiterate here that the regress mentioned in that premise is, according to Bergmann, the complexity regress,
and is not a regress having to do with the (potentially infinite) number of beliefs or conceptualizations. We have
thus refuted that premise. Still, for the sake of completeness, we briefly consider the issue of the number of requisite
beliefs or conceptualizations in what follows.
26
There are at least three plausible responses to this problem. A first option for versions of
SAI is to simply embrace the requirement that the subject actually hold an infinite number of
beliefs or conceptualizations. The best hope for plausibility for such versions of SAI is an appeal
to actual tacit beliefs.45 There is some plausibility to the claim that we already have an infinite
number of such beliefs;46 if that is right, then the idea that we might (have to) come, via the
preceding reasoning, to hold many more such beliefs is not obviously problematic. But whether
this appeal is ultimately satisfying is something that we will not go on to consider in any more
detail here. This is because we think that there are two alternative options for versions of SAI
that more straightforwardly avoid the “infinite beliefs” regress.
As we have already seen, E* is capable of justifying all of the (infinitely many) requisite
beliefs or conceptualizations. Experiencing E* and going through the reasoning described above
justifies S in the general belief that E* justifies all of the conceptualizations beyond C3. As we
noted, S can then readily infer any number of (justified) de re beliefs about conceptualizations at
levels “higher than” C3 from this general belief (namely, that they are each justified by E*).
That being so, one way for versions of SAI to avoid requiring an infinite number of actual beliefs
or conceptualizations (even if they are de re) is to require only that the subject actually have two
justified de re beliefs or conceptualizations regarding all of the conceptualizations at levels
“higher than” C3.47 One of these would be a justified de re belief, of the conjunction composed
of the infinitely many propositions expressing the evidential relationships between E* and the
increasingly-complex conceptualizations, that it is true—i.e., a de re belief concerning the
45
Bergmann suggests something like this response in his (2006a, 16).
It is at least plausible to think, for example, that many of us occurrently but tacitly believe that 10 is greater than
9, that 11 is greater than 9, that 12 is greater than 9, etc. For a defense of the claim that tacit beliefs are actual
beliefs, different from mere dispositions to believe, see Crimmins (1992, 58-74).
47
Though we have just mentioned conceptualizations or beliefs, we will go on to speak only of beliefs, noting here
that a parallel account could be given replacing “beliefs” with “conceptualizations.”
46
27
conjunction E* justifies C3 and E* justifies C4 and E* justifies C5 . . . and E* justifies Cn and
E* justifies Cn+1 (etc.). The other would be a justified de re belief that the truth of this
conjunction is relevant to the truth or justification of the pertinent object-level belief B1 (the
belief whose justification is under scrutiny). Let’s consider each of these in turn.
We have already seen how one can be justified in forming the relevant de re beliefs
concerning each of the individual conjuncts (i.e., concerning the proposition that E* justifies C3,
and so on for each conceptualization beyond C3). Going through the reasoning described above
justifies the subject in believing each of these conjuncts. Once one realizes this, it seems that
one can justifiably believe (at least de re) the proposition that is the conjunction of these
infinitely many propositions with their ever increasing iterations of complexity.
Since the
justification of each conjunct is not independent, and since all but the first conjunct simply adds
“trivial” content (in the sense described above) to the previous conjunct—content which the
subject who performs the aforementioned reasoning recognizes as trivial—there is no worry here
that the ever-growing number of conjuncts will make it such that the subject will at some point
lack justification for believing the conjunction. So, going through the reasoning described above
can justify the subject in believing of this infinitely long conjunction that it is true.
Further, understanding what the content of each conjunct is like (even though S cannot
explicitly grasp (de dicto) the content of the more complex propositions) justifies S in the de re
belief that this conjunctive proposition is relevant to the truth or justification of the pertinent
belief (the belief whose justification is under consideration). That is, S recognizes that each
conjunct claims that the experience E* justifies the subject in conceiving of E* as justifying one
of the infinite number of requisite conceptualizations (from C3 onward), and that each conjunct
is ultimately (in the way shown by the reasoning about “trivial” complexity) concerned with the
28
justification of the subject’s conceptualization of E1 as relevant to the truth or justification of B1
(the object-level belief). This being so, each conjunct is transparently relevant to the truth or
justification of this belief, and the subject, having gone through the above reasoning, will be able
to recognize this. Having done so, the subject will likewise be able to recognize that the
conjunction composed of these conjuncts is, ipso facto, itself relevant to the truth or justification
of the object-level belief. So, both the belief, of the conjunction, that it is relevant to the truth or
justification of the object-level belief, and the belief, of the conjunction, that it is true, will be
held by the subject with justification.
Any view requiring such justified beliefs or conceptualizations seems to readily avoid the
SPO. This is because once one justifiably believes, via the above reasoning, of this infinitely
long conjunction, that it is true and that it is relevant to the truth or justification of the pertinent
belief, it would not seem like an accident from the subject’s perspective that the relevant objectlevel belief, B1, is true. Bergmann’s worry with such views is that they allegedly succumb to a
vicious regress, but, as we have seen, this is not so for the view just described. So, we appear to
have a version of SAI that avoids the SPO and does not succumb to any of the regresses.
A final, alternative version of SAI that perhaps even more straightforwardly avoids the
“infinite beliefs” regress appeals to potential beliefs. Bergmann himself notes that there may be
versions of what he calls “potential strong awareness internalism” that require for object-level
justification only that the subject be able to ascend to higher levels of justified conceptualization
upon reflection. Of this third class of views, he says that they manage “to avoid requiring for
justification the actual possession of an infinite number of . . . beliefs.”48 Such versions of SAI
could thus avoid the “infinite instances” regress while also employing the strategies presented
earlier in this section to avoid both the complexity and contributor regresses. Importantly, those
48
Bergmann (2006a, 16).
29
earlier strategies not only do avoid these other regresses, but they also present the very reasoning
by which any subject could ascend to higher levels of justified conceptualization upon reflection,
precisely as a version of potential SAI would require. Such reasoning shows that the conceptual
ascent does not require an infinite number of experiences or impossibly powerful conceptual
abilities—that is, it shows that (typical) subjects are in principle able to meet the requirements of
versions of potential SAI.49 That said, versions of potential SAI can avoid all three regresses.
One might worry at this point that any version of SAI that only requires potential belief
or conceptualization of the justification-contributor as relevant to the truth or justification of the
pertinent belief is subject to the SPO, since such views will not require that the subject actually
conceive of the justification-contributor as relevant to the belief in question. It seems to us,
however, that such a view avoids the SPO for the same reasons that the earlier discussed versions
of WAI avoid it. On the view currently under discussion, the pertinent belief, B1, still seems
true to the subject, and, as we have seen, this alone is sufficient for making the truth or
justification of B1 non-accidental from the subject’s perspective. But the view under discussion,
as a version of SAI, adds even more to the subject’s perspective, putting him in an even better
epistemic position regarding the pertinent belief. Not only does the relevant proposition seem
true to the subject, but it also seems to the subject (by virtue of his having experienced E*) that
One might worry here that even potential awareness versions of SAI face a version of the “infinite
conceptualizations” regress that we have not yet considered. For it seems that such versions of SAI may still require
for justification that a subject be able to hold an infinite number of justified conceptualizations at some time, even if
they do not require that he actually do so. And perhaps, the thought goes, no (finite, human) subject is even able to
hold an infinite number of justified conceptualizations at some time, so that no such subject is able meet the
justification requirements of even potential SAI. (Thanks to Earl Conee here.)
It seems to us, however, that versions of potential SAI do not actually have this requirement. They do not
require that a subject be able to hold an infinite number of justified conceptualizations at a time. Rather, what such
views require is just that, for every individual conceptualization that is a member of this infinite set of
conceptualizations, the subject is able to (justifiably) hold it at the relevant time. This is the difference between such
views requiring, on the one hand, that it is possible that, at t, the subject form every conceptualization and, on the
other hand, that for every conceptualization, it is possible that the subject form it at t. The latter is true, does not
require potentially holding an infinite number of beliefs at a time, and is all that appears to be required by versions
of potential SAI.
49
30
its seeming so is good reason to think that the proposition is true. This second-order seeming
makes it definitively not an accident from the subject’s perspective that his belief is true or
justified. So, such a version of SAI clearly avoids the SPO while also avoiding the “infinite
beliefs” regress.
Having shown this much, we note again that the strategy employed in our defense of SAI
is, like the strategy employed in our defense of WAI, perfectly general. That is, it need not
appeal to seemings as justifiers in avoiding any of the preceding regresses. A defender of SAI
could build on Fumerton’s work, for example, and utilize an epistemology which conceives of
direct acquaintance as a provider of justification. Thus, although Fumerton himself embraces a
version of WAI, it is possible to use elements of his view to defend SAI as well. One would
simply need to substitute direct acquaintance states for seeming states in the preceding defense,
in a way analogous to the substitution made in defense of versions of WAI. 50 Many specific
versions of internalism could thus be defended using our defensive strategy. Any version of SAI
that employs this strategy appears to falsify premise III of Bergmann’s dilemma.51
IV. OBJECTIONS
In this section, we briefly consider two seemingly pressing and so far unaddressed
objections. Each objection concerns our defense of versions of SAI.52
First, one might worry that, although the defended versions of SAI avoid Bergmann’s
regress(es), they fail ultimately to prevent versions of SAI from leading to radical skepticism in a
50
On this account, the analogue to E* would be DA*:
DA*: S’s having the thought that direct acquaintance justifies while being directly acquainted with the fact
that direct acquaintance justifies and the correspondence between this thought and this fact.
51
Though we have noted this on occasion throughout Section III of this paper, it is worth explicitly reiterating here
that the versions of SAI defended so far also do not fall prey to the SPO (since they always require that the subject
have a perspective on his evidence that relates it to the truth of the relevant conceptualization(s) or belief(s)), and so
avoid Bergmann’s dilemma entirely.
52
We take ourselves to have addressed the seemingly pressing objection to (or, really, concern with) our defense of
WAI—namely, the concern that the view defended there is not really a version of internalism or is inconsistent with
the internalist “spirit”—in Section III of this paper.
31
different way. Aren’t these versions of SAI over-intellectualized, for example, to the extent that
they have the result that most individuals do not justifiably believe much of anything? Doesn’t
the “seeming” version of SAI, for example, require that individuals host the higher-order
seeming that all seemings provide reasons for belief, even if (as with potential SAI) such
individuals need not actually form higher-order conceptualizations of such seemings as relevant
to justification?
First, it is important to note that these requirements are requirements on doxastic, not on
propositional, justification.
This means that such views do not directly entail that any
individuals lack propositional justification for certain propositions. Even so, they do impose the
aforementioned requirements for the justification of any individual’s actual beliefs. But notice,
then, what those requirements actually amount to. They say that, for every belief actually held
by any individual, that belief is justified only if the individual is aware of some justificationcontributor for the belief and (at least potentially) justifiably conceives of that contributor as
relevant to the appropriateness of the belief. It is not wholly implausible to think that many
individuals who form beliefs are aware of reasons for those beliefs and do (at least potentially)
conceive of those reasons as relevant to their beliefs’ appropriateness. We do admit that it is a
bit less plausible to think that such individuals also possess (as SAI requires) justification for this
conceptualization itself and (at least potentially) conceive of that justification as relevant to the
appropriateness of the conceptualization, but we still do not find it absurd to think that some
do.53 For example, while we do not wish to speculate too much about such things, it does not
seem outlandish, from our armchairs, to think that it does seem to many individuals that for all p,
its seeming to one that p provides some reason for believing that p, even if they would not
express it that way. Nor does it seem outlandish to think that the individuals who host such
53
We would like to put particular emphasis on the word “potentially” here.
32
seemings conceive of them (or at least are able to conceive of them upon reflection), in some
perhaps implicit sense, as relevant to the appropriateness of the belief that seemings provide
reasons for belief. If that is the case, then many individuals actually do possess the experiences
required by SAI to avoid the contributor regress, and also have the conceptual abilities to avoid
both the complexity and “infinite instances” regresses.
We note also that we have so far assumed that such views would require actual
awareness (even if only potential belief) of the relevant justification-contributors. We now point
out that there may also be versions of SAI that can allow that the mere potential awareness of the
requisite justification-contributors is enough to do the job.54 That is, there may be versions of
potential awareness SAI that avoid the regresses and yet do not require even that any individuals
actually have the requisite experiential seemings (such as those mentioned in E*). Such versions
of SAI would require only that individuals be able to host such seemings upon reflection. It
seems quite plausible to us that, at least upon reflection, many individuals could host the seeming
that something’s seeming to be the case is a reason for believing it to be the case, just as it seems
that such individuals would also be able to, on reflection, avoid the complexity regress via the
reasoning mentioned in Section IV.55 So, it seems that at least potential awareness versions of
SAI have the resources to avoid regresses without having to endorse widespread skepticism.56
54
Again, such views appear to be considered live options by Bergmann. See Bergmann (2006a, 14-19; p. 14 in
particular). We note also that the view under discussion here differs from what was previously called “potential
SAI” in that it allows for both potential conceptualization and potential awareness; “potential SAI” allowed only for
potential conceptualization/belief.
55
Even if such reasoning is difficult or not immediately obvious, it still appears to be such that it is able to be
accomplished, on careful reflection, by a good number of people.
56
One might worry that any version of SAI that appeals to the mere potential awareness of the justification
contributor is now subject to the SPO, and so to the dilemma’s other horn. (Thanks again to an anonymous referee
here.) Indeed, we have this worry ourselves. Nevertheless, we mention this possibility to leave open a further
possible response to the dilemma that may avoid some of the skeptical worries potentially induced by the versions of
SAI so far defended. One particular possibility that we find promising in this vein is a view that requires actual
strong awareness of the justification-contributor at the object-level, but merely potential awareness of the
justification-contributors at all meta-levels. It seems to us that such a view will avoid the SPO, at least concerning
33
Still, we reiterate that, even if we are wrong about all of the above, it remains the case
SAI avoids the inevitable radical skepticism that Bergmann alleges infects any version of SAI.
Even if the view has it that most individuals are not doxastically justified in much of what they
believe, it still allows that it is in principle possible for such individuals to have justified beliefs,
provided that they have the requisite experiences and perform (or are able to perform) the
requisite reasoning. There is no vicious, impossible-to-avoid regress that plagues SAI. The
preceding defense provides a way to stop the regresses by utilizing states that any individual may
in principle have. Thus, these responses provide a way of refuting Bergmann’s charge of
“radical skepticism,” even if they deliver the verdict that most individuals are currently not
justified in believing what they do. The problem that Bergmann alleges confronts the defender
of SAI is not simply that we may be justified in believing much less than we typically think, but
is apparently that the very project of justifying a belief could not possibly get off the ground due
to the view’s extravagance.57 As we have seen, this latter claim is false.
Next, one might also object to our defenses of SAI on grounds of circularity. The
accounts sketched above claim that some states both justify their contents and the
conceptualization of those states themselves as related to the truth or justification of that content.
For instance, according to “seeming” SAI, that it seems to you that seemings are related to the
truth or justification of what seems true justifies you in believing that seemings are related to the
the first-order belief in question, and will also avoid entailing skepticism. But we leave this only as a last
suggestion, and are unsure whether the view could avoid charges of arbitrariness.
57
In his defense of premise V, Bergmann explains why its resulting in radical skepticism has the result that we
should not accept internalism. He says, “It is one thing to think that justification clearly requires something one
naturally expects it to require, such as a good reason, and then to acknowledge that most of our beliefs lack such a
reason. An internalist (open to skepticism) who thought this would insist that if we have no good reasons for any of
our beliefs, so much the worse for our beliefs; she wouldn’t be inclined to think that we don’t need good reasons for
them after all. But it’s another thing to think that, in order for any belief to be justified, the person holding it must
have (or have the ability to form) an infinite number of beliefs of ever-increasing complexity. For in that sort of
case, the problem isn’t merely that the requirement has skeptical implications. It’s also that the requirement just
seems excessive, especially when stated so bluntly. I think this is why the internalist, in response to my discussion
of strong awareness, will not (and should not) be inclined to adopt the radical skeptical results in question” (2006a,
22).
34
truth or justification of what seems true. One might allege that such a view “begs the question”
or engages in viciously circular reasoning, and is therefore untenable.
But Bergmann himself apparently denies that such circularity is “malignant,” and we do
too.58 We admit that such reasoning is not likely to convince an interlocutor who is already
skeptical that its seeming to one that p, or that one’s being directly acquainted with p, is relevant
to the truth or justification of p. However, if the failure of a view to be dialectically convincing
to any such skeptic is sufficient to undermine the view, then it is hard to see how any plausible
view could succeed. Such a standard is simply too high. Though the reasoning endorsed by
these views may not convince every skeptic, we still claim that this reasoning is perfectly
legitimate in the sense of being capable of conferring justification. Its seeming to one that p
either is a justification-contributor for the belief that p or it is not—such experiences either
provide reasons or they do not. It seems to us that they do provide reasons. But if seemings are
reasons, then the seeming that p is a reason for believing that p, irrespective of p’s content. Facts
about the content of what is being justified should not have the power to turn what it is otherwise
a good reason into no reason at all.59 So, if there is a kind of circularity here, it does not appear
to be of a problematic kind.60 Just as one might offer an inductive justification of induction, one
can be justified in conceiving of seemings as related to the truth or justification of what seems
true by virtue of having a seeming that seemings are so related, and one can be justified in
conceiving of direct acquaintance as related to the truth or justification of what one is directly
See Bergmann (2006a, Ch. 7). As one particular example, Bergmann explicitly claims that “it’s possible to
depend on X1 to justifiedly believe that X1 is reliable” (2006a, 196).
59
Fumerton (2006, 180) makes a similar point. He claims that if a view like the one we are endorsing here (about
seemings as reasons) is true, then it would simply be unreasonable not to let a proponent of the view defend his view
by appealing to the very things it says are reasons. Similar claims are defended in Conee (2004).
60
For remarks on the sorts of circularity that are problematic, see again Bergmann (2006a, Ch. 7).
58
35
acquainted with by virtue of being in a state of direct acquaintance. The circularity involved
here is of a harmless kind, and not sufficient to render either of the views problematic.61
V. CONCLUSION
Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism fails for many varieties of internalism. Versions of
WAI can avoid the SPO, so premise IV of his dilemma is false. Versions of SAI can avoid
vicious regress leading to radical skepticism, so premise III of his dilemma is false. Objections
to either view can be overcome, and the views defended do not fall prey to either horn of
Bergmann’s dilemma.
There are thus many ways for internalists to avoid succumbing to
dilemmatic defeat.62
The sort of circularity endorsed here, if any circularity is endorsed, seems to be an instance of Van Cleve’s
(epistemically harmless) ‘rule circularity’. See Van Cleve (1984).
62
Special thanks to Earl Conee and to an anonymous referee at Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper. We have also benefited from conversation with John Shoemaker.
61
36
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